INVALUABLE FRIENDSHIP.
JULY-SEPTEMBER, 1520.
DIVERS DISASTERS TO THE SPANIARDS—MEXICO MAKES OVERTURES
TO TLASCALA—A COUNCIL HELD—TLASCALA REMAINS TRUE TO THE
SPANIARDS—DISAFFECTION IN THE SPANISH ARMY—CORTÉS AGAIN
WINS THE SOLDIERS TO HIS VIEWS—RENEWAL OF ACTIVE OPERATIONS
AGAINST THE AZTECS—SUCCESS OF THE SPANISH ARMS—LARGE
REINFORCEMENTS OF NATIVE ALLIES—ONE AZTEC STRONGHOLD AFTER
ANOTHER SUCCUMBS.
At Tlascala were certain invalid Spaniards, who praised the natives for
their kind treatment, and for the almost universal sympathy exhibited
with regard to the misfortunes at Mexico. The army now learned
that disaster had also befallen the Spaniards in other parts of the
country. The news of the flight had spread with marvellous rapidity,
and Cuitlahuatzin’s envoys had not failed to magnify the successes
of his arms while urging throughout the country the extermination of
the invaders. This advice had found ready acceptance in the provinces
west and south of Tlascala, which had additional reasons for hostility
in the assumption of the little republic since she became the ally
of the strangers.
Shortly after the departure of the army from the coast a party of
fifty men with five horses had followed with baggage and valuables. At
Tlascala a portion of them, with two horses, under Juan de Alcántara
senior, received the portion of treasure set aside during the late
repartition for the coast garrison, estimated at sixty thousand pesos.
With this they set out on their return to Villa Rica, accompanied by
a few invalids. On the way they were surprised and slaughtered, the
treasures and effects being distributed as spoils.[901]
The larger division of the party, under the hidalgo Juan Yuste,[902]
which were to join Cortés, also picked up some convalescents, together
with additional treasure and baggage, and proceeded to Mexico by
the way of Calpulalpan. They numbered five horsemen, forty-five
foot-soldiers, and three hundred Tlascaltecs, the latter under command
of one of Maxixcatzin’s sons. Advised of their approach the natives of
Zultepec, among others, were induced, more by cupidity than patriotic
zeal, to form an ambuscade along the steep declivity of a narrow
pass which had to be followed. Here they fell upon the party on all
sides as they descended in single file, encumbered beside by their
burdens. Resistance was ineffective, and those not slain were carried
to Tezcuco to be offered up to the idols, while their effects were
distributed, some of the trophies being dedicated to temples of the
Acolhuan capital, there to tell the mournful tale to the returning
conquerors.[903]
About this time a vessel arrived at Villa Rica with three or four
score of adventurers, under Captain Coronado, and being told of the
fabulously rich Mexico they resolved to lose no time in following
the army, in order to secure a share of treasures. It was just after
the flight from Mexico, and the provinces were in arms, elated at the
triumphs at the lake. On approaching the Tepeaca district the party
was surprised, and partly slaughtered, partly captured, the prisoners
being distributed among the towns of the province for sacrifice.[904]
These reports created no small alarm for the safety of Villa Rica, and
several Tlascaltec messengers were sent with letters, by different
routes, to bring news. Orders were also given to the comandante to
forward powder, fire-arms, bows, and other necessaries that he could
spare, together with some men, sailors, if no others were available.
The reply was reassuring, for although the natives had fuller
particulars of the disaster at Mexico than Cortés had chosen to impart
to the garrison, yet everything remained quiet. The remittance of war
material was small, and the men who convoyed it numbered less than
a dozen, men stricken by disease, and led by Lencero, who became the
butt of the _drôles de corps_.[905]
Every attention and comfort was tendered at Tlascala to the Spaniards
while caring for their wounds and awaiting the development of projects.
Hardly a man had arrived scathless, and quite a number had received
injuries which maimed them for life or resulted in death.[906] Cortés’
wounds were most serious. The indomitable spirit which sustained him
so far now yielded with the failing body. Severe scalp cuts brought
on fever,[907] which caused his life to hang in the balance for
some time. Finally his strong constitution and the excellent empiric
methods of the native herb doctors prevailed, to the joy, not alone
of Spaniards, but of Tlascaltecs, who had shown the utmost anxiety
during the crisis.
* * * * *
During this period of Spanish inaction the Mexicans were energetically
striving to follow up their blow against the invaders. The first act
after ridding the capital of their presence was one of purgation,
in which the victorious party fell on those whose lukewarmness,
or whose friendly disposition toward Montezuma and his guests, had
hindered the siege operations and aided the enemy. A tumult was soon
raised, wherein perished four royal princes, brothers and sons of
Montezuma,[908] whose death may be attributed to Cuitlahuatzin’s
desire to remove any dangerous rival to the throne. Not that this was
a necessary precaution, since his standing, as a younger brother of
Montezuma, and his successful operations against the Spaniards, were
sufficient to raise him above every other candidate.[909] Furthermore,
as commander-in-chief of the army and as leader of the successful
party, he held the key to the position, and accordingly was unanimously
chosen. About the same time Cohuanacoch was elected king at Tezcuco,
in lieu of the younger brother forced on the people by Cortés, and
Quauhtemotzin, nephew of Montezuma, rose to the office of high-priest
to Huitzilopochtli. The coronation was the next prominent event,[910]
for which the indispensable captives had already been secured from
the fleeing army. What more precious victims, indeed, could have been
desired for the inaugural than the powerful Spaniards and the hated
warriors of brave Tlascala? And what grander site for the ceremony
than the great temple, recovered from the detested intruders and
purified from foreign emblems? In connection with this came a series
of festivals.[911]
The utmost activity was displayed in repairing the damage caused
by the Spaniards, and in fortifying the city and its approaches
against a possible future invasion. The construction and discipline
of the army were improved in some degree after the examples given
by the Europeans; its tactics were revised, and its arms perfected
with the aid of captured weapons, the Chinantec pike being also
introduced and tipped with Toledo blades or other metal points.
Envoys were despatched to near and distant provinces, bidding for
their support by remission of taxes and tributes, by restoration of
conquered territories, by patriotic appeals, and by roseate views
and promises.[912] The Spaniards were painted as selfish, perfidious,
and cruel, intent on conquering the whole country, on enslaving the
people, on extorting their substance, and on overthrowing social and
religious institutions. Spoils and heads of Spanish men and horses were
sent round to disabuse the people of their supposed invulnerability;
and as a further encouragement the dreaded Cortés was declared to
have fallen.
The most important missions were those to Michoacan and Tlascala,
the former an independent kingdom of considerable extent, stretching
westward beyond the lake region to the Pacific, over an undulating,
well watered territory, which abounded in all the resources of a rich
soil and a tropic climate. The inhabitants, the Tarascos, were distinct
from the Aztecs in language, but fully their equals in culture, which
was of the Nahua type, and as a rule successful in resisting the
armed encroachments of the lake allies. The present ruler was Zwanga,
who held court at Tzintzuntzan, on Lake Patzcuaro. He received the
embassadors of Cuitlahuatzin with due attention, but hesitated about
the answer to be given. The Aztecs had from time immemorial been
the enemies of his people, and to aid them would surely bring upon
him the wrath of the Spaniards, who must still be powerful, since
the Mexicans came to plead for his alliance. In this dilemma it was
resolved, with the advice of the council, to send plenipotentiaries
to Mexico, in order to learn more fully the condition of affairs,
and there determine what should be done.[913]
More decisive in its results was the mission to Tlascala. Regarded
as the most important of all, it was intrusted to six prominent
men, of acknowledged talent for negotiation. They came fortified
with choice presents of robes, feathers, salt, and similar desirable
commodities, and were received with customary courtesy by the assembled
lords and council. The eldest was the first to speak. He recalled
the intimate relationship between Mexico and Tlascala in blood and
language, deplored the feud which had so long existed, and urged the
establishment of permanent peace, for mutual benefit, whereby the
Tlascaltecs would gain all the advantages of a long prohibited trade.
One obstacle alone interposed to prevent a happy harmony, which was the
presence of the Spaniards, to whom was due the unfortunate condition
of the whole country. Their only aim was to make themselves masters,
to overthrow the gods of the natives, to enslave the inhabitants,
and impoverish them by exactions.
The Tlascaltecs would after rendering service be treated with the
same base ingratitude and perfidy as the over generous Montezuma,
and reap not only universal detestation, but the anger of the gods.
Better, therefore, to seize the present favorable opportunity to
deliver themselves from dreadful calamities, to establish prosperity
and independence on a firm basis, and by a joint alliance recover the
alienated provinces and share the revenues therefrom.[914] The first
step to this desirable end was the destruction of the Spaniards,
now at their mercy, whereby they would gain also the gratitude of
neighboring peoples, the fame of patriots, and the blessing of the
gods.
The speech delivered, together with the presents, the envoys withdrew
to let the council deliberate. Bitter as was the enmity between the
two peoples, intensified by the recent defeat, there were not wanting
persons to whom the argument and offers seemed all that the most
brilliant fortune could bring. What, indeed, had they in common with
a strange race by whom they had been conquered, and whose presence
portended many changes in their social and religious institutions,
transmitted by their forefathers, and upheld with the blood of
generations? Their independence would be endangered. Besides, the
invaders had been shamefully defeated, and might never again hold up
their heads. The whole country was mustering to drive them out, and,
if successful, woe to Tlascala, as their ally. In any case a struggle
was in prospect, wherein their sons and brethren would be sacrificed
by the thousands. And for what? For the benefit of strangers, always
ready with their yoke of slavery. On the other hand, they were offered
the peace so long desired, with its accompanying blessings; deliverance
from the trade blockade and seclusion which had so long afflicted
them, together with the attractive adjunct of assured independence,
and the triumphant and profitable position of conquering allies of
the Mexicans.[915]
The strongest advocate of these views was Xicotencatl junior, who
had never forgotten the several Spanish victories that checked his
triumphal career as soldier and general, and humiliated him in the
eyes of the whole people. Yet this feeling was tinged with love for
the independence and welfare of the country, threatened, in his eyes,
by the invaders. With the news of disaster at Mexico his party had
assumed respectable proportions. Some of its members were impelled by
motives similar to his own; some were bribed by Mexican gifts, and
promises of wealth and preferment; some were tempted by the arms,
baggage, and treasure of the fugitives, whom it seemed easy now to
overcome. Not a few considered the burden of maintaining a horde of
strangers, with the prospect of afterward yielding them service and
blood for their aggrandizement. When the collectors of provisions for
the Spaniards made their rounds they could not but observe the bitter
feeling which prevailed in some quarters.[916] The elder Xicotencatl
appears to have remonstrated with his son for breeding trouble; but
this availed little, as may be supposed. During the deliberation
of the council on the Mexican proposal the young chieftain stepped
beyond the timid suggestions of those who inclined toward an Aztec
alliance, and boldly advocated it as the only salvation for Tlascala.
Next spoke the wise Maxixcatzin, the leading representative of the
republic. In his chivalrous nature devotion to the Spaniards exercised
an influence, while as ruler of the richest district, in agriculture
and trade, he had also an eye to the benefits which would accrue from
an alliance with them. He recalled the many instances of treachery
and want of good faith on the part of the Mexicans to show how little
their promises could be relied on. It was merely the presence of the
Spaniards that prompted their offer of alliance, which was to restore
Mexico to its former terrorizing strength. This accomplished, the
ancient enemy would not fail to remember that Tlascala, in addition
to the old-standing enmity, had been one of the chief instruments in
their late suffering and humiliation, and had figured as conqueror
and master over them. They would lose no time in avenging themselves,
and by the destruction of the republic remove forever so dangerous an
enemy. Far better, then, to maintain the friendship of the Spaniards,
whose good faith had been tried, and whose prowess was not broken
by one defeat. Previous to their arrival they had been suffering
from the want even of necessaries, and had been exposed to incessant
ravages and warfare, which threatened their very existence. With the
Spaniards’ aid they had been freed from this want and danger; they
had enriched themselves with trade and spoils, and had raised the
republic to the most prominent position it had ever occupied, all
far beyond what the Mexicans would ever permit. What did the gods
say? Oracles and omens had foretold the doom of the empire. It was
in vain to struggle with fate, which had decreed the control to the
new-comers. The interests of the state demanded the friendship of
these destined victors, who offered them wealth and glory, while good
faith and honor demanded loyalty to the invited guests, from whom so
many benefits had already sprung.
Observing the effect of the appeal on the wavering members, young
Xicotencatl hastened to defend his cherished plans, but with such
imprudence as to rouse Maxixcatzin to strike him. He was thereupon
jostled out of the council-chamber, badly bruised and with torn
clothes.[917] Against this expulsion none of his supporters ventured to
remonstrate, and the vote being unanimously in favor of Maxixcatzin’s
views, the Aztec envoys were notified accordingly.[918] How momentous
this discussion! And did the council of Tlascala realize the full
import of their acts? For thereby they determined the present and
permanent fate of many powerful nations besides themselves. Undoubtedly
the country would at some time have fallen before the dominant power;
but, had it been possible for the nations of the great plateau to
combine and act in unison, very different might have been their
ultimate condition. Cortés and his company owed their safety to a
decision which kept alive discord between the native tribes, while
the Tlascaltecs were saved from what probably would have been a
treacherous alliance, perhaps from annihilation, only to sink into
peaceful obscurity and merge into the mass of conquered people.[919]
They endeavored to keep the disagreement in the council-chamber a
secret from Cortés, but he heard of it, and failed not to confirm
Maxixcatzin in his devotion by holding forth the most brilliant
prospects as the result of this alliance. The words by which the
council decided for Cortés were to him as drops of perspiration on
the lately fevered brow, which tell that the crisis is passed.
There was another cloud about this time appearing on the horizon
of the fortunes of Cortés. During his stay at Tlascala the men of
Narvaez began again to moot the subject of return. The golden vision
of Mexico’s treasures had been rudely dissipated, leaving only the
remembrance of hardships and disgrace. The flowery Antilles appeared
more alluring than ever to these gold-seekers, only too many of whom
were more accustomed to the farm than to the camp. They could think of
nothing but the ease and security of the fertile plantations, where
nature unloaded its wealth, and where docile natives ministered to
every want. In furtherance of this idea it was urged on Cortés, by
Duero and other leaders, to retire, to Villa Rica before the Mexicans
had succeeded in their efforts to cut off his retreat. There they would
intrench themselves while awaiting aid from the islands and arranging
a fresh campaign, having the vessels to fall back on, if necessary.
But to these intimations Cortés would not for a moment listen. And
there were many reasons for this—his ambition to be all or nothing
in this enterprise, his crimes against Velazquez, his irregularities
regarding the king’s interests, which only brilliant success could
redeem. As well might they talk to the unyielding hills; he would join
his dead comrades in the canals of Mexico, or voluntarily ascend to
the sacrificial stone, but he would not turn back from this adventure.
When the general revealed his firm intention to renew the campaign
as soon as possible, the outcry became loud. The Noche Triste and the
narrow escape at Otumba had left impressions too horrible to be easily
forgotten. They shuddered at the thought of renewing such risk, and
cursed the gold which had allured them to former discomfitures. If
the general wished to throw away his life he might do so, but they
were not such madmen. Moreover, it was highly imprudent to place so
much faith in the Tlascaltecs, who might at the first encounter with
the enemy abandon or betray allies differing so greatly in language,
religion, and customs. A formal demand was therefore addressed to
him, through the notary, to return to Villa Rica, on the ground of
their small number and dismembered condition, devoid as they were
of clothing, arms, ammunition, and horses, and with so many maimed
and wounded. They were wholly unfit to undertake any campaign, much
less against an enemy who had just defeated them when they were far
stronger in number and armament than now. Declared, as it was, in the
name of the army, though in truth by the men of Narvaez only,[920]
and headed by such persons as Duero, with invocation of the imperial
name, the proposal placed Cortés in a dilemma. Yet it roused in him
only a firmer determination. He was more master now than ever he
could be under the new proposal; and Cortés loved to be master. The
same reasons which had moved him before to advance into Mexico in
quest of independent fame and wealth, and to evade the prospective
disgrace and poverty, imprisonment and death, were reasons stronger
now than ever.
Here was another of those delicate points on which the destiny of the
Estremaduran seemed ever turning. Rousing himself to meet the issue,
though still weak with disease, he summoned an audience. “What is this
I hear?” he asked of the assembled soldiers. “Is it true that you
would retire from the fertile fields of New Spain, you, Spaniards,
Castilians, Christians! leave the ship-loads of gold which in the
Aztec capital we saw and handled; leave still standing the abominable
idols with their bloody ministers, and tamely summon others to enjoy
the riches and glories which you are too craven to achieve? Alack!
for your patriotism, for duty to your emperor, to God, for the honor
of Spanish arms! Know you not that one step further in retreat than
necessary is equivalent to the abandonment of all? Or perhaps the
fault is my own. I have been too careful of mine ease, too cowardly
to expose my person to the dangers into which I directed you; I
have fled before the foe—help me to remember, friends—I have left my
comrades to die unaided on the battle-field while I sought safety,
I have fed while you starved, I have slept while you labored, or my
too sluggish brain has refused the duty due by your commander.” The
speaker paused, but only for a moment. At this, the very beginning of
his plea, a hundred eyes were affectionately regarding him through
their moisture, a hundred tongues were denying all insinuations of
baseness as applied to him, their great and brave commander. Already
their hearts were aflame with avarice and ambition; aflame, like St
Augustine’s, with Christian zeal and fervency of devotion, soldier
fanatics as they were, stern, forehead-wrinkled men—for fighting
men, no less than fighting dogs, display a gravity in their every-day
demeanor unknown to tamer spirits. “Are not my interests yours, and
yours mine?” continued Cortés. “Therefore, I pray you, ascribe not
my views to disregard of your wishes, but to a desire to promote the
good of all. What people going to war that does not sometimes suffer
defeat; but what brave men ever abandoned a glorious campaign because
of one repulse? And do you not see that it is more dangerous to go than
to remain—that to retreat further would only invite further attack?
I will not allude before soldiers of mine,” concluded the speaker,
“to the everlasting infamy of abandoning these brave Tlascaltecs to
the enmity of the combined forces of the plateau for having stood the
Spaniards’ friend in time of danger. Go, all of you who will! abandon
your sacred trusts, and with them the riches in mines, and tributes
here awaiting you, and fair encomiendas, with countless servants
to attend before your new nobility; for myself, if left alone, then
alone will I here remain and general Indians, since Spaniards have
all turned cowards!”
Hearts of steel could not withstand such words so spoken; and loud
came the shouts of approval from Cortés’ old comrades, who swore that
not a man should be allowed to endanger the common safety by leaving.
This manifestation was in itself sufficient to shame the disaffected
into resignation, although not into silence, for mutterings were
frequent against the quality of persuasion employed by the general and
his beggarly followers, who had nothing to lose except their lives.
In order somewhat to allay their discontent Cortés promised that at
the conclusion of the next campaign their wishes should be consulted,
and the first favorable opportunity for departure be tendered them—a
cool proposal, affecting only those who would be left of them, yet
made with sober visage by the artless Cortés.[921]
The determination of Cortés was now what it always had been, namely,
to conquer and become master of all New Spain; and the greater the
difficulty the greater the glory. Fearing that further evil might
result from continued inactivity, and from remaining a burden on the
allies, Cortés resolved to lose no time in taking the field.[922] In
the fertile plains to the south of Tlascala lay the rich province
of Tepeyacac,[923] euphonized into Tepeaca, long hostile to the
republic. Intimidated by the subjugation of Tlascala and Cholula, the
three brothers who ruled it[924] had tendered their submission to the
conquerors, only to return to their old masters, the Aztecs, the moment
fortune seemed to favor them. The latter had indeed, in connection
with their other preparations, made particular efforts to stir the
provinces round Tlascala and toward the coast, sending large garrisons
to form centres for the native armies, the object being partly to cut
off communication with the coast, so as to prevent reinforcements from
reaching the Spaniards, and partly to effect a rear movement when it
might be decided to attack the republic. Reinforcements had already
been surprised in this region and slaughtered, as we have seen, and
raids had been made on the allied frontier.
Here was all the cause the Spaniards required for attack, and as the
country was for the most part open, the horsemen would have great
advantage over native troops. Its subjugation, therefore, promised
to be easy, and would secure the rear. The Tlascaltecs approved
of beginning the campaign with the outlying provinces,[925] where
the concentration of forces was smaller, and where the memory of
Aztec misrule and oppression might readily induce the inhabitants
to transfer their allegiance, so as to strengthen the conquerors
and allure fresh allies. They were eager to begin the campaign, and
offered a large force of warriors. Xicotencatl junior also evinced a
promptness to coöperate, as if to remove any ill feeling that might
have arisen from his machinations.[926] In order to thoroughly enlist
their sympathies Cortés made an arrangement with the lords whereby
a number of privileges were assured to their people, together with
a fixed proportion of the spoils[927] to be obtained during the war.
The troops were mustered at Tzompantzinco, near Tlascala, amidst a
large concourse of people. There were about four hundred and fifty
Spanish soldiers, with nearly twenty horses, a few firelocks and
field-pieces, and a number of cross-bows, but the arms were chiefly
swords and pikes. The reinforcements consisted of six thousand
Tlascaltecs, including a few Cholultecs and Huexotzincas, a larger
force being prepared under Xicotencatl to follow later.[928] A demand
had meanwhile been sent to Tepeaca to confirm the oath of allegiance
once tendered the Spanish sovereign and dismiss the Aztec garrisons,
whereupon all past offences would be forgiven. The reply was a
contemptuous refusal, with the threat that any attempt at coercion
would bring upon the invaders worse punishment than they had received
at Mexico, for they all would be dished up at the festive board.
Every proposal being rejected, a formal notice was sent condemning
the province to be chastised with sword, and fire, and slavery, for
rebellion and murder of Spaniards.[929]
The army now advanced on Zacatepec, the first town on the Tepeaca
border, where an ambuscade had been prepared in some maize fields. This
was discovered in time to prevent a surprise, but a fierce encounter
took place, wherein the horsemen did good execution, and victory was
soon obtained, with slaughter of the flying. Ojeda, who had led the
Tlascaltecs into the thickest of the fight, came during the pursuit to
the residence of the cacique and planted there the republican flag, in
token of capture. These warriors had suffered severely, owing in part
to the use of large lances by the enemy, but the Spaniards had only
a dozen wounded, beside two horses, one of which died.[930] During
the three days’ stay at this town the neighborhood was reduced, with
pillage and enslavement.
The next camp was formed at Acatzingo, which had been abandoned by the
enemy after a short fight. These successes so discouraged the Mexican
garrisons that they abandoned the province, and the allies, on marching
straight for Tepeaca, five days later, entered it without opposition.
This now became the headquarters for the different expeditions sent
out to reduce the surrounding districts;[931] and rare work they
made of it, plundering, and tearing down idols, and making captives.
Salt, cotton, feather ware, and other commodities were abundant,
and with their share therein the Tlascaltecs were highly delighted,
but the Spaniards obtained little gold. The rulers of the country
had fled; one of them to Mexico, to remonstrate against the retreat
of the garrisons, and to demand additional aid. Finding themselves
abandoned, the inhabitants sent to beg mercy of the conquerors, and
being assured that no further harm should be done them, they returned
to the city and again tendered allegiance. Several other towns were
taken, some, like Tecalco, south of Tepeaca, being evacuated, others
tendering submission in advance, while still others required hard
fighting to subdue.
The reduction of the Tepeaca province, which was virtually accomplished
in about a month,[932] produced an immediate and marked effect, not
only on the natives, but on the late refractory Spanish soldiers. The
latter were reconciled to the prosecution of the conquest on finding
the opening campaign so speedy and comparatively bloodless, and fresh
confidence was infused into the Tlascaltecs, and new allies came
forward, while the prestige of Spanish arms began again to spread
terror among the enemy and open a way into other provinces. This was
promoted by messengers, who carried promises of release from Aztec
tyranny, and pointed out the fate of rebellious and stubborn Tepeacan
towns. The Mexicans, who during the inactivity of the allies had
grown somewhat lax in their efforts to conciliate subject provinces,
now became more earnest, more free with presents and offers to remit
tribute. These endeavors were greatly counteracted by their troops,
however, whose insolence and greed drove the inhabitants to tacitly
or openly favor the Spaniards.
The withdrawal of the Aztec garrisons from Tepeaca served to strengthen
those on its frontier, particularly at Quauhquechollan,[933] ten
or eleven leagues south-west of the new Spanish head-quarters,
which protected the approach to the southern pass into the valley
of Mexico.[934] Its province bordered on Huexotzinco and Cholula,
and skirting the snow-crowned Popocatepetl it extended for some
distance south and south-east of it. The lord,[935] who had tendered
allegiance to Spain simultaneously with Montezuma, had recently sent
in the assurance of his loyalty, with the explanation that fear of
the Mexicans had prevented him from doing so before. A few days later
came his messengers to ask protection against the Aztec garrisons,
reinforced to the extent of some thirty thousand men,[936] who, from
their camp within a league of the city, were plundering and committing
outrages. This appeal being quite in accord with the plans of Cortés,
he at once complied by sending Olid and Ordaz, with two hundred
soldiers, thirteen horses, most of the fire-arms and cross-bows, and
thirty thousand allies.[937] It was arranged with the Quauhquechollans
that they should begin the attack as soon as the Spaniards came near,
and cut off communication between the city garrison and the adjoining
camp.
Olid marched by way of Cholula, and received _en route_ large
accessions of volunteers, chiefly from the province to be aided and
from Huexotzinco, all eager for a safe blow at the Aztecs, and for a
share of the spoils. So large, indeed, was the enrolment that some
of the ever timid men of Narvaez conjured up from this a plot for
their betrayal into the hands of the Mexicans, with whom rumor filled
every house at Quauhquechollan, making in all a larger number than at
Otumba. The loyalty of the new province being wholly untried, and that
of Huexotzinco but little proven, the alarm appeared not unfounded,
and even the leaders became so infected as to march back to Cholula,
whence the chiefs of the suspected allies were sent under guard to
Cortés, with a report of the occurrence.[938] The latter examined
the prisoners, and readily surmised the cause of the trouble; but,
as it would not answer to dampen native ardor for the war by leaving
them in that suspicion, he apologized for what had happened as a
misunderstanding, smoothed their ruffled feelings with presents,
and encouraged their zeal. With an additional force of one hundred
soldiers and some horses he set out for Cholula to assume command in
person, shaming the men out of their fears,[939] and accepting the
large reinforcements which were offered on the way.
As soon as he came in sight, at the end of the valley, the
Quauhquechollans, who had made their preparations in advance, fell on
the garrison, securing at the same time the scouts and stragglers. The
Aztecs resisted valiantly, encompassed though they were by assailants
who filled the roofs and heights round the temple which formed the
citadel. An entry was effected by the Spaniards, and the natives
rushed upon the warriors with such fury that scarcely one was left
to tell the tale. A number of the besieged, outside the citadel,
had already fled toward the Aztec camp, whose battalions were now
descending, brilliant in feathered mail and ornaments. Entering the
further side of the city they began to fire it. Cortés was summoned
to the rescue, and hurrying onward with the cavalry he soon routed
their disorganized masses, leaving pursuit chiefly to the allies.
At a certain pass the enemy rallied, to be dislodged within a few
moments and cut off from their camp. Exhausted by battle and flight,
under a broiling sun, they turned in disorderly scramble up the
steep mountain slope, only to find themselves checked on the summit
by fleeter bands of Quauhquechollans and other allies, and obliged
to make a stand. By this time they could hardly raise their hands
in self-defence, and the battle became little more than a butchery,
during which scattered remnants alone managed to escape, leaving the
rich garments and jewels of the dead to stay the pursuers, who now,
according to Cortés, numbered over one hundred thousand. Several
Spaniards were wounded, and one horse killed.[940] The field being
reaped, the victors entered the camp,[941] which was divided into
three parts, each large enough, it is said, to form a respectable town,
well appointed, with hosts of servants, supplies, and paraphernalia.
Laden with spoils they returned to the city to receive a well merited
ovation. The citizens were afterward rewarded with several privileges
for their loyal aid;[942] deservedly rewarded, for without their
coöperation the place could not have been captured without difficulty,
since it lay between two rivers[943] coursing through deep ravines,
and was shielded on one side by a steep mountain range. Beside its
natural strength the city was protected by a breastwork of masonry,
which extended toward the mountain and down into the ravines, forming
here a smooth facing of some twenty feet, and rising in other places
into a distinct wall of great height and width,[944] with a parapet.
There were four entrances,[945] wide enough for one horseman only,
with staircase approaches, and with maze-like lappings of the walls,
which rendered it difficult to force an entrance. Along the walls
lay piles of stones and rocks ready for the foe. The population was
estimated at five or six thousand families, supported in part by a
number of gardens within the city, and subject to it were three towns
in the valley, containing an equal number of people.
Four leagues south of Quauhquechollan lay Itzocan,[946] a well built
city, with a hundred temples, says Cortés, and a population of three
or four thousand families, situated in a fertile, irrigated valley,
which from the climatic protection afforded by the sheltering mountains
included cotton as one of its staples, and had also some attractive
gold mines. The place lay at the foot of a hill, surmounted by a
strong turreted fort, and offered a striking resemblance to Málaga,
it was said. The level sides were protected by the banks of a deep
river, which here formed a semicircle, and all round the city ran a
wall five feet high, well provided with towers and stone ammunition.
The cacique was an alien, appointed by Montezuma, whose niece he had
married, and possessed strong sympathies for the lake government,
which maintained a fine garrison. To reduce the place, so as to root
out a stronghold for the dissemination of Aztec influence, was of
the first importance.
Thither, therefore, Cortés proceeded with his forces, including
allies, who were by this time so numerous as to cover the plains and
mountains, wherever the eye could reach, representing at least one
hundred and twenty-five thousand men. On arriving before the city
it was found occupied only by warriors, estimated at from five to
eight thousand, the women and children having all withdrawn. Guided
by natives the army passed to a point affording a comparatively easy
entrance. The surprised garrison now thought less of resistance than of
securing their retreat across the river. It was spanned by a bridge,
but this the Spaniards destroyed as they fell upon them, and many of
the unfortunate Aztecs took to the water in their confusion, only to
add to the list of victims. The cavalry, swimming across with ease,
overtook and arrested a large portion of the flying till the allies
came up to aid in the slaughter.[947] Two captives were sent to offer
pardon to the inhabitants, on the condition of their returning and
remaining loyal. Soon after the chiefs came to make arrangements,
and within a few days the city had resumed its wonted appearance.
Cortés thought it the best policy, in this frontier town of his
conquest, to make a favorable impression by extending mercy, and with
the rapid flight of his fame as an irresistible conqueror spread
also his reputation as a dispenser of justice, lenient or severe,
as the case might be. A number of caciques hastened accordingly to
propitiate him, during his stay in this quarter,[948] by tendering
submission and praying to be confirmed in authority. Among them came
a deputation from the inhabitants of Ocopetlahuacan,[949] at the foot
of Popocatepetl, who cast the blame for delay on their cacique. He
had fled with the retreating Mexicans, and they disowned him, praying
that the dignity might be conferred on his brother, who had remained,
and who shared the popular desire for Spanish supremacy. After a
judicious hesitation the request was granted, with the intimation
that future disobedience would be severely chastised.[950]
Still more flattering overtures came from the caciques of eight towns
in Cohuaixtlahuacan,[951] some forty leagues to the south, who had
already tendered allegiance on the occasion when Pilot Umbría first
passed through that province in search of Zacatula’s gold mines.[952]
Before leaving Itzucan, Cortés was called upon to appoint a successor
to the fugitive cacique. The candidates were a bastard son of the
late native cacique, whose death was due to Montezuma, and the son
of the deceased ruler’s legitimate daughter, married to the lord of
Quauhquechollan. The general, being only too eager to please so loyal
an ally, decided in favor of his son, on the ground of legitimacy;
but since he was not yet ten years old, the regency was intrusted to
the bastard uncle, aided by some chiefs.[953] The boy followed the
army to imbibe Spanish ideas and instruction, and received baptism
not long after, with the name of Alonso,[954] the first Christian
prince in New Spain.
Another important yet troublesome expedition was to secure the road
to Villa Rica, on which so many Spaniards had fallen, and which
was still dangerous. It was intrusted to two hundred men, with ten
horses, and a large force of allies.[955] The first reduction in
this quarter had been Quecholac, where pillage and enslavement formed
the retaliation for murders committed,[956] and Tecamachalco, which
gave greater trouble before it fell, and yielded over two thousand
slaves, besides much spoil.[957] The chastisement of these districts
had taught the easterly parts a lesson, so that more hardship than
fighting was now encountered, for the march lay to a great extent
through uninhabited tracts. It was in the region of Las Lagunas that
some captive Spaniards had been denuded and fattened, and then goaded
to death, like bulls in a ring, for the amusement of the natives.
The bodies had then been devoured, a part of the flesh being jerked
and distributed over the district as choice morsels, and pronounced
savory. Forty of the most guilty tormentors were secured in a yard
for execution. Informed of their fate they began to dance and sing,
commending themselves quite cheerfully to the gods as they bent their
heads to the sword.[958] How blessed the righteous when they die!
FOOTNOTES
[901] This appears to have taken place on the Xocotlan road,
followed by the Spaniards on first entering the country, for
in the temple of this town, says Bernal Diaz, were found the
saddles and other trophies. He estimates the treasure lost
at 40,000 pesos. _Hist. Verdad._, 108, 116-117; _Lejalde_,
_Probanza_, in _Icazbalceta_, _Col. Doc._, i. 425.
[902] Herrera writes, under Iuste and Morla. If correct
there were two Morlas.
[903] Herrera copies this account, but gives also another in
an earlier chapter, which leads one to suppose that Yuste
and a few companions escaped to the mountains. They either
perished of hunger or were captured at some settlement
while offering the remnant of their treasures for food.
An inscription by Yuste on a piece of bark recorded their
sufferings. ‘Por aqui passò el desdichado Iuan Iuste, con
sus desdichados compañeros, con tãta hambre, que por pocas
tortillas de mayz, diò vno vna barra de oro, que pesaua
ochocientos ducados.’ dec. ii. lib. x. cap. xiii.; dec. iii.
lib. i. cap. v. Torquemada repeats both versions, i. 530-1.
Peter Martyr and Gomara are also confused, allowing the
Yuste party in one page to fall at the pass, and on another
to turn back to Villa Rica from Tlascala. _Hist. Mex._, 165,
181-2. A misinterpretation of a vague passage by Cortés is
the cause of the mistake, into which nearly every writer
has fallen. The party carried, according to the _Cartas_,
141, 183-4, a number of agreements with the natives, and
other valuable documents, beside Cortés’ personal effects
and valuables, worth over 30,000 pesos de oro. Bernal Diaz
says three loads of gold. The inhabitants said that people
from Tezcuco and Mexico had done the deed to avenge Cacama.
But none except the natives of the district could have had
time to gather for the attack.
[904] Herrera places the number of the party at 50 or 60.
dec. ii. lib. x. cap. xv. Bernal Diaz speaks of the slaughter
in Tochtepec of 72 men and 5 women, and he leaves the
impression that they were a part of the Narvaez force which
had followed the army at their leisure. _Hist. Verdad._,
108. This is no doubt the party described in the text.
Yet Herrera, in cap. xvii., refers to the destruction at
Tochtepec of a force of 80 men under Captain Salcedo, who
was sent to reduce this province a few months later. This
incident, mentioned by no other original authority, may be
identical with the preceding. Had the party in question
belonged to the original force of Narvaez it would have
accompanied Yuste and Alcántara. Such not being the case,
it must have arrived after their departure. This receives
confirmation from Gomara’s statement that several small
parties, who had been attracted to New Spain by Cortés’
conquests, were killed in Tepeaca and Xalacinco. _Hist.
Mex._, 173. The narratives of Bernal Diaz and Cortés specify
some of these, numbering from ten to eighteen men, who
fell at Quecholac, Tepeaca, and other places. It is not
likely that so many small parties could have arrived on the
coast during the short interval of Cortés’ departure from
Cempoala and his retreat to Tlascala; nor that they would
have ventured in small numbers into a strange country,
during so unquiet a period; nor would a mere dozen have
been allowed to penetrate so far as Tepeaca ere they met
their fate. Hence they must have belonged to the large party
spoken of in the text, whose members, dead or captive, were
distributed among the different towns which had aided in
their defeat. This appears to be the only way to reconcile
the differing statements, which have so confused every
writer as to lead them into apparent blunders or into the
omission of facts. See _Robertson’s Hist. Am._, ii. 99;
_Prescott’s Mex._, ii. 409-10; _Brasseur de Bourbourg_,
_Hist. Nat. Civ._, iv. 353-5.
[905] Bernal Diaz intimates that only two vessels remained
of Narvaez’ fleet, and one of these was now destroyed so
that the crew might be sent to Tlascala. The reinforcements
numbered four soldiers and three sailors, two of whom
suffered from swollen stomachs, and the rest from venereal
diseases. _Hist. Verdad._, 109.
[906] Bernal Diaz, _Hist. Verdad._, 109, mentions only four
deaths.
[907] ‘Se le pasmo la cabeça, o porque no le curaron bien,
sacãdole cascos: o por el demasiado trabajo.’ _Gomara_,
_Hist. Mex._, 162. Solis describes the progress of the
cure with a minuteness that would do credit to a medical
journal. _Hist. Mex._, ii. 212-14.
[908] The Cihuacohuatl, Tzihuacpopocatzin, Cipocatli,
and Tencuecuenotzin. The account of this tumult is given
in a memorial on the conquest by an Indian, possessed
by Torquemada. i. 509-10. Brasseur de Bourbourg assumes
Tzihuacpopocatzin and the Cihuacohuatl to be sons of Tizoc,
and the last two to be the sons of Montezuma, the last named
a bastard. Cipocatli, accepted by him as the other name for
Asupacaci, the legitimate heir of the emperor, he assumes
with Cano to have been murdered by Quauhtemotzin. _Hist.
Nat. Civ._, iv. 345. But we have seen that Cortés appears
more correct in saying that the prince fell with him during
the Noche Triste. Brasseur de Bourbourg’s assumption serves
merely to show how hasty and untrustworthy his statements
often are.
[909] Cortés assumes only two rivals, the natural sons of
Montezuma, ‘el uno diz que es loco y el otro perlático.’
_Cartas_, 153.
[910] Twenty days after Montezuma’s death. _Ixtlilxochitl_,
_Relaciones_, 413, 304.
[911] Of which Sahagun gives some account. _Hist. Conq._
(ed. 1840), 137. See also _Torquemada_, i. 511.
[912] ‘Él les hace gracia por un año de todos los tributos y
servicios que son obligados á le hacer.’ _Cortés_, _Cartas_,
155; _Gomara_, _Hist. Mex._, 173.
[913] _Beaumont_, _Crón. Mich._, MS., 68 etc.; _Native
Races_, ii. 107-8; v. 508 et seq.
[914] ‘Entrarian en parte de todas las rentas de las
provincias sugetas por el imperio.’ _Ixtlilxochitl_, _Hist.
Chich._, 304.
[915] ‘Tanto supieron decir á la señoría estos embajadores,
que casi toda ella, ... la redugeron á su voluntad y deseo.’
Old Xicotencatl being one of the most devoted. _Id._ Herrera
also assumes that this chief favors the Mexicans, but the
supposition is due to confounding the two men of this name.
dec. ii. lib. x. cap. xiv.
[916] ‘A q̄ venistes, a comernos nuestra hazienda, anda
que boluistes destroçados de Mexico, echados como viles
mugeres.’ _Id._
[917] Bernal Diaz assumes that the young chief had been
brought before the council a prisoner, to be arraigned for
his machinations. His father was so deeply incensed against
him as to decree his death, but the other chiefs were
lenient out of respect for the father; the conspirators were
arrested. _Hist. Verdad._, 109-10. A later writer states,
on doubtful authority, that the chieftain was also removed
from the command of the army; and Solis assumes that the
act of jostling him down the steps in the council-hall was
the form of degradation, which took place during a special
session, after the deliberation. He appealed to Cortés,
who caused him to be reinstated. _Hist. Mex._, ii. 220-3.
According to Camargo, the elder Xicotencatl had ceded
his place as ruler to the son, owing to his advanced age.
_Hist. Tlax._, 173-4. In such a case no imprisonment or
degradation could have been admitted; perhaps in no case,
since he merely advocated what he considered to be the
best for the country. Duran states that he was surrendered
to Cortés, who ‘le puso en prisiones, y creo que al cabo
le mandó matar,’ _Hist. Ind._, MS., ii. 485, a statement
which may have aided to confuse Gomara, who allows Cortés
to execute him already during his first stay at Tlascala.
On the present occasion he lets Maxixcatzin strike the
leader of the opposite faction. _Hist. Mex._, 90, 164.
His blunder and vagueness helped Herrera to confound the
two Xicotencatls, and Brasseur de Bourbourg to attribute
to father and son the same opinion. _Hist. Nat. Civ._,
iv. 365-7. This is also the view of Ixtlilxochitl. The
discussion was held in the hall or oratory of Xicotencatl,
where Cortés had planted the cross. While Maxixcatzin was
advocating the Spanish cause a cloud settled on the cross
and darkened the room. This miracle encouraged the orator,
who threw down the younger Xicotencatl and won all to his
side. The Mexican envoys were now dismissed with a refusal,
whereupon the cloud dissipated, leaving the room bright
and the cross resplendent, and attracting many believers.
_Hist. Chich._, 304-5. Sahagun allows Xicotencatl, chief
among the lords, to attack the second lord for urging the
murder of the Spaniards. _Hist. Conq._ (ed. 1840), 138.
[918] With reference to the attack on Xicotencatl in the
council-chamber, Herrera says, ‘Sin tener los Mexicanos otra
respuesta se boluieron, con relacion de lo que passaua,’ dec.
ii. lib. x. cap. xiv., a sentence which Clavigero elaborates
into a flight of the envoy on observing the agitation of
the people. ‘E’ però da credersi, che il Senato mandasse
degli Ambasciatori Tlascallesi per portar la risposta.’
_Storia Mess._, iii. 149. Prescott and others also suppose
that they fled; but this is unlikely, since personages so
conspicuous as envoys could hardly have escaped from the
centre of the republic without the knowledge of the senate,
who had, beside, given them a guard, as well for their
honor and protection as for preventing the undue exercise of
their curiosity. Envoys enjoyed great respect among these
peoples. Camargo and Ixtlilxochitl assume more correctly
that the envoys were notified and dismissed.
[919] Tlascala sealed her enslavement, as some view it,
ignoring national interests for the sake of shameful
revenge. Behold now the punishment in her decay, and in the
odium cast on her descendants by other peoples. So says
Bustamante, in _Sahagun_, _Hist. Conq._ (ed. 1840), 140.
They have certainly dwindled away ever since Cortés began
to scatter them as colonists in different directions; but
this was the natural and inevitable consequence of the
presence of the stronger element. During Spanish dominion
they enjoyed some slight privileges, and since then no
odium has attached to them except in casual references to
the conquest by prejudiced writers.
[920] ‘En nombre de todos.’ _Gomara_, _Hist. Mex._, 166.
Whereat Bernal Diaz is exceedingly wroth. ‘We, the old
soldiers, stood by Cortés,’ he asserts, ‘and Gomara’s
omission to say so is intended to exalt him at our expense.’
_Hist. Verdad._, 110. Cortés himself intimates that the
request was general. _Cartas_, 142. But Herrera more justly
attributes it to ‘la mayor parte.’ dec. ii. lib. x. cap. xiv.
[921] ‘Si mal nos sucediere la ida [of the next campaign]
hare lo que pedis: y si bien, hareis lo que os ruego.’
Thus Cortés, by his skill and firmness, saved not only
the conquest but the lives of his men, which must have
been sacrificed in a retreat. Had they reached Villa Rica
they would not have remained there, but would have passed
on to the islands, thus abandoning the country. _Gomara_,
_Hist. Mex._, 167. Most of the points in the above speech
are to be found in the lengthy harangue prepared by this
author. Oviedo’s is weaker, and loses itself in repetitions
and crude elaborations, adorned with learned references
ill suiting a soldier addressing rude men, although not
altogether inconsistent with Cortés’ love of display.
Toward the conclusion is said: ‘If any one there is who
still insists on leaving, let him go; for rather will I
remain with a small and brave number than with many, if
composed in part of cowards and of those who respect not
their honor. Even if all fail in their duty I shall not.
We shall now know who, being of us, will drink water from
the hand, and who will kneel to drink with the face to
the ground, so that they may be bidden to depart, as God
said to Gideon.’ _Oviedo_, iii. 332-3. The test, if ever
intended, was not made, since all acquiesced. Solis, the
inveterate speech-maker, has unaccountably subsided for
this period; perhaps he is piqued at finding himself so
fully anticipated. Cortés gives a brief synopsis of what he
indicates to have been a long speech. On no account would
he commit so shameful, dangerous, and treasonable an act
as to abandon the country. _Cartas_, 142-3; _Clavigero_,
_Storia Mess._, iii. 151; _Herrera_, dec. ii. lib. x. cap.
xiv.
[922] ‘Habiendo estado en esta provincia veinte dias,
aunque ni yo estaba muy sano de mis heridas, y los de mi
compañia todavía bien flacos, salí della.’ _Cortés_, 143.
Gomara follows, while Bernal Diaz, _Hist. Verdad._, 110,
writes that after a stay at Tlascala of 22 days Cortés
announced the determination to march on Tepeaca, which
provoked murmurs from the men of Narvaez. Preparations for
the campaign appear to have intervened before the march
began, and negotiations with the province to be assailed.
Herrera intimates that fully 50 days had passed before
negotiations were opened. dec. ii. lib. x. cap. xv.
[923] ‘Significa Tepeyacac, remate, o punta de zerro,’
owing to the position of the city at the end of a mountain
range. _Id._, cap. xxi.
[924] Their father, Chichtuc, had been sole ruler, but after
his death the sons divided the province. _Id._ This author
assumes that it was merely an ally of Mexico, but there
is little doubt about its being tributary. ‘Ixcozauhqui,
le principal de ses trois chefs.’ _Brasseur de Bourbourg_,
_Hist. Nat. Civ._, iv. 368.
[925] The suggestion of thus opening the campaign is claimed
by native historians for the Tlascaltec lords, Ixtlilxochitl
naming Xicotencatl as the originator. _Hist. Chich._, 303;
_Camargo_, _Hist. Tlax._, 177.
[926] And out of gratitude for Cortés’ intercession in his
behalf, as Solis claims.
[927] Half of the booty obtained in all conquered countries,
with incorporation of Cholula, Huexotzinco, and Tepeyacac.
_Camargo_, _Hist. Tlax._, 176. This extent of jurisdiction
is doubtful. ‘Les haria en nõbre de su Magestad escriptura
de conservarlos en sus tierras, y govierno,’ is the moderate
arrangement given in _Vetancvrt_, _Teatro Mex._, pt. iii.
146. When in 1655 an attempt was made to encroach on their
rights they produced the document and obtained justice.
[928] Bernal Diaz, who alone enters into details, enumerates
420 soldiers, 4000 Tlascaltecs, 17 horses, and 6 cross-bows,
without artillery or ammunition. _Hist. Verdad._, 111. But
this is hardly reliable, for a few lines before he refers
to 440 men, and there is no doubt that some ammunition,
field-pieces, and other war material must have been
obtained from Villa Rica. Herrera speaks of musketeers and
6000 allies, 50,000 more to follow. dec. ii. lib. x. cap.
xv. Gomara allows 40,000 allies to set out at once, with
provisions and carriers. _Hist. Mex._, 168. Ixtlilxochitl
mentions only 4000, and names some of the leaders. _Hist.
Chich._, 305. Herrera states that a question arose as to
the prudence of trusting so small a body of soldiers with
so large a force of allies—which soon swelled to over
100,000—who might in case of disagreement overwhelm them.
A council was held, which decided that the loyalty of the
Tlascaltecs had been sufficiently tried, and that a small
number of allies would be of no service. ubi sup., cap. xiv.
[929] Cortés’ first messengers returned with two Mexicans,
who brought the contemptuous reply. They were given presents,
and told to summon the native chiefs to a parley. On their
return with a threatening answer ‘fue acordado, ... por
ante Escriuano ... que se diessen por esclauos à todos los
aliados de Mexico, que huviessen muerto Españoles.’ _Bernal
Diaz_, _Hist. Verdad._, 112. ‘Respondieron que si mataron
Españoles fue con justa razon, pues en tiempo de guerra
quisieron passar por su tierra por fuerça, y sin demandar
licencia.’ _Gomara_, _Hist. Mex._, 168.
[930] ‘Tuuierõ los Indios amigos buena cena aquella noche
de piernas, y braços, porque sin los assadores de palo,
que eran infinitos, huuo cincuenta mil ollas de carne
humana.’ The Spaniards suffered from want of water and food.
_Herrera_, dec. ii. lib. x. cap. xv. Rather a strong story.
The Spaniards could not well suffer from hunger in the midst
of maize fields, in harvest time. Oviedo takes occasion
to dwell on the common practice of devouring the slain on
the battle-field, thus saving the trouble of burial. iii.
334. ‘Mi pare una favola,’ is Clavigero’s comment. _Storia
Mess._, iii. 152. See _Native Races_.
[931] ‘Padeciendo siempre de agua, y comida.’ _Herrera_,
ubi sup. But this could hardly be the case in so rich a
province, at this time.
[932] ‘En obra de veinte dias hobe pacíficas muchas villas
y poblaciones á ella sujetas ... sin que en toda la dicha
guerra me matasen ni hiriesen ni un español.’ _Cortés_,
_Cartas_, 143. ‘En obra de quarenta dias tuvimos aquellos
pueblos pacificos,’ but with great hardship, ‘porque de
sangre, y polvo que estaua quajado en las entrañas, no
echauamos otra cosa del cuerpo, y por la boca,’ etc. _Bernal
Diaz_, _Hist. Verdad._, 112-13.
[933] The name of a beautiful bird, now San Martin de
Huaquechula. This town was known to the Spaniards under
the name of Guacachula.
[934] ‘Á la entrada de un puerto que se pasa para entrar á
la provincia de Méjico por allí.’ _Cortés_, _Cartas_, 145.
After the conquest it was moved to a more open site, three
leagues south. _Torquemada_, i. 316.
[935] Calcozametl. _Brasseur de Bourbourg_, _Hist. Nat.
Civ._, iv. 372.
[936] Herrera reduces Cortés’ figure to 20,000.
[937] Bernal Diaz names Olid alone for the command, and
Gomara adds Ordaz and Andrés de Tapia, while Herrera
substitutes Ordaz and Ávila. The latter is probably wrong
in giving them 300 soldiers, and Peter Martyr errs, through
his printer, perhaps, in allowing only 3000 allies.
[938] Cortés writes that this occurred in a town of
Huexotzinco province, and that here the Spaniards were
alarmed by the report of collusion between the Huexotzincas,
the Quauhquechollans, and the Aztecs. The leaders described
the expedition as difficult. _Cartas_, 146. Gomara follows,
naming the captain who brought the chiefs captive to Cortés.
_Hist. Mex._, 169. Bernal Diaz points out very plausibly
that Huexotzinco lay wholly out of the way; and, ignoring
the accession of volunteers, he assumes that the report of
a vast gathering of Mexican troops round Quauhquechollan
was the cause for alarm, among the Narvaez party only. Olid
appealed to their honor, and did all he could to encourage
them, but failed. _Hist. Verdad._, 112-13. Clavigero
believes, on the other hand, that Olid caught the alarm as
readily as the rest. _Storia Mess._, iii. 154. The joining
of Huexotzincas may have led to the belief that the march
lay through their territory.
[939] Bernal Diaz states that Cortés did not go, but sent
Olid a sharp letter, which roused him to proceed with the
expedition. But our chronicler was sick with fever all this
time, and has evidently not been well informed. Cortés’
description of the route and of different occurrences
indicates that he must have been present.
[940] ‘Cayeron muchos dellos [enemy] muertos y ahogados de
la calor, sin herida ninguna, y dos caballos se estancaron,
y el uno murió.’ _Cortés_, _Cartas_, 149.
[941] ‘En Mexinca.’ _Gomara_, _Hist. Mex._, 169.
[942] ‘Y se les conservan el día de hoy,’ says Lorenzana,
in _Cortés_, _Hist. N. España_, 160.
[943] ‘Dos tiros de ballesta el uno del otro.’ _Cortés_,
_Cartas_, 150.
[944] ‘Tres estados en alto, y 14. pies en ancho,’ says
Herrera, dec. ii. lib. x. cap. xvi. ‘Alto como cuatro estados
por de fuera de la ciudad, é por de dentro está casi igual
con el suelo.’ _Cortés_, _Cartas_, 150. Meaning, in places.
[945] Herrera says two.
[946] Later Izucar; now Matamoros.
[947] Bernal Diaz assumes that Olid is the sole leader;
that he was here wounded, and lost two horses. Returning
to Tepeaca he was received with great honor, and joined in
laughing at the alarm which had caused the army to turn back
at Cholula. He would never after have anything to do with
the opulent and timid soldiers of Narvaez, he said. _Hist.
Verdad._, 114. Gomara supposes that the bridge had been
destroyed before the flight, so that few of the garrison
escaped from the sword and the stream. _Hist. Mex._, 171.
[948] Ixtlilxochitl extends the stay at Ytzocan alone to
twenty days. _Hist. Chich._, 305. Others make it less.
[949] Cortés calls it Ocupatuyo, which Lorenzana corrects
into Ocuituco, and Torquemada into Acapetlahuaca, i. 315,
while Clavigero insists that it should be Ocopetlajoccan.
_Storia Mess._, iii. 157.
[950] ‘Vinieron asimismo á se ofrecer por vasallos de V.
M. el señor de ... Guajocingo, y el señor de otra ciudad
que está á diez leguas de Izzucan.’ _Cortés_, _Cartas_, 152.
[951] This name is badly misspelled. Chimalpain identifies
it with Huaxtéca, which is decidedly out of the way, _Hist.
Conq._, ii. 12, while Orozco y Berra stamps ‘en verdad
errónea’ the suggestion of Lorenzana that it is Oajaca; but
modern maps do place it in Oajaca, very slightly modified
in spelling.
[952] They had always been loyal, they said, although
deterred by fear of Mexico from sooner proclaiming it; the
four remaining pueblos of the province would soon send in
their allegiance. _Cortés_, _Cartas_, 152-3.
[953] The construction of sentences in _Cortés_, _Cartas_,
152, and the complex relationship, have misled nearly every
one who notices this incident—as, _Gomara_, _Hist. Mex._,
171; _Vetancvrt_, _Teatro Mex._, pt. iii. 147; _Bernal
Diaz_, _Hist. Verdad._, .
[954] Alonso Coltzin. _Chimalpain_, _Hist. Conq._, ii. 12.
Ixtlilxochitl calls him Ahuecatzin. _Hist. Chich._, 305.
Alvarado stood sponsor. Terrified by some idle gossip,
or by the preparations for his baptism, the boy asked the
friar when he was to be sacrificed; but received comfort
in a pious exhortation. _Torquemada_, i. 520.
[955] Herrera gives the command to Olid and Juan Rodriguez
de Villafuerte, the owner of the much disputed first
madonna image, accompanied by Juan Nuñez, Sedeño, Lagos,
and Mata. dec. ii. lib. x. cap. xvii. Olid may have been
detached from Quauhquechollan after the first success had
made troops less necessary; yet Herrera indicates that he
set out before this expedition.
[956] ‘En lo de Cachula fue adonde auian muerto en los
aposentos quinze Españoles.’ _Bernal Diaz_, _Hist. Verdad._,
112.
[957] B. V. de Tapia, in his testimony against Cortés,
states that about 6000 prisoners were sent to him from
these districts by Olid, all of whom had surrendered
without resistance, and that he ordered the men, 2000 in
number, to be executed, the women and children being sold
or distributed. _Cortés_, _Residencia_, i. 59-60.
[958] ‘Boluierõ a Tepeaca, y auiendo estado treynta dias en
esta jornada hallaron a Hernando Cortes, que era buelto de
Guacachula.’ _Herrera_, dec. ii. lib. x. cap. xvii. These
successes are said to have been dimmed by a severe defeat
at Tochtepec, on Rio Papaloapan, whither Salcedo had been
sent with 80 men. It was the _entrepôt_ for trade in this
region, and was held by a strong Aztec garrison, aided by
native warriors with Chinantec pikes. Owing partly to the
efficient use of this weapon, and partly to the carelessness
of Salcedo, the troops were surprised and slaughtered to a
man, after selling their lives as dearly as possible. The
disaster being a blow also to Spanish prestige which it
would never do to overlook, Ordaz and Ávila were sent not
long after with a larger force, some horses, and 20,000
allies, to exact retaliation in death, captivity, and rich
spoil. The victors came back with ample plunder. _Herrera_,
ubi sup. See note 4 this chapter for doubts on the massacre.