THE COUP DE MAÎTRE OF CORTÉS.
MAY, 1520.
DISMAL PROSPECTS—EMPIRE TO HOLD, INVASION TO REPEL—THE ARMY
DIVIDES—ALVARADO GUARDS MONTEZUMA, WHILE CORTÉS LOOKS AFTER
NARVAEZ—THE MARCH SEAWARD—THE RENDEZVOUS—THE CHINANTECS
AND THEIR PIKES—CORTÉS SOWS ALLURING WORDS IN THE CAMP OF
THE ENEMY—PROPOSALS OF PEACE—DEFIANCE—NIGHT ATTACK—CORTÉS
CAPTURES NARVAEZ AND HIS ARMY.
It now behooved Cortés to look well to himself. He might win a
score of Marathons, but one Paros would ruin all. When embarking in
this enterprise, he was to all appearance little above the common
adventurer. But rare talents were constantly appearing as required
by occasion. Though sometimes carried away by excess of zeal, he
had proved himself an adept in diplomacy. And for one hitherto so
sportive and pleasure-loving, his temper was now grave, particularly in
times of peril, when his calm self-mastery increased with increasing
danger. The rhythm of battle was the sweetest harmony that could stir
his soul, and yet he never fought but for a purpose. On gaining an
advantage he indulged in no holiday of retrospect or repose; so long as
anything remained to be done no time was wasted in self-gratulations.
He never turned from danger, but hastened to seek it out, perceiving
it even in the darkness, intuitively, and always looking it full in
the face. It was while preparing to strike that the enemy received
the staggering blow, and the advantage thus gained was followed up to
yet greater advantage At no time appears this hero stronger, grander,
than now, when, without authority, without the royal sanction, in one
sense an outlaw, with the people of the country against him, his own
countrymen coming to war on him, his force insignificant as compared
with that of any one of his several enemies, he yet holds them all
at bay, by his iron nerve and ever ready strategic resources, keeping
them asunder, pitting one against another, playing on the foibles of
them all as easily and serenely as a lady fingers her guitar.
Greatly imperilled were now the conqueror’s brilliant visions of
conquest and conversion, of fame and wealth. If Narvaez were to
advance on Mexico, the Aztecs could not fail to take advantage of the
opportunity, either to join the professed liberator of their emperor
and themselves, or to attack the foreigners’ quarters on their own
account. This would place him between two fires, to which famine
would prove an effective ally. If Narvaez remained on the coast, it
would be to cut off both retreat and reinforcement, leaving him to
Aztec vengeance. To abandon Mexico for a campaign against the enemy
would be to surrender the most important part of the conquest.
To divide his forces, so as at once to retain his hold on the capital
and meet this new visitation—such a measure would render his already
small force less able to cope with an enemy not only its equal
in courage and military art, but far superior to it in number and
resources. Yet this he determined to do. The revelations of Narvaez’
messengers had shown how possible it might be, by judicious gifts and
promises, to sow discord in the enemy’s camp. The priests Guevara
and Olmedo, and others of both parties, were even then at work,
and chiefly on their efforts depended his prospects. Thus would he
seduce to his purpose the opponent’s troops, in so far at least as to
effect a compromise by which Narvaez might leave him in comparative
peace.[654] Who shall say that his good fortune may not still favor
him! And thereupon he resolved to move his camp nearer to the enemy,
so as to be ready for any emergency, and further, to give himself
a more imposing appearance by the addition of native auxiliaries.
Another reason for this advance was by his presence to counteract
the defection of Indian allies, arising from the parade of a superior
force by Narvaez, and from the stamping of Cortés as an impostor.
He laid the project before his council, showing the danger of
awaiting the advance of Narvaez, whose ill-will had already caused
their property to be declared confiscated and their names branded
with dishonor. Deserters to Sandoval had brought news of serious
discontent in the enemy’s camp. Hundreds, they said, would be ready
to come over or to remain neutral if Cortés showed a bold front.
Indeed, the protests of Aillon against a fratricidal war had been
echoed by most of them, intent as they were on obtaining gold, not
on slaughtering countrymen. It was in any case better to advance and
secure a good position, perhaps to surprise the careless Narvaez.
With God and the king on their side, so they claimed, they could not
fail to conquer. Some objections were ventured upon, but promptly
suppressed by one of the captains, who reminded his comrades of their
glorious achievements under Cortés, and their probable fate should
Narvaez gain the ascendancy. The result was an unanimous approval of
the plan proposed; and Cortés thereupon commissioned the captains to
represent the matter to the men, and to ascertain who were willing
to follow, and who should remain in Mexico.[655]
On acquainting Montezuma with his intention, the monarch questioned
him as to the reason of the hostility shown by the other force. Cortés
well knew that it was useless wholly to conceal the state of affairs.
He had been silent, he replied, in order not to give him pain. He and
his men had been sent by their king on this mission, and were from
the royal province of Castile, whilst the forces on the coast were
a rebellious horde from the outside province of Biscay, and inferior
to them, as Otomís, for instance, were inferior to the nobler Aztecs.
They had come with the design of injuring the natives, and Cortés as
their protector; but with the aid of his patron saint he would have
no trouble in chastising them, and in securing their vessels for his
speedy departure.[656] Alvarado, the tonatiuh, would remain in Mexico,
and him he recommended to the monarch’s consideration, requesting that
supplies be provided and peace maintained. Any attempt at revolt would
react with terrible effect on himself and his people. The emperor
promised that this should be done, and offered not only guides, but
an army to aid him. The latter was declined, chiefly because Aztec
troops could not be relied on.[657]
It was decided that all who were not wholly in sympathy with Cortés,
should remain with the garrison left in charge of Mexico, since
self-preservation would constrain them to act in the direction of
his interest. This force numbered one hundred and forty men, and with
the loyal Alvarado for captain, Mexico was regarded as secured. The
defences of the Spanish quarters were strengthened; all the guns and
most of the fire-locks, cross-bows, and ammunition were left with the
garrison, also seven horses. Supplies being not over abundant, owing
to the drought, maize and other provisions were brought from Tlascala
to serve in case of need. The men were promised wealth and honors if
they remained faithful, and their somewhat hot-headed commander was
exhorted to prudence. “You are few in number,” said Cortés to them
on leaving, “and yet you are strong; finally, have a care of your
prisoner.”[658]
About the middle of May Cortés set out from Mexico with seventy
Spaniards, sworn to implicit obedience.[659] There were also native
carriers, a number of prominent Mexicans as hostages, and guides who
were to take them by a short southern route through Aztec territory
to the coast. Montezuma accompanied him to the Iztapalapan causeway,
and there took his leave with friendly demonstration, while a number
of chieftains continued with him for some distance on the way to
the Huitzilapan plateau. He had no intention of encumbering himself
with heavy war material, for the little he possessed could not avail
against the superior armament of the enemy. His must be a light corps,
capable of quick movements; stratagem should supply the place of
numbers. And now what hopes and fears were theirs as they marched on
toward the sea! Surely so brave a little army was never more beset
by pitfalls and snares.
On reaching Cholula they were joined by Velazquez and Rangel, with one
hundred and fifty men, who were now the mainstay of the expedition.
About a score of these, suspected of favoring too strongly the Cuban
governor, were sent back to Mexico, so that the enterprise might
not be imperilled by treason. Among the remainder were distributed
the gold collected by the expedition in the Tochtepec and adjoining
region, in order to encourage loyalty.[660]
Unable himself to visit Tlascala, Cortés sent Francisco Rodriguez, with
instructions to raise a force of her stanch warriors. He succeeded in
enlisting several thousand; but as it became evident whom they were
to meet, the natives recalled only too vividly the terrible effect of
Spanish arms and prowess, and began rapidly to desert, so that only
a few presented themselves before Cortés, and they were dismissed
with presents.[661]
During the march to the coast scouts were sent out by the main road
and through by-paths to gather information of the enemy. Not far
from Cholula Olmedo rejoined the army, with a letter from Narvaez
demanding submission. Of this no notice was taken, for although the
latter had endeavored to intimidate the envoy by holding a review
of his troops, the brave friar had sounded the disposition of the
men too truly to be alarmed. He seemed rather disposed to underrate
the strength of Narvaez, and with a sense of the ludicrous he amused
the camp with his description of the vanity and carelessness of the
leader, and the arrogant assumption of the officers. When, therefore,
at Quecholac[662] they encountered Alonso de Mata,[663] notary of
Narvaez, who had been sent with four witnesses to advise Cortés of
his commission and demands, he was told first to produce his own
credentials as royal notary, and being unable to do so he was refused
a hearing.[664] The official mission of the messengers being thus
disposed of, Cortés soothed their wounded pride with soft words
and hospitable cheer; he gave them presents, and took care before
dismissing them to feast their eyes on the gold and jewels which he
caused his men to display, and to let them know that thousands of
Tlascaltec and other troops were on the way to join him. Their report
to Narvaez was a confirmation of Guevara’s statement, and did much
to promote the growing disaffection toward Narvaez.
The army now descended from the plateau to Ahuilizapan, and followed
the slope northward to Huatusco. This town appears to have been
situated on the head-waters of the present Rio Jamapa. Half-way down
this river, about ten leagues south of Cempoala, lay the town of
Tampaniquita,[665] which was the rendezvous. A number of Indians who
here appeared with complaints of outrages by Narvaez were consoled
with promises of speedy relief. Sandoval had come by a long and
difficult mountain route to avoid the enemy, and had brought with
him about sixty able-bodied soldiers, the old and infirm remaining
at Papalote.[666]
This addition raised the force to about two hundred and sixty
men, according to common statement, including the deserters from
Narvaez. Among the number were five horsemen, and a few archers and
musketeers.[667] They were poorly equipped, for they brought from
Mexico little else than well-worn escaupiles, or quilted cotton
armor, shields, swords, and dirks, a miserable outfit in which to
meet the well armed troops of Narvaez.[668] But the ready resource
of Cortés had found a remedy. He had noticed in the hands of the
Chinantecs a spear, twenty feet in length, which struck him at once
as a formidable weapon, either in defence or attack. It would be
particularly serviceable against cavalry. Immediately on hearing of
Narvaez’ arrival he had sent a messenger to that province with an
order for three hundred of the pikes, to be finished not with the
usual iztli head, but with double points of copper, a metal which
abounded in that region. The natives having previously tendered
submission to the Spaniards, Cortés also asked them for two thousand
warriors, to join him on pentecost day at the rendezvous. Both of
these requests were promptly granted, and before the Spaniards were on
the ground the messenger had returned with a force of Indians bearing
the weapons,[669] with points superior in finish to the models sent.
The messenger was Tobilla, a soldier from the Italian wars, and an
expert at arms, particularly with the lance. Under his instruction
the soldiers soon became expert pikemen, and gained no little praise.
Add to this courage, increased by many victories, their admirable
discipline, their influence over the natives, and their knowledge of
the country, and the little band assumes more formidable proportions.
Under the several influences surrounding him the original fierce design
of Narvaez in his dealings with Cortés had cooled somewhat. The calm
confidence and caustic wit of Olmedo tended to inspire respect for
his commander, which was not lessened by the rumor of vast Indian
armies massing under his banner. Nor were his men apparently inclined
to turn the sword against their countrymen.
Before the return of Mata he despatched a commission to Cortés
demanding the surrender of the country, but offering him liberty
to depart for any other region, accompanied by those who wished to
follow his fortunes. With this object vessels and stores would be
provided. The bearers of this proposal were his old friend Andrés de
Duero, Guevara, another clergyman named Juan de Leon, and one or two
others.[670]
Duero, it will be remembered, had greatly assisted Cortés in fitting
out his expedition from Cuba; in fact, without his intervention
Cortés would never have been appointed to the command. Láres was
dead, and it was quite natural, after this lapse of time, that Duero
should desire to look in on Mexico, and for that reason had joined
the expedition of Narvaez. Yet his sympathies were wholly with his
partner, and after a warm embrace he came at once to the subject of
his ducats. Their interview was private and protracted, and appears
to have been satisfactory, Cortés receiving on the one hand valuable
information about Narvaez’ plans and position, and Duero, on the
other, coming forth with weighted pockets, as an instalment of the
larger sum to follow. According to Bernal Diaz it was arranged that
Duero should receive valuable grants and offices if he persuaded the
alguacil mayor and other leaders so to manage affairs that Narvaez
should be captured or killed, and Cortés acknowledged captain-general
over all the troops.[671] Whatever may have been the agreement, there
is no doubt that Duero promised to promote his friend’s schemes in
the other camp.
Guevara and the other members of the commission were also loaded with
presents, and confirmed as supporters of Cortés. As for Narvaez’
proposition, he charged them to reply that he would listen to none
but a royal mandate, and would hold the country for the king, as was
the duty of a loyal subject, and to this he and his followers were
prepared to pledge their lives. Still, he was ready to meet Narvaez,
each accompanied by ten attendants, in order that their respective
claims might peradventure be happily adjusted. It was supposed by the
captains of Cortés, who had influenced the proposal, that the result
would be a division of territory, and to this they were willing to
agree.[672]
Duero had been requested by Narvaez to persuade Velazquez de Leon to
visit their camp, in the hope that a personal meeting might win him
to their cause.[673]
Velazquez’ disregard of the former summons from the enemy had confirmed
the faith of Cortés in his loyalty, and since a visit to the camp of
Narvaez might lead to important information, he advised him to go; at
the same time intimating that his heavy ornaments might have a happy
effect on that gold-thirsty crew.[674] With a view to temporize he
was authorized to offer himself as mediator between the two generals,
and with a supply of gold for bribes he went over to the camp of
Narvaez. There he met a most cordial reception. Gently the commander
remonstrated at his adherence to a traitor who had so deeply injured
his relatives. “He is no traitor,” replied Velazquez warmly, “there
has been no treason either acted or intended.” He would not listen
to any overtures, even when coupled with the promise of a command
second only to that of Narvaez. “I have sworn loyalty to Cortés,” he
said, “and I will remain true.” Nevertheless, that he might not appear
ungracious, he promised to use his efforts toward the recognition of
Narvaez’ supremacy. A review of the troops was held to impress him
with the superiority of the forces with which he might soon have to
contend.
A courtier in manner, and with a fine presence, Velazquez quickly won
his way among the captains and staff; nor did he fail to improve the
opportunity by presenting his general’s cause in the most attractive
light. No little weight was given to his words by the heavy gold
chain which fell in several coils upon his breast.[675]
Cortés affirms that the proposal for an interview with Narvaez
had been accepted, and that he was preparing to attend it when the
warning came that advantage would be taken of the meeting to seize
or kill him.[676] If treachery was intended, it is more likely to
have originated with Cortés, who was by no means scrupulous, as we
have seen, while Narvaez appears to have borne the reputation of a
man of honor.[677] It is still more probable that Cortés invented the
warning in order to be free before his followers, and before Narvaez,
to carry out a more momentous project, which, with the increased
knowledge of affairs in the enemy’s camp, and with the growth there
of his party, had begun to unfold in his mind.
It was a grand conception; yet grander still the execution. It was
a different matter with a small force to fall upon a well appointed
army of countrymen; different from war on naked savages, to surprise
them by night, or otherwise to vanquish them. Yet this was what
Cortés now proposed to do. Nor, in adopting this bold measure, does
he lay himself open to the charge of rashness or recklessness. His
situation was desperate: he must conquer or be conquered. Cortés
was no abstract theorist: he dealt mainly in concrete facts; not
necessarily demonstrated facts, but facts reached often by intuition
alone. With facts, intuitively or practically arrived at, he kept
himself well stored. He possessed many noble qualities, but on the
whole, as we have seen, his character was not cast in an immaculate
mould. He was exceedingly religious; and while, as I have said, he
would not let religion stand in the way of his ambition, yet he was
more bigoted than any of his followers. Aside from the chivalrous
abandonment of himself to fate, and the brilliant achievements thence
arising, there was little admirable in him. He knew nothing of lofty
magnanimity, although he did many magnanimous acts; he knew nothing
of pure disinterestedness, or a generosity of soul, although he was
ofttimes exceedingly generous. He had none of that sense of unswerving
justness and sensitiveness to wrong which characterized Grijalva. His
self-possession never left him. He was a power within himself, and
he knew it. Thus it was in Mexico now; and for years afterward when
Mexico was all America, he was Agamemnon, king of men, the greatest
of Greece when Greece was all the world.
Under the present inspiration, he sent Rodrigo Álvarez Chico and
a notary[678] to withdraw the proposal he had made Narvaez for an
interview, and to demand of him the production of a royal commission,
authorizing his presence there, which commission would be respected;
otherwise he must cease meddling with the affairs of the country.
The followers of Narvaez were to be formally forbidden to obey his
orders; and they were to appear before Cortés within a specified time,
and learn from him what the interests of the king required of them.
Failing in this, he would have them seized and dealt with as rebels
against his majesty.[679]
The cool impudence of this demand, coming from the captain of a little
band of outlaws hemmed in between hostile forces, gave rise to no
small amusement in the enemy’s camp. Narvaez chose nevertheless to
regard the matter seriously, receiving the message as an insolent
defiance. He declared he would no longer show forbearance toward the
traitor; he set a price on the head of Cortés, announced the estate
of his followers to be confiscated, and proclaimed open war against
them.[680]
Immediately after despatching his ultimatum Cortés broke camp and
followed his messengers at a quick march.[681] At Rio de Canoas, or La
Antigua, Velazquez came up with letters from Duero and others. They
had probably been written under a preconcerted arrangement, for they
were read to the leaders and discussed, the result being a unanimous
resolution to advance. So forward they went, Cortés exclaiming, “Death
to the ass or to him who drives it!”[682]
Crossing the swollen river with some difficulty,[683] he hurried
on to Rio Chachalacas, over a league from Cempoala, where camp
was formed quietly and without fires.[684] This sudden movement,
coming immediately after Duero’s interview with Cortés, confirms
the supposition that a plot had been concocted by them, which was
to surprise Narvaez under advantageous circumstances arranged by
confederates. There were to be no half-way measures; all must be
staked on one cast.[685]
Calling his men round him, he made one of those stirring appeals in
which he knew so well how to animate their spirit and touch their
heart. He reviewed their right to the conquest, and their promises to
hold the country for the king. “And now comes this emissary of Señor
Velazquez,” Cortés continued, “full of envy and treacherous design,
to appropriate the fruit of your hard-won victories. This pompous
Narvaez, while seizing your riches and clothing himself in your glory,
would load you with impositions and brand you with dishonor. Will you
submit to this? Will you, who have overcome mighty hosts, who have
seized empires, who even now hold monarchs in your hands, will you
place your necks in the yoke and humbly submit to the unjust demands
of this instrument of your ancient enemy? God, who has always been
with us, will still fight on our side, if we will be true to him and
true to our king. We must fight, and it is for life; ay, and more
than life—for honor and glorious inheritance.” Cheer after cheer burst
from the men, while the captains hastened to assure Cortés that they
would follow him to the death.[686]
Although it was generally understood that coöperation was expected
within the enemy’s camp, the prudent general made no mention of the
fact, lest it might render the men less self-reliant. He pointed out,
however, that their opponents, although more numerous than they,
were unused to war, effeminate, disheartened from hardships, and
discontented with their commander. He explained the arrangement of
Narvaez’ camp, and divided the force into three parties, under the
command respectively of Sandoval, Olid, and himself, the position
of the former as alguacil mayor and comandante on the coast, and the
second as maestre de campo, entitling them to this distinction, young
as they were, particularly since Cortés retained the direction of
affairs. To the former, aided by Jorge and Gonzalo Alvarado, Alonso
de Ávila, and eighty men, was intrusted the task of attacking Narvaez’
special quarters, with the formally worded command to seize him, dead
or alive.[687] As a further inducement toward the accomplishment of
this important end, rewards of three thousand, two thousand, and one
thousand pesos respectively were promised to the first three soldiers
who should secure the general.[688] Olid received the important
order to capture the artillery, from which the greatest danger was
to be apprehended. With him were Andrés de Tapia, Diego Pizarro, and
others. Cortés himself was to follow and render aid where most needed,
supported by Ordaz, Grado, the brothers Chico, and others.[689] The
password was ‘Espíritu Santo,’ suggested by Olmedo with reference to
pentecost day, on which all these events took place.
While occupied with their preparations a deserter arrived, sent by
Duero, it seems, to warn Cortés that, advised of his approach by the
Indians,[690] Narvaez had taken alarm, and was forming the best part
of his troops in the field[691] between him and Cempoala. To this he
had been prompted also by the more watchful of his captains, who had
not failed to observe the growing sympathy for the rival general.
This most unpleasant change of tactics disconcerted Cortés not a
little, and for the time he could do nothing but remain in camp,
protected in front by the creek. Fortune again came to the rescue,
however, in the form of a heavy rain, which fell all Sunday. It was
the beginning of the rainy season.[692] Most of Narvaez’ men, unused
to military service, and enervated by the frivolous inactivity of the
camp, found this highly disagreeable, and began to complain at what
they termed an unnecessary precaution against an insignificant foe.
The friends of Cortés did not fail to take advantage of this feeling
by ridiculing the manœuvre, representing that no troops, much less a
handful of boasters, would think of attacking in such weather. They
would in any case be far more secure within their strong quarters,
and by leaving an advance post in the field timely warning could be
given. This appeared to be reasonable, and since Narvaez by no means
relished the exposure, he gave orders to return to quarters before
dusk, leaving, however, a body of forty horsemen on the plain and
two spies at a brook ford, about half a league off. The remainder
of the horses were kept saddled at the entrance to the camp, and the
men were instructed to sleep on their arms, prepared at any rate to
reoccupy the field in the morning. The watchword was ‘Santa María.’
Cortés was occupied in devising new measures when informed of this
movement. Pointing out to his men the effeminacy and unsoldierly
qualities of the rabble with which they had to deal, and the
carelessness and inefficiency of their commander, he ordered an
immediate advance on Cempoala, where they would now be scarcely
expected. “You know the maxim,” he said, “‘upon the enemy at dawn;’
but better still, we will surprise them by night.[693] Let each strive
to excel his comrade in valor.” These words were received with hearty
approval, for anything was preferable to suspense in a dreary bivouac
without fire or comfort. Crossing the creek they marched noiselessly
over the plain, through the rain, drenched and hungry. On reaching
the brook, near the town, they came upon the two scouts of the enemy,
Gonzalo Carrasco and Alonso Hurtado; they captured the former, while
the latter, warned by the cry of his comrade, hurried into camp to
give the alarm. Carrasco was compelled under threats to answer a
number of questions on the position and plans of his party, and was
menaced with death if he played false.[694]
A cross had been erected at the ford,[695] probably during the first
march to Cempoala, and here the army knelt in all humility to do
reverence. Father Olmedo then gave the men the general absolution,
and appealed to heaven to bless the efforts now to be made in behalf
of their faith and the king, closing with the soul-stirring assurance
that victory should be theirs. The men, one and all, felt no doubt
that they were about to fight not only for their own rights, but for
God and their sovereign; and if the robber could feel encouraged in
his lawless pursuit after kneeling at the shrine of St Demas, surely
these heroes of a hundred fights were stronger for their religious
faith. Therefore it was with renewed confidence that the men buckled
tighter their escaupiles, and pike in hand, their main reliance,
they resumed the march with quickened steps, leaving the baggage and
horses in the care of Marina and the carriers. The horsemen stationed
in the field were not encountered, thanks to Duero who was one of them.
It was just past midnight, on the morning of whit-monday,[696] when
they entered Cempoala. Owing to the darkness and the presence of troops
in the field, together with the recent marches and countermarches,
the presence of the intruders was not suspected till they had almost
crossed the plaza. The storm was not wholly past, but the moon
peered forth at times between the chasing clouds, dimly revealing the
buildings occupied by the enemy. These consisted of three conspicuous
edifices, rising upon pyramidal foundations, the ascent to which was
by a wide staircase along one of the slopes. The highest was a temple,
known as Nuestra Señora since the iconoclastic achievement of Cortés
therein, and this was occupied by the troops of Diego Velazquez. Next
to it was the building held by the captain-general, guarded by the
whole battery of guns.[697]
Hurtado had arrived nearly half an hour before and given warning,
but instead of immediately calling to arms, Narvaez lost time with
questions, which elicited only that his companion had been seized and
that he fancied he had heard Spanish voices. Some of the captains,
friendly to Cortés, ridiculed the story as a dream, and entertained
the general with speculations about the projects of the audacious
rebel.[698] While so occupied the alarm of the sentinels was heard.
Cortés was upon them.[699] Narvaez at once became the self-possessed
commander, and hastened to issue the necessary orders. There was a
rush to arms, and the confusion was increased by the appearance of
innumerable fire-flies, which the besieged mistook for the fire-arms
and spears of a large army.[700]
In order to avoid the range of the guns, Cortés had kept his men
along the sides of the approaches, and on finding himself discovered
he shouted, “Close with them! At them!” Fife and drum joined in
and echoed the cry.[701] Olid rushed on the battery, ranged along
a terrace on the ascent to the commander’s house. So sudden was the
attack that those of the artillerymen who still remained loyal had
time to discharge only one gun, which killed two men.[702] The next
instant Olid, Pizarro, and their followers had practically secured
the pieces, and were pressing the defenders, who offered little
resistance. At the same time Sandoval rushed past and hurried up the
stair-way to the summit, where Narvaez stood to receive him.[703] A
volley of arrows and bullets was fired at him, but being poorly aimed,
out of consideration for comrades below, he escaped unharmed. Nothing
daunted, Sandoval’s followers pressed onward in a compact column, and
in a moment they were on the summit platform. “Surrender!” shouted
their leader with resolute confidence, to which Narvaez responded
with a jeer, calling on his men to spare no traitors. But the order
was an empty one, for their swords and short Spanish lances availed
nothing against the line of bristling copper points on the long pikes
of the attacking party, and step by step they were driven backward
into the building. What they did with their fire-arms or cross-bows
is not stated.
Meanwhile Cortés was doing brave work below. One body engaged the
cavalry, unhorsing with the all-effective pike those who had managed
to reach the saddle, and cutting the girths. Another body turned their
attention to the reinforcements which came rushing from the adjoining
quarters to the scene of action, and taking advantage of the confusion
and the darkness, relieved only at fitful intervals by the moon,
their cool opponents readily disarmed the greater number, so that but
a small proportion made their way through the besieging lines.[704]
While thus occupied they heard a shout from above, “Victory! Victory
for Cortés! Narvaez is dead!”[705] Cortés immediately caused the cry
to be taken up by the rest of his men, which added to the confusion
of the enemy.
It appears that Sandoval, although reinforced by a portion of Olid’s
party, could not effect an entry into the building to which his pikes
had driven those who still adhered to Narvaez, a number having passed
over to his side before this. After watching the vain skirmishing
for a while, Lopez, the ship-builder, bethought himself of setting
fire to the dry palm roof of the otherwise substantial building.
The besieged now had no recourse but to come out, which they did,
headed by Narvaez. No sooner had they appeared on the platform than
Sandoval’s men charged them with the pikes, and the commander was the
first to receive a thrust, in the left eye, which bore him down as he
cried out: “Santa María, save me!” In an instant Pedro Sanchez Farfan
was upon him,[706] and he was dragged down the steps and placed in
a chapel. Awed by this mischance the rest speedily surrendered.
Alférez Fuentes fought valiantly till overthrown with two pike
thrusts. “Our Lady save me!” he cried, still clutching the standard.
“She shall!” responded Sandoval, averting the pikes of the excited
soldiers.[707]
The cry of victory and the rumor of Narvaez’ death had stayed the
stream of reinforcements from the adjoining houses, wherein defence
was now alone thought of. Recognizing that a charge on them might meet
with more determined opposition, Cortés resolved to bring the enemy’s
own battery to his aid.[708] By the time the guns were in position,
most of the forces of Sandoval and Olid were free to aid Velazquez
de Leon in the task of reducing the quarters in which Salvatierra
and Diego Velazquez still held out.
They were summoned to submit to the king and to Cortés, under pain
of death, but gave a defiant answer. The guns were now brought into
play, and fired first over their heads to frighten them. As the balls
came whizzing by, the blustering Salvatierra, who had sworn to eat
the ears of Cortés, declared himself sick. His fierceness changed to
abject fear, and his men asserted that they never saw a captain behave
so contemptibly. The shots, supported by promises, soon brought about
the surrender of this pyramid.
The last to hold out was Diego Velazquez, a brave fellow, well liked by
his followers; but after a few more parleys, and the loss of three men
from well directed shots, his party was also prevailed on to descend
and deliver up their arms,[709] the leaders being secured and removed
in irons to the chapel, the wounded receiving there the attentions
of a surgeon. Cortés looked in to examine their condition, and as
the whisper reached Narvaez that the hero of the day was present, he
turned and said: “Señor Cortés, you may hold high the good fortune
you have had, and the great achievement of securing my person.” With
a twinkle of malicious merriment Cortés regarded for a moment his
fallen foe, whose insufferable conceit did not desert him even here,
and said: “Señor Narvaez, many deeds have I performed since coming
to Mexico, but the least of them all has been to capture you.”[710]
[Illustration]
FOOTNOTES
[654] ‘Velazquez ... si yua en persona no podia escusar de
respetarle, aunque por su buena, y blãda condicion, confiaua
que le traeria a qualquier buen partido; pero temia que
yendo otro qualquier General.’ _Herrera_, dec. ii. lib.
ix. cap. xix.
[655] _Gomara_, _Hist. Mex._, 144; _Herrera_, dec. ii. lib.
ix. cap. xxi.; _Bernal Diaz_, _Hist. Verdad._, 90. ‘Afirman
muchos, que en essa saçon estaba tan bien quisto Cortés,
que si á todos los quisiera llevar, todos se fueran trás
él.’ _Oviedo_, iii. 509. Which is exaggerated, as we have
seen.
[656] ‘Debia ser alguna mala gente, y no vasallos de V.
A.,’ is Cortés’ version of the reply, _Cartas_, 119-20,
while his interpreter, Aguilar, gives it more literally as
‘una gente vizcaynos e que no los enbiava el enperador.’
_Testimonio_, in _Cortés_, _Residencia_, ii. 47, 184. Gomara
adds that Cortés said he was going to protect Montezuma’s
subjects, and to keep the strangers on the coast till he
was ready to depart. The emperor probably dissimulated,
‘holgando que vnos Christianos a otros se matassen.’ _Hist.
Mex._, 145. Forgetting that the declared purposes of Narvaez
were well known in Mexico, Herrera renders the answer that
this captain was a brother of Cortés, sent with a present
from their king. Both would come up to the capital and then
leave the country. The rumored enmity was due to an order
from Spain to avenge any injury suffered at the hands of
the natives, dec. ii. lib. x. cap. i. Brasseur de Bourbourg
follows him.
[657] ‘Aquellos españoles le dejaba encomendados con todo
aquel oro y joyas que él me habia dado ... y le dí muchas
joyas y ropas á él,’ et seq. _Cortés_, _Cartas_, 119-20.
‘Aun prometiò, que embiaria en nuestra ayuda cinco mil
hombres de guerra, e Cortes ... bien entendiò que no los
auia de embiar, e le dixo, que no auia menester.’ _Bernal
Diaz_, _Hist. Verdad._, 91; _Vetancvrt_, _Teatro Mex._, pt.
iii. 135. Ixtlilxochitl assumes in one place that Cortés
asked for men, and was told that Aztecs dared not fight
Spaniards, but would go as carriers. In another version the
confederate kings grant the auxiliaries. _Hist. Chich._,
300; _Relaciones_, 389, 412. Solis assumes that Montezuma
is devoted to Cortés; so does Zamacois, who sees a proof
thereof in the offer of troops. He could not communicate
with Narvaez for want of interpreters, and had he wished to
aid the latter he would have attacked the Spanish quarters.
_Hist. Mex._, ii. 70-1. All of which shows that this author
is not profound either in investigation or argument.
[658] Bernal Diaz places the force at 83 men, with 10
cross-bows, 14 firelocks, 4 large guns, falconets, 7
horses, and all the ammunition; 150 men were left, and 150
taken, _Oviedo_; a little over 50 were left, _Tapia_; all
wished to go, but 200 were left and 250 taken, including
the men of Velazquez, with 8 to 9 horses, and a force of
carriers, _Gomara_; 150 left, 250 taken, with a number of
Indians, _Ixtlilxochitl_; 150 left, _Probanza de Lejalde_.
B. V. de Tapia, who remained with Alvarado, says 130;
_Ramirez_, _Proceso contra Alvarado_, 36. Cortés’ own
account distributes the total of his force as follows:
140 left at Mexico, 150 absent under Velazquez, 70 taken
by himself, 150 at Villa Rica; but this is more than the
original number given on setting out for the plateau. The
Villa Rica force may, however, have been reduced by later
drafts, for other authorities allow only about 70 men for
this fortress. In the Ramusio edition of the _Cartas_ 140
men are given as the garrison left under Alvarado, while
60 are taken by Cortés, _Viaggi_, iii. 244, but later
issues place the former figure at 500, which is evidently
a misprint. However much the figures of different writers
may vary, it seems to be admitted that war and disease had
made a considerable inroad upon them.
[659] ‘Fizo capitan dellos a Alonzo Davila.’ _Monjaras and
Aguilar_, in _Cortés_, _Residencia_, ii. 48, 184.
[660] ‘Que seria fasta catorze mill castellanos.’ _Monjaras_,
in _Cortés_, _Residencia_, ii. 49. ‘Cinco o seys mill.’
_Tirado_, in _Id._, 7.
[661] ‘Porq̄ le pareciò q̄ auia conseguido su intento.’
_Herrera_, dec. ii. lib. x. cap. i. Perhaps in spreading
the rumor that he came with Indian auxiliaries. Among the
auxiliaries were 400 men from Huexotzinco, under Pedro
Gonzalez de Trujillo. _Tirado_, and others, in _Cortés_,
_Residencia_, i. 247 et seq.; ii. 7 et seq. It is this
expedition of Rodriguez, assisted by Diego Garcia, Alonso
de Ojeda, and Juan Marquez, as captains, that has misled
Gomara, and particularly Herrera, in supposing that the
whole expedition received a grand reception at Tlascala;
but, beside the above reference, Cortés intimates clearly
enough that he did not go that way, and he certainly
did take a more southerly route to the coast than on the
previous journey. _Cartas_, 120. Bernal Diaz also says:
‘embiò Cortes a Tlascala â rogar ... que nos embiassen de
presto quatro mil hombres.’ _Hist. Verdad._, 91. Prescott
falls not only into this generally adopted error, but states
that 600 troops were asked for, _Mex._, ii. 243, whilst the
chroniclers all say from 4000 to 10,000. ‘La maior parte de
ellos se bolviò, porque aquella Nacion no estaba acostumbrada
à pelear fuera de su Tierra.’ _Torquemada_, i. 482. A not
very sound excuse, since their troops had already gone to
Mexico.
[662] About twenty leagues east of Cholula.
[663] ‘Vezino de la Puebla, que era ballestero.’ _Bernal
Diaz_, _Hist. Verdad._, 90.
[664] ‘Púsole preso en su pié de amigo.’ _Demanda de
Ceballos_, in _Icazbalceta_, _Col. Doc._, i. 441. But this
is not likely. Bernal Diaz says that Narvaez was told to
send communications to Tampaniquita. _Hist. Verdad._, 91;
_Cortés_, _Residencia_, i. 248, ii. 185.
[665] Torquemada and Clavigero attempt to correct this
spelling, but Bernal Diaz is sustained by Orozco y Berra, in
_Mex._, _Noticias Ciudad_, 244-6. Bernal Diaz also mentions
Mitalaguita, which may be Metlangutla, a few leagues farther
east. _Hist. Verdad._, 91. Herrera states that they passed
through Cotastlan, by which he means probably the province,
and not the town, of Cuetlachtlan. dec. ii. lib. x. cap. i.
[666] Herrera, ubi sup., leaves Ircio in command at Villa
Rica, which is improbable. Sandoval arrived at the rendezvous
the day after us. _Bernal Diaz_, _Hist. Verdad._, 92;
_Cortés_, _Residencia_, ii. 3-9. Prescott makes him join
long before this, on the high plateau, but he misunderstands
his authorities, and is quite at sea with respect to the
route followed by the forces.
[667] Bernal Diaz and Herrera say 266 in all; Torquemada
has 266, beside captains and five horsemen; Cortés, 250 in
all; Tapia, about 250.
[668] ‘Por vn peto, ó capacete, ó casco, ó babera de hierro,
dieramos aquella noche quãto nos pidierã por ello.’ _Bernal
Diaz_, _Hist. Verdad._, 98.
[669] Thirty-eight palmos long. _Herrera_, dec. ii. lib.
x. cap. iii.
[670] According to Bernal Diaz this commission was arranged
by the combined influence of Olmedo and Duero, during
Olmedo’s second visit to the camp. The friar appears,
however, to have been there but once, when he was expelled.
Knowing Salvatierra to be a blusterer, Bermudez, the alguacil
mayor, proposed that he should join the commission, but
his intended victim, not caring to trust himself within
the power of Cortés, pleaded sickness and a dislike to
speak with a traitor. ‘Señor Veedor,’ chimed in Olmedo,
ironically, ‘best it is to be prudent, and you may have
him prisoner before long.’ _Hist. Verdad._, 93.
[671] Duero was to receive the share of treasures claimed,
a command in the expedition equal to that of Cortés, and
after the conquest a grant of towns similar to his own.
As a further inducement, sufficient gold was given to load
his two Cuban servants. On taking leave of the general, on
pentecost morning, Duero asked: ‘What has your worship to
say, before I leave?’ ‘God be with you,’ was the reply, ‘and
see to it, Señor Duero, that it be done as arranged, or by
my conscience [Cortés’ favorite oath] I’ll be in your camp
within three days, with all my companions, and the first
to receive the lance will be your worship, if I see aught
contrary.’ _Bernal Diaz_, _Hist. Verdad._, 94. Monjaras
states that Duero and Leon warned Cortés against opposing
Narvaez’ army and commission. _Cortés_, _Residencia_, ii.
49.
[672] Cortés to remain governor of the part to be allotted
him till the king should decide. _Tapia_, _Rel._, in
_Icazbalceta_, _Col. Doc._, ii. 588. According to Gomara,
who sends Veedor Álvarez Chico, Juan Velazquez, and Juan
del Rio, to carry the message, Cortés proposed a private
interview for the discussion of two points, whether Narvaez
would leave Mexico to him and go to Pánuco or elsewhere,
aided by Cortés with gold and supplies, or whether Narvaez
preferred to take Mexico and give him 300 or 400 men
wherewith to pass on to new conquests. _Hist. Mex._, 144.
The last proposal could only have been a trap to secure
Narvaez’ men. Prescott chooses to omit the proposal for
an interview, and sends instead the ultimatum with Duero,
a glaring disregard of Cortés’ own text, as confirmed by
others. _Cortés_, _Cartas_, 121-2; _Oviedo_, iii. 314.
[673] ‘Dize Narvaez, y en todo su Real ay fama, qui si
U. merced [Velazquez] vá allâ, que luego yo [Cortés] soy
deshecho.’ _Bernal Diaz_, _Hist. Verdad._, 95.
[674] Bernal Diaz states that Cortés made the request in
a manner that appeared to Velazquez an attempt to probe
his loyalty. He therefore refused to take any valuables
with him, but was finally persuaded. Juan del Rio, Cortés’
equerry, kept him company.
[675] Bernal Diaz adds that, these efforts being observed
by Salvatierra, Narvaez was urged to seize Velazquez, and
this would have been done but for the representations of
Duero and others. During the dinner given in his honor,
Captain Diego Velazquez, nephew of the Cuban governor,
alluded in one of his remarks to Cortés as a traitor. The
guest appealed to Narvaez against such expressions. Diego
repeated the term, and added that Juan did not deserve to
bear the name Velazquez. Grasping his sword the latter
retorted, calling him a liar. He would prove himself a
better man than either uncle or nephew, if permission
was granted. The others had to interfere to prevent the
clashing of swords, and Narvaez was persuaded to order the
turbulent visitor away. At leave-taking the general showed
his annoyance, and said that it would have been better had
he not come. Diego Velazquez, who stood by his side, added
a threat, to which Juan rashly retorted, with a twirl of
his beard: ‘Before many days I shall see if your prowess
equals your boast.’ Alarmed at his want of self-control,
Duero and other sympathizers hurried him away before he
could utter any more indiscretions. He and the equerry had
hardly left camp before some horsemen appeared, as if in
pursuit, and caused them to increase their pace. _Hist.
Verdad._, 95-6; _Herrera_, dec. ii. lib. x. cap. i.
[676] _Cartas_, 122. Bernal Diaz assumes that the proposal
for an interview came from Narvaez, through Duero, to
whom he also confided the intended treachery. Olmedo, who
had pretended to be won over, was also informed. _Hist.
Verdad._, 93. Herrera supposes that Sandoval warns Cortés,
who, according to Gomara, is still at Mexico when the
proposal comes. _Hist. Mex._, 144. Solis is more correct
in ascribing the warning to Duero. _Hist. Mex._, ii. 83.
[677] The fact that he allowed such dangerous men as
Velazquez de Leon and Olmedo to go free indicates that he
harbored no treachery.
[678] Gomara sends them with Velazquez de Leon. _Hist. Mex._,
144. ‘Chico, é Pedro Hernandez, escribano.’ _Demanda de
Ceballos_, in _Icazbalceta_, _Col. Doc._, i. 440. Velazquez
having gone on a mediatory mission, Chico must have been
sent after his departure.
[679] ‘La respuesta ... fué prender al escribano y á la
persona que con mi poder ... los cuales estuvieron detenidos
hasta que llegó otro mensajero que yo envié.’ ‘Escribí una
carta al dicho Narvaez y otra á los terceros, diciéndoles
cómo yo habia sabido su mala intencion.’ _Cortés_, _Cartas_,
122-3. The reference to a messenger indicates Cortés’
meaning to be that Chico preceded Velazquez de Leon. Gomara
assumes that Cortés’ pretext for withdrawing the proposal
for an interview was that Narvaez had declined to entertain
the points to be there discussed. See note 19. Chico had
warned him of the intended treachery. _Hist. Mex._, 144.
‘Y que supiesse que no auian de cantar dos gallos en vn
muladar, y que aparejasse las manos.’ _Herrera_, dec.
ii. lib. ix. cap. xxi. Bernal Diaz sends the message with
Olmedo, ‘since no royal notary dare carry it,’ and gives
Narvaez three days in which to send in any commission he
may possess signed by the king. Without such commission he
must leave the country, or Cortés will seize him and inflict
punishment for the outrage on Aillon and on the Indians.
This ultimatum was signed also by the captains and some
soldiers, including Bernal Diaz. _Hist. Verdad._, 92-3. An
answer was demanded through the same messengers. _Tapia_,
_Rel._, in _Icazbalceta_, _Col. Doc._, ii. 588.
[680] ‘Daria dos mil pesos, a quien matasse a Hernando
Cortes, o a Gonçalo de Sandoual.’ _Herrera_, dec. ii.
lib. x. cap. i. ‘Traia mandado de Diego Velazquez que
á mí y á ciertos de los de mi compañía que ... nos
ahorcase.’ _Cortés_, _Cartas_, 121. ‘Hizo proceso en forma
contra Cortés, y por su sentencia, le condenó á muerte.’
_Ixtlilxochitl_, _Hist. Chich._, 300; _Gomara_, _Hist.
Mex._, 143, 146.
[681] ‘Dende a dos horas que se partiô el Juan Velazquez,’
says Bernal Diaz, _Hist. Verdad._, 95.
[682] Implying that since Narvaez would not listen to reason,
Cortés or he should die. ‘Velazquez dixo al ... Cortés
que adonde yva que yva a la carnesceria.’ _Testimonio_,
in _Cortés_, _Residencia_, i. 249; ii. 9, 50, 185-6. On
the way to Rio de Canoas, where they arrived the day after
leaving camp, two hogs, with navel on the back, were killed,
an incident which many interpreted as a sign of victory.
Velazquez having arrived with the messenger who carried
the ultimatum, the army proceeded. _Bernal Diaz_, _Hist.
Verdad._, 95. ‘Anduvimos aquel dia casi diez leguas.’
_Tapia_, in _Icazbalceta_, _Col. Doc._, ii. 588.
[683] Two men were drowned in crossing the stream. _Herrera_,
dec. ii. lib. x. cap. ii.
[684] ‘Dos leguas de los contrarios.’ _Tapia_, _Rel._, in
_Icazbalceta_, _Col. Doc._. ‘Fuimos a dormir a vn riachuelo,
adõde estava en aquella sazon vna puẽte obra de vna legua
de Cẽpoal.’ _Bernal Diaz_, _Hist. Verdad._, 96. Prescott
here evidently follows the erroneous topography of Solis,
who confuses this creek with Rio Canoas. _Hist. Mex._, ii.
85; _Cortés_, _Residencia_, i. 249; ii. 50.
[685] ‘Como yo deseaba evitar todo escándalo, parecióme
que seria el menos, yo ir de noche, sin ser sentido ... y
prenderlo [Narvaez]; ... porque los demás querian obedecer
á la justicia, en especial que los mas dellos venian por
fuerza.’ _Cortés_, _Cartas_, 123-4.
[686] He also stated that offers had been made favorable to
him alone, not to them, hence he had declined them. ‘Muera
el asno ó quien lo aguija.’ Any other course will disgrace
us, was the concluding remark, whereupon we lifted him
upon our shoulders and carried him round. _Tapia_, _Rel._,
in _Icazbalceta_, _Col. Doc._, ii. 588-9. ‘Hizo muchas
ofertas, y prometimiẽtos, que seriamos todos muy ricos.’
_Bernal Diaz_, _Hist. Verdad._, 98. It would be his fault,
not theirs, if success failed. _Herrera_, dec. ii. lib. x.
cap. ii.
[687] ‘Gonzalo de Sãdoual, Alguazil mayor desta Nueua
España, por su Magestad, yo os mando q prendays el cuerpo
de Panfilo de Narvaez, e si se os defendiere, matadle,
que assi conviene al servicio de Dios, y de su Magestad, y
le prendió a vn Oidor.’ Countersigned by Secretary Pedro
Hernandez. _Bernal Diaz_, _Hist. Verdad._, 98; _Tapia_,
_Rel._, in _Icazbalceta_, _Col. Doc._, ii. 590.
[688] Herrera writes 3000, 1500, and 1000 pesos de oro.
Cortés’ acts are said by the men of Velazquez to have been
prompted by ‘un diabólico pensamiento é infernal osadía.’
_Demanda de Ceballos_, in _Icazbalceta_, _Col. Doc._, i. 441.
[689] The above agrees chiefly with Herrera, who assigns
Sandoval 60 men, and names a number of the leading members
of each party. The parties were to keep a stone’s throw
apart. One of Cortés’ squads was to look to the cacique’s
palace, and another to Alcalde Yuste’s quarters. dec. ii.
lib. x. cap. iii. He is evidently confused on many points,
and several names are guessed at. Bernal Diaz states
that Pizarro, with 60 young men, including himself, was
charged to capture the artillery; Sandoval received 60 men;
Velazquez de Leon also a force of 60, wherewith to attack
Diego Velazquez’ quarters; Cortés remained with a reserve
of 20. It is more likely that a higher officer, like Olid,
received the order to capture the artillery, rather than the
comparatively unknown Pizarro. Velazquez de Leon does not
appear to have been detailed for his charge till afterward.
Cortés names only Sandoval as the leader of one party of 80
men, he himself following with the remaining 170. _Cartas_,
123. Solis reverses Herrera’s order. _Hist. Mex._, ii. 91-2.
[690] The stout cacique had remonstrated with the general
on his carelessness, assuring him that Malinche with his
Teules was far different. ‘When you least expect it he
will be here and will kill you.’ Although the warning was
received with laughter, yet the hint was not lost. _Bernal
Diaz_, _Hist. Verdad._, 96.
[691] Eighty horsemen and 500 infantry. ‘Y llegó casi una
legua de donde yo estaba.’ _Cortés_, _Cartas_, 123.
[692] _Laet_, _Nov. Orb._, 221; _Hakluyt’s Voy._, iii. 467.
[693] Botello, known as the Astrologer, who had made several
successful predictions, had assured Cortés that a night
attack would secure him the victory. _Herrera_, dec. ii.
lib. x. cap. xi.
[694] Cortés rallied him upon his capture, and addressed him
as compadre. After obtaining certain information, more was
demanded. The prisoner declared that he knew nothing more.
‘Well, then, you will swing,’ said Cortés, half jestingly.
The two pikemen who held the rope round his neck took this
for a command, and hoisted him. Rangel rode up, however,
and saved his life, but the compression of the throat
troubled him for some time. dec. ii. lib. x. cap. ii.-iii.
Carrasco warned him against attacking the powerful Narvaez.
_Vetancvrt_, _Teatro Ecles._, pt. iii. 137; _Tapia_, _Rel._,
in _Icazbalceta_, _Col. Doc._, ii. 589. Prescott says that
he with ‘Spartan heroism’ remained silent, _Mex._, 257-8;
but Prescott has evidently not understood his authorities.
[695] At a cross-road a little farther on, says Herrera.
[696] May 28th. _Chimalpain_, _Hist. Conq._, 277. Clavigero
and others assume it to be the night between Saturday and
Sunday, but the authorities are pretty clear in mentioning
the following night.
[697] Estimated by various authorities at from twelve to
nineteen pieces. _Testimonio_, in _Cortés_, _Residencia_,
ii. 12, 168.
[698] Expressing the belief that Cortés would be foolhardy
enough to attack in the morning. _Tapia_, _Rel._, in
_Icazbalceta_, _Col. Doc._, ii. 589.
[699] ‘Llegamos junto á las centinelas sin que nos sintiesen,
é iban huyendo é diciendo: Arma, arma!’ _Id._, 590. ‘Auisado
Naruaez, y se estaua vistiendo vna cota: y dixo aqui ẽ le
auisò, no tengays pena, y mandò tocar al arma.’ _Herrera_,
dec. ii. lib. x. cap. iii.
[700] Bernal Diaz, _Hist. Verdad._, 99, calls the flies
cocayos.
[701] Prescott, following Herrera, makes Cortés shout the
password ‘Espíritu Santo,’ which Bernal Diaz says was given
as a secret word for mutual recognition.
[702] So say all the original authorities that refer to it,
except Bernal Diaz, who claims that four guns were fired,
three balls passing overhead and the fourth killing three
men. Cortés acknowledges no casualties from it. Tapia even
intimates that no discharge took place, owing to the fact
that to protect the touch-holes from rain they had been
covered with wax and tiles. Confused by the sudden alarm
the artillerists applied the match, forgetful of the wax,
and ‘we saw that the charges failed to go off.’ _Rel._, in
_Icazbalceta_, _Col. Doc._, ii. 590. Perhaps he would have
been more correct in saying that the men were confused by the
glittering bribes of Usagre. Bachiller A. Perez testifies:
‘Dixo al artillero poned fuego a estos tiros ... puso fuego
e no salieron los tiros e oyo dezir este testigo que avian
puesto cera en los dichos tiros.’ _Cortés_, _Residencia_,
ii. 85. This implies that the wax had been smeared on by
accomplices.
[703] With from 40 to 100 men, are the different estimates.
[704] ‘Vinien los contrarios á nuestra gente, creyendo que
eran de los suyos, á preguntar, “¿qué es esto?” é así los
prendien.’ _Tapia_, _Rel._, in _Icazbalceta_, _Col. Doc._,
ii. 590. ‘De las otras dos torres ... no le acudierõ,
porq̄ dizen algunos que se hizieron sordos, otros que
no pudieron llegar, por el impedimento de las tropas de
Cortes.’ _Herrera_, dec. ii. lib. x. cap. iii.; _Cardona_,
in _Cortés_, _Residencia_, i. 181-2.
[705] ‘Uitoria, vitoria por los del nõbre del Espíritu Sãto,
q muerto es Narvaez!’ _Bernal Diaz_, _Hist. Verdad._, 98.
Even this authority now shouts forth the password!
[706] Solis assumes that Farfan gave also the thrust. Bernal
Diaz’ text leads one to suppose that Narvaez received the
thrust before his followers were driven into the building,
but the other authorities state clearly: ‘al salir de su
camara, le dieron vn picaço.... Echaronle luego mano.’
_Gomara_, _Hist. Mex._, 147; _Oviedo_, iii. 510. Monjaras
states that Narvaez supplicated for his life: ‘Hidalgos,
por amor de Dios no me mateys!’ _Testimonio_, in _Cortés_,
_Residencia_, ii. 51, 85, 107; i. 365. ‘Alonso Dávila le
sacó dichas provisiones reales de V. M. del seno, teniéndolo
preso é abrazado el dicho Pero Sanchez Farfán.’ _Demanda
de Ceballos_, in _Icazbalceta_, _Col. Doc._, i. 442. This
occurred some time after the capture. Narvaez called upon
his fellow-prisoners to witness the deed, but Ávila shouted
that the papers were merely letters. They were given to
Cortés. ‘Las avian quemado.’ _Testimonio_, in _Cortés_,
_Residencia_, i. 345, 365, 250; ii. 52, 187.
[707] He died, however, says Bernal Diaz, _Hist. Verdad._,
99. Herrera calls him Diego de Rojas, whom Bernal classes
as a captain.
[708] ‘Se retrajeron á una torre alta de un ídolo de aquel
pueblo casi cuatrocientos hombres, é muchos de los de caballo
... salieron al campo.’ _Tapia_, _Rel._, in _Icazbalceta_,
_Col. Doc._, 590. Herrera says that 300 intrenched themselves
till the morning. dec. ii. lib. x. cap. iv. Cortés reached
the battery just in time to prevent a catastrophe, as
Tapia relates. A hot-blooded young companion of the latter,
carried away by excitement, rushed to powder barrels, eight
in number, and shouted, ‘Let us fire the powder and spoil
it for the enemy!’ Cleaving a barrel, he cast a brand into
it, and threw himself flat upon the ground, commending his
life to God. It happened, fortunately, that this barrel
contained sandals, which by some mistake had been mixed
up with the ammunition. After waiting in vain a while for
the explosion, the madcap discovered the reason and began
to open another barrel. At this moment Cortés came up, and
learning of his intention he rushed forward and snatched
away the brand.
[709] Including also Juan Yuste, Juan Bono, and Gomara.
[710] _Oviedo_, iii. 510. Bernal Diaz lengthens Cortés’
reply: He thanked God for the victory and for giving him
such valiant gentlemen and companions to aid him. One of
the smallest things he had done in New Spain was to secure
and defeat him; it appeared more daring to seize an oidor
of his majesty. Las Casas relates that Narvaez had a not
dissimilar surprise by night from Cuban Indians, during
his campaign for Velazquez, and had a narrow escape. _Hist.
Ind._, iv. 6-8.