THE STRUGGLE FOR THE BAGDAD RAILWAY IS RESUMED
GERMANY IS ELIMINATED AND RUSSIA WITHDRAWS
The Great War has completely destroyed German influence in the Near
East. In the way of any resumption of German enterprise in Turkey
are formidable obstacles which are not likely to be removed for some
time. To begin with, the Turks themselves will not encourage German
attempts to recover the Bagdad Railway or other property rights which
were liquidated by the Treaty of Versailles. Among Turkish Nationalists
there is satisfaction that Turkey has “shaken off the yoke of the
ambitious leaders who dragged the country into the general war on the
side of Germany” and has got rid of the “arrogance” of the Germans who
infested the Near East during the last years of the war. Resentment at
German military domination of Turkey during 1917 and 1918 will not soon
disappear.[1]
Furthermore, Germany possesses neither the disposition nor the power
to regain her former preëminence in the Near East. The confiscation by
the Treaty of Versailles of private property in foreign investments
has set a precedent which will make German investors—as well as
prudent investors everywhere—extremely chary of utilizing their funds
for the promotion of such enterprises as the Bagdad Railway. The
surplus production and surplus capital of Germany may be absorbed
by reparations payments or attracted to such enterprises as the
reconstruction of the German merchant marine. But the _Drang nach
Osten_ has become a thing of the past. The dismemberment of the
Austrian Empire and the erection of the Jugoslav Kingdom have shut
off German access, through friendly states, to the Balkan Peninsula
and Asiatic Turkey. Formidable customs barriers will stand in the way
of overland trade with the Near East and render railway traffic from
“Berlin to Bagdad” unprofitable. Defeat and disarmament have destroyed
German prestige in the Moslem world. Democratization of both Germany
and Turkey, it is hoped, will render increasingly difficult the kind of
secret intrigue that characterized Turco-German relations during the
régime of William II and of Abdul Hamid. If Germany returns to the Near
East in the next generation or two, it is not likely to be in the rôle
of an Imperial Germany promoting railway enterprises of great economic
and strategic importance.
Russian diplomatic policy toward Turkey has likewise undergone
important changes. Imperial Russia had been a bitter opponent of
Imperial Germany in the Bagdad Railway project. Imperial Russia had
conspired with Great Britain and France to bring about the collapse
and dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire. Imperial Russia was the
“traditional enemy” of the Turk. But Imperial Russia was destroyed
in 1917 by military defeat and social revolution. Regardless of the
pronunciamentos of bourgeois imperialists like Professor Milyukov,
revolutionary Russia was certain to look upon the Near Eastern question
in a new light. Political and economic disorganization incidental
to the war and the revolution would have made it imperative for any
government in Russia to curtail its imperialistic pretensions. And with
the advent of Bolshevism the outcome was certain. A government which
was anti-capitalist and anti-imperialist could not sanction Russian
“spheres of interest” or Russian territorial aggrandizement at the
expense of Turkey. A government which preached “self-determination of
peoples” and “no annexations” could not confirm the secret treaties of
1915–1916. A government which was engaged in repelling foreign invasion
and in resisting counter-revolutionary insurrections had to keep within
strict limits its military liabilities. Therefore, Soviet Russia
speedily foreswore any intention of occupying Constantinople, declared
unreservedly for a free Armenia, and proceeded forthwith to withdraw
its troops from Persia. These measures were considered “a complete
break with the barbarous policy of bourgeois civilization which built
the prosperity of the exploiters among the few chosen nations upon
the enslavement of the laboring population in Asia,” as well as an
expression of Bolshevist Russia’s “inflexible determination to wrest
humanity from the talons of financial capital and imperialism, which
have drenched the earth with blood in this most criminal of wars.”[2]
Turkish Nationalist resistance to the Treaty of Sèvres met with a
sympathetic response on the part of Bolshevist Russia, and on March
16, 1921, the Government of the Grand National Assembly and the
Government of the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic signed
at Moscow a treaty to confirm “the solidarity which unites them in
the struggle against imperialism.” By the terms of this treaty Russia
refused to recognize the validity of the Treaty of Sèvres or of any
other “international acts which are imposed by force.” Russia ceded
to Turkey the territories of Kars and Ardahan, in the Caucasus
region, as a manifestation of full accord with the principles of the
National Pact. The Soviet Republic, “recognizing that the régime of
the capitulations is incompatible with the national development of
Turkey, as well as with the full exercise of its sovereign rights,
considers null and void the exercise in Turkey of all functions and
all rights under the capitulatory régime.” In particular, Russia freed
Turkey “from any financial or other obligations based on international
treaties concluded between Turkey and the Government of the Tsar.”
As regards the construction of railways in Anatolia, the Soviet
Government completely reversed the former policy of Imperial Russia,
which was to oppose all such railways as a strategic menace.[3] It
was now provided that, “with the object of facilitating intercourse
between their respective countries, both Governments agree to take in
concert with each other all measures to develop and maintain within
the shortest possible time, railway, telegraphic, and other means of
communication,” as well as measures “to secure the free and unhampered
traffic of passengers and commodities between the two countries.”
Finally, both countries agreed to stand together in resisting all
foreign interference in their domestic affairs: “Recognizing that the
nationalist movements in the East,” reads the treaty, “are similar
to and in harmony with the struggle of the Russian proletariat to
establish a new social order, the two contracting parties assert
solemnly the rights of these peoples to freedom, independence, and free
choice of the forms of government under which they shall live.”[4]
No more complete disavowal of Russian imperialism could be desired by
the New Turkey. It is by no means certain, however, that Russia will
continue indefinitely to pursue so magnanimous a policy in the Near
East. With the development of her natural resources and the extension
of industrialism, it is not improbable that Russia—in common with
the other Great Powers—will once again feel the urge to imperialism.
Raw materials, markets, the maintenance of unimpeded routes of
commercial communication, and opportunities for profitable investment
of capital are likely to be considered—in the present anarchic state
of international relations—as essential to an industrial state under
working-class government as to an industrial state under bourgeois
administration. If such be the case, Russian economic penetration in
Turkey and Persia may be resumed, and Russian eyes may once more be
cast covetously at Constantinople. “In Mongolia and Tibet, in Persia
and Afghanistan, in Caucasia and at Constantinople, the Russian has
been pressing forward for three hundred years,” writes an eminent
American geographer, “and no system of government can stand that denies
him proper commercial outlets.”[5]
Nevertheless, whatever be the future policy of Russia in the Near East,
for the present the Russian Republic has no economic or strategic
interests which are inconsistent with the national development of the
Turkish people. Certainly Russia has neither the economic nor the
political resources to demand a share in the Bagdad Railway or to seek
for herself other railway concessions in Anatolia. And the Western
Powers are little likely to heed the wishes of the Soviet Government
until such time as those wishes are rendered articulate in a language
the Western Powers understand—the language of power.
FRANCE STEALS A MARCH AND IS ACCOMPANIED BY ITALY
Those who believed that the defeat of Germany and the withdrawal of
Russia would solve all problems of competitive imperialism in the
Near East were destined to be disillusioned. For no sooner was the war
over than France and Great Britain took to pursuing divergent policies
regarding Turkey. The rivalry between these two powers—which had been
terminated for a time by the Entente of 1904—was resumed in all its
former intensity. The Entente, in fact, had been formed because of
common fear of Germany, rather than because of coincidence of colonial
interests; and with that fear removed, the foundation of effective
coöperation had been undermined.[6] The Great War may be said to have
terminated the first episode of the great Bagdad Railway drama—the rise
and fall of German power in the Near East; it opened a second episode,
which promises to be equally portentous—an Anglo-French struggle for
the right of accession to the exalted position which Germany formerly
occupied in the realm of the Turks.
Anglo-French rivalry in the Near East will not be an unprecedented
phenomenon. “Since the Congress of Vienna in 1814, France and Great
Britain have never fought in the Levant with naval and military weapons
(though they have several times been on the verge of open war), but
their struggle has been real and bitter for all that, and though it has
not here gone the length of empire-building, it has not been confined
to trade. Its characteristic fields have been diplomacy and culture,
its entrenchments embassies, consulates, religious missions, and
schools. It has flared up on the Upper Nile, in Egypt, on the Isthmus
of Suez, in Palestine, in the Lebanon, at Mosul, at the Dardanelles,
at Salonica, in Constantinople. The crises of 1839–41 and 1882 over
Egypt and of 1898 over the Egyptian Sudan are landmarks on a road that
has never been smooth, for conflicts [of one sort or another] have
perpetually kept alive the combative instinct in French and English
missionaries, schoolmasters, consuls, diplomatists, civil servants,
ministers of state, and journalists. One cannot understand—or make
allowances for—the post-war relations of the French and British
Governments over the ‘Eastern Question’ unless one realizes this
tradition of rivalry and its accumulated inheritance of suspicion and
resentment. It is a bad mental background for the individuals who have
to represent the two countries. The French are perhaps more affected by
it than the English, because on the whole they have had the worst of
the struggle in the Levant as well as in India, and failure cuts deeper
memories than success.”[7]
French statesmen were dissatisfied with the division of the spoils
of war in the Near East. They had a feeling that here, as elsewhere,
Britain had obtained the lion’s share. They believed that Mr. Lloyd
George had been guilty of sharp practice in his agreement of December,
1918, with M. Clémenceau, by the terms of which Mosul and Palestine
were to be turned over to Great Britain.[8] Frenchmen were suspicious
of British solicitude for the Arabs, which they believed was not based
upon disinterested benevolence; in fact, self-determination for the
Arabs came to be considered a political move to render precarious the
French mandate for Syria. French patriots chafed at British emphasis
upon the fact that “the British had done the fighting in Turkey almost
without French help” and that “there would have been no question of
Syria but for England and the million soldiers the British Empire had
put in the field against the Turks.” French pride was hurt by the
rapid rise of British prestige in a region where France had so many
interests. And prestige—diplomatic, military, religious, cultural,
and economic—has always been an important desideratum in Near Eastern
diplomacy.[9]
French dissatisfaction with the Turkish settlement was one of the
issues of the San Remo Conference of April, 1920, at which were
assigned the mandates for the territories of the former Ottoman Empire.
Exclusive control by Great Britain of the oilfields of the Mosul
district was so vigorously contested that M. Philippe Berthelot, of
the French Foreign Office, and Professor Sir John Cadman, Director
of His Majesty’s Petroleum Department, were instructed to work out
a compromise. Thus came into existence the San Remo Oil Agreement
of April 24, 1920, by which Great Britain, in effect, assigned to
France the former German interest in the Turkish Petroleum Company’s
concession for exploitation of the oilfields in the vilayets of
Mosul and Bagdad.[10] But the British drove a shrewd bargain, for it
was provided, in consideration, that the French Government should
agree, “as soon as application is made, to the construction of two
separate pipe-lines and railways necessary for their construction
and maintenance and for the transport of oil from Mesopotamia and
Persia through French spheres of influence to a port or ports on the
Mediterranean.” The oil thus transported was to be free of all French
taxes.[11]
French imperialists likewise were dissatisfied with the disposition of
the Bagdad Railway as provided for by the unratified Sèvres Treaty.
French bankers had held a thirty per cent interest in the Bagdad
line while it was under German control,[12] and they believed, for
this reason, that they were entitled to a controlling voice in the
enterprise when it should be reorganized by the Allies. Although the
settlement at Sèvres—the Treaty of Peace with Turkey and the Tripartite
Agreement between Great Britain, France, and Italy—recognized the
special interests of France in the Bagdad Railway, and particularly
in the Mersina-Adana branch, it provided, as has been seen, for
international ownership, control, and operation.[13] Now, Frenchmen
were suspicious of internationalization, particularly where British
participation was involved. Had not the condominium in Egypt proved to
be a step in the direction of an eventual British protectorate? Might
not the history of the Suez Canal be repeated in the history of the
Bagdad Railway? Would Great Britain look with any greater equanimity
upon French, than upon German, interests in one of the great highways
to India? To answer these questions was but to increase the French
feeling of insecurity.
French dissatisfaction with the distribution of the spoils in the Near
East and French fear of British imperial power and prestige—these
were factors in a new alignment of the diplomatic forces in Turkey
during 1920–1922. British imperialists were desirous of keeping Turkey
weak. A weak Turkey could never again menace Britain’s communications
in the Persian Gulf and at Suez; a weak Turkey could be of no moral
or material assistance to restless Moslems in Egypt and India. To
keep Turkey weak the Treaty of Sèvres had loaded down the Ottoman
Treasury with an enormous burden of reparations and occupation costs
(to which France could not object without repudiating the principle
of reparations); had taken away Turkish administration of Smyrna
and Constantinople, the two ports essential to the commercial life
of Anatolia; and had made possible a Greek war of devastation and
extermination in the homeland of the Turks. France, on the other
hand, would have preferred to see Turkey reasonably strong. A strong,
prosperous Turkey would the more readily pay off its pre-War debt,
of which French investors held approximately sixty per cent; payment
of this debt was more important to France than payment of Turkish
reparations. A strong Turkey, furthermore, might fortify the French
position in the Near East. As Germany had utilized Ottoman strength
against Russia and Great Britain, so France might utilize Nationalist
Turkey against a Bolshevist Russia which would not pay its debts or an
imperial Britain which might prove unfaithful to the Entente.[14]
Anglo-French differences in the Near East were brought to a head by
the rapid rise of the military power of the Angora Government, for
it was against France that Mustapha Kemal’s troops launched their
principal early attacks. General Gouraud—his hands tied by an Arab
rebellion which had necessitated a considerable extension of his
lines in Syria—was unable to repulse the Turkish invasion of Cilicia,
which reached really serious proportions in the autumn of 1920. Time
and again French units were defeated and French garrisons massacred
by the victorious Nationalists. In these circumstances, France “had
to choose between the two following alternatives: either to maintain
her effectives and to continue the war in Cilicia, or to negotiate
with the _de facto_ authority which was in command of the Turkish
troops in that region.” The French armies in Syria and Cilicia already
numbered more than 100,000 men; to reënforce them would have been to
flout the opinion of the nation and the Chamber, “which had vigorously
expressed their determination to put an end to cruel bloodshed and
to expenditure which it was particularly difficult to bear.” To
negotiate with Mustapha Kemal was, to all intents and purposes, to
scrap the unratified Treaty of Sèvres. The French Government chose
the latter alternative. It is said that during the London Conference
of February-March, 1921, “M. Briand declared to Mr. Lloyd George on
several occasions, without the British Prime Minister making the
slightest observation, that he would not leave England without having
concluded an agreement with the Angora delegation. M. Briand pointed
out that neither the Chamber nor French public opinion would agree to
the prolongation of hostilities, involving as they did losses which
were both heavy and useless.”[15]
Accordingly, on March 9, 1921, there was signed at London a
Franco-Turkish agreement terminating hostilities in Cilicia. The
Turkish Nationalists recognized the special religious and cultural
interests of France in Turkey and granted priority to French
capitalists in the awarding of concessions in Cilicia and southern
Armenia. French interests in the Bagdad Railway were confirmed. In
return, France was to evacuate Cilicia, to readjust the boundary
between Turkey and Syria, and to adopt a more friendly attitude toward
the Government of the Grand National Assembly.[16]
The Italian Government was only too glad to have so excellent an excuse
for throwing over the Treaty of Sèvres, which had thoroughly frustrated
Italian hopes in Asia Minor to the advantage of Greece. Italian troops,
furthermore, had been driven out of Konia and were finding their hold
in Adalia increasingly precarious; the Italian Government had neither
the disposition nor the resources to wage war. Therefore, on March
13, 1921, the Italian and Turkish ministers of foreign affairs signed
at London a separate treaty, providing for “economic collaboration”
between Turkey and Italy in the hinterland of Adalia, including part
of the sanjaks of Konia, Aidin, and Afiun Karahissar, as well as for
the award to an Italian group of the concession for the Heraclea coal
mines.[17] The Royal Italian Government pledged itself to “support
effectively all the demands of the Turkish delegation relative to the
peace treaty,” more especially the demands of Turkey for complete
sovereignty and for the restitution of Thrace and Smyrna. Italian
troops were to be withdrawn from Ottoman soil.[18]
During the summer of 1921 further negotiations were conducted between
France and Turkey for the purpose of elaborating and confirming their
March agreement. The outcome was the so-called Angora Treaty, signed
October 20, 1921, by M. Henri Franklin-Bouillon, a special agent of the
French Government, and Yussuf Kemal Bey, Minister of Foreign Affairs
in the Government of the Grand National Assembly. This treaty formally
brought to an end the state of war between the two countries, provided
for the repatriation of all prisoners, defined new boundaries between
Turkey and Syria, and awarded valuable economic privileges to French
capitalists. It obligated the French Government “to make every effort
to settle in a spirit of cordial agreement all questions relating to
the independence and sovereignty of Turkey.”[19]
The Bagdad Railway was given a great deal of consideration in the
Angora Treaty. The Turks wanted possession of the line because of its
great political and strategic value; French capitalists sought full
recognition of their previous investments in the railway, together with
a controlling interest in its operation. A solution was reached which
fully satisfied both Turkish Nationalists and French imperialists.
The Turco-Syrian boundary was so “rectified” that the Bagdad Railway
from Haidar Pasha to Nisibin was to lie within Turkish territory,
whereas formerly the sections from the Cilician Gates to Nisibin lay
within the French mandate for Cilicia and Syria.[20] In return for
these territorial readjustments the Turkish Government assigned to a
French group (to be nominated by the French Government) the _Deutsche
Bank’s_ concession for those sections of the railway, including
branches, between Bozanti and Nisibin, “together with all the rights,
privileges, and advantages attached to that concession.” The Government
of the Grand National Assembly, furthermore, declared itself “ready
to examine in the most favorable spirit all other desires that may
be expressed by French groups relative to mine, railway, harbor and
river concessions, on condition that such desires shall conform to
the reciprocal interest of Turkey and France.” In particular, the
Turkish Government agreed to take under advisement the award to French
capitalists of concessions for the exploitation of the Arghana copper
mines and for the development of cotton-growing in Cilicia.[21]
Thus France sought to make herself heir to the former German estate in
Asiatic Turkey. Her capitalists became the recipients of the kilometric
guarantee for which German concessionaires had been so freely
criticized. And in some respects the conditions of French tenancy were
questionable. The old Bagdad Railway concession had prohibited the
Germans, under any and all circumstances to grant discriminatory rates
or service to any passenger or shipper.[22] The conditions of French
control of the line, however, recognized only a limited application of
the principle of the “open door”: “Over this section and its branches,”
reads Article 10 of the Angora Treaty, “no preferential tariff shall
be established _in principle_. Each Government, however, _reserves the
right to study in concert with the other any exception to this rule
which may become necessary. In case agreement proves impossible, each
party will be free to act as he thinks best._”[23]
During the spring of 1922 the concession for the operation of the
French sections of the Bagdad Railway, as defined by the Angora Treaty,
was assigned to the Cilician-Syrian Railway Company (_La société
d’exploitation des chemins de fers de Cilicie-Nord Syrie_.) The
Mesopotamian sections of the line, from Basra to Bagdad and Samarra,
were under the jurisdiction of the British Civil Administration
for Irak. From Haidar Pasha to the Cilician Gates the Railway was
being operated by the Turkish Nationalist Government, although its
utilization for commercial purposes was seriously curtailed by the
Greco-Turkish War.[24]
BRITISH INTERESTS ACQUIRE A CLAIM TO THE BAGDAD RAILWAY
The Angora Treaty met with a distinctly heated reception from the
British Government. During November and December, 1921, Lord Curzon
carried on a lengthy correspondence with the French Embassy at London,
in which he made it perfectly plain that the British Government
considered the Franklin-Bouillon treaty a breach of good faith on
the part of France, in the light of which Great Britain must possess
greater freedom of action than would otherwise be the case.[25]
Lord Curzon called into question the moral right of the French
Government to enter into separate understandings with Turkey or to
recognize the Angora Assembly as the _de jure_ government of the
country. He insisted that a revision of the frontier of northern Syria
“could not be regarded as the concern of France alone”:
“It hands back to Turkey a large and fertile extent of territory which
had been conquered from her by British forces and which constituted
a common gage of allied victory, although by an arrangement between
the Allies the mandate has been awarded to France. The mandate is
now under consideration by the League of Nations, and this important
and far-reaching modification of the territory to which it applies
altogether ignores the League of Nations, while the return to Turkey
of territory handed over to the Allies in common without previous
notification to Great Britain and Italy is inconsistent with both the
spirit and the letter of the treaties which all three have signed.
“Further, the revision provides for handing back to Turkey the
localities of Nisibin and Jezirit-ibn-Omar, both of which are of great
strategic importance in relation to Mosul and Mesopotamia; the same
consideration applies to the handing back to Turkey of the track of
the Bagdad Railway between Tchoban Bey and Nisibin.... His Majesty’s
Government cannot remain indifferent to the manifest strategic
importance to their position in Irak of the return to Turkey of the
Bagdad Railway or of the transfer to that power of the localities of
Jezirit-ibn-Omar and Nisibin.”
In addition to disputing the territorial readjustments contemplated
by the Angora Treaty, the British Government challenged the transfer
to French capitalists of the former German concession for the
Bozanti-Nisibin sections of the Bagdad Railway. Lord Curzon pointed
out that Great Britain would not recognize the Franco-Turkish treaty
as overriding the Treaty of Sèvres, “whereby Turkey was herself to
liquidate the whole Bagdad Railway on the demand of the principal
Allies”; neither would the British Government assent to the award to
France of “a large portion of the railway without regard to the claims
of her other allies upon a concern which both under the Treaty of
Versailles and the Treaty of Sèvres is the Allies’ common asset.”[26]
“Apart from the immediate and premature advantage gained by France
by this transfer of a large portion of the Bagdad line to a French
company in advance—and therefore possibly to the prejudice—of the
reciprocal allied arrangements contemplated by Article 294 of the
Treaty of Sèvres and Article 4 of the Tripartite Agreement, it is
necessary to point out that these stretches of the railway which were
previously in Syria, but are now surrendered to Turkey, although
placed in the French zone of economic interest, ought naturally to
be divided among the Allies in accordance with the above mentioned
treaties.... The transfer to a French company of that part of the
railway which still remains in Syria does not in itself fulfil the
provisions of the Treaty of Sèvres, which stipulates for liquidation
by the mandatory and the assignment of the proceeds to the Financial
Commission as an allied asset.”
The correspondence was concluded by Lord Curzon with emphatic
statements that “when peace is finally concluded the different
agreements which have been negotiated up to date, including the
Angora Agreement, will require to be adjusted with a view to taking
their place in a general settlement”; that he was obliged “explicitly
to reserve the attitude of His Majesty’s Government with regard to
the Angora Agreement”; and that there must especially be reserved for
further discussion “all articles of the Agreement which appear to
infringe the provisions of the Treaty of Sèvres and the Tripartite
Agreement.
Subsequent events did nothing to restore Anglo-French unity in the
Near East. At the Washington Conference in December, 1921, Lord Lee
and M. Briand engaged in a verbal war over submarines which created no
little hard feeling and suspicion in both Great Britain and France.
Differences of opinion regarding Russia and other questions discussed
at the Genoa Conference, together with a clash over reparations in
midsummer, 1922, strained relations still further. Charges by Greeks
and Englishmen that France and Italy were supplying munitions to the
Turkish Nationalists were received with counter-charges that British
officers were aboard Greek warships and that British “observers” were
directing Greek military operations in Asia Minor.[27] Feeling ran high
in September, 1922, when—seeking to avoid a Near Eastern war—the French
and Italian Governments withdrew their troops from the Neutral Zone of
the Straits, leaving the British forces to face, alone, the victorious
Nationalist army of Mustapha Kemal Pasha. British patriots were further
irritated by the mysterious activities of M. Henri Franklin-Bouillon
in the negotiations preceding the Mudania armistice and by the claims
of the Paris press to a great victory thereby for French prestige at
Angora and Constantinople. Fundamental differences of opinion regarding
reparations—culminating in the French invasion of the Ruhr in January,
1923—made still more difficult coöperation by the former Allies in
the Near East. In fact, it might be questioned whether the Entente
Cordiale any longer existed.
This situation was brought into sharp relief at the first Lausanne
Conference for Peace in the East.[28] Great Britain’s interests were
chiefly territorial. She had abandoned all hope of destroying Turkish
power by creating a Greek empire in Asia Minor; Greece was gone from
Smyrna for good. But England was determined to maintain her hold in
Mesopotamia—particularly in the oilfields of Mosul—and to hold out for
neutralization of the Straits. These territorial questions occupied
the major part of the first six weeks of the Conference. France had no
interest in the decisions regarding the Straits and Mosul; therefore
she supported the Turks and placed Lord Curzon in the position of
appearing to be the real opponent of Turkish Nationalist ambitions and
the principal obstacle in the way of an equitable settlement. Lord
Curzon himself strengthened this impression, for many of his utterances
were provocative and bombastic in the extreme—apparently he would not
give up the idea that the Turks could be bluffed and bullied into
submission.
While the conference as a whole was debating territorial questions
and problems concerning the rights of minorities, a member of the
French delegation was presiding over the sessions of the all-important
Committee on Financial and Economic Issues. It was in this committee
that questions of the Ottoman Public Debt and of concessions were
to be threshed out; therefore it was in this committee that French
imperialists hoped to achieve real successes. And while France was
framing the economic sections of the treaty, her co-worker Italy was
supervising the work of the Committee on the Status of Foreigners in
Turkey, to determine the conditions upon which French and Italian
schools and missions should continue their activities in Asia Minor.
In this manner France hoped to protect adequately her economic and
cultural interests in the Near East.
As the work of these committees progressed, the Turks became more and
more suspicious of French aims. The Nationalist delegates—including
Djavid Bey—were mindful of the price which their country had had to
pay because of its economic exploitation by Germany, and they were
determined not to permit another European Power to succeed to the
position which Germany had left vacant. Friction developed, therefore,
as soon as concessions came up for consideration. The French delegation
asked for the incorporation in the treaty of provisions confirming all
concessions to Allied nationals whether granted by the old Ottoman
Government before the War, or by the Constantinople Government after
the armistice, or by mandatory powers in territory subsequently
evacuated (as in Cilicia, Smyrna, and Adalia). The Turks objected
that they were not aware of the nature, the number and extent, or the
beneficiaries of the concessions coming within the last two categories;
confirmation of such would have to be the subject of independent
investigation and negotiation, for the Turks would not sign any
blank checks at Lausanne. They doubted whether they could accept the
financial burden which would be involved in validating concessions
granted by the Sultan’s Government before the War, especially if the
National Assembly was to be obliged to honor Ottoman pre-War debts
in full. In any case, the Turkish delegates insisted, no concessions
would be confirmed if they in any way limited the sovereignty of
Turkey or infringed upon its financial and administrative integrity.
Between the French and Turkish views was a chasm which it would be
difficult, indeed, to bridge. The French stood upon the rock of the old
imperialism; the Turks were fortified in their new nationalism. The
French were seeking to intrench certain important vested interests;
the Turks were striving to preserve a precious independence, recently
won at great price.
In these circumstances, it was to be expected that the British and
the Turks should seek to effect an understanding. The claims of Great
Britain, it appeared, were more easily reconcilable with the Turkish
program than were the claims of France. Concessions obtained by British
nationals between 1910 and 1914 were largely in areas detached from
Turkey during the War—chiefly in Mesopotamia—whereas many of the most
important French concessions were in Anatolia, the stronghold of the
Turkish Nationalists.[29] To Great Britain, therefore, it was a matter
of comparative indifference whether all concessions within Turkey
were specifically confirmed; to France it was a matter of the utmost
importance. According to the proposed Lausanne treaty the Turkish
Government was to expropriate the former German railways in Turkey,
with a view to incorporating them into a state-owned system, and was to
pay therefor to the Financial Commission, on reparations account, a sum
to be fixed by an arbitrator appointed by the League of Nations.[30] It
suited British interests thus to prevent a rival Power from obtaining
control of the former Bagdad line; it suited French interests not
at all to be deprived of a considerable share in a highly important
enterprise. In the settlement of questions regarding the Ottoman Public
Debt, likewise, the French were more obdurate than the British.
In the closing days of the conference, the question of Mosul and its
oilfields—the last question which stood in the way of an Anglo-Turkish
agreement—was temporarily settled by a decision to make it the subject
of “direct and friendly negotiations between the two interested
Powers.” But no agreement was possible between Turkey and France on
concessions and capitulations. When the first Lausanne Conference broke
up, therefore, it was because of the determination of the Turks not to
accept economic, financial, and judicial clauses which they believed
menaced their independence. “The treaty,” said Ismet Pasha, head of
the Turkish delegation, “would strangle Turkey economically. I refuse
to accept economic slavery for my country, and the demands of the
Allies remove all possibility of economic rehabilitation and kill all
our hopes.” On the other hand, the refusal of the Turks to sign was
characterized by the chief of the French delegates as “a crime.”[31]
During the interim between the first and second Lausanne conferences
French prestige in the Near East was dealt some severe blows. The
Turkish press attacked the French Government for having insisted upon
concessions and capitulations which were designed to keep Turkey under
foreign domination in the interest of bondholders and promoters. Such
conduct, it was pointed out, was altogether inconsistent with the terms
of the Angora Treaty by which France agreed “to make every effort to
settle in a spirit of cordial agreement all questions relating to the
independence and sovereignty of Turkey.”[32] In the National Assembly
hostility to French claims was so pronounced that no further action
was taken toward the ratification of the Angora Treaty—and without
such ratification the French title to certain sections of the Bagdad
Railway would be invalid. The Turkish army on the Syrian frontier was
reënforced for the purpose of bringing home to France the determination
of the Angora Government to tolerate no foreign interference in its
domestic affairs. The situation in Syria became so serious that M.
Poincaré saw fit to despatch to Beirut one of Marshal Foch’s right-hand
men, General Weygand, as commander-in-chief in Syria.
The breach between France and Turkey was widened when, on April 10,
1923, the Angora Government awarded to an American syndicate headed
by Admiral Colby M. Chester, a retired officer of the United States
Navy, concessions for almost three thousand miles of railway, together
with valuable rights to the exploitation of the mineral resources
of Anatolia.[33] The Chester concessions conflicted with certain
French claims which had been under discussion at the first Lausanne
Conference: the concession for a Black Sea railway system, which had
been conferred upon French capitalists in 1913; and rights to the
Arghana copper mines, to which a French group had been given a kind
of priority under the Angora Treaty of 1921.[34] In part, at least,
the award of the Chester concessions at this particular time was a
shrewd political move on the part of the Nationalist Government.
It was designed to serve notice on France that no treaty would be
acceptable to Turkey which would require complete confirmation of
pre-War concessions; from this decision there could be no departure
without infringing upon American rights and without recognizing the
acts of a former Sultan as superior to acts of the new government
of Turkey. It was intended, also, to win for the Turks a measure of
American diplomatic support. That the French Government understood the
implications of the Chester concessions is evidenced by the fact that
the Foreign Office despatched to Angora a note which characterized
the award as “a deliberately unfriendly act, of a nature to influence
adversely the coming negotiations at Lausanne.”[35]
When the second Lausanne Conference convened on April 22, 1923,
therefore, it was France, not Great Britain, which was on the
defensive. And the French position became steadily worse, rather than
better. On May 15, it was announced that a syndicate of British banks
had purchased a controlling interest in the _Bank für orientalischen
Eisenbahnen_, of Zurich, the _Deutsche Bank’s_ holding company for the
Anatolian and Bagdad Railway Companies. Ismet Pasha, it was said, was
kept fully informed of the British plans and expressed his pleasure
at the consummation of the transaction. Thus, after twenty years of
diplomatic bargaining, British imperialists had won possession of the
“short cut to India”![36] Should Great Britain succeed in establishing
her point that the _Bank für orientalischen Eisenbahnen_ is a neutral
Swiss, rather than enemy German, corporation and therefore exempt from
seizure under the reparations provisions of the Treaty of Versailles;
and should the Chester concessions be recognized as superseding the
rights of the Black Sea Railways, French interests in the Levant will
face a powerful Anglo-American competition which it will be very
difficult for them to combat with any degree of success.[37] And the
power of the French Government is so heavily invested in the Ruhr
occupation that it is doubtful if it can do anything at all to coerce
the Turks into full recognition of French claims.
Kaleidoscopic indeed have been the changes in the Near East since the
outbreak of the Great War in 1914. The economic and political power
of Germany in Anatolia, Syria, and Mesopotamia has been completely
destroyed. The Ottoman Empire has disappeared, and in its place has
risen a republican Nationalist Turkey. Tsarist Russia, with its
consuming desire for aggrandizement in the Caucasus, in Asia Minor, and
at the Straits, has given way to a proletarian Russia which foreswears
imperialist ambition. Italy, which sought to transform the Adriatic and
the Ægean into Italian lakes, has finally been compelled to recognize
that she assumed imperial liabilities out of all proportion to her
economic resources. France, after achieving a temporary victory in
the New Turkey, has had to surrender her position to more powerful
competitors. But Great Britain has emerged from the conflict in all
her glory. She has obtained possession of another highway to the East.
Alongside the Suez Canal, in the collection of British imperial jewels,
will be placed the Bagdad Railway; alongside of Malta and Gibraltar and
Cyprus must be placed Jerusalem and Basra and Bagdad.
No less remarkable than all these changes, however, is the entry of
American interests into the tangled problem of the Near East.
AMERICA EMBARKS UPON AN UNCHARTED SEA
The Great War was accompanied by a definite growth of American prestige
in the Near East. After the entry of Turkey into the war against the
Allied Powers, American schools and missions were left practically a
free hand in the Ottoman Empire; and inasmuch as the United States
did not declare war against Turkey, American institutions were not
disturbed even after 1917. Carrying on their work under the most
trying circumstances, these educational and philanthropic enterprises
established a still greater reputation than they formerly possessed
for efficient and disinterested service. In consequence, an American
official mission to the Near East in 1919 was able to report that the
moral influence of the United States in that region of the world was
greater than that of any other Power. President Wilson was looked upon
as the champion of small nations and oppressed peoples. Americans were
considered to be charitable and generous to a fault. The United States
was hailed as the only nation which had entered the war for unselfish
purposes.[38]
Since the armistice of 1918 events have not materially decreased the
prestige which the War built up. “From Adrianople to Amritsar, and
from Tiflis to Aden, America is considered a friend. It has become a
tradition in the Near East to interpret every action of the European
Powers as an attempt at political domination. America is the only power
considered strong enough to provide the Orient with the capital and
expert knowledge for its industrial development, without aiming at more
than a legitimate profit. The Oriental feels that he needs coöperation
with the West; but he is anxious to restrict that coöperation to the
economic field. And he considers the United States the only power which
would replace Europe’s political ambitions by a sound, matter-of-fact,
and sincere economic policy.”[39]
During the Great War the economic situation of the United States
underwent certain fundamental changes which seem to forecast increasing
American interest in imperialism. Before the War, America was
practically self-sufficient in raw materials; its export trade was
composed very largely of foodstuffs and raw materials which found a
ready market in the great industrial nations of Europe; financially,
it was a debtor, not a creditor, nation. The enormous industrial
expansion of the United States during the Great War, however, has
changed these conditions. Raw materials have become an increasingly
greater proportion of the nation’s import trade, and American business
men are becoming concerned about foreign control of certain essential
commodities such as rubber, nitrates, chrome, and petroleum. American
export trade has experienced an unparalleled period of expansion, and
American manufactured articles are competing in world markets which
formerly were the exclusive preserves of European nations. Furthermore,
the export of American capital has almost kept pace with the export
of American goods, so that by 1920 the United States had taken its
place alongside Great Britain and France as one of the great creditor
nations of the world. As time goes on American business will be
reaching out over the world for a fair share of the earth’s resources
in raw materials, for new markets capable of development, and for
opportunities for the profitable investment of capital.[40]
These new tendencies were quickly reflected in American relations
with the Near East. As early as the spring of 1920 the Government
of the United States was engaged in a lengthy correspondence with
His Britannic Majesty’s Government regarding the right of American
capital to participate in the exploitation of the oil resources of
Mesopotamia.[41] About the same time the Guaranty Trust Company of
New York—the second largest bank in the United States—established a
branch in Constantinople and proceeded to inform American business men
regarding the opportunities for commercial expansion in the Near East.
In a booklet entitled _Trading with the Near East—Present Conditions
and Future Prospects_, the bank had this to say:
“The establishing of a Constantinople branch of the Guaranty Trust
Company of New York brings forcibly to mind the growing importance
of the Near East to American foreign trade. Up to the present time
American business in Constantinople has been seriously handicapped by
the absence of American banking facilities. Our traders were forced to
rely on British, French, or other foreign banks for their financial
transactions. This was not only inconvenient, but it was devoid of
that business secrecy which is so necessary in exploiting new fields.
“Before the war merchandise from the United States was a negligible
factor in the business life of Constantinople, and a vessel flying
the Stars and Stripes was a rare sight. Today one will find four or
five American liners in the Golden Horn at all times.... Today a dozen
important American corporations have permanent offices there, and many
other American concerns are represented by local agents.
“The future possibilities of imports from and exports to the Eastern
Mediterranean, the Sea of Marmora, and the Black Sea ports from the
United States are of almost unbelievable proportions. These entire
sections must be fed, clothed, and largely rehabilitated. Roads,
ports, railways, and public works of all kinds are needed everywhere.
The merchants of the Near East have valuable raw products to send us
in exchange for the manufactured goods which they so urgently need.“
This estimate of the situation was confirmed by the American Chamber
of Commerce for the Levant when, in urging upon the Department of
State the vigorous defence of the “open door” in Turkey, it said: “The
opportunities for the expansion of American interests in the Near East
are practically unlimited, provided there is a fair field open for
individual enterprise.... In fact, with the conclusion of peace, there
is the economic structure of an empire to be developed.”[42]
The rapid development of American economic interests in Turkey can
be most effectively presented by reference to the trade statistics.
American exports to Turkey at the opening of the twentieth century
amounted to only $50,000. In 1913 they had risen to $3,500,000. But
between 1913 and 1920 they showed a phenomenal increase of over twelve
hundred per cent, reaching the sum of $42,200,000. Nor was this trade
one sided, for during the period 1913–1920, American imports from
Turkey increased from $22,100,000 to $39,600,000.[43]
The Chester concessions are another important step in the development
of a new American policy in the Near East. They provide for the
construction by the Ottoman-American Development Company—a Turkish
corporation owned and administered by Americans—of approximately 2800
miles of railways, of which the following are the most important:
1. An extension of the old Anatolian Railway from Angora to Sivas,
with a branch to the port of Samsun, on the Black Sea.
2. A line from Sivas to Erzerum and on to the Persian and Russian
frontiers, with branches to the Black Sea ports of Tireboli and
Trebizond.
[Illustration]
3. A line from Oulu Kishla, on the Bagdad Railway, to Sivas _via_
Kaisarieh.
4. A trans-Armenian railway from Sivas to Kharput, Arghana, Diarbekr,
Mosul, and Suleimanieh, including branches to Bitlis and Van.
5. A railway from Kharput to Youmourtalik, a port on the Gulf of
Alexandretta.
No more elaborate project for railway construction in Asiatic Turkey
has ever been incorporated in a definitive concession. That it should
be entrusted to American promoters and American engineers is one of the
most significant developments in the long and involved history of the
Eastern Question.
But the Chester concessions do not stop at railway construction
alone. As in the case of the Bagdad Railway, the Turkish Government
is obliged to offer the financiers powerful inducements to the
investment of capital in railway enterprises which, in themselves,
may be unremunerative for a time. The German promoters of the Bagdad
Railway obtained a kilometric guarantee, or subsidy; the American
promoters of the Chester lines are granted exclusive rights to the
exploitation of all mineral resources, including oil, lying within
a zone of twenty kilometres on each side of the railway lines. The
Bagdad Railway mortgaged the revenues of Imperial Turkey; the Chester
concessions mortgage the natural resources of Nationalist Turkey. The
Ottoman-American Development Company, furthermore, is authorized to
carry out important enterprises subsidiary to the construction of the
railway lines and the exploitation of the mines aforementioned. It
may, for example, lay such pipe lines as are necessary to the proper
development of the petroleum wells lying within its zone of operations.
It is permitted to utilize water-power along the line of its railways
and to install hydro-electric stations for the service of its mines,
ports, or railways. It is required to construct elaborate port and
terminal facilities at Samsun, on the Black Sea, and at Youmourtalik,
on the Gulf of Alexandretta.
There are other respects in which the terms of the Chester grant
are strikingly similar to those of the Bagdad Railway concession of
March 5, 1903.[44] Lands owned by the Turkish Government and needed
for right-of-way, terminal facilities, or exploitation of mineral
resources are transferred to the Ottoman-American Development Company,
free of charge, for the period of the concession (ninety-nine years).
Public lands required for construction purposes—including sand-pits,
gravel-pits, and quarries—may be utilized without rental, and wood
and timber may be cut from State-owned forests without compensation.
As public utilities, the Chester enterprises are granted full rights
of expropriation of such privately owned land as may be necessary for
purposes of construction or operation. Like the _Deutsche Bank_, the
Ottoman-American Development Company is granted sweeping exemption
from taxation, as follows: “The materials, machines, coal, and other
commodities required for the construction operations of the Company,
whether purchased in Turkey or imported from abroad, shall be exempt
from all customs duties or other tax. The coal imported for the
operation of the [railway] lines shall be exempt from customs duties
for a period of twenty years, dating from the ratification of the
present agreement. For the entire duration of the concession the lines
and ports constructed by the Company, as well as its capital and
revenues, shall be exempt from all imposts.”[45]
From the Turkish point of view, the Chester concessions may be
justified on the grounds that the new railways will bring political
stability to Anatolia[46] and will initiate an era of unprecedented
economic progress. From the point of view of those American interests
which believe in the stimulation of foreign trade, likewise, the
Chester project has much to commend it. Exploitation of the oilfields
of the vilayets of Erzerum, Bitlis, Van, and Mosul, and the development
of the mineral resources of Armenia—including the valuable Arghana
copper mines—will provide rich sources of supply of raw materials. In
the construction of railways, ports, and pipe lines there will be a
considerable demand for American steel products. Economic development
of the vast region through which the new railways will pass promises
to furnish a market for American products, such as agricultural
machinery, and to offer ample opportunity for the profitable investment
of American capital. The Chester project may well become an imperial
enterprise of the first rank.
With the exception of the temporary advantage which they hoped to gain
at the second Lausanne Conference, the Turkish Government wished no
political importance to be attached to the Chester concessions. As
Abdul Hamid had awarded the Anatolian and Bagdad Railway concessions
to a German company because he believed Germans would be less likely
to associate political aims with their economic privileges, so the
Government of the National Assembly has awarded the Chester concessions
to an American syndicate because Turkish Nationalists are convinced
that Americans have no political interests in Turkey. This was made
clear by Dr. I. Fouad Bey, a member of the National Assembly, in a
semi-official visit to the United States during April, 1923. “We Turks
wish to develop our country,” he said. “We need foreign coöperation to
develop it. We cannot do without this coöperation. Now, there are two
kinds of foreign coöperation. There is the foreign coöperation that
is coupled with foreign political domination—coöperation that brings
profit only to the foreign investor. We have had enough of that kind.
There is another kind of coöperation—the kind we conceive the Chester
project and other American enterprises to be. This kind of coöperation
is a business enterprise and has no imperialistic aim. It is a form
of coöperation designed to profit both America and Turkey, and not
to invade Turkish sovereignty and Turkish political interests in any
way. That is why we prefer American coöperation. That is why the Grand
National Assembly at Angora is prepared to welcome American capital
with open arms and secure it in all its rights.”[47]
These sentiments found a ready echo among American merchants. At a
dinner given in honor of Dr. Fouad Bey by the American Federated
Chambers of Commerce for the Near East, one of the speakers said:
“Turkey, in our opinion, is destined to have a magnificent future.
It is on the threshold of a new and great era. Its extraordinary
resources, amazingly rich, are practically untouched. Although in
remote ages of antiquity these vast regions played a great rôle in
history, they have for many centuries lain practically fallow. The
tools, appliances, machinery and methods which have been so highly
perfected in the United States are appropriate to and will be needed
for the development of this marvelous latent wealth. Our capital
likewise can be very helpful. The members of our Chamber of Commerce
have a keen interest in the furtherance of trade relations between
Turkey and the United States. We want both to increase the imports of
its raw materials into our country and to stimulate the export of our
manufactured articles to Turkey. We are inspired by no political aims.
We seek no annexation of territory. We desire no exclusive privileges.
Our motto, if we had one, would be ‘A fair field and no favors.’ In
the development of commercial relations with Turkey, in seeking the
investment of our capital there, we ask for nothing more than an open
door.”[48]
The American press, likewise, is in accord with a policy of
governmental non-intervention in the ramifications of the Chester
project. The following editorial from the new York _World_ of April 23,
1923, is perhaps representative:
“There is no reason why the State Department should make itself the
attorney for or the promoter of the Chester business enterprises. If
the Angora Government has granted privileges to the Admiral’s company,
then the Admiral’s business is with Angora and not with Washington.
“Certainly the American people have no more interest in taking up
the Chester concessions diplomatically than they would have if
the Admiral were proposing to open a candy store in Piccadilly, a
dressmaking establishment in the Rue de la Paix, or a beauty parlor
on the Riviera. If the Admiral and his friends wish to invest money
in Turkey, they no doubt know what they are doing. They will expect
profits commensurate with the risks, and they should not expect the
United States Government, which will enjoy none of the profits, to
insure them against the risks.”
It is difficult, nevertheless, to see how the Chester concessions,
and their affiliated enterprises can be kept scrupulously free from
political complications. The French Government, in defence of the
interests of its nationals, has announced semi-officially that American
support of the concessions might lead to “a diplomatic incident of the
first importance.”[49] Furthermore, the United States Navy is said
to be vitally interested in the Chester project. The oilfields to
which Admiral Chester’s Ottoman-American Development Company obtain
rights of exploitation may prove to be important sources of fuel
supply to American destroyers operating in the Mediterranean—Mr.
Denby, Secretary of the Navy, said apropos of the concessions that the
Navy “is always concerned with the possibility of oil supplies.”[50]
Furthermore, an American-built port at Youmourtalik, on the Gulf of
Alexandretta, might conceivably be utilized as an American naval base.
Such a station, less than 150 miles from Cyprus and less than 400 miles
from the Suez Canal, could hardly be expected to increase the British
sense of security in the Eastern Mediterranean.
The American Navy has already been very active in the Near East. “Soon
after the armistice, Rear Admiral Bristol was sent to Constantinople
to command the small American naval forces there. A large part of
his efforts was immediately devoted to the promotion of American
business in that unsettled region, including the countries bordering
on the Black Sea. He soon established for himself such an influential
position by sheer force of character and by his intelligent grasp of
both the political and economic situations that he was appointed high
commissioner by the State Department.
“Early in 1919 several American destroyers were ordered to
Constantinople for duty in the Near East. Although these destroyers
are good fighting ships, it costs some $4,000,000 a year to maintain
them on this particular duty, which does not train the crews for use
in battle.... The possible development of the economic resources of
this part of the world was carefully investigated by representatives
of American commercial interests. These representatives were given
every assistance by the Navy, transportation furnished them to various
places, and all information of commercial activities obtained by naval
officers in their frequent trips around the Black Sea given them. The
competition for trade in this part of the world is very keen, the
various European countries using every means at their disposal to
obtain preferential rates. The Navy not only assists our commercial
firms to obtain business, but when business opportunities present
themselves, American firms are notified and given full information on
the subject. One destroyer is kept continuously at Samsun, Turkey, to
look after the American tobacco interests at that port. ... The present
opportunities for development of American commerce in the Near East
are very great, and its permanent success will depend largely upon
the continued influence of the Navy in that region.”[51] This is the
situation as diagnosed by the Navy Department itself.
“With the assistance of a small force of destroyers based on
Constantinople,” according to an instructor in the United States Naval
Academy, “our commercial representatives are establishing themselves
firmly in a trade which means millions of dollars to the farmers of
the American Middle West. By utilizing the wireless of destroyers in
Turkish ports, at Durazzo, and elsewhere, commercial messages have
been put through without delay.... Destroyers are entering Turkish
ports with ‘drummers’ as regular passengers, and their fantails piled
high with American samples. An American destroyer has made a special
trip at thirty knots to get American oil prospectors into a newly
opened field.” Here is “dollar diplomacy” with a vengeance! “If this
continues, we shall cease to take a purely academic interest in the
naval problems of the Near East. These problems are concerned with
the protection of commerce, the control of narrow places in the
Mediterranean waterways, and the naval forces which the interested
nations can bring to bear. They cannot be discussed without constant
reference to political and commercial aims.”[52]
Americans would do well to take stock of this Near Eastern situation.
Mustapha Kemal Pasha invites the participation of American capital in
railway construction in Anatolia for substantially the same reasons
which prompted Abdul Hamid to award the Bagdad Railway concession to
German bankers. In 1888, Abdul Hamid considered Germany economically
powerful but politically disinterested. Today, Mustapha Kemal Pasha
believes that American promoters, engineers, and industrialists possess
the resources and the technical skill which are required to develop
and modernize Asia Minor. And, from the Turkish point of view, the
political record of the United States in the Near East is a good
record. America never has annexed Ottoman territory or staked out
spheres of interest on Turkish soil; America has not participated in
the Ottoman Public Debt Administration; America has few Mohammedan
subjects and therefore is not fearful of the political strength of
Pan-Islamism; America did not declare war on Turkey during the European
struggle; America was not a party to the hated treaty of Sèvres.
America alone among the Western Powers seems capable of becoming a
sincere and disinterested friend of Turkey.[53] The avowed foreign
policies of the United States appear to confirm the opinion of the
Turks that Americans can be depended upon not to infringe upon Turkish
sovereignty. America must be kept scrupulously free from all “foreign
entanglements”; therefore an American mandate for Armenia has been
firmly declined. Splendid isolation is declared to be the fundamental
American principle in international affairs.
The political theory of isolation, however, is not altogether in
harmony with the economic fact of American world power. The enormous
expansion of American commercial and financial interests during and
since the Great War brings the United States face to face with new,
difficult, and complicated international problems. American business
men will be increasingly interested in the backward countries of the
world, in which they can purchase raw materials, to which they can sell
their finished products, and in which they can invest their capital.
American financiers, manufacturers, and merchants will look to their
government for assistance in the extension of foreign markets and
for protection in their foreign investments. Already there is grave
danger that the United States may “plunge into national competitive
imperialism, with all its profits and dangers, following its financiers
wherever they may lead.”[54]
The situation is not unlike that which faced the German Empire in
1888. When the _Deutsche Bank_ initiated its Anatolian railway
enterprises, it inquired of the German Government whether it might
expect protection for its investments in Turkey. Bismarck—who desired
to avoid imperialistic entanglements and to limit German political
interests, as far as possible, to the continent of Europe—replied with
a warning that the risk involved “must be assumed exclusively by the
entrepreneurs” and that the Bank must not count upon the support of the
German Government in “precarious enterprises in foreign countries.”
But Bismarck’s policy did not take full cognizance of the phenomenal
industrial and commercial expansion of the German Empire, whose
nationals were acquiring economic interests in Asia and in Africa and
on the Seven Seas. William II was more sensitive than Bismarck to the
demands of German industrial, commercial, and financial interests that
they be granted active governmental support and protection abroad.
Bismarck tolerated German enterprises in Turkey; William II sponsored
them. It was under William II, not under Bismarck, that Germany
definitely entered the arena of imperial competition.[55]
The development of American interests in Turkey puts the Government
of the United States to a test of statesmanship. The temptations will
be numerous to lend governmental assistance to American business men
against their European competitors; to utilize the new American
economic position in Turkey for the acquisition of political influence;
to use diplomatic pressure in securing additional commercial and
financial opportunities; to emphasize the economic, at the expense
of the moral, factors in Near Eastern affairs. To yield to these
temptations will be to destroy the great prestige which America
now possesses in the Levant by reason of disinterested social and
educational service. To yield will be to forfeit the trust which
Turkish nationalists have put in American hands. To yield will be to
intrench the system of economic imperialism which has been the curse
of the Near East for half a century. To yield will be to involve the
United States in foreign entanglements more portentous than those
connected with the League of Nations, or the International Court of
Justice, or any other plan which has yet been suggested for American
participation in the reconstruction of a devastated Europe and a
turbulent Asia.
The Chester concessions may be either promise or menace. They will give
promise of a new era in the Near East insofar as they contribute to
the development and the prosperity of Asia Minor, without infringing
upon the integrity and sovereignty of democratic Turkey, and without
involving the Government of the United States in serious diplomatic
controversies with other Great Powers. They will be a menace—to Turkey,
to the United States, and to the peace of the world—if, unhappily, they
should lead republican America in the footsteps of imperial Germany.
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL AND EXPLANATORY NOTES
[1] Mufty-Zade Zia Bey, “How the Turks Feel,” in _Asia_, Volume XXII
(1922), p. 857.
[2] “Declaration of the Rights of the Toiling and Exploited People,”
Article III. Available in English translation in _International
Conciliation_, No. 136 (New York, 1919).
[3] _Supra_, Chapter VII.
[4] The text of the Russo-Turkish Treaty of March 16, 1921, is given
as an appendix to an article by A. Nazaroff, “Russia’s Treaty with
Turkey,” in _Current History_, Volume XVII (1922), pp. 276–279.
[5] Bowman, _op. cit._, p. 398.
[6] _Cf._ _supra_, pp. 202–203. Professor Toynbee now speaks of this
feature of the Entente in terms of contempt: “Its direct motive was
covetousness, and it rested locally on nothing more substantial than
the precarious honor among thieves who find their business threatened
by a vigorous and talented competitor. Some of the thieves, at any
rate, never got out of the habit of picking their temporary partners’
pockets.“ _Op. cit._, p. 46.
[7] _Ibid._, pp. 45–46.
[8] It seems to be established that Mr. Lloyd George compelled a
readjustment of the terms of the Sykes-Picot Treaty by threatening
M. Clémenceau with a complete exposure and repudiation of all of the
secret treaties. _Cf._ Baker, _op. cit._, Volume I, pp. 70–72.
[9] See Minutes of the Council of Four, March 20, 1919, reported in
full by Baker, _op. cit._, Volume III, Document No. 1.
[10] Regarding the claims of the Turkish Petroleum Company, _cf._
_supra_, p. 261.
[11] _Parliamentary Papers_, No. Cmd. 675 (1920). _Cf._, also, the
“Franco-British Convention of December 23, 1920, on Certain Points
Connected with the Mandates for Syria, the Lebanon, Palestine, and
Mesopotamia,” _Parliamentary Papers_, No. Cmd. 1195 (1921). For
a general discussion of the oil situation, see: H. Bérenger, _La
politique du pétrole_ (Paris, 1920); F. Delaisi, _Le pétrole—La
politique de la production_ (Paris, 1921); A. Apostol and A. Michelson,
_La lutte pour le pétrole_ (Paris, 1922).
[12] _Cf._ _supra_, Chapter X, Note 18.
[13] _Supra_, pp. 301–302.
[14] Interesting sidelights on these points will be found in the
correspondence between the French and British Governments regarding the
Angora Treaty of October 20, 1921, _Parliamentary Papers_, No. Cmd.
1571, Turkey No. 1 (1922). _Cf._, also, Toynbee, _op. cit._, Chapter
III, “Greece and Turkey in the Vicious Circle”; Jean Lescure, “Faut-il
détruire la Turquie?” in _Revue politique et parlementaire_, Volume
103 (1920), pp. 42–48; “Where Diplomacy Failed,” _The Daily Telegraph_
(London), September 19, 1922.
[15] M. de Montille to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, November 17,
1921, in the official correspondence cited in Note 14.
[16] _Cf._ a statement by M. Briand regarding the purposes and the
scope of the agreement, _Journal officiel, Débats parlementaires,
Chambre des députés_, March 16, 1921, pp. 1272–1273. The text of the
agreement is available in _Current History_, Volume XIV (1921), pp.
203–204, and in the _Contemporary Review_, Volume 119 (1921), pp.
677–679.
[17] Regarding the Heraclea coal mines _cf._ _supra_, p. 14. During
the War the mines were operated by Hugo Stinnes.
[18] For the text of the Turco-Italian treaty see _L’Europe Nouvelle_
(Paris), May 28, 1921, or _The Nation_, Volume 113 (New York, 1921), p.
214. _The New York Times_, April 13, 1921, contains a good summary of
the treaty and the circumstances of its negotiation.
[19] The text of the Angora Treaty is given in _Parliamentary Papers_,
No. Cmd. 1556, Turkey No. 2 (1921). It has been reprinted in Current
History, January, 1922. For a statement by M. Briand regarding the
purposes and scope of the treaty, _cf._ _Journal officiel, Débats
parlementaires, Sénat_, October 28, 1921, pp. 818–819.
[20] Aleppo remained within the French mandate for Syria, so that for
a time—until the Turks construct a substitute line—through trains will
have to pass through French territory for a short distance. Guarantees
against interruption of either military or commercial traffic were
exacted by the Turks, however. In addition, Turkey was guaranteed full
use of the port of Alexandretta on a basis of absolute equality with
Syria.
[21] Most of the supplementary economic concessions are provided for in
a covering letter of Yussuf Kemal Bey and in an exchange of notes which
coincided with the signature of the treaty. These were kept absolutely
secret until December, when their contents were made known to the
British Government.
[22] _Supra_, p. 83.
[23] The italics are mine. Discrimination against British trade from
Mosul to Alexandretta, for example, might be used to force Great
Britain to abandon many of her claims in northern Mesopotamia.
[24] _The Times_ (London), August 2, 1922; _Manchester Guardian
Commercial_, August 31, 1922; _Chicago Tribune_, Paris edition, August
21, 1922.
[25] For the text of the correspondence, _cf._ _Parliamentary Papers_,
No. Cmd. 1571, Turkey No. 1 (1922).
[26] _Cf._ _supra_, pp. 301–302.
[27] A not unrepresentative Greek view is the following: “Nationalist
Turkey became, in a military sense, French territory. Political
missions, military missions, propaganda missions, financial missions,
found their way from Paris to Angora. The entire credit of the French
Republic was placed behind Kemal. The warships of France and the liners
of the _Messageries Maritimes_ became Turkish transports, and the
French arsenals were placed at the disposal of the Turks. Once the ally
of Kemal, France supported him to the fullest extent of its ability and
its resources.” A. T. Polyzoides, “The Greek Collapse in Asia Minor,”
in _Current History_, Volume XVII (1923), p. 35.
[28] Material regarding the Lausanne Conference is scattered and
fragmentary. The text of the proposed treaty is to be found in
_L’Europe Nouvelle_ (Paris), February 24 and March 10, 1923; a summary
is given in _The Times_ (London), February 1, 1923. The newspaper
accounts which I have used are those of _The New York Times_, _The
Times_ (London), _The Manchester Guardian_, _The World_ (New York),
and the _Christian Science Monitor_ (Boston). For reports and
editorial comment in weekly periodicals I have consulted _The Near
East_, _L’Europe Nouvelle_, _Journal des Débats_, _The New Statesman_
(London), _The Nation_ (New York). The following magazine articles have
proved useful: “The Lausanne Conference,” in _Current History_, Volume
XVII (1923), pp. 531–537, 743–748, 929–930; Saint-Brice, “De la Ruhr à
Lausanne,” in _Correspondance d’Orient_ (Paris), February, 1923; “The
Oriental Labyrinth at Lausanne,” in the _Literary Digest_, April 21,
1923, pp. 19–20; H. Froidevaux, “Les négociations de Lausanne et leur
suspension,” in _L’Asie Française_, 33 year, No. 208 (Paris, 1923), pp.
8–10; J. C. Powell, “Italy at Lausanne,” in _The New Statesman_, Volume
XX (1922), pp. 291–292; A. J. Toynbee, “The New Status of Turkey,” in
the _Contemporary Review_, Volume 123 (1923), pp. 281–289; P. Bruneau,
“La question de Mossoul,” in _L’Europe Nouvelle_, February 3, 1923, pp.
138–140. For some of my information regarding the Lausanne Conference I
am indebted to Djavid Bey.
[29] _Cf._ _supra_, Chapters IX and X, _ad lib._
[30] Compare with the provisions of the Treaty of Sèvres, _supra_, pp.
301–302.
[31] _The New York Times_, February 5, 1923.
[32] _Cf._ _supra_, pp. 324–325.
[33] The Chester concessions will be treated more fully in the
succeeding pages.
[34] _Supra_, pp. 245–249, 325–326. It was the Turkish contention that
the Black Sea concessions were invalid for the following reasons: they
were negotiated by a government for the acts of which the National
Assembly assumed no responsibility; they never had been ratified by
the Turkish Parliament; the French bankers had not fulfilled all the
conditions upon which the concessions were predicated.
[35] _The New York Times_, April 12, 1923.
[36] Regarding the _Bank für orientalischen Eisenbahnen_, _cf._
_supra_, p. 32. Accounts of the purchase by British interests are to be
found in _The New York Times_, April 28, May 15 and 16, 1923, and _The
Times_ (London), May 18, 1923.
[37] The Chester concessions conflict, to a degree, with the rights of
the British-owned Turkish Petroleum Company (_cf._ _supra_, Chapter X)
in the vilayet of Mosul. The area in conflict is so small, compared
to the total of the two concessions, however, that it is extremely
doubtful if there will be any serious difficulty in reaching a
satisfactory adjustment.
[38] “Report of the King-Crane Mission to the Near East,” published as
a supplement to the _Editor and Publisher_, Volume 55 (New York, 1922),
pp. I-XXVIII. _Cf._, also, “Report of the American Military Mission to
Armenia,” Senate Document No. 266, Sixty-sixth Congress, First Session
(Washington, 1920).
[39] E. J. Bing, “Chester and Turkey, Inc.,” in _The New Republic_,
Volume XXXIV (New York, 1923), pp. 290–292.
[40] _Cf._ E. M. Earle, “The Outlook for American Imperialism,” in
the _Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science_,
Volume CVIII (Philadelphia, 1923).
[41] For the text of this correspondence, _cf._ _Parliamentary Papers_,
No. Cmd. 675 (1921).
[42] _The New York Times_, October 29, 1922.
[43] _Statistical Abstract of the United States_, 1921, _passim_; “The
Trade of Turkey During 1920,” _Commerce Reports_, Special Supplement
(Washington, 1921).
[44] Compare with the terms of the Bagdad Railway concession, _supra_,
pp. 70–71, 77–84.
[45] The text of the Chester concessions—in an English translation
which leaves much to be desired—is to be found in _Current History_,
Volume XVIII (1923), pp. 485–489. For an official copy of the
concessions, with a map, I am indebted to Mr. M. Zekeria, Secretary of
the Turkish Information Service in New York.
[46] The Chester concessions contain the usual provisions for the
utilization of the railways by the gendarmerie and the military, both
in time of peace and in time of war.
[47] _The World_ (New York), April 10, 1923.
[48] The remarks are those of Mr. Ernest Filsinger, of the firm of
Lawrence & Company, exporters. Mr. Filsinger has been good enough to
supply me with a copy of his speech.
[49] _The New York Times_, April 12, 1923.
[50] _Ibid._, April 23, 1923.
[51] _The United States Navy as an Industrial Asset_ (Washington,
Office of Naval Intelligence, 1923). _Cf._, also, C. Merz, “Bristol,
Quarterdeck Diplomat,” in _Our World_, December, 1922.
[52] Allen Westcott, “The Struggle for the Mediterranean,” in _Our
World_, February, 1923, pp. 11–17.
[53] _Cf._, _supra_, pp. 63–65.
[54] _Cf._ W. E. Weyl, _American World Policies_ (New York, 1917),
Chapter V; A. Demangeon, _America and the Race for World Dominion_
(Garden City, 1921), a translation of _Le Déclin de l’Europe_ (Paris,
1920).
[55] _Supra_, pp. 40–42.
INDEX
Abdul Hamid, Sultan, 5, 23, 198;
problems of, 9;
interest in railway construction, 20, 30;
deposition of, 97.
Adaban Island, 283.
Adalia, 267, 285, 302, 324.
Adana, 22, 72. (_See also_ Mersina-Adana Railway.)
Adrianople, 29.
Afiun Karahissar, 34, 53, 324.
Agadir crisis, 170, 253.
Agriculture in Turkey. (_See_ Turkey, agricultural conditions.)
Aidin, 324. (_See also_ Smyrna-Aidin Railway.)
Alashehr, 34.
Aleppo, 2, 22, 62, 71, 73, 281, 299.
Alexandretta, 19, 62, 73, 110, 112, 151.
Allenby, Field Marshal Sir E. H. H., 298–299.
_Alliance Israélite Universelle_, 133.
Amanus Mountains, 22, 72, 94, 234, 277, 289;
Bagdad Railway tunnels through, 113, 119, 289.
Amara, 286.
America. (_See_ United States of America.)
American Federated Chambers of Commerce for the Near East, 344.
Anatolia, 280, 302, 305;
geography of, 10;
natural resources of, 13–14;
railways of, 29–30.
(_See also_ Anatolian Railway, Smyrna-Cassaba Railway, Smyrna-Aidin
Railway, Black Sea Railways, etc.)
Anatolian Railway, 34, 53, 61, 63, 224, 248, 339;
concession of 1888, 32;
concession of 1893, 33;
agreement with Smyrna-Cassaba Railway, 59–60;
board of directors, 85;
irrigation enterprises, 98, 117;
economic achievements of, 230–232;
concessions of 1914, 248–249, 272.
Andrew, Sir William, 176–177.
Anglo-French Entente. (_See_ Entente Cordiale.)
Anglo-French rivalry in the Near East, 318–329.
Anglo-German Agreement of June 15, 1914, 261–265.
Anglo-German rivalry, 138, 179–180, 203.
Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 204.
Anglo-Persian Oil Company, 259, 261, 283, 286.
Anglo-Russian Agreement (1907), 204.
Anglo-Turkish Agreements (1913), 254–258, 263–264.
Angora, 31, 32, 33, 34, 305, 339.
Angora Government. (_See_ Grand National Assembly.)
Angora Treaty (October 20, 1921), 324–325, 333, 352.
Arabs, 9–10, 15, 87, 196, 207, 282–284, 294, 297, 299, 302, 305, 320.
Ardahan, 316.
Arghana, 246, 340;
copper mines of, 326, 334, 343.
Armenia, 2, 9, 44;
republic of, 302, 305;
proposed American mandate, 348.
Asia Minor. (_See_ Anatolia.)
Atlas Line, 107.
Auguste Victoria, Kaiserin, 132.
Austria-Hungary, policies in Near East, 11;
railways in Turkey, 58;
trade with Turkey, 105–106;
annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, 218;
relations with Germany in Near East, 129–130.
(_See also Drang nach Osten._)
_Backshish_, 94.
Bagdad, 2, 31, 32, 62, 71, 73–74, 261, 281, 286, 296, 336.
Bagdad Railway, 3, 7, 21, 34;
factor in Great War, 4, 172, 278, 288–289, 291, 299–300;
strategic importance to Turkey, 22, 152–153;
mileage, 90;
construction, 94–95, 113–114, 289;
political importance to Germany, 126–131;
opponents and friends of enterprise in Germany, 137–142;
economic success, 233–234;
disposition of by Allies, 301;
Angora Treaty, 325–326;
status in 1922, 326;
purchase by British bankers, 334.
(_See also_ Germany, Great Britain, France, Russia.)
Bagdad Railway Company, incorporation of, 70, 92;
concession of 1903, 22, 70–75, 77–84, 219;
attempt to internationalize (1903), 92–93;
board of directors, 93, 115, 256, 263;
preliminary concession of 1899, 61–65, 68;
financing concession of 1903, 77, 91, 93–94, 116;
concession of 1908, 96–97;
convention of March, 1911, 111–112, 228–229, 252;
Franco-German agreement of 1914, 170, 247–252;
contracts with Lord Inchcape, 259–260, 264;
agreement with Smyrna-Aidin Railway Company, 260, 264;
proposed liquidation, 301.
Bagtché tunnel, 289.
Bahrein Island, 283.
Balfour, A. J. (Earl Balfour), 93, 180–185, 202.
Balfour of Burleigh, Lord, 117.
Balkan States, 11, 152;
nationalism of, 7.
Balkan Wars, 246–275.
Ballin, Albert, 141, 281.
Banditry, 9, 12.
_Bank für Handel und Industrie_, 101, 116.
_Bank für orientalische Eisenbahnen_, 32, 334.
_Banque d’Orient_, 99.
Barrow, General Sir Edmond, 282.
Basra, 2, 19, 62, 74, 255, 263, 282, 284, 336.
Bassermann, Herr, 120, 129, 170, 256.
Beersheba, 298.
Beirut, 30, 62, 72, 299.
Belgium. Railway concessions of Belgians in Turkey, 30.
Berger, Léon, 91, 115.
Bergmann, Dr. Carl, 260.
Berthelot, Philippe, 320.
Bethmann-Hollweg, von, 249.
Beyens, Baron, 249.
Bieberstein, Baron Marschall von, 43, 55, 170, 218, 254.
Bismarck, 40–42, 54–55, 349.
Bitlis, 340.
Black Sea Basin Agreement, 65, 149.
Black Sea Railways, 245–246, 248–249.
Boer War, 61, 179, 203.
Boli, 246.
Bowles, Gibson, 190, 210.
Bozanti, 325.
_Breslau_ (Cruiser), 278, 282.
Briand, Aristide, 329.
Brusa, 14.
Bulgaria, 288, 290.
Bulgurlu, 94, 96.
Bülow, Prince von, 48, 135.
Cadman, Sir John, 321.
Caillard, Sir Vincent, 31, 32.
Caliphate, 27, 64, 278–279, 296.
Cambon, Jules, 268.
Cambon, Paul, 225.
Capitulations, 10–11, 82, 153–154, 276, 303–306, 316, 332.
Carden, Admiral, 282.
Cassel, Sir Ernest, 209, 220–221, 225.
Chamberlain, Austen, 287.
Chamberlain, Joseph, 67, 178–179, 185.
Chéradame, André, 155, 215.
Chesney, Francis R., 176.
Chester, Rear Admiral Colby M., 15, 333.
Chester concessions, 334, 339, 353;
compared with Bagdad Railway concessions, 340–343;
political significance of, 350.
Chrome, 13, 337.
Churchill, Winston, 282.
Cilicia, 305, 325–326, 331;
French mandate for, 302, 325.
(_See also_ Mersina-Adana Railway.)
Cilician Gates of the Taurus, 72, 113, 149, 325.
Cilician-Syrian Railway Company, 326.
Clémenceau, Georges, 310, 320, 351.
Coal, Heraclea mines, 14, 324.
Colonization, 84, 123–125.
Combes, Émile, 167.
Commercial Revolution, 1, 3–4, 73. (_See also_ Trade routes.)
Committee of Union and Progress, 217, 219.
Constans, M., 60, 155.
Constantinople, 2, 10, 23, 281, 302.
Cotton, 16, 50–51, 294, 297, 326.
Cox, Sir Percy, 283–284, 286.
Cranborne, Lord, 69.
Crawford, Sir Richard, 221.
_Crédit Lyonnais_, 158.
Crewe, Lord, 282.
Crowe, Sir Eyre, 259.
Ctesiphon, 287.
Curzon, Lord, 23, 113, 192, 197–198, 199, 212–213, 283, 327.
Customs duties of Ottoman Empire, 95, 111, 180, 226–228, 256, 262.
Damascus, 12, 21, 30, 62, 72, 299.
Damascus-Homs-Aleppo Railway, 34, 246.
D’Arcy Exploration Company, 259, 261.
Dardanelles, 245, 280, 282, 285, 288–289.
Dawkins, Sir Clinton, 186.
Deir, province of, 294.
Deir es Zor, 248.
Delamain, General, 283–284.
Delcassé, Théophile, 66, 68, 155–157, 168–169.
De Lesseps, Ferdinand, 177.
Denby, Charles, 345.
Deschanel, Paul, 159, 172.
_Dette Publique._ (_See_ Ottoman Public Debt Administration.)
_Deutsche Bank_, 32–33, 36, 99, 140, 141, 184–185, 261;
negotiations of 1899 with Imperial Ottoman Bank, 59–60, 155;
influential position in German industry, 100–101;
loans to Young Turks, 225;
negotiations of 1913–1914 with Imperial Ottoman Bank, 170, 247–252.
(_See also_ Anatolian Railway, Bagdad Railway Company, etc.)
_Deutsche Levante Linie_, 36, 107.
_Deutsche Mittelmeer Levante Linie_, 108.
_Deutsche Orientbank_, 99.
_Deutsche Orient Mission_, 132.
_Deutsche Palästina Bank_, 37, 99, 158.
_Deutsch-türkische Vereinigung_, 281.
_Deutsches Vorderasienkomitee_, 281.
_Deutschtum, das_, 135.
Diarbekr, 12, 14, 31, 73, 246, 340.
Disraeli, Benjamin (Earl of Beaconsfield), 3, 178, 215.
Djavid Bey, 95, 219–220, 224–229, 235–236, 247, 275, 278, 331.
Djemal Pasha, 278, 285, 298.
Dodecanese Islands, 267.
Downing Street, 185, 201, 210, 254.
_Drang nach Osten_, 51, 123, 129–130, 139, 141–142, 315.
_Dresdner Bank_, 101, 116.
Eastern Bank, The, 117.
Egypt, 3, 7, 21, 195, 201, 278, 319.
El Helif, 96.
Ellenborough, Lord, 102, 197.
Entente Cordiale, 188, 203–204, 319.
Enver Pasha, 275, 278, 285, 297.
Eregli, 72.
Erzerum, 12, 246, 303, 339.
Eski Shehr, 14, 33.
Euphrates River, 2, 74, 81.
(_See also_ Lynch Brothers.)
Euphrates Valley Railway Company, 176.
Euphrates & Tigris Steam Navigation Company, Ltd. (_See_ Lynch
Brothers.)
Falkenhayn, General von, 298–299.
Fashoda incident, 61, 203.
Fouad Bey, Dr. I., 343.
France, 7, 23, 276, 293;
French railways in Turkey, 30, 34, 53, 59, 165–166, 245–246,
248–249. (_See also_ Smyrna-Cassaba Railway, Damascus-Homs-Aleppo
Railway, etc.);
trade with Turkey, 104–106;
imperialism, 122, 294, 300, 330;
attitude toward Bagdad Railway, 66, 94, 153–169;
investments in Turkey, 154–155;
spheres of interest in Near East, 293–294, 302;
mandate for Syria and Cilicia, 302, 320, 325;
rivalry with Great Britain in Near East, 318–329;
treaty of March 9, 1921, with Turkish Nationalists, 323–324;
Angora Treaty, 324–326;
policy at Lausanne Conferences, 329–335;
attitude toward Chester concessions, 333–334, 345.
Francis I, 154.
Franco-German convention of 1914, 247–252, 272.
Franco-Russian Alliance, 153, 158–159, 168.
Franco-Turkish Treaty of March, 1921, 323–324.
Franco-Turkish Treaty of October, 1921. (_See_ Angora Treaty.)
Franklin-Bouillon, Henri, 324, 329.
Gallipoli, 8, 280, 285.
Gaza, 288, 299.
Genoa Conference, 329.
George V, of Great Britain, 258.
Germany, railways in Turkey. (_See_ Anatolian Railway, Bagdad Railway,
_Deutsche Bank_);
trade with Turkey, 101–106, 109, 118;
banks in the Near East, 98–101;
steamship lines in the Near East, 36, 107–110;
military missions to Turkey, 38, 269, 288, 297–298;
Near Eastern policies, 38–45, 64–65, 120–131, 261–265, 276–279,
287–292, 297–300;
schools and missions, 131–136, 145;
imperialism, 39–40, 44–52, 56, 114, 125–135, 277, 280–281, 292;
anti-imperialism, 137–138;
rivalries with Great Britain, 138, 179–180, 203;
alliance with Turkey, 271;
propaganda, 281–282;
military campaigns in Turkey, 285–290, 296–299;
destruction of interests in Near East, 301–302, 314–315.
_Goeben_ (cruiser), 278, 282.
Golden Horn, 29, 338.
Goltz, Field Marshal von der, 21, 38–39, 153, 223, 282, 288, 289, 296.
Gouraud, General, 323.
Grand National Assembly, 305, 316, 323, 325, 331, 333–334, 343.
Great Britain, Near Eastern policies, 11, 23, 66–67, 68–69, 111,
195–208, 225–228, 252–265, 282–287, 297, 322;
attitude toward Bagdad Railway, 66–67, 69, 182–201, 205–209, 261–265;
imperialism, 122, 195–197, 200, 277, 282, 294, 300;
trade with Turkey, 105–106;
economic enterprises in Near East, 30, 53, 60, 117, 189–192, 220,
261 (_see also_ Lynch Brothers, Anglo-Persian Oil Company,
Inchcape, etc.);
spheres of interest in Ottoman Empire, 294, 302;
acquisition by Bagdad Railway, 334–335;
military campaigns in Near East, 283–285, 286–287, 296–297, 298–299.
(_See also_ headings under “Anglo,” Persian Gulf, Mesopotamia,
Suez Canal, etc.)
Great War, 234, 275–276;
rôle of Bagdad Railway in, 285–290, 296–299.
Greece, 11, 302, 303, 306.
Greco-Turkish War (1920–1922), 306, 329.
Grey, Sir Edward (Viscount Grey), 111, 198, 225–227, 228, 243, 255,
261–262, 282–283.
Grothe, Dr. Hugo, 281, 307.
Guaranty Trust Company of New York, 338.
Gwinner, Dr. Arthur von, 114–115, 121, 125, 129, 141, 184, 186, 221,
236, 247, 281.
Haidar Pasha, 298, 325.
Haidar Pasha-Ismid Railway, 30, 31, 80.
Haidar Pasha Port Company, 86, 112.
Haifa, 246.
Hakki Bey, Ismail, 219.
Hakki Pasha, 254–255, 261.
Haldane, Lord, 198, 254.
Hama, 72.
Hamburg-American Line, 108–109, 141.
Hanotaux, Gabriel, 241–242.
Hatzfeld, Count, 38.
Hedjaz, 284, 299, 302.
Hedjaz Railway, 21, 27, 246, 302.
Helfferich, Dr. Karl, 52, 97, 141, 225, 236, 247, 249.
Heraclea, 246;
coal mines of, 14, 324.
_Hilfsverein der deutschen Juden_, 136.
Hirsch, Baron, 32.
Hittites, 12.
Holy Land, 6, 299.
(_See also_ Palestine.)
Holy War, 278–279, 281.
Homs, 72, 246.
Huguenin, M., 63.
Immigration, 234.
Imperial Ottoman Bank, 59, 93, 117, 245, 246–248.
Imperialism, 3, 5–8, 11–12, 45–52, 114, 235–236, 267, 279–280,
292–296, 306, 316–318, 331, 337–338, 350.
(_See also_ Imperialism as sub-topic under France, Germany,
Great Britain, Italy, Russia, United States.)
Inchcape, Lord, 109, 192, 256, 258–260.
India, 7, 126, 178, 195, 196, 282, 283.
Industrial Revolution, 13, 45–46.
Industry in Turkey. (_See_ Turkey, industrial backwardness.)
Interallied Commission on Ports, Waterways, and Railways, 300.
Interallied Financial Commission, 303.
International Court of Justice, 350.
Irak, 16, 108, 277, 326.
(_See also_ Mesopotamia.)
Irrigation, 16–17, 98, 117, 205, 221, 256, 263, 297.
Ismet Pasha, 333–334.
Ismid, 14, 305.
Italy, trade with Turkey, 105–107;
imperialism, 11, 173–174, 218, 295, 300, 330;
Tripolitan War, 246;
economic interests in Turkey, 266–267;
spheres of interest in Near East as defined by secret treaties,
285, 295, 302, 305;
treaty of 1921 with Turkish Nationalists, 324.
Jäckh, Ernst, 204–205, 279, 281, 307.
Jaffa, 30, 72, 246, 299.
Jagow, Gottlieb von, 254, 268.
Jastrow, Morris, 142.
Jaurès, Jean, 242.
Jericho, 299.
Jerusalem, 30, 72, 299.
_Jerusalems-Verein_, 132, 135.
Jezirit-ibn-Omar, 327.
Joffre, Marshal, 268–269.
Johnston, Sir Harry H., 205–206, 215, 254.
Kaisarieh, 272, 340.
Kapnist, Count Vladimir I., 58.
Kapp, Wolfgang, 141.
Karaman, 72.
Kars, 316.
Kaulla, Dr. Alfred von, 31.
Kemal Bey, Yussuf, 325.
Kemal Pasha, Mustapha, 298, 303, 323, 347.
Khanikin, 58, 75, 240.
Kharput, 73, 246, 340.
Kiderlen-Waechter, von, 239.
Kilometric guarantees, 31, 33, 77–78, 85, 90, 245.
Kipling, Rudyard, 137.
Kitchener, Lord, 283.
Klapka, M. de, 247, 249.
Konia, 14, 33, 62, 72, 281.
Koweit, 4, 180, 197–198, 255;
Sheik of, 181, 223, 255, 284.
Kühlmann, Herr von, 255, 259, 261.
Kurds, 9.
Kurna, 284.
Kut-el-Amara, 226, 261, 286, 289–291.
Land of the Two Rivers. (_See_ Mesopotamia.)
Langénieux, Cardinal, 162–163.
Lansdowne, Lord, 69, 93, 122, 184, 197.
Lausanne Conferences (1922–1923), 306, 329–333, 334–343.
League of Nations, 327, 350.
Ledochowski, Cardinal M. H., 144.
Lee, Lord, 329.
Lichnowsky, Prince, 139–140, 146, 255, 262.
Lloyd George, David, 199, 242–243, 310, 320, 351.
Ludwig Loewe & Company, 37, 101.
Lynch Brothers, 74, 81, 82, 111, 190–191, 210–211, 256, 260.
McMahon, Sir Arthur H., 284.
Macedonian Railways Company, 113.
Mackensen, Dr., 34.
Mackensen, Field Marshal von, 297.
Mahmoud Pasha, 60.
Mandates, 302, 320, 325, 327, 348.
Manissa, 30.
Maude, General Sir Stanley, 296, 297.
Meade, Colonel, 198.
Mecca, 21, 62.
Medina, 21.
Mendeli, 261.
Mersina, 19, 72, 110.
Mersina-Adana Railway, 30, 109, 321.
Mesopotamia, 32, 35, 51, 124, 140, 147, 152, 176, 180–181, 226, 234,
256, 262–266, 277, 280, 282, 284, 288, 327;
trade routes, 1–2;
natural resources, 14–17;
Bagdad Railway in, 73–75;
German steamship service, 108–109;
military campaigns, 286–287, 289–290, 296–299;
British sphere of interest, 294–295;
British mandate for, 302, 320;
British Civil Administration, 297, 326.
(_See also_ Persian Gulf, Shatt-el-Arab, Koweit, Irak.)
Metternich, 295.
Middle East, 3, 178, 196.
Militarism, 268–271, 275–276.
Milyoukov, Professor, 315.
Minerals in Turkey, 13–15, 50–51, 280, 340.
(_See also_ Chrome, Oil, Turkey, mineral resources.)
Missions and missionaries, effect on Turkey, 6;
in support of the Bagdad Railway, 131–133, 141;
German, 132–133;
French, 133, 135, 160–165;
Italian, 133, 173–174;
American, 336.
_Mittel-Europa_, 277, 290, 292.
Mocha, 10.
Moltke, General H. K. B., 145, 176.
Morgen, Major, 34.
Morley, Viscount, 207–208.
Mosul, 2, 12, 62, 73, 261, 305, 321, 327, 332.
Mount Stephen, Lord, 184, 209.
Mudania armistice, 306.
Mudros armistice, 299.
Mutius, Herr von, 109.
National Bank of Turkey, 220, 261.
National Pact, 304–305, 316.
Nationalism, 267–268;
Balkan, 7;
German, 136–137, 163;
French, 136, 163;
Italian, 173–174;
English, 211;
Turkish, 222, 275, 278, 303–304, 314.
(_See also_ Young Turks, Pan-Turanianism, Kemal Pasha, etc.)
Naumann, Friederich, 127.
Near East. (_See_ Ottoman Empire, Turkey, Middle East.)
Neuflize, Baron de, 247.
Neutral Zone of the Straits, 329.
Nicholas, Grand Duke, 290, 293.
Nicholas II, Tsar of Russia, 239.
Nineveh, 73, 137.
Nisibin, 73, 246, 325, 327.
Nixon, General J. E., 286.
Northcote, Sir Stafford, 178.
North German Lloyd Steamship Company, 107.
O’Connor, Sir Nicholas, 60.
Oil, 14–15, 50–51, 147, 261, 282–283, 286, 294, 321, 332, 338, 340.
Open Door, 83, 125, 263, 326, 339.
Oriental Railways, 18, 29, 32, 113.
Osmanie, 111.
Ottoman-American Development Company. (_See_ Chester concessions.)
Ottoman Civil List, 15.
Ottoman Empire, economic, strategic, and religious importance, 4–17;
military system, 26;
partition of, 285, 293–295, 302–303;
abolition of Sultanate, 306.
(_See also_ Turkey, Abdul Hamid, Ottoman Public Debt Administration,
etc.)
Ottoman General Staff, 22.
Ottoman Ministry of Public Works, 31, 32, 81, 246.
Ottoman Ports Company, 260.
(_See also_ Inchcape.)
Ottoman Public Debt Administration, 11, 31, 32, 81, 303, 305;
railway policies, 17–20, 29.
Ottoman River Navigation Company, 258.
(_See also_ Inchcape.)
Oulu Kishla, 340.
_Palästinaverein_, 133.
Palestine, 280, 294, 298, 319–320;
British mandate, 302.
Palmerston, Viscount, 176–177.
Panderma, 221, 245.
Pan-Germanism, 35, 103, 281;
support of Bagdad Railway, 136–137.
Pan-Islamism, 64, 87, 222, 276.
Pan-Slavism, 164.
Pan-Turanianism, 222, 237.
Parker, Alwyn, 261.
Peninsular & Oriental Steam Navigation Company, 192, 256.
Persia, 73, 122, 196, 239–240, 255.
Persian Gulf, 2, 74, 255, 263, 280, 282, 322;
British strategic interests, 196–199, 211–212.
(_See also_ Koweit, Shatt-el-Arab, Anglo-Persian Oil Company.)
Petroleum. (_See_ Oil.)
Pichon, Stephen, 224, 243.
Pobêdonostsev, 58.
Poincaré, Raymond, 333.
Ponsot, M., 249.
Potsdam Agreement, 199, 239–244.
Pressel, Wilhelm von, 18, 26, 30.
Propaganda, 281–282.
_Quai d’Orsay_, 169, 245, 247.
Radek, Karl, 130.
Railways, military value of, 22, 176.
(_See_ Abdul Hamid, Anatolia, Cilicia, Syria, Mesopotamia,
Anatolian Railway, Bagdad Railway, etc.)
Ras el Ain, 114.
Rathmore, Lord, 260.
Rechnitzer, Ernest, 60, 85–86, 87.
Reparation Commission, 301–302.
Repington, Colonel, 283.
Revelstoke, Lord, 184, 209.
Reventlow, Count zu, 140–141.
Rhodes, Cecil, 67, 178.
Richelieu, 295.
Rohrbach, Dr. Paul, 15, 16, 27, 120, 125, 127, 128, 136, 213, 218,
287.
Roosevelt, Theodore, 243.
Rosenberg, Baron von, 249.
Rouvier, M., 157, 167, 169.
Royal Dutch Petroleum Company, 261.
Russia, Near Eastern policies, 7, 11, 23, 42, 147–153, 239–244,
315–318;
attitude toward Bagdad Railway, 65–66, 147–153;
Potsdam Agreement with Germany, 199, 239–244;
entente with Great Britain and France, 153, 158–159, 168, 204;
imperialism, 7, 9, 15, 23, 61, 65, 127, 151–153, 166–168, 177,
183, 212, 240–241, 269, 276, 278–279;
spheres of interest defined by secret treaties, 285, 293;
Soviet Republic and the Near East, 315–318.
Russo-Japanese War, 3, 153.
Russo-Turkish War of 1877, 150, 152.
Sadijeh, 73, 75, 114, 240.
Samarra, 73, 297.
Samsun, 31, 246, 339.
Sanders, Field Marshal Liman von, 269, 278, 299.
San Remo Conference, 320.
San Remo Oil Agreement, 321.
Sarolea, Charles, 131.
Sazonov, 239.
Sazonov-Paléologue Treaty, 293.
Scheidemann, Philip, 130, 137, 214.
Schoen, Baron von, 93, 101–102, 120, 125, 130–131.
Seljuk Turks, 72.
Sericulture. (_See_ Silk.)
Shatt-el-Arab, 2, 74, 81, 264.
Sherif of Mecca, 87, 284.
Siemens, Carl von, 141.
Siemens, George von, 31, 41, 68, 121.
Silk, 20, 158, 294.
Simplon-Orient Express, 300.
Sinai Peninsula, 4, 21, 27, 285.
Sivas, 31, 246, 303, 339, 340.
Slav Peril, 242.
Smith, Sir Henry Babington, 188, 209, 227.
Smyrna, 4, 19, 110, 302, 303, 306, 324.
Smyrna-Aidin Railway, 30, 84, 189, 260, 264.
Smyrna-Cassaba Railway, 30, 34, 53, 59–60, 245.
_Société d’exploitation des chemins de fer de Cilicie-Nord Syrie_,
326.
_Société du chemin de fer de Damas-Hama et prolongements_, 34, 246.
_Société du chemin de fer ottomane d’Anatolie._ (_See_ Anatolian
Railway.)
_Société française de Heraclée_, 14.
_Société impériale ottomane du chemin de fer de Bagdad._ (_See_
Bagdad Railway Company.)
_Société pour la construction et l’exploitation du réseau de la Mer
Noire._ (_See_ Black Sea Railways.)
_Société pour enterprises électriques en Orient_, 99.
Soma, 30, 245.
Soma-Panderma Railway, 221, 245.
Speyer, Edward B. von, 141.
Spheres of influence, 277, 294, 295, 302.
St. Jean de Maurienne Agreement, 295, 302, 311.
_Stahlwerksverband_, 103.
Standard Oil Company, 15, 232.
Stemrich, Herr, 34.
Sublime Porte, 43, 55, 149, 247, 252, 261.
Subsidies, railroad, 75–80.
Suez Canal, 2, 3, 4, 21, 27–28, 177, 178, 192, 195, 204, 259, 277,
282, 283, 285, 290.
Suleiman the Magnificent, 7.
Suleimanieh, 340.
Sykes, Sir Mark, 251, 272–273, 295.
Sykes-Picot Treaty, 293–294, 310.
Syria, 2, 11, 280, 288, 302, 320, 323, 328;
railways of, 30, 34, 245–246, 248–249, 326;
military campaigns, 299;
French sphere of interest, 293–294;
French mandate, 302, 320, 325.
Tardieu, André, 169–170, 203, 214, 267–268.
Taurus Mountains, 72, 94, 113, 149, 288.
Tchoban Bey, 327.
Teheran, 75, 240.
Tekrit, 73, 294.
Thrace, 305, 306, 324.
Tigris River, 2, 74, 81.
(_See also_ Lynch Brothers.)
Tireboli, 239.
Townshend, General Sir Charles, 286, 287, 289, 290.
Trade routes, 2, 71.
Trans-Caspian Railway, 2, 150.
Trans-Caucasian Railways, 2, 150.
Trans-Persian Railway, 2, 147.
Trans-Siberian Railway, 2, 3, 4, 147, 150.
Treaty of Berlin (1878), 149, 162–163.
Treaty of Bucharest (1913), 246.
Treaty of Lausanne (1912), 267.
Treaty of London (1915), 285, 302.
Treaty of Sèvres (1920), 301, 305, 306.
Treaty of Versailles (1919), 301.
Trebizond, 246, 339.
Tripartite Agreement (Great Britain, France, Italy, 1920), 301.
Triple Alliance, 107, 271.
Triple Entente, 275.
Tripoli-in-Syria, 72, 246.
Tripolitan War, 246.
Turco-Italian Treaty (March, 1921), 324.
Turkey, agricultural conditions, 5, 12, 13, 15–16, 18, 20, 230–232;
industrial backwardness, 12–13;
general economic conditions, 12–17, 233–234;
finances (_see_ Ottoman Public Debt Administration);
mineral resources, 13–15, 50–51, 280, 340;
foreign trade, 36, 104–107, 339;
alliance with Germany and Austria, 271;
entry into Great War, 275–278;
as spoils of war, 280–281, 285, 292–295, 301–302;
military campaigns of 1920–1922, 305–306;
a republic, 306.
(_See also_ Ottoman Empire, Anatolia, Cilicia, Syria, Mesopotamia,
Grand National Assembly, Angora Treaty, Lausanne Conferences,
etc.)
Turkish Petroleum Company, 261, 321, 353.
Union and Progress, Committee of, 217, 219.
United States of America, railroad subsidies, 79;
economic changes since the Great War, 337–338;
American interests in the Near East, 336, 337–338
(_see also_ Chester concessions);
naval activity in Near East, 346–347;
outlook for American imperialism, 337–338, 347–350.
Van, 246, 340.
Wangenheim, Baron von, 43, 270, 278, 282.
Washington Conference (1921), 329.
Weygand, General, 333.
_Wilhelmstrasse_, 121, 133, 142, 201, 236, 247, 254.
Willcocks, Sir William, 16, 205, 214–215, 220–221.
William II, German Emperor, 142, 198, 298, 349;
imperialistic policies of, 39–40, 44–52, 349;
visits to Turkey, 41, 43–44, 55, 134–135;
and Bagdad Railway concession of 1899, 68.
Wilson, Woodrow, 291, 336.
Witte, Count, 58, 68, 149–150.
_Württembergische Vereinsbank_, 31.
_Young Turks_, 5, 13, 17, 110–111, 217–218;
hostility to Germans, 220–224;
financial difficulties, 224–229;
efforts to conciliate France and Great Britain, 244, 252–261;
hostility to imperialism, 267.
Young Turk Revolution, 27, 96.
Youmourtalik, 340–341.
Zander, Dr. Kurt, 68.
Zihni Pasha, 68.
Zinoviev, M., 65, 149.
Zubeir, 75.