Fortieth Day, Tuesday, 22 January 1946,
Morning Session 1
Afternoon Session 26
Forty-first Day, Wednesday, 23 January 1946,
Morning Session 53
Afternoon Session 84
Forty-second Day, Thursday, 24 January 1946,
Morning Session 111
Afternoon Session 134
Forty-third Day, Friday, 25 January 1946,
Morning Session 158
Afternoon Session 177
Forty-fourth Day, Monday, 28 January 1946,
Morning Session 203
Afternoon Session 236
Forty-fifth Day, Tuesday, 29 January 1946,
Morning Session 268
Afternoon Session 295
Forty-sixth Day, Wednesday, 30 January 1946,
Morning Session 329
Afternoon Session 344
Forty-seventh Day, Thursday, 31 January 1946,
Morning Session 369
Afternoon Session 393
Forty-eighth Day, Friday, 1 February 1946,
Morning Session 418
Afternoon Session 447
Forty-ninth Day, Saturday, 2 February 1946,
Morning Session 476
Fiftieth Day, Monday, 4 February 1946,
Morning Session 505
Afternoon Session 534
FORTIETH DAY
Tuesday, 22 January 1946
_Morning Session_
M. HENRY DELPECH (Assistant Prosecutor for the French Republic): Mr.
President, Your Honors, I had the honor yesterday of beginning to
explain before the Tribunal the methods of economic spoliation of
Belgium by the Germans in the course of their occupation of the country.
Coming back to what was said in the course of the general considerations
on economic pillage and on the behavior of the Germans in Norway and
Denmark and in Holland, I have been able to show that in all places the
determination to economic domination of National Socialism had
manifested itself. The methods were the same everywhere, at least in
their broad outlines. Therefore in immediate response to the wish
expressed yesterday by the Tribunal and to fulfill the mission entrusted
to the French Prosecution by the Belgian Government to plead its case
before your high jurisdiction, I shall confine myself to the main
outlines of the development, and I shall take the liberty of referring
to the details of the German seizure of Belgian production, to the text
of the report submitted to the Tribunal, and to the numerous documents
which are quoted in our document book.
I have had the honor of calling your attention to the existence of the
black market in Belgium, its organization by the occupation troops, and
their final decision to suppress this black market. One may, with
respect to this, conclude, as has already been indicated in the course
of the general observations, that in spite of their claims it was not in
order to avoid inflation in Belgium that the German authorities led a
campaign against the black market.
The day the Germans decided to suppress the black market, they loudly
proclaimed their anxiety to spare the Belgian economy and the Belgian
population the very serious consequences of the threatening inflation.
In reality, the German authorities intervened against the black market
in order to prevent its ever-growing extension from reaching the point
where it would absorb all the available merchandise and completely
strangle the official market. In a word, the survival of the official
market with its lower prices was finally much more profitable for the
army of occupation.
I now come, gentlemen, to Page 46 of my presentation, to the third
Chapter—purchases which were regular in appearance; which had only one
aim, namely the subjugation of Belgian productive power.
Carrying out their program of domination of the countries of Western
Europe as it had been established since before 1939, the Germans, from
the moment they entered Belgium in May 1940, took all the measures which
seemed to them appropriate to assure the subjugation of Belgian
production.
No sector of Belgian economy was to be spared. If the pillage seems more
noticeable in the economic sphere, that is only because of the very
marked industrial character of Belgian economy. Agriculture and
transport were not to escape the German hold, and I propose to discuss
first the levies in kind in industry.
Belgian industry was the first to be attacked. Thus, the military
commander in Belgium, in agreement with the various offices of the Reich
for raw materials and with the Office of the Four Year Plan and the
Ministry of Economics, drew up a program the purpose of which was to
convert almost the whole of Belgian production to the bellicose ends of
the Reich. Already on the 13th of September 1940 he was able to make
known to the higher authorities a series of plans for iron, coal,
textiles, and copper. I submit Exhibit Number RF-162 (Document Number
ECH-2) in support of this statement.
Also a report by Lieutenant Colonel, Dr. Hedler, entitled “Change in
Economic Direction,” states that from 14 September 1940 the Army
Ordnance Branch sent to its subordinate formations the following
instructions, to be found in the document book under Exhibit Number
RF-163 (Document Number ECH-84). I read the last paragraph of Page 41 of
the German text:
“I attach the greatest importance to the proposition that the
factories in the occupied western territories, Holland, Belgium,
and France, be utilized as much as possible to ease the strain
on the German armament production and to increase the war
potential. Enterprises located in Denmark are also to be
employed to an increasing extent for subcontracts. In doing so
the operational directives of the regulation of the Reich
Marshal as well as the regulations concerning the economy of raw
materials in the occupied territories are to be strictly
observed.”
All these arrangements quickly enabled the Germans to control and to
direct Belgium’s whole production and distribution for the German war
effort.
The decree of 27 May 1940, VOBEL Number 2, submitted as Document Number
RF-164, established commodity control offices whose task was—and I
quote from the third paragraph:
“. . . to issue, in compliance with Army Group directives,
general regulations or individual orders to enterprises which
are producing, dealing with, or using controlled commodities, in
order to regulate production and ensure just distribution and
rational utilization while keeping to the place of work, as far
as possible.”
Article 4 of the same text indicated in detail the powers of these
commodity control offices, and in particular they were given the right:
“To force enterprises to sell their products to specified
purchasers; to forbid or require the utilization of certain raw
materials; to subject to their approval every sale or purchase
of commodities.”
To conceal more effectively their real objective, the Germans gave these
commodity control offices independence and the status of a corporation.
Thus, there were set up 11 commodity control offices which embraced the
whole economy except coal, the direction of which was left under the
Belgian Office of Coal. Exhibit Number RF-165 (Document Number ECH-3),
gives proof of this.
The execution of the regulations was ensured by a series of texts
promulgated by the Belgian authorities in Brussels. They issued in
particular a decree dated 3 September 1940, by virtue of which Belgian
organizations took over again the offices which the Germans gave up.
These offices were to experience various vicissitudes. Although
originating from the Belgian Ministry of Economics, they were closely
controlled by the German military command. In this way, the seizure of
Belgian production was completed by the appointment of “Commissioners of
Enterprises,” under the ordinance of 29 April 1941, submitted as
Document Number RF-166. Article 2 of this text defines the powers of the
commissioners:
“The duty of the Commissioner is to set or keep in motion the
enterprise under his charge, to ensure the systematic
fulfillment of orders, and to take all measures which increase
the output.”
The decline of the commodity control offices began with an ordinance
dated 6 August 1942, establishing the principle providing for the
prohibition of manufacturing certain products or for ordering the use of
certain raw materials. This ordinance is to be found in the document
book under Document Number RF-167. Supervision of the commodity control
offices was soon organized by the appointment to each of them of a
German Commissioner, selected by the competent Reichsstelle.
From the last months of 1943 on, the “Rüstungsobmann” Office of the
Armament and War Production Ministry (Speer), acquired the habit of
passing its orders direct, without having recourse to the channel of the
commodity control offices.
Even before this date measures had been taken to prevent any initiative
that was not in accord with the German war aims. Further and even before
the above ordinance of 6 August 1942, the ordinance of 30 March 1942
should be mentioned, which made the establishment or extension of
commercial enterprises subject to previous authorization by the military
commissioner.
In the report of the military administration in Belgium that has already
been cited, the chief of the administrative staff, Reeder, specifies in
Exhibit Number RF-169 (Document Number ECH-335) that for the period of
January to March 1943 alone, out of 2,000 iron works, 400 were closed
down for working irrationally or being useless to the war aims. The
closing of these factories seems to have been caused less by the concern
for a rational production than by the cunning desire to obtain cheaply
valuable tools and machines.
In this connection, it is appropriate to point to the establishment of a
Machine Pool Office. The above quoted report of the military
administration in Belgium, in the 11th section, Pages 56 and following,
is particularly significant in this respect. Here is an extract from the
German text, the last lines of the last paragraph of Page 56, in the
French translation, the last lines . . .
THE PRESIDENT (Lord Justice Sir Geoffrey Lawrence): That passage you
read about the Defendant Raeder, was that from Document 169 or 170?
M. DELPECH: Mr. President, I spoke yesterday of the chief of the
administration section, Reeder. He was section chief in Brussels. He has
no connection with the defendant here.
THE PRESIDENT: I see, very well.
M. DELPECH: Exhibit Number RF-171 (Document Number ECH-10), second
paragraph of the French text. The paragraph concerns the Machine Pool
transactions:
“Proof may be seen by a brief glance at the pool operations
dealt with and actually carried out. Altogether 567 demands have
been dealt with, to a total value of 4.6 million Reichsmark.”
Reeder then gave a number of figures. I shall pass over these and I come
to the end of the first paragraph, Page 57 in the German text:
“The legal basis for the requisition of these machines was the
Hague Convention of 1907, Articles 52 and 53. The formulation of
the Hague Convention which provides for requisitions only for
the benefit and the needs of the occupying power, applied to the
circumstances of the year 1907, that is, to a time when war
actions were confined within narrowly restricted areas and
practically the military front alone was involved in war
operations. In view of such space restrictions for war, it was
evident that the provisions of the Hague Convention, stipulating
that requisitions be made solely for the needs of the occupying
power, were sufficient for the conduct of operations. Modern
war, however, which by its expansion to total war is no longer
bound by space but has developed into a general struggle of
peoples and economies, requires that while the regulations of
the Hague Convention should be maintained, there should be a
sensible interpretation of its principles adapted to the demands
of modern warfare.”