THE CUBAN GOVERNOR IN PURSUIT.
1519-1520.
THE MEXICANS THREATEN REVOLT—THE CLERGY IN ARMS—THEY
DENOUNCE THE CONDUCT OF MONTEZUMA—THE EMPEROR DECLARES
HE CAN NO LONGER RESTRAIN HIS PEOPLE—TIDINGS OF
VELAZQUEZ’ FLEET—SAILING FROM CUBA OF AN EXPEDITION UNDER
NARVAEZ—ARRIVAL IN MEXICO—CONFLICT WITH CORTÉS—INTERCHANGE
OF THREATS AND COURTESIES—ATTEMPTED UNION OF FORCES—NARVAEZ
REMAINS LOYAL TO VELAZQUEZ—DESERTION OF SOME OF HIS MEN TO
CORTÉS.
War now seemed inevitable; for if earthly powers availed not against
the invaders, heaven’s artillery should disperse the impious foe. If
feeble man by fearful combinations be brought low, surely the gods
may yet defend themselves from insult.
Hitherto it had been the higher nobles only who harbored designs
against the Spaniards, but, while no longer cemented by the accustomed
despotism, they were held in check by their jealousies, their party
politics, and fear for their possessions. A stronger influence than
these was at hand, however. Now for the first time the lesser nobles
and the common people were aroused. The outrage on the idols affected
all. And the clergy, who out of regard for their high-priest, the
emperor, had remained passive, now felt themselves struck in a vital
part. Their influence, supremacy, and means of support were all
involved, and the power of the priesthood was as great here as among
other superstitious peoples. How far they worked upon the nobles and
plebeians is not clear, but their interviews with Montezuma, although
held in secret, out of the reach even of the favorite page, became so
frequent and earnest as to rouse the suspicions of the guard. It was
said that, assisted by influential courtiers, they represented how
deeply the sacrilegious act had stirred the people, already incensed
by the shameful captivity of their sovereigns. Further than this,
oracles had announced that the gods would abandon the city and its
inhabitants to their fate if the obnoxious strangers were not quickly
killed or driven hence. The masses would rise, and if Montezuma,
forgetful of his dignity and duty, still declined to be liberated,
preferring the fate of Quauhpopoca, which must surely overtake him,
then they would choose another monarch.[605] This last threat struck
home. Sorely had Montezuma sighed for liberty, and he had feared for
his throne; now his own subjects threatened him with what he dreaded
most. In this dilemma he turned to Cortés.[606]
The apprehensions of the Spaniards had been aroused not only by the
secret interviews of the priests, but by the somewhat distant manner
of the emperor, and at this unusual summons they became seriously
alarmed. Even the general could not suppress his misgivings as he
hurried to the emperor’s apartments, attended by Olid, then captain
of the guard. With solemn visage Montezuma bade him be seated. Then
he reminded him of the warnings against his many rash proceedings,
particularly the installation of the cross upon the pyramid. The
incensed gods at last had spoken, had ordered him to attack and drive
the Spaniards into the sea, and the people were stirred almost beyond
control. He had only to give the signal; nay, did he delay to do so,
they would rise. But he loved Malinche; had he not proved this by
his devotion? He wished to save the Spaniards; and now he warned,
he implored them to leave the city before it would be too late. They
might take all his treasures; nay, he would give each man a load of
gold if they would only go.[607]
The tone and manner of the prince convinced them that his words were
sincere. Cortés deemed it best to feign compliance. He thanked the
emperor for the interest manifested in their safety, and replied that
since he and his gods and people so desired it, they would comply;
but having no vessels, time must be allowed to build them.[608] This
was perplexing, but Montezuma overlooked everything on hearing that
the Spaniards were ready to leave. He insisted no further, knowing
well enough that he and the other captives would have to follow if a
withdrawal from the city was required before the means of transport
had been found.[609] He had seen that it did not take long to
construct ships, and offered the necessary carpenters to fell and
prepare timber, as before. Meanwhile he would endeavor to appease his
vassals, pointing out that an uprising would be disastrous also to
himself and them. Martin Lopez was at once sent down to Villa Rica
with Andrés Nuñez, some chiefs, and a number of Indian workmen, to
build three vessels, but with secret instructions to delay the work
in every manner.[610]
* * * * *
Cortés had no intention to surrender his hold on the country. It was
now more than eight months since the procuradores had left for Spain,
and he began to look for their return with a royal commission, if not
with reinforcements. Once provided with this worshipful paper he could
brave Velazquez and all the world. He could send to the Islands and
buy vessels, arms, and supplies; and he could easily enlist all the
troops necessary to the achievement of his great project. Meanwhile he
hoped to maintain his position, supported by native allies, such as
the Tlascaltecs, Chinantecs, Goazacoalcos, and Cempoalans. It needed
not the warning of Montezuma to convince the Spaniards that a serious
attitude had been assumed against them by the natives, and that the
precautions for defence must be redoubled. The attendants appeared
less obsequious, and the supplies had materially diminished—owing to
the late drought, they said.[611] This was remedied by the commands
of the emperor. But even the prospect of a speedy departure of the
strangers did not appear to conciliate the people; and less sanguine
than their leader, the soldiers of Cortés felt oppressed by gloomy
forebodings. In addition to this they were harassed by extra guard
duty and by being obliged to sleep in their accoutrements, ready for
instant defence.[612]
We must now go back to Cuba for a moment, where long since we left the
irate governor cursing. Poor Velazquez! Córdoba, Grijalva, Cortés,
all the deputies sent out to conquer for him new lands, had only
been a drain on him, bringing back little compensation in slaves and
gold. Deeply as he felt these troubles they had not yet affected his
obesity, and it was with difficulty that he waddled about his island
stirring up avengers. With the aid of Fonseca the chaplain, Benito
Martin, whom Velazquez had sent to Spain on his behalf, had obtained
for him a royal commission,[613] with the title of adelantado of
the lands lately discovered under his auspices to the westward; and
October, 1519, saw busy preparations on the island for an expedition
as well against Cortés as Montezuma.[614]
There was no trouble in obtaining men. The rumors created by the visit
of Puertocarrero and Montejo left the impression that ship-loads of
gold had been forwarded from the new region to Spain, and the island
was consequently in a ferment with excitement. So great indeed became
the desire to enlist that Velazquez would in any case have been obliged
to form an expedition to prevent the people from going on their own
account to reinforce Cortés.[615] At first it was announced that the
governor would go in person, and so prevent further rebellion. But
Velazquez never thought of such a thing: he was too corpulent, he
lacked courage, and he could not abandon his interests and his post
in Cuba, leaving the island scantily provided with defenders. Further
than this, he had confidence in the legal right conferred on him over
the new country and over any expedition he might send. His announced
reasons were the duties of his office, which demanded his presence
more than ever owing to the prevalent small-pox epidemic.[616]
Among the many candidates eager for the command were Baltasar Bermudez,
a relative, Vasco Porcallo de Figueroa, and Pánfilo de Narvaez, the
first two mentioned already in connection with Cortés’ appointment.
With Bermudez the governor could come to no arrangement, and with
Porcallo he managed to quarrel after selecting him,[617] so that he
was left with no other choice than Narvaez. This was the hidalgo of
Valladolid,[618] whom we have met before, who had joined Velazquez
shortly after his arrival in Cuba, and had taken a leading part in its
conquest. This over, he had married a rich widow, María de Valenzuela,
possessing a number of towns, and had accepted civil positions, such
as procurador for the island, and contador in the newly discovered
region. Narvaez was about forty-two years of age, tall and strongly
built, with a long face, ruddy complexion, and sandy beard. To a deep
voice might be added agreeable manners, being quite fascinating in
conversation. His qualities were such as created favorable impression.
Ordinarily he exhibited good judgment, but he was careless, headstrong,
and arrogant. As a soldier he was undoubtedly brave, but deficient
in discipline and foresight; as a general he was far from being the
equal of Cortés.[619]
By virtue of his commission Velazquez appointed this man
captain-general and lieutenant-governor of the new country, with
orders to send Cortés and any rebellious captain in chains to Cuba,
to carry on the conquest, and to administer for the best interests
of the settlement.[620] But the friends of Cortés were not idle. They
caused representations to be secretly made to the audiencia[621] that
a fratricidal war was about to be opened in the new region, ruinous
to the interests of God and the king, and legal steps were at once
taken by the promotor fiscal.[622] The policy of Cortés in sending
procuradores to Spain, with presents and messages to the king, had
its effect on the audiencia, which considered not only that his case
had passed beyond them, but that he was rendering, and likely to
render, greater service to the royal interest than was his rival.
By no means predisposed in favor of Velazquez, they moreover sent
to Cuba the prudent licentiate Lucas Vazquez de Aillon, a member of
their body, with instructions to prevent the threatened danger.
Accompanied by Pedro de Ledesma, secretary to the audiencia, and the
alguacil mayor, Aillon met Narvaez at Yagua,[623] preparing with
a portion of the fleet to join the rest at Guaniguanico. Placing
the captain under injunction not to leave Cuba, he proceeded to the
rendezvous and represented to Velazquez the evil which must result
from his project, urging that his duty as governor and loyal subject
demanded him to forego personal vengeance and interest, and finally
forbidding the expedition without express permission from the king. The
governor, who appears to have obtained more definite news from Spain
regarding the wealth and promises of New Spain, was more determined
than ever to carry out his scheme. Relying upon the grant of the
country to himself, he considered that he had every right to claim
his own and to treat Cortés as an interloper. At first he refused
to recognize the jurisdiction of the audiencia in the matter, but
pretended finally to fall in with Aillon’s views.
It was accordingly agreed that, in order to promote the interests both
of king and governor, by rendering available the costly preparations
made, the fleet should proceed to its destination, but without
Indians, and with a less number of settlers than had volunteered.
Narvaez might present the claims of his principal upon Cortés, but
only in a peaceable manner, without landing any forces. If they were
not entertained, he must sail onward in quest of new discoveries.[624]
In the presence of Aillon instructions were given to Narvaez in
accordance with the agreement, but the former nevertheless resolved
to accompany the expedition and watch over their observance, for he
suspected the sincerity of both parties.[625]
The expedition was the largest which had as yet been fitted out in
the New World, and consisted of eleven large and seven small vessels,
with somewhat over nine hundred soldiers, including eighty men with
fire-arms, one hundred and twenty with cross-bows, and eighty horsemen.
There were also several hundred Indians, a large force of sailors,
and a park of artillery, together with ample stores of all kinds.[626]
Sail was set early in March, 1520, and after touching at Cozumel
Island to pick up the party which had been left there[627] some time
before, they entered Rio de Tabasco to obtain water and provisions.
The inhabitants fled from the town on seeing so large a force, but
with the aid of an interpreter found there they were reassured, and
brought maize and fowl, together with three women, as presents for
the captain. Four days after leaving the river the fleet was dispersed
by a storm, with the loss of six vessels and a number of soldiers and
sailors.[628] The rest of the vessels arrived at San Juan de Ulua in
the latter part of April.[629]
Three soldiers, deserters from the exploring expedition[630] of Cortés,
came on board, and after declaring allegiance to Narvaez, poured into
the ears of their wondering countrymen the story of their general’s
brilliant achievements. They told of the vast extent and resources
of the country, of the wealth accumulated, the unfairness of Cortés
in dividing, and the consequent discontent of the soldiers and the
danger of their position.[631] This tended to render the conceited
Narvaez over-confident, so that his rival was rather benefited than
injured by the story of the deserters. He now told Aillon that he
would land, since Cortés was so far in the interior and the vessels
in a bad condition. He was also determined to form a settlement, and
regardless of the oidor’s protest a town was founded for a second
time upon the site of the present Vera Cruz.[632] The governor of
Cuetlachtlan hastened to send presents of supplies, as an act of
courtesy to a captain whom he supposed to be the friend of Cortés.
He was undeceived, however, and told by the deserters that Narvaez
was the real envoy and captain sent by the king, while Cortés and
his men were fugitive adventurers whom Narvaez would punish. His
king had heard of the outrage on the emperor, and had sent him to
procure his release, to restore order, and thereupon to return. The
governor reported this to Montezuma, who, thinking no doubt that it
would be prudent to secure the friendship of so powerful a commander,
whether he came as liberator or oppressor, sent him a number of
valuable presents, and gave orders to provide his army with supplies.
Narvaez kept the valuables for himself, a course which did not tend
to increase his popularity, and transmitted in return a few trinkets
to the monarch, with assurances of his good-will.[633]
Hearing that Velazquez de Leon was leading a large force not far
off, Narvaez sent a message, appealing to him as a relative and old
friend to join him with his men; but Velazquez, who was still in the
region in and above Chinantla, looking for tribute and gold, deigned
not even to reply, but forwarded the letter to his general and asked
for orders. Meanwhile he and his lieutenant, Rangel, assembled their
men and made them swear allegiance to Cortés, a few suspected of
sympathy with the Cuban governor being placed under surveillance.[634]
The next step of Narvaez was to demand the surrender of Villa Rica,
which the deserters represented as held by less than four score
men. This task was intrusted to the clergyman Juan Ruiz de Guevara,
accompanied by Notary Vergara, Amaya a relative of Velazquez, and
three witnesses,[635] and letters were given them for distribution
among Cortés’ soldiers, with a view to gain their allegiance.[636]
Sandoval had been advised concerning the fleet, and suspecting the
object he sent to warn Cortés, despatching at the same time two
dark-complexioned soldiers, disguised as Indian fruit vendors, to learn
further particulars. The spies remained in Narvaez’ camp a whole day,
and by mingling with the leaders they picked up valuable information,
escaping during the night with two horses.[637] Sandoval now sent off
the old and infirm soldiers to a town called Papalote, in the hills,
and obtained the promise of the remainder to hold the fort with him,
a gallows being erected in a conspicuous site as a warning to the
faint-hearted. About this time Guevara appeared before the quarters
of Sandoval. No one came to receive him, and he had to find his way
to the commander’s house. The priest had been led to believe that
little or no objection would be made by the adherents of Cortés to
his demands, and confidently he began his harangue, speaking of the
claims of Velazquez and the treason of Cortés. The word treason fired
Sandoval. His party were the better servants of the king, he said,
and were it not for Guevara’s character as a clergyman he would have
him chastised for his impudence. As it was, he referred him to Cortés
as captain-general and justicia mayor of New Spain. Guevara likewise
grew warm,[638] and a war of words followed, which the commander cut
short by ordering some Indians to bundle the three principals into
net hammocks. In these they were carried to Mexico, under a Spanish
guard, to be delivered to the general.[639]
* * * * *
When Montezuma first received news from the coast governor of the
arrival of the great fleet, he supposed that these were the vessels
which Cortés had said that he expected, and by which it was hoped
he would depart. Montezuma at once sent for Cortés to impart the
tidings.[640] The Spanish general was not a little surprised at this
second unusual summons, and still more when told that his vessels
had arrived, and that new ones need not be built. While he was yet
puzzling over the words, the emperor produced the painted message
showing a fleet at anchor off Chalchiuhcuecan. “You can now leave
in safety, and all will be well,” continued the monarch, overjoyed
at the thought of release.[641] “Thanks be to God, who provides all
things!” was the fervent utterance of the general, while the soldiers
sent up shouts of joy mingled with discharges of fire-arms. “Surely,”
they said, “Puertocarrero and Montejo have returned in good time.”
Further consideration of the matter, however, convinced Cortés that
these were not the ships of his friends, but that they belonged to
his archenemy of Cuba. His captains thought the same, and talked
with calculated effect to the men of the great wrong to them if the
hirelings of Velazquez were to step in and reap the results of their
hardships.
Anxious to learn something definite, Cortés sent two messengers by
different routes to bring news about the expedition, a third being
instructed to follow Velazquez de Leon with instructions to await
orders before proceeding to Goazacoalco; a fourth messenger was
despatched to Villa Rica.[642] Learning meanwhile from Sandoval that
the expedition was inimical to him, Cortés sent letters from himself
and his regidores to the commander, stating the progress of conquest
on behalf of the Spanish king, and demanding his object. If he needed
no succor, and came not provided with royal authority, he must at once
depart; otherwise Cortés would march against him, supported by the
vast forces of the empire.[643] The letters were made the subject of
jest among the officers of Narvaez, the veedor Salvatierra declaring
that the messages of traitors should receive no attention. He urged
the expediency of marching upon them without loss of time, and swore
that he would broil and eat the ears of Cortés.
Shortly after the letters had been sent, the approach of Guevara
and his companions was announced. And now for more of that deep
diplomacy in which Cortés was so skilled. Perceiving the importance
of conciliating men of their standing, he despatched an escort with
horses to bring them with all honor into the city, and he himself
went to meet them, expressing regret at the rude treatment they had
received. With smooth tongue and promises he wove his web round them,
and “oiled their hands with gold,” as Bernal Diaz expresses it. He
showed them the greatness and wealth of the country, and explained
to them how it was all in his power; and he sought to convince them
of the injury dissension must occasion to God, to the king, and
to themselves. Ah, rare talent, the talent of tongue! Guevara, at
least, was won over, and went back delighted with his courtesy and
liberality, and in full sympathy with his cause.[644] On reaching
the camp he told of what he had seen, the great extent of country,
its vast population, and the number of well built towns on every
side. Nor did he fail to sing the praises of Cortés, and speak of
his treasures, of which he displayed specimens. Every captain and
soldier under him, he said, could boast of heavy gold ornaments and
well filled purses, of numerous servants and beautiful women; and
they lived on the fat of the land, having the country and all its
inhabitants at their disposal. The general had taken care to exhibit
only the attractive features of his position, which as now detailed
by the priest captivated the hearts of the listeners, who longed to
be with so fortunate and liberal a leader. Even before this many were
disaffected, and despised the arrogant and narrow-minded Narvaez;
others took an impartial view, and recognized the evil of dissension
in a country only half subdued, while yet others were intent only on
securing treasures.
The priest brought a letter to Narvaez, wherein Cortés expressed
delight at finding his old friend commander of the expedition, although
he regretted that hostile measures had been taken against him, who as
a loyal servant held the country for the king. If Narvaez carried a
royal commission, it had only to be presented to be obeyed; otherwise
he was willing to come to a friendly agreement, since hostilities must
be prejudicial not only to them both, but to the crown.[645] Guevara
supported these expressions by recommending a peaceful arrangement
and withdrawal to new territory, for Cortés was evidently loyal, and
had hosts of Indians to aid him in maintaining his position. Narvaez
not only refused to listen to any overtures, but became indignant
with the clergyman and his companions for advocating them. He knew
that the forces of Cortés were inferior to his own, and of Indians
he had no fear.
Cortés had elicited from Guevara a number of facts regarding the
expedition, among them that the arrogance and parsimony of Narvaez
had alienated a large proportion of his followers, and that a little
gold would have a wonderful effect.[646] Indeed, they had come for
gold, and had no desire to raise the sword against their brethren
if it could be avoided. This information was not lost on the astute
conqueror.
Shortly after the departure of the clergyman, Cortés took counsel with
Father Olmedo, that most admirable of friars, whose knowledge of the
world, calm judgment, and clear foresight had more than once saved
Cortés from himself. Olmedo now undertook the conversion of Narvaez and
his men. Laden with instructions and jewels, he proceeded to their camp
and endeavored to win Narvaez to peaceful measures. Special letters
and presents were given Duero, Aillon, and others, who were supposed
to be friendly, with a view of obtaining their active coöperation.
Cortés wished especially that Narvaez should understand that he was
friendly to him. Dissension would react on both, particularly on
Narvaez; unity of action could alone promote their common aim and
preserve the country to the king. Cortés had fewer soldiers, but was
nevertheless stronger, from possessing interpreters, knowledge of
the country, and control of its forces and resources. Were not the
kings already his servants?
But Narvaez was stubborn. Olmedo, however, overcame the scruples of a
number of his counsellors, who advised him to negotiate with a man so
strongly established. Narvaez called them all traitors, and told Olmedo
that he ought to be ashamed of himself for promulgating such base
sentiments; whereat the priest became indignant, and devoted himself
all the more assiduously to the subordinates, among whom he found the
way well prepared by Guevara. His arguments found willing ears, and
his gold confirmed the arguments. Among his companions from Mexico was
one Usagre, an artillerist, whose brother occupied a similar position
under Narvaez. This man also did Cortés good service. These doings
could not escape notice, and, warned by Salvatierra, the commander
would have arrested the friar had not Duero and others interfered.
They called attention to his diplomatic and religious character, and
the courteous treatment Cortés had given his own messengers. Narvaez
hurried him away, however, with a letter for his general, wherein he
claimed authority to take possession of the country for Velazquez.
If Cortés resisted, it would fare ill with him.[647]
It was an easy escape for Olmedo, for Narvaez had not scrupled shortly
before to deal with the royal oidor in a most peremptory manner. Aillon
had remonstrated with him about his proceedings, such as forming a
settlement, threatening to enter the country, spreading harsh reports
among the natives against Cortés, and neglecting to restrain his
men from taking property and otherwise abusing the inhabitants. No
attention being paid to this, he formally called upon Narvaez to make
a peaceful demand for the surrender of the country, and, if refused,
to go elsewhere to settle. He intimated publicly that the measures of
Narvaez were actuated by malice, rather than by loyal wisdom. This the
vain and arrogant commander could not endure. It was to the oidor, he
said, that the present growing disaffection among his men was due. He
was becoming dangerous, and the municipal officers were directed to
seize and carry him on board the same vessel in which he had arrived.
His secretary and alguacil were placed on board another, and a day or
two after sail was set for Cuba, the captains and crews having been
sworn to deliver them to Velazquez.[648] During the voyage, however,
Aillon persuaded his jailers to take him to Española, which he reached
in the last days of August, after a long and dangerous trip of three
months and a half. The consort vessel was separated from him during
a storm shortly after leaving Ulua, and the secretary and alguacil
did not rejoin the oidor till October. A report of the outrage was
promptly forwarded to the king, signed by the whole audiencia, with
a request that severe chastisement be inflicted, in order to maintain
respect for that august tribunal.[649]
Among others falling under the wrath of Narvaez was Gonzalo de
Oblanco, whose advocacy of Cortés and condemnation of Aillon’s arrest
brought imprisonment, which so wrought upon him that he died within
a few days.[650] These harsh and foolish measures engendered further
discontent, and half a dozen of Aillon’s supporters, including Pedro
de Villalobos, deserted to Sandoval, who received them with open
arms. Others sent to signify their willingness to join Cortés.[651]
After Aillon’s arrest Narvaez had been persuaded to move his camp
to Cempoala, as a healthier place, more suitable for head-quarters,
and better provided with supplies. The cacique was intimidated to
surrender some effects belonging to Cortés and to accord the new-comers
a welcome, which seemed to stamp his conduct as desertion. “Oh, well!”
said Cortés when told of it, “long live the last victor.”[652] But
he could hardly blame the natives for yielding, when even Sandoval
himself, on hearing of this approach, abandoned Villa Rica and took
refuge in the mountains, where he remained till the general bade him
join his forces.[653]
FOOTNOTES
[605] _Gomara_, _Hist. Mex._, 136-7; _Bernal Diaz_, _Hist.
Verdad._, 85-6. ‘El diablo q̄ muchas vezes le hablaua, le
amenazaua.’ _Herrera_, dec. ii. lib. ix. cap. vi. ‘Hiço
Monteçuma aperçebir çient mill hombres de pelea.’ _Oviedo_,
iii. 507. Others make the number less. To this Clavigero
objects: ‘Mi persuado che vi sia stata in fatti qualche
truppa allestita, non però per ordine del Re, ma soltanto
d’alcuni Nobili.’ _Storia Mess._, iii. 112.
[606] Solis sees in this determination only a proof of his
supposition that the offer of vassalage and tribute was but
a bribe to satiate the Spaniards, since he now bids them
go. _Hist. Mex._, ii. 35-6.
[607] ‘Yo os daré para vos dos cargas de oro, é una para
cada chripstiano.’ _Oviedo_, iii. 507; _Gomara_, _Hist.
Mex._, 138. Herrera increases this to four loads for Cortés
and two loads for each horseman. dec. ii. lib. ix. cap. vi.
And Duran heard that a ship-load of treasures was offered;
but the pious Cortés was too intent on converting souls to
accept the bribe. _Pizarro y Orellana_, _Varones Ilvstres_,
91; _Bernal Diaz_, _Hist. Verdad._, 86. Montezuma had become
attached to many of the Spaniards, including the courteous
general, and really wished them well.
[608] ‘Dixo a vn Español de los doze, q̄ fuesse a auisar a
los compañeros q̄ se aparejassen por quanto se trataua cõ el
de sus vidas.’ _Gomara_, _Hist. Mex._, 137-8. This author
and others state that Cortés gives thanks for the warning,
and offers to go whenever he is bidden. Montezuma, equally
polite, tells him to select his own time. When ready to
leave he will give a load of gold to each man, and two for
himself. Cortés thereupon brings up the question of vessels.
[609] ‘Cortes le dixo ... q̄ por fuerça auia de ir el
Mõteçuma con nosotros, para que le vea nuestro gran
Emperador.’ _Bernal Diaz_, _Hist. Verdad._, 86. It is not
probable that this was said on the present occasion, however,
and it would only have irritated the emperor.
[610] ‘Yd con essos indios, é córtese la madera, y entretanto
Dios nos proveerá de gente é socorro: por tanto, poned
tal dilaçion que parezca que haçeys algo.’ _Oviedo_, iii.
507-8; _Gomara_, _Hist. Mex._, 138. Bernal Diaz considers
this wrong. He knows not what Cortés told Lopez, ‘mas
muy secretamente me dixo el Martin Lopez, que de hecho,
y apriessa los labrava.’ Montezuma had demanded that ‘no
huviesse mas palabras, sino obras.’ _Hist. Verdad._, 86.
Perhaps Lopez did hurry, from personal fear of remaining
in the country; or he may have been instructed by Cortés
to say so to the soldiers, in order to calm them.
[611] ‘Comenzó á faltar todo lo necessario para comer y
beber.’ To remedy this, strict orders had to be issued
to purveyors, and the Tlascaltecs were sent on foraging
expeditions, which led to much abuse. _Sahagun_, _Hist.
Conq._, 25 (ed. 1840), 90.
[612] _Gomara_, _Hist. Mex._, 138. In speaking of this,
Bernal Diaz says that he became so used to sleeping in his
clothes, and enduring hardships generally, that he almost
discarded the bed during his later encomendero life, and
could take only short naps. ‘Esto he dicho, por que sepã
de que arte andamos los verdaderos Conquistadores, y como
estavamos tan acostũbrados a las armas, y a velar.’ _Hist.
Verdad._, 86.
[613] This was dated Saragossa, November 13, 1518, within
a week of Cortés’ usurpation of the fleet, as Las Casas
observes, and conceded to Velazquez the position of
adelantado not only over Yucatan, Cozumel, and ‘other
islands’ discovered by his expeditions, but over any further
lands that he might find. In connection with this title
was granted, to him and one heir, one fifteenth of the
revenue accruing to the king from these lands; and after
their conquest and settlement one twentieth of the same
revenue, in perpetuity for himself and heirs, from any one
island that he might select—the discoveries were supposed
to be all islands. All supplies of food, clothes, and arms,
introduced by him during his life, were to be free of duty.
In support of his expenses a royal plantation near Habana
was transferred to him, and an annual salary conferred
of 300,000 maravedís. A number of other provisions were
made for the promotion of economic, politic, and spiritual
welfare in the new region. A synopsis of the commission
is given in _Las Casas_, _Hist. Ind._, v. 2-5. Prescott
misunderstands the _Carta de Velazquez_ of October 12, 1519,
in supposing that the governor had not received notice of
his appointment by that time, and is therefore wrong in
taking Gomara to task for saying: ‘Estando pues en aqueste
pensamiẽto [to thwart Cortés], auino que llego a Santiago
... cartas del Emperador, y el titulo de Adelantado, y
cedula de la gouernacion ... de Yucatã.’ _Hist. Mex._, 140.
[614] _Carta de Velazquez_, October 12, 1519, in _Pacheco_
and _Cárdenas_, _Col. Doc._, xii. 246-51. Solis assumes that
the preparations of Velazquez were influenced by the news
of the reception accorded in Spain to the procuradores of
Cortés. _Hist. Mex._, ii. 42-4. But this supposition, based
partly on a vague expression of Herrera, dec. ii. lib. ix.
cap. xviii., is wrong, for the procuradores reached Spain
only in October, and were detained for some time before
they saw the emperor.
[615] ‘Conociendo que la gẽte, de vna manera o de otra, se
auia de yr, acordò de recogerla.’ _Herrera_, dec. ii. lib.
ix. cap. xviii.
[616] _Letter to Figueroa_, Nov. 17, 1519, in _Icazbalceta_,
_Col. Doc._, i. 400.
[617] It appears that Velazquez’ suspicious nature had led
him to cast reflections upon Porcallo, who resented them
by throwing up the appointment. Herrera tells the story,
which is not very interesting. dec. ii. lib. ix. cap. xviii.
[618] Bernal Diaz says also ‘Ualladolid, ó de Tudela de
Duero.’ _Hist. Verdad._, 246, 38.
[619] ‘A este Narvaez hizo Diego Velazquez su Capitan
principal, siempre honrándolo, de manera que despues dél
tuvo en aquella isla el primer lugar.’ _Las Casas_, _Hist.
Ind._, iv. 4-6; _Oviedo_, i. 496. ‘Dezian que era muy
escaco.’ _Bernal Diaz_, _Hist. Verdad._, 247.
[620] In a letter to Judge Figueroa, of the Española
audiencia, dated November 17, 1519, he gives notice of this
appointment, and states that the object of the expedition is
to prevent injury to the royal interest and outrages upon the
natives. That very day he was leaving for Trinidad and other
parts to aid Narvaez in the preparations. _Icazbalceta_,
_Col. Doc._, i. 399-403. Narvaez’ appointment is mentioned
already in the letter of October 12th, addressed to a Spanish
dignitary, wherein he is spoken of as contador for the new
countries. _Pacheco_ and _Cárdenas_, _Col. Doc._, xii. 250.
[621] ‘Auiso y relacion dellos les embió desde Cuba el
licenciado Zuaço, que auia venido ... a tomar residencia.’
_Bernal Diaz_, _Hist. Verdad._, 87. But we are safe in
saying that Duero gave the impulse.
[622] This official, Juan Carrillo, laid the case before
the audiencia, December 24th, representing that Cortés had
without superior permission made war on the natives of the
new lands and conquered them. He had also appropriated
Velazquez’ fleet and captured men from Garay’s party,
greatly to the injury of both. Velazquez was now preparing
an expedition against him. The two parties would meet
and fight, giving the natives the opportunity to rise and
recover the country. Both Cortés and Velazquez being guilty
in undertaking such expeditions without authority, the
fiscal prays that they be punished in person and estate. An
oidor or his proxy should at once be sent to investigate
the case and prevent such war. During the following weeks
Carrillo presented letters and witnesses in support of his
petition. _Proceso por Real Audiencia de la Española_, in
_Icazbalceta_, _Col. Doc._, i. 404-10.
[623] Fourteen leagues west of Trinidad.
[624] ‘Todo lo qual se asentó desta manera, y lo dió por
instruccion en mi presencia al dicho Pánfilo de Narvaez.’
_Ayllon_, in _Carta de Audiencia_, in _Pacheco_ and
_Cárdenas_, _Col. Doc._, xiii. 337. For fuller text of this
agreement see _Ayllon_, _Parecer_, in _Col. Doc. Inéd._,
i. 476-9. By the time the discovery voyage was concluded
the king would have decided the case.
[625] This creeps out in his report, to which he adds:
‘Parecióme que, pues yo principalmente habia ido á estorbar
que no oviesen debates y escándalos, que debia seguir mi
camino hasta los dexar pacíficos.’ _Pacheco_ and _Cárdenas_,
_Col. Doc._, xiii. 337. The account of his efforts in Cuba
is also given in a special letter to the king, written by
him at Guaniguanico March 4th, on the eve of departure for
New Spain. This letter was detained in Cuba till August.
_Pacheco_ and _Cárdenas_, _Col. Doc._, xi. 439-42; _Col.
Doc. Inéd._, i. 481-6. Herrera, who is not aware of the
agreement with Aillon, assumes that Velazquez and Narvaez
answer his protests by mere assurances that they intend no
harm, but will take care of the king’s interest, Narvaez
ending the discussion by saying: ‘de qualquiera manera se
pensaua embarcar dentro de dos horas.’ dec. ii. lib. ix.
cap. xviii. Bernal Diaz also states that Velazquez relied
so much on the favor of the bishop that he totally ignored
the protests of Aillon. ‘Soldados dixeron, que venia con
intencion de ayudarnos, y si no lo pudiesse hazer, tomar la
tierra en si por su Magestad, como Oidor.’ _Hist. Verdad._,
87. Solis supposes that Aillon hoped to prevail on Narvaez
when once out of Velazquez’ reach. _Hist. Mex._, ii. 47;
_Cortés_, _Cartas_, 117; _Gomara_, _Hist. Mex._, 140. The
governor evidently feared to oppose Aillon’s distasteful
resolution to embark, lest he should induce the audiencia
to adopt a more forcible interference; and perhaps he
thought that his protests could be more safely disregarded
the farther he was removed from the centre of government.
[626] At the review in Cempoala, New Spain, were found 80
musketeers, 120 archers, 600 infantry, and 80 horsemen.
_Gomara_, _Hist. Mex._, 146. Cortés was told by Guevara
that there were 800 infantry, including 80 archers and 120
musketeers. _Cartas_, 116. Oviedo has only 800 men, but with
200 horses, iii. 508, while Bernal Diaz raises the totals
to 19 vessels, with 1300 to 1400 soldiers, including 80
horsemen, 90 archers, and 70 musketeers, but not counting
the sailors. The artillery of guns was in charge of Captain
Rodrigo Martin. _Hist. Verdad._, 86-7. Clavigero adopts 18
vessels, 800 infantry, 85 cavalry, over 500 sailors, and
12 guns. _Storia Mess._, iii. 113. Aillon vaguely mentions
‘over 600 Spaniards in sixteen vessels.’ ‘Sin que yo lo
supiese, llevaron hasta mil indios.’ _Carta_, in _Pacheco_
and _Cárdenas_, _Col. Doc._, xiii. 337; and Tapia says 1000
and odd men. _Rel._, in _Icazbalceta_, _Col. Doc._, ii. 587.
The figures from the review in New Spain must be increased
by the number lost with six of the vessels off that coast,
and this may be what Bernal Diaz attempts to do, although
he evidently makes the estimate too high. Agustin Bermudez
was alguacil mayor, and Cortés’ old friend, Duero, managed
to join as contador. _Herrera_, dec. ii. lib. x. cap. i.
[627] Eighty Spaniards had been landed, and a number of
Indians, but most of the latter, together with a large
proportion of the natives, had died of small-pox introduced
by the Cubans. To judge from Aillon’s report he appears to
have allowed a number of Spaniards to remain, with a view
to make there a calling-place for ships, and which might
serve as a base for operations tending to the conquest
of Yucatan. He refers to the latter country as an island
adjoining Ulua, which he believes is a continent, lying
near the land discovered by Solís and Yañez. _Carta de
Audiencia_, Aug. 30, 1520, in _Pacheco_ and _Cárdenas_,
_Col. Doc._, xiii. 338.
[628] ‘Se ahogaron cinqüenta ombres é los demas escapamos
con harto riesgo.’ _Carta de Audiencia_, in _Pacheco_ and
_Cárdenas_, _Col. Doc._, xiii. 338-9. Montezuma informed
Cortés of this shipwreck, ‘é le mostró en una manta
pintados diez y ocho navíos, é los cinco dellos á la costa
quebrados é trastornados en el arena.’ _Tapia_, _Rel._,
in _Icazbalceta_, _Col. Doc._, ii. 586. ‘Tuuo vn viento de
Norte ... y de noche se le perdio vn nauio de poco porte,
que dio al traues; Capitan ... Christoval de Morante ...
y se ahogó cierta gente.’ _Bernal Diaz_, _Hist. Verdad._,
87.
[629] Aillon was among the first to arrive, Narvaez and
the other captains coming in during the following two
days. _Carta de Audiencia_, in _Pacheco_ and _Cárdenas_,
_Col. Doc._, xiii. 339. Hence Prescott’s date of April 23d
is somewhat too accurate. Brasseur de Bourbourg assumes
that a landing is effected on April 20th. _Hist. Nat.
Civ._, iv. 276. Cortés states that the news reached him in
the beginning of May. _Cartas_, 113. Taking four days to
travel to Mexico, the fleet arrived eight days after the
ship-building party had left the capital. _Gomara_, _Hist.
Mex._, 138; _Alaman_, _Disert._, i. 109. Narvaez’ agent
in Spain states that the fleet numbered eleven vessels on
arrival. _Demanda de Ceballos_, in _Icazbalceta_, _Col.
Doc._, i. 437.
[630] Three of the men left in Chinantla, ‘que se dezian
Ceruantes el chocarrero, y Escalana, y ... Alonso Hernandez
Carretero.’ _Bernal Diaz_, _Hist. Verdad._, 87; _Herrera_,
dec. ii. lib. ix. cap. xviii. Porras gives several and
different names. _Cortés_, _Residencia_, ii. 500. Cortés
appears to say that they were the men sent by him to bring
news of Narvaez and who deserted. _Cartas_, 115. Aillon
speaks of one man who came on board of his vessel. Finding
that Cortés had instructed the Indians to regard any foreign
arrivals as inimical, this man was sent to reassure them.
_Carta de Audiencia_, in _Pacheco_ and _Cárdenas_, _Col.
Doc._, xiii. 339. It appears probable, however, that Cortés’
expectation of messengers from his king was known to the
Indians.
[631] ‘Alçauan las manos a Dios, que los librò del poder de
Cortés, y de salir de ... Mexico, donde cada dia esperauan
la muerte ... y aũ dezia el Cervantes, ... O Narvaez,
Narvaez, que bien avẽturado que eres ... que tiene esse
traidor de Cortes allegados mas de seteciẽtos mil pesos de
oro, y todos los soldados estan mui mal con el.’ _Bernal
Diaz_, _Hist. Verdad._, 87.
[632] This was speedily abandoned for a camp at Cempoala.
Aillon wanted merely a camp to be formed near a well supplied
town. The municipal officers were: ‘Alcaldes hordinarios
á Francisco Verdugo, cuñado del dicho Diego Velazquez,
casado con una hermana suya, é un Juan Yuste, su cuñado é
mayordomo, é regidores á Diego Velazquez é Pero Velazquez,
sus sobrinos, é á Gonzalo Martin de Salvatierra é Juan de
Gamarra.’ _Carta de Audiencia_, in _Pacheco_ and _Cárdenas_,
_Col. Doc._, xiii. 342.
[633] ‘Conocian en el Narvaez ser la pura miseria, y
el oro, y ropa ... todo se lo guardaua.’ _Bernal Diaz_,
_Hist. Verdad._, 89, 87. According to Oviedo’s version
Montezuma held a council, wherein some members favored
the plan of attacking and killing the Spaniards then in
Mexico, so as to prevent a junction of forces. This might
frighten the rest into departing. Others, who were more
confident, urged that the new arrivals should be allowed
to come to Mexico, so as to swell the list of victims for
the sacrifices, and this proposition was carried, iii.
509. Oviedo’s informant evidently ignores the declared
object of Narvaez; or, like Solis, _Hist. Mex._, ii.
64-6, he does not believe that any communication could
have taken place, for want of an interpreter. But Solis
forgets the three deserters, and Indian mediums, perhaps.
Prescott takes the peculiar ground that for Montezuma to
‘have entered into a secret communication, hostile to the
general’s interests, is too repugnant to the whole tenor of
his conduct.’ _Mex._, ii. 236. Cortés states that Father
Olmedo had evidence of communication and interchange of
presents between Montezuma and Narvaez. _Cartas_, 120-1.
Others confirm this, as: _Tapia_, _Rel._, in _Icazbalceta_,
_Col. Doc._, ii. 587; _Gomara_, _Hist. Mex._, 141-2; _Carta
del Ejército de Cortés_, in _Icazbalceta_, _Col. Doc._, i.
428-30. The position of the emperor as prisoner, and the
speedy succession of events, did not permit the relationship
between the two to develop.
[634] Francisco de Lugo being actually secured with shackles.
_Tirado_, in _Cortés_, _Residencia_, ii. 6; _Cortés_,
_Cartas_, 118; _Carta de Audiencia_, in _Pacheco_ and
_Cárdenas_, _Col. Doc._, xiii. 342. Oviedo reviews Velazquez’
conduct in this instance, and concludes that, since Cortés
gave him the men and appointed him captain, he was bound to
obey this his immediate principal, unless royal orders to
the contrary had been exhibited. ‘Si aquel capitan, Johan
Velazquez de Leon, no estoviera mal con su pariente Diego
Velazquez, é se passara con los çiento é çinqüenta hombres,
que avia llevado à Guaçacalco, á la parte de Pámphilo de
Narvaez, su cuñado, acabado oviera Cortés su offiçio.’ iii.
316-17.
[635] ‘Alonso de Vergara, escribano, é con Antonio de Maya.’
_Demanda de Ceballos_, in _Icazbalceta_, _Col. Doc._, i. 439;
Bernal Diaz, _Hist. Verdad._, 88, writes Amaya; _Cortés_,
_Residencia_, ii. 168, 412.
[636] ‘Me trajeron mas de cien cartas,’ wherein the soldiers
were told to give credit to the statements of Guevara and
his companions, and to rest assured that they would be
rewarded on joining. _Cortés_, _Cartas_, 116.
[637] While selling cherries to Captain Salvatierra they
heard him refer to the treasures of Cortés as a magnificent
prize. The designs of Cortés against Montezuma and his
subjects were painted in dark colors. One of the stolen
horses belonged to this captain, whose raving against the
spies afforded great amusement to the camp. _Bernal Diaz_,
_Hist. Verdad._, 92; _Tapia_, _Rel._, in _Icazbalceta_,
_Col. Doc._, ii. 587.
[638] He ordered Vergara to read the provisions. Sandoval
declared that none but a royal notary should do so, and
threatened him with 100 lashes unless he desisted. Guevara
interfered, and was told that he lied, and was a low
clergyman. _Bernal Diaz_, _Hist. Verdad._, 88.
[639] Alguacil Pedro de Solis was in charge. Bernal Diaz,
_Hist. Verdad._, 88, describes how they wondered at the
succession of great cities, etc. The guard consisted of
twenty men. _Cortés_, _Cartas_, 115.
[640] Gomara describes somewhat minutely the apprehension
created among the soldiers by this summons, in face of
the threatening aspect of affairs. _Hist. Mex._, 138-9.
Bernal Diaz states that Montezuma kept the news back for
three days, while he communicated with Narvaez. He might
have delayed longer, but feared that Cortés would suspect
something. _Hist. Verdad._, 87.
[641] While still talking, they received another message,
saying that troops, horses, and guns had been landed. In
his joy Montezuma embraced Cortés, exclaiming that he loved
him more than ever, and saying that he would dine with him.
While at table both were in good humor, the emperor thinking
of the departure, the general of renewed conquests. After
this Montezuma gave daily feasts, in the belief that the
task of entertaining would soon be over. _Gomara_, _Hist.
Mex._, 139. It is more likely that apprehensions prevailed
on both sides. Brasseur de Bourbourg calls attention to
the fact that no stranger had till then been so far honored
as to sit at the same table with the monarch. _Hist. Nat.
Civ._, iv. 277.
[642] Monjaras gives their names. ‘Fuesen ... tiznados como
los yndios,’ et seq. _Cortés_, _Residencia_, i. 442-3; ii.
47-49, 134-5. Andrés de Tapia, who had just returned from
Cholula, after settling a boundary dispute with Tlascala, was
the fourth messenger. He followed by-paths, walking by day
and being carried by Indians at night, so that he reached his
destination in three days and a half. Finding that Sandoval
had already sent messages, he remained with him. _Rel._, in
_Icazbalceta_, _Col. Doc._, ii. 586-7. Cortés writes that
after being informed by Montezuma he received a letter,
by a Cuban Indian, from a Spaniard who had been stationed
on the coast to watch for vessels. This announced that a
vessel had anchored at San Juan de Ulua, which was supposed
to be that of the returning procuradores. The general now
despatched his four messengers. Fifteen days passed without
further news—this is probably a misprint—after which native
paintings were received showing the number of men landed,
and with them the report that the messengers from Mexico
were detained by the new arrivals. _Cartas_, 114-15. A man
named Pinedo, who fled from the capital, was overtaken by
Aztecs, at Cortés’ order, and brought back dead. _Demanda
de Ceballos_, in _Icazbalceta_, _Col. Doc._, i. 440.
[643] Cortés intimates that a friar carried this message,
and that one of the questions was the nationality of the
expedition. _Cartas_, 115. The friar appears to have carried
a later message. Gomara assumes that Cortés already knew
who the commander was, and offered his friendship. _Hist.
Mex._, 142.
[644] ‘A cabo de dos dias ... donde venian muy bravosos
leones, bolvieron muy mansos, y se le ofrecieron por
servidores.’ _Bernal Diaz_, _Hist. Verdad._, 88; _Cortés_,
_Residencia_, ii. 168, 465, 500.
[645] Cortés said that he could not leave Mexico, where
his presence was necessary for the preservation of peace
and treasures. _Cartas_, 117-18. ‘Y q̄ se viessen solos.’
_Gomara_, _Hist. Mex._, 142. According to Bernal Diaz a
letter of similar tenor had been sent on before, by a swift
messenger, to clear the way for Guevara’s recommendations,
and Cortés therein intimated that the hostile utterances
attributed to Narvaez must be due to the interpreters,
for he was sure that so wise and brave a captain would
not utter anything to the prejudice of king and comrades.
_Hist. Verdad._, 89.
[646] ‘Porq̄ dadivas quebrantan peñas.’ _Bernal Diaz_,
_Hist. Verdad._, 89.
[647] According to Bernal Diaz, Duero persuaded Narvaez,
at the instigation of the friar, to invite the latter, and
to seek by friendly efforts to win him over. Pretending
to yield to his persuasions, Olmedo told him that if the
proper persons were sent to confer with Cortés, he could no
doubt be brought to terms. It was then agreed that Duero
and others should arrange a private interview between the
two generals. _Hist. Verdad._, 93; _Herrera_, dec. ii. lib.
ix. cap. xxi.
[648] The reason for this separation of oidor and officers
was to prevent the former from issuing authoritative orders.
This seizure had been effected just as Guevara returned
from Mexico. _Cortés_, _Cartas_, 118. Hence, Cortés’ letter
failed to reach him; yet Bernal Diaz assumes that he received
it, and coöperated accordingly. _Hist. Verdad._, 89.
[649] This report, embodying Aillon’s, is dated August
30, 1520. A formal statement of the case, prepared on the
arrival of the secretary, was forwarded on November 10th.
_Carta de Audiencia_, in _Pacheco_ and _Cárdenas_, _Col.
Doc._, xiii. 332-48; _Ayllon_, _Relacion_, in _Id._, xii.
251-2; _Carta al Rey de los Oidores_, in _Col. Doc. Inéd._,
i. 495-511. The report proved a heavy argument against
Velazquez’ case, although Bishop Fonseca at first sought
to keep it back. _Bernal Diaz_, _Hist. Verdad._, 90; _Peter
Martyr_, dec. v. cap. v.
[650] Two soldiers were also imprisoned for speaking
favorably of Cortés. One of them was Sancho de Barahona who
settled in Guatemala. _Bernal Diaz_, _Hist. Verdad._, 89,
100. To Bernardino de Santa Clara, who had aided Aillon in
the formal demands upon Narvaez, nothing was done, owing to
his many friends in the camp. _Herrera_, dec. ii. lib. ix.
cap. xx.-xxi. This man was not actuated by friendship for
Cortés, however. He had been treasurer of Española, where
his prodigality nearly made him a defaulter. _Cortés_,
_Residencia_, ii. 166-8.
[651] ‘Villalobos, y vn Portugues, y otros seys o siete se
passaron a Cortes. Y otros le escriuieron, a lo que algunos
dizen ofreciendosele, si venia para ellos y que Cortes leyo
las cartas, callando la firma ... y que publicaua tener
en Zempoallã dozientos Españoles.’ _Gomara_, _Hist. Mex._,
143. Bernal Diaz says five deserters, relatives and friends
of Aillon. _Hist. Verdad._, 90, 92.
[652] Herrera assumes that he was deceived by Narvaez,
dec. ii. lib. ix. cap. xix., but intimidation was no doubt
the leading motive, for he could not possibly relish the
prospect of Montezuma’s release by the new-comers, nor the
licentiousness and greed of the soldiers. ‘This conduct
of the men drove the inhabitants to flight,’ says Cortés,
_Cartas_, 119, 125. When the jewels and other effects
belonging to Cortés’ party were seized, together with
the Indian wives of the conquerors, the cacique became
seriously alarmed, exclaiming that he would surely be killed
for permitting the outrage. This excited only derision,
Salvatierra remarking: ‘Aueys visto que miedo que tienen
todos estos Caciques desta nonada de Cortesillo.’ _Bernal
Diaz_, _Hist. Verdad._, 90.
[653] _Tapia_, _Rel._, in _Icazbalceta_, _Col. Doc._, ii.
587. ‘Ellos dejaban la villa sola por no pelear con ellos.’
_Cortés_, _Cartas_, 119.