THE YOUNG TURKS ARE WON OVER
A GOLDEN OPPORTUNITY PRESENTS ITSELF TO THE ENTENTE POWERS
The Young Turk revolutions of 1908 and 1909, which ended the reign of
Abdul Hamid in the Ottoman Empire, offered France and Great Britain an
unprecedented opportunity to assume moral and political leadership in
the Near East. Many members of the Committee of Union and Progress,
the revolutionary party, had been educated in western European
universities—chiefly in Paris—and had come to be staunch admirers of
French and English institutions. “Liberty, Equality, Fraternity,”
the slogan of Republican France, became the watch-cry of the new era
in Turkey. Parliamentary government and ministerial responsibility
under a constitutional monarch, the political contribution of
Britain to Western civilization, became the aim of the reformers at
Constantinople. The Ottoman Empire was to be modernized politically,
industrially, and socially according to the best of western European
traditions.[1]
Into this scheme of things German influence fitted not at all. From
the Young Turk point of view the Kaiser was an autocrat who not only
had blocked democratic reform in Germany, but also had propped up
the tottering regime of Abdul Hamid and thus had aided suppression
of liberalism in the Ottoman Empire. As for Baron Marschall von
Bieberstein, he had hobnobbed with the ex-Sultan and was considered
as much a representative of the old order of things as Abdul Hamid
himself. As Dr. Rohrbach described the situation, “the Young Turks,
liberals of every shade, believed that Germany had been a staunch
supporter of Abdul Hamid’s tyrannical government and that the German
influence constituted a decided danger for the era of liberalism. That
thought was zealously supported by the English and French press in
Constantinople. The Young Turkish liberalism showed in the beginning a
decided leaning toward a certain form of Anglomania. England, the home
of liberty, of parliaments, of popular government—such were the catch
phrases promulgated in the daily papers.”[2]
German prestige suffered still further because of the unseemly
conduct of Germany’s allies toward the Young Turk Government. The
revolution of 1908 was less than three months old when Austria-Hungary
annexed Bosnia-Herzegovina. Almost simultaneously, Ferdinand of
Bulgaria—presumably at the instigation and with the connivance of
Austria—declared the independence of Bulgaria from the Sultan and
assumed for himself the title of tsar. To cap the climax, Italy was
intriguing in Tripoli and Cyrenaica with a view to the eventual seizure
of those provinces. Baron Marschall found it impossible to explain
away these hostile moves of the allies of Germany, and he protested
vehemently against the failure of the Foreign Office at Berlin to
restrain Austria-Hungary and Italy. He warned Prince von Bülow that
vigorous action must be taken if Germany’s influence in the Near East
were not to be totally destroyed.[3]
The decline of German prestige at Constantinople could not have been
without effect upon the Bagdad Railway and the other activities of the
_Deutsche Bank_. The Bagdad enterprise, in fact, was looked upon as a
concrete manifestation of German hegemony at the Sublime Porte and as
the crowning achievement of the friendship of those two autocrats of
the autocrats, Abdul Hamid and William II. As such, it was certain to
draw the fire of the reformers. The concession of 1903 had never been
published in Turkey. Only fifty copies had been printed, and these had
been distributed only among high officials of the Palace, the Sublime
Porte, and the Ministries of War, Marine, and Public Works. It was
generally supposed by the Union and Progress party, therefore, that
the summaries published in the European press were limited to what
the Sultan chose to make public. “The secrecy which thus enveloped
the Bagdad Railway concession gave rise to the conviction that the
contract contained, apart from detrimental financial and economic
clauses, provisions which endangered the political independence of
the State.”[4] And Young Turks were determined to tolerate no such
additional limitations on the sovereignty of their country.
The opening, in the autumn of 1908, of the first parliament under
the constitutional regime in Turkey gave the opponents of the Bagdad
Railway their chance. A bitter attack on the project—in which hardly a
single provision of the contract of 1903 escaped scathing criticism—was
delivered by Ismail Hakki Bey, representative from Bagdad, editor of
foreign affairs for a well-known reform journal, and a prominent member
of the Union and Progress party. Hakki Bey denounced the Railway as a
political and economic monstrosity which could have been possible only
under an autocratic and corrupt government; in any event, he believed,
it could have no place in the New Turkey. He proposed complete
repudiation of the existing contracts with the _Deutsche Bank_. In this
proposal he received considerable support from other members of the
parliament.
An equally ringing, but more reasoned, speech was delivered by the
talented Djavid Bey, subsequently to become Young Turk Minister of
Finance. He agreed that the concession of 1903 infringed upon the
economic and administrative independence of the Ottoman Empire; he
condemned the scheme of kilometric guarantees as an unwarranted and
indefensible drain upon the Treasury; he denounced the preponderance
of strategic over business considerations in the construction of the
line; he made it plain that he had no wish to see the extension of
German influence in Turkey. He believed that the Bagdad concession
should be revised in the interest of Ottoman finance and Ottoman
sovereignty. But there must be no repudiation. “We must accept the
Bagdad Railway contract, because there should exist a continuity and
a solidarity between generations and governments. If a revolutionary
government remains true to the obligations of its predecessor—even if
those obligations be contracted by a government of the worst and most
despotic kind—it will arouse among foreigners admiration of the moral
sense of the nation and will accordingly increase public confidence.
Just now, more than at any other time in our history, we Turks need
the confidence of the world.” Everything should be done to effect a
revision of the Bagdad Railway concession, however, and a firm resolve
should be taken never again to commit the nation to such an engagement.
The anti-German and pro-Entente proclivities of the Young Turks were
expressed in tangible ways. In 1909, for example, the Ottoman Navy was
placed under the virtual command of a British admiral, and British
officers continued to exercise comprehensive powers of administration
over the ships and yards almost to the declaration of war in 1914.
In 1909, also, Sir Ernest Cassel accepted an invitation to establish
the National Bank of Turkey, for the purpose of promoting more
generous investment of British capital in the Ottoman Empire. During
the same year Sir William Willcocks was appointed consulting engineer
to the Minister of Public Works, and his plans for the irrigation
of Mesopotamia were put into immediate operation. Sir Richard
Crawford, a British financier, was appointed adviser to the Minister
of Finance; a British barrister was made inspector-general of the
Ministry of Justice; a member of the British consular service became
inspector-general of the Home Office. Later, serious consideration
was given to a proposal to invite Lord Milner to head a commission
to suggest reforms in the political and economic administration
of Anatolia. A French officer was made inspector-general of the
gendarmerie. In June, 1910, a French company was awarded a valuable
concession for the construction of a railway from Soma to Panderma, and
the following year the lucrative contract for the telephone service in
Constantinople was granted to an Anglo-French syndicate.[5]
The Young Turk Government likewise was desirous of doing everything
possible to remove French and British objections to the construction of
railways in the Ottoman Empire. With this end in view they prevailed
upon Dr. von Gwinner to reopen negotiations with Sir Ernest Cassel
regarding British participation in the Bagdad Railway, and they secured
the consent of the _Deutsche Bank_ to a rearrangement of the terms of
the concession of 1903. The latter was to be undertaken in accordance
with British wishes and with due regard to the financial situation of
Turkey. This was followed up, on November 8, 1909, by a formal request
of the Ottoman ambassador at London for a statement of the terms upon
which the British Government would withdraw its diplomatic objections
to the Bagdad enterprise. Simultaneously negotiations were initiated
for “compensations” to French interests, represented by the Imperial
Ottoman Bank.
Until the end of the year 1909, then, the political situation in the
Ottoman Empire under the revolutionary government had been almost
altogether to the advantage of the Entente Powers. During 1910,
however, German prestige began to revive in the Near East, and by the
spring of 1911 German influence in Turkey had won back its former
preëminent position.
THE GERMANS ACHIEVE A DIPLOMATIC TRIUMPH
The Young Turk program, in its political aspects, was not only
liberal, but nationalist. In the fresh enthusiasm of the early months
of the revolution, emphasis was laid upon modernizing the political
institutions of the empire—parliamentary government and ministerial
responsibility and equality before the law were the concern of the
reformers. As time went on, however, liberalism was eclipsed by
nationalism and modernizing by Ottomanizing. By the autumn of 1909
Turkish nationalist activities were in full swing. Revolts in Macedonia
and Armenia were suppressed with an iron hand; there were massacres in
Adana and elsewhere in Anatolia and Cilicia; restrictions were imposed
upon personal liberties and upon freedom of the press; martial law
was declared. Pan-Turkism and Pan-Islamism were revived as political
movements.[6]
The development of an aggressive Turkish nationalism was not viewed
with equanimity by the Entente nations. The newspapers of France and
England roundly denounced the Adana massacres and came to adopt a
hostile attitude toward the Young Turk Revolution, which only a short
time previously they had extravagantly praised. Great Britain looked
with apprehension upon Ottoman support of the nationalist movements
in Egypt and India, and France was disturbed at the prospect of a
Pan-Islamic revival in Tunis, Algeria, and Morocco. Russia demanded
“reform” in Macedonia and Armenia and encouraged anti-Turk propaganda
in the Balkans. English interference in Cretan affairs and British
support of the insolent Sheik of Koweit still further complicated the
situation.[7]
For Germany, on the other hand, Turkish nationalism held no menace.
So far from desiring a weak Turkey—as did most of the other European
Powers—her policy in the Near East was based upon the strengthening
of Turkey. If Turkey was to be strong, she must suppress dissentient
nationalist and religious minorities; therefore Germany raised no voice
of protest against the Armenian and Macedonian atrocities. If Turkey
sought to recover territories which formerly had acknowledged the
suzerainty of the Sultan, Germany had nothing to fear; the Kaiser ruled
over no such territories. If Turkey chose to arouse the Moslem world
by a Pan-Islamic revival, that was no concern of Germany; the German
Empire had a comparatively insignificant number of Mohammedan subjects.
If the Turkish program discomfited the Entente Powers, that was to
Germany’s advantage in the great game of world politics; therefore
Germany could afford to support the Young Turk Government. As in the
days of Abdul Hamid, Germany appeared to be the only friend of the
Ottomans.[8]
The improvement in the German political position at Constantinople was
reflected in a changing Turkish attitude toward the Bagdad Railway.
Among revolutionary leaders there was a growing realization of the
great economic and political importance of railways and, particularly,
of the Bagdad system. It became apparent upon examination, also,
that others than Germans had obtained monopolistic concessions in
the Ottoman Empire—in this respect the Lynch Brothers came in for a
good deal of attention. The Ottoman General Staff—which had recalled
General von der Goltz as chief military adviser—insisted that the
early construction of a trans-Mesopotamian railway at whatever cost,
was essential to the defence of the empire. In spite of serious
financial difficulties resulting from strikes, increased cost of
materials, and general economic paralysis which followed upon the
heels of the revolutions of 1908 and 1909, the Anatolian and Bagdad
Railway Companies advanced large sums to the Minister of Finance
toward the ordinary expenses of running the Government. In addition,
the concessionaires evinced a desire to meet all Turkish financial and
diplomatic objections to the provisions of the concession of 1903.[9]
It was the financial needs of the Young Turk administration which
enabled German diplomacy and the _Deutsche Bank_ to reëstablish
themselves thoroughly in the good graces of the Ottoman Government. But
here again the Germans were given their chance only after England and
France had turned the Turks away empty handed.
During the summer of 1910, Djavid Bey, as Ottoman Minister of Finance,
went to Paris to raise a loan of $30,000,000, secured by the customs
receipts of the Ottoman Empire. The negotiations with the Parisian
bankers were complicated by a bitter anti-Turk campaign on the part of
the press and by the frequent interference of the French Government.
Nevertheless, Djavid Bey succeeded in signing a satisfactory contract
with a French syndicate, and his task appeared to be accomplished. At
this juncture, however, M. Pichon, French Minister of Foreign Affairs,
informed the bankers that official sanction for the proposed loan
would be withheld unless the Ottoman Government would consent to have
its budget administered by a resident French adviser. The Young Turk
ministry, determined to tolerate no further foreign intervention in
the administrative affairs of the empire, flatly refused to consider
any such proposal, and Djavid Bey was instructed to break off all
negotiations. “As a true and loyal friend of France,” wrote Djavid, “I
regretted this incident as one likely to strain the future relations
between the two countries.”
From Paris Djavid Bey went to London. Sir Ernest Cassel appeared to be
willing to negotiate a loan to Turkey of the desired amount, but, upon
representations from M. Cambon, the French ambassador at London, Sir
Edward Grey persuaded Cassel not to put in a bid for the bonds. This
decision was reached largely, as Djavid Bey was informed by the British
Foreign Office, because the Bagdad Railway was considered to be “an
enterprise which under the existing concession has not been conceived
in the best interests of the Ottoman Empire, while it offers, as at
present controlled, an undoubted menace to the legitimate position of
British trade in Mesopotamia.” To the Turkish Government this statement
was a piece of gratuitous impertinence, for, as Djavid Bey replied, “It
was a prerogative only of the Ottoman Government to determine whether
the conditions of construction and management of the Bagdad Railway
were beneficial or detrimental to Turkey. England had no more right to
object to the Bagdad Railway than Germany had to object to the British
and French lines in operation in Turkey.”
The collapse of the financial negotiations in Paris and London offered
the _Deutsche Bank_ an opportunity which its directors were too
shrewd to overlook. Dr. Helfferich was despatched to Constantinople
and within a few weeks had secured the contract for the entire issue
of $30,000,000 of the Ottoman Four Per Cent Loan of 1910, upon terms
almost identical with those agreed upon with the French syndicate
before M. Pichon’s interference. “On this occasion,” writes Djavid
Bey, “the Germans handled the business with great intelligence and
tact. They brought up no points which were not related directly or
indirectly to the loan, and they made no conditions which would have
been inconsistent with the dignity of Turkey. This attitude of Germany
met with great approval on the part of the Turkish Government, which
was then in a very difficult position. The result was the greatest
diplomatic victory in the history of the Ottoman Empire between the
revolution of 1908 and the outbreak of the Great War.”[10]
The purchase of the loan of 1910 by the _Deutsche Bank_, however,
did not solve the financial problems of the Young Turk Government.
It was essential that measures be taken to increase the revenues of
the Ottoman Empire. Accordingly, negotiations had been conducted
during 1910, and were continued until midsummer of 1911, to secure the
consent of the Powers to an increase of 4% in the customs duties. It
was apparent from the outset that the British Government would block
any project for an increase in Turkish taxes, unless it were granted
important compensations of a political and economic character and
unless it could determine, in large measure, the purposes for which
the additional revenues would be expended. In this respect, also, it
appeared that Entente policy was standing in the way of the success of
the Revolution in Turkey!
British objections to the proposed increase in the Ottoman customs
duties were founded in large part upon British opposition to the
Bagdad Railway and, more particularly, to the sections of the Railway
between Bagdad and the Persian Gulf. In the spring of 1910, the British
Government proposed that a concession for a railway from Bagdad to
Basra _via_ Kut-el-Amara should be awarded to British financiers,
in order that British economic interests in Mesopotamia might be
adequately safeguarded. In May of that year Sir Edward Grey wrote the
British ambassador at Constantinople, “Please explain quite clearly
to the Turkish Government that the British Government will not agree
to any addition to the taxes until this claim for a concession is
taken into favorable consideration, and also that Great Britain’s
attitude towards Turkey will depend largely upon how she meets this
demand of yours.” Upon the refusal of the Ottoman Government to accede
to this demand, Sir Edward Grey wrote to Sir Henry Babington Smith,
English representative on the Ottoman Public Debt Administration,
that England must be awarded at least a 55% participation in the
Bagdad-Basra section of the Bagdad Railway, as well as concessions for
the construction and control of port works at Koweit. In addition,
Turkey should be made to understand that Great Britain could approve no
agreement without the sanction of the French and Russian Governments.
When Djavid Bey was in London in July, 1910, he submitted two
counterproposals to Sir Edward Grey: first, that the portion of the
Bagdad Railway from Bagdad to Basra should be internationalized upon
terms agreeable to Sir Ernest Cassel and Dr. Arthur von Gwinner;
or, second, that the Ottoman Government itself should undertake the
construction of the line beyond Bagdad. The British Foreign Office
indicated that it might consent to an increase in the Ottoman customs
duties until April, 1914, upon some such terms, provided the consent of
the other Powers were forthcoming, and provided Turkey would surrender
her right of veto over the borrowing powers of Egypt. Because of the
collapse of the loan negotiations, however, nothing further came of
these proposals.
On March 7, 1911, the Ottoman ministers at London and Paris presented
to the British and French Governments respectively a proposition that
the Bagdad-Basra section of the Bagdad Railway should be constructed
by an Ottoman company, to the capital of which the Turkish Government
should subscribe 40%, and German, French, and British capitalists 20%
each. The Sublime Porte expressed a willingness, furthermore, to confer
with representatives of France and Great Britain for the purpose of
satisfying the legitimate political demands of those two nations in
Syria and Mesopotamia. The following day, nevertheless, Sir Edward
Grey informed the House of Commons that His Majesty’s Government was
not prepared to consent to an increase in the Turkish customs duties,
because it was not clear that the Ottoman Government was ready to
guarantee adequate protection to British commercial interests in
Mesopotamia and the region of the Persian Gulf.[11]
This decision was received in Constantinople with undisguised
animosity. Young Turks were as little disposed to tolerate British,
as they were French, supervision of Ottoman finances and economic
policies. The press roundly denounced the British and said that once
again Turkey had been shown the wisdom of friendship for Germany.[12]
Entente actions were contrasted with the more conciliatory policy
of the Germans. As early as November, 1910, Baron Marschall von
Bieberstein had notified the Sublime Porte that Germany would place
no obstacles in the way of an increase in the Ottoman customs duties
and that, furthermore, his Government was prepared to urge that
the Anatolian and Bagdad Railway Companies forego any additional
assignment of Turkish revenues. During the first week of March, 1911,
Dr. von Gwinner and Dr. Helfferich informed the Ottoman Government
that the Bagdad Railway Company was willing to abandon its right to
construct the sections of the line from Bagdad to Basra and the Persian
Gulf, including the concessions for port and terminal facilities
at Basra. The Turkish Government was to be given a free hand as to
the disposition of the portion of the railway beyond Bagdad, with
the single reservation that the _Deutsche Bank_ should be awarded a
share in the enterprise equal to that granted any non-Ottoman group
of financiers. The German proposals were accepted and incorporated in
a formal convention of March 21, 1911, by which the Bagdad Railway
Company abandoned its claims to further commitments from the Ottoman
Treasury and agreed, at the pleasure of the Turkish Government, to
surrender its concession for the Bagdad-Basra-Persian Gulf sections to
an Ottoman company internationally owned and controlled.[13]
The outcome of the negotiations for an increase in the customs duties
was a keen disappointment to the Young Turks. Desirous as they were of
carrying the Bagdad enterprise to a successful conclusion, they could
not help resenting its political implications. “We tried,” writes
Djavid Bey, “to better our relations with the English; they talked to
us of the Bagdad Railway! We tried to introduce financial and economic
reforms in Turkey; we found before us the Bagdad Railway! Every time an
occasion arose, the French stirred up the Bagdad Railway question. Even
the Russians, notwithstanding the Potsdam Agreement,[14] constantly
waved in their hands the Bagdad weapon.” This resentment was fortified
by the knowledge that those who opposed the Bagdad Railway were those
who believed that the Sick Man would die and were interested in the
division of his inheritance. From these Powers Turkey could accept no
tutelage!
THE GERMAN RAILWAYS JUSTIFY THEIR EXISTENCE
From the Turkish point of view, the best test of the wisdom of
supporting the German railway concessions in Turkey was an examination
of the results achieved in improving political and economic conditions
in the Ottoman Empire. By 1914 the Anatolian Railways and part of the
Bagdad Railway had been in existence a sufficient length of time to
appraise their worth to Asia Minor, and the appraisal thus arrived at
would be a fair prognostication of the value of the entire system when
it should be opened to operation.
Dr. von Gwinner, in justification of the Bagdad Railway enterprise,
summarized what he believed to be the chief services of the Anatolian
Railways to Turkey. “More than twenty years ago,” he wrote in 1909,
“my predecessor, the late George von Siemens, conceived the idea
of restoring to civilization the great wastes of Asia Minor and
Mesopotamia, once and for long the center of the history of humanity.
The only means of achieving that end was by building railways; this
was undertaken, slowly but persistently, and with marvelous results.
Constantinople and the Turkish army at that time were eating bread made
from Russian flour; they are now eating grain of their own country’s
growth. Security in Asia Minor at that time was hardly greater than it
is to-day in Kurdistan. When the _Deutsche Bank’s_ engineers reached
a station a little beyond Ismid (Nikomedia) on the Sea of Marmora,
the neighborhood was infested by Tscherkess robbers; the chief of
those robbers is now a stationmaster of the Anatolian Railway Company,
drawing about £100 _per annum_, a party as respectable as the late Mr.
Micawber after his conversion to thrift. The railways brought ease to
the peasantry, who are obtaining for their harvest twice to four times
the price formerly paid, and the railways have brought revenue to the
Treasury. The Anatolian Railway’s lines are in as good condition as any
line in the United Kingdom, and their transportation charge is less
than half the rates of any railway in England.”[15]
Although this was the statement of an avowed protagonist of the
Anatolian Railway, the testimony of other observers must lead to
the conclusion that it was not an overestimate of the value of
the Anatolian system. As early as 1903, for example, the British
Consul General at Constantinople wrote: “There is no doubt that the
agricultural production of the districts traversed by the Angora
Railway has increased largely. Before the Angora Railway was opened
there was no export of grain from that district; the annual export of
wheat and barley is now from £1,500,000 to £2,000,000. The Railway
has attracted a large number of immigrants from Bulgaria and Russia,
who have settled in the most fertile parts. They form a hardworking
and intelligent population, accustomed to more civilized methods
of cultivation than the Anatolian peasantry. Population, improved
communications and security are the essentials required for the
development of Asia Minor. The Railway attracts the one and creates the
others. All agree that the country along the Railway is much safer than
elsewhere. It would be surprising, therefore, if the production of the
country did not increase.”[16]
The improvement in economic conditions in Anatolia became more marked
as time went on. The Anatolian Railway Company established a special
agricultural department for the education of the peasantry in more
improved methods of farming; nurseries and experimental stations were
maintained; demonstrations were given of the best systems of irrigation
and drainage; attention was paid to the development of markets for
surplus products of various kinds. American agricultural machinery was
introduced and promised to become widely adopted. As a result of these
improvements, the agricultural output of the country increased by leaps
and bounds, and the cultivated areas in some districts were more than
doubled. Famine, formerly a common occurrence, became a thing of the
past, because irrigation eliminated the danger of recurrent droughts
and floods. Increased production assured a plentiful food supply, and
improved transportation enabled the surplus of one district to be
transferred, in case of need, to another. All in all, the peasantry
were developing qualities of industry, thrift, and adaptability which
seemed to forecast great things for the future of Asia Minor.[17]
Furthermore, the German railways in Turkey, the failure of which had
been freely prophesied, proved to be successful business enterprises.
The directors took all possible steps to build up the earning power of
the lines, rather than depend upon the minimum return guaranteed by the
Ottoman Government. The railways were efficiently and intelligently
administered—the operating expenses of the Anatolian and Bagdad lines
never exceeded 47% of the gross receipts, although the operating
expenses of the chief European railways, under much more favorable
conditions, varied from 54% to 62% of gross receipts during the same
period. Occasional dividends of 5% or 6% were paid by the Anatolian
and Bagdad Railway Companies between 1906 and 1914, but only when the
disbursements were warranted by earnings. In 1911, a notable advance
was made by the introduction of oil-burning locomotives on the Bagdad
lines; henceforth the German railways in Turkey were operated with fuel
purchased from the Standard Oil Company of New Jersey![18]
This scrupulously careful management eventually brought its reward. In
1911, the earnings of the Angora line exceeded the kilometric guarantee
and, in accordance with the terms of the concession, the Ottoman
Government received a share of the receipts. In 1912, the returns of
the Eski Shehr-Konia line also exceeded the sum guaranteed by the
Government, the Ottoman Treasury receiving a share of the earnings of
the Anatolian system to an amount of more than $200,000. After 1913, no
further payments to the Anatolian Railway Company were required under
the kilometric guarantees.[19]
The results on the completed sections of the Bagdad Railway were
equally promising, as will be indicated by the following table:[20]
_Year_ _Kilometres_ _Passengers_ _Freight_ _Gross_ _Total_
_in_ _Tons_ _Receipts per_ _Government_
_Operation_ _Kilometre_ _Subsidy_
(_Francs_) (_Francs_)
1906 200 29,629 13,693 1,368.83 624,028.21
1907 200 37,145 23,643 1,754.44 546,129.77
1908 200 52,759 15,941 1,839.86 529,443.12
1909 200 57,026 15,364 1,936.72 509,565.45
1910 200 71,665 27,756 2,571.43 381,135.58
1911 238 95,884 38,046 3,379.34 238,166.59
1912 609 288,833 57,670 5,315.67 278,785.25
1913 609 407,474 78,645 3,786.53 216,295.17
1914 887 597,675 116,194 8,177.97 2,939,983.00
Figures in italics indicate payments _to_ the Turkish Government of
its share of the receipts in excess of the guarantee of 4,500 francs
per kilometre.
The improvement in the economic conditions of Anatolia, and the success
of the German railways as business enterprises, were sources of great
satisfaction and profit to the Imperial Ottoman Government. Not only
was the Treasury receiving revenue from the railway lines which had
formerly been a drain upon the financial resources of the empire, but
the receipts from taxes in the regions traversed by the railways were
constantly increasing. As early as 1893 the Ottoman Ministry of Public
Works announced that the increase in tithes and the increased value of
farm lands in Asia Minor had more than justified expenditures by the
Sultan’s Government in subsidies to the Anatolian Railway.[21] For
those portions of Anatolia which were served by the Railway, the amount
of the tithes had almost doubled in twenty years: in 1889, the year
after the award of the Anatolian concession, $639,760 was collected; in
1898, $948,070; in 1908, $1,240,450. In certain districts the amount
of the tithes collected in 1908 was five or six times as great as the
yield before the construction of the Railway.[22]
The economic prospects of Turkey never were brighter than they were
just before the outbreak of the Great War. The new régime had removed
many of the vexatious restrictions on individual initiative which had
characterized the rule of Abdul Hamid. The country’s losses in men
in the Italian and Balkan wars had been made up by an immigration of
Moslem refugees from the ceded territories. Numerous concessions had
been granted for the exploitation of mines, the construction of public
utilities, and the improvement of the means of communication. “There
was a feeling abroad in the land that an era of exceptional commercial
and industrial activity was about to dawn upon Turkey.” The Ottoman
Empire was in a fair way to become modernized according to Western
standards.[23]
Thus the Anatolian and Bagdad Railways achieved all that was claimed
for them by their sponsors. They increased political security in Asia
Minor; they brought about an economic renaissance in the homeland
of the Turks; they justified the investment of public funds which
was necessary to bring the system to completion. Beyond the Amanus
Mountains lay the plains of Syria and the great unexploited wealth
of Mesopotamia. A development of Mesopotamia, even as modest as that
achieved in Anatolia, would pay the cost of the Bagdad Railway many
times over. Were the Ottoman statesmen who supported this great project
to be condemned for so great a service to their country? Or would
they have been short-sighted had they failed to realize the great
potentialities of railway construction in Asiatic Turkey? That the
Bagdad Railway contributed to the causes of Turkish participation in
the Great War—and to the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire—was not
so much the fault of the Turks themselves as it was the blight laid
upon Turkey, a “backward nation,” by European imperialism.
THE YOUNG TURKS HAVE SOME MENTAL RESERVATIONS
Although the revolutionary party in Turkey had come to look with favor
upon German influence in the Near East, and particularly to support the
Bagdad Railway, there is little reason for accepting the too hastily
drawn conclusion that the Young Turks had sold their country to the
Kaiser or that they were under a definite obligation to subscribe to
German diplomatic policies. They were too strongly nationalistic for
that. They believed that the Ottoman Empire must eventually rid itself
of foreign administrative assistance, foreign capital invested under
far-reaching economic concessions, and foreign interference in Ottoman
political affairs. But for a period of transition—during which Turkey
could learn the secrets of Western progress and adapt them to her own
purposes—it was the obvious duty of a forward-looking government to
utilize European capital and European technical assistance for the
welfare of the empire. Patriotism and modernism went hand in hand in
the Young Turk program.[24]
The Young Turks were not unaware of the menace of the Bagdad Railway
to their own best hopes. As Djavid Bey appropriately says: “The great
drawback of this enterprise was its political character, which clung
to it and became a source of endless toil and anxiety for the country.
In a word, it poisoned the political life of Turkey. If the Bagdad
concession had not been granted, the revolutionary government could
have solved much more easily pending political and economic problems.
But one must admire the courage of Abdul Hamid in granting the
concession, no matter what the cost, because the construction of the
Bagdad line was essential for the defence and the economic progress of
the empire. Unfortunately for Turkey, she has always had to suffer from
such politico-economic concessions.
“The Bagdad Railway did not escape the malady of politics. When one
entered the meeting room of the company, one breathed the atmosphere of
the ministerial chamber in _Wilhelmstrasse_ and felt in both Gwinner
and Helfferich the presence of undersecretaries for foreign affairs.
This state of affairs, instead of simplifying the negotiations and
relations between Germany and Turkey, served only to envenom them.”
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL AND EXPLANATORY NOTES
[1] For accounts of the Young Turk Revolutions see René Pinon,
_L’Europe et la jeune Turquie_ (Paris, 1911); V. Bérard, _La révolution
turque_ (Paris, 1909); C. R. Buxton, _Turkey in Revolution_ (London,
1909); Ernst Jäckh, _Der aufsteigende Halbmond_ (Berlin, 1911); A.
H. Lybyer, “The Turkish Parliament,” in _Proceedings of the American
Political Science Association_, Volume VII (1910), pp. 66 _et seq._;
S. Panaretoff, _Near Eastern Affairs and Conditions_ (New York,
1922), Chapter V; A. Kutschbach, _Die türkische Revolution_ (Halle,
1909); Baron C. von der Goltz, _Der jungen Türkei Niederlage und die
Möglichkeit ihrer Wiedererhebung_ (Berlin, 1913).
[2] Paul Rohrbach, _Germany’s Isolation_, p. 50.
[3] Karl Helfferich, _Die deutsche Türkenpolitik_, p. 21.
[4] This quotation, together with many other facts in this chapter, is
from a lengthy memorandum of Djavid Bey on the Bagdad Railway, prepared
especially for the use of the author in the writing of this book. It is
dated January 3, 1923, and was forwarded from the Lausanne Conference
for Peace in the Near East. Unless otherwise specified, quotations
from Djavid Bey here given are from this memorandum. There probably is
no person who knows more of the Ottoman point of view on the Bagdad
Railway than Djavid, who as Young Turk Minister of Finance and, later,
as Turkish delegate to the Ottoman Public Debt Administration has had
perhaps an unprecedented opportunity to observe the financial and
economic ramifications of European imperialism in the Near East.
[5] _Diplomatic and Consular Reports_, No. 4835 (1911), p. 16;
_Mesopotamia_, p. 41; _The Annual Register_, 1911, pp. 364–365;
_Armenia and Kurdistan_, p. 62; _Turkey in Europe_, pp. 72–73;
_Anatolia_, pp. 51–52, 81; _infra_, pp. 244–246.
[6] Pan-Turkism, or Pan-Turanianism, started as a cultural movement
among Ottoman intellectuals. It assumed political aspects as a result
of three important circumstances: 1. Aggressions against Turkey
by foreign powers; 2. The ardent nationalism of the Balkan states
bordering on Turkey; 3. The existence within Turkey of vigorous
dissident nationalities, such as the Armenians and the Arabs.
Pan-Turanianism and Pan-Islamism, although separate movements, had much
in common. In 1911, at any rate, the Young Turks adopted Pan-Islamism
as part of their program. Pinon, _op. cit._, pp. 134 _et seq._;
_Mohammedan History_, pp. 89–96; Sir Thomas Barclay, _The Turco-Italian
War and Its Problems_ (London, 1912), pp. 100 _et seq._
[7] For an excellent statement of the reaction of Turkish nationalism
upon European politics see _The Quarterly Review_, Volume 228 (1917),
pp. 511 _et seq._
[8] Regarding the coincidence of German and Turkish interests during
the reign of Abdul Hamid _cf._ _supra_, pp. 64–65, 125–130.
[9] _Report of the Anatolian Railway Company_, 1908 and 1909, pp.
8–9; _The Annual Register_, 1909, pp. 337 _et seq._; _Stenographische
Berichte, XII Legislaturperiode, 1 Session_, Volume 260 (1910), pp.
2174d _et seq._
[10] From Djavid Bey’s memorandum. For scattered details of these
negotiations see _The Annual Register_, 1910, pp. 336–340; _Report
of the Deutsche Bank_, 1910, pp. 13 _et seq._; K. Helfferich, _Die
deutsche Türkenpolitik_, pp. 23 _et seq._; Ostrorog, _op. cit._, pp.
60–61.
[11] _Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons_, fifth series, Volume
22 (1911), pp. 1284–1285. For further details of the negotiations
of 1909–1911 _cf._ B. von Siebert, _Diplomatische Aktenstücke zur
Geschichte der Ententepolitik der Vorkriegsjahre_ (Berlin and Leipzig,
1921), Chapters VIII and IX. Hereinafter cited as _de Siebert_
documents.
[12] _Cf._ foreign correspondence of _The Times_, March 21, 1911.
[13] _Troisième convention additionelle à la convention du 5 Mars,
1903, relative au chemin de fer de Bagdad_ (Constantinople, 1911);
_supra_, pp. 111–113.
[14] _Cf._ _infra_, Chapter X.
[15] _The Nineteenth Century_, Volume 65 (1909), pp. 1083–1084.
[16] _Diplomatic and Consular Reports_, No. 3140 (1903), p. 29.
[17] _Société du chemin de fer d’Anatolie-Jahresbericht des
Agrikultur-Dienstes_ (Berlin, 1899 _et seq._), _passim_.
[18] _Archiv für Eisenbahnwesen_, Volume 31 (Berlin, 1908), pp.
207–211, 1485–1491; _Commerce Reports_, No. 18d (Washington, 1915), p.
9; _Diplomatic and Consular Reports_, No. 4835 (1911), p. 17; _Report
of the Anatolian Railway Company_, 1910–1913, _passim_.
[19] _Report of the Anatolian Railway_, 1911–1914, _passim_.
[20] Compiled from the _Report of the Bagdad Railway Company_,
1903–1914. Figures for the years 1904 and 1905 are incomplete and have
therefore been omitted. It should be kept in mind in reading this table
that the years 1912–1914 were abnormal, especially as regards passenger
traffic, because of the two Balkan Wars and the Great War.
[21] _The Levant Herald_ (Constantinople), October 25, 1893.
[22] Caillard, _loc. cit._, p. 439.
[23] _Commerce Reports_, No. 18d (1915), pp. 1–2.
[24] _Cf._ _Questions diplomatiques et coloniales_, Volume 26 (1908),
pp. 475–477.