INVESTMENT OF MEXICO.
MAY-JUNE, 1521.
PHASES OF HEROISM—THE BRIGANTINES UPON THE LAKE—DIVISION
OF FORCES BETWEEN ALVARADO, SANDOVAL, AND OLID—DESERTION,
CAPTURE, AND EXECUTION OF XICOTENCATL—DEPARTURE OF THE
TROOPS FROM TEZCUCO—NAVAL BATTLE—POSSESSION TAKEN OF THE
CAUSEWAYS—AT ONE POINT CORTÉS UNEXPECTEDLY GAINS ENTRANCE TO
THE CITY—BUT IS DRIVEN OUT.
The ideal heroic character is to be viewed from two standpoints: the
effect of heroism on the hero, and on the world. A very bad person
may do mankind a great service. An evil-minded man, while sinking his
soul yet deeper in corruption, may bring benefactions upon society.
But even a fairly good man cannot increase his innate nobleness of
character while doing injury to his fellows.
I do not know that the claim of good man was ever advanced for Hernan
Cortés, except, indeed, by that strange fanaticism which, dazzled
by one object, fails to see other objects, or the terrible means for
their attainment. He and his followers formed a sad mixture of good
and evil, in which the latter predominated, if judged by the moral
standard which they had formed for themselves as soldiers of the cross.
The grossest injustice, the most horrible wickedness constituted
part of their moral ideal, so that while fighting for the highest
morality they were the most immoral of men. Long after the conquest
was consummated, under the ministrations of men of piety and ability,
it would seem that the weapons used by these conquerors, who at times
justified murder as the highest morality, were still instinct with
blood, even as the cornel-wood spear with which the king of Thrace
transfixed the unhappy Polydorus springs into life instinct with the
blood of Priam’s slaughtered son.
Cortés was not an idealist after the manner of Columbus. Both were full
of egoism; the spiritual-mindedness of both was essentially selfish.
They would both dictate terms to God and their king, that for so much
service they must have so much reward. Both were full of the follies
of their day; but Columbus displayed a grave, unconscious folly, while
Cortés consciously indulged in all the follies of lust and cruelty
that prudence admitted or his aim demanded. Cortés abandoned himself
to ambition; Columbus to brooding thought. The insanity of reckless
adventure was not the insanity of Columbus, who nevertheless was as
mad as any lunatic in his own way. Commanding energy and practical
daring were as conspicuous in Cortés as in Columbus; but it happened
that the aims of Columbus were of greater import to the race than
those of Cortés.
How alike, and yet how different, these men! Cortés was impetuous and
extravagant; Columbus calm, calculating, and prudent. One was full
of joyous activity, the simple exercise of which was his greatest
pleasure; obligations of every sort sat lightly on him; the other was
but an instrument in the hands of providence. Both were ambitious,
both excessively religious; but Cortés, in the main, made religion
subservient to advancement, as before noted, while mundane glories
to Columbus were hollow indeed beside his heavenly aspirations. Both
were exceedingly great men; both became eminent by a selfish adventure
of self; but Columbus saw the New World through the glorious haze
of immortality, while Cortés viewed Mexico under the lightly woven
covering of personal ambition.
Cortés was an Antony rather than a Cæsar, nor did he lack that one
great gift of Antony’s, subordination, as we have seen. He was not so
greatly in love with himself, stood not so greatly in awe of himself,
as Cæsar; he was possessed of finer perceptions and feelings, and
with consummate versatility could drop himself out of his plans as
occasion required. Nor was Cortés without imagination and the æsthetic
sense, though of a grosser and sensual kind; but it is not in great
men that we are to look for the swelling harmonies of nature.
* * * * *
A turning-point was now reached in the campaign. The brigantines were
completed, and the siege could begin. The day for the entry of the
vessels into the lake was a gala day, inaugurated with the communion
and festive with the concourse of gayly attired spectators.[1113]
After prayer and a discourse the flags with name and royal arms were
hoisted on each vessel,[1114] amid salvos and cheers, and the dams
being broken, the gallant fleet floated down the canal to the placid
lake.
While the mute bunting was thus proclaiming Spanish supremacy over
these inland waters, a Te Deum, in which joined a thousand voices,
echoed aloud the gratitude of every heart. Each vessel was placed in
charge of a captain[1115] with twenty-four Spaniards, of whom about
six were cross-bowmen and arquebusiers, some artillerists to manage
the bronze gun, and twelve rowers, six to each side. The boats were
evidently half-decked.[1116]
Active preparations were now made to begin the siege. Tlascaltecs,
Huexotzincas, Cholultecs, Chalcans, and other allies were summoned to
send in contingents by Whitsunday, the latter to assemble at Chalco,
and the Tlascaltecs at Tezcuco. Though but ten days’ notice was given,
the last named presented themselves in the camp before the appointed
time to the number of over fifty thousand, which was increased by
later reënforcement.[1117]
As they approached Tezcuco under the guidance of Ojeda, and commanded
notably by Chichimecatl and Xicotencatl junior, they spread out in
one long serpentine file, bristling with iztli points and brilliant
with shields and armor covered with variegated devices and flowing
plumage, while at intervals waved high the banners of the different
corps. Cortés went forth to meet them with grand demonstrations, and
as they marched past loud vivas[1118] rent the air.
On the 28th of April Cortés had mustered his forces and found that,
with the several reënforcements lately arrived, there were present
over nine hundred Spaniards, of whom eighty-six were horsemen and one
hundred and eighteen cross-bowmen and arquebusiers;[1119] the rest
being armed with swords and shields and the more formidable pikes.
They were well protected with cotton armor, many having cuirasses and
corselets, and small weapons were not wanting. The artillery consisted
of three heavy iron guns, fifteen smaller pieces of bronze, mostly
distributed among the vessels, with ten quintals of powder and a
quantity of shot, while some fifty thousand arrows had been furnished
by the Tezcucan towns, all fitted according to pattern with copper
tips.[1120]
Not only had the Spaniards, particularly the new recruits, been well
exercised in cavalry movements, target practice, fencing, and pike
drill, but the allies had been trained to a certain extent in European
tactics. For efficiency and good conduct this army rose far above
any yet mustered in the Indies. In the usual speech before the ranks,
Cortés pointed out how God had favored them with constant victories
and with reënforcements which had nearly doubled their number and
resources. They might indeed be hopeful, for holy was their cause.
Full of confidence they could march against the only stronghold yet
opposed to them, avenge their slaughtered comrades, and win riches
and glory for themselves.
On Whitmonday, the 20th of May, an apportionment of the troops was
made to Alvarado, Olid, and Sandoval, who led the cavalry in person,
but directed the movements of the infantry through captains, and of
the allies through native chiefs. Each received from twenty-four to
thirty horsemen, and one hundred and fifty infantry, divided into two
or three battalions, with a proportionate number of arquebusiers,
cross-bowmen, guns, and ammunition, besides from twenty to forty
thousand allies. To Sandoval was given the smallest number of horse and
the largest number of allies, those gathered at Chalco having orders
to await him, while Alvarado received a full half of the Tlascaltec
force, with whom the Tonatiuh was a great favorite. To this leader
Tlacopan was assigned for head-quarters; to Olid, Coyuhuacan; and
Sandoval received orders to complete the destruction of Iztapalapan,
and then to advance through Coyuhuacan and along one of the southern
causeways, and there to select his head-quarters, under the protection
of the brigantines. These appointments and orders underwent several
changes during the siege. For himself Cortés selected the management
of the fleet, whereon so much depended during the opening of the
siege, and in addition to its ships’ companies of three hundred
men he was supported by several thousand allies, chiefly Tezcucans
under Ixtlilxochitl, who attended in a large number of canoes. This
selection hardly pleased the army, which considered their operations
the most important and dangerous, and therefore in need of Cortés’
supervision. But he evidently never intended to remain with the fleet
except at the beginning.[1121]
The following day the allied forces apportioned to Alvarado and
Olid were ordered to march in advance, for greater convenience,
to the border of Tezcuco province and there await the Spaniards.
Not many hours after their departure a messenger appeared with the
announcement that Xicotencatl, the companion general of Chichimecatl,
had disappeared. Inquiries revealed that shortly before his cousin
Piltecuhtli had been severely and wantonly struck by a soldier during
a quarrel over some carriers. In order to save the soldier from the
wrath of Cortés, Ojeda, the Spanish inspecting officer over the allied
forces, smoothed the matter and sent the injured nobleman home. It
was claimed by some that this outrage had so wounded Xicotencatl
that he followed his cousin. Others assumed that both chiefs were
in love with the same woman, and that Xicotencatl could not bear to
leave his rival alone in the field. But the true reason lay no doubt
in his dislike to fight for the Spaniards, whom he had never ceased
to oppose, openly and in secret, as invaders bent on the enslavement
of the whole country. This idea, if faint at first, had become more
fixed with every fresh blow against his personal ambition, such as
the first series of defeats which plucked from him his just renown;
the equal or perhaps superior position assigned in the native army to
Chichimecatl, of whom he appears to have been deeply jealous;[1122]
and the prospect of a wearisome and unprofitable campaign, wherein
he must be content to figure as a subordinate, not only of Alvarado,
but subject perhaps to the orders of petty Spanish officers. All this
became too galling to his proud spirit, and with a few followers he
turned toward his mountain home.
It would never do to countenance desertion, and by so prominent a man,
at the very opening of a campaign; and Cortés immediately sent a number
of troopers in pursuit, with instructions to represent to the chief
the gravity of his offence, which cast a heavy stain on Tlascaltec
honor, and to persuade him to return. They speedily overtook him,
only to meet with insolence. He would not go back; if his people had
listened to him they would not now be tools and servants of a horde
of foreigners. With this reply the troops were forced to return.
“This cacique is incorrigible,” exclaimed Cortés, “and will ever be a
traitor and counsellor to evil. I have had enough of him!” The troopers
were at once sent back, accompanied by an alguacil and some trusty
Tlascaltec nobles, with orders to arrest the fugitive and bring him
to Tezcuco. In a letter to the republican lords, Cortés at the same
time complained of the desertion and its grave influence, and declared
that according to Spanish law the penalty was death. They replied
that the same punishment obtained in Tlascala; and not only do they
appear to have actively aided in surrendering the culprit, but they
declared all his property, including wives and slaves, confiscated to
the crown, against which he had sinned.[1123] Indeed, the arrogance
of the young chief does not seem to have endeared him to the other
rulers. Instantly on his arrival he was sentenced and hanged on a
very high gallows, while the crier and interpreter announced his crime.
The execution of so prominent a chief, heir to one of the rulers
among his best allies, was an act which few besides Cortés would
have ventured on; but he saw the necessity for a firm observance of
discipline, and was not deceived in the salutary effect which it had
on the allies.[1124] There were not many Tlascaltecs left in Tezcuco,
or a serious demonstration might have occurred; as it was, the mantle
and maxtli of the deceased were secured, and an eager contest ensued
for them as relics. Axayacatzin Xicotencatl had achieved fame before
the advent of the Spaniards.[1125]
Alvarado and Olid had set out from Tezcuco for Tlacopan with their
Spanish forces on the 22d of May,[1126] taking the same route by which
Cortés had returned from the Xochimilco campaign, and though longer
than that north of Tezcuco Lake, yet it was easier and safer. On
approaching Acolman, Olid sent a party in advance to secure quarters,
and when Alvarado arrived he found every house bearing the green
bough on the roof, which indicated occupancy. This raised a tumult
between the parties, and even the captains would have come to blows
but for the interference of friends. Informed of the trouble, Cortés
took steps to reconcile them, although the two leaders never renewed
their former intimacy.
On the evening of the fourth day they reached Tlacopan, which was
deserted, as were all the towns along the route.[1127] Late as was the
hour, forages and reconnoissances were made, involving a skirmish with
the Mexicans. The following day, Sunday, Olid proceeded to Chapultepec
to cut the aqueduct which supplied the city, a task which involved
another encounter wherein a score of Mexicans fell. Meanwhile the
canals were filled and other obstacles removed which might impede a
free advance, and foraging tours were made. The Mexicans continued to
harass the operations with repeated sallies, and finally Alvarado,
with characteristic rashness, pursued them until his troops were
well advanced between the houses and bridges. The Mexicans, who had
retreated on purpose, now rolled back upon his front and flanks.
The roofs, hitherto deserted, teemed with slingers and archers, who
showered their missiles with terrible effect, while from the lanes and
openings between the houses sprang numbers who assailed the cramped
soldiers with their long lances, swords, and clubs, and leaped back
into their holes and canoes and behind breastworks whenever they
were pressed. The allies were ordered back, and the Spaniards slowly
retreated, with a loss of eight killed and fifty wounded, glad to be
relieved from their strait.
Olid was highly incensed with Alvarado for his rashness, and regardless
of all remonstrance he seized the pretext to hasten the departure
to his own camp at Coyuhuacan. He established his head-quarters on
Corpus Christi day, the 30th of May, and from this date, accordingly,
Clavigero and many others date the beginning of the siege. The causeway
leading thence to Mexico was broken, and he sought for several days
to cover the breaches and gain a footing upon it, but without success.
The Mexican warriors displayed great spirit, and their leaders are to
be blamed for not energetically assuming the offensive and attacking
the two camps.
* * * * *
The Mexicans had not quite understood the drift of Cortés’ delay
and preliminary manœuvres. When they found two camps established,
the aqueduct destroyed, and earnest preparations in progress for
investment, their eyes were opened; but they were then too bewildered
to act with promptness and precision. The chronicles relate that
Quauhtemotzin held a grand council to consider the situation, and
to sound the spirit of the people for peace or war, so that there
might be no faltering when necessity came. A number indeed of the
elder and wiser lords, particularly of the Montezuma faction, spoke
of the formidable enginery and strength of the Spaniards, and their
host of allies, and expressed fears of failure. With the occupation
of all the surrounding territory, and the influx of people from
abroad, the food supply might fall short, and famine and sickness
ensue. But the young men and the warriors, as might be expected,
would listen to no counsellor whose words implied cowardice; they
were enthusiastic for resistance, and formed too numerous a party to
allow the entertaining of peace proposals. Quauhtemotzin cautiously
refrained from committing himself,[1128] but reminded the assembly
that the oracles of their gods and heroic ancestors had above all to
be listened to in so important a matter as the preservation of the
homes and sacred temples intrusted to their care. He knew well what
answer would come from the priests, whose possessions, wealth, and
honors depended on the exclusion of invaders, aiming above all at the
overthrow of their religion. “My people shall not fear the enemy,”
spake the war-god Huitzilopochtli, “for the allied hosts will not
persevere long in the siege, and I will scatter the Castilians now
as hitherto.” This utterance suited many views, and the declaration
for war was solemnized by sacrifices of human beings, including the
four Spaniards lately captured.[1129]
Renewed efforts were made to fortify and supply the city, and canoes
were collected to aid in the defence. With insolent assurance,
derived from the oracles, corps of warriors would advance close to
the Spanish camps and vent their feelings with insults and menaces,
“Men of evil, you shall pay for your madness! Behold, the gods have
already feasted on your bodies!” they cried, flinging in among the
horrified soldiers pieces of their sacrificed comrades. “Our snakes
shall drink your blood, and our tigers devour your flesh, though they
are already satiated therewith. And you, infamous Tlascaltecs, slaves
and traitors! you shall atone for your misdeeds; you shall die a bad
death, and furnish flesh for our banquets! Behold!” And therewith
they threw in disjointed pieces of dusky human bodies. “We shall
not rest till your land is desolated, and not a man or woman left to
perpetuate your vile race.” Unabashed by this tirade the Tlascaltecs
told them not to threaten like women, but to act like men. Still it
were better for them to yield unless they wished to be destroyed.
* * * * *
Cortés had been delayed till the fleet should be fully prepared. On
the 31st of May, following Corpus Christi day, he was able to despatch
Sandoval, who, reënforced by some forty thousand allies awaiting
him on the Chalco border, marched against Iztapalapan. Although
severely crippled by Cortés’ expedition, this town still figured as
a stronghold of too great importance to be left in the rear. Advised
of the movement, the Mexicans hurried by road and water to aid in
covering the retreat of the inhabitants. Suddenly smoke columns
were observed in different parts of the lake, and cries of alarm
ran through the town. Yet more and more hurriedly the people fled,
and while one body of warriors retired along the causeway to Mexico,
others departed in canoes. The Spanish forces pressed onward in close
pursuit, and slaughter, pillage, and torch accompanied them. The
chief cause of the panic was the appearance of the brigantines, which
had set sail shortly after Sandoval’s departure, attended by a large
number of Tezcucan canoes[1130] whose object was to coöperate against
Iztapalapan. On approaching it the vessels passed close to a steep
rocky isle, the Tepepulco, since known as El Peñol del Marqués,[1131]
occupied by a large number of fugitives who shouted defiance, and
showered stones and arrows. Finding that Sandoval required no aid,
Cortés resolved to inflict a lesson on the insolent islanders. The
Mexicans appeared confident in the impregnable strength of the rock,
and gave so warm a reception to the hundred and fifty men with whom
Cortés began to climb it, that fully a score were wounded at the
onset. The brigantines turned their guns upon them, however, and under
this cover the soldiers speedily gained the summit, there to wreak
bloody vengeance. Not a man was spared, only the women and children.
“It was a beautiful victory!” exclaims Cortés.
While they were pillaging, a large fleet of canoes, five hundred at
the lowest estimate,[1132] was seen to approach from the direction of
Mexico, bristling with iztli points, which found a gleaming reflection
in the smooth waters of the lake. Cortés ordered an immediate return
to the brigantines, and rowed them forward into an extended line. He
had longed for an opportunity like this, to meet a formidable fleet
upon which the brigantines might inflict a lesson severe enough to
open the eyes of the enemy to their invincible power; for “in them
lay the key of war,” as he expressed it. Unfortunately the wind was
so light as barely to flap the sails. The hostile fleet had already
drawn up in good order just beyond range, evidently puzzled at the
passive attitude of the monster vessels, yet shouting defiance.[1133]
Cortés stood chafing with impatience, for without wind his greatest
advantage would be lost, and his position even become precarious. Just
then the waters rippled and a breeze came from abaft which speedily
freshened. “Ah, God favors us!” he cried, and with a grateful gaze
toward heaven he gave orders to advance under full sail. As they
came close to the enemy a blinding volley was sent pouring in upon
them from the whole line, from guns, arquebuses, and cross-bows, and
while the natives were trying to recover from their confusion, from
out the smoke burst the ponderous bows, crashing into the lines of
canoes, overturning, breaking, and sinking. In the vessels’ wake were
wrecks and struggling bodies, while the few canoes which had escaped
by passing between the ships struggled to escape the Tezcucan boats
in the rear. At the first encounter the canoes in the farther lines
turned in hot haste for home, as did a vast number of others which had
ventured forth, partly with reënforcements, partly with spectators.
But the clumsy-looking vessels sped faster, pursuing their career
of destruction for three leagues, into the very canals of the city,
whence they turned back to pick up captives. The victory exceeded the
wildest hopes of the Spaniards, as Cortés admits, for not only did
the Aztecs lose a great number of their foremost warriors and their
best canoes, but they surrendered forever to the formidable craft
sovereignty over the lake waters, and with it the hope of assistance
from trans-lacustrine allies.
Encouraged by this success, Olid advised Alvarado, and both hastened
to take advantage of the panic to advance along the causeways and
effect considerable execution, impelled as they were with emulation
and fresh courage.[1134] Olid had advanced close to Fort Xoloc, which
with its stout battlemented walls and towers guarded the junction of
the southern causeways, when the brigantines approached it from the
eastern side. It was already after vespers; nevertheless Cortés landed
to coöperate with his lieutenant and pursue the advantage gained. A
breach was made in the wall with one of the heavy guns, and under
cover of the fleet’s artillery the place was soon carried. Cortés
had intended to make Coyuhuacan his head-quarters, but such were the
obvious advantages of Xoloc, in strength and in position, for it lay
but half a league from Mexico and was connected in the rear with the
mainland by three causeways, that he at once decided to establish
his camp there, making it also his naval station.
Enraged rather than discouraged by the several defeats, Quauhtemotzin
ordered a night attack on Xoloc, contrary to native custom. They
approached both by sea and land, but owing to their noise they were
observed, and driven back by the artillery. The fort was not very
strong on the northern side, and the force within was small; but in
the morning half of Olid’s troops came to reënforce him, together
with fifty of Sandoval’s infantry. The addition was opportune, for
the Mexicans were advancing in swarms along the causeway as well as
by water, this time on the inner side of the road where the vessels
could not reach them. The heavy guns soon cleared a space on the
roadway, but as the soldiers pursued they suffered severely from the
canoes, which not only showered missiles but afforded retreat for
the sallying parties. Orders were accordingly given to cut a passage
through the embankment, so that the four brigantines might enter to
clear the inner basin. By this means the Spaniards were able to advance
to the very entrance of the city and inflict some damage, while the
remaining vessels explored the waters beyond, and drove back canoes
and fired buildings in the suburbs.
Sandoval at the same time advanced along the causeway from Iztapalapan
to Coyuhuacan. It was a league and a half in length, and a quarter
of a league from shore it passed through an island town, which was
captured and burned. Advised of this, Quauhtemotzin directed a fleet
to cut the causeway and entrap the Spaniards; but before long two of
the vessels were able to relieve Sandoval, who thereupon left a portion
of his troops, including the allies, at Coyuhuacan, and joined his
chief with the remainder. Nearly a week was occupied in strengthening
Fort Xoloc, arranging the camp, and bringing in supplies, during
which time desultory skirmishings were maintained, wherein Sandoval
among others received wounds. The brigantines roamed incessantly and
inflicted great damage, entering on one occasion for a long distance
a canal which led into the suburbs.[1135] Canoes no longer ventured
abroad when a sail was in sight, and the Mexicans began to protect
the water approaches and channels with stakes.
* * * * *
In order to complete the investment of the city it was only necessary
to occupy the northern causeway to Tepeyacac, along which the
besieged maintained a steady intercourse with the mainland. Advised
of this neglect by Alvarado, the general ordered Sandoval to form
a camp at that town[1136] with one hundred and forty Spaniards, of
whom twenty-three were horsemen, and a full proportion of allies.
Alvarado had half as many more infantry and a few more cavalry, while
two hundred infantry were quartered at Xoloc, supported besides by
a cavalry force in the rear, and by Olid’s party, with whom remained
the largest proportion of allies, now over eighty thousand, according
to Cortés’ own statement. The fort could not hold them, and they
accordingly encamped at Coyuhuacan, which lay more convenient for
supplies, and must be occupied to watch the hostile shore and lake
towns clustered in this quarter. The brigantines carried at least
two hundred and fifty men.[1137]
Everything being prepared, Cortés ordered a simultaneous attack from
all the camps, so as to divide the attention of the Mexicans and gain
all possible advantage. He himself advanced along the Iztapalapan
causeway with the greater part of his infantry, attended by several
cavaliers on foot, and by over eighty thousand allies, while a vessel
skirted the road on either side. There was more than one breach in
the road, behind which were posted large forces of warriors protected
by intrenchments of earth and masonry.
Without the vessels it would have cost much time and many lives to
cross; but the well-directed fire from the guns and arquebuses on the
flanks and rear of the enemy soon wrought disorder, which enabled
the sallying parties to obtain a foothold. Meanwhile a number of
infantry had swum across the channel and aided to drive the Mexicans
beyond the next breach. The same manœuvre was repeated at this and
the other chasms, till the army found itself at the very entrance of
the city, protected by a wider channel than the preceding, with more
extensive fortifications, commanded by a temple tower. This with its
swarms of slingers and archers made the capture difficult, and the
Mexicans also showed more determination; but the guns and fusillade
could not be resisted, and soon the Spaniards stood within the city
for the first time since the memorable Noche Triste. Revenge seemed
already secured, and the lost treasures almost within the invaders’
grasp. Cortés, however, did not permit himself to be carried away
by a momentary success. He saw the main street beyond thronged with
warriors fiercely bent on resistance, streets as far as the distant
temple of the war-god bordered with buildings, each a fortress in
itself, while many a barricaded channel blocked the way.
A large force of allies had been left to fill the chasm and level
the ground as the army advanced, using for this purpose the captured
intrenchments and buildings, or even material from the causeway
itself. This work was under the direction of Diego Hernandez, a
man of herculean strength, who could throw a stone with a force and
precision, it was said, approximating those of cannon.[1138] This
filling of the chasms enabled the horses to be brought forward, and
they now led the charge against the dense masses of natives, after
the arquebuses had effected the preliminary clearing. Cortés had not
underestimated the annoyance to be encountered from the archers and
slingers covering the roofs on either side; but the operations of the
cavalry left the many arquebusiers and cross-bowmen at liberty to cover
the points of approach through which the allies in particular poured
in countless numbers with sidearms and fire-brands. The progress so
far had surpassed all anticipation; but now the Spaniards came to
a canal from which the retreating Mexicans removed the few planks
remaining of the bridge, leaving a solitary beam. Here the warriors
were massed in greater confidence, free as they were from the attack
of vessels and sheltered by strong intrenchments, while the adjoining
roofs, equally protected by the canals, teemed with missile-throwers.
The soldiers tried again and again to cross the chasm, only to be
driven back with injury. The volleys from cross-bows and fire-arms
could effect but little damage against the well sheltered warriors,
while their arrows and stones came in rattling showers. Finally two
cannon were brought forward. This changed the issue, for a breach
was speedily made in the intrenchments, and now the small-arms were
able to coöperate with great execution.
After a delay of two hours the soldiers were across; and while the
allies filled the canal they again pursued their advance along the
avenue, though suffering considerably from the roof missiles. They
now came to the last channel in the street, close to the main plaza,
wherein stood the famous temple of Huitzilopochtli.
The advance of the Spaniards had been so unexpected and rapid that
the Mexicans had not thought of fortifying this canal, and little
difficulty was met in crossing. But beyond, the plaza was filled
with files of defenders, determined to save their deities and that
sacred ground. Greatly frightened, the priests cried out to them:
“Behold! it was here upon this spot you fought these beings infernal
before, and drove them forth in shameful flight; the gods will help
you again!” Even the Spanish soldiers were impressed by the words
and gestures of the frantic devotees, and noted their effect in the
gleaming eyes and pressed lips of the warriors, and they paused. But
presently a gun was brought forward and directed against the packed
throng. This effected a backward movement. “There is no time for rest
or fear!” shouted Cortés, as with shield in hand he rushed forward.
With a thundering Santiago the soldiers followed. The charge was
irresistible, and already startled by the mowing cannon-balls the
Mexicans took refuge within the temple enclosure and in the by-streets.
The Spaniards followed the crowd within the sacred grounds, slashing
and thrusting. It seemed a repetition of Alvarado’s massacre, and
the war-god, thirsting for blood, might now have his fill. In a
few moments not a warrior was left round the temple, only prostrate
bodies. Then the soldiers prepared to ascend the pyramid to hurl down
the idol and its defenders. But the deity was aroused. The sombre
notes of the sacred drum struck their fearful appeal on every heart,
“Rouse ye to your imperilled hearths and temples!” It was but now the
Mexicans observed that the death-dealing horsemen were not present,
for the last channel had not yet been filled to afford a crossing.
This lent them courage, and on the foe they quickly rushed from lanes
and houses, while down from the temple-top came a doubly inspired
avalanche. The shock was overwhelming. The Spaniards were forced to
retire, partly in disorder. Cortés made frantic efforts to stay the
flight, and at the gate a momentary rally was made by a few; but
what availed that handful against the torrent sweeping onward, headed
by the renowned band of Quauhtin? Perforce they must yield and join
the troops which were in such hasty flight from the plaza that they
even abandoned the cannon. Cortés was on foot in the crowd, and his
voice was drowned in the tumult. He could but follow with the wild
current, which threatened to lead into another disaster. Just then
cries of alarm burst from the crowds on the roofs, and there was a
lull in the shower of stones and darts, and the pressure of pursuers
relaxed. The next moment the ears of the wandering Spaniards caught
the clatter of hoofs.
The cavalry had come up; a revulsion set in. They were but a few,[1139]
but enough to bring back to the minds of the Mexicans their original
and ever present fear of the monsters, for they knew not how many
might be coming down upon them.
The infantry followed the horsemen with inspiring cheers, and bore
unresisted onward, for the late bravery of the foe was now turned to
cowardice. Before long the Spaniards had penetrated through the plaza
and occupied once more the temple court. Once more their looks were
upward toward the summit of the lofty pyramid consecrated during their
former occupation to the holy virgin; and while the main portion of the
troops fought the now rallying Mexicans, a sturdy handful undertook
the capture of the sanctuary. A dozen chiefs held possession, but
naught could stay the fury of the soldiers, and in a few moments the
last defender had yielded his spirit in defense of his faith.
The Spaniards looked in vain for any trace of their own altar and
symbols, round which they had so oft congregated in prayer. In their
stead rose a new idol glittering with ornaments and hideous with
devices, while fresh stains of blood spread horror over all. The
gleam of gold proved all absorbing, however, and hastily the jewels
and the golden mask were torn away, and then the head of the idol
was struck off and sent clattering below.[1140]
There was time for nothing more, for on finding so few horsemen
present, the Quauhtin knights had again made an effective rally,
pressing the troops closely. Fortunately a larger force of cavalry
came up again to turn the tide of battle and inflict a severe lesson.
As it was late by this time, there remained no choice but that
of returning to camp. This movement gave fresh confidence to the
Mexicans, who followed in swarms, harassing from roofs and lanes,
on front and flanks, rushing forward with renewed fury after every
charge by the cavalry which covered the rear. But for the horses
the soldiers would have suffered severely; as it was, the retreat
proceeded in good order, and as many houses as possible were fired
with a view to make the next entry safer. On approaching the causeway
the canoe crews, composed of selected warriors, fell on the flanks
and created no little confusion before they were driven back. After
this no difficulty was experienced in reaching camp, thanks to the
foresight of Cortés, who had ordered the channels filled.[1141] The
other captains, Alvarado and Sandoval, had performed their share in
the day’s work, and although they do not appear to have reached even
the suburb, detained by the many breaches and other obstacles on
the causeways, yet the diversion created by their attacks proved of
great service to Cortés. One reason for their slower advance was the
want of coöperation from the vessels, which had been of such great
assistance on the Iztapalapan road. This was at once remedied by the
detachment of three brigantines each for the Tlacopan and Tepeyacac
camps.[1142]
FOOTNOTES
[1113] Several leading authors assume this to have occurred
on the 28th of April, when Cortés mustered his forces. He
says nothing about the formal launch on that occasion, and
it is hardly likely that two such performances could have
been effected in one day.
[1114] ‘Las vanderas Reales, y otras vanderas del nombre
que se dezia ser el vergantin.’ _Bernal Diaz_, _Hist.
Verdad._, 138. Ixtlilxochitl assumes that the flag-ship
was named _Medellin_, _Hist. Chich._, 313-14, but this
appears to be based on a misinterpretation of Herrera, who
places Villafuerte ‘of Medellin’ at the head of the list
of captains. Vetancurt believes that the vessels were named
after the apostles, to whom Cortés was so devoted. _Teatro
Mex._, pt. iii. 156. If so, the flag-ship may have been
called _San Pedro_, after his patron. When all were floated
a storm came which threatened to break them one against
the other. _Torquemada_, i. 532.
[1115] Their names appear to have been Juan Rodriguez de
Villafuerte of Medellin, Juan Jaramillo of Salvatierra,
Francisco Rodriguez Magariño of Merida, Cristóbal Flores
of Valencia, Juan García Holguin of Cáceres, Caravajal of
Zamora, Pedro Barba of Seville, Gerónimo Ruiz de la Mota
of Búrgos, Pedro de Briones of Salamanca, Rodrigo Morejon
de Lovera of Medina del Campo, Antonio de Sotelo of Zamora,
Juan de Portillo of Portillo, and Miguel Diaz de Auz. Martin
Lopez, the ship-builder, also joined, in the character of
chief pilot. Herrera, dec. iii. lib. i. cap. xii. xxi., has
Francisco de Verdugo, of Arévalo, instead of Diaz de Auz,
but Bernal Diaz names him as one of the company captains
under Olid, and he ought to know better in this respect.
He also names a second Caravajal, Zamora, a ship-master,
afterward settled in Oajaca, Colmenero, Gines Nortes, and
Lerma. _Hist. Verdad._, 138.
[1116] The smallest was soon set aside as useless. There was
some trouble in obtaining rowers, owing in a great measure
to the employment in Spain of criminals in that capacity.
Hidalgos shrank from anything that could be regarded as
common labor, and even ordinary sailors refused to handle
a branded implement. In this dilemma a list was made of
all natives of seaports, and of those known to be able
fishermen, and finally the selected number were ordered to
take the oar, regardless of caste.
[1117] So says Cortés, _Cartas_, 208. Bernal Diaz as usual
implies a smaller number by stating that Cortés sent to ask
for only 20,000 men from the republics. _Hist. Verdad._,
137-8. The Cholultecs, he says, who had maintained a neutral
attitude since the massacre there, sent a small force under
their own captain. Gomara allows 60,000 allies to come;
Vetancurt 90,000, of whom 60,000 are Tlascaltecs; Clavigero
limits the arrival to 50,000 Tlascaltecs, the whole number
of allies swelling gradually to over 200,000, while Herrera
makes that number arrive within two days; Ixtlilxochitl
names thirteen chiefs, who commanded the 50,000 Tlascaltecs
(a misprint gives 5000), and some of those leading the
10,000 Huexotzincas; he also allows 10,000 Cholultecs;
of his own Tezcucans he claims over 200,000 to have come,
50,000 each being furnished by the provinces of Tezcuco,
Otumba, Tziuhcohua, and Chalco, with Tepeaca, Quauhnahuac,
etc.; 8000 chiefs or nobles joined besides from Tezcuco,
and 50,000 laborers in addition, it seems. _Hist. Chich._,
313; _Hor. Crueldades_, 20.
[1118] ‘Viua el Emperador nuestro señor, y Castilla,
Castilla, Tlascala, Tlascala!’ _Bernal Diaz_, loc. cit. It
took three days for the auxiliaries to enter, says Ojeda,
and great as was Tezcuco, there was not room for them.
_Herrera_, dec. iii. lib. i. cap. xii. Bernal Diaz reduces
the days to hours.
[1119] _Cortés_, _Cartas_, 206. Gomara agrees, _Hist. Mex._,
191, but Bernal Diaz gives the number as 84 horsemen, 650
soldiers with swords, shields, and lances, and 194 archers
and arquebusiers. loc. cit.
[1120] Some half a dozen towns furnished 8000 each within
eight days. The feathers were fastened by the archers with
glue from the _cactle_ root. They kept two strings and as
many catches, and maintained their skill by target practice.
_Id._
[1121] The distribution of forces as given by Cortés stands
thus: To Alvarado, 30 horse, 18 arquebusiers and archers,
150 sword and shield men, and over 25,000 Tlascaltecs; to
Olid, 33 horse, 18 archers and arquebusiers, 160 sword
and shield men, and over 20,000 allies; to Sandoval, 24
horse, 4 arquebusiers, 13 archers, 150 sword and shield
men, and over 30,000 allies from Huexotzinco, Cholula, and
Chalco. _Cartas_, 207. Others differ more or less, some
giving details that hardly accord with the totals. Bernal
Diaz names as Alvarado’s three captains his brother Jorge
de Alvarado, Gutierre de Badajoz, and Andrés de Monjaraz,
the latter an agreeable, bright-faced fellow of about 32
years, always suffering from a Lotharian disease which
prevented him from doing anything. The three captains under
Olid were Andrés de Tápia, a growing favorite of Cortés’,
Francisco Verdugo, the unconscious fellow-conspirator
of Villafañe, and Francisco de Lugo, the natural son of
a prominent estate-holder at Medina del Campo. Sandoval
had but two captains, the insinuating Pedro de Ircio, and
Luis Marin of San Lúcar, a muscular and dashing fellow, of
Monjaraz’ age, with an open blonde face, somewhat pitted,
and possessed of a voluble tongue. _Hist. Verdad._, 139,
240, 246. Ixtlilxochitl gives a longer list, which is
clearly wrong in many respects, and he adds some names of
native leaders. Alvarado kept the Tlascaltecs of Tizatlan
and Tepeticpac; Olid those of Ocotelulco and Quiahuiztlan.
_Hist. Chich._, 313-14. He further states that his namesake
joined Cortés’ fleet with 16,000 canoes, containing 50,000
Tezcucans, of whom 8000 were nobles. _Hor. Crueldades_, 21.
Brasseur de Bourbourg follows this author in many respects,
improving somewhat on the names. Herrera names five of the
sub-captains, among them Hernando de Lerma of Galicia. dec.
iii. lib. i. cap. xii.
[1122] ‘Iva a tomar por fuerça el Cacicazgo, e vassallos,
y tierra del mismo Chichimecatecle,’ _Bernal Diaz_, _Hist.
Verdad._, 139, which must be an idle rumor.
[1123] Some time later when Ojeda went to Tlascala for
supplies he brought back the confiscated property, including
a quantity of treasure, and 30 women, the daughters,
servants, etc., of Xicotencatl. _Torquemada_, i. 558. The
Tlascaltec laws were severe, ‘E l’odio particolare, che
portavano a quel Principe, il cui orgoglio non potevano
più soffrire.’ _Clavigero_, _Storia Mess._, iii. 195. Some
Tlascaltecs say his father had warned Cortés against his
son, and urged his death. _Bernal Diaz_, loc. cit. Herrera
observes that he could hardly have been seized without
Tlascaltec aid. dec. iii. lib. i. cap. xvii.
[1124] _Ojeda_, in _Herrera_, loc. cit. Solis, _Hist. Mex._,
ii. 379, thinks that it would have been hazardous to hang
him at Tezcuco, where many Tlascaltecs were gathered; but
he forgets that nearly all this people had already set
out for Mexico. His supposition is based on Bernal Diaz,
who intimates that he was not hanged in Tezcuco. Alvarado
had pleaded for his life, and Cortés, while pretending
compliance, secretly ordered the alguacil to despatch him.
_Hist. Verdad._, 139.
[1125] Cortés divided the lordship of the chieftain afterward
between his two sons, and the name of Xicotencatl has been
perpetuated by more than one line, as Camargo shows in
his _Hist. Tlax._ Two officers of that name figured during
the American invasion of 1847 in defence of their country.
_Brasseur de Bourbourg_, _Hist. Nat. Civ._, iv. 447.
[1126] Most writers say the 10th, misled by an error in
_Cortés_, _Cartas_, 208; and this error causes Prescott,
among others, to fall into more than one mistake, which
he upholds with vain arguments. On earlier pages in the
_Cartas_ are given dates in connection with religious
festivals which show that Whitsunday fell on the 19th of
May, and the departure took place three days later. Bernal
Diaz gives the 13th, and says that the Xicotencatl affair
had detained them a day. He afterward varies the date.
[1127] They passed round Zumpango Lake, through Quauhtitlan
and Tenayocan. _Cortés_, _Cartas_, 210; _Bernal Diaz_,
_Hist. Verdad._, 139.
[1128] ‘Jamàs quisieron Paz [the Aztecs]; y aunque à
la postre la recibieron, el Rei no la aceptò, porque al
principio, contra su Consejo, la rehusaron.’ _Torquemada_,
i. 572. Gomara says the same, but Duran, the historian
of his dynasty, declares that he loved too much to rule
and to display his personal valor ever to listen to peace
proposals. _Hist. Ind._, MS., ii. 490. On the following
pages he gives a speech by this ruler, painting the shame
and evil of surrender. Before this, according to the native
records of Sahagun, Cortés had invited Quauhtemotzin, under
promise of security, to a conference, in order to explain
his motives for the campaign. Not wishing to appear afraid,
the Aztec monarch came to the rendezvous near Acachinanco,
in a state barge, attended by several nobles. Cortés arrived
in a brigantine. He reviewed the allegiance tendered to the
Spanish sovereign, the revolt, precipitated by Alvarado’s
effort to anticipate the murderous plot, and the subsequent
slaughter of Spaniards and robbery of treasures. These
unjustifiable and inhuman outrages he had come to avenge;
and he would not stay his hand till the enemies of his king
and God had been driven forth. Quauhtemotzin merely replied
that he accepted war, and thereupon returned to the city.
_Sahagun_, _Hist. Conq._ (ed. 1840), 147-50. Torquemada,
i, 543, and Brasseur de Bourbourg adopt this story, the
latter stating that the Aztec ruler proposed to consult his
council. But Clavigero rightly assumes that the interview
never took place. All other records say that Quauhtemotzin
persistently refused ever to speak with Cortés, even from
behind his walls.
[1129] Many captives had been secured during recent raids
on Chalco and Tezcuco, and other parts, so that there was
no lack. The native victims numbered 4000, it is said.
_Herrera_, dec. iii. lib. i. cap. xvii. ‘All boys,’ says
Oviedo, iii. 515. ‘Yo bien creo que fuerõ muchas, mas no
tantas.’ _Gomara_, loc. cit. The limbs of the Spaniards were
sent to different provinces to frighten the inhabitants.
_Bernal Diaz_, _Hist. Verdad._, 135.
[1130] Ixtlilxochitl states in one place that his namesake
remained at Tezcuco to raise troops and to arrange for
regular trains of supplies for the Spanish camps. In another
relation he allows him to accompany Cortés with 16,000
canoes. _Hor. Crueldades_, 21; _Relacion_, 314. The canoes
which now attended the fleet appear to have served chiefly
as transports.
[1131] Owned even under republican rule by the heirs of
Cortés, as a tetzontli quarry.
[1132] _Cortés_, _Cartas_, 211. Bernal Diaz raises the number
to 4000, Peter Martyr to 5000, while Vetancurt assumes that
the 500 were merely the van. _Teatro Mex._, pt. iii. 158.
[1133] Oviedo writes that they were sacrificing boys to
propitiate the gods. iii. 516. ‘La flota q̄ les parecio
no dar batalla con tan pocas y cansadas,’ observes Gomara,
_Hist. Mex._, 194.
[1134] Alvarado advanced as far as the first wide bridge,
but lost three men. _Bernal Diaz_, _Hist. Verdad._, 141.
[1135] Probably behind the great southern levee. See _Native
Races_, ii. 564.
[1136] Gomara calls it wrongly Xaltoca, and Robertson
confounds it, singularly enough, with Tezcuco. _Hist. Am._,
ii. 114.
[1137] _Cortés_, _Cartas_, 216-17. The greater number of
the allies came daily from their camp at Coyuhuacan to
join Cortés as warriors and sappers. Digging and similar
work was done chiefly by Tezcucans. Herrera states that
the vessels of Flores and Ruiz de la Mota were placed at a
broken causeway between the camps of Alvarado and Sandoval.
dec. iii. lib. i. cap. xvii.
[1138] ‘Asserrador ... trabajò mas que mil Indios.’
_Herrera_, dec. iii. lib. i. cap. xviii.
[1139] Only three, says Cortés and others.
[1140] Ixtlilxochitl allows his namesake and Cortés to figure
in this scene, the former cutting off the idol’s head while
the general secured the mask. He states that the temple
was captured during the first entry into the court. When
the Mexicans rallied, Ixtlilxochitl managed to kill their
general, which so enraged them that they rushed madly on
and drove back the Spaniards till the horse arrived. _Hor.
Crueldades_, 29-30. His version is adopted in the main by
Prescott and others; but there are several discrepancies.
The death of a general as a rule discouraged native armies.
Cortés, who would not have failed to claim the overthrow
of the idol, states that it was effected by four or five
Spaniards, after the second capture of the court. _Cartas_,
218. His presence was needed below to direct operations.
Gomara’s text must have misled Ixtlilxochitl and others.
_Hist. Mex._, 197-8. Herrera and Torquemada adhere better
to Cortés.
[1141] Cortés speaks of an ambuscade by the horsemen wherein
30 Mexicans fell. _Cartas_, 218. How many of his own were
lost he prudently abstains from mentioning, though admitting
many wounded. ‘Dexaron perdido los Españoles esta vez el
tiro grueso,’ says Torquemada, i. 548, but this is unlikely.
[1142] _Cortés_, _Cartas_, 221. Bernal Diaz states that
Alvarado received four and Sandoval only two. _Hist.
Verdad._, 141.