BARGAINS ARE STRUCK
THE KAISER AND THE TSAR AGREE AT POTSDAM
During the early days of November, 1910, William II entertained at
the Potsdam palace his fellow sovereign Nicholas II, Tsar of all the
Russias. He extended his royal hospitality, also, to the recently
chosen foreign ministers of Germany and Russia respectively—Herr
von Kiderlen-Waechter, next to the ambassador at Constantinople the
Kaiser’s most competent expert on the tortuous affairs of the Near
East; and M. Sazonov, subsequently to guide Russian foreign policy
during the critical days of July, 1914. It was apparent even to the
untutored that there was some political significance to the conference
between the German Emperor and his distinguished guests, and the
press was rife with speculation as to what the outcome would be. The
answer was forthcoming on November 4, when it was announced that the
Kaiser and the Tsar, with the advice and assistance of their foreign
ministers, had reached an agreement on the Bagdad Railway question.
A short time later the terms of this Potsdam Agreement were made
public. As outlined by the German Chancellor, with some subsequent
modifications, they were as follows: 1. Germany recognized the Russian
sphere of interest in northern Persia, as defined by the Anglo-Russian
agreement of 1907, and undertook not to seek or support concessions
for railways, roads, telegraphs, or other means of communication in
the region; in other words, there was to be no change in the _status
quo_. 2. Russia recognized the rights of the _Deutsche Bank_ in the
Bagdad Railway and agreed to withdraw all diplomatic opposition to the
construction of the line and to the participation of foreign capital
therein. 3. Russia agreed to obtain from Persia, as soon as possible, a
concession for the construction of a railway from Teheran, the capital
city, to Khanikin, an important commercial city on the Turco-Persian
frontier. This new railway was to be linked with a branch of the Bagdad
system to be constructed in accordance with the terms of the concession
of 1903 from Sadijeh, on the Tigris, to Khanikin. Both lines were to
be planned for through international traffic. If, for any reason, the
Russian Government should fail to build the proposed railway from
Teheran to Khanikin, it was understood that German promoters might
then apply for the concession. 4. The policy of the economic open door
was to be observed by both nations. Russia agreed not to discriminate
against German trade in Persia, and the two nations pledged reciprocal
equality of treatment on the new railway lines from Sadijeh to
Teheran.[1]
Russia had a great deal to gain and little to lose by the Potsdam
Agreement. Whether Russia liked it or not, the Bagdad Railway had
become a going concern, and there was every indication that another
decade would see its completion. When finished, the Bagdad system,
together with projected Persian lines, would provide Russian trade
with direct communications with the Indies (_via_ Bagdad and the
Persian Gulf) and with the Mediterranean (_via_ Mosul, Aleppo, and the
Syrian coast). By the entente of 1907 with Great Britain the Tsar had
renounced his imperial interests in southern Persia; therefore he had
little to gain by a dog-in-the-manger attitude toward the development
of Mesopotamia by the Germans. Under these circumstances continued
resistance to the Bagdad Railway appeared to be short-sighted and
futile. Cheerful acquiescence, on the other hand, might bring tangible
diplomatic compensations. In addition, it has been suggested, Russian
reactionaries were delighted at the prospect of a _rapprochement_
with Prussia, in which they saw the last strong support of a dying
autocracy.[2]
From the German point of view the agreement with Russia was a
diplomatic triumph. All that Germany conceded was recognition of
Russia’s special position in Persia, which affected no important German
interests and exerted no appreciable influence on the balance of
power in the Near East. In return, German trade was to be admitted to
the markets of Persia, heretofore an exclusively British and Russian
preserve; the sphere of the Bagdad Railway was to be considerably
enlarged; Russian political obstruction of the Bagdad enterprise was
to cease. Russian objections had been the first stumbling block in the
way of the Railway; Russian protests had been the instigation of French
opposition; now Russian recognition held out high promise for the
final success of the Great Plan. The first breach had been made in the
heretofore solid front presented by the Entente.[3]
Outside of Germany and Russia, however, the Potsdam Agreement met
with a heated reception. The Ottoman press complained that Turkey
was being politely ignored by two foreign powers in the disposition
of her rights. One Constantinople daily said it was a sad commentary
on Turkish “sovereignty” that in an important treaty on the Bagdad
Railway “there is no mention of us, as if we had no connection with
that line, and we were not masters of Bagdad and Basra and the ports
of the Persian Gulf.”[4] M. Hanotaux, a former French minister of
foreign affairs, expressed his belief that “the negotiations at Potsdam
have created a situation which, from every point of view, obliges
us to ask, now, if Russia has dissolved the Triple Entente.”[5] Mr.
Lloyd George delivered a particularly venomous attack upon Russia for
having disregarded her diplomatic engagements, and he announced in
clarion tones that this desertion from the ranks of the Entente—even
if condoned by France—would not cause Great Britain to alter one iota
her former policy.[6] The “Slav peril” appeared to be more keenly
appreciated, for the moment, in France and England than in Germany!
M. Jaurès, the brilliant French Socialist parliamentarian, believed
that the Potsdam Agreement was an admirable instance of the menace
of the Russian Alliance to the security of France and the peace of
Europe. During the course of a bitter debate in the Chamber of Deputies
he confronted the Minister of Foreign Affairs, M. Pichon, with this
dilemma: “What is the situation in which you find yourself? You are
going to be faced, you already are faced, with a _fait accompli_, a
Russo-German convention on the Bagdad question. What do you propose
to do? Well, you may pursue an independent course and continue to
oppose the Bagdad Railway. In that event you will be in the unenviable
position of opposing Germany in an enterprise to which Russia—whose
interests are more directly involved—has given her support. Or, on
the other hand, you may subscribe with good grace to this enterprise
which Russia commends to you. What then will be your situation? For
some years France has successfully resisted the Bagdad Railway. If
during this time we have sulked at the enterprise, it was not of our
own choice, but out of regard for Russia, because Russia believed her
interests to be menaced. In short, we arrive at this paradox. You have
created an extremely delicate situation between France and Germany
by opposing the Bagdad Railway, in which you had no interests other
than those of Russia. And now it is this same Russia which, without
previously consulting you, places at the disposal of Germany the
moral advantage of compelling you—you who resisted only on behalf of
Russia—to accede to the Bagdad Railway.” Was this the sort of ally to
whom France should entrust her national safety?[7]
In the midst of the storm over the Potsdam Agreement, M. Stephen Pichon
and Sir Edward Grey alone appeared to be unruffled. Both of these
gentlemen, interpolated in the Chamber of Deputies and the House of
Commons respectively, averred that they saw no reason for becoming
disturbed or alarmed at the new Russo-German understanding. This point
of view was incomprehensible to the average citizen, unskilled in
the niceties of professional diplomacy, until on January 31, 1911,
M. Jaurès forced M. Pichon to admit that the French Foreign Office
had been informed of the character of the Potsdam negotiations before
they took place. Less than a month later Mr. Lloyd George severely
criticized his fellow-minister Sir Edward Grey for having taken no
action against the policy of Russia at Potsdam, although, as Foreign
Secretary, Sir Edward had been fully posted on the nature of the
negotiations. Apparently, then, Russia had come to the agreement with
Germany only after having consulted France and Great Britain and,
perhaps, after having received their consent.[8]
There were a few persons who hoped that the Potsdam Agreement might
be the first step in a general settlement of the Bagdad Railway
entanglement. One humble member of the House of Commons, Mr.
Pickersgill, said, for example, “I cannot understand the policy of
continued antagonism to Germany. Ex-President Roosevelt recently gave
much good advice to our Foreign Minister, and amongst other things he
said that the presence of Germany on the Euphrates would strengthen the
position of Great Britain on the Nile.... The action of Russia in the
recent meeting at Potsdam has brought matters to a head, and I hope
the Foreign Office will approach Turkey with a view to an arrangement
for the completion of the Bagdad Railway which might be agreeable to
Turkey, Germany and ourselves.”[9]
The hope of Mr. Pickersgill was fulfilled, for the agreement of
November 4, 1910, proved to be the first of a series of conventions
regarding the Near East negotiated between 1911 and 1914 by Germany,
Turkey, Great Britain and France. On the eve of the Great War the
Bagdad Railway controversy had been all but settled!
FRENCH CAPITALISTS SHARE IN THE SPOILS
France, relieved of the necessity of supporting Russia’s strategic
objections to the Bagdad Railway, was glad to compromise with Turkey—in
return for compensatory concessions to French investors. The sharp
rebuff given M. Pichon by the Young Turks in the loan negotiations of
the spring and summer of 1910 had convinced French diplomatists and
business men alike that a policy of bullying the new administration
at Constantinople would be futile.[10] Continued obstruction of
Ottoman economic rehabilitation could have but two effects: to injure
French prestige and prejudice the interests of French business; to
drive the Young Turks into still closer association with the German
Government and still greater dependence upon German capitalists. On
the other hand, a conciliatory policy might be rewarded by profitable
participation of French bankers in the economic development of
Turkey-in-Asia and by a revival of French political influence at the
Sublime Porte.
Even before the negotiation of the Potsdam Agreement the Young Turks
had smiled upon French financial interests in the hope that the French
Government might adopt a more friendly attitude toward the new régime
in Turkey. In June, 1910, for example, the Smyrna-Cassaba Railway was
authorized to extend its existing line from Soma, in western Anatolia,
to Panderma, on the Sea of Marmora. The concession carried with it the
highest kilometric guarantee (18,800 francs) ever granted a railway in
the Ottoman Empire, although the construction of the line offered fewer
engineering and financial difficulties than other railways which had
been constructed under less favorable terms. From the standpoint of the
Turkish Government, however, the Soma-Panderma railway offered economic
and strategic returns commensurate with the investment, for it was part
of a comprehensive plan for the improvement of commercial and military
communications in Asia Minor.[11]
The acceptance of this concession by French capitalists—presumably
with the approval, certainly without the opposition, of their
Government—was an interesting commentary on the official attitude of
the French Republic toward the Bagdad Railway. If it was unprincipled
for Germans to accept a guarantee for the construction and operation
of their railways in Turkey, it is difficult to ascertain what
dispensation exempted Frenchmen from the same stigma. If the Anatolian
and Bagdad systems were anathema because of their possible utilization
for military purposes, little justification can be offered for the
Soma-Panderma line, which, completed in 1912, was one of the principal
factors in the stubborn defence of the Dardanelles three years later.
Shortly after the promulgation of the Soma-Panderma convention
additional steps were taken by the Ottoman Government toward the
further extension of French railway interests in Anatolia and Syria.
Negotiations were initiated with the Imperial Ottoman Bank for the
award to a French-owned company, _La Société pour la Construction
et l’Exploitation du Réseau de la Mer Noire_, of a concession for a
comprehensive system of railways in northern Anatolia. It was proposed
to construct elaborate port works at the Black Sea towns of Heraclea,
Samsun, and Trebizond, and to connect the new ports by railway with
the inland towns of Erzerum, Sivas, Kharput, and Van. Connections were
to be established at Boli and Sivas with extensions to the Anatolian
Railways, and at Arghana with a branch of the Bagdad line to Nisibin
and Diarbekr. Thus adequate rail communications would be provided from
the Ægean to the Persian Gulf, from the Black Sea to the Syrian shore
of the Mediterranean.[12]
Simultaneously, negotiations were being carried on between the Ottoman
Ministry of Public Works and the Imperial Ottoman Bank for extensive
concessions to the French Syrian Railways, owned and operated by _La
Société du Chemin de Fer de Damas-Hama et Prolongements_. Provision was
made for the construction of port and terminal facilities at Jaffa,
Haifa, and Tripoli-in-Syria; a traffic agreement was negotiated with
the Ottoman-owned Hedjaz Railway, pledging both parties to abstain
from discriminatory rates and other unfair competition; tentative
arrangements were made for the construction of a line from Homs to
the Euphrates. Provisional agreements embodying the Black Sea and
Syrian railway and port concessions were signed in 1911, but technical
difficulties of surveying the lines, together with the political
instability occasioned by the Tripolitan and Balkan Wars, postponed the
definitive contract.[13]
After the Treaty of Bucharest, August 10, 1913, the Ottoman Government
was more determined than ever to do everything in its power to
eliminate French opposition to railway construction in Asia Minor and
to secure French aid in the further economic development of Turkey.
Crushing defeats at the hands of the Italians and the Balkan states had
emphasized the deficiencies of Ottoman communications, Ottoman economic
and military organization, Ottoman financial resources. The national
treasury, emptied by the drain of three wars, needed replenishment by
an increase in the customs duties, to which French sanction would have
to be obtained, and by a foreign loan, for which it was hoped French
bankers would submit a favorable bid. All of these questions were so
closely associated with the question of political influence in the Near
East, however, that it was obviously desirable to arrive at some _modus
vivendi_ between French and German interests in Ottoman railways and
in Ottoman financial affairs. Accordingly, the Young Turk Government
prevailed upon the Imperial Ottoman Bank and the _Deutsche Bank_ to
discuss a basis for a Franco-German agreement, and Djavid Bey was
despatched to Paris to conduct whatever negotiations might be necessary
with the French Government.
On August 19 and 20 and September 24, 25, 26, 1913, a series of
important meetings was held in Berlin to ascertain upon what terms
French and German investments in Turkey might be apportioned with the
least possibility of conflict. German interests were represented by Dr.
von Gwinner and Dr. Helfferich; the chief of the French negotiators
were Baron de Neuflize, a Regent of the Bank of France, and M. de
Klapka, Secretary-General of the Imperial Ottoman Bank. Supposedly the
conferences were conducted only between the interested financiers,
but the discussions were participated in by representatives of the
French, German, and Ottoman foreign offices. Obstacles which, at the
start, seemed insurmountable were overcome at the Berlin meetings and
a series of minor conferences which followed. The result was one of
the most important international agreements of the years immediately
preceding the Great War—the secret Franco-German convention of February
15, 1914. The terms of this agreement, heretofore unpublished, may be
summarized as follows:[14]
1. Northern Anatolia was recognized as a sphere of French influence
for purposes of railway development. Arrangements were concluded for
linking the Anatolian and Bagdad systems with the proposed Black Sea
Railways, and traffic agreements satisfactory to all of the companies
were ratified and appended to the convention. It was agreed that the
port and terminal facilities at Heraclea should be constructed by a
Franco-German company.
2. Syria, likewise, was recognized as a French sphere of influence. In
particular, the right of the Syrian Railways to construct a line from
Tripoli-in-Syria to Deir es Zor, on the Euphrates, was confirmed. A
traffic agreement between the Bagdad and Syrian companies was ratified
and appended to the convention.
3. The regions traversed by the Anatolian and Bagdad Railways
were defined as a German sphere of influence. A neutral zone was
established in Northern Syria to avoid infringement upon German or
French rights in that region.
4. The _Deutsche Bank_ and the Imperial Ottoman Bank each pledged
itself to respect the concessions of the other, to seek no railway
concessions within the sphere of influence of the other, and to
do nothing, directly or indirectly, to hinder the construction or
exploitation of the railway lines of the other in Asiatic Turkey.
5. It was agreed that appropriate diplomatic and financial measures
should be taken to bring about an increase in the revenues of the
Ottoman Empire, sufficient, at least, to finance all of the projected
railways, both French and German. Construction of the lines already
authorized, or to be authorized, should be pursued, as far as
possible, _pari passu_, each group to receive subsidies from the
Ottoman Treasury in about the same proportion.
6. The _Deutsche Bank_ agreed to repurchase from the Imperial Ottoman
Bank all of the latter’s shares and debentures of the Bagdad Railway
and its subsidiary enterprises, amounting to Fr. 69,400,000. Payment
was to be made in like value of Imperial Ottoman bonds of the Customs
Loan of 1911, Second Series, which had been underwritten by a German
syndicate.
Certain observations should be made regarding the character of this
convention, if its full significance is to be appreciated. It was an
agreement between two great financial groups in France and Germany; as
such it was signed by M. Sergent, Sub-Governor of the Bank of France;
M. de Klapka, Secretary-General of the Imperial Ottoman Bank; and Dr.
Karl Helfferich, Managing Director of the _Deutsche Bank_. In addition,
it was an understanding between the Governments of France and Germany;
as such it was signed by M. Ponsot, of the French Embassy in Berlin,
and by Herr von Rosenberg, of the German Foreign Office. A speech of
Chancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg to the Reichstag, December 9, 1913,
acknowledged the official character of the negotiations being conducted
by the French and German bankers. That the French Government considered
the convention a binding international agreement is made perfectly
clear by a despatch of Baron Beyens, Belgian Minister in Berlin, to
M. Davignon, Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs, February 20, 1914,
in which the attention of the Belgian Government is officially called
to the existence of the convention.[15] The agreement, furthermore,
was acceptable to the Ottoman Government, for the Sultan promptly
confirmed the concessions for the new Black Sea and Syrian lines and
for the necessary extensions to the Anatolian Railways. Much has been
written about governmental support of investors in foreign countries,
but, so far as the author has been able to ascertain, this is the first
instance in which a financial pact and an international agreement have
been combined in one document. No longer are treaties negotiated by
diplomatists alone, but by diplomatists and bankers!
From the standpoint of the French interests involved, the February
convention of 1914 was an eminently satisfactory settlement of the
Bagdad Railway controversy. French capitalists secured concessions for
more than 2,000 miles of railways in Asiatic Turkey, thus eliminating
the danger of eventual German control of all communications in the
Ottoman Empire. The Imperial Ottoman Bank was relieved of the risk
of carrying an investment of almost seventy million francs in the
Bagdad enterprise—an investment which had been a “frozen asset”
because of the persistent refusal of the French Government to admit
the Bagdad securities to the Bourse. In return, the Bank received a
large block of Imperial Ottoman bonds, which were readily negotiable
and which materially increased French influence in the Ottoman Public
Debt Administration. Furthermore, as a result of a tacit agreement
with the _Deutsche Bank_, the Imperial Ottoman Bank was awarded the
Imperial Ottoman Five Per Cent Loan of 1914, amounting to $100,000,000,
upon terms affording a handsome profit to the underwriters.[16] As
for the French Government, it was enabled to emerge gracefully from
the difficult situation in which it found itself after the Potsdam
Agreement. France no longer was obliged to pursue a purely Russian
policy in the Near East, for the Tsar’s Government—in addition to
withdrawing its objections to German railways in Asiatic Turkey—gave
its consent to the construction of the French Black Sea Railways
with the sole proviso that the system should not be completed in its
entirety until Russia had constructed certain strategic railways
necessary to assure the safety of the Caucasus frontier.[17]
German diplomacy, on the other hand, had strengthened its position in
the Near East by securing definite recognition of central and southern
Anatolia, northern Syria and Mesopotamia as German spheres of interest.
German financiers acquired exclusive control of the Bagdad enterprise
and were assured that there would be no further obstruction of their
plans by the French Government. The French promise to coöperate in
improving the financial situation in Turkey meant that funds would
be forthcoming for continued construction of uncompleted sections of
the Bagdad Railway. The Young Turks were delighted at the prospect
that the Powers might finally consent to the much-needed increase in
the customs duties. They were no less delighted to know that railway
construction in Asia Minor—which held out so much promise for the
economic development and the political stability of the country—was to
go on unimpeded by Franco-German rivalry and antagonism.[18]
There was some harsh criticism in Great Britain, however, of the
advantages which France had obtained for herself in the Ottoman Empire.
Sir Mark Sykes, an eminent student of Near Eastern affairs, believed
that the new state of affairs was worse than the old. Speaking in the
House of Commons, March 18, 1914, he warned the Foreign Office that
“the policy of French financiers will produce eventually the collapse
of the Ottoman Empire.... Take the proposed loan arranged with the
French Government, for something over £20,000,000. In order to get this
there are concessions which I cannot help feeling are more brazen and
more fatal than any I have seen. The existing railways in Syria meander
for miles to avoid legitimate profits in order to extort a guarantee.
Alongside these railways you can see the merchants’ merchandise and the
peasants’ produce rotting because the railway people do not trouble to
warehouse the stuff or to shift it. They have got their guarantee, and
they do not care. These concessions, which have been extracted from
Turkey, mean a monopoly of all Syrian transit; and, further, a native
press is to be subventioned practically in the interest of these
particular monopolies.... In practice, loans, kilometric guarantees,
monopolies, and a financed native press must, whether the financiers
desire it or not, pave the way to annexation. I submit that this is not
the spirit of the _entente_. The British people did not stand by the
French people at Agadir to fill the pockets of financiers whose names
are unknown outside Constantinople or the Paris Bourse.... The Ottoman
Empire is shaken, and the cosmopolitan financier is now staking out the
land into spheres of interest. An empire may survive disaster, but it
cannot survive exploitation. A country like Turkey, without legislative
capacity, without understanding what the economics of Europe mean and
at the same time rich, is a lamb for the slaughter.”[19]
This trenchant criticism of French policy might have been taken more
seriously had Great Britain herself been actuated by magnanimous
impulses. Instead, British financiers were joining the common scramble
for concessions, and British statesmen were pursuing with ruthless
avidity every means of protecting British imperial interests.
THE YOUNG TURKS CONCILIATE GREAT BRITAIN
The Bagdad negotiations of 1910–1911 between Sir Ernest Cassel and Dr.
von Gwinner, on the one hand, and the British and Ottoman Governments,
on the other, came to naught, it will be recalled, because of the
refusal of Sir Edward Grey to consent to an increase in the Turkish
customs duties. The Sublime Porte was unwilling to grant the economic
concessions demanded by Great Britain as the price of her assistance in
Ottoman financial stabilization. But the Young Turks were shrewd enough
to keep the door open for further negotiations by removing the chief
political objection of England to the Bagdad enterprise—namely, that it
menaced British imperial interests in the region of the Persian Gulf.
In the convention of March 21, 1911, with the Bagdad Railway Company,
the Ottoman Government reserved to itself considerable latitude in the
disposition of the sections of the line beyond Bagdad.[20]
Conversations were resumed in July, 1911, when the Turkish minister
in London solicited of the Foreign Office a further statement of the
conditions upon which British objections to the Bagdad Railway might be
waived. He was informed that English acquiescence might be forthcoming
if the Bagdad-Basra section of the railway were constructed by a
company in which British, French, German, Russian, and Turkish capital
should share equally; if adequate guarantees were obtained regarding
the protection of British imperial interests in southern Mesopotamia
and Persia; if English capital were granted important navigation rights
on the Shatt-el-Arab, including complete exemption of British ships and
British goods from Ottoman tolls; if safeguards were provided against
discriminatory and differential tariffs on the Bagdad system.
These proposals met with only partial acceptance by the Ottoman
Government. Turkey was willing to internationalize the southernmost
sections of the Bagdad Railway, but under no circumstances would she
permit Russian participation in an enterprise which was so vital to the
defence of the Sultan’s Empire. Turkey was prepared to discuss with
England measures for the protection of legitimate British interests
in the Middle East, provided there be no further infringement on the
sovereign rights of the Sultan in southern Mesopotamia. Turkey agreed
that the principle of the economic open door should be scrupulously
observed throughout the Ottoman Empire; therefore she could not agree
to discriminatory treatment in favor of British commerce on the
Shatt-el-Arab, the Tigris, and the Euphrates. Upon these conditions
the Ottoman minister at London was authorized to continue negotiations
in the most friendly spirit.[21]
The Agadir crisis, which threatened war between England and Germany,
and the Tripolitan War, which diverted Turkish attention from domestic
reform to defence of the Empire, unfortunately led to a suspension of
the Anglo-Turkish conversations. They were not resumed until 1913, when
Turkey found a breathing spell between the first and second phases of
the First Balkan War.
During the interim, however, steps were taken to remove the obstacles
which stood in the way of an Anglo-German understanding. In February,
1912, Lord Haldane visited Berlin as the guest of the Kaiser to
discuss curtailment of the naval programs of the two Powers and to
agree upon other measures which would effect a _rapprochement_ between
_Wilhelmstrasse_ and Downing Street. As regards the Bagdad Railway,
Lord Haldane informed the German Government that he stood upon the
position he had taken in 1907—that Great Britain was prepared to
grant its consent to the enterprise if British political interests
in Mesopotamia were adequately safeguarded.[22] A few months later,
Baron Marschall von Bieberstein—who for fifteen years had guided
Germany’s destiny in the Near East—was transferred from Constantinople
to the embassy at London, as the first step in an attempt to reconcile
British imperial interests with German diplomatic hegemony in Turkey.
Almost simultaneously, Sir Harry Johnston, whose enthusiasm for
German ventures in Asia Minor has already been mentioned,[23] began a
quasi-official lecture tour in Germany to urge a sane settlement of the
Near Eastern tangle. Another important development was the appointment
as German Minister of Foreign Affairs, in January, 1913, of Herr von
Jagow, who believed that a great European war was inevitable unless
England and Germany could come to terms on the Turkish question.[24]
In this manner the stage was set for a resumption of Anglo-Turkish
conversations on the Bagdad Railway. In February, 1913, Hakki Pasha,
minister plenipotentiary and extraordinary of the Ottoman Government,
arrived in London with instructions to leave no stone unturned to
settle outstanding differences with Great Britain. For almost four
months Hakki Pasha and Sir Edward Grey discussed the problems of the
Near East and conferred with Herr von Kühlmann and Prince Lichnowsky,
of the German embassy at London, regarding the general terms of a
tripartite settlement of the economic and political questions at issue.
In May, 1913, a full agreement was reached upon the following wide
range of subjects: regularization of the legal position in Turkey of
British religious, educational, and medical institutions; pecuniary
claims of Great Britain against the Ottoman Empire; the Turkish veto
on the borrowing powers of Egypt; Turco-Persian boundary disputes,
particularly in so far as they affected oil lands; navigation of the
Tigris, Euphrates, and Shatt-el-Arab; irrigation of the Mesopotamian
valley; the status of Koweit. The settlements agreed upon were ratified
by a series of treaties between Great Britain and Turkey, notably those
of July 29, and October 21, 1913, and of June, 1914. Reconciliation of
British and German interests was reserved for discussion between London
and Berlin.[25]
In so far as concerned the Bagdad Railway, the substance of the
Anglo-Turkish agreements of 1913 is as follows:
1. Turkey recognized the special position of Great Britain in the
region of the Persian Gulf. Therefore, although Great Britain
acknowledged the suzerainty of the Sultan over Koweit, the Ottoman
Government pledged a policy of non-interference in the affairs of
the principality. The existing treaties between the Sheik and Great
Britain were confirmed.
2. The terminus of the Bagdad Railway was to be Basra, unless and
until Great Britain should give consent to an extension of the line to
the Persian Gulf.
3. In order to assure equality of treatment for all, regardless of
nationality or other considerations, the Ottoman Government agreed
that two British citizens should be elected to the Board of Directors
of the Bagdad Railway Company.
4. Exclusive rights of navigation by steamers and barges on the
Tigris, Euphrates, and Shatt-el-Arab were granted to the Ottoman
River Navigation Company, to be formed by Baron Inchcape, chairman of
the Peninsular and Oriental and the British India Steam Navigation
Companies. The Navigation Company, in which Turkish capital was to
be offered a fifty per cent participation, was to have wide powers
for the improvement and regulation of all navigable streams in
Mesopotamia, in cooperation with a commission to be appointed by the
Ottoman Government. Lord Inchcape’s concession was for a period of
sixty years, with optional renewals for ten-year periods.
5. It was agreed, however, that the Bagdad Railway and Inchcape
concessions were without prejudice to the rights of the Lynch
Brothers, which were specifically reaffirmed. The Lynch Brothers, in
fact, were granted the privilege of adding another steamer to their
equipment, with the single restriction that it fly the Turkish flag.
6. The British Government agreed that no navigation rights of its
nationals would be construed as permitting interference with the
development of Mesopotamia by irrigation, and the Ottoman Government
guaranteed that no irrigation works would be permitted to divert
navigable streams from their course.
7. In return for these, and other, assurances and concessions, Great
Britain consented to support an increase of 4% in the customs duties
of the Ottoman Empire.
The terms of this settlement were hailed by the English press as an
admirable solution of the Mesopotamian imbroglio. _The Times_ of May
17, 1913, for example, said: “Great Britain will have no further
reason for looking askance at a project which should do much for the
development of Asiatic Turkey. Our interests will be safeguarded;
we have always said that a terminus at Basra offered no menace to
specific British interests in the Persian Gulf; and the German
promoters will be free to complete their great project with the
benevolent acquiescence of Great Britain. There will be no official
participation in the construction of the line, but there will also
be nothing to deter British capital from being associated with the
scheme. We believe that if some such solution is adopted, a fertile
source of international misunderstanding will disappear. It is a
solution which should receive the approval of France and Russia and
should give gratification to Germany. It appears to leave no room for
subsequent differences of opinion, while it wipes out a whole series
of obscure disputes. It will be a further demonstration of that spirit
of coöperation among the Great Powers which has done so much of late
to preserve the peace of Europe. It should convince Germany that Great
Britain does not oppose the essential elements of the Bagdad Railway
scheme provided her own special interests are protected. Above all,
it will relieve the financial disabilities of Turkey and will enable
her to press forward the great task of binding with bonds of steel the
great Asiatic territories in which her future chiefly lies.” Other
press opinion was in accord with Sir Edward Grey that the agreement
“justifies us in saying that it is no longer in British interests to
oppose the line.”[26]
In Germany, likewise, the Anglo-Turkish agreement was favorably
received. The _Berliner Tageblatt_ of December 29, 1913, hailed it as
a triumph of German diplomacy. “For years,” it said, “this undertaking
has threatened to become a bone of contention between Russia, England,
and Germany. The German Government has now, through its cleverness
and tenacity, succeeded in removing all differences and in bringing
the line altogether into German possession.” In the Reichstag, as
well, the general tenor of the comments was favorable, although Herr
Bassermann and other National Liberals were somewhat vociferous about
the great “sacrifices” which Germany had made to propitiate Great
Britain. Among the Social Democrats and the Centrists, however, the
sentiment was obviously in accord with one member who said, “We share
the general satisfaction at this _rapprochement_, which is an aid to
world peace, but we also are of the opinion that there is no occasion
for over-exuberance or patriotic bombast.”[27]
As usual, the rôle of the Turks themselves was slighted. A casual
observer might have remarked that whatever “benevolent acquiescence”
was included in the settlement originated in Constantinople rather than
in London, and that the “sacrifices” involved were much more painful to
Turkey than to Germany!
BRITISH IMPERIAL INTERESTS ARE FURTHER SAFEGUARDED
In the Speech from the Throne, February 10, 1914, King George V
informed Parliament that the Near Eastern question was approaching a
solution. “My relations with foreign Powers continue to be friendly,”
he said. “I am happy to say that my negotiations, both with the German
Government and the Ottoman Government as regards matters of importance
to the commercial and industrial interests of this country in
Mesopotamia are rapidly approaching a satisfactory issue.” Nothing was
said to indicate the character of the negotiations or to identify the
“commercial and industrial interests” which were the objects of royal
solicitude.
Before the British Government would give its consent to a final
agreement with Turkey and Germany regarding the Bagdad Railway, the
King might have added, it was determined to acquire for certain worthy
Britons a share in some of the choicest economic plums in the Ottoman
Empire. Heading the interests which were thus to be favored was the
Right Honorable James Lyle Mackay, Baron Inchcape of Strathnaver, who
had been the beneficiary of the aforementioned Mesopotamian navigation
concession of July, 1913. Lord Inchcape is perhaps the foremost
shipping magnate in the British Empire. He is chairman and managing
director of the Peninsular and Oriental and the British India Steam
Navigation Companies; chairman and director of the Australasian United
Steam Navigation Company and the Eastern and Australian Steamship
Company; a director of the Steamship Owners’ Coal Association,
the Australasia and China Telegraph Company, the Marine Insurance
Company, the Central Queensland Meat Export Company, and various other
commercial enterprises. He is a vice-president of the Suez Canal
Company. He has extensive interests in the petroleum industry as a
director of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, Scottish Oils, Ltd., and the
D’Arcy Exploration Company.
Lord Inchcape’s interests were given ample consideration in the
Anglo-German negotiations of 1914. On February 23, a contract was
signed at London between the Bagdad Railway Company and Lord Inchcape,
the signatures to which were witnessed by Herr von Kühlmann, of
the German embassy, and Sir Eyre Crowe, of the British Foreign
Office. Under the terms of this contract the Bagdad Railway Company
acknowledged the monopolistic privileges in Mesopotamian river
navigation conferred upon Lord Inchcape’s interests by the Ottoman
Government; agreed to cancel its outstanding engagements with the Lynch
Brothers for the transportation of railway materials between Basra and
points along the Tigris; and guaranteed Lord Inchcape a minimum amount
of 100,000 tons of freight, at a figure of 22–1/2 shillings per ton, in
the transportation on the Tigris of supplies for the construction of
the Bagdad Railway and its subsidiary enterprises.[28]
This contract was so obviously in contravention of earlier rights of
the Lynch Brothers, which had been specifically reaffirmed by the
negotiations with Turkey, that it was amended by an agreement of March
27, 1914, between Lord Inchcape, Mr. John F. Lynch, and the Bagdad
Railway Company. The latter arrangement provided: 1. That Lord Inchcape
should immediately organize the Ottoman Navigation Company to take
over the concession of July, 1913, and the rights conferred upon Lord
Inchcape by his agreement of February 23, 1914, with the Bagdad Railway
Company; 2. That the Lynch Brothers should be admitted to participation
in the new Navigation Company and that Mr. John F. Lynch should be
elected a director thereof; 3. That the Bagdad Railway should assign to
a new Ottoman Ports Company—in which Mr. Lynch and Lord Inchcape should
be granted a 40% participation—all of the rights of the Railway to the
construction of port and terminal facilities at Bagdad and Basra; 4.
That the Bagdad Railway Company should be granted a 20% participation
in the new Ottoman Navigation Company. Thus were Lord Inchcape’s
powerful interests further propitiated! Thus did the Lynch Brothers
cease to be big fish in a small pond, to become small fish in a big
lake!
Measures were now taken to protect another vested interest, the
British-owned Smyrna-Aidin Railway Company. On March 26, a draft
agreement, subsequently confirmed as part of the Anglo-German
convention of June 15, was executed by Dr. Carl Bergmann, of the Bagdad
Railway Company, and Lord Rathmore, of the Smyrna-Aidin Company. It
provided for important extensions of over 200 miles to the existing
Smyrna-Aidin line (including a junction with the Anatolian-Bagdad
system at Afiun Karahissar), granted to British interests valuable
navigation rights on the lakes of Asia Minor, and protected each
railway from discriminatory treatment at the hands of the other. This
settlement was approved by Herr von Kühlmann, on behalf of the German
Government; Mr. Alwyn Parker, of the British Foreign Office; and Hakki
Pasha, minister plenipotentiary of the Sultan to the Court of St.
James.[29]
Oil—the magic word which has become the open sesame of so many
diplomatic mysteries—was of no inconsiderable importance in 1914. Early
in that eventful year the British Government—in order to insure an
uninterrupted supply of fuel to the fleet—had purchased a controlling
interest in the Anglo-Persian Oil Company. As a necessary step in
the negotiations regarding Turkish oilfields the German Government
was obliged, in March, 1914, to recognize southern Mesopotamia,
as well as central and southern Persia, as the exclusive field of
operations of the Anglo-Persian Company, and, in addition, to agree
to the construction of a railway from Kut-el-Amara to Mendeli for the
purpose of facilitating petroleum shipments. Thereupon an Anglo-German
syndicate organized the Turkish Petroleum Company for the acquisition
and exploitation of the oil resources of the vilayets of Mosul and
Bagdad. Half of the stock of the new company was assigned to the
National Bank of Turkey (controlled by Sir Ernest Cassel) and the
D’Arcy group (in which Lord Inchcape was interested); one quarter was
assigned to the Royal Dutch Company, and the remainder was reserved
for the _Deutsche Bank_. Upon joint representations by the British
and German ambassadors at the Sublime Porte, the Sultan, in June,
1914, conferred upon the Turkish Petroleum Company exclusive rights of
exploitation of the oil resources of the Mesopotamian valley from Mosul
to Bagdad.[30]
The vested interests of certain of its citizens having thus been
amply protected, the British Government proceeded to complete its
negotiations with the German ambassador in London. On June 15, 1914,
Sir Edward Grey and Prince Lichnowsky initialed an important convention
regarding the delimitation of English and German interests in Asiatic
Turkey. The following day _The Times_ announced that the terms of
an Anglo-German agreement had been incorporated in a draft treaty,
and on June 29, Sir Edward Grey informed the House of Commons that
formal ratification of the convention was being postponed only “until
Turkey and Germany have completed their own separate negotiations.”
By mid-July all was in readiness for the definitive signing of the
treaty, but the widening importance of the Austro-Serbian dispute
and the outbreak of the Great War put an end to the Bagdad Railway
conversations.[31]
The terms of the convention of June 15, 1914—which might have meant so
much to the future of Anglo-German relations—constituted a complete
settlement of the controversy which had waged for more than ten years
over German railway construction in the Mesopotamian valley. The
reconciliation of the divergent interests of the two Powers was based
upon the following considerations:[32]
1. “In recognition of the general importance of the Bagdad Railway
in international trade” the British Government bound itself not “to
adopt or to support any measures which might render more difficult
the construction or management of the Bagdad Railway by the Bagdad
Railway Company or to prevent the participation of capital in the
enterprise.” Great Britain further agreed that under no circumstances
would it “undertake railway construction on Ottoman territory in
direct competition with lines of the Bagdad Railway Company or in
contravention of existing rights of the Company or support the efforts
of any persons or companies directed to this end,” unless in accord
with the expressed wishes of the German Government.
2. His Britannic Majesty’s Government pledged itself to support an
increase in the customs duties of the Ottoman Empire from 11% to
15% _ad valorem_ and, furthermore, to “raise no objection to the
assignment to the Bagdad Railway Company of already existing Turkish
State revenues, or of revenues from the intended increase in tariff
duties, or of the proposed monopolies or taxes on the consumption of
alcohol, petroleum, matches, tinder, cigarette-paper, playing cards,
and sugar to the extent necessary for the completion of the Railway.“
3. The terminus of the Bagdad Railway was to be Basra. Both of the
signatory Powers declared that under no circumstances would they
“support the construction of a branch from Basra or any other point
on the main line of the Bagdad Railway to the Persian Gulf, unless
a complete understanding be previously arrived at between the
Imperial Ottoman, the Imperial German, and His Britannic Majesty’s
Governments.” The German Government furthermore pledged itself under
no circumstances to “undertake the construction of a harbor or a
railway station on the Persian Gulf or support efforts of any persons
or companies directed toward that end, unless a complete agreement be
previously arrived at with His Britannic Majesty’s Government.”
4. The German Government undertook to see that “on the lines of
the Bagdad Railway Company, as hitherto, no direct or indirect
discrimination in transit facilities or freight rates shall be made in
the transportation of goods of the same kind between the same places,
either on account of ownership or on account of origin or destination
of the goods or because of any other consideration.” In other words,
the German Government agreed to enforce Articles 24 and 25 of the
Specifications of March 5, 1903, which provided that “all rates,
whether they be general, special, proportional, or differential, shall
be applicable to all shippers and passengers without distinction,”
and which prohibited the Company to enter into any agreement for the
purpose of granting reductions in the rates announced in its published
tariffs.
5. In order further to protect British interests the German Government
assumed responsibility for the election to the Board of Directors of
the Bagdad Railway Company of “two English members acceptable to His
Britannic Majesty’s Government.”
6. Both Powers pledged themselves unreservedly to observe the
principle of the economic open door in the operation of railway,
ports, irrigation, and navigation enterprises in Turkey-in-Asia.
7. Great Britain recognized German interests in the irrigation of
the Cilician plain, and Germany recognized British interests in the
irrigation of the lower Mesopotamian valley.
8. Both signatory Powers took cognizance of and agreed to observe the
Anglo-Turkish agreement of July, 1913, conferring important navigation
rights in Mesopotamia upon British subjects; the agreements between
Lord Inchcape and the Bagdad Railway Company, regarding navigation
and port and terminal facilities on the Tigris and Euphrates; the
agreement between the Smyrna-Aidin Railway and the Bagdad Railway
regarding important extensions to the former line.
9. Great Britain and Germany agreed to “use their good offices with
the Imperial Ottoman Government to the end that the Shatt-el-Arab
shall be brought into a satisfactory navigable condition and
permanently maintained in such condition, so that ocean-going ships
may always be assured of free and easy access to the port of Basra,
and, further, that the shipping on the Shatt-el-Arab shall always be
open to ocean-going ships under the same conditions to ships of all
nations, regardless of the nationality of the ships or their cargo.”
10. It was agreed, finally, that any differences of opinion resulting
from the convention or its appended documents should be subject to
arbitration. If the signatory Powers were unable to agree upon an
arbitrator or a special court of arbitration, the case was to be
submitted to the Permanent Court of Arbitration at the Hague.
From both the German and the British points of view the foregoing
convention was an admirable solution of the Turkish problem. Had
the agreement been reached ten years earlier, it might have avoided
estrangement between the two nations. Had it come at almost any other
time than on the eve of the Great War, it would have been a powerful
stimulus to an Anglo-German _rapprochement_.
Germany, it is true, was obliged to abandon any hope of establishing
a port on the Persian Gulf. But there were grave uncertainties that
Koweit could ever be developed as a commercially profitable terminus
for the Bagdad Railway, whereas its very possession by a German company
would have been a constant source of irritation to Great Britain.
Basra, on the other hand, had obvious advantages. Like many of the
great harbors of the world—Hamburg, Bremen, Antwerp, London, New
York—it was on a river, rather than the open sea; and inasmuch as Great
Britain had agreed that the freedom of the open sea should be applied
to the Shatt-el-Arab, German ships were assured unrestricted access to
the southern terminus of the Bagdad Railway. In return for surrendering
the Basra-Persian Gulf section of the Bagdad system and for admitting
British capitalists to participation in the Bagdad and Basra ports
company, Germany received full recognition of her economic rights in
Anatolia, Syria, and northern Mesopotamia, together with a minor share
in Lord Inchcape’s navigation enterprises and in the newly formed
Turkish Petroleum Company. Above all, British opposition to the Bagdad
Railway, which had been so stubbornly maintained since 1903, was to be
a thing of the past. For these considerations Germany could well afford
to accept a subordinate place in southern Mesopotamia and to recognize
British interests in the Persian Gulf.
Great Britain gained even more than Germany. She abandoned her policy
of obstruction of the Bagdad Railway and consented to an increase
in the customs duties of the Ottoman Empire. These considerations
had never been ends in themselves, but rather pawns in the great
game of diplomacy, to be surrendered in return for other valuable
considerations. For them England secured guarantees of equality of
treatment for British citizens and British goods on the German railway
lines in Turkey. In addition, English capitalists received a monopoly
of navigation on the Tigris and Euphrates, a 40% interest in port and
terminal facilities at Bagdad and Basra, control of the oil resources
of the Mesopotamian valley, extensions to British-owned railways in
southern Anatolia, and other valuable economic concessions. British
political control was recognized as dominant in southern Mesopotamia;
therefore the Bagdad Railway no longer could be said to be a menace to
the safety of India. As for Britain’s new position in the Persian Gulf,
one of her own publicists said, “England has virtually annexed another
sea, one of the world’s highways.”[33]
DIPLOMATIC BARGAINING FAILS TO PRESERVE PEACE
It is one of the tragedies of pre-War diplomacy that the negotiations
of 1910–1914 failed to preserve peace in the Near East or, at least, to
prevent the entry of Turkey into the Great War. But the failure of the
treaties between Germany and the Entente Powers regarding the Ottoman
Empire can be traced, in general, to the same reasons that contributed
to the collapse of all diplomacy in the crisis of 1914. Imperialism,
nationalism, militarism—these were the causes of the Great War; these
were the causes of Ottoman participation in the Great War.
One obvious defect of the Potsdam Agreement, the Franco-German
agreement regarding Anatolian railways, the Anglo-Turkish settlement
of 1913, and the Anglo-German convention regarding Mesopotamia,
was the fact that they were founded upon the principle of imperial
compensations. Each of the Great Powers involved made “sacrifices”—but
in return for important considerations. And throughout all of the
bargaining the rights of Turkey, a “backward nation,” were completely
ignored. As the German ambassador in London wrote: “The real purpose
of these treaties was to divide Asia Minor into spheres of interest,
although this expression was anxiously avoided, out of regard for the
rights of the Sultan.... By virtue of the treaties all Mesopotamia as
far as Basra became our sphere of interest, without prejudice to older
British rights in the navigation of the Tigris and in the Willcocks
irrigation works. Our sphere further included the whole region of the
Bagdad and Anatolian Railways. The British economic domain was to
include the coasts of the Persian Gulf and the Smyrna-Aidin line; the
French, Syria; the Russian, Armenia.”[34]
In the scramble for concessions in Asia Minor, Italy had been
overlooked. The proposed extension of the Smyrna-Aidin Railway met with
vehement denunciation on the part of patriotic Italians who looked
forward to the further development of Italian economic influence in the
hinterland of the port of Adalia. The Italian press loudly demanded
that energetic action be taken by the Government to secure from Turkey
compensatory concessions or, in default of that, to announce to the
Sublime Porte that Italy would not return to Turkey the Dodecanese
Islands, of which Italy was in temporary occupation under the terms of
the Treaty of Lausanne (1912). A formal demand of this character was
made by King Victor Emmanuel’s ambassador at Constantinople, but was
met with a curt refusal on the part of the Turks to bargain for the
return of their own property.[35]
The Young Turks were not unaware of the true character of the
agreements they had entered into with the respective European Powers,
but they considered themselves impotent to act otherwise at the time.
They knew full well that there was grave danger in an extension of
British influence in Mesopotamia, French interests in Syria, and
Franco-Russian enterprise in northern Anatolia. They had not forgotten
the spoliation of their empire by Austria-Hungary and Italy. They
were not altogether unsuspicious about the intentions of Germany. But
they believed they could never emancipate their country from foreign
domination until they had modernized it. They needed foreign capital
and foreign technical assistance, and they had to pay the price. In
order to throw off the yoke of European imperialism they had to consent
temporarily to be victimized by it.[36]
Nationalistic fervor added to the difficulties created by imperialist
rivalry. M. André Tardieu, political editor at the time of _Le Temps_,
did not let a single opportunity pass during February and March, 1914,
to denounce the French Government for its pro-German policy in the
Bagdad Railway question. When M. Cambon, French ambassador at Berlin,
was asked whether the Franco-German agreement on Turkish railways would
improve the relations between his country and the German Empire, he
said: “Official relations, yes, perhaps to some extent, but I do not
think that the agreement will affect the great body of public opinion
on both sides of the Vosges. It will not, unfortunately, change the
tone of the French press towards the Germans.... There is no doubt
whatever that the majority, both of Germans and Frenchmen, desire to
live at peace; but there is a powerful minority in each country that
dreams of nothing but battles and wars, either of conquest or revenge.
That is the peril that is always with us; it is like living alongside
a barrel of gunpowder which may explode on the slightest provocation.”
Herr von Jagow, German Minister of Foreign Affairs, expressed a
similar opinion when he said that he was watching for a favorable
moment for the publication of the Anglo-German convention of June 15,
1914—“an appropriate moment when the danger of adverse criticism was
no longer so acute.”[37] Hatred, suspicion, fear, and other unbridled
passions were the stock-in-trade of the Continental press during the
months preceding the outbreak of the Great War. Patriotic bombast,
not international conciliation, was demanded by the imperialist and
nationalist minorities, who exerted only too much influence upon the
Governments and made politicians fear lest their efforts at peace be
misconstrued as treason!
A situation which was made bad by imperial rivalries and national
antagonisms was made intolerable by militarism. During the year
1913–1914, when the diplomatists were working for peace, preparations
were being made for war. In the month of August, 1913, while
conversations were being held in Berlin to reconcile French and German
interests in the Near East, General Joffre was on his way to Russia
to confer with the Tsar’s general staff regarding the reorganization
of the Russian army. In October of the same year, while tripartite
negotiations were being conducted by England, Turkey, and Germany
regarding Mesopotamia, General Liman von Sanders was despatched to
Constantinople by the Kaiser as head of a German military mission to
rebuild the Ottoman army and improve the Ottoman system of defence.
Considerations of military strategy were vitiating the efforts of
conciliatory diplomacy.
The mission of Liman von Sanders created a crisis at Constantinople.
The Russian, French, and British ambassadors protested against
such an obvious menace to the interests of the Entente. Russia, in
particular, objected to the announced intention of the German general
to strengthen the defences of the Straits. All three of the Powers
expressed opposition to the further proposal that Field Marshal von
Sanders be placed in command of the First Army Corps, with headquarters
at Constantinople. The Ottoman Government replied that it meant no
offence to England or France, but that it could not allow its military
policy to be determined by Russia. It called attention to the fact
that the improvement of the navy was in the hands of a British mission
and that the reorganization of the gendarmerie was going on under the
direction of a French general. German officers were being asked to
perform similar services for the army because the great majority of
Turkish officers had completed their training in Germany, and the rest,
since the days of General von der Goltz Pasha, had been educated and
experienced in German methods. To change from German to French or
British technique appeared to the Ottoman Minister of War an extremely
inadvisable procedure.[38]
Although the storm over Liman von Sanders cleared by February, 1914,
it left behind it certain permanent effects. It strengthened German
influence at Constantinople, indirectly because of the increased
Turkish hostility to Russia and suspicion of France and England,
directly because of the presence of hundreds of German staff and
regimental officers who used every opportunity to increase German
prestige in the army and the civil services. The German ambassador
at the Sublime Porte, Baron von Wangenheim, readily capitalized this
prestige in the interest of German diplomacy. A formal Turco-German
alliance was rapidly passing from the realm of the possible to the
realm of the probable.
In the meantime feverish efforts were being made to complete
Turkey’s military preparations. In March, 1914, at the request of
the Minister of War, a conference was held of representatives of all
railways in Asiatic Turkey to discuss the utilization of Ottoman rail
communications for mobilization in the event of war. Under the guidance
of German and Turkish staff officers a plan was adopted by which the
respective railways agreed to merge their services into a unified
national system for the transportation of troops. Throughout the spring
of 1914 the defences of the Dardanelles were being strengthened,
schools were being conducted for junior officers and non-commissioned
officers, the General Staff was reorganized, new plans for mobilization
were in process of completion. On July 23, 1914, the handiwork of Field
Marshal Liman von Sanders Pasha was exhibited in a great national
military review. On that occasion Baron von Wangenheim said to the
Ottoman Minister of Marine: “Djemal Pasha, just look at the amazing
results achieved by German officers in a short time. You have now
a Turkish army which can be compared with the best organized armies
in the world! All German officers are at one in praising the moral
strength of the Turkish soldier, and indeed it has proved itself beyond
all expectation. We could claim we have won a great victory if we could
call ourselves the ally of a Government which has such an army at its
disposal!”[39]
A few days later the Ottoman Empire was admitted to the Triple
Alliance—with the consent of Austria, but without even the knowledge of
Italy. The die was cast for Turkey’s participation in the War of the
Nations![40]
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL AND EXPLANATORY NOTES
[1] Statement of Chancellor von Bethmann Hollweg to the Reichstag,
December 10, 1910, in _Stenographische Berichte, XII Legislaturperiode,
2 Session_, Volume 262, pp. 3561b _et seq._ _Cf._, also, _The Annual
Register_, 1910, pp. 314–315, 335–336; Shuster, _op. cit._, pp. 225
_et seq._ The informal agreement reached at Potsdam was confirmed by a
treaty of August 19, 1911. _The Annual Register_, 1911, pp. 357–358.
For the diplomatic correspondence arising out of the Potsdam Agreement
_cf._ de Siebert, _op. cit._, Chapter IX.
[2] Korff, _op. cit._, pp. 163–164. Baron Korff believes, also, that
the Potsdam Agreement was forced upon the weak and vacillating Nicholas
II by the unscrupulous and bullying William II.
[3] _Supra_, pp. 65–66, 147–153. For German estimates of the importance
of the Potsdam Agreement see a reasoned and temperate speech by Dr.
Spahn, of the Catholic Centre, and an impassioned and boisterous
speech by Herr Bassermann, of the National Liberals. _Stenographische
Berichte, XII Legislaturperiode, 2 Session_, Volume 266 (1911), PP.
5973 _et seq._, 5984 _et seq._
[4] _The Times_, January 18, 1911.
[5] Quoted by W. M. Fullerton, _Problems of Power_ (new and revised
edition, New York, 1915), p. 171.
[6] _Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons_, fifth series, Volume 21
(1911), pp. 241–244.
[7] _Journal Officiel, Débats parlementaires, Chambre des Députés_,
January 13, 1911, pp. 33–34. M. Jaurès was one of the Frenchmen who
felt that their Government never should have opposed the Bagdad Railway
in the first instance.
[8] _Ibid._, January 16, pp. 64 _et seq._; _Parliamentary Debates,
House of Commons_, Volume 21 (1911), pp. 82 _et seq._, 243–244; _The
Times_, January 17 and 19, 1911.
[9] _Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons_, Volume 21 (1911), p. 82.
[10] _Cf._ _supra_, pp. 224–225.
[11] _Cf._ G. Saint-Yves, “Les chemins de fer français dans la Turquie
d’Asie,” in _Questions diplomatiques et coloniales_, Volume 37 (1914),
pp. 526–531; _Anatolia_, pp. 51–52.
[12] It was proposed that the Anatolian Railways should construct three
branches: one from a point east of Bulgurlu north and north-east to
Kaisarieh and Sivas; a second from Angora east to the aforementioned
branch, joining it near Kaisarieh; a third from Adabazar to Boli. The
branch of the Bagdad Railway from Nisibin to Diarbekr and Arghana was
authorized by the concession of 1903.
[13] Much of the present account of the negotiations of the years
1910–1914 is based upon documentary material furnished by Dr. von
Gwinner and upon additional information supplied by Sir Henry Babington
Smith and Djavid Bey. Almost everything heretofore published has been
very general in character, but one may find some illuminating details
in the following: R. de Caix, “La France et les chemins de fer de
l’Asie turque,” in _Questions diplomatiques et coloniales_, Volume
36 (1913), pp. 386–387; _Armenia and Kurdistan_, p. 36; _Commerce
Reports_, No. 18a (1915), pp. 2–3; _Stenographische Berichte, XIII
Legislaturperiode, 1 Session_, Volume 291 (1913), pp. 6274c _et seq._;
_American Journal of International Law_, April, 1918; Commandant
de Thomasson, “Les négotiations franco-allemandes,” in _Questions
diplomatiques et coloniales_, Volume 37 (1914), pp. 257 _et seq._
[14] For certified copies of the minutes of the meetings of August
19–20 and September 24–26, 1913, and for the text of the convention of
February 15, 1914, the author is indebted to Dr. von Gwinner.
[15] _Stenographische Berichte, XIII Legislaturperiode, 1 Session_,
Volume 291 (1913), p. 6274c. No. 111 of a series of despatches
published by the German Foreign Office (Berlin, 1915), an English
translation of which is to be found in E.D. Morel’s _Diplomacy
Revealed_ (London, 1921), pp. 282–283.
[16] _Parliamentary Papers_, No. Cmd. 964 (1920).
[17] _Cf._ de Caix, _op. cit._, pp. 386–387.
[18] It should be made clear that not all the terms of the
Franco-German agreement were carried out before the beginning of the
Great War. Because of the delay in the negotiations with Great Britain
(_cf._ _infra_) the exchange of Bagdad Railway securities for Imperial
Ottoman Bonds was not completed, with the result that, when the War
came, French bankers still held an interest in the Bagdad Railway
Company.
[19] _Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons_, fifth series, Volume
59 (1914), pp. 2179–2189. Sir Mark Sykes (1879–1919) had traveled
extensively in the Near and Far East and was the author of many books
on the political and economic problems of those regions. During the
Great War he was commissioned by the British Government to negotiate
with France regarding the delimitation of the Allies’ interests in
Mesopotamia and Syria. He was one of the authors of the Sykes-Picot
Treaty of 1916.
[20] _Supra_, pp. 111–112, 228–229.
[21] Memorandum of Djavid Bey, cited in Chapter IX, _supra_.
[22] Haldane, _op. cit._, _passim_; W. von Hohenzollern, _My Memoirs,
1878–1918_, pp. 142–156; _supra_, pp. 198–199; _The Annual Register_,
1912, pp. 16, 332; Count de Lalaing, Belgian Minister in London, to M.
Davignon, Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs, February 9 and 16, 1912,
despatches Nos. 88 and 90, translated in Morel, _op. cit._, pp. 228–230.
[23] _Supra_, pp. 205–207.
[24] Baron Marschall died in September, 1912, after only a few weeks
of service at his new post. He was succeeded by Prince Lichnowsky, who
took up his duties in London in November. Regarding the lecture tour
of Sir Harry Johnston see the authentic account by Bernadotte Schmitt,
_England and Germany, 1740–1914_, pp. 355–356. Herr von Jagow’s opinion
of the importance of an Anglo-German understanding on the Near East is
to be found in his reply to Prince Lichnowsky, in the _Norddeutsche
Allgemeine Zeitung_ of March 23, 1918, translated by Munroe Smith, _The
Disclosures from Germany_, pp. 130–131.
[25] Regarding the Anglo-Turkish negotiations _cf._ _Parliamentary
Debates, House of Commons_, Volume 53 (1913), pp. 392–395;
_Stenographische Berichte, XIII Legislaturperiode, 1 Session_, Volume
291 (1913), pp. 6274c-6294d; Karl Helfferich, _Die Vorgeschichte des
Weltkrieges_, pp. 143 _et seq._; _Mesopotamia_, pp. 97–98; _The Times_
(London), May 17 and May 31, 1913; _The Quarterly Review_, Volume 228
(1917), pp. 517–521; de Siebert, _op. cit._, Chapter XX.
[26] _Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons_, Volume 53 (1913), p.
393.
[27] _Stenographische Berichte, XIII Legislaturperiode, 1 Session_,
Volume 289 (1913), p. 4744d. _Cf._, also, _ibid._, pp. 4744c-4746c;
Volume 290 (1913), p. 5326a-c.
[28] For copies of this and other agreements the author is indebted to
Dr. von Gwinner, of the _Deutsche Bank_.
[29] For the text of the agreement _cf._ E.M. Earle, “The Secret
Anglo-German Convention of 1914 regarding Asiatic Turkey,” in the
_Political Science Quarterly_ (New York), Volume XXXVIII (1923), pp.
41–44.
[30] “Correspondence between His Majesty’s Government and the United
States Ambassador respecting Economic Rights in Mandated Territories,”
_Parliamentary Papers_, No. Cmd. 675 (1921); _The Daily News_ (London),
June 26, 1920; G. Slocombe, “The Oil Behind the War Scare,” in _The
Daily Herald_ (London), October 12 and 13, 1922; _The Disclosures from
Germany_, p. 238.
[31] _Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons_, Volume 64 (1914), pp.
116–117.
[32] For the complete text of the convention, _cf._ E. M. Earle, “The
Secret Anglo-German Convention of 1914 regarding Asiatic Turkey,” _loc.
cit._, pp. 24–44.
[33] Fullerton, _op. cit._, p. 307.
[34] Prince Lichnowsky, quoted from _The Disclosures from Germany_, pp.
71–72.
[35] Saint-Yves, _loc. cit._, pp. 526–531; _Anatolia_, pp. 49 _et seq._
Regarding the earlier development of Italian economic interests in
Turkey _cf._ _supra_, pp. 105–107.
[36] For an interesting discussion of this point see Ahmed Djemal
Pasha, _Erinnerungen eines türkischen Staatsmannes_ (Munich, 1922),
translated into English under the title, _Memories of a Turkish
Statesman, 1913–1919_ (New York, 1923), pp. 107–115 of the translation,
pp. 113–122 of the German text. (Hereafter page references are given
for the translation only).
[37] Baron Beyens, Belgian minister in Berlin, to M. Davignon, Belgian
Minister of Foreign Affairs, No. 111 of the Belgian documents,
translated in Morel’s _Diplomacy Revealed_, p. 283. The quotation from
von Jagow is from _The Disclosures from Germany_, p. 251.
[38] Regarding the German military mission to Turkey _cf._ Djemal
Pasha, _op. cit._, pp. 65–70, 101–102; Liman von Sanders, _Fünf Jahre
Türkei_ (Berlin, 1919); Field Marshal von der Goltz, _Die Militärische
Lage der Türkei nach dem Balkankriege_ (Berlin, 1913); _The Disclosures
from Germany_, pp. 57 _et seq._
[39] Djemal Pasha, _op. cit._, p. 108.
[40] _Ibid._, pp. 107–115. Regarding other aspects of German military
and diplomatic successes in Turkey during 1914, _cf._ _Anatolia_, pp.
44–45; Henry Morgenthau, _Ambassador Morgenthau’s Story_ (New York,
1918); Karl Helfferich, _Die deutsche Türkenpolitik_, pp. 28 _et seq._,
and _Die Vorgeschichte des Weltkrieges_, _passim_; André Chéradame,
_The Pan German Plot Unmasked_ (New York, 1917)—all representing widely
divergent points of view.