UPRISING OF THE AZTECS.
MAY-JUNE, 1520.
CHARACTER OF THE AZTECS—SPANISH QUARTERS—THE CITY IN
ARMS—GROWING HATRED TOWARD THE INVADERS—PERILOUS POSITION
OF ALVARADO—MONTEZUMA CALLED TO INTERFERE—FAILING
PROVISIONS—MIRACULOUS WATER—CORTÉS TO THE RESCUE—RENDEZVOUS
AT TLASCALA—THE CITY AND ITS PEOPLE—THE ARMY JOINS
ALVARADO—DESPERATE ENCOUNTERS.
The Spaniards had mistaken somewhat the character of the Aztecs.
Ground to the dust by political despotism and bloody superstition,
their features had assumed a melancholy cast and their form the
attitude of humility. Yet beneath all slumbered a ferocity the most
blood-thirsty among the Nahua nations. And now, though their nature
might be as cold and impassive as the stone of the pavement, the iron
heel of the conqueror had struck fire from it.
Before the fort the angry throng increased, until the whole city seemed
to have gathered there. On the roofs and in the courts fell showers
of arrows, stones, and darts, and charge after charge was made at
the entrances. Attempts were also made both to scale and undermine
the walls, and some resorted to battering, until it seemed to the
besieged as if the whole habitation was coming down upon their heads.
The structure consisted of a vast irregular pile of stone buildings,
one story in height, and raised, like most of the pretentious edifices,
on a pyramidal foundation, which was low and difficult to undermine or
beat down. An occasional tower relieved the monotony of the outline
and offered a view over the neighborhood. Beside the smaller courts
inclosed by the buildings, a larger yard appears to have been formed by
a stout wall, within which the allies had erected temporary shelter.
This was the weakest point, and here the battering parties were
chiefly collected. The flanks and curtains of modern fortification
were wanting, and the protection of the wall face depended on the
turrets which rose here and there, and on the parapets, with their
few embrasures.
Though attempting no sortie beyond the immediate vicinity of the
gates, the Spaniards were not sparing of powder and arrows, and picked
off the more presumptuous assailants, while their pikes and swords
did good service at the parapets and openings. The cannon, however,
loaded as they were with small shot and scraps, which brought down
a dozen or more at a time, were the only weapons that could hold the
enemy in check. On one occasion, when a charging party had approached
in a somewhat wavering column to carry the main entrance, the cannon
charge failed to explode, owing to dampness. This the assailants
were quick to observe, and with yells of encouragement they rushed
forward, and were soon in a hand-to-hand conflict with a party which
had sallied to break the first column. The Spaniards plied their
swords and pikes with desperation, supported by a desultory fire
from the musketeers and archers of the fort, but without effect. The
gaps made by their weapons were quickly filled with fresh warriors,
and the sallying party was obliged to fall back with the loss of two
soldiers, who were captured alive and devoted to sacrifice. It was a
critical moment, for the enraged horde was about to follow them into
the quarters. Just then, as if touched by invisible fire, the powder
ignited, sending from the cannon its death-dealing missiles, mowing
a path through the crowd of pursuers. The Mexicans were appalled and
speedily thrown into disorder, of which the Spaniards were not slow
to take advantage. Nor was this the only miracle of the day; for it
is alleged that the virgin, and he of the dazzling white steed, both
appeared fighting on the side of the Spaniards, and bringing defeat
and confusion upon their assailants, as at Tabasco and Tlascala.[744]
Thus closed the first day of Alvarado’s chivalrous doings, during which
a large number were wounded, although there were but six killed,[745]
not including allies. A portion of the quarters, with a quantity of
ammunition and supplies, had been burned, and a large breach made
in the wall. The brigantines were also burned, the bridges raised,
and barricades erected in different parts of the city; while the
supply of provisions was cut off. Even after darkness had stilled the
fury of the warriors the unhappy people remained before the Spanish
quarters, and with outstretched arms and dishevelled hair they lifted
up their voices, crying, “You are doomed, you vile things! But for
your thunder and your fortress walls, curses on them, you would now
be killed and cooked. And you shall be, unless you instantly release
Montezuma and depart. You shall meet with holy death, and be cooked
with _chilmole_, and be given as food to the eagles and the beasts,
for your flesh is bitter, as we have found, and not fit for men to
eat. Why does not the earth swallow you alive? Oh ye gods! ye gods!
unmoved all, all but the devilish gods of these devilish men. But our
mighty ones, whom you have outraged, shall yet give you your deserts.
If they do not, we shall; nor shall they escape, the despicable ones
of Tlascala, your slaves, who serve you as women and hire out the
wives of their lords!” Thus raved the heart-broken.
So critical had become his condition on the second day that Alvarado
appealed to Montezuma to exert his influence to stay the assailants,
intimating that if the Spaniards perished so would the Aztec king.
Montezuma’s overtures were not received with enthusiasm by the
people; nevertheless aggressive operations were reduced to desultory
attacks.[746] Water was greatly needed by the besieged, and again the
good fortune of the Spaniards, which hardly ever forsook them, came
to their aid. Digging, under inspiration or desperation, they struck
fresh water within the fortress,[747] and offered thanksgiving.
Communication was shortly after established between Alvarado and
Cortés. Several Tlascaltecs and Cholultecs were despatched by
different routes to the coast, and a courier arrived from Cempoala
and gained entrance to the fort.[748] Ordering Velazquez and Ordaz
to abandon their mission and direct their march to Tlascala, Cortés
hastened preparations to join them there. A garrison of one hundred
men was left at Villa Rica, under Rodrigo Rangel, a relative of the
general,[749] and about thirty men remained at Cempoala to take charge
of the sick and wounded, and some baggage, with orders to follow as
soon as possible.
The route to the plateau lay partly through a bleak and desert country,
and the inhabitants being beside less friendly than before, the army
would have found it difficult to obtain supplies; but Cortés had
gathered experience from his previous march, and Tlascala was entered
in the middle of June.[750] A hearty reception was accorded, and
more encouraging news obtained from Mexico, showing that the siege
maintained its passive character. Reinforcements were nevertheless
urgent, since a fresh outbreak might at any time occur. A message was
again sent to gladden the garrison with promises of speedy relief.[751]
Including the troops under Velazquez and Ordaz the muster-roll
showed about eleven hundred men, with some eighty horses, one hundred
cross-bows, and eighty fire-arms, besides several cannon, and a large
quantity of ammunition.[752] The heart of the company, however, was
the veterans of Cortés, whose superior discipline and familiarity
with native warfare made them doubly reliable. Eager for a fray with
the detested Aztecs, and desirous of excusing their refusal of men
a month before, the Tlascaltecs offered not only supplies but large
reinforcements, of which only two thousand were accepted, besides a
small number from Cholula and Huexotzinco.
The more northerly route by way of Calpulalpan, recommended already on
the former march as the easiest, was this time selected, partly with
a view to obtain provisions more readily.[753] As the lake region was
approached evidences were seen of the revolt in deserted villages and
in the sullen demeanor of the few Indians who showed themselves. The
contrast was chilling indeed as compared with the reception accorded
on the former occasion, when the journey resembled the triumphal
march of gods. Oppressed with misgivings the army entered Tezcuco,
the seat of the Acolhua kings, a few leagues north of Mexico, on the
border of the same lake.
* * * * *
It was one of the most ancient cities of the country, ranking since
the early half of the eighth century as the capital of a dominion
founded by Tezcatlipoca, the later supreme deity of the Nahuas.
After the fall of the Toltec empire it took the leading position in
Anáhuac, as the centre of Chichimec power. The new dynasty fostered
the inherited culture in every way, and made the city not only the
political capital, but the Athens of the country. The rise of the
Aztecs gave it a rival in Mexico, which in course of the fifteenth
century assumed the political sceptre, but Tezcuco still maintained
the precedence in culture and elegance. It was said to contain one
hundred and forty thousand houses, distributed among different suburbs,
and extending with their smiling gardens from the border of the lake
to a distance of from three to four leagues. The six divisions of the
city were crossed by a series of fine streets lined with tasteful and
costly buildings. Among the finest structures were the two palaces,
which are claimed to have excelled those of Mexico. The older, the
Huetecpan, wherein the poet-king Nezahualcoyotl held his court, formed
a magnificent monument of his artistic taste. It lay upon a triple
terrace bathed by the lake, and was surrounded by an immense wall,
from fifteen to twenty-five feet high, inclosing two large squares.
Within this precinct were the council-chambers, the halls for various
arts and sciences, and the royal apartments. The pleasure-grounds,
almost hedged by cedars, were filled with shady groves, traversed
by labyrinthian paths, and interspersed with well stocked ponds
and aviaries, baths, and sparkling fountains. The new palace, which
occupied a smaller space, excelled in imposing architecture and in
comforts of the most varied character.
Beside these there were a number of summer resorts in the neighborhood,
conspicuous among them the fine palace of Tezcocingo, a prototype
of Chapultepec, and like it overlooking the capital from a hill, two
leagues to the east. An aqueduct of stone supplied two reservoirs on
the summit, whence the water was distributed over grounds intersected
by canals with meandering currents and picturesque cascades. The
palace lay almost hidden within groves of gigantic cedar and cypress,
revealing to the rapt beholder pavilions of marble, tessellated
pavements, and playing fountains with statuary of unique form.[754]
* * * * *
The Spaniards found none to welcome them, but were allowed unmolested
to take up their quarters in the palace. Shortly afterward a
canoe arrived from Mexico[755] with an imperial messenger and a
Spaniard,[756] bearing the cheering news that everything had been
quiet in the capital for some time, and that supplies, which had been
scantily furnished only against heavy payments, had now become more
liberal. Montezuma sent word that the city would return to its normal
condition the moment Cortés entered it, and he expressed a hope that
no ill-will would be entertained toward him for what had happened,
since this had been beyond his control, and had grieved him as much
as the Spaniards. Reassuring messages were forwarded to Villa Rica.
After a stay of four days the army proceeded from Tezcuco by the
northern shore of the lake, and camped for the night at Tepeyacac,
the terminus of the northern causeway from Mexico.[757] On entering
this place the horse of Solis, Casquete, stepped into a hole on the
bridge and broke a leg, throwing its rider into the water. This was
looked on as a bad omen, particularly by an astrologer soldier named
Botello, but Cortés made light of it, saying, “Troubles at St John’s
festival bring peace for the year.”[758] The following morning, St
John’s day, the army entered the capital. On all sides an ominous
silence prevailed. The streets were deserted, the houses apparently
abandoned, and the solitary native occasionally seen hovered in the
distance like a shadow.[759] It was also noticed with apprehension
that many of the canal bridges were removed. On approaching the
Axayacatl palace the arrival was heralded by trumpet blasts, which
called forth responsive shouts from the garrison. Throwing open the
gates, the besieged received their deliverers with the most extravagant
demonstrations of joy.[760] For greater accommodation a part of the
troops were quartered in the great temple adjoining the fort.
* * * * *
The unpleasant aspect of affairs, so apparent during the last days
of the march, had ruffled the temper of Cortés, and his treatment
of Alvarado was not altogether cordial. Still, as he had ever been
a close friend, and as he was an invaluable officer, brave and
influential, he deemed it prudent to go no further than to express
a curt disapproval of his rashness.[761] Indeed, an inquiry into
the causes and results of the massacre could criminate Alvarado no
further than the Cholula affair did himself. The captain had acted
in full accord with his party, and whatever blame might attach must
be shared by all. Dissension would never answer, and so the matter
was dropped. But the ill-temper which the general dared not wreak on
his own men found a ready object in Montezuma. The conduct of Cortés
in this respect was most ungenerous. It shows the several sides of
humanity: how odious in some respects are those who appear to the
best advantage in other respects. This poor king had a superstitious
sympathy, a maudlin affection for the captain, who, considering his
own infamous conduct toward him, might at least have saved the captive
unnecessary mental suffering. As Cortés entered the fort Montezuma
stepped out of his apartment to welcome him. The cavalier passed by
the king in lofty disdain, ignoring his presence. Cut to the quick,
the monarch shrank back, apparently more stunned by this treatment
than by the late terrible slaughter of his subjects.[762] He retired
deeply chagrined to pour his sorrow into Olmedo’s ear. “What can I
do?” he cried; “he loves gold and fame, and I will give him a life-size
equestrian statue of himself in gold if he will but be kind to me.”
With the arrival of the main forces supplies were stopped, as if in
protest, and Cortés became only the more irritated. Accordingly, when
two chiefs appeared on behalf of the emperor to ask for an interview
they were repulsed with the insulting epithet of ‘dogs!’ Velazquez
and other officers remonstrated against the policy of this rudeness to
one who had interfered to save his troops. “What consideration can I
have for a dog?” was the dastardly rejoinder. “Was he not willing to
treat with Narvaez, and does he not now seek to starve us?” Persuaded
presently of the necessity for imperial interposition, he addressed
the chiefs roughly, “Tell your master, Montezuma, to order markets to
be held at once, or there will be trouble.” His tone and gesture were
sufficient indications to the chiefs of the insults offered to them
and their august lord, and they failed not to give them full force in
their report. In answer to the demand Montezuma said that he and his
chief officials were prisoners, and that nothing could be effected
without the release of one among them. Cortés saw the necessity,
and, without considering the result, released Cuitlahuatzin, lord of
Iztapalapan, the emperor’s brother, and generalissimo of the army, a
man whose hostility to everything Spanish was well known. According
to Aztec law he was the most probable successor to the throne, and
therefore particularly dangerous.[763]
Cortés was becoming foolhardy. Whether the brothers were in accord
upon the measures to be adopted is uncertain; but Cuitlahuatzin,
who was not only bold, but ambitious, had evidently determined on
his course. If the Mexicans had hoped for better prospects with the
arrival of Cortés that hope was now dissipated, and bitter indignation
filled their breasts. Cuitlahuatzin was welcomed as a liberator. His
constant efforts in the imperial council to oppose the admission of
the Spaniards, by force if necessary, and his services for the cause
of liberty and religion in connection with the Cacama revolt, were
sufficient to endear him to his brother patriots. Strongly urged, he
accepted the leadership of the insurgents, a position for which his
experience and success as a general had well fitted him. He began
by ordering war material and erecting barricades. The value of the
Chinantec pikes introduced by Cortés had not been lost on him, and
a number were provided, barbed with the vitreous iztli. Arrangements
were made with adjoining towns and provinces for a supply of provisions
and reinforcements to carry on the holy war.[764]
The Spaniards soon learned what was brewing, and first in this way:
Ojeda and Marquez, when out foraging early in the morning of the day
following their arrival, observed several suspicious circumstances,
among others broken bridges, which in one place obliged them to
fill up a canal before crossing it. Here and there they saw large
collections of slings and other weapons, and presently they came on a
priest with dishevelled hair shouting with wild gesticulations to a
crowd of armed men. They hurried back to inform the general, guided
through intricate cross-streets by a Tlascaltec. Antonio del Rio,
who had been despatched for Villa Rica the same morning, returned
at a gallop in less than half an hour, excited and bleeding. The
streets, he said, were full of warriors, who had raised the bridges
and were apparently prepared to attack. Had it not been for his trusty
sword and swift horse he would have been slain. At this moment the
sentinels in the towers announced the approach of a vast multitude
from different directions, with gleaming iztli weapons, and speedily
the neighborhood was alive with warriors, whose yells rose high above
the shrill shell and doleful drum.[765] Even if they did not inspire
the full measure of dread intended they presented a striking picture
in their painted bodies, grotesque with patterns and brilliant colors,
with no covering among the rank and file save the raw cotton on the
head and the universal maxtli round the loins. They were protected
in part by the _chimalli_, or shield, a slight bamboo frame covered
with gaudily colored skin or reed-grass, chiefly oval and round, and
often large enough to cover the whole body. Secured to the arm it left
the hand free to hold the bow or stone, while the right managed the
arrow or the sling. The latter was an implement of great effect with
the Aztecs, who could impel the stone with wonderful precision and
force. The _maza_, or club, with its knotty head, and the _macana_,
or sword, toothed with iztli, were well represented, while high above
gleamed the obsidian or copper points of the spear. One of the most
dreaded weapons was the _tlacochtli_, or javelin, often provided with
three points, and attached to a cord by which it could be recovered
for a fresh cast. Conspicuous among the warriors were the nobles,
those that were left of them, in lofty quetzal plumage on a head-dress
of green feathers set in tiger-skin, or in a gold or silver band,
which gave the appearance of metal helmets. The body was covered in
corselets of red, green, or yellow feathers, worked with gold, and so
arranged as to indicate the company or district to which the wearer
belonged. Beneath gleamed occasionally cuirasses of gold or silver.
The limbs were covered with wood or leather armor set with feathers
or gold plates. A more common body armor was the cotton tunic, one
or two fingers in thickness, which extended to the knees and elbows.
It was almost equivalent to the quilted cotton protector used on the
eastern coast, whose efficiency against native weapons had caused
the Spaniards to adopt it. The tunic was adorned with feathers, which
corresponded to the uniform in color and arrangement, usually in the
form of an animal. Many were distinguished by casques in the form of
eagle-heads, and in armor spotted like a tiger-skin, indicative of the
two orders of Quauhtin and Ocelome, eagles and tigers. At the head of
the different columns appeared officers with small drums, painted and
adorned with feathers, with which they directed the march. Beyond,
in the centre of the masses, could be seen banners, with devices
in various colors and forms, which the Tlascaltecs pointed out as
belonging to different wards and to cities on the mainland, a sign
that an extensive body of troops had been enlisted for the war.[766]
As the forces drew near, slingers and bowmen appeared on the roofs
of the neighboring buildings, who, together with those below, began
to send stones, arrows, and darts in showers upon the fort. The
Spaniards responded with a series of volleys, the number of cannon
being increased to twelve or more. The effect was merely to startle
them for a moment, and on they pressed over dead and dying, amid
encouraging shouts, till they reached the sides of the wall, where
the dreaded cannon, at least, could not destroy them. All attempts to
scale the wall proved futile, and soon their efforts were confined to
effecting breaches. With their rude implements this was slow work,
but they persevered with reckless obstinacy, reinforced at frequent
intervals, while the main body kept up a galling discharge of missiles,
and occupied the attention of the besieged with continual charges at
different points.
This passive or defensive policy did not suit the Spaniards, while
it encouraged the Aztecs. Therefore two corps were formed, each of
two hundred men, besides allies, under Cortés and Ordaz. Clearing a
path with a volley of artillery, they sallied in different directions
to drive back the assailants, who hurried for safety into lanes and
houses, and behind barricades. This comparative freedom of advance
appears to have been permitted to entice the Spaniards into a
disadvantageous position, for soon the natives reappeared in swarms
in the rear and along the flanks, showering arrows and stones, and
coming to close quarters with spears and swords. The heaviest attack
was from the roofs, on which large supplies of missiles had been
collected, and from which commanding position the enemy was able
to direct the discharges with terrible effect, particularly upon
the naked Tlascaltecs. Several Spaniards also fell, and the greater
number were wounded. Ordaz received three cuts, and Cortés a wound
which maimed two fingers of the left hand.[767] The assailants were
comparatively safe, for those on the roofs could be picked off only
by archers and musketeers, and those below took refuge when pressed,
only to return to fresh attack. Efforts were made to fire the houses,
but this was slow work, since they were constructed almost wholly of
adobe or stone, and were filled with defenders. Nor would the fire
spread, owing to the detached form of the buildings, separated by
alleys or canals, so that the torch had to be applied to each.
Thus matters continued until Ordaz, who was engaged on the street to
the west of the fort, sent word to Cortés, who was pressing forward
in the direction of the Iztapalapan causeway, that he was losing
ground. Leaving his own forces, the general hurried to the scene with
a few horsemen, and heading the charge, drove back the warriors at
the most exposed point, so as to relieve the infantry in the retreat
which was now found necessary. Returning to his men he found them also
retreating, those who headed the column, including Andrés Duero, the
Cuban secretary, having been cut down. “Shame upon you!” exclaimed
Cortés to the corps, as he led the horsemen to the rescue of the
fallen cavaliers. He was just in time to save them, for a moment more
and Duero, at least, would have been slain. The elated warriors fell
back before the charge of the terrible Malinche, although they soon
recovered. Cortés then concluded to retreat, but this proved no less
dangerous than the advance, and among others Lezcano was dragged from
his horse and killed, after having distinguished himself for bravery
and execution. The fort had meanwhile sustained an active siege,
and when the retreating corps approached it they found more enemies
in waiting, who, fearful of losing their prey, rushed forward with
greater fury than ever. An entrance was finally effected, the forces
in the temple being at the same time withdrawn for the greater safety
of themselves and the fort.[768]
Swelling with triumph the Aztecs now directed all their efforts
against the Spanish quarters. Burning arrows and whirling brands began
to mingle with their missiles. Although the building itself was of
stone, the roof and portions of the outwork, and the Tlascaltec camp
in the yards, were of inflammable material, and more than once the
flames burst forth, filling the whole place with suffocating smoke,
and calling for the greatest exertions to subdue them. The little
water at hand could not be spared, and so earth was cast up, and
portions of the wall were torn down to check the fire and to stop
the gaps. The assault continued all day, till darkness sent most of
the warriors to their homes.[769]
FOOTNOTES
[744] Which speaks little to the credit of either Mary or
Santiago. _Bernal Diaz_, _Hist. Verdad._, 102. ‘Otro miraglo
... é fué muy notorio.’ ‘Ya sé que los incrédulos ... dirán
que mi ocupaçion en esto de miraglos, pues no los ví, es
supérflua ... é yo hablo que esto é más se puede é debe
creer;’ for did the Indians have mysteries and miracles,
surely God, the virgin, and the saints could effect greater
deeds. _Oviedo_, iii. 511. He quotes from Livy and others
concerning the reliable miracles of Roman times. Prescott
and others transfer the miracles to the siege under Cortés
for greater effect. Bustamante, the modern champion of the
shrines of Mexico, who is ready to uphold any deed attributed
to these images, is rather incredulous about miracles
recorded in favor of Spanish cutthroats. See _Chimalpain_,
_Hist. Conq._, i. 283 et seq. ‘Si no oviéssemos miedo de
esse del caballo blanco, ya vosotros estaríedes coçidos,’
cried some, _Oviedo_, iii. 511, while the more valiant added
that ‘con todo esto si no soltays a Motecçumacin, y os vays
luego, presto sereys muertos.’ _Gomara_, _Hist. Mex._, 152.
[745] _Cortés_, _Cartas_, 127. Bernal Diaz, _Hist. Verdad._,
101-2, says seven, two having been taken alive. ‘Mataron
a Peña, el querido de Motezuma,... Valdibia, y Juan Martin
Narizes.’ _Herrera_, dec. ii. lib. x. cap. vii.
[746] ‘Tuvieron guerra con los yndios en esta Cibdad dos
medios dias que fueron jueves e viernes.’ ‘Guerra casy dos
dias.’ _Lopes_ and _Flores_, in _Ramirez_, _Proceso contra
Alvarado_, 131, 134. ‘Dieron bateria los Mexicanos á los
Españoles siete dias, y los tuvieron cercados veinte y tres
dias.’ _Sahagun_, _Hist. Conq._, 29. ‘Cercados los españoles
ocho dias.’ _Id._ (ed. 1840), 105. ‘Pelearõ y combatieron
la casa diez dias arreo.’ _Gomara_, _Hist. Mex._, 151.
Torquemada explains this by assuming two days of fighting
and eight days of close siege, with attacks upon all who
sallied, i. 490. Sahagun states that Itzquauhtzin, governor
of Tlatelulco, accompanied Montezuma to the roof and spoke
to the people, representing that the Spaniards, as the
mightier race, would inflict great injury on them unless they
ceased to fight, and that the emperor would be murdered. The
Mexicans responded with insults and missiles, but as the
soldiers interposed their shields no harm was done. They
appear to have stopped active operations, however. _Hist.
Conq._, 28-9. The insults and missiles belong no doubt to
the later siege under Cortés. Duran states, however, that
Montezuma was henceforth looked on as an accomplice of the
Spaniards, and discarded as a ruler, it being resolved
to kill him and his family. _Hist. Ind._, MS., ii. 463.
According to Oviedo the news came at this time of the
victory over Narvaez, ‘é Monteçuma mandó á los indios que
dexassen de pelear é dexassen venir los otros chripstianos,
porque á todos juntos matassen; é aquesto se cree que fué su
intento.’ iii. 512. That he may have urged this with intent
or as a bait is not unlikely, but it should apply equally
to Narvaez’ men, since it appears that their defeat could
not yet have been known. When known, however, it must have
had its effect. ‘Quando supieron nuestra vitoria, cessarõ
de dalle guerra.’ _Bernal Diaz_, _Hist. Verdad._, 101. Yet
Gomara writes that on learning of the large forces coming
against them, the besiegers resumed the attack at one time.
_Hist. Mex._, 151.
[747] This spring was rediscovered during the reign of
Viceroy Revilla Gigedo. _Bustamante_, _Mem. Piedad Mex._, 7.
A pool of sweet water was the chief inducement for founding
the city on this site in 1325. _Native Races_, ii. 559-61;
v. 345 et seq.
[748] _Cortés_, _Cartas_, 126. The Spanish messenger from
Mexico returned wounded. _Peter Martyr_, dec. v. cap. v.
With him, or about the same time, arrived four chiefs sent
by Montezuma to complain that Alvarado had attacked the
nobles without cause. While defending themselves six soldiers
had fallen. Cortés told the chiefs with stern countenance
that he was returning to investigate the matter. A letter
was sent to Alvarado enjoining him to guard the emperor
closely. _Bernal Diaz_, _Hist. Verdad._, 101.
[749] And the zealous aid of Velazquez de Leon, who did so
much toward securing the Goazacoalco command for Cortés when
Narvaez sent letters to win it over. _Cortés_, _Residencia_,
i. 409; ii. 6, 31, 165-6. He is accused by his enemies of
impiety and licentiousness, and as one whom the general
favored above more worthy men. Solis assumes that Sandoval
nominally retained the command of the coast province, Rangel
being merely his lieutenant. _Hist. Mex._, ii. 108.
[750] ‘Llegò aquel dia [the first] à la Rinconada, el segundo
caminò siete Leguas ... llegò à Tlaxcalla à diez y siete de
Junio.’ _Torquemada_, i. 492. Herrera tells a long story of
suffering from hunger and thirst during the march through
the desert. Marquez and Ojeda were sent ahead to Tlascala
for supplies, and came back with 1200 carriers laden with
fowl, bread, fruit, and other refreshments. Cortés, among
others, was found starving, and a number were discovered on
the road almost dead. All, it seems, were rescued. dec. ii.
lib. x. cap. vii. There are several reasons for believing
that Herrera, who is somewhat confused about this period,
has confounded the present march with the flight from Mexico
to Tlascala of a month later, when the people were really
starving. This seems confirmed by the erroneous statement
that the troops arrived at Tlascala July 17th, the time,
according to Herrera’s own later statement, when they reached
that place after the flight. The account also intimates
that the starving army was met among the Otomí settlements,
where food could readily be obtained, without the necessity
for Marquez and Ojeda to go ten leagues farther, to the
capital, to obtain it. These and other discrepancies are
overlooked by all who refer to the march. Prescott dwells
in particular on the suffering from thirst, forgetful of
the statement on a previous page that the rainy season
had begun about three weeks before, and that water must
have been abundant along the whole route. Solis finds that
the effeminate followers of Narvaez endured the suffering
remarkably well. _Hist. Mex._, ii. 109.
[751] ‘Embiò a fray Bartolome de Olmedo ... a Motezuma.’
_Herrera_, dec. ii. lib. x. cap. vii. It is unlikely that
so valuable a man would have been sent while affairs were
threatening.
[752] Narvaez landed with about 900 soldiers, including 80
horsemen, 120 with bows, and 80 with fire-arms. A number
had been picked up at Cozumel, but an equal proportion
perished by shipwreck. Cortés had about 250 men, and 200
were probably left on the coast, of garrison, guards, and
invalids. To the 950 soldiers thus taken may be added at
least 150 from the crews of the dismantled or destroyed
vessels. Prescott manages to mysteriously increase the horses
and projectile arms beyond what he previously assigns to
Narvaez and Cortés. One thousand infantry, 100 horsemen,
and many allies, say Gomara and Herrera. The _Probanza de
Lejalde_, in _Icazbalceta_, _Col. Doc._, i. 425, indicates
80 horses. Bernal Diaz places the figures as high as 1300
soldiers, including 96 or 97 horsemen, 80 archers, 80
musketeers, and 2000 Tlascaltec warriors; while Cortés,
with a prudent desire to cover the subsequent losses at
Mexico, reduces them to 500 infantry and 70 cavalry. Solis
gives the reason of the profound historian for the small
number of allies taken to Mexico: ‘Por no escandalizar á
Motezuma, ó poner en desesperacion á los rebeldes.’ _Hist.
Mex._, ii. 111.
[753] The arrival at Tezcuco is evidence enough that a more
northern road was taken than the one previous. The middle
route by Telapon appears somewhat more direct for Mexico,
but requires a detour to reach the Acolhua capital, and it
is not likely that an army in hurried march could afford
to go out of its way. Hence the Calpulalpan road must have
been followed.
[754] See _Native Races_, ii. 162-3, 168-73, 569; v.,
passim; _Motolinia_, _Hist. Ind._, 181-3.
[755] Cortés writes that he was on the point of sending
a Spaniard to Mexico with Tezcucan rowers, a chief being
taken as hostage, but just then came this canoe. _Cartas_,
127.
[756] Two, named Santa Clara and Pedro Hernandez, says
Herrera, dec. ii. lib. x. cap. vii.
[757] ‘Parò en Tepeaquilla, lugar a legua de Mexico.’ _Id._
Now the shrine of Guadalupe. Prescott assumes that the
Iztapalapan road was taken, as before, but it was avoided
probably because Cortés feared the fort Xoloc, which guarded
the centre. It was also longer, and had more movable bridges
than the other causeways.
[758] ‘Riñas por San Iuan pazes para todo el año.’
_Vetancvrt_, _Teatro Mex._, pt. iii. 139. The following
day a dress was found hanging from a beam, and in a square
a pile of bread, with over 500 fowl, without a guard. This
Cortés considered less favorable, and said ‘que serian riñas
de por San Iuan.’ _Herrera_, dec. ii. lib. x. cap. vii.-viii.
[759] ‘Para dar á entender con esto que ellos estaban de
guerra y muy ofendidos de los españoles que él habia dejado.’
_Sahagun_, _Hist. Conq._ (ed. 1840), 108. His account
of deserted streets, applied to Cortés’ first arrival in
Mexico, belongs no doubt to this occasion. Duran argues
that had the massacre taken place before Cortés’ arrival he
would not have been allowed to enter. _Hist. Ind._, MS.,
ii. 470. Equally in the dark is Acosta, who assumes that
the Indians were openly at war, but the custom being to
rest every fourth day, Cortés managed to enter during the
cessation of hostilities. _Hist. Ind._, 522. Oviedo looks
on the non-resistance of the Indians as a wile to entrap
all the Spaniards. iii. 510.
[760] Herrera writes amusingly that Cortés shouted before
the closed gates, ‘Open!’ ‘Who is there?’ demanded Alvarado.
‘I,’ replied Cortés. ‘Do you come with full liberty, and
power to command, as before?’ ‘Yes, and with victory, and
greater forces.’ Alvarado thereupon opened, kissed his
hand, and surrendered the keys! dec. ii. lib. x. cap. viii.
[761] ‘Con que aventuró la mayor parte de sus fuerzas.’
_Solis_, _Hist. Mex._, ii. 120. Or perhaps because he had
not had recourse to some safer measure, such as arresting
the leaders of the proposed plot, for hostages. ‘Le dixo
muy enojado, q̄ era muy mal hecho, y grande desatino, y poca
verdad ... no le hablò mas en ello.’ _Bernal Diaz_, _Hist.
Verdad._, 102. Cortés would hardly have told him that he
lied, since his statements were confirmed by so many; they
certainly were years after. Vetancurt supposes that Cortés
told him he should have allowed the emperor to attend the
festival, and should have awaited the attack rather than
opened the war. _Teatro Mex._, pt. iii. 140. ‘Dissimulo por
no enojar a los que lo hizieron.’ _Gomara_, _Hist. Mex._,
151.
[762] Solis supposes, however, that the two met in friendly
intercourse, and takes Bernal Diaz and Herrera to task for
asserting the contrary. _Hist. Mex._, ii. 112-14. He refers
to Cortés’ friendly message from Tezcuco, which is doubtful,
and to Gomara, who certainly allows Cortés to refer to
Montezuma and his courtiers as ‘dogs.’ _Hist. Mex._, 153.
In the testimony during Cortés’ residencia the discourtesy
is asserted. _Cortés_, _Residencia_, i. 42 etc. Clavigero
suggests ‘ch’era d’uopo il far sembianza di credere il Re
colpevole dell’inquietudine.’ _Storia Mess._, iii. 121.
[763] _Native Races_, ii. 134-6; v. 462-4; ‘Il y
joignait, comme de coutume, la charge du grand prêtre de
Huitzilopochtli.’ _Brasseur de Bourbourg_, _Hist. Nat. Civ._,
iv. 309. Gomara assumes that Cortés orders a chief to open
the market. He, offended at the insults used, goes only to
rouse the people. _Hist. Mex._, 153. Ixtlilxochitl supposes
that the chief is offended at the reprimand administered for
delaying to open the market. _Hist. Chich._, 301. ‘Mandò
Hernando Cortes llamar a los mas principales caualleros,
hizoles vna larga platica diziẽdo, que les perdonaua lo
passado, con que para adelãte fuessen ... amigos: ... sin
responder ... se fueron.’ _Herrera_, dec. ii. lib. x. cap.
viii.
[764] Duran enumerates some of the provinces summoned, as
Xilotepec and Matlaltzinco. ‘Mandó llamar á ... Encantadores
y Hechiceros para que los asombrasen y los mostrasen algunas
visiones de noche, ... para que alli muriesen de espanto.’
_Hist. Ind._, MS., ii. 462-6.
[765] Cortés describes first a brief attack, then a sally,
succeeded by a fresh assault on the fort, while Bernal Diaz
and Herrera let a force advance against the Indians before
they reached the palace. I follow Cortés as the chief guide,
because his account of all this period was written while
quite fresh in his mind, and appears the most sensible and
correct, while the other versions depend more or less on
faint recollection and hearsay. Cortés as a rule did not
wait till the enemy approached, but he may not have been
prepared for the sudden attack. Yet it is probable that
he wished in his report to lay the responsibility of the
attack upon the enemy. I do not think Cortés inclined to
misrepresent in general or without an object.
[766] For war customs see _Native Races_, ii. 400-32.
[767] ‘Sinistræ manus digitis duobus mutilis.’ _Peter
Martyr_, _De Insvlis_, 5. Cortés also says ‘quedé manco,’
_Cartas_, 142, 131, yet Cano ridicules the statement, and
declares ‘nunca fué manco dellos ni le faltan.’ _Oviedo_,
iii. 551-2.
[768] _Cortés_, _Cartas_, 128-9. Bernal Diaz speaks of
a sally by Ordaz, with 400 men, before the natives reach
the fort. He is sorely beset, as related, and retires with
a loss of 23 soldiers. _Hist. Verdad._, 102-3. Herrera’s
account, as usual, is confused. After Rio returns wounded
to report the uprising of warriors, five horsemen rally to
reconnoitre. The following day Ojeda and Marquez set out to
forage, and come to announce the approach of assailants. Two
hundred men now make a sortie and kill a multitude without
losing a man. dec. ii. lib. x. cap. viii. It is useless to
follow this author here except for incidents.
[769] Bernal Diaz places the dead at 35 soldiers, besides a
large number of allies. Eight fell during the first discharge
upon Ordaz’ party and fifteen more before he regained the
fort, while of the 46 wounded among the garrison twelve
died. _Hist. Verdad._, 103. Cortés, with his usual prudent
suppression of evil news, allows four deaths and over 80
wounded. He never refers to those who die of wounds. Gomara
follows him. _Hist. Mex._, 153.