ALVARADO’S MERCILESS MASSACRE.
MAY, 1520.
AFTER THE BATTLE—VICTORY MADE SECURE—CONDUCT OF THE
CONQUERED—A GENERAL AMNESTY—DISPOSITION OF THE FORCES—AFFAIRS
AT THE CAPITAL—INSURRECTION THREATENED—THE SPANIARDS HOLD A
COUNCIL—ALVARADO’S RESOLVE—THE GREAT DAY OF THE FEAST—THE
SPANIARDS PROCEED TO THE TEMPLE—THE GRAND DISPLAY THERE
WITNESSED—THE ATTACK OF THE SPANIARDS—HORRORS UPON HORRORS.
Cortés was exultant. During the last brief hour how completely had
his fortunes changed! Again was his star ascendant, filling the whole
heavens with its brightness. Alas now for Montezuma and Mexico! And
Velazquez; this was his fourth attempt on Mexico, and in some respects
his greatest failure. Instead of annihilating the outlaw with his
grand army, the outlaw in one fell swoop had secured the grand army,
and was now master of all the ships, and men, and munitions of war,
which he so much needed in consummation of his further designs. It
seemed to be the fate of the fat governor out of his solid substance
to feed his enemy with wealth and honors.
* * * * *
Before it was fairly light Cortés had seized and placed in confinement
such persons as might question his rights as victor; the remainder on
surrendering their arms were permitted to go at large.[711] In order
to make more secure his magnificent prize before the all-searching
sun should disclose the paucity and poverty of the victors, Cortés
seated himself in state, arrayed in a wide orange-colored robe, and
ordered the conquered troops to pass before him, and swear allegiance
to the king, and fealty to him as captain-general and justicia mayor.
This was done by nearly all, some humbling themselves and kissing
his hand, while the late hostile leaders and old acquaintances were
recognized with friendly greetings and embraces.[712]
Meanwhile Olid and Ordaz, each with a corps, set out on the captured
horses to summon stragglers and seek the forty troopers in the field.
Duero and other friends of Cortés being among them, little persuasion
was needed to win the party over, and shortly after dawn the whole
cavalcade came in to the sound of fife and drum, shouting vivas
for Cortés.[713] High above this noise were heard from a window the
voices of two women, named Ordaz, filling the air with their loud
philippics. “Villainous Dominicanos!” they cried to the soldiers of
their own party, “the distaff would better suit you than the sword.
A good account have you given of yourselves! Unfortunate women we
to have come to the wars with such men!” Truly might Narvaez exclaim
with Xerxes, as he beheld his fair ally, Queen Artemisia, outwit her
Athenian pursuers, “My men fight like women, and my women like men.”
The Ordaz women, however, fought only with their tongues, and that
after the issue of battle. And thus relieved they immediately descended
and did homage to the victor. The general did all he could to check
this excess of zeal, which he feared might engender ill feeling, and
he even seized some of the noisiest enthusiasts, although they were
afterward rewarded.
The cacique of Cempoala, who had been slightly wounded during the
battle, appeared like the rest to offer fealty to the victor by
crowning him with flowers. Cortés received his demonstrations as if
nothing had taken place to mar their intercourse, and took up his
abode with Catalina, whose hand he had accepted during his previous
occupation of the place. The chiefs vied with one another to obliterate
their unfortunate mistake by increased attention and hospitality,
while many among Narvaez’ men thought it necessary to excuse their
tardy surrender by pleading that they had been deceived by their
principals, who had assured them that Cortés was a traitor. Great
was their chagrin in the morning on discovering how few the victors
were and how poorly they were armed. And where were the much talked
of native auxiliaries? At the same time they could not but admire
a leader who had achieved such results with such means. Narvaez and
his supporters declared that the victory was due wholly to treachery,
particularly noticeable in the action of the artillerists.[714] In
this there was much truth, but the consummate tact and soldierly
qualities of Cortés shine no less brightly for all that. And the
cost of this glory and advantage, how insignificant it was! Four of
his own men and fifteen of the enemy, including a captain, beside a
number wounded on both sides; this was all.[715]
In his report to the king Cortés seeks to gloss over the occurrence
by stating that only two men were killed, intimating that it was on
both sides. There was a deeper reason for this and other falsehoods
than the wish to hide the bloody result of fratricidal conflict. He
was still doubtful as to the view taken in Spain of his conduct, and
could not afford to prejudice his case by laying bare every misfortune.
He was aware that even to the impartial observer he must appear as a
defaulter in the duty owing by him to a principal, and in the agreement
or partnership which he had formed, and also as the usurper of an
expedition fitted out in the name and under the auspices, at least,
of Velazquez. His plea rested on his brave and masterly conquest of a
rich country, and on his election to independent command by a party
formed on the pretence that the superior interests of the sovereign
demanded the immediate subjugation of the country. But his acceptance
of that command was a breach of duty and of contract; the right of
the party to act as it did was doubtful, and its pretence hasty, or
perhaps usurped from Velazquez, who had first entertained it; while
the commission to undertake the conquest had already been conferred on
the latter. Velazquez held besides the right of a discoverer to this
coast, and above all the royal grant to it, vaguely worded though it
was so far as indicating the situation and extent of territory. He
had a right to claim his own; though circumstances had so changed,
Cortés claimed, as to render this perilous to the interests of God,
the king, and the people, which rose above those of individuals; and
in ignoring the orders of the audiencia to desist from war on his
countrymen he followed only natural law and justifiable impulse.
In this respect Cortés was equally guilty, since his duty was to
yield to the rightful claimant. He pleads in his letter to the king,
however, that self-preservation obliged him to resist, for Narvaez had
determined to hang him and several of his followers. Here he again
hides the fact that favorable terms were at one time offered. “Had
Narvaez carried off the victory,” he continues, “it would have been
with a great loss, which must have so weakened him as to surely enable
the Indians to succeed in their meditated revolt. This would have
lost the country to the king and to the faith, and twenty years would
not have sufficed to regain it.”[716] In brief, howsoever we admire
Cortés, however much we would prefer his banner to that of Velazquez
or Narvaez, we must admit that he had hardly a shadow of right on his
side, and that no position in which he could possibly place himself
was tenable. He was a defaulter, pirate, usurper, renegade, traitor,
outlaw, hypocrite; but he was a most lovable villain, an admirable
soldier, a rare hero. On the other hand, Velazquez was right. But,
though deeply injured, he was disagreeable; though foully wronged,
he was vanquished. And the Spanish monarch was not the first or last
to smile on iniquitous success, or turn the cold shoulder to whining,
disappointed virtue.
In the course of the morning the soldier Barrientos, who had been
staying in Chinantla, arrived with the promised Chinantec warriors,
two thousand in number.[717] They had reached the rendezvous on
pentecost day, as ordered, but Cortés had found it convenient to
advance on Cempoala sooner than he had intended. An imposing sight
they presented as they marched by amidst vivas in a file of three
abreast, gorgeous with plumes and shields, the centre man with bow and
arrows, while his companions on either side carried the formidable
pike, tipped with glistening iztli. It was fortunate that they had
failed to arrive in time, since much bloodshed was saved thereby. In
fact the soldiers of Narvaez expressed a fear that they would have
fared badly with such opponents. Cortés was nevertheless delighted
with their coming, since this proved not only the sincerity of their
friendship, but showed the conquered that he did indeed control native
armies. Distributing some beads and trinkets, he bade them return
peaceably under the supervising care of Barrientos.
One of the first measures after the fight was to secure the fleet;
and for this purpose a suitable force was sent down to the port to
take the vessels to Villa Rica, and remove the sails and rudders, so
as to prevent the escape of any to Cuba.[718] Shortly after, when the
masters and crews had tendered allegiance, the vessels were placed
in charge of Pedro Caballero, captain of one of the vessels under
Narvaez, in whom Cortés had great confidence.[719] The fortress was
again garrisoned, with a larger force,[720] and thither were sent
Narvaez and Salvatierra in chains.[721]
As for the rest, Cortés applied himself with his usual skill to
recompense those who had remained true, and to conciliate the yet
unreconciled. He reminded them that they had come not to risk their
lives for Velazquez, but to gain honor and wealth under the banner of
the king, and he was prepared to aid in this by offering them equal
terms with his veterans. As an earnest he restored within two days
their arms to all except a few leaders, and ordered his men to return
the horses, weapons, and other effects taken by them as spoils of
war.[722] What with their admiration of the liberality and soldierly
qualities of Cortés, and the prospect of speedy advancement, there
were but few who did not immediately and cheerfully accept the terms.
But this was by no means to the taste of the aforesaid veterans. They
had seen with envy that rich presents were made to the conquered,
while they, whose courage and devotion had achieved such magnificent
results, received nothing, and were even told to return what they
regarded as lawful spoils; and, further, to share with these late
comers and intended despoilers the fruits of their years of toil
and victories. A general murmur arose, and many soldiers refused to
surrender the appropriated effects. Captain Ávila and Father Olmedo
being requested to remonstrate, did so earnestly, and told Cortés
that he acted like Alexander, who honored more the conquered than
those who won the battle. He and all he possessed belonged to his
comrades, was the reply, but at present it was necessary to conciliate
their invaluable acquisition, whose aid was needed to overcome the
threatening danger in Mexico, and who being the more numerous party
might otherwise rise against them. Their aims effected, the entire
resources of a vast and rich country were theirs. Olmedo was convinced
of the wisdom of the course, although he considered that too great
liberality had been shown. The headstrong Ávila pressed the point with
his natural haughtiness, whereupon Cortés said: “I am for Mexico;
those who please may follow; those who do not, may leave it alone.
There are yet women in Spain to bear soldiers.” “Yes, and captains
and governors,” retorted Ávila. Cortés deemed it discreet to bandy
no further words at present. So spirited a tongue must be curbed with
gifts; but Cortés awaited his opportunity. He never forgot anything.
With a view chiefly to divert the troubled spirits two expeditions
were sent out, each of two hundred men, mostly from the ranks of the
late enemy. One was directed to Goazacoalco, as before, under the
command of Velazquez de Leon, who had already held this commission,
and two vessels were placed at his disposal to send to Jamaica for
live-stock, seeds, and other requirements of the proposed colony.
The other expedition was intrusted to Ordaz for the occupation of
Pánuco, with a view to anticipate Garay. Two vessels were given him
to explore the coast.[723]
* * * * *
While Cortés was thus risking all on the cast of fortune at Cempoala
the troops at Mexico had been exposed to even greater perils. At the
time of his departure for the coast, Toxcatl, the fifth month, had
begun, and with it the most solemn festival of the year. It was in
honor of Tezcatlipoca, the highest of the divinities, and identified
with a supreme god, although less conspicuous in the daily worship
of the people, for they appealed rather to the nearer minor deities,
whom they regarded as intercessors, than to their supreme divinity,
whom they greatly feared, and who was very far away. The Mexicans
had been permitted to hold the celebration in the great temple,
which had been partly dedicated to Christian worship, on condition
that no human sacrifices should take place.[724] A festival of this
prominence could not fail to recall with all its force to the natives
the indignities to which they and their gods had been subjected. We
have seen how narrowly an uprising on account of the occupation of
the great temple by strange religious emblems was escaped, and how
it was restrained only by the promise of the speedy departure of the
Spaniards. Before Cortés had left the capital he saw the smouldering
fire, and it was this that led him to strengthen the defences of
the fort, to obtain extra supplies from Tlascala, and to enjoin the
strictest watchfulness and moderation.
The hostile feeling was by no means diminished by the tidings of
another larger host of invaders with doubtful motives. At a meeting
of native leaders it was admitted that the promises and statements of
the newly arrived Spaniards could no more be relied upon than those
of the deceitful Malinche, and the deferred proposition to drive out
or to kill the Spaniards was renewed with ardor. A better opportunity
for carrying out such a measure could never again be found. The
great Cortés with his cunning controlling mind was absent. There
remained only a small force in charge of the city, and the troops
on the seaboard were divided against each other. On the other hand
a multitude of pilgrims were pouring in for the festival; and what
better subjects to be worked upon for an uprising than these, and
what better incentive than religion? Beside the appeal for vengeance
on the desecrators of their altars came the patriotic call for the
release of an oppressed sovereign, whose influence was still supreme
with many, and the alluring prospect of securing the rich spoils in
possession of the Spaniards and the Tlascaltecs, the latter still
more detested as an inferior race which after years of contest had
now assumed the galling attitude of master. The preparations made
during the late fermentation required only to be perfected. More arms
were made, the people were stirred by passionate appeals, warriors
were enrolled, and other measures taken.[725]
The utmost secrecy had been observed by the conspirators, but with
so many confidants, actuated by race jealousy, by ties of friendship,
by interest, and by one above all others, the love of woman, that the
rumor was whispered in Alvarado’s ear.[726] Yet to the mistress, who
in her devotion to the lover forgot her duty to home and kindred, must
not be charged more than is her due. Sharpened by the remembrance
of past wrongs suffered on battle-field and stone of sacrifice,
the wits of the Tlascaltecs discovered evidence which their hatred
failed not to magnify. Warnings were hardly required, however, to
indicate that something unusual was stirring, for the demeanor of the
Indians had undergone a yet more marked change. Supplies were further
diminished; servants sent to market were abused and ill-treated, and
insolence was shown even to the Spaniards themselves.[727] A still
more alarming sign was the discovery of an undermined wall,[728]
and after obtaining further particulars from a devoted Tezcucan
chief,[729] afterward known as Don Hernando, Alvarado resolved to
inspect the adjacent temple where the chief celebration was held.
Here a number of suspicious circumstances were noticed, which the
Castilians readily wrought into threatening realities; among them
several victims destined for sacrifice, regardless of the promises
given, while some bloody hearts which they saw testified to the work
already done by the knife.[730] With the victims Alvarado seized
their attendants and certain of the emperor’s courtiers, from some
of whom he tortured a confession. In this manner he learned what he
already partially knew, namely, that many arms were prepared; that
during the Incensing of Huitzilopochtli, as the festival was called,
the Christian emblems would be cast out of the temple, and that the
uprising was to take place at the conclusion of the feast.[731]
A seeming confirmation of the proposed sacrilege came from Montezuma
himself, who sent to request the removal of the Christian emblems
from the summit of the great temple, pleading as high-priest that the
presence of strange images must prove irritating to the worshippers
of other gods. Alvarado indignantly refused; he would rather fight.
The Mexicans did not choose to see their festival broken up before
the appointed time, and so the point was waived. It was then arranged
that the Spaniards should attend the ceremonies, so as to be assured
that no indignities would be offered their images.[732]
And now comes another of those diabolical deeds which, done in the
name of civilization, or religion, or any other entity or idea,
fills us with horror toward the gods and men for whom or by whom such
acts are consummated. The lion and the tiger are humane and gentle
beside the Spaniard, harboring thoughts born of bigoted zeal or blind
apprehension. And what are his thoughts? These: He would enter the
sanctuary, the holy temple of his god and their gods, and while all
the people, while priests and nobles, the flower of the Aztec race,
were celebrating the highest service of the highest festival, he
and his men would fall upon them and hew them in pieces! And this
because they had tired of harboring and feeding them. They desire to
be relieved of the self-invited guests, and since dismissal does not
avail they must be driven out or killed. But the intruders do not
wish to be exterminated, and if there is striking to be done, they
propose to strike first.
Pedro de Alvarado was no such man as Hernan Cortés. He was scarcely
fit to be his servant. There were a dozen prominent qualities that
combined to make up the great man in Cortés which were absent in
Alvarado. Both of them were loyal, brave, and merciless, but there
was a method in the excesses of Cortés which those of Alvarado lacked.
Cortés was deep, Alvarado shallow; Cortés was patient under affront,
Alvarado was violent; Cortés was cool in time of danger, Alvarado
was excited—and so on. And yet Alvarado was a gallant cavalier.
The Spaniards now held a council, before which Alvarado placed the
information thus far obtained of the plot, and the necessity of prompt
measures was at once recognized. They did not believe Montezuma to
be taking any active part in the conspiracy, but that swayed by hopes
and fears he was allowing himself, with his usual want of resolution,
to yield to the stronger will of his courtiers a passive consent to
the efforts for his release.[733]
Less prudent than his chief, and less fertile in resources, Alvarado
did not look for preventives to check the conspiracy, but to what he
regarded as a decisive blow to crush it, such as that administered
at Cholula. He had not the foresight of his general with regard to
the proper adjustment of means to ends, nor his magic influence over
those around him, friend or foe. He remembered only the good effect
of the massacre on the effeminate Cholultecs, and felt convinced that
so excellent a measure must answer also for the apparently abject
Aztecs. It thoroughly suited his rash daring and cruel disposition.
To attack is to win, was his maxim. The difference in circumstances
hardly entered into consideration, chief among which was the smaller
force, unsupported by the neutrality of half the city, as at Cholula,
and without allies close at hand. The gathering of so many nobles and
military leaders in connection with the war-god celebration provided
the opportunity desired, since this would permit the blow to be
directed against those who were looked on as the promoters of the
revolt; and deprived of their leaders the people would be likely to
abandon any further attempt. This plan met with general approval.[734]
The hour[735] having arrived for the visit to the temple,[736] Alvarado
selects half the force to accompany him,[737] and proceeds thither,
armed with more than usual care. Upon those who remain in charge of
the fort, says Tapia, devolves the safer, though even more cruel task
of slaughtering the greater part of the courtiers and attendants,[738]
who have this day presented themselves in larger numbers than usual.
The Spaniards with their Tlascaltec followers are welcomed at the
sanctuary with great demonstrations by the unsuspecting nobles, who
see nothing to apprehend in the gleaming arms, since the Spaniards
never go forth without weapons. We must remember it is a gala day,
and the court presents a magnificent scene with its festive decking
of garlands, festoons, and drapery, and its gayly attired audience.
A procession of plumed priests and pages march by with swinging
censers, chanting weird music before the hideous idols. Behind comes
a file of nuns and novices, with red feathers and painted faces,
surmounted by garlands of toasted maize, and bearing in their hands
flags with black bars. Hidden musicians strike, and the dance begins.
Joining the priests, the consecrated women and the tyros whirl round
a large brazier, while two shield-bearers with blackened faces direct
their motions. A conspicuous figure is the _ixteocale_, the living
representative of the god, for whom he is fated to die, like the more
prominent proxy of Tezcatlipoca. Dressed like a warrior ready for
the fray, and prepared to lead in the chief dances as is his duty,
he seems to impersonate the omen of evil which hovers over the scene.
Presently the Spaniards are conducted to a separate court, wherein
are assembled several hundred nobles and leading men, arrayed in
rich costumes glittering with gold and precious stones. The centre
of attraction is the new image of Huitzilopochtli, of _tzoalli_
dough, its jacket wrought with human bones. Before this image the
_mazehualiztli_ dance now begins.[739] Rings are formed round the
music-stand, where two leaders direct the movements, the highest
nobles and the most aged composing the inner circles, and the younger
men the outer. When all is ready the music strikes up lightly to a
well known tune, and the dancers move off, chanting a song bearing on
the event of the day, and on gods and kings.[740] Forewarned as the
Spaniards are, they see treason in every act and word, and many who
understand somewhat the Aztec language declare that the songs bear
distinct allusions to the intended uprising.
As the dance progresses a few of the soldiers, together with a number
of Tlascaltecs, take possession of the different entrances, while the
rest distribute themselves in suitable positions and watch for the
signal.[741] Instructed by his native allies, Alvarado waits the time
when the Indians shall install the war-god image in the chapel. And
now the sanguinary moment has come. Falling on the assembly with pike
and sword, some strike the idol and some its worshippers. They hew
down the priests and drive the cruel steel through the bodies of the
nobles. Few of the Indians possess any weapons with which to defend
themselves from the sharp Toledo blades. Taken thus by surprise,
panic-stricken, they tread one upon another, and then fall helpless
under the merciless thrusts of the enemy. Their first impulse has
been to rush for the gates, but lines of bristling pikes oblige them
to press back against the crowd, thereby increasing the confusion.
Some attempt to climb over the high walls, some to hide in the temple
buildings, even burrowing beneath the heaps of the slain. Before an
hour has passed there is nothing left in sight deemed worthy of Spanish
swords, so suddenly has this brilliant assembly been transformed into
loathsome masses of mangled bodies. The pathway of the conquerors is
everywhere slippery with the blood of their victims.
In this horrible butchery, as we have seen, the lower classes suffered
less than the nobles. Desolation was brought home to nearly every
prominent family in the city. Their grief, shared by dependants and
adherents throughout the provinces, was commemorated in plaintive
ballads, by which the people kept alive the hatred of their oppressors
long after the conquest. The estimates of the killed vary from four
hundred to over three thousand, the most common number being six
hundred; and as this generally refers to prominent personages it may
be accepted as not too low.[742]
Finding no more to kill, or rather no more worth the killing, the
Spaniards and the Tlascaltecs proceeded to plunder. The reward was
rich, but even in the eyes of their national historians odium attached
to every trinket, for by such action, as Herrera observes, they gave
currency to the charge that the deed had been prompted by avarice. But
this interesting occupation was destined to be interrupted. Shouts from
the maddened multitude without were soon heard, roaring in response to
the death clamor of their countrymen. Warned by the guard at the gates,
the plunderers hastened to regain the fort. Yells of execration greeted
them as they issued from the temple, and showers of stones and darts
fell thick, while the front ranks of the assailants pressed them with
swords and clubs.[743] Short as was the distance to the fort, much time
was occupied in reaching it, and hardly a man escaped injury. Alvarado
was severely wounded, while one soldier and a number of allies were
slain.
FOOTNOTES
[711] _Cartas_, 124; _Cortés_, _Residencia_, ii. 12. Bernal
Diaz confirms that this was effected long before dawn, while
Herrera states that 300 held out till morning; but he is
contradictory. Carrasco, whom he assumes to be free, urged
them to fall upon the attacking party, who were scattered
to plunder. But this was not done for want of a leader. Nor
did they favor his advice to plunder the baggage of Cortés,
which was protected only by Indians, and to embark with
Diego Velazquez. Carrasco accordingly proceeded alone to the
baggage camp, and securing a horse and lance he returned
and urged them to follow. He had evidently supernatural
means wherewith to penetrate the besieging force. dec. ii.
lib. x. cap. iv. Duran allows Cortés to form ambuscades and
leap walls, so that the arms are secured ere the men of
Narvaez can form in defence. _Hist. Ind._, MS., ii. 453.
Peter Martyr disposes briefly of the matter, and assumes
that the chief captains of Narvaez were seduced. dec. v.
cap. v.; _Castellanos_, _Varones ilustres de Indias_, 71-2;
_Galvano’s Discov._, 144-5.
[712] ‘Cortes se mandò pregonar por Capitan general, y
justicia mayor, de ambos exercitos.’ Carrasco was three
days in stocks before he yielded obedience. _Herrera_, ubi
sup. ‘Y todo esto era de noche, que no amanecia.’ _Bernal
Diaz_, _Hist. Verdad._, 99.
[713] ‘Viua, viua la gala de los Romanos, que siẽdo tan
pocos, han vencido a Narvaez!’ to which Guidelo, the negro
jester of Narvaez, added, ‘Behold! the Romans never performed
such a feat.’ _Bernal Diaz_, _Hist. Verdad._, 99. Herrera
speaks more at length of the sayings of this negro, who
was rewarded with a crown of gold worth 600 ducats. dec.
ii. lib. x. cap. iv.
[714] ‘I saw Narvaez in Spain in 1525, and heard him publicly
denounce Cortés as a traitor. He asked but royal permission
to prove it, face to face with his enemy; furthermore,
he was a liar, a tyrant, and an ingrate. Narvaez had been
betrayed by those in whom he confided.’ _Oviedo_, iii. 316.
Still, the chronicler cannot excuse his carelessness nor
his entering into parley with Cortés; and he told him so.
iii. 316.
[715] Bernal Diaz mentions fifteen [a misprint of _dos_
for _doce_ makes it only five deaths among Narvaez’ men,
including Captain Rojas, Alférez Fuentes, who was an hidalgo
of Seville, and Carretero, one of the deserters from Cortés’
explorers. Cortés lost four. _Hist. Verdad._, 99. Cortés
prudently mentions to the king only two deaths, but leaves it
uncertain to what side they belonged. _Cartas_, 124. Gomara
claims them for Cortés, and states that Narvaez lost his eye,
his honor, and sixteen men. _Hist. Mex._, 148. Cortés lost
two men and one wounded; Narvaez eleven. _Herrera_, dec.
ii. lib. x. cap. iv. Cortés four, Narvaez eleven, besides
many wounded on both sides. _Vetancvrt_, _Teatro Mex._, pt.
iii. 138. Solis supposes that two wounded of Cortés’ army
died, making four in all, while Narvaez lost fifteen. _Hist.
Mex._, ii. 101. One version claims that Narvaez lost fifteen
by arms and six by fire in the burning of the quarters,
which is probably an exaggeration. Narvaez lost all his
property, including notes of hand. _Demanda de Ceballos_,
in _Icazbalceta_, _Col. Doc._, i. 442. The testimony in
_Cortés_, _Residencia_, i. ii., varies from twelve to sixteen
for Narvaez.
[716] Oviedo looks on Cortés’ reasons as insufficient to
justify his procedure, such as ordering Narvaez to be seized,
and demanding of him to exhibit a royal commission, ‘as if
Cortés had been appointed by the king.’ Velazquez, as the
principal who sent him forth, had every right to remove
him. iii. 316.
[717] Bernal Diaz places the number at 1500, while Ceballos
raises it to 3000, under Heredia, and places the arrival
a day or two later. Herrera assumes that they came in time
to march with Cortés on Cempoala. dec. ii. lib. x. cap. i.
[718] Bernal Diaz, _Hist. Verdad._, 100, names Francisco
de Lugo as the captain of this party, but Tirado states
that he had been sent back to Mexico as an adherent of
Velazquez. _Cortés_, _Residencia_, ii. 6. ‘Dió con los
once navios que el dicho mi parte allí tenia, al través, é
les fizo quemar.’ _Demanda de Ceballos_, in _Icazbalceta_,
_Col. Doc._, i. 442. Bernal Diaz also intimates that all
but two vessels were destroyed when the army proceeded to
Mexico and one afterward. _Hist. Verdad._, 109. It is not
probable, however, that more than a few were destroyed,
because unseaworthy. Some were wrecked a few months later.
[719] ‘Por Almirãte, y Capitan de la mar ... al qual
dizen que le dió primero buenos tejuelos de oro.’ His
baptismal name was either Juan or Pedro. Two vessels were
still expected to arrive. _Bernal Diaz_, _Hist. Verdad._,
100, 113. Caballero was probably an old friend. ‘Pedro de
Maluenda criado de Diego Velazquez, que venia por mayordomo
de Naruaez, recogio y guardo los nauios y todo la ropa y
hazienda.’ _Gomara_, _Hist. Mex._, 148. By Cortés’ order,
adds Herrera.
[720] ‘Envié otros docientos hombres á la villa de la
Veracruz.’ _Cortés_, _Cartas_, 125. Clavigero assumes that
Cortés at this time already gave orders for removing Villa
Rica southward, but events interfered with the project.
_Storia Mess._, iii. 120.
[721] ‘Cortés le [Narvaez] tuvo preso con muy ásperas
prisiones tres años, poco mas ó menos, é con guardias que
nadie no le pudiese ver; é aquellos pasados, le quitó las
prisiones é le tuvo preso otros dos años.’ So says Narvaez’
agent. _Demanda de Ceballos_, in _Icazbalceta_, _Col. Doc._,
i. 442-3. The testimony in _Cortés_, _Residencia_, reduces
the term to two years, and intimates that several other
men were kept at Villa Rica, under surveillance at least.
i. 223, 362-3, et seq.
[722] Narvaez claims to have been robbed of 100,000
castellanos’ worth of effects, and it is not likely that his
property was restored. See _Demanda de Ceballos_, ubi sup.
Bernal Diaz had to surrender a horse fully accoutred, two
swords, three daggers, and other effects. _Hist. Verdad._,
100. Santa Clara intimates that the horses and arms were not
as a rule restored. _Cortés_, _Residencia_, ii. 169. If so,
compensation was probably given, according to the _Relacion
hecha por el Señor Andrés de Tápia, sobre la Conquista de
México_. This is one of the most valuable documents extant on
the earlier period of the conquest, but it is unfortunately
only a fragment, which takes up the narrative from the eve
of leaving Cuba, and carries it to the capture of Narvaez,
relating with rather uneven completeness the principal
incidents of the voyage to Vera Cruz, the march to Mexico,
the stay there, and the operations against the forces of
Velazquez. Andrés de Tápia appears from his own statement
to have been a poor nephew of Governor Velazquez, to whom
he presented himself just in time to join the expedition
of Cortés. At this time, says Bernal Diaz, he was about 24
years old, of good build, with a grave face, slight beard,
and somewhat ashy complexion. _Hist. Verdad._, 246. He took
an active part in the leading wars and expeditions during
and after the conquest, and became one of the most noted
among the captains, favored by Cortés, with whom he was
frequently associated, accompanying him also on a voyage
to Spain. Settling in Mexico, he died there peacefully,
long after 1539, to judge from his reference to this date.
His narrative, as may be supposed, is a panegyric upon his
leader and patron, and some statements have accordingly to
be weighed, but this defect impairs the importance of only
a few passages, the rest being highly valuable, and many
of them unique in their testimony. Guided by a reference
in _Bibl. de Autores Esp._, xxii., Señor Icazbalceta of
Mexico obtained, after great trouble, a copy of the apparent
original from the Royal Academy of History, Madrid, entitled:
_Relacion de algunas cosas de las que acaecieron al Muy
Ilustre Señor Don Hernando Cortés_, etc. This he published
in his _Coleccion de Documentos_, ii. 554-94. The last three
pages form an appendix of brief remarks on the inhabitants
and resources of New Spain.
[723] _Gomara_, _Hist. Mex._, 149. ‘Dos dias después de
preso el dicho Narvaez, porque en aquella ciudad no se
podia sostener tanta gente ... despaché dos capitanes.’
_Cortés_, _Cartas_, 125. Cortés writes that before leaving
for Mexico he sent Mexican envoys to obtain the friendship
and allegiance of the lord of Pánuco. This was at once
offered, and presents were exchanged. _Id._, 56-7, 125,
144-45. Cortés was either deceived or he invented the story
to counteract Garay’s schemes. Bernal Diaz names Ordaz for
Goazacoalco and Velazquez for Pánuco; but it has entirely
escaped his memory or notes that Velazquez had already
been charged to form a colony in Goazacoalco, for which
he was also better fitted, while Ordaz was more suited
for rough warfare in Pánuco. This author gives to each 120
men, twenty of them from the ranks of Cortés, ‘porq̄ teniã
mas experiẽcia en la guerra.’ _Hist. Verdad._, 100. The
200 allowed by others may include the ship-crews. Herrera
places 300 men under Ordaz. dec. ii. lib. x. cap. iv.
[724] For description of the feast, so as better to
understand what follows, see _Native Races_, ii. 317-21,
iii. 422-8.
[725] Oviedo refers the council and its acts only to the
time immediately preceding Cortés’ departure, iii. 509.
[726] ‘Esto afirmaron muchas mugeres, de las quales se sabia
siẽpre la verdad.’ _Herrera_, dec. ii. lib. x. cap. viii.
[727] ‘Nos quitaron la comida e enbiando por ella no nos
la quisieron dar e nos davan de palos a las naborias e
estando lavando una yndia de las nuestras la hahogaron e
dezian e publicavan que asy avian de hazer a los españoles.’
_Ramirez_, _Proceso contra Alvarado_, 66. This testimony
is confirmed by a number of his followers.
[728] ‘Con muchas escalas para subir y matar a los
españoles.’ _Id._, 67. _Martin_, in _Id._, 144.
[729] ‘Le prince acolhua Tecocoltzin.’ _Brasseur de
Bourbourg_, _Hist. Nat. Civ._, iv. 287.
[730] ‘A number of poles were raised in the court-yard,
destined, as I was told, to impale the Spaniards, one
taller than the rest upon the pyramid being reserved for
me.’ _Alvarado_, in _Ramirez_, _Proceso contra Alvarado_,
66.
[731] Alvarado’s statements with regard to reports and signs
of revolt, and to the confession of several natives, is
confirmed by a number of witnesses, including the clergyman
Juan Diaz. _Id._, 66, 113, et seq. Tapia, who is arrayed
against Alvarado, intimates that torture induced the natives
to give the confirmation of the plot as desired by the
Spanish captain, and that the interpreter was unreliable.
One witness declares that the uprising was understood to
be planned to take place within ten days; another says on
the day following the torture, intimating that it was to
be after the great dances. _Id._, 37, 150. ‘Alvarado dixo,
que luego le auian de venir a dar guerra ... que lo supo
de vn Papa, y de dos Principales, y de otros Mexicanos.’
_Bernal Diaz_, _Hist. Verdad._, 102.
[732] Tapia’s testimony to this and other criminating points
is particularly valuable, as he was a bitter opponent of
Alvarado. The latter states that Montezuma declared himself
powerless to prevent the premeditated sacrilege to the
Christian images. _Ramirez_, _Proceso contra Alvarado_,
36-7, 66-7. But this plea, if made, must, according to other
accounts, be interpreted to apply only to pagan ceremonies,
held almost before the images, and which might be regarded as
a sacrilege. Torquemada writes that arms had been collected
within the temple and everything prepared for the day when
the Spaniards attended by invitation to witness the dance
of the nobles. At a given signal an evidently simultaneous
attack was to be made on the assembled guests and on the
fort, thus taking the Spaniards at a disadvantage. Jars
stood prepared, filled with certain liquids, wherein to
cook their bodies for the feast. i. 489-90. The general
inclination of those who follow the Spanish version, of
which Torquemada, usually so stanch for the natives, is
here the best exponent, has been to assume that the attack
was arranged for the day of the great dances; and this
is not unlikely, although the original writers and their
commentators appear to be ignorant of or oblivious to certain
features of the festival. Another view has been to place
the attack during the installation of the new image of the
war-god. This ceremony belonged to the preceding day, a
fact not as a rule understood, and therefore the source of
much confusion. Brasseur de Bourbourg, who is clearest on
these points, assumes that the raising of the idol would
involve the casting forth of the Christian emblems, and
be the signal for attack. But evidences are conclusive
that the natives were not ready on that day. They were
too occupied with the celebration, and Alvarado, with his
small force, was not so negligent as to wait till the last
moment, when the enemy was fully prepared. He and several
of his men indicate clearly enough that they attended the
temple at the installation. The uprising must therefore have
been appointed for the following or even a later day. See
note 25. Vetancurt, _Teatro Mex._, iii. 139, is among the
authorities who follow the version of Torquemada in general.
One of the fervid-minded witnesses of Alvarado repeats the
account of pots and jars for cooking the Spaniards. Helps
supposes that Huitzilopochtli’s festival had not yet been
entered upon, and that Tezcatlipoca’s image is the one in
question; but the Spaniards, who knew the difference between
these idols, all affirm that the celebration of the war-god
was now held. See _Ramirez_, _Proceso contra Alvarado_,
69, 113, 130, 137, and 150.
[733] This received support from his neglect to interfere
when supplies were cut down. Even Tapia refers to a change
in his disposition, and to Alvarado’s displeasure thereat,
but his words may apply to the stoppage either of supplies or
of presents. _Id._, 36. Want of power could not be pleaded
by Montezuma, because a few days later, when the natives
were far more embittered both against the Spaniards and
against their captive sovereign, the latter was able by a
mere appeal to stay their onslaught. The testimony speaks
not only of an undermined wall and scaling ladders, but
of weapons, ‘porras y otras armas,’ and of conspirators
within the fort. _Id._, 67, 113, et seq. Gomara says that
his love for the Spaniards has been denied by some. _Hist.
Mex._, 154-5; but Bernal Diaz will not believe Montezuma
guilty of conspiracy. _Hist. Verdad._, 102. The grief of the
Spaniards at his death, and the care taken of his children,
indicate that they and the crown regarded him as loyal.
[734] ‘Los españoles lo requirieron al dicho D. Pedro.’
_Ramirez_, _Proceso contra Alvarado_, 150. Tapia pretends
that he objected. _Id._, 37.
[735] Alvarado and his men in more than one instance indicate
the day when the dough idol was raised. _Id._, 67, 113,
134. Ixtlilxochitl points to the following greater day,
which he dates May 19th. _Relaciones_, 412. Sahagun is not
so definite, but his editor accepts the chief day, calling
it whitsunday, May 27th. _Hist. Conq._ (ed. 1840), 99. In
another place he says May 25th. _Tezcuco en los ultimos
tiempos_, 274. One of Alvarado’s men states that it was a
Thursday. _Ramirez_, _Proceso contra Alvarado_, 131.
[736] The testimony of the conquerors, confirmed by native
paintings and records, leaves no doubt that the dance of
the nobles and the massacre took place in the great temple
adjoining the fort. _Ramirez_, _Proceso_, 37 et seq. Acosta
writes, however, that they occurred in the palace, _Hist.
Ind._, 522, and he is partly right, since a massacre was
carried out here also. Clavigero follows Acosta, and assumes
that the fort is meant. He argues that the dance was held
there so that the emperor might, as customary, be present,
and that a massacre could not have been undertaken by so
few Spaniards in the great temple, where the arsenals were
situated, and where the concourse of people must have been
very large. _Storia Mess._, iii. 118. The Spaniards had
forbidden the use of arms during the festival, and none
appear to have been produced in the temple. Among other
precautions Alvarado appears to have insisted on a small
attendance beyond that of nobles, and most authorities so
accept it.
[737] Torquemada says 50 men; the Tlascaltecs are seldom
counted.
[738] ‘Que no quedaron sino el dicho Montezuma y quinze o
veynte criados,’ says the charge against Alvarado. _Ramirez_,
_Proceso_, 4, 20, 37, 43. This generally ignored part of the
massacre finds also indirect confirmation in the diffuse
testimony to the finding of concealed weapons among the
attendants of Montezuma. Alvarado would not have failed to
punish them for this.
[739] _Ixtlilxochitl_, _Relaciones_, 412. ‘Este bayle es
como el Netoteliztli.’ ‘Mazeualiztli: que quiere dezir
Merecimiento con trabajo.’ _Gomara_, _Hist. Mex._, 150.
[740] See _Native Races_, ii. 288-9.
[741] ‘Fue al patio donde estava el Oechilobos e vi mucha
gente junta para le subir e defendiendolo venia mucha gente
los quales comensaron a pelear con nosotros.’ _Ramirez_,
_Proceso contra Alvarado_, 67. This is a mere excuse
evidently, which none attempt to support, definitely at
least; but it sounded well to say that the actual fight began
on the native side, as had the plotting. One of Brasseur
de Bourbourg’s unique manuscripts states that the first
attack by the Spaniards was upon those who were advancing
with the idol. _Hist. Nat. Civ._, iv. 287. ‘Este testigo
desfizo el ydolo que los dichos yndios tenian para sobir
donde estava Nuestra Señora.’ _Nuño Pinto_, in _Ramirez_,
134.
[742] There were from 300 to 400 dancers, nearly all chiefs,
and an audience of from 2000 to 3000, says Tapia; and from
the wording of the accusation against Alvarado it appears
that all the chiefs were killed, and a number of the rest,
besides those slaughtered in the fort. Ramirez interprets
the native painting to signify 400, most likely of the
nobles only, _Id._, 4, 37, 286; 400 killed, _Cortés_,
_Residencia_, i. 41; over 600 nobles slaughtered in one
hour, _Cano_, in _Oviedo_, iii. 550; 600 to 1000 nobles
and caciques, _Gomara_; over 1000 nobles, _Ixtlilxochitl_,
_Relaciones_, 412, and _Brasseur de Bourbourg_. ‘Fué tan
grande el derramamiento de sangre, que corrian arroyos della
por el patio como agua cuando mucho llueve.’ _Sahagun_,
_Hist. Conq._ (ed. 1840), 100. He gives sickening details
of truncated bodies, of dismembered hands and feet, and of
draggling entrails. Father Duran goes to an extreme in his
account, according to which Alvarado prompted the deed, and
Cortés executed it. From 8000 to 10,000 illustrious men were
summoned through Montezuma to assemble in the temple, in
order to permit Cortés to kill them and thus become master
in the country. He places ten soldiers at each gate, and
sends in ten to commit the slaughter. _Hist. Ind._, MS. ii.
456-9. Las Casas is not so absurd, this time at least, but
close behind him in the estimate, for he states that the
slaughter was carried on in different parts of the city
at the same time, and in one place alone about 2000 young
nobles fell. Prescott misinterprets him. ‘Non procul à
palatio aberant, duo circiter millia juvenum nobilium.... Ad
hos se contulit Hispanorum Capitaneus, & alios ad reliquas
urbis partes, in quibus hæ choreæ celebrabantur, misit,
... non cessabunt celebrare & lamentari ... calamitatem,’
etc. _Regio. Ind. Devastat._, 32.
[743] _Tapia_, and others, in _Ramirez_, 38, 67, 131.
Torquemada assumes that the arms used by the assailants
were those which had been collected for the outbreak in the
houses adjoining the temple, i. 490. As regards the motives
for the massacre, the Spanish authorities seek as a rule to
justify them, while the native accounts are equally inclined
to ascribe them to greed or to wanton cruelty. According to
Sahagun the celebration was held at the instance of Alvarado,
who slaughtered the devotees without known cause. _Hist.
Conq._, 27 (ed. 1840), 100. Duran, who is as prejudiced
as he is blundering, dates the massacre after the return
of Cortés from the coast. Alvarado persuades him to secure
the submission of the country by killing all the lords and
chiefs, and they are accordingly allured to their death.
_Hist. Ind._, MS., ii. 456-7. Las Casas inclines to a similar
motive; ‘quo magis cresceret, & augeretur in his provinciis
formido illorum crudelitatis.’ _Regio. Ind. Devastat._, 30.
Nearer the truth comes Ixtlilxochitl, who, while disposed
to credit his countrymen, dares not accuse the Spaniards,
and so takes the prudent middle course of casting the blame
on the Tlascaltecs. Prompted by the hatred bred of former
wrongs inflicted by Mexicans, and by greed for spoils, they
invent charges of treason and speedy revolt. Alvarado, being
also avaricious, is readily induced to believe them, and
considers it besides a good opportunity to obtain control
by dispatching the assembled chiefs, unarmed as they are.
_Hist. Chich._, 300; _Relaciones_, 389, 412. Ixtlilxochitl
is not to blame for his assumption, since his admired
guide, the biographer of Cortés, does not attempt to defend
Alvarado, but merely mentions that he was influenced either
by reports of a proposed uprising or by avarice. _Gomara_,
_Hist. Mex._, 151. The commentator Chimalpain says bluntly
that the latter motive ‘es mas de creer.’ _Hist. Conq._,
i. 281; _Benzoni_, _Mondo Nuovo_, 94; _Pizarro y Orellana_,
_Varones Ilvstres_, 92. Vetancurt rather condemns Alvarado
for acting on insufficient evidence. _Teatro Mex._, pt.
iii. 139-40. Cortés’ silence respecting the cause may be
attributed to his usual prudence in suppressing unpleasant
facts. He states, however, that Montezuma supplicated him
not to be annoyed at what had happened, since he regretted
it as much as the Spaniards. This implies that the Indians
were regarded as originators of the trouble. The severity
with which he treated the emperor on his return to Mexico,
notwithstanding the efforts made by him to save the
Spaniards, indicates still more strongly that Cortés was
convinced of Mexican treachery. _Cartas_, 126 et seq. In the
letter of the army to the emperor the uprising is attributed
to Narvaez’ plots. _Carta del Ejército_, in _Icazbalceta_,
_Col. Doc._, i. 429. Herrera notices the native versions,
particularly that which accuses the Tlascaltecs of having
trumped up charges against the Mexicans, but he affirms,
‘la verdad fue, que pensaron matar los Castellanos.’ He
thereupon enumerates proofs of the plot. dec. ii. lib. x.
cap. viii. Torquemada, who is more fully acquainted with
native accounts, condemns them as unreliable, and states
that Sahagun accepted them without investigation, i.
489-91. The charge that Alvarado was influenced by avarice
is promptly rejected by Bernal Diaz. ‘No lo creo, ni nunca
tal oí, ni es de creer que tal hiziesse.’ His motive was to
inspire terror and inflict such injury as to prevent the
Indians from attacking him. That they intended to attack,
Bernal Diaz fully believes. _Hist. Verdad._, 102. Solis is
quite indignant at the supposition that avarice impelled
the Spaniards. _Hist. Mex._, ii. 117. According to Oviedo
the intention of the natives was to kill also Cortés on
his return. He inserts without comment the version of
Cano, married to Montezuma’s daughter, that avarice was
the motive, iii. 510, 550. Acosta, who generally adheres
to native versions, does not apparently find them reliable
in this case, since he merely says that a ‘chastisement’
was inflicted, but that it was excessive. _Hist. Ind._,
522. This is also the opinion of Clavigero, who believes
that the Spaniards were deceived by Tlascaltec stories of
a plot, and wished to anticipate it, on the principle that
‘chi assalisce vince. Checchessia, la sua condotta non può
scusarsi d’imprudenza, e di crudeltà.’ _Storia Mess._, iii.
119. This view has been widely adopted, even by the modern
Mexican historian Carbajal Espinosa, plagiarist though he be.
_Hist. Mex._, ii. 339. His confrère Bustamante, as editor
of Sahagun, is inclined to magnify even the exaggerations
of the latter. Prescott wavers between Clavigero’s views
and disbelief in Alvarado’s apology. But in expressing
his opinion he misconstrues Bernal Diaz and raises some
meaningless questions. _Mex._, ii. 284-6. There is no doubt
that the Indians were bent on mischief. A large faction had
been hostile to the Spaniards ever since their arrival, as
intruders who menaced the existing politic, economic, and
religious order. This feeling had been steadily spreading
under the threatening attitude assumed by the unbidden
guests in seizing the emperor, in extorting tribute, and in
assuming mastery. With the occupation of the temple by the
Christian emblems the climax was reached; and now the whole
population became possessed with a desire to avenge not only
the outraged idols, but themselves and their sovereign,
and to uphold the tottering throne. The observations of
the Spaniards and the reports of their informers were
correct in pointing to an uprising, to take place during
the gathering of pilgrims for the war-god festival, when
the reduced number of the Spanish garrison favored the
design. The confession of several natives, whether extorted
by torture or not, confirmed the charges and justified
belief. Alvarado could not as a prudent commander ignore
them, and duty required him to use prompt measures for the
protection of his force, and of the interests of his king
and the expedition. It might be urged by those who seek to
defend this kind of thing that seizure of the victims for
hostages would have been equally effective and more humane;
but from the precedence established by the general himself
at Cholula the conduct of the rash Alvarado is scarcely to
be wondered at. Cortés’ object had been to strike terror
as the only effective lesson for a people who seemed
to recognize no other sway, and if this was regarded as
necessary with the Cholultecs, Alvarado must have held it to
be doubly so now. His position was far more critical than
that at the former city, for his resources were smaller,
the prospect of aid was hopeless, and escape was cut off.
He had to strike promptly and strike well. Here were the
leaders, and here the temple, wherein a punishment would
apparently have greater effect. It was natural to suppose
that the installation of the war-god would be attended by
the leaders or representative men of the enemy; and to
level the blow at this class must be considered as less
cruel at least than to strike the multitude, as at Cholula.
Perhaps the recognition of this was a reason for the silence
of Cortés. All this discussion, however, as to the minor
motives prompting a dastardly deed I do not regard as very
relevant. I am very sure that the motives of the Spaniards
in this massacre were not plunder. They were playing for
a higher stake, for the whole country, and, in case they
won, all in it would be theirs. The present heavy blow was
but one of the points in the game.