TURKEY, CRUSHED TO EARTH, RISES AGAIN
NATIONALISM AND MILITARISM TRIUMPH AT CONSTANTINOPLE
The outbreak of the Great War precipitated a serious political crisis
at Constantinople. Decisions of the utmost moment to the future of
the Ottoman Empire had to be taken. Chief among these was the choice
between neutrality and entry into the war in coöperation with the
Central Powers. Pacifists and Entente sympathizers, of whom Djavid
Bey was perhaps the foremost, counseled non-intervention in the
struggle. Militarists and Germanophiles, headed by Enver Pasha, the
distinguished Minister of War, advocated early and complete observance
of the alliance with Germany, which called for active military measures
against the Entente. In support of the pacifists were the great mass of
the people, overburdened with taxes, worn out with military service,
and weary of the sacrifices occasioned by the Tripolitan and Balkan
Wars. In support of the militarists were German economic power, German
military prestige, and the powerful emotion of Turkish nationalism.
The case of the pacifists, like that of their opponents, was based
frankly upon national self-interest. A great European war seemed to
them to offer an unprecedented opportunity for setting Ottoman affairs
in order without the perennial menace of foreign interference. Ottoman
neutrality would be solicited by some of the belligerents, Ottoman
intervention by others; during the war, however, no nation could
afford to bully Turkey. By clever diplomatic bargaining economic and
political privileges of the greatest importance might be obtained—the
Capitulations, for example, might be abolished. Neutral Turkey might
grow prosperous by a thriving commerce with the belligerents. After the
peace both victor and vanquished would be too exhausted to think of
aggression against a revivified Ottoman Empire. To remain neutral was
to assure peace, security, and prosperity. To intervene was to invite
defeat and dismemberment.
Militarists, however, appraised the situation differently. National
honor demanded that Turkey go to the assistance of her allies. But,
more than that, national security demanded the decisive defeat of the
Entente Powers. As contrasted with the firm friendship of Germany
for Turkey, it was pointed out, there was the traditional policy of
Russia to dismember the Ottoman Empire and of France and Great Britain
to infringe upon Ottoman sovereignty whenever opportunity presented
itself. A victorious Russia would certainly appropriate Constantinople,
and as “compensations” France would take Syria and England Mesopotamia.
By closing the Dardanelles and declaring war, Turkey could deal Russian
economic and military power a blow from which the empire of the
Tsars might never recover. By associating herself with the seemingly
irresistible military forces of Germany, Turkey might once and for
all eliminate Russia—the feared and hated enemy of both Turks and
Germans—from Near Eastern affairs. In addition, British security in
Egypt might be shaken, and the French colonial empire in North Africa
might be menaced by a Pan-Islamic revival. In these circumstances
the war might be for Turkey a war of liberation, from which only the
craven-hearted would shrink.
For a time, however, practical considerations led to the maintenance
of Ottoman neutrality. “To Germany the ‘sphere of influence’ in
Turkey was of far greater economic and political importance than all
her ‘colonies’ in Africa and in the South Seas put together. The
latter, under the German flag, were an obvious and quick prey to Great
Britain’s naval superiority, but so long as Turkey remained out of
the war the German sphere of influence in Anatolia and Mesopotamia
was protected by the neutral Crescent flag. As soon as Turkey entered
the war, however, Great Britain’s naval superiority could be brought
to bear upon Germany’s interests in the Near East as well as upon her
interests in Africa and Oceanica. If German imperialists were devoted
to a Berlin-to-Bagdad _Mittel-Europa_ project, there were British
imperialists whose hearts and minds were set upon a Suez-to-Singapore
South-Asia project. The Ottoman Empire occupied a strategic position
in both schemes. A neutral Turkey, on the whole, was favorable to
German imperialism. A Turkey in armed alliance with Germany presented a
splendid opportunity for British imperialism.”[1]
Turkish mobilization, furthermore, was a tediously slow process. The
construction of the Bagdad Railway, as we have seen, had not been
completed before the outbreak of the Great War.[2] There were wide
gaps in northern Mesopotamia and in the Amanus mountains which made
difficult the transportation of troops for the defence of Irak, an
attack on the Suez, an offensive in the Caucasus, or the fortification
of the Dardanelles. The entry of Turkey into the war before the
completion of mobilization would have been of no material advantage
to Germany and would almost certainly have brought disaster to the
Ottoman Empire. Therefore, while the war went well for Germany on the
French and Russian fronts, German influence at Constantinople was
more concerned with creating sentiment for war and with speeding up
mobilization than with encouraging premature intervention. After the
Teutonic defeats at the Marne and in Galicia, however, active Turkish
support was needed for the purpose of menacing Russian security in
the Caucasus and British security in Egypt, as well as for bolstering
up German morale. During the latter part of September and the month
of October, Marshal Liman von Sanders, Baron von Wangenheim, the
commanders of the _Goeben_ and the _Breslau_, and other German
influences at Constantinople exerted the strongest possible pressure on
the Ottoman Government to bring Turkey into the war on the side of her
Teutonic allies.
On October 31, 1914, the Turkish Government took the fatal step
of precipitating war with the Entente Powers, after Enver Pasha,
Minister of War, and Djemal Pasha, Minister of Marine, were satisfied
that Ottoman preparations were sufficiently advanced to warrant the
beginning of hostilities. The outcome of the Bagdad Railway concession
of 1903 was the entry of Turkey into the War of 1914![3]
Discouraged by their failure to maintain the peace, and fearful of
impending disaster to their country, Djavid Bey and three other
members of the Ottoman ministry resigned their posts. There were other
indications, also, that intelligent public opinion at Constantinople
was not whole-hearted in support of war. But the nationalists—playing
upon the “traditional enmity” toward Russia—had their way, and with
an outburst of patriotic fervor Turkey began hostilities. In a
proclamation to the army and navy the Sultan affirmed that the war was
being waged for the defence of the Caliphate and the “emancipation”
of the Fatherland: “During the last three hundred years,” he said,
“the Russian Empire has caused our country to suffer many losses in
territory. And when we finally arose to a sentiment of awakening and
regeneration which was to increase our national welfare and our power,
the Russian Empire made every effort to destroy our attempts, either
with war or with numerous machinations and intrigues. Russia, England,
and France never for a moment ceased harboring ill-will against our
Caliphate, to which millions of Mussulmans, suffering under the tyranny
of foreign domination, are religiously and wholeheartedly devoted. And
it was always these powers that started every misfortune that came
upon us. Therefore, in this mighty struggle which we are undertaking,
we once and for all will put an end to the attacks made from one side
against the Caliphate and from the other against the existence of our
country.”[4]
Turcophiles in Germany were enthusiastic over Ottoman participation
in the Great War. The Turkish military contribution to a Teutonic
victory might not be decisive, but neither would it be insignificant.
And German coöperation in Ottoman military ventures would certainly
strengthen German economic penetration in the Near East, even though
Turkish arms might not drive Britain out of Egypt or Russia out of the
Caucasus. “Over there in Turkey,” wrote Dr. Ernest Jäckh, “stretch
Anatolia and Mesopotamia—Anatolia, the ‘land of sunrise,’ Mesopotamia,
an ancient paradise. Let these names be to us a symbol. May this world
war bring to Germany and Turkey the sunrise and the paradise of a new
era. May it confer upon a strengthened Turkey and a greater Germany
the blessings of fruitful Turco-Teutonic cooperation in peace after
victorious Turco-Teutonic collaboration in war.”[5]
ASIATIC TURKEY BECOMES ONE OF THE STAKES OF THE WAR
Whatever may have been the European origins of the Great War, there was
no disposition on the part of the belligerents to overlook its imperial
possibilities. A war which was fought for the protection of France
against German aggression, for the defence of Belgian neutrality,
for the recovery of Alsace-Lorraine, for the democratizing of a
bureaucratic German Empire—this war was fought not only in Flanders and
Picardy and the Vosges, but in Africa and Asia and the South Seas; not
only in Poland and Galicia and East Prussia, but in Mesopotamia and
Syria and the Dardanelles. Anatolia, Palestine, and the region of the
Persian Gulf were as much the stakes of the war as _Italia irredenta_,
the lost provinces of France, or the Serbian “outlet” to the Adriatic.
Of all the spoils of the war, Turkey was among the richest. Her
undeveloped wealth in minerals and fuel; her potentialities as a
producer of foodstuffs, cotton, and other agricultural products; her
possibilities as a market—these were alluring as war-time necessities
and peace-time assets. Her strategic position was of inestimable
importance to any nation which hoped to establish colonial power in the
eastern Mediterranean. Her future as a sphere of influence promised
unusual opportunities for the investment of capital and the acquisition
of exclusive economic rights. It was no accident, therefore, that
brought men from Berlin and Bombay, Stuttgart and Sydney, Munich
and Marseilles, to fight bitterly for possession of the cliffs of
Gallipoli, the deserts of Mesopotamia, and the coast of Syria.
Turkey-in-Asia was a rich prize upon which imperialists in Berlin and
Vienna, London and Paris and Petrograd, had set their hearts.
No sooner had Turkey entered the war than the imperial aspects of
the struggle became apparent. Germany was deluged with literature
designed to show that Ottoman participation in the war would assure
Germany and Austria their legitimate “place in the sun.” Business men
and diplomatists, missionaries and Oriental scholars[6] combined in
prophesying that the Turco-German brotherhood-in-arms would fortify
the Teutonic economic position in the Near East, disturb Russian
equanimity in the Caucasus, menace Britain’s communications with
India, and end once and for all French pretensions in Syria. Moslem
sympathizers predicted that the Holy War would shake the Entente
empires to their foundations. Pan-Germans frankly avowed that the war
offered an opportunity to make Berlin-to-Bagdad a reality rather than
a dream—some went so far as to believe that German domination could be
extended from the North Cape to the Persian Gulf! Mercantilists foresaw
the possibility of creating a politically unified and an economically
self-sufficient Middle Europe.[7]
As a means of promoting closer relationships with Turkey numerous
societies were established in Germany for the purpose of disseminating
information on the Near East and its importance in the war. For
example, Dr. Hugo Grothe conducted at Leipzig the work of the
_Deutsches Vorderasienkomitee_—_Vereinigung zur Förderung deutscher
Kulturarbeit im islamischen Orient_. This organization published
and distributed hundreds of thousands of books, pamphlets, and
maps regarding Asiatic Turkey; conducted a Near East Institute, at
which lectures and courses of instruction were given; maintained an
information bureau for business men interested in commercial and
industrial opportunities in the Ottoman Empire; and established German
libraries in Constantinople, Aleppo, Bagdad, Konia, and elsewhere
along the line of the Bagdad Railway. A similar organization, the
_Deutsch-türkische Vereinigung_, was maintained at Berlin under the
honorary presidency of Dr. von Gwinner of the _Deutsche Bank_ and the
active supervision of Dr. Ernest Jäckh. The two societies numbered
among their members and patrons Herr Ballin, of the Hamburg-American
Line, General von der Goltz, Baron von Wangenheim, and the Ottoman
ambassador at Berlin.[8]
The watchdogs of British imperial welfare, however, were not asleep.
Lord Crewe, the Secretary of State for India, was busily engaged in
plans for safeguarding British economic and strategic interests in
Mesopotamia. Early in September, 1914, General Sir Edmund Barrow,
Military Secretary of the India Office, prepared a memorandum,
“The Rôle of India in a Turkish War,” which proposed the immediate
occupation of Basra on the grounds that it was “the psychological
moment to take action” and that “so unexpected a stroke at this moment
would have a startling effect” in checkmating Turkish intrigues,
encouraging the Arabs to revolt and thus forestalling an Ottoman attack
on the Suez, and in protecting the oil installations at the head of the
Persian Gulf.[9] Supporters of a pro-Balkan policy, in the meantime,
were urging an attack on Turkey from the Mediterranean. Winston
Churchill, Chief Lord of the Admiralty, for example, in a memorandum of
August 19, 1914, to Sir Edward Grey, advocated an alliance with Greece
against Turkey; by September 4 he had completed plans for a military
and naval attack on the Dardanelles; on September 21 he telegraphed
Admiral Carden, at Malta, to “sink the _Goeben_ and _Breslau_, no
matter what flag they fly, if they come out of the Straits.” Mr.
Churchill, with whose name will ever be associated the disastrous
expedition to the Dardanelles, believed that, whatever the outcome
of the war on the Western Front, the success or failure of Germany
would be measured in terms of her power in the Near East after the
termination of hostilities. To destroy German economic and political
domination of Turkey it was necessary to have an expedition at the head
of the Persian Gulf and, possibly, another in Syria, but the commanding
strategic position was the Straits. The capture of Constantinople would
win the war.[10]
There were others who considered that a purely defensive policy should
be followed in the Near East. Lord Kitchener, for example, believed in
concentrating the maximum possible man power in France and advocated
restricting Eastern operations to the protection of the Suez Canal and
other essential communications. Influential military critics, like
Colonel Repington, were firmly opposed to “side shows” in Mesopotamia,
at the Dardanelles, or elsewhere, which would divert men, matériel,
and popular attention from the Western Front. Sir Edward Grey appeared
to be more interested in Continental than in colonial questions. Lord
Curzon was swayed between fear of a Moslem uprising in India and the
hope that British prestige in the East might be materially enhanced by
outstanding military successes at the expense of the Turks.[11]
The Near Eastern imperialists, however, had their way. During
September, 1914, the Government of India was ordered to prepare an
expeditionary force for service in the region of the Persian Gulf.
Early in October, almost four weeks before Turkey entered the war,
Indian Expeditionary Force “D,” under General Delamain, sailed from
Bombay under sealed orders. It next appeared on October 23, at
Bahrein Island, in the Persian Gulf, where General Delamain learned
the purposes of the expedition which he commanded. His army was to
occupy Adaban Island, at the mouth of the Shatt-el-Arab, “with the
object of protecting the oil refineries, tanks and pipe lines [of the
Anglo-Persian Company], covering the landing of reënforcements should
these be required, and assuring the local Arabs of support against
Turkey.” For the last-named purpose Sir Percy Cox, subsequently British
High Commissioner in Irak, was attached to the army as “political
officer.” In addition, General Delamain was to “take such military
and political action as he should consider feasible to strengthen his
position and, if necessary, occupy Basra.” Nevertheless, he was warned
that the rôle of his force was “that of demonstrating at the head of
the Persian Gulf” and that on no account was he “to take any hostile
action against the Turks without orders from the Government of India,
_except in the case of absolute military necessity_”![12]
Meanwhile, Sir Arthur Henry McMahon, subsequently first High
Commissioner in Egypt under the Protectorate, entered into an
agreement, dated October 23, 1914, with the Sherif of Mecca, assuring
the latter that Great Britain was prepared “to recognize and support
the independence of the Arabs within territories in which Great Britain
is free to act without detriment to the interests of her ally, France,”
it being understood that “the districts of Mersina and Alexandretta and
portions of Syria lying to the west of the districts of Damascus, Homs,
Hama and Aleppo cannot be said to be purely Arab.” In other words, an
independent Arab state was considered to be feasible insofar as it did
not conflict with the sphere of interest in Syria developed by French
railway-builders and recognized by the Franco-German agreement of
February 15, 1914.[13]
Even before Turkey formally entered the war, therefore, a British army
was “demonstrating” in the Shatt-el-Arab; Sir Percy Cox was coöperating
with the Sheik of Koweit for the purpose of precipitating a rebellion
among the Arabs of Mesopotamia, and a British representative had sown
the seeds of a separatist movement in the Hedjaz. It was a short step
from this, after the declaration of hostilities, to the occupation of
Basra, on November 22, and of Kurna, on December 9. The close of the
year 1914 saw Turkey in the unenviable position of having to choose
between increasing German economic and political domination, on the one
hand, and dismemberment by the Entente Allies, on the other.
The political and military situation of Turkey did not improve during
the year 1915. By mid-January, the rigors of a Caucasian winter and
the absence of adequate means of communication and supply brought to a
standstill Enver Pasha’s drive against the Russians. Early in February,
Djemal Pasha’s army, which had crossed the Sinai Peninsula in the face
of seemingly insuperable obstacles, attacked the Suez Canal only to
be decisively defeated by its British and French defenders. During
March a secret agreement was reached between Great Britain, France,
and Russia for the partition of the Ottoman Empire, including the
assignment of Constantinople to the Tsar. On April 26, by the Treaty
of London which brought Italy into the war, the Entente Powers bound
themselves to “preserve the political balance in the Mediterranean” by
recognizing the right of Italy “to receive on the division of Turkey an
equal share with Great Britain, France and Russia in the basin of the
Mediterranean, and more specifically in that part of it contiguous to
the province of Adalia, where Italy already had obtained special rights
and developed certain interests”; likewise the Allies agreed to protect
the interests of Italy “in the event that the territorial inviolability
of Asiatic Turkey should be sustained by the Powers” or that “only a
redistribution of spheres of interest should take place.”[14] To give
greater effect to these secret imperialistic agreements British troops
were landed at the Dardanelles on April 28. The bargains were sealed
with the blood of those heroic Britons and immortal Anzacs who went
through the tortures of hell—and worse—at Gallipoli![15]
In the meantime, British activities were resumed in Mesopotamia. In
March, 1915, General J. E. Nixon was ordered to Basra with renewed
instructions “to secure the safety of the oilfields, pipe line and
refineries of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company,” as well as with orders
to consolidate his position for the purpose of “retaining complete
control of lower Mesopotamia” and of making possible a subsequent
advance on Bagdad. On May 29, in accordance with these instructions,
the Sixth Division, under General Sir Charles Townshend, occupied
Amara, a town of 12,000 lying about fifty miles north of Basra on
the Tigris, seat of the Turkish provincial administration and one
of the principal entrepôts of Mesopotamian trade. Beyond this point
General Nixon refused to extend his operations unless assured adequate
reënforcements, which were not forthcoming. Nevertheless, because of
the insistence of Sir Percy Cox that some outstanding success was
necessary to retain support of the Arabs, another advance was ordered
in the early autumn. On September 29, General Townshend occupied
Kut-el-Amara, 180 miles north of his former position.
Then followed the decision to advance on Bagdad—a move which will go
down in history as one of the chief blunders of the war, as well as a
conspicuous instance of the manner in which political desiderata were
allowed to outweigh military considerations. The soldiers on the ground
were opposed to the move. General Nixon believed it would be disastrous
to advance farther than Kut without substantial reënforcements. General
Townshend was convinced that “Mesopotamia was a secondary theatre of
war, and on principle should be held on the defensive with a minimum
force,” and he warned his superiors that his troops “were tired, and
their tails were not up, but slightly down,” that they were fearful
of the distance from the sea and “were going down, in consequence,
with every imaginable disease.” But the statesmen at London were
thinking not only of winning the war but of eliminating Germany from
all future political and economic competition in the backward areas of
the world. “Because of the great political and military advantages to
be derived from the capture of Bagdad,” and because the “uncertainty”
of the situation at the Dardanelles made apparent “the great need of
a striking success in the East,” Austen Chamberlain, Secretary of
State for India, telegraphed the Viceroy on October 23, 1915, that
an immediate advance should be begun. Fearful of the consequences,
but faithful to his trust, General Townshend began the hundred-mile
march to Bagdad. Worn out, but heroic beyond words, his troops drove
the Turkish forces back and, on November 22, occupied Ctesiphon, only
eighteen miles from their goal. This, however, marked the high tide of
Allied success in the Near East during 1915, for General Townshend was
destined to reach Bagdad only as a prisoner of war.[16]
GERMANY WINS TEMPORARY DOMINATION OF THE NEAR EAST
Allied military successes in Turkey were not looked upon with
equanimity in Germany. There was a realization in Berlin, as well as
London and Paris and Petrograd, that the stakes of the war were as
much imperial as Continental. Nothing had as yet occurred which had
lessened the importance of establishing an economically self-sufficient
Middle European _bloc_ of nations. In the event that the German
oversea colonies could not be recovered, Asiatic Turkey—because of
its favorable geographical position, its natural resources, and its
potentialities as a market—would be almost indispensable in the German
imperial scheme of things. As Paul Rohrbach wrote in _Das grössere
Deutschland_ in August, 1915, “After a year of war almost everybody in
Germany is of the opinion that victory or defeat—at least political
victory or defeat—depends upon the preservation of Turkey and the
maintenance of our communications with her.”
The dogged defence of the Dardanelles had convinced Germany that,
granted proper support, Turkey could be depended upon to give a good
account of herself. The problem was one of supplementing Ottoman man
power with Teutonic military genius, technical skill, and organizing
ability. The enlistment of Bulgaria and the obliteration of Serbia made
possible more active German assistance to Turkey, and during the latter
months of 1915 and the early months of 1916 strenuous efforts were made
to bring the Turkish military machine to a high point of efficiency.
Large numbers of German staff officers were despatched to Mesopotamia,
Syria, and Anatolia, and Turkish officers were brought to the French
and Russian fronts to learn the methods of modern warfare. The
Prussian system of military service was adopted throughout the Ottoman
Empire, and exemptions were reduced to a minimum. Liberal credits were
established with German banks for the purchase of supplies for the new
levies of troops. Field Marshal von der Goltz was sent to Mesopotamia
as commander-in-chief of the Turkish troops in that region.[17]
Perhaps the chief handicap of the Turks in all their campaigns was
inadequate means of transportation. The Ottoman armies operating
in the vicinity of Gaza and of Bagdad were dependent upon lines of
communication more than twelve hundred miles long; and had the Bagdad
Railway been non-existent, it is doubtful if any military operations at
all could have been conducted in those regions. But the Bagdad Railway
was uncompleted. Troops and supplies being despatched from or to
Anatolia had to be transported across the Taurus and Amanus mountains
by mule-back, wagon, or automobile, and then reloaded on cars south
or north of the unfinished tunnels. To remedy these deficiencies,
herculean efforts were made by Germans and Turks during 1915 to improve
the service on existing lines and to hurry the completion of the Bagdad
Railway. Locomotives and other rolling stock were shipped to Turkey,
and German railway experts coöperated with the military authorities
in utilizing transportation facilities to the best advantage. In
September, 1915, the Bagtché tunnel was pierced; and although through
service to Aleppo was not inaugurated until October, 1918, a temporary
narrow-gauge line was used, during the interim, to transport troops
and matériel through the tunnel. Commenting on the importance of the
Bagtché tunnel, the American Consul General at Constantinople wrote:
“With its completion the most serious difficulties connected with the
construction of the Bagdad Railway have been overcome, and the work of
connecting up many of the isolated stretches of track may be expected
to be completed with reasonable rapidity. In spite of delays occasioned
by the war, this most important undertaking in railway construction in
Turkey has passed the problematical stage and is now certain to become
an accomplished fact in the near future.”[18]
The effects of German assistance to Turkey soon made themselves
apparent. Field Marshal von der Goltz, commanding a reënforced and
reinvigorated Ottoman army, supported by German artillery, compelled
General Townshend to abandon hope of occupying Bagdad and to fall back
toward Basra. By December 5, 1915, Townshend’s army was besieged in
Kut-el-Amara; and although the Turks failed to take the town by storm,
they did not fail to beat off every Russian and British force sent to
the relief of the beleaguered troops. About the same time, December 10,
evacuation of the Dardanelles was begun, and the last of the British
troops were withdrawn during the first week of January, 1916. On April
29, Townshend’s famished garrison surrendered. Shortly thereafter the
offensive of the Grand Duke Nicholas in Turkish Armenia was brought
to a standstill. During July and August a second Ottoman attack was
launched against the Suez Canal; and although it was unsuccessful, the
expedition reminded the British that Egypt was by no means immune from
danger. By the end of the year 1916 Turkey, with German assistance, had
completely cleared her soil of enemy troops, except for a retreating
Russian army in northern Anatolia and a defeated British expedition at
the head of the Persian Gulf.[19]
As for Germany, she “was unopposed in her mastery of that whole
vast region of southeastern Europe and southwestern Asia which goes
by the name of the Near East.... She now enjoyed uninterrupted and
unmenaced communication and commerce with Constantinople not only, but
far away, over the great arteries of Asiatic Turkey [the Bagdad and
Hedjaz railways], with Damascus, Jerusalem, and Mecca, and with Bagdad
likewise.... If military exploits had been as conclusive as they had
been spectacular, Germany would have won the Great War in 1916 and
imposed a _Pax Germanica_ upon the world.... With the adherence of
Turkey and Bulgaria to the Teutonic Alliance, and the triumphs of those
states, a Germanized _Mittel-Europa_ could be said to stretch from the
North Sea to the Persian Gulf, from the Baltic to the Red Sea, from
Lithuania and Ukrainia to Picardy and Champagne. It was the greatest
achievement in empire-building on the continent of Europe since the
days of Napoleon Bonaparte.”[20]
If Germany had been alarmed during the summer of 1915 at the prospect
that she might lose her preponderant position in Turkey, the world was
now alarmed at the prospect that she might maintain that position.
Nor was that alarm easily dispelled, for the Bagdad Railway and the
power and prestige it gave Germany in the Near East were pointed to by
statesmen as additional evidence of the manner in which the Kaiser and
his cohorts had plotted in secret against the peace of an unsuspecting
and unprepared world. In fact, the Bagdad Railway came to be considered
one of the fundamental causes of the war, as well as one of the chief
prizes for which the war was being fought. President Wilson, for
example, in his Flag Day speech, June 14, 1917, stated the case in the
following terms:[21]
“The rulers of Germany ... were glad to go forward unmolested,
filling the thrones of Balkan states with German princes, putting
German officers at the service of Turkey to drill her armies and
make interest with her government, developing plans of sedition and
rebellion in India and Egypt, setting their fires in Persia. The
demands made by Austria upon Serbia were a mere single step in a plan
which compassed Europe and Asia, from Berlin to Bagdad....
“The plan was to throw a broad belt of German military power and
political control across the very centre of Europe and beyond the
Mediterranean into the heart of Asia; and Austria-Hungary was to be
as much their tool and pawn as Serbia or Bulgaria or Turkey or the
ponderous states of the East.... The dream had its heart at Berlin. It
could have had a heart nowhere else!...
“And they have actually carried the greater part of that amazing
plan into execution.... The so-called Central Powers are in fact but
a single Power. Serbia is at its mercy, should its hands be but for
a moment freed. Bulgaria has consented to its will, and Roumania
is overrun. The Turkish armies, which Germans trained, are serving
Germany, certainly not themselves, and the guns of German warships
lying in the harbor at Constantinople remind Turkish statesmen every
day that they have no choice but to take their orders from Berlin.
From Hamburg to the Persian Gulf the net is spread!”
As late as November 12, 1917, after some spectacular victories by the
Allies in Mesopotamia and Syria, President Wilson made it plain that no
peace was possible which did not destroy German military power in the
Near East. Addressing the American Federation of Labor, at Buffalo, N.
Y., he said:[22]
“Look at the map of Europe now. Germany, in thrusting upon us
again and again the discussion of peace, talks about what? Talks
about Belgium—talks about Alsace-Lorraine. Well, these are deeply
interesting subjects to us and to them, but they are not talking about
the heart of the matter. Take the map and look at it. Germany has
absolute control of Austria-Hungary, practical control of the Balkan
States, control of Turkey, control of Asia Minor. I saw a map the
other day in which the whole thing was printed in appropriate black,
and the black stretched all the way from Hamburg to Bagdad—the bulk
of the German power inserted into the heart of the world. If she can
keep that, she has kept all that her dreams contemplated when the
war began. If she can keep that, her power can disturb the world as
long as she keeps it, always provided ... the present influences that
control the German Government continue to control it.”
In the light of all the facts, this diagnosis of the situation is
incomplete, to say the least. Had President Wilson been cognizant
of the contemporaneous counter-activities of the Allied Powers, he
might not have been prepared to offer so simple an explanation of a
many-sided problem. For it was not German imperialism alone which
menaced the peace of the Near East and of the world, but _all_
imperialism.
“BERLIN TO BAGDAD” BECOMES BUT A MEMORY
Germany may have been determined to dominate the Ottoman Empire by
military force. But from the Turkish point of view domination by
Germany was hardly more objectionable than the dismemberment which was
certain to be the result of an Allied victory.
Indeed, confident that they would eventually win the war, the Entente
Powers had proceeded far in their plans for the division of the Ottoman
Empire. During the spring of 1915, as has been indicated,[23] Russia
had been promised Constantinople, and Italy had been assigned a share
of the spoils equal to that of Great Britain, France, or Russia. To
give full effect to these understandings, further negotiations were
conducted during the autumn of 1915 and the spring of 1916, looking
toward a more specific delimitation of interests.
Accordingly, on April 26, 1916—the first anniversary of the
Treaty of London with Italy—France and Russia signed the secret
Sazonov-Paléologue Treaty concerning their respective territorial
rights in Asiatic Turkey. Russia was awarded full sovereignty over the
vilayets of Trebizond, Erzerum, Bitlis, and Van—a vast area of 60,000
square miles (about one and one-fifth times the size of the State of
New York), containing valuable mineral and petroleum resources. This
handsome prize put Russia well on the road to Constantinople and in a
fair way to turn the Black Sea into a Russian lake. And at the moment
the treaty was signed the armies of the Grand Duke Nicholas were
actually overrunning the territory which Russia had staked out for
herself! For her part, France was to receive adequate compensations in
the region to the south and southwest of the Russian acquisitions, the
actual delimitation of boundaries and other details to be the result of
direct negotiation with Great Britain.[24]
Thus came into existence the famous Sykes-Picot Treaty of May 9, 1916,
defining British and French political and economic interests in the
hoped-for dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire. The Syrian coast from
Tyre to Alexandretta, the province of Cilicia, and southern Armenia
(from Sivas on the north and west to Diarbekr on the south and east)
were allocated to France in full sovereignty. In addition, a French
“zone of influence” was established over a vast area including the
provinces of Aleppo, Damascus, Deir, and Mosul. Administration of this
stretch of coast and its hinterland would give French imperialists
what they most wanted in the Near East—actual possession of a country
in which France had many religious and cultural interests, control
of the silk production of Syria and the potential cotton production
of Cilicia, ownership of the Arghana copper mines, and acquisition
of that portion of the Bagdad Railway lying between Mosul and the
Cilician Gates of the Taurus.[25] Aside from its satisfaction of French
imperial ambitions, however, “the French area defied every known law of
geographic, ethnographic, and linguistic unity which one might cite who
would attempt to justify it.”[26]
Great Britain, by way of “compensation,” was to receive complete
control over lower Mesopotamia from Tekrit to the Persian Gulf and
from the Arabian boundary to the Persian frontier. In addition,
she was recognized as having special political and economic
interests—particularly the right “to furnish such advisers as the
Arabs might desire”—in a vast territory lying south of the French
“zone of influence” and extending from the Sinai Peninsula to the
Persian border. Palestine was to be internationalized, but was
subsequently established as a homeland for the Jews. In this manner
Britain, also, had adequately protected her imperial interests—she
had secured possession of the Bagdad Railway in southern Mesopotamia;
she had gained complete control of the head of the Persian Gulf, thus
fortifying her strategic position in the Indian Ocean; she was assured
the Mesopotamian cotton supply for the mills of Manchester and the
Mesopotamian oil supply for the dreadnoughts of the Grand Fleet; she
had erected in Palestine a buffer state which would block any future
Ottoman attacks on the Suez Canal. All in all, Sir Mark Sykes had
driven a satisfactory bargain.[27]
Italian ambitions now had to be propitiated. For a whole year before
the United States entered the war—while the Allied governments were
professing unselfish war aims—secret negotiations were being conducted
by representatives of France, Great Britain and Italy to determine what
advantages and territories, equivalent to those gained by the other
Allies, might be awarded Italy. In April, 1917, by the so-called St.
Jean de Maurienne Agreement, Italy was granted complete possession of
almost the entire southern half of Anatolia—including the important
cities of Adalia, Konia, and Smyrna—together with an extensive “zone of
influence” nort-heast of Smyrna. With such a hold on the coast of Asia
Minor, Italian imperialists might realize their dream of dominating the
trade of the Ægean and of reëstablishing the ancient power of Venice in
the commerce of the Near East.[28]
These inter-Allied agreements for the disposal of Asiatic Turkey were
instructive instances of the “old diplomacy” in coöperation with
the “new imperialism.” The treaties were secret covenants, secretly
arrived at; they bartered territories and peoples in the most approved
manner of Metternich and Richelieu. But they were less concerned with
narrowly political claims than with the exclusive economic privileges
which sovereignty carried with it; they determined boundaries with
recognition of their strategic importance, but with greater regard for
the location of oilfields, mineral deposits, railways and ports of
commercial importance. They left no doubt as to what were the real
stakes of the war in the Near East.
It is difficult, if not impossible, to reconcile the secret treaties
with the pronouncements of Allied statesmen regarding the origins
and purposes of the Great War. Certainly they were no part of the
American program for peace, which promised to “the Turkish portions
of the Ottoman Empire a secure sovereignty”; which demanded “a free,
open-minded, and absolutely impartial adjustment of all colonial
claims, based upon a strict observance of the principle that in
determining all such questions of sovereignty the interests of the
populations concerned must have equal weight with the equitable claims
of the government whose title is to be determined”; and which announced
in no uncertain terms that “the day of conquest and aggrandizement is
gone by” as is also “the day of secret covenants entered into in the
interest of particular governments and likely at some unlooked-for
moment to upset the peace of the world.”[29]
Allied diplomacy was to have its way in the Near East, however, for the
goddess of victory finally smiled upon the Allied armies and frowned
upon both Turks and Germans. As 1916 had been a year of Turco-German
triumphs at the Dardanelles and in Mesopotamia, 1917 brought
conspicuous Allied victories along the Tigris and in Syria, and 1918
saw the complete collapse of the Ottoman Empire. On February 24, 1917,
General Sir Stanley Maude, in command of reënforced and rejuvenated
British forces in Mesopotamia, captured Kut-el-Amara, retrieving the
disaster which had befallen Townshend’s army a year before. Deprived
of the services of Field Marshal von der Goltz, who died during the
Caucasus campaign, the Turks retired in disorder, and on March 11
British troops entered Bagdad—the ancient city which had bulked so
large in the German scheme of things in the Near East. Although the
capture of Bagdad was not in itself of great strategic importance,
its effect on morale in the belligerent countries was considerable.
British imperialists were in possession of the ancient capital of the
Arabian Caliphs, as well as the chief entrepôt of caravan trade in the
Middle East; therefore their prestige with both Arabs and Turks was
certain to rise. At home, pictures of British troops in the Bagdad of
the Arabian Nights appealed to the imagination of the war-weary, as
well as the optimistic, patriot. In the Central Powers, on the other
hand, the loss of Bagdad created scepticism as to whether the German
dream of “Hamburg to the Persian Gulf” was not now beyond realization.
This scepticism became more confirmed when, on April 24, General Maude
captured Samarra, northern railhead of the uncompleted Bagdad line in
Mesopotamia.[30]
Scepticism would have turned to alarm, however, had Germans been
fully aware of the significance of the British advance in the Land
of the Two Rivers. For behind the armies of General Maude came civil
officials by the hundreds to consolidate the victory and to lay the
foundations of permanent occupation. An Irrigation Department was
established to deal with the menace of floods, to drain marshes, and
to economize in the use of water. An Agricultural Department undertook
the cultivation of irrigated lands and conducted elaborate experiments
in the growing of cotton—the commodity which means so much in the
British imperial system. A railway was constructed from Basra to Bagdad
which, when opened to commerce in 1919, became an integral part of
the Constantinople-Basra system. There was every indication that the
British were in Mesopotamia to stay.[31]
Germans and Turks were sufficiently aroused, however, to take strenuous
measures to counteract General Maude’s successes. In April, 1917,
Field Marshal von Mackensen, hero of the Balkan and Rumanian campaigns
and strong man of the Near East, was sent to Constantinople to confer
with Enver Pasha regarding the military situation. It was decided,
apparently, that Bagdad must be retaken at all costs, for throughout
the summer quantities of rolling stock for the Bagdad Railway were
shipped to Turkey, enormous supplies of munitions were accumulated
at Haidar Pasha, and a division of picked German troops (including
machine-gun and artillery units) made its appearance in Anatolia.
Command of all the Turkish armies in Mesopotamia was conferred upon
General von Falkenhayn, former German Chief of Staff. Germany was not
yet prepared to surrender her sphere of interest in Turkey.
The great expedition against Bagdad, however, had to be abandoned.
In the first place, Turkish officers were loath to serve under von
Falkenhayn. Turkish nationalism was beginning to assert itself, and
German supervision of Ottoman military affairs was resented—Mustapha
Kemal Pasha, for example, refused to accept orders from German generals
and resigned his commission. Von Falkenhayn himself was disliked
because of his dictatorial methods and was held in light esteem
because of his responsibility for the disastrous Verdun offensive.
Furthermore, many Turks deemed it inadvisable to dissipate energy in
a Mesopotamian campaign, the avowed purpose of which was a recovery
of German prestige, when all available man power was required for the
defence of Syria. Djemal Pasha was so insistent on this point that he
received from the Kaiser an “invitation” to visit the Western Front! In
the second place, Providence or, perhaps, an Allied spy intervened to
thwart the German plans, for a great fire and a series of explosions
(September 23–26, 1917) destroyed the entire port and terminal of
Haidar Pasha, together with all the munitions and supplies which had
been accumulated there by months of patient effort. And finally, the
spectacular campaign of Field Marshal Allenby in Palestine, which
opened with the capture of Beersheba, on October 31, convinced even
von Falkenhayn that an expedition in Mesopotamia, while Aleppo was in
danger, would be the height of folly. German energies were thereupon
diverted to the defence of the Holy Land.[32]
During the autumn of 1917, Great Britain and France, to assure their
possession of the territories assigned them by the Sykes-Picot Treaty,
began a Syrian campaign which was not to terminate until Turkey had
been put out of the war. Under Field Marshal Sir E. H. H. Allenby,
British troops, reënforced by French units and assisted by the
rebellious Arabs of the Hedjaz, captured Gaza (November 7), Jaffa
(November 16), and Jerusalem (December 9). The triumphal entry of
General Allenby into Jerusalem was hailed throughout Christendom as
marking the success of a modern crusade to rid Palestine of Ottoman
domination forever. Jericho was occupied, February 21, 1918, but
Turkish resistance, under Marshal Liman von Sanders, stiffened for a
time, and it was not until the autumn that large-scale operations were
resumed. On October 1, Damascus was occupied by a combined Arab and
British army; a week later Beirut was taken; and on October 25, Aleppo,
the most important junction point on the Bagdad Railway, capitulated.
Five days afterward, Turkey gave up the hopeless fight by signing the
Mudros armistice, terminating hostilities.[33]
Thus ended a Great Adventure for both Turkey and Germany. Germany
lost all hope of retaining any economic or political influence in the
Ottoman Empire; the dream of Berlin-to-Bagdad became a nightmare.
Turkey faced dismemberment. “The Bagdad Railway had proved to be the
backbone of Turkish utility and power in the War. Were it not for
its existence, the Ottoman resistance in Mesopotamia and in Syria
could have been discounted as a practical consideration in the War,
and the sending of Turkish reënforcements to the Caucasus would have
been even more materially delayed than was in fact the case.”[34]
For Turkey, then, the war had come at a most inappropriate time. Had
hostilities begun ten years later, after the completion of the Bagdad
system, military operations in the Near East might have had an entirely
different result. As it was, the Bagdad Railway—and the international
complications arising from it—proved to be the ruination of the Ottoman
Empire.
TO THE VICTORS BELONG THE SPOILS
During 1919, the Allied Governments set about possessing themselves of
the spoils which were theirs by virtue of the secret treaties and by
right of conquest. In April, Italian troops occupied Adalia and rapidly
extended their lines into the interior as far as Konia. In November,
French armies replaced the British forces in Syria and Cilicia. Great
Britain began the “pacification” of the tribesmen of Mesopotamia and
Kurdistan. And in the meantime there was plentiful evidence that German
rights in the Near East would be speedily liquidated in the interest
of the victorious Powers. For example, on March 26, the Interallied
Commission on Ports, Waterways, and Railways announced at Paris the
adoption of “a new transportation agreement designed to secure a route
to the Orient by railway without passing through the territories of
the Central Empires.” Accordingly, a fast train, the “Simplon-Orient
Express,” was to be run regularly from Calais to Constantinople _via_
Paris, Lausanne, Milan, Venice, Trieste, Agram, and Vinkovce. Later
this service was to be extended into Asiatic Turkey, over the lines of
the Anatolian, Bagdad, and Syrian railways. To meet a changed situation
one must provide new paths of imperial expansion, and the French press
spoke glowingly of the prospect that the slogans “Hamburg to the
Persian Gulf” and “Berlin to Bagdad” would be speedily replaced by
“Calais to Cairo” and “Bordeaux to Bagdad”![35]
All German rights in the Bagdad Railway and other economic enterprises
in the Near East were abrogated by the Treaty of Versailles, signed
June 28, 1919. The German Government was obligated to obtain and to
turn over to the Reparation Commission “any rights and interests of
German nationals in any public utility undertaking or in any concession
operating in ... Turkey, Austria, Hungary, and Bulgaria” and agreed, as
well, “to recognize and accept all arrangements which the Allied and
Associated Powers may make with Turkey and Bulgaria with reference to
any rights, interests and privileges whatever which might be claimed by
Germany or her nationals in Turkey and Bulgaria.”[36]
The Treaty of Sèvres, August 10, 1920—together with the accompanying
secret Tripartite Agreement of the same date between Great Britain,
France, and Italy—carried still further the liquidation of German
interests in the Near East. The Turkish Government was required to
dispose of all property rights in Turkey of Germany, Austria, Hungary,
Bulgaria, or their respective nationals and to turn over the proceeds
of all purchases and sales to the Reparation Commission established
under the treaties of peace with those Powers. The Anatolian and
Bagdad Railways were to be expropriated by Turkey and all of their
rights, privileges, and properties to be assigned—at a valuation to be
determined by an arbitrator appointed by the Council of the League of
Nations—to a Franco-British-Italian corporation to be designated by the
representatives of the Allied Powers. German stockholders were to be
compensated for their holdings, but the amount of their compensation
was to be turned over to the Reparation Commission; compensation due
the Turkish Government was to be assigned to the Allied Governments
toward the costs of maintaining their armies of occupation on Turkish
soil. German and Turkish property in ceded territories of the Ottoman
Empire was to be similarly liquidated. The Treaty of Versailles and the
Treaty of Sèvres left hardly a vestige of German influence in the Near
East.[37]
The Sèvres settlement, furthermore, destroyed the Ottoman Empire
and sought to give the Allies a stranglehold upon the economic life
of Turkey. Great Britain and France received essentially the same
territorial privileges as they had laid out for themselves in the
Sykes-Picot Treaty, with the vague restrictions that they should
exercise in Mesopotamia and Palestine and in Syria and Cilicia
respectively only the rights of mandatory powers. Great Britain was
confirmed in her oil and navigation concessions in Mesopotamia, France
in her railway rights in Syria; in addition, the Hedjaz Railway was
turned over outright to their joint ownership and administration. Italy
received only a “sphere of influence” in southern Anatolia, including
the port of Adalia, but, as a consequence of one of the most sordid of
the transactions of the Paris Conference, she was deprived of the bulk
of the privileges guaranteed her under the Treaty of London and the St.
Jean de Maurienne Agreement.[38] Greece was installed in Smyrna—the
most important harbor in Asia Minor, a harbor the control of which was
vital to the peasantry of Anatolia for the free export of their produce
and for the unimpeded importation of farm machinery and other wares of
western industry. Constantinople was put under the jurisdiction of an
international commission for control of the Straits, and the balance
of the former Russian sphere of interest was assigned to the ill-fated
Armenian Republic. The Hedjaz was declared to be an independent Arab
state. The Ottoman Empire was no more.
Even the Turkey that remained—a portion of Anatolia—enjoyed sovereignty
in name only. The Capitulations, which the Sultan had terminated in
the autumn of 1914, were reëstablished and extended. Concessions to
Allied nationals were confirmed in all the rights which they enjoyed
before Ottoman entry into the Great War. Because of the reparations,
and because of the high cost of the Allied armies of occupation, the
country was being loaded down with a still further burden of debt from
which there appeared to be no escape—and debts not only mortgaged
Turkish revenues but impaired Turkish administrative integrity. To
assure prompt payment of both old and new financial obligations of
the Turkish Government, an Interallied Financial Commission was
superimposed upon the Ottoman Public Debt Administration. The Financial
Commission had full supervision over taxation, customs, loans, and
currency; exercised final control over the Turkish budget; and had
the right to veto any proposed concession. In control of its domestic
affairs the new Turkey was tied hand and foot. Here, indeed, was a
Carthaginian peace! And all of this was done in order “to help Turkey,
to develop her resources, and to avoid the international rivalries
which have obstructed these objects in the past!”[39]
“THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE IS DEAD. LONG LIVE TURKEY!”
In the meantime, however, while the Sèvres Treaty was still in
the making, there was a small handful of Turkish patriots who were
determined at all costs to win that complete independence for which
Turkey had entered the war. These Nationalists were outraged by the
Greek occupation of Smyrna, in May, 1919, which they considered a
forecast of the kind of peace to be dictated to Turkey. During the
summer of 1919 they held two conferences at Erzerum and Sivas and
agreed to reject any treaty which handed over Turkish populations to
foreign domination, which would reduce Turkey to economic servitude
to the victorious Powers, or which would impair the sovereignty of
their country. Upon this program they won a sweeping victory in the
parliamentary elections of 1919–1920. For leadership they depended
largely upon that brilliant soldier and staunch Turk, Mustapha Kemal
Pasha, who had distinguished himself by his quarrel with Liman von
Sanders at the Dardanelles and his defiance of von Falkenhayn in Syria.
Mustapha Kemal Pasha, who had bitterly contested the growth of German
influence in Turkey during the war, was not likely to accept without a
struggle the extension of Allied control over Turkish affairs.[40]
In Constantinople, January 28, 1920, the Nationalist members of the
Turkish Parliament signed the celebrated “National Pact”—frequently
referred to as a Declaration of Independence of the New Turkey. “The
Pact was something more than a statement of war-aims or a party
programme. It was the first adequate expression of a sentiment which
had been growing up in the minds of Western-educated Turks for three
or four generations, which in a half-conscious way had inspired the
reforms of the Revolution of 1908, and which may dominate Turkey and
influence the rest of the Middle East for many generations to come.
It was an emphatic adoption of the Western national idea.”[41] It
was based upon principles which had received wide acceptance among
peoples of the Allied nations during the war: self-determination of
peoples, to be expressed by plebiscite; protection of the rights of
minorities, but no further limitations of national sovereignty. As
regards the Capitulations and the Ottoman Public Debt Administration,
the Pact is explicit: “With a view to assuring our national and
economic development,” it reads, “and with the end of securing to the
country a more regular and more modern administration, the signatories
of the present pact consider the possession of complete independence
and liberty as the _sine qua non_ of our national existence. In
consequence, we oppose all juridical or financial restrictions of any
nature which would arrest our national development.” Rather that Turkey
should die free than live in slavery! Foreswearing any intention of
recovering the Sultan’s former Arab possessions, the Pact proceeded to
serve notice, however, that Cilicia, Mosul, and the Turkish portions
of Thrace must be reunited with the fatherland. “The Ottoman Empire is
dead! Long live Turkey!”[42]
With this amazing program Mustapha Kemal Pasha undertook to liberate
Turkey. In April, 1920, the government of the Grand National Assembly
was instituted in Angora and proceeded to administer those portions of
Anatolia which were not under Allied or Greek occupation. The proposed
Treaty of Sèvres—which was handed to the Turkish delegates at Paris
on May 11—was condemned as inconsistent with the legitimate national
aspirations of the Turkish people. The Allies and the Constantinople
Government were denounced—the former as invaders of the sacred soil of
Turkey, the latter as tools of European imperialists. Then followed
a series of successful military campaigns: by October, 1920, the
French position in Cilicia had been rendered untenable, the Armenian
Republic had been obliterated, the British forces of occupation had
been forced back into the Ismid peninsula, and the Italians had
withdrawn their troops to Adalia. In the spring of 1921 separate
treaties were negotiated with Russia, Italy, and France, providing for
a cessation of military operations and for the evacuation of certain
Turkish territories.[43] Then came the long, bitter struggle against
the Greeks, terminating with the Mudania armistice of October 10,
1922, which assured to the Turks the return of Smyrna and portions
of Thrace. On November 1, the Sultanate was abolished, and Turkey
became a republic. Four days later the Turkish Nationalists entered
Constantinople in triumph. The struggle for the territorial and
administrative integrity of a New Turkey seemed to be won.
The victory of the Nationalists scrapped the Treaty of Sèvres and
called for a complete readjustment of the Near Eastern situation. When
the first Lausanne Conference for Peace in the Near East assembled
on November 20, 1922, there were high hopes that a just and lasting
settlement might be arrived at. The conference was only a few days old,
however, when the time-honored obstacles to peace in the Levant made
their appearance: the rival diplomatic policies of the Great Powers;
the desire of the West, by means of the Capitulations, to maintain a
firm hold upon its vested interests in the East; the imperialistic
struggle of rival concessionaires, supported by their respective
governments, for possession of the raw materials, the markets, and the
communications of Asiatic Turkey. Once more the Bagdad Railway, with
its tributary lines in Anatolia and Syria, became one of the stakes of
diplomacy!
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL AND EXPLANATORY NOTES
[1] C. J. H. Hayes, _A Brief History of the Great War_ (New York,
1920), pp. 71–72; “A Rival to the Bagdad Line,” in _The Near East_, May
25, 1917.
[2] _Supra_, Chapter V.
[3] Regarding the diplomatic situation at Constantinople during the
critical months of July to November, 1914, _cf._ “Correspondence
respecting events leading to the rupture of relations with Turkey,”
_Parliamentary Papers_, No. Cd. 7628 (1914); C. Mehrmann, _Der
diplomatische Krieg in Vorderasien_ (Dresden, 1916); J. Aulneau,
_La Turquie et la Guerre_ (Paris, 1916); C. Strupp, _Diplomatische
Aktenstücke zur orientalischen Frage_ (Berlin, 1916); Historicus,
“Origines de l’alliance turco-germanique,” in _Revue_, 7 series, Volume
III (Paris, 1915), pp. 267 _et seq._; Ostrorog, _op. cit._, Chapters
XII-XVI; footnote 40, Chapter X, _supra_.
[4] Quoted from _Current History_, Volume I (New York, 1915), p. 1032.
[5] _Die deutsch-türkische Waffenbrüderschaft_, p. 30.
[6] Notably Dr. Ernst Jäckh and Dr. Hugo Grothe.
[7] The following list of books is given without any pretence that it
is a complete bibliography of German publications on the Near Eastern
question during the year 1914–1915: A. Ritter, _Berlin-Bagdad, neue
Ziele mitteleuropäischer Politik_ (Munich, 1915) and _Nordkap-Bagdad,
das politische Programm des Krieges_ (Frankfort a. M., 1914); Hugo
Grothe, _Die Türken und ihre gegnerkriegsgeographische Betrachtungen_
(Frankfurt a. M., 1915), _Deutsch-türkische wirtschaftliche
Interessengemeinschaft_ (Munich, 1915), and _Deutschland, die Türkei
und der Islam_ (Leipzig, 1915); C. A. Schäfer, _Deutsch-türkische
Freundschaft_ (Stuttgart, 1915); Carl H. Becker, _Deutschland und
der Islam_ (Leipzig, 1914); J. Ritter von Riba, _Der türkische
Bundesgenosse_ (Berlin, 1915); J. Hall, _Der Islam und die
abendländische Kultur_ (Weimar, 1915); Ernst Marré, _Die Türken und
wir nach dem Kriege_ (Leipzig, 1916); Tekin Alp, _Türkismus und
Pantürkismus_ (Weimar, 1915); R. Schäfer, _Der deutsche Krieg, die
Türkei, Islam und Christentum_ (Leipzig, 1915); W. T. Vela, _Die
Zukunft der Türkei in Bundnis mit Deutschland_ (Berlin, 1915); W.
Blanckenburg, _Die Zukunftsarbeit der deutschen Schule in der Türkei_
(Berlin, 1915); H. Schmidt, _Das Eisenbahnwesen in der asiatischen
Türkei_ (Berlin, 1914); H. Margulies, _Der Kampf zwischen Bagdad
und Suez in Altertums_ (Weimar, 1915); M. Horten, _Die islamische
Geisteskultur_ (Leipzig, 1915); Fritz Regel, _Die deutsche Forschung
in türkische Vordasien_ (Leipzig, 1915); M. Roloff, _Arabien und seine
Bedeutung für die Erstärkung des Osmanenreiches_ (Leipzig, 1915);
A. Paquet, _Die jüdische Kolonien in Palästina_ (Weimar, 1915); C.
Nawratzki, _Die jüdische Kolonisation Palästinas_ (Munich, 1914); D.
Trietsch, _Die Juden der Türkei_ (Leipzig, 1915). Two notable magazine
articles are: R. Hennig, “Der verkehrsgeographische Wert des Suez- und
des Bagdad-Weges,” in _Geographische Zeitschrift_, 1916, pp. 649–656;
A. Tschawisch, “Der Islam und Deutschland—Wie soll man sich die Zukunft
des Islams denken?”, in _Deutsche Revue_, 1915, Volume III, pp. 249 _et
seq._
[8] See advertisements regarding the society and its work in a series
of pamphlets _Länder und Völker der Turkei_, edited by Dr. Hugo Grothe
(Leipzig, 1915, _et seq._), and descriptions of similar organizations
in a series _Orientbücherei_, edited by Dr. Ernst Jäckh (Stuttgart and
Berlin, 1914, _et seq._).
[9] “Report of the Commission Appointed by Act of Parliament to Enquire
into the Operations of War in Mesopotamia,” _Parliamentary Papers_,
1917, No. Cd. 8610.
[10] W. S. Churchill, _The World Crisis, 1910–1915_ (New York, 1923),
pp. 529–535; A. MacCallum Scott, _Winston Churchill in Peace and War_
(London, 1916), Chapter X.
[11] C. C. Repington, _The First World War, 1914–1918_ (2 volumes,
London, 1920), Volume I, pp. 42, 51, etc. _ad lib._; Churchill, _op.
cit._, pp. 537–538.
[12] The italics are mine. The proposed debarkation of troops,
however, was certain to involve a breach of Persian neutrality. _Cf._
_Parliamentary Papers_, 1917, No. Cd. 8610.
[13] _Ibid._ Regarding the Franco-German agreement of February 15,
1914, _cf._ _supra_, pp. 246–250.
[14] The text of the agreement between England, France and Russia
regarding the disposition of Constantinople and other portions of
Turkey is to be found in _Full Texts of the Secret Treaties as Revealed
at Petrograd_ (New York, _The Evening Post_, 1918); _cf._, also, R. S.
Baker, _Woodrow Wilson and World Settlement_ (3 volumes, Garden City,
1922), Volume I, Chapter III. The text of the Treaty of London between
Italy and the Allies is to be found in _Parliamentary Papers_, 1920,
No. Cmd. 671, Miscellaneous No. 7.
[15] The best single work on military operations in Turkey during the
Great War is Edmund Dane’s _British Campaigns in the Nearer East,
1914–1918_ (2 volumes, London, 1919). Regarding the Caucasus campaigns
of 1914–1915 _cf._ M. P. Price, _War and Revolution in Asiatic Russia_
(London, 1918), Chapter I; R. Machray, “The Campaign in the Caucasus,”
in the _Fortnightly Review_, Volume 97 (1915), pp. 458–471. Excellent
accounts of the first Turkish offensive against the Suez Canal are to
be found in G. Douin, _Un épisode de la guerre mondiale: l’attaque
du canal de Suez, 3 Fevrier, 1915_ (Paris, 1922); C. Stiénon, “Sur
le chemin de fer de Bagdad,” in _Revue des deux mondes_, 6 series,
Volume 5 (1916), pp. 148–174; T. Wiegand, _Sinai_ (Berlin, 1920); N.
Moutran, _La Syrie de demain: France et Syrie_ (Paris, 1916); R.
Hennig, _Der Kampf um den Suezkanal_ (Stuttgart, 1915); E. Serman,
_Mit den Türken an der Front_ (Berlin, 1915); J. Walther, _Zum Kampf
in der Wüste am Sinai und Nil_ (Leipzig, 1916); P. Schweder, _Im
türkischen Hauptquartier_ (Leipzig, 1916); _Eine Geschichte der Türkei
im Weltkriege_ (Munich, 1919). For the Mesopotamian expedition of
1914–1915 consult _Despatches Regarding Operations in the Persian
Gulf and Mesopotamia_ (London, the War Office, 1915); G. M. Chesney,
“The Mesopotamian Breakdown,” in the _Fortnightly Review_, Volume
102 (1917), pp. 247–256; H. B. Reynardson, _Mesopotamia, 1914–1915_
(London, 1919); C. H. Barber, _Besieged in Kut and After_ (Edinburgh,
1917). Of the great quantity of material available on the Dardanelles
campaign, _cf._, in particular, the following: _Gallipoli: der Kampf um
den Orient, von einem Offizier aus dem Stab des Marschalls Liman von
Sanders_ (Berlin, 1916); General Sir Ian Hamilton, _Gallipoli Diary_
(London, 1920); H. W. Nevinson, _The Dardanelles Campaign_ (London,
1918); S. A. Moseley, _The Truth About the Dardanelles_ (London, 1916);
John Masefield, _Gallipoli_ (London, 1916).
[16] _Parliamentary Papers_, 1917, No. Cd. 8610; C. V. F. Townshend,
_My Campaign in Mesopotamia_ (London, 1920).
[17] Regarding renewed German activity and interest in the Near East
after the elimination of Serbia from the war seemed to bring the
_Drang nach Osten_ within the realm of practical politics, _cf._:
R. Zabel, _Im Kampfe um Konstantinopel und die wirtschaftliche Lage
der Türkei während des Weltkrieges_ (Leipzig, 1916); C. H. Müller,
_Die wirtschaftliche Bedeutung der Bagdadbahn_ (Hamburg, 1917); R.
Junge, _Die deutsch-türkischen Wirtschaftsbeziehungen_ (Weimar,
1916); E. Marré, _Die Türken und wir nach dem Kriege: ein praktisches
Wirtschaftsprogramm_ (Berlin, 1916); H. Rohde, _Deutschland in
Vorderasien_ (Berlin, 1916); H. W. Schmidt, _Auskunftsbuch für den
Handel mit der Türkei_ (Leipzig, 1917); E. Mygind, _Anatolien und seine
wirtschaftliche Bedeutung_ (Berlin, 1916); C. V. Bichtligen, “_Die
Bagdadbahn, eine Hochstrasse des Weltverkehrs in ihrer wirtschaftliche
Bedeutung_,” in _Soziale Revue_, 16 year (1916), pp. 1–11, 123–139; F.
C. Endres, _Die Türkei_ (Munich, 1916); A. Philippsohn, _Das türkische
Reich_ (Weimar, 1916); H. Kettner, _Vom Goldenen Tor zum Goldenen
Horn und nach Bagdad_ (Berlin, 1917). For the point of view of Allied
sympathizers, _cf._: E. F. Benson, _Deutschland über Allah_ (London,
1917), and _Crescent and Iron Cross_ (New York, 1918); E. A. Martel,
_L’emprise austro-allemande sur la Turquie et l’Asie Mineure_ (Paris,
1918); H. C. Woods, _The Cradle of the War_ (New York, 1919), and an
article, “The Bagdad Railway in the War,” in the _Fortnightly Review_,
Volume 102 (1917), pp. 235–247; J. Thureau, “La pénétration allemande
en Asie Mineure,” in _Revue politique et parlementaire_, Volume 86
(1916), pp. 19–44; R. Lane, “Turkey under Germany’s Tutelage,” in
_Unpopular Review_, Volume 9 (1918), pp. 328 _et seq._; N. Markovitch,
_Le pangermanisme en Orient_ (Nice, 1916); A. J. Toynbee, _Turkey, a
Past and a Future_ (New York, 1917).
[18] Quoted in _The Near East_, November 12, 1915. For other material
regarding construction of the Bagdad Railway during the war and its
utilization for military purposes, _cf._: _Report of the Bagdad Railway
Company_, 1914, pp. 6–7; 1915, pp. 3–6; _The Engineer_, February 4,
1915; “Transportation in the War—The Railways of Mesopotamia,” in
_Modern Transport_ (London), November, 1919; D. G. Heslop, “The Bagdad
Railway,” in _The Engineer_ (London), November 12 and 26 and December
3 and 17, 1920; “Railways of Mesopotamia,” in the _Railway Gazette_
(London), War Transportation Number, September 21, 1920, pp. 129–140;
“Die Bagdadbahn und der Durchschlag des letzten grossen Tunnels,” in
_Asien_, 14 year (1917), pp. 97–101.
[19] Dane, _op. cit._, Volume I, Chapters VIII-XII, inclusive; “The
German-Turkish Expedition Against the Suez Canal in 1916,” in _Journal
of the United Service Institution_, Volume 65 (London, 1920), pp.
353–357.
[20] Hayes, _op. cit._, pp. 142–143.
[21] Quoted from the official text as given in E. E. Robinson and V.
J. West, _The Foreign Policy of Woodrow Wilson, 1913–1917_ (New York,
1917), pp. 403–405.
[22] _The New York Times_, November 13, 1917.
[23] _Supra_, p. 285.
[24] Baker, _op. cit._, Volume I, Chapter IV, contains an excellent
account of the inter-Allied negotiations of 1916–1917 regarding Asiatic
Turkey, based upon the private papers of Woodrow Wilson. _Cf._, also,
_Full Texts of the Secret Treaties as Revealed at Petrograd_.
[25] The Treaty provided that the Bagdad Railway should not be extended
southward from Mosul or northward from Samarra without the express
consent of both France and Great Britain and in no case before the
construction of a railway from Bagdad to Aleppo _via_ the Euphrates
Valley—the purpose being, as far as possible, to develop southern
Mesopotamia and the Syrian coast rather than Kurdistan. By a subsequent
agreement of December, 1918, between Messrs. Lloyd George and
Clémenceau, Mosul was transferred to Great Britain.
[26] W. L. Westermann, “The Armenian Problem and the Disruption of
Turkey,” in _What Really Happened at Paris—The Story of the Peace
Conference, 1918–1919, by American Delegates_, edited by E. M. House
and C. Seymour (New York, 1921), pp. 176–203. _Cf._ p. 183.
[27] The text of the Sykes-Picot Treaty was first published by _The
Manchester Guardian_, January 8, 1920, and was reprinted in _Current
History_, Volume XI (1920), pp. 339–341. _Cf._, also, Bowman, _The New
World_, pp. 100–104; Baker, _op. cit._, pp. 67–69.
[28] Baker, _op. cit._, pp. 68–70. The negotiations concerning the St.
Jean de Maurienne Agreement extended from the autumn of 1916 to August,
1917. The agreement appears to have been negotiated with the Italians
by Mr. Lloyd George, in April, 1917, while Mr. Balfour was in America
with the British Mission. It was amended in August, as a result of the
insistence of the Italians that they had not received an adequate share
of the spoils.
[29] President Wilson’s address to a joint session of the Congress of
the United States, January 8, 1918, setting forth the famous Fourteen
Points of a durable peace. Quoted from James Brown Scott, _President
Wilson’s Foreign Policy_ (New York, 1918), pp. 354–363.
[30] Regarding General Maude’s brilliant campaign in Mesopotamia,
_cf._: Dane, _op. cit._, Volume II, Chapters II, III, XII; E. F. Eagan,
_The War in the Cradle of the World_ (London, 1918); Kermit Roosevelt,
_War in the Garden of Eden_ (New York, 1919); Sir Charles Collwell,
_Life of Sir Stanley Maude_ (London, 1920); E. Betts, _The Bagging of
Bagdad_ (London, 1920); E. Candler, _The Long Road to Bagdad_ (London,
1920); C. Cato (pseudonym), _The Navy in Mesopotamia_ (London, 1917);
F. Maurice, “The Mesopotamian Campaign,” in _Asia_, Volume 18 (New
York, 1918), pp. 933–936.
[31] British intrenchment in Mesopotamia, 1917–1920, is described in
the following: “Review of the Civil Administration of Mesopotamia,”
_Parliamentary Papers_, No. Cmd. 1061 (1920); R. Thomas, _Report on
Cotton Experimental Work in Mesopotamia_ (Bagdad, 1919); “Cotton
Growing in Mesopotamia,” _Bulletin of the Imperial Institute_, Volume
18 (London, 1920), pp. 73–82; _Mesopotamia as a Country for Future
Development_ (Cairo, Ministry of Public Works, 1919); “Transportation
and Irrigation in Mesopotamia,” _Commerce Reports_, No. 50 (Washington,
1919), pp. 948–954; Sir H. P. Hewett, _Some Impressions of Mesopotamia_
(London, 1919); C. R. Wimshurst, _The Wheats and Barleys of
Mesopotamia_ (Basra, 1920); _Review of the Civil Administration of
the Occupied Territories of Irak_ (Bagdad, 1918); L. J. Hall, _Inland
Water Transport in Mesopotamia_ (London, 1921); Sir Mark Sykes, _The
Commercial Future of Bagdad_ (London, 1917); “Turkish Rule and British
Administration in Mesopotamia,” in The Quarterly _Review_, Volume 232
(1919), pp. 401 _et seq._; W. Ormsby Gore, “The Organization of British
Responsibilities in the Middle East,” in _Journal of the Central Asian
Society_, Volume 7 (1920), pp. 83–105; I. A. Shah, “The Colonization
of Mesopotamia,” in _United Service Magazine_, Volume 179 (1919), pp.
350 _et seq._
[32] Townshend, _op. cit._, pp. 375 _et seq._; Djemal Pasha, _op.
cit._, Chapter VII; _Current History_, Volume XII (1920), pp. 117–118;
A. D. C. Russell, _loc. cit._, pp. 325 _et seq._; F. C. Endres, _Der
Weltkrieg der Türkei_ (Berlin, 1919).
[33] Regarding General Allenby’s campaigns in Palestine and Syria,
see: H. Pirie-Gordon, _A Brief Record of the Advance of the Egyptian
Expeditionary Force_ (London, 1919); W. T. Massey, _Allenby’s Final
Triumph_ (London, 1920); C. C. R. Murphy, _Soldiers of the Prophet_
(London, 1921); H. O. Lock, _The Conquerors of Palestine Through Forty
Centuries_ (New York, 1921); R. E. C. Adams, _The Modern Crusaders_
(London, 1920); H. Dinning, _Nile to Aleppo: With the Light Horse in
the Near East_ (London, 1920); P. E. White, _The Disintegration of the
Turkish Empire_ (London, 1920); C. T. Atkinson, “General Liman von
Sanders and His Experiences in Palestine,” _Army Quarterly_, Volume 3
(London, 1922), pp. 257–275; A. Aaronsohn, _Mit der türkischen Armee in
Palästina_ (Berne, 1918); J. Bourelly, _Campagne d’Égypte et de Syrie
contre les Turcs_ (Paris, 1919); G. Gautherot, _La France en Syrie
et en Cilicie_ (Paris, 1920); C. Stiénon, _Les campagnes d’Orient et
les intérêts de l’entente_ (Paris, 1918), and _La défense de l’Orient
et le rôle de l’Angleterre_ (Paris, 1918); A. Mandelstamm, _Le sort
de l’Empire Ottoman_ (Paris, 1917); G. A. Schreiner, _From Berlin to
Bagdad: Behind the Scenes in the Near East_ (New York, 1918).
[34] H. Charles Woods, _The Cradle of the War_, p. 271.
[35] See a suggestive article by Hilaire Belloc, “Europe’s New Paths
of Empire,” in _Our World_ (New York), October, 1922, pp. 41–46; _The
Evening Post_ (New York), January 3 and March 27, 1919.
[36] _The Treaty of Peace with Germany_, Articles 155, 258, 260, 261,
297.
[37] “Treaty of Peace with Turkey, Signed at Sèvres August 10, 1920,”
_Parliamentary Papers_, No. Cmd. 964, Treaty Series No. 11, 1920;
“Tripartite Agreement Between the British Empire, France, and Italy,
Respecting Anatolia, Signed at Sèvres, August 10, 1920,” _Parliamentary
Papers_, No. Cmd. 963, Treaty Series No. 12, 1920. An official summary
of the Sèvres treaty was published in _The Nation_ (New York),
International Relations Section, Volume 111 (1920), pp. 21–28, and
in _Current History_, Volume XIII (1921), pp. 164–184. An excellent
discussion of the main provisions of the treaty and its probable
effects is to be found in Bowman’s _The New World_, Chapters XXIV and
XXVI.
[38] Regarding the negotiations at the Paris Conference by which the
claims of Italy were disregarded in favor of those of Greece, _cf._
Baker, _op. cit._, Volume II, Chapter XXXII, and Volume III, Documents
Nos. 1, 31–41.
[39] Preamble to the Tripartite Agreement of August 10, 1920.
[40] Regarding the Turkish Nationalist movement, see: Major General
James G. Harbord, “Mustapha Kemal Pasha and His Party,” in the
_World’s Work_, Volume 36 (London, 1920), pp. 470–482; M. Paillarès
_La kémalisme devant les Alliés_ (Paris, 1922); “The Recovery of the
Sick Man of Europe,” an excellent review, with a colored map, in the
_Literary Digest_, November 11, 1922, pp. 17 _et seq._; M. K. Zia Bey,
“How the Turks Feel,” in _Asia_, Volume XXII (1922), pp. 857 _et seq._,
and “The New Turkish Democracy,” in _The Nation_, Volume 115 (New
York, 1922), pp. 546–548; Major General Sir Charles Townshend, “Great
Britain and the Turks,” in _Asia_, Volume XXII (1922), pp. 949–953;
Clair Price, “Mustapha Kemal and the Angora Government,” in _Current
History_, Volume XVI (1922), pp. 790–800; Ludwell Denny, “The Turk
Comes Back,” in _The Nation_, Volume 115 (1922), pp. 575–577; “The New
Epoch in Turkey,” in the _Muslim Standard_ (London), November 9, 1922.
[41] A. J. Toynbee, _The Western Question in Greece and Turkey: A Study
in the Contact of Civilizations_ (New York, 1922), p. 190. Professor
Toynbee’s book is the most noteworthy of recent contributions to the
history of Turkey since the Great War.
[42] The text of the National Pact, as translated from the French,
is to be found in _The Nation_, Volume 115 (1922), pp. 447–448, in
_Current History_, Volume XVII (1922), pp. 280–281, and in Toynbee,
_op. cit._, pp. 207–211 (in both French and English).
[43] _Infra._, pp. 316–317, 323–324.