CONTINUATION OF THE SIEGE.
JUNE-JULY, 1521.
SOMETHING ABOUT QUAUHTEMOTZIN—INFAMOUS PRETENSIONS OF
EUROPEAN CIVILIZATION AND CHRISTIANITY—PROMPT ACTION OF THE
MEXICAN EMPEROR—REPETITIONS OF THE ENTRY ASSAULT—SUBMISSION
OF THE SURROUNDING NATIONS—DIRE CONDITION OF THE
MEXICANS—SPANISH DEFEAT AND DISAFFECTION—RESOLUTION TO RAZE
THE CITY.
In their present position, with the advantages of superior
civilization, there was equal glory accruing to the Spaniards in
winning Mexico, and to the Mexicans in manfully losing their city.
Quauhtemotzin as a patriot and a skilful general was fully alive to the
perils of his position, but he was prepared to use to best advantage
all the resources at his command, and that is all any one can do.
Stern as Saturnius, and passionately patient, from the day of the
capture of Montezuma his nature had been proof against all pleasure.
Of an imperious temper, haughty and overbearing as Coriolanus, yet
was he as faithful to defend the city as any Hector or Horatius. I
hold that Spaniards of the sixteenth century were no worse than their
neighbors. It was a bigoted and cruel age; though for that matter
enough of bigotry yet remains, and there is sufficient cruelty in
our latter-day fightings to keep us humble. And while we see much to
condemn in the motives that brought hither these foreigners, and much
in their conduct that was cruel and unjust, yet we are constrained
to admit that the work which they accomplished was in the pathway of
destiny. The conquest of the county, the destruction of its barbarous
and inhuman rites, and the establishment of the religion of Christ
in their place were the inevitable consequences of the discovery
of America. Once brought face to face with the sacrificial stone,
and other brutal atrocities of the Aztecs, and Christianity had no
alternative but to eradicate these evils or be itself overthrown.
* * * * *
The victorious advance into the heart of the city had been a
pleasant surprise to the Spaniards, while to the Mexicans it was
incomprehensible. If such were the results of the first day’s doings,
what would the days following bring forth? Quauhtemotzin immediately
issued orders to reopen the channels and construct fresh intrenchments
and pitfalls. Such were the forces employed, and such their zeal,
that when the morning dawned the causeways and streets presented even
greater difficulties than before. The allies of the Mexicans were
not so easily reassured, however, and several began to waver, among
them the Xochimilcans, to the rear of Olid’s camp, who sent in their
submission to Cortés, promising not only active aid but much needed
supplies. The same offer came from the more numerous Otomís, occupying
the western mountain border of the valley, followed by the substantial
reinforcement of twenty thousand of their sturdy warriors, with large
supplies.[1143] Still larger reinforcements arrived just before these
from Tezcuco, where ever since Cortés’ departure the young king and
his brothers had been busily engaged in forwarding supplies[1144]
and fitting out troops. Fifty thousand were raised and placed under
the command of the energetic Ixtlilxochitl, who had great military
reputation and possessed far more influence than his ruling brother.
He joined Cortés with thirty thousand, and distributed the rest
among the other captains. Cortés praises him for his bravery and good
traits, a eulogy which serves only to embitter Mexican writers against
one who favored aliens against his own race, and aided to overthrow
their liberty and religion. During the campaign he was frequently
taunted as a renegade, traitor, and fratricide, but he never swerved
in his allegiance, and found ready retorts and excuses, the strongest
being that he favored the Christians for introducing the true faith.
Yet this strange religion he was in no haste, personally, to adopt.
“Curses on his odious memory!” exclaims the rabid Bustamante.[1145]
Three days after the last assault a second was made, supported by more
allies than ever. Cortés’ Spanish forces consisted of twenty horses,
three hundred infantry, with three guns. Although he had noticed the
operations of the Mexicans, he was hardly prepared to find his work
so completely undone. As before, each channel with its intrenchments
had to be captured anew, and while the causeway was readily gained
with the aid of brigantines, the advance along the street was slower,
although the soldiers were somewhat less exposed to roof volleys since
the burning of so many of the buildings during the previous entry. The
breaches and channels were filled up as they advanced. In the plaza
the houses were yet intact and the missile showers severe, so much
so that Cortés found it necessary to apply the torch, among others
to the Axayacatl palace, his former head-quarters, wherein he had
sustained so fierce a siege, and to the House of Birds, which formed
so prominent and admired a feature in the city. It was of vast extent,
and devoted almost wholly to the maintenance of beasts and birds of
every species, some kept in the gardens, some in courts, others in
galleries, rooms, and cages; altogether a collection which must tend
to cast a favorable light on the culture of the race. Both palaces
were splendid specimens of Nahua architecture, adorned with marble
galleries supported on monolith pillars, with elaborate cornices
and stucco work, and surmounted by turrets and battlements, while
within and around rose groves of rare trees, choice shrubbery, and
flowers, refreshed by ever sparkling fountains. Cortés had rightly
concluded that the destruction of such monuments, cherished not alone
for their beauty and contents but for their hallowed associations,
would be a more severe lesson than the loss of numerous lives; and as
the flames rose over all that vast area, fed by the roofs, interior
wood-work, and other combustible material, lamentations mingled with
the maddened cries of burning animals. Around in the suburbs, also,
could be seen column after column of dense smoke started by the
torches of the cruisers, and settling in dense masses over the city
as if threatening to bury her forever from sight. Fortunately for the
inhabitants, the houses thereabout were too wide apart to allow the
flames to spread far. Even at this juncture the work of destruction
might have been stopped for the reason that Cyrus stopped the sack of
Sardis when Crœsus said to him: “These are not my goods, but thine,
O Cyrus, that thou art spoiling!”
All this time waged the conflict of arms, the Mexicans seeking by
repeated charges and sallies to check the advance of the Spaniards
and to harass them. The native chronicles relate that during one of
the countercharges by the cavalry a horseman pierced a warrior with
such force that the lance remained fast in the ground. Regarding
it as a disgrace to abandon his weapon he rashly dismounted to
unfasten it, only to be surrounded by the foe and cut in pieces. His
comrades hastened to the rescue, but could recover only the mangled
remains.[1146]
When evening came and the signal was given for return to camp, the
Mexicans fell upon the rear with renewed ardor. It seems as if courage
came to them in proportion to their misfortunes. For their fury broke
forth anew, fed by the dire conditions round them, by the sight of
lately enslaved Otomís, Xochimilcans, and Chalcans, now fighting
against them under the sheltering wings of the invaders, and exulting
over their misfortunes with bitter taunts. “Behold!” they cried,
displaying dismembered limbs of Aztecs, “we shall fill our bellies
with your braves, and have enough over wherewith to feed the beasts.
Do not starve yourselves, for to-morrow we will return for more.”
“And in truth they both supped and breakfasted on the limbs,” says
Cortés.[1147] Camp was regained without serious trouble.
The following day the entry was repeated, and early as it was, the
channels had been nearly all reopened and provided with the usual
intrenchments. This involved a repetition of the previous day’s
manœuvres, but the Mexicans fought with greater obstinacy, partly
because they had become accustomed to the Spanish tactics, and it was
one o’clock before the plaza was reached, by which time the archers
and arquebusiers had exhausted their quivers and ammunition-pouches.
Cortés now advanced beyond the temple along the Tlacopan road, well
known to the veterans from the hard fighting there met during the
previous siege, and captured two canal crossings, which were filled
up, while to the buildings on either side the torch was applied.
The object of the movement was partly to open intercourse with
Alvarado’s forces, which were advancing less rapidly, owing to the
number of intrenched channels. Progress was slowly increased during
the succeeding entries, when Andrés de Tápia and Ávila pushed along
adjoining streets with detachments.[1148]
* * * * *
One result of the Spanish successes was the submission of all the
threatening and neutral lake and island towns to the south and
south-west of Mexico, from Iztapalapan and Culhuacan to Cuitlahuac.
To this step they had been partly impelled by the repeated raids of
the Chalcan confederates, and since their submission was so tardy they
were employed chiefly as laborers and purveyors. Gomara now estimates
the native auxiliaries at two hundred thousand men, “some engaged
intent on fighting, some on eating, some on stealing, and many on
gazing.”[1149] These lake peoples, known as Chinampanecs, from their
floating gardens and aquatic life, possessed canoes in abundance, and
Cortés availed himself of this to reënforce the blockading fleet with
a boat flotilla, three thousand in all, which harassed the city on
every side, entering into the canals to burn and pillage, and landing
sallying parties to carry desolation all through the suburbs.
Allured by the prospect of spoils, the Chinampanec crews arranged
a plan whereby a still richer draught might be made. Before their
adhesion to the Spanish cause, or knowledge of it had yet come to
Quauhtemotzin, they sent to offer him their services against the
invaders, with whom they proposed to deal treacherously. They were
assigned a post and played their part well. No sooner were the Mexicans
occupied with the Spanish forces than they rushed into the dwellings
of their pretended allies and began to rob, slay, and carry off
women and children. An alarm was given and reënforcements hurried up
which speedily overwhelmed the traitorous crews, killing a number,
capturing others, and recovering nearly all the booty. The captives
were condemned to the stone of sacrifice, those of Cuitlahuac by one
of their own caciques, Mayehuatzin, a companion of Quauhtemotzin.
The incident cost many lives on both sides, greatly to the delight
of the Spaniards, to whom this mutual throat-cutting was the economy
of war.[1150]
With so large a hostile fleet upon the lake the Mexican crews never
ventured abroad by day, but when darkness set in, their canoes
sped across, impelled by the demand for food. Informed of this,
Cortés detached two brigantines, under Portillo and Pedro Barba, to
cruise all night. This proved a severe blow to the poor Mexicans,
although a number of canoes still ran the blockade successfully,
and it was resolved to entrap the vessels, since open battle could
not avail against them. Thirty of the largest canoes, or piraguas,
were accordingly manned with stout warriors and strong boatmen, and
hidden amongst the rushes near a heavily staked channel, into which
some swift canoes were to decoy the brigantines. This succeeded, and
no sooner were they fast on the stakes than the canoes attacked them
with such spirit that every Spaniard was wounded, while Portillo fell,
and Barba died within three days.[1151] The brigantines managed to
escape. Encouraged by this attempt the Mexicans became more brisk
in their blockade-running, and stationed forty piraguas to repeat
the decoy surprise. Advised of this by two captives, Cortés sent six
brigantines by night to hide near the spot, leaving one to cruise
about for canoes. Some of these soon appeared, and the sailor pursued
them for a distance toward the hiding-place of the Mexicans. Suddenly
she turned about as if afraid of stakes. Observing this, the forty
piraguas ventured forth and were allured toward the Spanish ambuscade.
At the proper moment the six vessels came down upon the pursuers,
overturning and sinking a number, and capturing others, together with
many warriors. The Mexicans attempted no further naval surprises.[1152]
* * * * *
By the night cruisers and the Chinampanecs, supplies were nearly all
cut off, and gaunt hunger began to stalk the streets of the fated
capital. The ravages of the fleet and the flotilla along the eastern
suburbs had rendered these wholly untenable, and the south-eastern
district had been desolated by Cortés’ divisions, compelling the
inhabitants to abandon the greater part of Tenochtitlan and concentrate
chiefly in Tlatelulco. These two main divisions of the city had been
rivals ever since its foundation, with frequent disputes to sustain
the flame of discord. Gradually the Tenochtitlans had assumed the
sway, honored by imperial presence, while the other division had
assumed a plebeian stamp, patronized by the former. During this common
misfortune, however, rivalry was forgotten, and the more warlike
Tlatelulcans unhesitatingly aided the others and now welcomed them
into their quarter.[1153]
Every loss of allies to the Mexicans was a corresponding gain to the
Spaniards, less in regard to fresh auxiliaries than to the relief from
hostile attitude and to supplies. The Chinampanecs, for instance, were
ordered to bring material and construct barracks along the causeway
on either side of Fort Xoloc. These afforded shelter for all the
Spaniards and two thousand servants, and proved most welcome, for
the rainy season had already set in. The same natives were obliged
to provide supplies, such as fish and a species of cherry, which
together with maize formed the chief sustenance of the army. Frijoles,
or beans, cacao, _quilite_ herbs, and _nochtli_, afforded variety.
The maize was ground by hand and made into tortillas, or pancakes,
by the slave women and mistresses of the soldiers, either for their
individual lords or for the mess to which they belonged. These duties
were also assumed by some of the few Spanish and mulatto women who
had accompanied their husbands. Although there was little fear of
starvation in the Spanish camps, yet the fare was at times not of
the best.[1154] The less fastidious auxiliaries were content with
a range of eatables which the soldiers would not touch; human meat
with them was a _bonne-bouche_ for which they were prepared to risk
even their own flesh.[1155] Alvarado’s men enjoyed perhaps the least
comfort, for they had moved their camp to a point on the causeway,
leaving the auxiliaries at Tlacopan, together with the slaves and
tortilla-makers. Nor were their barracks properly constructed, so
that exposure to wind and rain was added to poor fare and miry roads,
while the situation of the camp added to danger and guard duty.
The camp had been formed round a temple square on the causeway, quite
close to Mexico, or rather to Tlatelulco, for Alvarado had tired
of having his day’s work destroyed every night, and he resolved at
least to protect the approach to the suburb. One deep channel yet
intervened, beyond which the camp could not well be moved, but a
large force was stationed to guard it at night, so that the crossing
should be assured for the morning’s attack.[1156] On the other side
gleamed the watch-fires of the Mexicans, behind and between which
might be seen the flitting figures of their warriors, signalling to
one another by whistling. This and other operations were forced upon
them to a great extent by Spanish tactics, from which they had copied
many features with no little effect.
From Alvarado’s camp to the Tlatelulco market, the heart of the
enemy’s stronghold, the distance was less than from the camp of
Cortés, though the first part of the way was more difficult than
the Iztapalapan road. The immense stride of the Fort Xoloc party
had wholly eclipsed the progress of the others, and Alvarado’s men
began to fear that, near as they were to the enemy’s centre, the
more distant comrades might reach it before them. It was therefore
resolved to make strenuous efforts to penetrate into the suburb. The
assault being on Tlatelulco itself, the Mexicans found no difficulty
in offering so strong a resistance that hardly any advance could
be made. Several vessels were thereupon directed against the suburb
to coöperate with a brisk fire, and to divert attention by landing
sallying parties. This succeeded for a while, but inspired by the
prowess of two Tlatelulcans named Tzoyetzin and Temoctzin, the warriors
rallied and drove back the invaders. Another brave who distinguished
himself during the repulse was Tzilacatzin. In the guise of an Otomí
warrior, and protected by cotton armor and shield, he rushed toward
the Spaniards as if bewildered, in advance of his comrades, and threw
his stone, knocking down an opponent at each throw. This man appeared
in different guise on different days, and did no little to encourage
his companions.[1157]
Notwithstanding these rebuffs Alvarado persevered, and the Mexicans
resolved to take advantage of his zeal to entrap him. Two or three
wide channels intervened between the end of the causeway and the
great market, and the first of these was now the point of contention,
a chasm of sixty feet in width and over ten feet in depth. By great
effort a crossing had here been formed with débris. This the Mexicans
undermined one night and covered a part with a false ground. In the
morning they attacked the Spanish outpost with great demonstration,
but retired as soon as the horsemen charged. Flushed with success, the
Spaniards followed in divided parties, and one of fifty with a number
of allies pursued across the channel. No sooner were they over than
the boatmen below tore away the support, while the warriors turned
with overwhelming force upon the band. Resistance was impossible,
and they retreated only to fall into the opening, where crews were at
hand to pounce upon them. Indescribable confusion ensued. Thick fell
the blows off the despairing men, as they sought to beat back the
triumphant foe. Bernal Diaz, who was among the number trapped, felt
himself seized by stout arms, but although badly wounded he managed
to cast off the assailant and spring to the bank, where he fell
exhausted. Fortunately Alvarado came up at this moment, after driving
back a division in another direction, and so startled the assailants
that they retreated, though with four captive Spaniards, one or two
more being killed, besides a horse and a number of allies.[1158]
When Cortés heard of the affair he came over to administer a reprimand,
but on learning the particulars he could not withhold his admiration
for the valiant deeds performed, and merely exhorted his lieutenant to
be more cautious.[1159] Great was the exultation of the Mexicans over
their success, and tauntingly they hovered round the camp, imitating
the cries of the entrapped soldiers. So encouraged did they feel as
to make several determined night attacks on the different camps or
their advance posts. Alvarado’s being nearest and most exposed had
to sustain quite a severe fight, losing several men.[1160]
* * * * *
Although Alvarado had made little advance into the city, the planting
of his camp so near it saved much fighting and enabled him to direct
daily operations almost at once against the main points. In this
he possessed an advantage over Cortés, who was compelled daily to
recapture a number of positions already gained. He himself remarks on
this loss of time and work. “Your Majesty may blame me for retreating
instead of holding what is gained,” he writes, but guards at the
bridges, which must be large, would be so harassed as to unfit them
for the next day’s work, while to take up a position within the city
would draw the whole of the large population upon them, and might lead
to the cutting off of communication and supplies, and probably to a
repetition of the great disaster of the previous year. Such a position
would besides render it possible for the Mexicans to obtain supplies
from the mainland, for the Spanish allies could not be relied on to
watch them. Cortés’ own officers, however, could not fail to observe
that Alvarado’s course might have been followed with some advantage.
They began to tire of the slow progress, attended as it was with so
much fighting for so little gain; so much exposure to alternate rain
and heat; so much discomfort in rude camps with poor diet and want of
proper care for wounded or sick men. This was represented to Cortés,
with the request that a general storming be attempted with a view
to abbreviate the siege. He represented the danger of advancing over
so many channels, along streets lined with houses, against hosts of
determined warriors, with the prospect of being caught in the rear.
Still he was as eager as any one to end the siege, and would call a
council to deliberate on the matter. The result was a decided majority
for the proposition to attempt the capture of Tlatelulco market and
there establish a permanent camp.[1161]
Since Sandoval will not be able to render efficient service on his
route for an attack on Tlatelulco, he is ordered to join Alvarado
with the weightiest part of his forces, and to take advantage of the
movement to entrap the Mexicans. He will pretend to make a general
evacuation of his camp, and thus allure the foe to an attack on the
baggage-train, during which the ambuscaded cavalry can inflict a
lesson which shall also serve to secure the camp against later attack.
Sandoval sends another portion of his forces to Cortés, who has more
points to cover, and receives instructions to attend in particular
to the capture of the channels and their filling, and otherwise to
secure the safety of the more impetuous Alvarado.
On the day appointed, the brigantines with their flotillas are sent
early to aid in clearing the causeways and approaches. The troops
find little trouble in reaching the Tlacopan avenue, from which three
long roads give access to the market. It is advantageous to push the
advance on each of these, and three divisions are accordingly formed,
one to follow the main street under command of the comptroller and
treasurer, Julian de Alderete, who has been among the foremost to
urge the assault; another under Andrés de Tápia and Jorge de Alvarado,
brother of the Tlacopan leader, both dashing and able men; the third
and somewhat larger body, swelled particularly by auxiliaries, Cortés
himself directs along the most dangerous approach, a sort of causeway,
lined with houses but bordered with water.[1162] Two cannon are placed
on the Tlacopan road, guarded by eight horsemen, and Cortés leaves
his horse at the entrance of the road taken by him, and gives strict
orders to all captains for filling every channel behind them.
Cortés at first leads his men on foot, and with the aid of a
field-piece readily gains the first bridge and barricade, carrying
all before him, while the auxiliaries swarm into the houses and
drive slingers and archers from the roofs. The determination of the
assaulting party seems to have disheartened the Mexicans, for the
advance is quite rapid, so much so that the captain who has taken
Cortés’ place at the head of his division soon reports that he is
approaching the market and can hear the operations of Alvarado
and Sandoval. May he advance? This message reaches Cortés on a
section of his causeway to the rear, where he has remained to gain
a contested point, and to oppose assaults from the cross-streets.
He replies that the captain must first secure his rear and flanks,
and look particularly to the channels, of which there are three
in that causeway. “They are filled,” was the answer, made without
a thought as to its accuracy, for flushed with the success of the
advance, soldiers and cavaliers alike cast prudence to the winds,
and disregarding common ditches bend their eyes alone upon the goal.
Immediately after comes the doleful sound of the _teponastli_, and
a shrill trumpet blast, the alarm signal of Paynalton, the mythic
page of the war-god. Struck on the summit of Tlatelulco temple, the
sounds float over the contestants, sending a chill into the heart
of the Spaniards and allies as they rush onward filled with visions
of success. To the Mexicans, on the other hand, it comes as a magic
appeal from Huitzilopochtli, stirring their spirit with fresh energy:
a resistless appeal to make a supreme effort for imperilled home,
and faith, and liberty.[1163]
Cortés also hears the warning, only too deeply impressed since that
Sorrowful Night, and with anxious heart he hastens forward to see how
matters stand. His anxiety is increased as the jubilant cries of his
own men appear to change, while high above them rise the unmistakably
triumphant shouts of the Aztecs. Just then he comes to one of the
crossings formed by his party at a channel ten to twelve paces wide,
and over ten feet deep. It seems insecure, and on looking he finds it
constructed of some loosely thrown pieces of wood and reed, covered
with a little earth. He at once orders the auxiliaries in his following
to rebuild the structure. Scarcely is the order uttered before he
sees his forces coming down the causeway in disorderly flight, led
by the allies. Cortés makes frantic efforts to stay the current. None
heed him. Fears lend wings and drown all appeal. On come the pressing
throng, on to the frail bridge, which sinks with its living freight
into the deep water. Still onward rush the mass behind, impelled by
their mad momentum, tumbling on the heads of these, scrambling and
wading, adding their cries for help to the shrieks of despair beneath,
while from the rear roll the terrifying shouts of hot pursuers. Already
the house-tops teem with slingers and archers; the lanes pour forth
their warriors with swords and long pikes to pierce the flanks, and
the canals are alive with canoes whose crews secure the struggling
fugitives for sacrifice, or deal the more grateful _coup de grace_.
The Spanish soldiers are among the last to come up, and a terrible
gauntlet they have had to run. Regardless of the showering missiles
or the pressing foe, Cortés stands on the brink to strike back the
hungry crew and lend a helping hand to his floundering men. “I was
determined to remain there and die fighting,” he writes. But so many
are beyond his reach, and there he must stand helpless to watch the
struggle; to behold now this soldier felled, now the other carried
off; and more, to see the banner torn from the hands of his alférez.
_Tlapanecatl_ is the name given by the records to the doughty captor
of so esteemed a prize.
Standing there conspicuously on the brink, Cortés becomes the target
for hundreds of missiles, though protected by his mail; but soon the
foe begin to press round him, and even in his rear, separating him from
the men.[1164] The next moment more than one pair of arms had coiled
round his body, and, with triumphant shouts of “Malinche! Malinche!”
they seek to drag him into the water to the canoes. Alarmed by the
outcry, his body-soldier, Cristóbal de Olea, hastens to his side, and
with a sabre-blow severs the arm which was well nigh pulling over the
bent form of his master. The next instant he himself falls beneath the
furious onslaught roused by the magnitude of the prize, “a glorious
death in so good a cause!” exclaims Herrera. Another soldier, named
Lerma, rushes to the spot and is nearly overpowered; while a stout
Tlascaltec, Temacatzin, plants himself in front of the leader, half
prostrate with exhaustion and wounds, and wards off the blows till
Antonio de Quiñones, captain of the guard, manages to force his way
forward and sustains him, followed by a number of men whom the report
of their general’s danger has stirred to fierceness.[1165] “Away
from here, your worship, and save your person,” cries the captain,
“for without you all will be lost!” Cortés refuses, “for I desired
rather death than life,” he writes; but finally by dint of pleading
and main force he is induced slowly to retire, seeking to cover the
rear of the fleeing. And well it was, for a longer stay would have
proved fatal. But for the eagerness of the Mexicans to secure as
prisoner so magnificent a prize, they could easily have despatched
him. Aztecs made it a point to obtain as many prisoners as possible,
particularly chiefs and nobles, and white men, who ranked even above
these, in order to do honor to the war-god. This effort was prompted
by a deep religious obligation as well as by warrior spirit.
Not far from the disastrous channel a horse was brought, upon which
Cortés was mounted, though wounded in the leg. Shortly before, his
chamberlain, Cristóbal de Guzman, a great favorite, had ridden up
with a charger to the relief of his master, only to be surrounded with
warriors and cut down, together with the animal,[1166] while another
rider was obliged to retreat with a lance-thrust in the throat. On
retiring from the section of causeway assigned to the horse, another
animal was killed and a third narrowly escaped. Finally the troops
reached the broader Tlacopan road, and now Cortés, with the nine
horsemen left in his division, was able to take a firm stand against
the enemy. Checked in their pursuit, and made timid in their charges
by the presence of the bold line of horses and lances, they flung
their missiles and insults with increased energy. Suddenly two or
three Spanish heads were cast before the horsemen, with the cry:
“Tonatiuh!” “Sandoval!” The meaning could not be misunderstood, and
as the Spaniards gazed on the gory and disfigured faces a sickening
fear crept over them. Could it be that these beloved leaders had
fallen! There was no time for deliberation. Finding his own party now
comparatively secure, Cortés hurriedly sent messengers to recall the
other divisions under Alderete and Tápia.
There was hardly need for this message. The triumphant shouts of
the Mexicans in pursuit of the troops of Cortés and the increased
attack on their own had already warned these leaders. Still they
persevered, although their men manifested some discouragement. It
was not long, however, before two or three mutilated, bearded heads
were cast before them with the cry, “Malinche is dead!” “Tonatiuh and
all their men have fallen!” The leaders saw that farther advance was
useless, especially since the Mexicans now attacked with great fury.
The leaders kept their men in good order, and were already retiring
when the order of recall reached them. The streets there being wider
and easier, and the channels all filled, they found no trouble in
rejoining their general. Now jointly they retreated through the plaza
and down the Iztapalapan road, furiously pursued by the warriors,
who showed themselves more reckless than usual on seeing their prey
escape. The central temple was filling with a vast throng to watch
the onslaught, and on the summit the priests were already burning
incense and chanting in honor of victory, while the rabble railed at
the humiliated children of the sun.
Alvarado had meanwhile advanced along the road to Tlatelulco from
his causeway, leaving Sandoval to coöperate along the flank and
to direct the movements of the brigantines and the filling of the
channels. The advance was fiercely resisted by the Mexicans from roofs,
cross-lanes, and barricades, and hundreds had been severely wounded,
chiefly Tlascaltecs, only too many fatally, yet he persevered. He
was already near the market, the aim of all efforts, when the drum
and trumpet came to startle his men and to encourage the Mexicans to
greater resistance. Progress was now almost checked, and soon came
the cry, “Malinche is dead!” “Sandoval and the other captains are
dead!” “Behold their faces!” And therewith several heads with gory
beards were cast before them. “This shall be your fate!”
Alvarado’s men were white with dismay, and but for the intrepid
courage of their leader the rout of Cortés’ party might have been
repeated. Making a bold stand with his Spaniards, he ordered the
Tlascaltecs to fall back and leave the retreat open. They needed no
second instructions to this end, for the bleeding heads lent wings
to their haste. Then grew the onslaught fiercer than ever, for the
retreat of Cortés’ forces enabled a larger number of enemies to turn
against Alvarado and Sandoval. The latter also received his cast of
bloody heads with a new string of prominent names, all calculated to
inspire terror. “By this time they had us all killed,” adds Bernal
Diaz, “but, in truth, we were all wounded, and filled with anguish
concerning the fate of our chief. Without God’s aid we could never
have escaped from the swords and clutches of the Mexicans.” Some
pious chroniclers, indeed, assert as usual that the virgin appeared
in person, together with perennial Santiago, to save the Spaniards
from their greatest peril.[1167]
* * * * *
Encouraged by the victories on land, the Mexicans had ventured forth
also in their canoes to harass the vessels which were occupied in
protecting the retreat of the armies. Unable in some instances to
leave their position, or impeded in their movement by stakes and other
obstacles, many of the brigantines were severely pressed, and one,
commanded by Briones, in Alvarado’s division, was actually captured,
with the loss of four men, one being taken alive. Jaramillo came to the
relief of the vessel, however, drove forth the enemy, and kept them
at bay.[1168] By this time both the forces of Alvarado and Sandoval
had reached the causeway, pursued by a great host, reckless in their
endeavor to inflict all the injury possible ere the Spaniards escaped.
Some delay occurred in crossing the only partly filled channel to the
causeway, and a number of soldiers were detained waist-deep in water,
seeking to lift a brigantine over the stakes, for the auxiliaries
were already away from the front; and all this time the cavalry were
compelled to remain before the causeway to cover the infantry and
bear the brunt of the terrible onslaught. Charge after charge they
made to keep back the advancing foe, through the shower of blinding
missiles, against the line of bristling lances, amidst the whirling
swords and clubs, until not a rider but felt his arm droop and his
body grow faint with loss of blood. Sandoval himself had a number
of wounds. “For God’s sake make haste and retire,” he cried to his
foot-soldiers, “or we shall all be lost!”
Finally the passage was clear, and they fell back along the causeway,
still fighting, and now exposed to the canoe sallies. On reaching
his quarters, Alvarado turned two cannon against the swarm which
sought to scale the camp, and this with the fusillade procured a much
needed respite.[1169] It was time, for the increasing darkness would
soon have added fresh dangers to the retreat. Sandoval had already
hurried away with a solitary companion to seek the camp of Cortés and
calm his fears.[1170] With a similar object Andrés de Tápia had been
sent with three horsemen from Fort Xoloc to Alvarado’s camp, where
he arrived with some scars from marauding stragglers. Not wishing to
discourage the soldiers, he reduced the losses of his party to quite
a small number, and made light of the matter.
By this time the enemy had retired, but from the city rose their shouts
of triumph, and every temple was ablaze with fires to celebrate the
victory. The summit of the Tlatelulco pyramid, the highest of them
all, was the scene of great commotion, and soon the sombre notes of
the melancholy drum called it to attention. A number of instruments
now added their discordant notes, in clash and blast, and a procession
with torches, swinging censers, and religious paraphernalia circled
round with imposing ceremony. Then a space was cleared, and a long file
of naked men stood revealed. A cry of horror burst from the gazing
soldiers. There could be no mistake. Distant as was the temple, the
glare of fire clearly revealed the white hue and bearded faces of
their comrades, bound for sacrifice, and plumed. Now they were made
to march forward, and with blows to dance before the idol to whom
they had been consecrated. Ah, to be a helpless looker-on at such a
time! Again they formed in line exhausted, and then one was seized by
several priests and borne struggling to the stone of sacrifice. He was
thrown on his back and held down by the limbs while the high-priest
with ceremonious flourish raised the glittering blade. The gazing
soldiers clutched each other’s hands in agony, as their eyes followed
the instrument and saw it plunged into the breast of the victim.
They seemed to hear his stifled cry, to feel the knife in their own
heart, and realizing that they were still safe they thanked heaven
for their escape.[1171]
Victim after victim was carried to the stone, some with frantic
struggles, others resigned, and still others weighed down in helpless
fear of what they had beheld. Heart after heart was torn from the
gaping breasts and held before the idol, while the bodies were cast
down the steps. The skin, particularly of the head and upper body,
was removed and used as a dress for festive occasion, and the flesh
was hacked to pieces, the limbs for the banquet table, the trunk
for the beasts. After a while came darker-hued victims, and now
the Tlascaltecs and other allies shuddered. To them the sacrifices
were not so terrifying as to the Spaniards, but they could not
unmoved behold the cruel death of their countrymen. Then came more
processions, music, and idolatrous rites, followed by fresh companies
for the sacrifice, white and dark; and so passed the night, until the
horror palled on the gazers, and many expressed the opinion that the
priests were pretending sacrifice by producing the same bodies upon
the stone several times so as to inspire greater fear. This belief
was strengthened when they observed similar ceremonies take place on
other minor temples, and by the continuance of the sacrifices for
several days. The offering at the minor temples consisted chiefly
of the lower class of allies. All the pyramids, however, received
a quota of heads from Spanish, leading native, and equine victims,
wherewith to decorate their summits.[1172]
Aware that the sight of the sacrifice, purposely intensified for
Spanish edification, must have stirred deeply the breasts of the
survivors, the Mexicans took advantage of this to attack the camp of
Alvarado during the night. “Behold the fate in store for you all!”
they cried, casting in half-roasted pieces of flesh from white and
dusky bodies. “Eat, for we are satiated!” The Spaniards were too well
prepared to suffer from the assault, but it added to their sorrows.
The lesson had been costly, for about sixty men were lost, with six
horses, one gun, and a number of small-arms, while the ranks of the
allies had been diminished by from one to two thousand, and this
without reckoning the vast number of wounded.[1173]
When Sandoval reached Camp Xoloc and learned the news he burst forth,
“Señor Capitan, what is this? Where are the fine counsels and warlike
skill which you are wont to exhibit?” With tears springing to his
eyes, Cortés replied: “Sandoval, my son, my sins I admit, but I am not
so guilty in this matter as I appear. The officer whom I charged to
fill the channel failed to obey.” He further intimated that Alvarado
might be led by his daring into difficulties, and bade Sandoval
watch carefully over the safety of the western and northern camps,
particularly for the present, while Cortés was restrained by his
wounds.[1174] The injunction was needful in view of the reoccupation by
the Mexicans of the channels from which they had lately been driven,
and their harassing attacks, chiefly by night, against the camps and
fleets. Alvarado’s camp, as the nearest to the city, was the most
exposed, and Sandoval with his tried prudence could be best relied
on to counteract the recklessness of its commander in repelling these
attacks. Knowing the signal for the sallies, usually a shot, the enemy
were warned in time to retire, or to form some trap or combination;
so that the charge of the soldiers carried little advantage.
On one occasion, it is related, a shield-bearer named Peinado stepped
outside the camp gate and found himself surrounded by a horde of
marauders. Escape was cut off. In this dilemma he began to rattle
his shield and sword, and shout, looking at the same time toward the
camp. The enemy assumed at once that he was signalling to some party
in ambush, and beat a hasty retreat.[1175] For several days[1176] the
Spaniards remained inactive. During this time the Mexicans continued
their daily sacrifice of captives, with conspicuous rites and loud
demonstrations.
As usual amidst trying scenes, there were here examples of the
devotedness of woman. In one of the encounters on the causeway to
drive back the prowling Mexicans, Beatriz Bermudez de Velasco, wife
of Francisco de Olmos, accompanied the soldiers, in cotton armor, and
with sword and shield. Such was the pressure of the enemy that the
troops were thrown into disorder and began to turn in flight. With
raised sword she planted herself in their path and cried, “Shame upon
you, Castilians! turn at once against this vile rabble, for I will
kill any man who attempts to pass this way.” So abashed were the men
by this resolute demeanor that they again fell upon the Mexicans and
defeated them.[1177] Other women of less valor did equally good service
as sisters of mercy, to tend and cheer the many disabled. One, named
Isabel de Rodriguez, attained quite a reputation in curing wounds,
a success attributed chiefly to her holy invocation, for in applying
the bandage she invariably uttered the formula, “In the name of the
father, the son, and the holy ghost, one true God; may he cure and
restore thee!”[1178]
* * * * *
Cortés found it absolutely necessary to resume operations in order
to prevent the utter demoralization of his men, although they could
advance no farther than the last canal on the Iztapalapan road, which
was strongly fortified to protect the plaza. On the Tlatelulco side
the channel separating the city from the causeway had been reopened
as a barrier. No serious effort was made to pass these points, and
the movements were effected with the greatest prudence possible.
For this caution several reasons existed, based on momentous
consequences of the late defeat. In their exultation the Mexicans
had imprudently published the oracular utterance that within eight
days the Spaniards would be destroyed, though many Aztecs would also
perish.[1179] Care was taken that this divine proclamation should
be known in the Spanish camps, with the intent of disheartening the
allies and procuring their desertion. This main object accomplished,
it was hoped that neighboring districts might be again persuaded to
join in hostile operations, or at least assume a neutral attitude
against the isolated Spaniards. Severely harassed by all the strength
of the capital and its allies, the Spaniards would be unable to
maintain the siege or even to sustain their own position, particularly
if supplies were cut off, and so be obliged to retreat. Many indeed
looked upon the Spaniards as doomed, and tired besides of the long
siege, so contrary to native ideas of warfare, corps after corps of
their allies disappeared, in secret retreat to their homes. Others
were sufficiently shaken in their belief to lose all ardor, the more
so when they recalled the prophecy of disaster uttered by the hanged
Xicotencatl. Cortés and his officers did all they could to counteract
this influence by referring to previous failures of oracles, to
the comparatively small percentage of the late losses, the critical
condition of the besieged, and their efforts to gain advantages by
spreading lies. Let the allies but abide till the end of the term
mentioned by the oracle and they would be convinced of its falsity.
The last argument was perhaps the strongest that could be offered
under the circumstances, and it was decided to take no risks that
might imperil the proof.[1180]
These precautions were imperative in view of the effect of Aztec
machinations in the lake districts and outlying provinces. The lake
towns last to join the Spaniards relapsed into a frigid neutrality,
and might have risen but for the imposing proximity of the fleet and
army. Remoter districts assumed a more decided attitude, and from
Quauhnahuac came an urgent appeal for help against the attacks of
the Malinalcas and Cohuixcas, prompted by Mexico. Immediately after
the late victory Quauhtemotzin had sent envoys to these and other
provinces, in every direction, bearing heads or flayed skins of
Spaniards and horses, and other tokens, wherewith to impress their
story that more than half of the white besiegers were slain, and
that the remainder would soon perish, as declared by the oracle. It
behooved them, therefore, to decide at once whether they would join
for a share in the spoils, or be forever excluded from all favor at
the hands of victorious Mexico. Thus, while many were frightened into
severing their connection with the invaders, secretly or openly, more
aggressive provinces like Malinalco hastened to profit by the state
of affairs.
* * * * *
To detach troops under the circumstances was not agreeable, and
many officers objected, but Cortés considered that it would be far
more dangerous to Spanish prestige and prospects to encourage such
hostile movements by a passive demeanor. “It was now more necessary
than ever,” he writes, “to exhibit prowess and spirit, so as to
hide our weakness both from friends and foes.” Andrés de Tápia was
accordingly despatched with ten horse and eighty foot, together with
a considerable force of allies.[1181] In order to calm the many
remonstrances against the expedition, he was instructed to return
within ten days. Tápia found the enemy awaiting him in large force
near a hamlet not far from Malinalco, and at once prepared to attack,
assisted by the Quauhnahuacs. The ground being level, the horses
proved of great service, and the hostile army was presently in flight
toward Malinalco. This place was strongly situated on a height, well
supplied with water, so that Tápia considered it useless to attempt
an assault, much less a siege when so short a term had been allowed
him, and he accordingly returned.
The complaint from Quauhnahuac was followed by a deeper wail from
Toluca and adjoining Otomí settlements in the mountain region west of
the lake. The Matlalzincas, devoted adherents of Quauhtemotzin, had
been induced to openly declare for him and to invade their districts,
preparatory to advancing against the Spaniards. This intention had
been already vauntingly proclaimed by the Aztecs, and since the
Matlaltzincas were both powerful and warlike, the necessity for prompt
measures became even more apparent in this case. The tried Sandoval
was intrusted with the expedition, composed of eighteen cavalry, one
hundred infantry, and a large force of allies chiefly Otomís, which
soon grew to about seventy thousand. After a quick march he came
to the smoking ruins of some settlements and startled into flight
a band of marauders, who left behind them a quantity of plunder and
provisions, including some tender children still roasting on the spit.
He pursued the raiders, and after crossing a river[1182] came upon
a larger force, which turned as he approached, to seek safety within
the town of Matlaltzinco, over two leagues distant. The cavalry made
terrible havoc among them, and the infantry following in their wake,
killed more than two thousand. Those who escaped made a stand at the
town to cover the conveyance of families and effects to a fortified
hill close by. This was pretty well accomplished before the infantry
came up to assist in capturing the town. The defenders now fled, and
the place was entered and burned, after being rifled of what remained
to take. Since it was late, the assault on the hill was deferred
till the morning. There the natives maintained a loud uproar until
some time after midnight, when all became quiet. With early dawn the
Spaniards prepared to storm the hill only to learn that it had been
abandoned. A number of people were seen in the field, however, and
eagerly the soldiers revived the fading expectation for a fray. In a
twinkling they were among the rabble, and a number were slain before
the explanation gained ears that these people belonged to the friendly
Otomís. Sandoval now advanced on another fortified town, whose cacique
threw open the gates on beholding the hosts before him, and not only
offered his own submission, but promised to effect the submission of
the allied caciques and those of Malinalco and Cohuixco. Regardless
of the insinuations of the Otomís that such promises could not be
relied on, Sandoval returned to Mexico, and four days later appeared
there the caciques of all these provinces to tender allegiance and
aid for the siege.[1183]
* * * * *
Meanwhile the portentous eighth day had dawned on the Spanish camps.
Hardly less concerned than the natives, the soldiers could not control
their trepidation as they thought of the oracle, although striving
to appear indifferent. Nor were they without tangible reasons for
their fears. With a daily growing desertion among the much needed
allies, and fading enthusiasm among those who remained; with supplies
greatly reduced owing to the neutral attitude assumed by surrounding
districts; with fresh wars upon their hands, which demanded not only
more hardships but a division of their weakened forces; with constant
vigils and alarms amid the harassing attacks of a triumphant foe; with
a large number of wounded deprived of needful care and comforts, and
above all the ghastly spectacle of a daily sacrifice of late comrades,
attended by wild and imposing celebrations—with all this gloom and
distress it required stout hearts indeed to remain steadfast. Yet
they were firm; they believed in the strength and justice of their
cause, and in their ultimate triumph, though momentarily dismayed,
prayer afforded them relief. It dissipated fear and infused fresh
courage.
Thus passed the day, amidst fear and hope, and the Spaniards still
existed. The Mexicans do not appear to have made any special effort
to support the oracle by a determined attack. Nor had they been able
to open any effective communication with the mainland; for although
the lake towns had withdrawn their canoe fleet, they offered no aid
to the besieged, while the brigantines maintained too strict a guard
to permit many boats to gain the capital with supplies.
The ninth day came, and now it was the turn of the Spaniards to exult,
for not only did they feel inspired with the belief that providence
was protecting them—and nobly the friars helped Cortés to impart that
stirring idea—but they were cheered with revived animation among the
allies and the early return of most of the deserters. From Tezcuco,
indeed, came additional troops under the command of some Spaniards
there stationed.[1184] Cortés greeted the returning corps with rather
cold forgiveness. He showed them that besides carrying on the siege
without their aid he had undertaken victorious campaigns, and needed
not their assistance. Nevertheless, since they had served so zealously
before, he would not only overlook the grave crime of desertion, due
partly to ignorance of Spanish laws, but let them again share in the
final reduction of the city, and thus gain both revenge and riches.
Cortés could adopt no other course, for the siege could not be carried
on without the allies.
Under Spanish training the latter had besides grown very efficient,
as the following instance will illustrate: No sooner had the eight
portentous days passed by than Chichimecatl, the leading Tlascaltec
captain serving under Alvarado, disgusted with the idle fears which
had unmanned his people, and eager to retrieve them in the eyes of the
Spaniards, resolved to show both them and the Aztecs what he could do.
With the aid of the soldiers the first fortified channel was captured,
and the chief advanced into the city with his own people only, the
flower of his warriors, after leaving several hundred archers near
the passage to keep the route clear for retreat. With unwavering
columns he advanced along the main street and captured the next canal
passage after a fierce struggle. Then he passed onward to the next,
maintaining a sharp contest all the day. Finally came the hour for
returning, and the Aztecs bore down with doubled fury on his flank
and rear. The retreat was performed in good order, partly owing to
the foresight of leaving a rear body; and Chichimecatl came back a
lauded hero.[1185]
Messengers had been sent to the allies far and wide to encourage them
with the news of the non-fulfilment of the oracle. Ojeda and Marquez
went in person to Tlascala, partly also with the object of procuring
certain supplies. They left Alvarado’s camp at midnight with only
a few natives, and when about half-way to Tepeyacac they perceived
a train of men descending from the hills with heavy burdens, which
they deposited in a number of canoes. Information was at once sent to
Alvarado, who placed a guard along the shore to check this smuggling
that had evidently escaped the cruisers.[1186] Ojeda’s party proceeded
to Tlascala and brought a large train of provisions.[1187] In addition
to this the camps were cheered by the arrival of a party of recruits
with quite a mass of war material, chiefly powder and cross-bows,
relics of Ponce de Leon’s Florida expedition.[1188] The war stores
were particularly valuable; so low had run the actual stock that
Cortés was preparing more Chinantec pikes to cover the deficiency in
weapons.
Everything was again ready for a serious revival of hostilities. Over
six weeks had passed since the siege began, and the end seemed little
nearer than before. On the day of the defeat three fourths of the city
might be said to have been reduced; but nearly all this advantage had
been lost, owing chiefly to the narrow streets, encompassed by houses
which served both for attack and retreat, and the numerous traps in
the form of canals and channels. So long as these obstacles remained
the progress must not only be slow, ever slower as advance was made,
but the troops would be constantly exposed to fresh disaster. One
more defeat might ruin all, and Cortés resolved to avoid risks. He
would tear down every building as he advanced on both sides of the
streets, and fill up every channel; “not take one step in advance
without leaving all desolated behind, and convert water into firm land,
regardless of the delay.” So writes the general, and yet he expresses
regret for this destruction of the city, “the most beautiful in the
world.”[1189] In pursuance of this plan he asked the allied chiefs to
summon additional forces of laborers with the necessary implements.
They eagerly consented, and within a few days the men stood prepared.
FOOTNOTES
[1143] ‘Eran esclavos del señor de Tenuxtitan,’ is Cortés’
definition of their vassalage to Mexico. _Cartas_, 220.
[1144] A service which employed 20,000 carriers, 1000
canoes, and 32,000 convoy warriors, all at the expense of
Tezcuco, says Ixtlilxochitl, _Relaciones_, 314.
[1145] His biographer admits to a certain extent the truth
of the invectives, but eager to please his Spanish masters
he seeks rather to extol the self-sacrifice and loyalty
of his kinsman. He claims that with this reënforcement the
Tezcucan auxiliaries reached the improbable number of 250,000
men, of whom 5000 wounded were now sent home. ‘Next to God,
Cortés owed to Tezcucan aid the conquest and the planting
of the faith.’ He further assumes that Ixtlilxochitl was
already king, and had been with Cortés since the fleet
set sail, while his brother Ahuaxpictzoctzin remained at
Tezcuco to provide supplies. _Hor. Crueldades_, 21-33. He
contradicts himself on several points in his _Relaciones_,
314 et seq. Duran also, as may be expected from a compiler
of native records, extols the hero, ‘à quien dió una espada
dorada que Don Hernando Cortes traia y una rodela.’ _Hist.
Ind._, MS., ii. 493. With Ixtlilxochitl came half a dozen
out of his hundred brothers. _Gomara_, _Hist. Mex._, 198;
_Chimalpain_, _Hist. Conq._, ii. 55. Torquemada, i. 548,
sends Cohuanacoch as general of the forces, while Clavigero
allows King Fernando Ixtlilxochitl to send his brother Cárlos
Ixtlilxochitl. _Storia Mess._, iii. 202. He is evidently
confused with respect to the surname.
[1146] _Sahagun_, _Hist. Conq._ (ed. 1840), 177-8. Torquemada
places the incident earlier, i. 547. Cortés admits no losses
of Spaniards this day.
[1147] _Cartas_, 222-3. ‘Los combidauan a çena, mostrando
les piernas y braços.’ _Gomara_, _Hist. Mex._, 199.
[1148] Bernal Diaz speaks of a bridge attack which cost the
lives of four Spaniards, besides numerous wounded. _Hist.
Verdad._, 145.
[1149] He enumerates also the cities of Mexicalcinco and
Vitzilopuchtli. _Hist. Mex._, 202. Herrera adds Mizquic.
dec. iii. lib. i. cap. xix.
[1150] Mazeoatzi, as Sahagun calls the cacique, sacrificed
four chiefs, Quauhtemotzin four more; the rest fell by the
hands of priests. _Hist. Conq._ (ed. 1840), 187. He does
not speak of a premeditated plan like Torquemada, i. 551-2,
and since the account comes from native sources it may be
merely an exaggerated version of a flotilla raid.
[1151] This was the lieutenant of Velazquez at Habana, who
joined Cortés during the Tepeaca campaign. Portillo was a
soldier from the Italian wars. Bernal Diaz adds that one
brig was captured, but this is doubtful. _Hist. Verdad._,
143; _Clavigero_, _Storia Mess._, iii. 214; _Sahagun_,
_Hist. Conq._, 46.
[1152] _Bernal Diaz_, _Hist. Verdad._, 144-5.
[1153] Cortés exultantly claims that three fourths of the
city is now captured. _Cartas_, 227; _Sahagun_, _Hist.
Conq._ (ed. 1840), 181; _Torquemada_, i. 550.
[1154] ‘No se hartauan de pescado, que tuuierõ pocos dias:
y demas de la hambre con q̄ peleauan, el sol, y el frio
no les dio pequeño trabajo.’ _Herrera_, dec. iii. lib. i.
cap. xix.
[1155] ‘Soliti sunt hostes in prælio cadentes intra suos
ventres sepelire,’ explains Peter Martyr, dec. v. cap.
viii., and with some truth.
[1156] Forty soldiers watched till midnight, when a similar
number relieved them, and they again were relieved two hours
before dawn; all three divisions camping on the spot. Often
every man was kept awake by alarms. _Bernal Diaz_, _Hist.
Verdad._, 142-3. The old soldier waxes eloquent over the
hardships, for he served at this camp.
[1157] The Spaniards tried in vain to despatch him.
Sahagun states that during these attacks fifteen soldiers
were captured, and shortly after eighteen more, who were
sacrificed in a temple of Tlacuchcalco ward, ‘donde agora
es la iglesia de Santa Ana.’ _Hist. Conq._, 183, ed.
1840, 188-9. One repulse took place in Coyonacazco ward.
_Torquemada_, i. 550-2. Spanish versions indicate no such
losses, and they may probably belong to the later great
defeat.
[1158] Such is in main the version of Bernal Diaz; the
other accounts differ greatly. This author states that five
Spaniards were captured, nearly all the men wounded, and
two rowers killed, for the brigantines in seeking to aid
had become fast on stakes and exposed to attack. Had the
Mexicans not been so frightened by the horsemen the loss
would have been very great. _Hist. Verdad._, 143-4. Cortés
allows three or four captured. _Cartas_, 228; _Clavigero_,
_Storia Mess._, iii. 196. Duran places the scene where rose
afterward the San Hipólito hermitage. _Hist. Ind._, MS.,
ii. 500. But for Quauhtlizcatzin, the prince who led the
Tezcucan auxiliaries, all the Spaniards would have been
lost, exclaims Ixtlilxochitl, _Hor. Crueldades_, 36. Herrera
assumes that the fault lay with Alvarado for neglecting to
fill the channel. dec. iii. lib. i. cap. xx.
[1159] ‘No solo no le culpo, mas loole.’ _Gomara_, _Hist.
Mex._, 203.
[1160] The most serious attacks took place on June 24th and
25th, as if oracles had impelled the Mexicans to seek the
destruction of the Spaniards on the anniversary of their
reëntry into the city after the Alvarado massacre. The
Tlacopan camp lost ten soldiers and had a dozen severely
wounded, including Alvarado. _Bernal Diaz_, _Hist. Verdad._,
142, 145.
[1161] Bernal Diaz seeks to convey the idea that he or his
camp were opposed to the attempt, _Id._, 146, but had it
succeeded, he would probably have declared the truth, that
Cortés was urged on all sides to make the effort, as stated
in _Gomara_, _Hist. Mex._, 203, _Herrera_, dec. iii. lib.
i. cap. xx., and _Cortés_, _Cartas_, 228-9. Perhaps the
general made objections chiefly to cover his responsibility
in case of failure.
[1162] Alderete’s party consisted of 70 infantry, 7 or 8
horsemen, and 15,000 to 20,000 allies, besides a force of
laborers to tear down and to fill up; Tápia’s of 80 men and
over 10,000 allies, and Cortés’ of 8 horsemen, 100 infantry,
and an immense number of allies. _Cortés_, _Cartas_, 230-1.
Gomara and Herrera differ slightly. Ixtlilxochitl says
that his namesake followed Cortés with 8000 Tezcucans.
_Hor. Crueldades_, 37. This insignificant number makes it
difficult to account for the 250,000 Tezcucans which he
lately introduced into the camps. Chimalpain names the
three streets Cuahuecatitlan, Tecontlanamacoya, and the
later Santa Ana. _Hist. Conq._, ii. 62.
[1163] See _Native Races_, ii. 303; iii. 293 et seq.
[1164] He crossed the channel with fifteen soldiers to
sustain the fugitives, says Torquemada, i. 554; but this
seems incorrect.
[1165] The claims to the honor of rescuing the general are
conflicting. Gomara, followed by Herrera and Torquemada,
names ‘Francisco’ de Olea. Bernal Diaz, who states that
this soldier slew four of the captains holding Cortés,
lets Lerma dispose of the remainder. After this came other
soldiers and Quiñones. Cristóbal de Olea was quite young, 26
years of age, a native of Medina del Campo, muscular, and
skilled in arms, and a general favorite. Bernal Diaz adds
other particulars. _Hist. Verdad._, 146, 246. Ixtlilxochitl,
on the other hand, claims for his namesake the credit of
having done what Spaniards claim for Olea, aided by his
Tezcucans, who kept the enemy at bay. This, he adds, is
proved by a painting on the gate of the monastery of Santiago
Tlatelulco. _Hor. Crueldades_, 38-9. Herrera briefly alludes
to Ixtlilxochitl as coming up after Olea, and then relates
with some detail that at the same time came the Tlascaltec,
Tamaxautzin he calls him, a native of Hueyotlipan. He was
afterward baptized as Antonio or Bautista, and became a
good Christian, the first native to receive extreme unction.
dec. iii. lib. i. cap. xx. Torquemada, i. 555, copies, but
calls the man Teamacatzin. Both evidently prefer Tlascaltec
to Tezcucan records. In fact, Ixtlilxochitl adds certain
incredible particulars about the prowess of his wounded hero
in pursuing the Mexican general into a temple, although such
pursuit could not have taken place under the circumstances.
See also _Duran_, _Hist. Ind._, MS., ii. 503, and _Camargo_,
_Hist. Tlax._, 130. Cortés writes that he would have been
lost but for Quiñones, and one of his men who lost his life
to save him. _Cartas_, 233. A small chapel was erected in
the convent de la Concepcion to commemorate the escape.
See _Saavedra_, _Indio Peregrino_, canto 20.
[1166] Bernal Diaz assumes that Guzman rode up after Cortés
was mounted, and fell captive into Aztec hands. _Hist.
Verdad._, 147.
[1167] ‘Como lo hallarán pintado en la Yglesia de Tlatilulco,
los cuales Indios confiesan haberle visto.’ _Duran_, _Hist.
Ind._, MS., ii. 512. Why these patrons did not give their aid
before is a question to which Bernal Diaz answers ‘porque
Nuestro Señor Iesu Christo lo permitiò.’ _Hist. Verdad._,
146.
[1168] Herrera relates how two captains, Flores and Mota,
advanced with their vessels up a narrow channel. Flores was
severely pressed at one time, and the latter had to sally
on the street to relieve him and enable the brigantines
to gain more open water. Flores died within a week of his
wounds. dec. iii. lib. i. cap. xx. Torquemada says that
Briones’ vessel was lifted through a breach in the causeway.
i. 555. Bernal Diaz speaks of several such narrow escapes.
loc. cit.
[1169] The artillerists being all disabled or dead, Pedro
Moreno de Medrano, afterward a settler at Puebla, took
their place. _Id._
[1170] Bernal Diaz writes as if Sandoval gained the camp
at an early hour, rode over to Fort Xoloc, and came back
in time to aid in Alvarado’s retreat. But he would never
have ventured to leave his command and his comrade in
their danger; nor does it seem likely that he could have
ridden the long distance to Xoloc and back in time to join
in Alvarado’s conflict, even if Cortés’ defeat took place
before ‘misa mayor,’ as he assumes. _Hist. Verdad._, 146-8.
This author is here very confused, assuming, for instance,
that Sandoval was fighting from his own camp instead of
coöperating near Alvarado.
[1171] So deeply affected was Bernal Diaz, among others, by
the sight, and by the fear of himself falling captive—twice
had he narrowly escaped—that he ever after had an oppressive
feeling before battle. He then had recourse to prayer,
and this invariably fortified him for the fight, so that
he always maintained his reputation as a good soldier. He
enumerates several incidents to prove that he was esteemed
a brave man. _Hist. Verdad._, 157. Oviedo, referring to
human sacrifices among the Romans, observes that they could
not have been half so fearful. iii. 515.
[1172] ‘Sacrificados los Nuestros, en el Momoztli, y Templo
de su Maior Dios,’ observes Torquemada, i. 553, among other
points, though all are not exactly true. Huitzilopochtli’s
image had been brought with the retreating Mexicans to
Tlatelulco. ‘Immediatamente sacrificati,’ says Clavigero,
_Storia Mess._, iii. 212, probably on authority of Gomara;
but Bernal Diaz states that the sacrifices lasted ten days,
_Hist. Verdad._, 150; others write eight; one victim is
said to have been kept eighteen days. See also _Sahagun_,
_Hist. Conq._, 192. Ixtlilxochitl states that three victims
were burned. _Hor. Crueldades_, 39.
[1173] A count revealed the loss of 62 men and 6 horses,
says Bernal Diaz, _Hist. Verdad._, 146, 152, 241, though
he in one place leaves the impression that the men were all
captured alive. This could hardly be the case, for a ‘count’
would reveal only the missing; none could tell how many
fell captive. Yet Prescott boldly assumes this number to
have been taken, besides those who fell. Vetancurt divides
the figures into 40 captives and 20 dead, _Teatro Mex._,
pt. iii. 162, and Clavigero also includes dead and captive
in that number, while raising the dead horses to 7. _Storia
Mess._, iii. 212. Solis writes that over 40 Spaniards were
carried off alive, and that Alvarado and Sandoval lost 20.
_Hist. Mex._, ii. 410. Bernal Diaz acknowledges only a third
of such loss between these two captains. Gomara gives 40
captives, several killed, 3 or 4 horses lost, and over 30
wounded. _Hist. Mex._, 205-6. Ixtlilxochitl raises the allied
loss to over 2000. _Hor. Crueldades_, 37-9. Fifty-three
Spaniards, says Sahagun, _Hist. Conq._, 192. In the cédula
of March 7, 1525, granting a coat-of-arms to Cortés, 50 are
mentioned, but in his letter to the sovereign the general
acknowledges only 35 to 40 and over 1000 allies. Herrera
and Torquemada adopt these figures. Oviedo, iii. 516, lowers
the number to 30. Duran, who confounds the late repulse of
Alvarado with the Sorrowful Night and this defeat, allows
4 banners to be captured. _Hist. Ind._, MS., ii. 501-4,
508.
[1174] Bernal Diaz gives this conversation with some detail,
and names Treasurer Alderete as the guilty officer who
neglected to fill the channel, intimating that Cortés had
been heedlessly allured onward by the Mexicans, leaving
Alderete to attend to the filling. He even allows the
treasurer to retort to the charge, in Sandoval’s presence,
that Cortés’ eagerness had been the cause of the neglect.
This is probably an invented account, based on Gomara’s
statement that the ‘treasurer,’ no name being given,
neglected to fill a channel on his route. Informed of this,
Cortés hastened thither to remedy the fault, only to meet the
fleeing. Herrera adopts this version, as do most writers,
including Prescott; but it is evidently wrong, for Cortés
writes clearly that the misfortune occurred on his own
route, some distance above its junction with the Tlacopan
road, to which they soon retreated. On reaching this road
he sent to recall the ‘treasurer and comptroller,’ who were
leading their division victoriously at the farther end of
it. Owing to their care in filling channels ‘they received
no injury in retreating.’ _Cartas_, 233-4. There can be
little doubt about this statement, since Cortés would have
been only too glad to cast the blame on any other division
than his own. He does not even claim to have been at the
front, but in the rear, and near the spot where the neglect
occurred. The only question then is, who was the guilty
officer? The ‘treasurer’ commanded the centre division,
and although there were several treasurers, the royal,
late and new, and he who acted for the army, yet the new
royal treasurer is undoubtedly meant, and this appears to
have been Alderete, according to the statement of several
authorities. Hence the accusation against Alderete must be
wrong; anything besides this must be conjecture.
[1175] ‘Bolviò à la grita, Andrés de Tapia [the captain of
his party] matò mas de sesenta Mexicanos,’ adds Torquemada,
i. 558-9.
[1176] ‘Esto no fue sino cinco dias.’ _Bernal Diaz_, _Hist.
Verdad._, 149.
[1177] Similar women of courage were María de Estrada, the
heroine of Otumba, Beatriz de Escobar, Juana Martin, and
Beatriz de Palacios. _Herrera_, dec. iii. lib. ii. cap. i.
[1178] Oil was the chief remedy. _Torquemada_, i. 558-60.
Bernal Diaz speaks of a soldier named Juan Catalan who
performed cures with the sign of the cross and psalm-singing.
The Tlascaltecs also besieged the man for his attentions.
‘Y verdaderamente digo, que hallauamos que Nuestro Señor
Iesu Christo era servido de darnos esfuerço, ... y de
presto sanauan.’ Not twenty of Alvarado’s men were free
from wounds at this time. _Hist. Verdad._, 142. Solis allows
this wonderful healing power to be attributed to no woman.
_Hist. Mex._, ii. 412. But then he was a strict priest,
who saw woman chiefly as a feeble and adoring supplicant.
[1179] ‘Que de ai a ocho dias no auia de quedar ninguno
de nosotros a vida, porque assi se lo auian prometido la
noche antes sus Dioses.’ _Bernal Diaz_, _Hist. Verdad._, 149.
[1180] Solis, _Hist. Mex._, ii. 415, states, and Prescott
hastily affirms, that nearly all the allies deserted, and
Bernal Diaz enumerates the mere handful that remained;
but this must be erroneous, as shown by the course of the
narratives in general. Two expeditions were sent forth about
this time, and the large number of allies which joined
therein may account in part for the gaps which gave rise
to the above exaggeration. Cortés, indeed, alludes very
indirectly to any defection.
[1181] Forty thousand, says Ixtlilxochitl, obtained chiefly
from Quauhnahuac and other towns subject to Tezcuco. _Hor.
Crueldades_, 40. Herrera and others mention no auxiliaries
from the camp. Bernal Diaz is confused.
[1182] The Chicuhnauhtla, Ixtlilxochitl calls it.
[1183] ‘Y ellos le siruieron muy biẽ en el cerco.’ _Gomara_,
_Hist. Mex._, 207. Ixtlilxochitl claims of course that his
Tezcucans formed the chief auxiliaries of Sandoval. Bernal
Diaz wrongly gives Tápia this expedition, which Cortés
intimates to have been sent about three days after the
return of the Quauhnahuac party. _Cartas_, 237.
[1184] Farfan and Villareal came, says Bernal Diaz,
and Tecapaneca, cacique of Topeyanco, led the returning
Tlascaltecs. _Hist. Verdad._, 151.
[1185] Cortés leaves the impression that this incident
took place during the days when the Spaniards were making
desultory entries into the city; but since he does not speak
of the oracle or the defection the affair is undecided.
Torquemada, i. 557, intimates that Chichimecatl served
under Sandoval, but this is wrong.
[1186] Ojeda magnifies the train of men to 4000 and the
canoes to 3000. _Herrera_, dec. iii. lib. i. cap. xxii.
[1187] Fifteen hundred loads maize, 1000 loads fowl, 300
sides venison, besides other effects, including Xicotencatl’s
confiscated property and women. _Id._
[1188] Herrera intimates that the material may have been
a consignment to Leon, for which the disappointed owner
sought a market. A vessel of Aillon’s fleet, says Bernal
Diaz, _Hist. Verdad._, 153.
[1189] Some time before he had expressed the same intention,
and the fear that little or no treasure would be recovered.
_Cartas_, 222, 241. Ixtlilxochitl claims that his namesake
provided 100,000 men for the task, _Hor. Crueldades_, 42,
and Bernal Diaz states that this prince proposed purely a
strict blockade as a safe and sure plan. _Hist. Verdad._,
150. The result proves that this would have been the best
and as speedy as the one adopted, while the city would
have been saved from destruction. That the plan was ever
seriously suggested among this impatient crew is affirmed
by no other authority.