exceptionally cold winters on the Continent, and the winter of 1840-41,
though certainly cold in the British Isles, is not included by Mr.
Plant in his list of the coldest winters since 1795. But this winter
was exceedingly cold on the Continent. At Paris there were fifty-nine
days' frost, twenty-seven of them consecutive--viz. from December 5th,
when the cold began, to January 1st. The intermission which began on
January 1, lasted only till January 3, when there was another week of
frost. There was frost again from January 30 to February 10. One of the
most remarkable stories connected with the cold of this winter is thus
told by Flammarion:--'On the 15th of December, the ashes of Napoleon,
brought back from St. Helena, entered Paris by the Arc de Triomphe.
The thermometer in places exposed to nocturnal radiation, had that day
marked 6.8 degrees above zero. An immense crowd, the National Guard of
Paris and its suburbs, and numerous regiments lined the Champs Elysées,
from the early morning until two in the afternoon. Every one suffered
severely from the cold. Soldiers and workmen, hoping to obtain warmth
by drinking brandy' (the most chilling process they could have thought
of), 'were seized by the cold, and dropped down dead of congestion.
Several persons perished, victims of their curiosity: having climbed up
into the trees to see the procession, their extremities, benumbed by
the cold, failed to support them, and they were killed by the fall.'
The winter of 1844-45 was remarkable for the long duration of cold
weather. The whole of December was very cold, January not so severe,
but still cold, February singularly cold, and the frost so severe
in March that on Good Friday (March 21st) the boats, which had been
frost-bound for weeks in the canals, were still locked tightly in ice.
Mr. Plant omits to notice in the letter above-mentioned the long
winter of 1853-54, which was indeed less severe (relatively as well as
absolutely) in England than on the Continent. Still, he is hardly right
in saying, that after 1845 there was no winter of long and intense
character until January and February 1855. On the Continent the winter
of 1853-54 was not only protracted but severe, especially towards the
end of December. Several rivers were frozen over. The cold lasted from
March till November, with scarcely any intermission.
The winter of 1854-55 was still more severe than its predecessor. The
frosts commenced in the east of France in October and lasted till the
28th of April. The mean temperatures for January and February, in
England, were 31 degrees and 29 degrees respectively. This year will
be remembered as that during which our army suffered so terribly from
cold in the Crimea. But our brave fellows would have resisted Generals
January and February (in whom the Czar Nicholas expressed such strong
reliance), as well as the Russians themselves did, or maybe a trifle
better (if we can judge from the way in which Englishmen have borne
Arctic winters), had it not been for the gross negligence of the Red
Tapists.
The winter of 1857-58 was rather severer than the average, but not
much. The Danube and Russian ports in the Black Sea were frozen over in
January, 1858.
The frost of December, 1860, and January, 1861, was remarkable. The
coldest recorded mean temperature for a month in time (not the coldest
month), was that for the thirty days ending January 16, 1861,--namely,
26 degrees. Mr. Plant remarks that 'the intense cold on Christmas-eve,
1860, finds no equal in his records, since January 20, 1838. The
thermometer registered 34 degrees of frost, and in the valley of the
Rea, five to seven degrees below zero. Strangely enough, Flammarion
makes no mention of this bitter winter in his list of exceptionally
cold winters.
The winter of 1864-65 lasted from December to the end of March, all of
which four months, Mr. Plant notes, were of the true winter type. The
Seine was frozen over at Paris, and people crossed the ice near the
Pont des Arts.
The winter of 1870-71 will always be remembered as that during
which the siege of Paris was carried on, and the last scenes of the
Franco-Prussian war took place. As Flammarion justly remarks, this
winter will be classed among severe winters, because of the extreme
cold in December and January (notwithstanding the mild weather of
February), and also because of the fatal influence which the cold
exercised upon the public health at the close of the war with Germany.
'The great equatorial current,' he proceeds (meaning, no doubt, the
winds which blow over the prolongation of the Gulf Stream), 'which
generally extends to Norway, stopped this year at Spain and Portugal,
the prevailing wind being from the north. On the 5th of December there
was a temperature of 5 degrees, and on the 8th, at Montpellier, the
thermometer stood at 17.6 degrees. A second period of cold set in on
the 22nd of December, lasting until the 5th of January. In Paris the
Seine was blocked with ice, and seemed likely to become frozen over.
On the 24th there were 21.6 degrees of frost, and at Montpellier, on
the 31st, 28.8 degrees. It is well known that many of the outposts
around Paris, and several of the wounded who had been lying for fifteen
hours upon the field, were found frozen to death. From the 9th to the
15th of January a third period of cold set in, the thermometer marking
17.6 degrees' (14.4 degrees of frost) 'at Paris, and 8.6 degrees at
Montpellier. The most curious fact was that the cold was greater
in the south than in the north of France. At Brussels the lowest
temperatures were 11.1 degree in December and 8.2 degrees in January.
There were forty days' frost at Montpellier, forty-two at Paris, and
forty-seven at Brussels during these two months. Finally, the winter
average (December, January, and February) was 35.2 degrees in Paris,
whereas the general average is 37.9 degrees.' In the north of Europe
this was also a very hard winter, though the cold set in at a different
time than that noted for France. There were forty degrees of frost at
Copenhagen on February 12--that is, the temperature was 5 degrees below
zero. By the documents which M. Renon furnished Flammarion with for
France, 'I discover,' says the latter, 'a minimum of 9.4 degrees below
zero at Périgueux, and of 13 degrees below zero at Moulins! I find by
the documents supplied me by Mr. Glaisher,' he proceeds, 'that he also
considers the winter of 1870-71 as appertaining to the class of winters
memorable for their severity.' Lastly, in the winter which as I write
(February 10, 1879) seems to be nearly over, we have had for December
a mean temperature of only 31 degrees in the midlands--the coldest
December known there, followed by a January so cold that the mean
temperature for the midlands was only 29.8 degrees. Mr. G.J. Symons,
the well-known meteorologist, says of the past winter, that January
was the coldest for at least twenty-one, and he believes for forty-one
years, following a December which was also, with one exception, the
coldest for twenty-one years.' He gives an abstract of the temperatures
(both maximum and minimum) for November, December, and January during
the last twenty-one years, from which it appears:--
1. That the average _maximum_ temperature of November was the lowest
during the period with two exceptions, that of December the lowest with
one exception, and that of January the lowest of the whole period.
2. That the average _minimum_ of November was the lowest during the
period with four exceptions, that of December the lowest with one
exception, and that of January the lowest.
3. That the mean temperature of the three months was not only five
degrees below the average, but also lower than in any previous year out
of the twenty-one.
On the whole, the winter of 1878-79 must be regarded as the coldest we
have had during at least the last score of years, and probably during
twice that time. It was not characterised by exceptionally severe short
periods of intense cold, like those which occurred during the winters
of 1854-55, 1855-56, and 1860-61; but it has been surpassed by few
winters during the last two centuries for constant low temperature and
long-continued moderate frost. During the last ninety years there have
been only four winters matching that of 1878-79 in these respects.
* * * * *
Since the preceding pages were written the weather record for February
1879 has been completed. Like the three preceding months, February
showed a mean temperature below the average, though the deficit was not
quite so great as in those months. The following table, drawn out by
Mr. Plant, shows the mean temperature at Moseley for four winter months
of 1878-79, and the average temperature for those months at Moseley
during the last twenty years:--
1878-79
Deg.
November 37.0
December 31.0
January 29.8
February 35.8
----
Mean of the four months in 33.4
Average of 20 years
Deg.
November 41.5
December 39.0
January 35.5
February 39.0
----
Average of four months in 20
years observations 38.8
_OXFORD AND CAMBRIDGE ROWING._
The records of the last eighteen boat-races between Cambridge and
Oxford indicate clearly enough the existence of a difference of style
in the rowing of the two universities, a circumstance quite as plainly
suggested by the five successive victories of Cambridge in the years
1870-74, as by the nine successive victories of Oxford which preceded
them. For it is, or should be, known that the victories of Cambridge
only began when Morrison, one of the finest Oxford oarsmen, had taught
the Cambridge men the Oxford style, so far as it could be imparted to
rowers accustomed, for the most part, in intercollegiate struggles,
to a different system. With regard to the long succession of Oxford
victories which began in 1861, and which, be it noticed, followed on
Cambridge successes obtained when the light-blue stroke rowed in the
Oxford style, I may remark that, viewing the matter as a question of
probabilities, it may safely be said that the nine successive victories
of Oxford could not reasonably be regarded as accidental. The loss of
three or four successive races would not have sufficed to show that
there was any assignable difference in the conditions under which the
rival universities encountered each other on the Thames. In cases
where the chance of one or other of two events happening is exactly
equal, there will repeatedly be observed recurrences of this sort.
But when the same event recurs so often as nine successive times,
it is justifiable to infer that the chances are _not_ precisely--or
perhaps even nearly--equal. I believe I shall be able to indicate the
existence of a cause quite sufficient to account for the series of
defeats sustained in the years 1861-69 by Cambridge, and for the change
of fortune experienced when for a while the Cambridge oarsmen adopted
the style of rowing which has prevailed for many years at the sister
university.
I may premise that Cambridge has an important advantage over Oxford
in the fact that she has a far larger number of men to choose from
in selecting a university crew. It may seem to many, at first sight,
that as good a crew might well be selected from three hundred as from
five hundred boating-men; because it is not to be supposed that either
number would supply many more than eight first-rate oarsmen. But it
must be remembered that there are first-rate oarsmen _and_ first-rate
oarsmen. The unpractised eye may detect very little difference
between the best and the worst oarsmen in such crews as Oxford and
Cambridge yearly send to contend for the blue-riband of the river.
But differences exist; and if the best man of the crew were replaced
by one equal in rowing ability to the worst, or _vice versâ_, an
important difference would be observed in the time of rowing over the
racing course, under similar conditions of wind, tide, and so forth.
Accordingly, a large field for the selection of the men is a most
important advantage. Taking, for instance, the five hundred rowing men
of Cambridge and dividing them into two sets--one of three hundred men,
corresponding to the three hundred rowing men of Oxford, and the other
of two hundred men--we see that the first set ought to supply a crew
strong enough to meet Oxford, and the second a crew nearly as strong.
Now, if the best men of the two Cambridge crews thus supposed to be
formed are combined--say five taken from the first and three from the
second, all the inferior men being struck out--a far stronger crew than
either of the others would undoubtedly be formed.
So that if Cambridge were generally the winner in these contests, the
Oxonians would be able to account for their want of success in a
sufficiently satisfactory manner. The successive defeats sustained by
the Cambridge crews in 1861-69 are therefore so much the less readily
explained as due to mere accident, by which of course I mean simply
such an accidental circumstance as that better oarsmen chanced to be at
Oxford than at Cambridge in these years, not to accident occurring in
the race itself.
Several reasons were assigned from time to time for the repeated
victories of Oxford. Some of these may conveniently be examined here,
before discussing what I take to be the true explanation.
Some writers in the papers advanced the general proposition that Oxford
men are as a rule stronger and more enduring than Cambridge men.
They did not tell us why this should be the case--to what peculiar
influences it was due that the more powerful and energetic of our
English youth should go to one university rather than the other. No
evidence of this peculiarity could be found in the university athletic
sports, in which success was, as it has since been, very equally
divided. And what made the theory the less satisfactory was the
circumstance that it afforded no explanation of the early triumphs of
the Cantabs, who won seven of the nine races they rowed against Oxford.
Of these races five were rowed from Westminster to Putney, a course
two miles longer than the present course from Putney to Mortlake. A
race over such a course and in the heavier old-fashioned racing-boats
was a sufficient test of strength and endurance; yet the Cambridge
men managed to win four out of these five events, and that not by a
few seconds, but in three instances by upwards of a minute. If there
were any reason for conceiving that Oxonians were as a rule stronger
than Cantabs in the years 1861-69, there is at least no reason for
conceiving that any change can have taken place in the time between the
earlier races and that during which Oxford won so persistently. And as
the earlier races show no traces of any difference such as was insisted
upon by many journalists in the latter part of the period of the
Oxford successes, we may reasonably conclude that the difference had no
real existence.
Another theory resembling the preceding was also often urged. It was
said repeatedly in the papers that Cambridge traditions encouraged
a light flashy stroke, pretty to look at but not effective; that
again, Cambridge rowed the first part of the course well but
exhausted themselves before the conclusion of the race, through their
over-anxiety to get the advantage of their opponents in the beginning
of the contest. Critics undertook to say that the Oxford men 'rowed
within themselves' at first, reserving their strength for the last
mile or two of the course. Now, it will presently appear that there
does exist in a certain peculiarity of what may justly be called the
Cambridge style, a true cause for want of success, and even for such a
repeated series of defeats as the light-blue flag sustained in 1868-69.
But the Cambridge style rowed during these years was very far from
being a flashy style. On the contrary, the old Cambridge style, which
is still too often seen in College contests, and has within the last
four years been seen on the Thames, involves the rowing of a longer
stroke than _seems_ to be rowed in the true Oxford style. Oxford
rowing is pre-eminently lively. Anyone who had been at the pains to
time the strokes of the Oxford and Cambridge crews during the years
1861-69, would have been able at once to dispose of the notion that
Cambridge men row the more rapid stroke. In these nine races, as in
the practice preceding them, the Oxford crew often took forty-four
strokes per minute. Especially did they rise to this swift stroke in
some of those grand spurts which so often carried the dark-blue flag
in front. I do not remember that the Cambridge crews ever went beyond
forty-two strokes per minute. Then again as to starting early and
being quickly spent, a good deal of nonsense was written. In some of
the later contests of the series 1861-69, indeed, the Cambridge crews,
urged by the thought of numerous past defeats, made unduly exhausting
efforts in the earlier part of the race. But nothing was done in this
way which would have caused the loss of the race if the Cambridge crew
had really had it in them to win. If the better of two crews puts on
rather too much steam at first, they draw so quickly ahead that they
soon begin to feel that they have the race in hand, and so proceed to
take matters more steadily. In such powerful and well-trained crews
as both universities usually send to the contest, very little harm is
done by varying the order of the work a little--rowing hard at first
and steadily afterwards, or _vice versâ_. It is easy for lookers-on,
most of whom have never taken part in a boat-race, to theorise on these
matters. But those who know what boat racing is (as distinguished, be
it noticed, from most contests of speed) know that the better boat is
almost sure to win in whatever way the stroke may set them their work.
A good crew, unlike a good horse, requires no jockeying.
The difference of the rivers Cam and Isis has been urged as a
sufficient reason for inferiority on the part of the Cambridge crews.
That the difference used to tell unfavourably upon the chances of the
light blue flag before the river had been widened and the railway
bridge modified, and that even now the Cambridge crews would not be all
the better for a better river to practice on, cannot be denied. But I
question whether even before the widening of the river, this particular
cause sufficed to counterbalance the advantage of the Cantabs in point
of numbers. Nor do I think that those who urged the inferiority of the
Cambridge river have recognised the principal disadvantage which it
entailed upon the light-blue oarsmen.
The first circumstance to be noticed, in this connection, is the
difference in the conditions under which racing-boats were and are
steered along the two rivers. A Cambridge coxswain has in some respects
an easier, in others a more difficult task than the Oxonian. In the
first place, he has very little choice as to the course along which
he shall take his boat. All he has to do is to steer as closely round
each corner as possible; and the narrowness of the river renders
it difficult for him to fall into any error in running a straight
line from corner to corner. The Oxonian coxswain, on the other hand,
requires to be more carefully on the watch lest he should suffer his
boat to diverge from the just course, which is far less obvious on
the wider Isis than on the Cam. But although the Cambridge coxswain
has the shores of the river close to him on either hand, and can thus
never be at a loss as to his just course, yet to maintain this obvious
course he has to be continually moving the rudder-lines. In fact,
there are some 'eights' which steer so ill that it is no easy matter
to keep them from the shores when the crew are sending them along at
racing speed. In rounding the three great corners which have to be
passed in the ordinary racing-course at Cambridge--viz., First Post
Corner, Grassy Corner, and Ditton Corner--the rudder has to be made
use of in a much more decided manner than in the straighter course
along which the Oxford racing eights have to travel. I have seen the
water bubbling over the rudder of a racing eight, as she rounded Grassy
Corner, in a manner which showed clearly enough how her 'way' must have
been checked; yet, probably, if the rudder-lines had been relaxed for
a moment, the ill-steering craft would have gone irretrievably out of
her course, and been presently stranded on the farther bank. And even
eights which steer well had to be very carefully handled along the
narrow and winding ditch which we Cantabs used to call 'the river.'
A more serious disadvantage, so far as the prospects of University
Boats were concerned, lay in the circumstance that there was no part
of the Cam (within easy reach, at least, of Cambridge) along which the
crew could row without a break, for four or five miles, as they had to
do in the actual encounter with the Oxford boat. The whole range of the
river between the locks next below Cambridge and Bait's Bite Locks, is
somewhat under four miles and a half. But about a mile and a quarter
from Bait's Bite sluice, the railway-bridge crosses the river, and
until a few years ago, the supports of this bridge divided the river
into three parts. There was in my time a vague tradition that the
University Eight had once or twice been steered through the widest of
these passages without stopping; but I doubt much whether there could
have been any truth in the story. Certainly no coxswain in my time at
Cambridge ever achieved the feat, nor could it be safely attempted even
by the most skilful steersman. The consequence was that there was a
break in the long course which took away all its value as a preparation
for the actual race. It may seem to the uninitiated a trifling matter
that a crew should get a few seconds of rest in so long a pull. But
those who know what racing is, are aware that the slightest break--one
stroke even, shirked--is an immense relief to the tugging oarsman.
Beyond Bait's Bite Locks there is a three-and-a-half-miles course,
liable to be broken by the manoeuvres of a floating bridge or
ferry boat opposite Clayhithe. Next comes another short course
extending to Upware. And lastly from Upware to Ely there is a fine
five-and-a-half-miles course, considerably wider than the Cam, and
presenting several splendid reaches. To this course the Cambridge men
used to betake themselves four or five times in the course of their
preparation for the great race. But a course so far removed from the
university itself was clearly far less advantageous than the convenient
Oxford long course, extending from the ferry at Christ Church meadows
to Newnham. Still, annoying as the want of a convenient long-course
must be considered, I cannot attribute the long succession of Cambridge
defeats in 1861-69 to such a cause as this. It is true that before the
railway-bridge was built, the Cambridge crew used generally to win, and
that since it has been so far modified as not to interfere with the
passage of a racing eight, they have again been successful, whereas,
while the supports of the bridge checked them midway on their course,
they were less fortunate. But to connect these circumstances as cause
and effect, would be as unsafe as the theory of the Margate fishermen
who ascribed the Goodwin Sands to the building of the Reculvers.
It has been said that the shallowness of the Cam affects the style of
Cambridge oarsmen. This seems to me a fanciful theory. Occasionally in
the course of a race close steering round one or other of the sharper
corners might permit the oarsmen to 'feel the bottom,' for two or
three strokes; but during all the rest of the course the oars find
plenty of water to take good hold of. The Cam was undoubtedly growing
shallower for some time after 1860; and the change gave some degree of
support to the theory that the peculiarities of the Cambridge style
were due to the peculiarities of the Cambridge river. But I believe
the notion was a wholly mistaken one; and I am confirmed in this
belief by noticing that the Cambridge style from 1860 to 1869 was in
all essential respects, and especially in that feature which I shall
presently describe as its radical and fatal defect, the same precisely
as it had been in earlier times when Cambridge was oftener successful
than defeated.