THE CHATTANOOGA CAMPAIGN AND BATTLE OF CHICKAMAUGA.
ROSECRANS AND BRAGG--FIGHT AT DOVER--AT FRANKLIN--AT MILTON--MORGAN'S
RAID IN OHIO--MANOEUVRING FOR CHATTANOOGA--BATTLE AT
CHICKAMAUGA--NUMBER OF MEN ENGAGED ON EACH SIDE--OPERATIONS OF THE
FIRST DAY--RETREAT OF FEDERAL FORCES AT CHATTANOOGA--NUMBER OF
OFFICERS AND MEN KILLED AT CHICKAMAUGA--GENERAL ROSECRANS'S OPINION OF
THE GENERAL CONDUCT OF THE BATTLE--INSTANCES OF PERSONAL COURAGE AND
GALLANTRY--GENERAL BRAGG'S CRITICISMS OF GENERAL POLK.
While Grant's army was pounding at the gates of Vicksburg, those of
Rosecrans and Bragg were watching each other at Murfreesboro', both
commanders being unwilling to make any grand movement. General Grant
and the Secretary of War wanted Rosecrans to advance upon Bragg, lest
Bragg should reinforce Johnston, who was a constant menace in the rear
of the army besieging Vicksburg. The only thing Grant feared was, that
he might be attacked heavily by Johnston before he could capture the
place. But Rosecrans refused to move, on the ground that it was
against the principles of military science to fight two decisive
battles at once, and that the surest method of holding back Bragg from
reinforcing Johnston was by constantly standing ready to attack him,
but not attacking. As it happened that Bragg was very much like
Rosecrans, and was afraid to stir lest Rosecrans should go to Grant's
assistance, the policy of quiet watchfulness proved successful--so far
at least as immediate results were concerned. Bragg did not reinforce
Johnston, Johnston did not attack Grant; and besiegers and besieged
were left, like two brawny champions of two great armies, to fight it
out, dig it out, and starve it out, till on the 4th of July the city
fell. Whether it afterward fared as well with Rosecrans as it might if
he had attacked Bragg when Grant and Stanton wanted him to, is another
question.
But though the greater armies were quiescent, both sent out
detachments to make destructive raids, and that season witnessed some
of the most notable exploits of the guerilla bands that were operating
in the West, all through the war, in aid of the Confederacy. Late in
January, 1863, a Confederate force of cavalry and artillery, about
four thousand men, under Wheeler and Forrest, was sent to capture
Dover, contiguous to the site of Fort Donelson, in order to close the
navigation of Cumberland River, by which Rosecrans received supplies.
The place was held by six hundred men, under command of Col. A. C.
Harding, of the Eighty-third Illinois Regiment, who, with the help of
gunboats, repelled two determined attempts to storm the works
(February 3), and inflicted a loss of seven hundred men, their own
loss being one hundred and twenty-six.
Early in March, a detachment of about twenty-five hundred National
troops, under Colonels Coburn and Jordan, moving south of Franklin,
Tenn., unexpectedly met a force of about ten thousand Confederates
under Van Dorn, and the stubborn fight that ensued resulted in the
surrounding and capture of Coburn's entire force, after nearly two
hundred had been killed or wounded on each side. A few days later, Van
Dorn was attacked and driven southward by a force under Gen. Gordon
Granger. Still later in the month a detachment of about fourteen
hundred men under Colonel Hall went in pursuit of the guerilla band
commanded by John Morgan, fought it near Milton, and defeated it,
inflicting a loss of nearly four hundred men. Early in April another
detachment of National troops, commanded by Gen. David S. Stanley,
found Morgan's men at Snow Hill, and defeated and routed them so
thoroughly that it was two weeks before the remnants of the band could
be brought together again.
[Illustration: A PASS IN THE RACCOON RANGE.]
{296} [Illustration: MISSIONARY RIDGE, FROM ORCHARD KNOB. (From a
Government photograph.)]
In the same month Col. A. D. Streight, with eighteen hundred men, was
sent to make a raid around Bragg's army, cut his communications, and
destroy supplies. This detachment was pursued by Forrest, who attacked
the rear guard at Day's Gap, but was repelled, and lost ten guns and a
considerable number of men. Streight kept on his way, with continual
skirmishing, destroyed a dépôt of provisions at Gadsden, had another
fight at Blount's Farm, in which he drove off Forrest again, and
burned the Round Mountain Iron Works, which supplied shot and shell to
the Confederates. But on the 3d of May he was confronted by so large a
force that he was compelled to surrender, {297} his men and horses
being too jaded to attempt escape.
These are but examples of hundreds of engagements that took place
during the war of secession and are scarcely known to the general
reader because their fame is overshadowed by the magnitude of the
great battles. Had they occurred in any of our previous wars, every
schoolboy would know about them. In Washington's celebrated victory at
Trenton, the number of Hessians surrendered was fewer than Streight's
command captured by Forrest; and in the bloodiest battle of the
Mexican war, Buena Vista, the American loss (then considered heavy)
was but little greater than the Confederate loss in the action at
Dover, related above. The armies surrendered by Burgoyne and
Cornwallis, if combined, would constitute a smaller force than the
least of the three that surrendered to Grant.
One of these affairs in the West, however, was so bold and startling
that it became famous even among the greater and more important
events. This was Morgan's raid across the Ohio. In July he entered
Kentucky from the south, with a force of three thousand cavalrymen,
increased as it went by accessions of Kentucky sympathizers to about
four thousand, with ten guns. He captured and robbed the towns of
Columbia and Lebanon, reached the Ohio, captured two steamers, and
crossed into Indiana. Then marching rapidly toward Cincinnati, he
burned mills and bridges, tore up rails, plundered right and left, and
spread alarm on every side. But the home guards were gathering to meet
him, and the great number of railways in Ohio and Indiana favored
their rapid concentration, while farmers felled trees across the roads
on hearing of his approach. He passed around Cincinnati, and after
much delay reached the Ohio at Buffington's Ford. Here some of his
pursuers overtook him, while gunboats and steamboats filled with armed
men were patrolling the river, on the watch for him. The gunboats
prevented him from using the ford, and he was obliged to turn and give
battle. The fight was severe, and resulted in Morgan's defeat. Nearly
eight hundred of his men surrendered, and he with the remainder
retreated up the river. They next tried to cross at Belleville by
swimming their horses; but the gunboats were at hand again, and made
such havoc among the troopers that only three hundred got across,
while of the others some were shot, some drowned, and the remnant
driven back to the Ohio shore. Morgan with two hundred fled still
farther up the stream, but at last was compelled to surrender at New
Lisbon. He was confined in the Ohio penitentiary, but escaped a few
months later by digging under the walls. A pathetic incident of this
raid was the death of the venerable Daniel McCook, sixty-five years
old. He had given eight sons to the National service, and four of them
had become generals. One of these was deliberately murdered by
guerillas, while he was ill and riding in an ambulance in Tennessee.
The old man, hearing that the murderer was in Morgan's band, took his
rifle and went out to join in the fight at Buffington's Ford, where he
was mortally wounded.
[Illustration: BRIGADIER-GENERAL J. H. MORGAN, C. S. A.]
[Illustration: MAJOR-GENERAL GEORGE L. HARTSUFF.]
[Illustration: SCENE OF OPERATION OF THE ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND IN
TENNESSEE, GEORGIA, AND ALABAMA.]
When at last Rosecrans did move, by some of the ablest strategy
displayed in the whole war he compelled Bragg to fall back
successively from one position to another, all the way from Tullahoma
to Chattanooga. This was not done without frequent and heavy
skirmishes, however; but the superiority of the National cavalry had
now been developed at the West as well as at the East, and they all
resulted in one way. Colonel (afterward Senator) John F. Miller was
conspicuous in several of these actions, and in that at Liberty Gap
one of his eyes was shot out by a rifle-ball.
The purpose of Rosecrans was to get possession of Chattanooga; and
when Bragg crossed the Tennessee and occupied that town, he set to
work to manoeuvre him out of it. To effect this, he moved southwest,
as if he were intending to pass around Chattanooga and invade Georgia.
This caused Bragg to fall back to Lafayette, and the National troops
took {298} possession of Chattanooga. But at this time Rosecrans
was for a while in a critical situation, where a more skilful
general than Bragg would probably have destroyed him; for his three
corps--commanded by Thomas, Crittenden, and McCook--were widely
separated. The later movements of this campaign had been rendered
tediously slow by the heavy rains and the almost impassable nature of
the ground; so that although Rosecrans had set out from Murfreesboro'
in June, it was now the middle of September.
Supposing that Bragg was in full retreat, Rosecrans began to follow
him; but Bragg had received large reinforcements, and turned back from
Lafayette, intent upon attacking Rosecrans. The two armies, feeling
for each other and approaching somewhat cautiously for a week, met at
last, and there was fought, September 19 and 20, 1863, a great battle
on the banks of a creek, whose Indian name of Chickamauga is said to
signify "river of death."
Rosecrans had about fifty-five thousand men; Bragg, after the arrival
of Longstreet at midnight of the 18th, about seventy thousand. The
general direction of the lines of battle was with the National troops
facing southeast, and the Confederates facing northwest, though these
lines were variously bent, broken, and changed in the course of the
action. Thomas held the left of Rosecrans's line, Crittenden the
centre, and McCook the right. Bragg was the attacking party, and his
plan was, while making a feint on the National right, to fall heavily
upon the left, flank it, crush it, and seize the roads that led to
Chattanooga. If he could do this, it would not only cut off Rosecrans
from his base and insure his decisive defeat, but would give Bragg
possession of Chattanooga, where he could control the river and the
passage through the mountains between the East and the West. The
concentration of the National forces in the valley had been witnessed
by the Confederates from the mountain height southeast of the creek,
who therefore knew what they had to meet and how it was disposed.
The battle of the 19th began at ten o'clock in the forenoon, and
lasted all day. The Confederate army crossed the creek without
opposition, and moved forward confidently to the attack. But the left
of the position--the key-point--was held by the command of Gen. George
H. Thomas, who for a slow and stubborn fight was perhaps the best
corps commander produced by either side in the whole war. Opposed to
him, on the Confederate right, was Gen. (also Bishop) Leonidas Polk.
There was less of concerted action in the attack than Bragg had
planned for, partly because Thomas unexpectedly struck out with a
counter-movement when an opportunity offered; but there was no lack of
bloody and persistent fighting. Brigades and divisions moved forward
to the charge, were driven back, and charged again. Batteries were
taken and re-taken, the horses were killed, and the captains and
gunners in some instances, refusing to leave them, were shot down at
the wheels. Brigades and regiments were shattered, and on both sides
many prisoners were taken. Thomas's line was forced back, but before
night he regained his first position, and the day closed with the
situation practically unchanged.
[Illustration: MAJOR-GENERAL GEORGE H. THOMAS.]
During the night both sides corrected their lines and made what
preparation they could for a renewal of the struggle. Bragg intended
to attack again at daybreak, his plan (now perfectly evident to his
opponent) being substantially the same as on the day before. He wanted
to crush the National left, force back the centre, and make a grand
left wheel with his entire army, placing his right firmly across the
path to Chattanooga. But the morning was foggy, Polk was slow, and the
fighting did not begin till the middle of the forenoon. Between Polk
and Thomas the edge of battle swayed back and forth, and the
Confederates could make no permanent impression. Thomas was obliged to
call repeatedly for reinforcements, which sometimes reached him and
sometimes failed to; but whether they came or not, he held manfully to
all the essential portions of his ground.
Rosecrans was constantly uneasy about his right centre, where he knew
the line to be weak; and at this point the great disaster of the day
began, though in an unexpected manner. It arose from an order that was
both miswritten and misinterpreted. This order, addressed to Gen.
Thomas J. Wood, who commanded a division, was written by a member of
Rosecrans's staff who had not had a military education, and was not
sufficiently impressed with the exact meaning of the technical terms.
It read: "The general commanding directs that you close up on Reynolds
as fast as possible, and support him." It was impossible to obey both
clauses of this order; since to "close up" means to bring the ends of
the lines together so that there shall be no gap and they shall form
one continuous line, while to "support," in the technical military
sense, means to take a position in the rear, ready to advance when
ordered. The aid that wrote the order evidently used the word
"support" only in the general sense of assist, strengthen, protect,
encourage, and did not dream of its conflicting with the command to
"close up." General Wood, a West Point graduate, instead of sending or
going to Rosecrans for better orders, obeyed literally the second
clause, and {299} withdrew his command from the line to form it in the
rear of Reynolds. Opposite to the wide and fatal opening thus left was
Longstreet, the ablest corps commander in the Confederate service, who
instantly saw his advantage and promptly poured his men, six divisions
of them, through the gap. This cut off McCook's corps from the rest of
the army, and it was speedily defeated and routed in confusion. The
centre was crumbled, and it looked as if the whole army must be
destroyed. Rosecrans, who had been with the defeated right wing,
appeared to lose his head completely, and rode back in all haste to
Chattanooga to make arrangements for gathering there the fragments of
his forces. At nightfall he sent his chief of staff, Gen. James A.
Garfield (afterward President), to find what had become of Thomas, and
Garfield found Thomas where not even the destruction of three-fifths
of the army had moved or daunted him.
When Thomas's right flank was exposed to assault by the disruption of
the centre, he swung it back to a position known as Horseshoe Ridge,
still covering the road. Longstreet was pressing forward to pass the
right of this position, when he was stopped by Gordon Granger, who had
been with a reserve at Rossville Gap, but was wiser and bolder than
his orders, and, instead of remaining there, moved forward to the
support of Thomas. The Confederate commander, when complete victory
was apparently so near, seemed reckless of the lives of his men,
thrusting them forward again and again in futile charges, where
Thomas's batteries literally mowed them down with grape and canister,
and a steady fire of musketry increased the bloody harvest. About dusk
the ammunition was exhausted, and the last charges of the Confederates
were repelled with the bayonet. Thomas had fairly won the title of
"the rock of Chickamauga." In the night he fell back in good order to
Rossville, leaving the enemy in possession of the field, with all the
dead and wounded. Sheridan, who had been on the right of the line and
was separated by its disruption, kept his command together, marched
around the mountain, and before morning joined Thomas at Rossville,
whence they fell back the next day to Chattanooga, where order was
quickly restored and the defences strengthened.
The National loss in the two-days' battle of Chickamauga--killed,
wounded, and missing--was sixteen thousand three hundred and
thirty-six. The Confederate reports are incomplete and unsatisfactory;
but estimates of Bragg's loss make it at least eighteen thousand, and
some carry it up nearly to twenty-one thousand. With the exception of
Gettysburg, this was thus far the most destructive action of the war.
Tactically it was a victory for Bragg, who was left in possession of
the field; but that which he was fighting for, Chattanooga, he did not
get.
[Illustration: LEE AND GORDON'S MILLS ON THE CHICKAMAUGA.]
{300} [Illustration: BATTLE OF CHICKAMAUGA, GA., SEPTEMBER 19th AND
20th, 1863.]
Among the killed in this battle were Brig.-Gen. William H. Lytle on
the National side, and on the Confederate side Brig.-Gens. Preston
Smith, Benjamin H. Helm, and James Deshler; also on the National side,
three colonels who were in command of brigades--Cols. Edward A. King
of the Sixty-eighth Indiana Regiment, Philemon P. Baldwin of the Sixth
Indiana, and Hans C. Heg of the Fifteenth Wisconsin. The number of
officers of lower rank who fell, generally when exhibiting notable
courage in the performance of their dangerous duties, was very great.
Of General Whittaker's staff, numbering seven, three were killed and
three wounded. His brigade lost nearly a thousand men, and Colonel
Mitchell's brigade of four regiments lost nearly four hundred. The
Ninety-sixth Illinois Regiment went into the battle with four {301}
hundred and fifteen men, and lost one hundred and sixty-three killed
or wounded. Of its twenty-three officers, eleven were either killed or
wounded. In the fall of General Lytle we lost another man of great
literary promise, though his published writings were not extensive,
whose name must be placed on the roll with those of Winthrop, Lander,
and O'Brien. He was the author of the popular poem that begins with
the line--
"I am dying, Egypt, dying."
Another poet who distinguished himself on this field was Lieut.
Richard Realf, of the Eighty-eighth Illinois Regiment, who was
honorably mentioned, especially for his services in going back through
a heavy fire and bringing up a fresh supply of ammunition when it was
sorely needed. Realf was a personal friend of Lytle's, and the bullet
that killed Lytle passed through a sheet of paper in his pocket,
containing a little poem that Realf had addressed to him a short time
before. Some of Realf's war lyrics are among the finest that we have.
Here are two stanzas from one:
"I think the soul of Cromwell kissed
The soul of Baker when,
With red sword in his bloody fist,
He died among his men.
I think, too, that when Winthrop fell,
His face toward the foe,
John Hampden shouted, 'All is well!'
Above that overthrow.
"And Lyon, making green and fair
The places where he trod;
And Ellsworth, sinking on the stair
Whereby he passed to God;
And those whose names are only writ
In hearts, instead of scrolls,
Still show the dark of earth uplit
With shining human souls."
And here is a sonnet suggested by the loss of many of his comrades on
the battlefield:
"Thank God for Liberty's dear slain; they give
Perpetual consecration unto it;
Quickening the clay of our insensitive
Dull natures with the awe of infinite
Sun-crowned transfigurations, such as sit
On the solemn-brooding mountains. Oh, the dead!
How they do shame the living; how they warn
Our little lives that huckster for the bread
Of peace, and tremble at the world's poor scorn,
And pick their steps among the flowers, and tread
Daintily soft where the raised idols are;
Prone with gross dalliance where the feasts are spread,
When most they should stride forth, and flash afar
Light like the streaming of heroic war!"
General Garfield was distinguished in this action for his judgment and
incessant activity. As chief of staff he wrote every order issued by
General Rosecrans during the action, except the blundering order that
caused the disaster by the withdrawal of Wood's division from the
line. He was advanced to the rank of major-general "for gallant and
meritorious services at the battle of Chickamauga."
[Illustration: MAJOR-GENERAL JAMES B. STEEDMAN.]
General Rosecrans, in his official report, says of his own personal
movements on the field:
"At the moment of the repulse of Davis's division [when the
Confederates poured through the gap left by Wood] I was standing in
rear of his right, waiting the completion of the closing of McCook's
corps to the left. Seeing confusion among Van Cleve's troops, and the
distance Davis's men were falling back, and the tide of battle surging
toward us, the urgency for Sheridan's troops to intervene became
imminent, and I hastened in person to the extreme right, to direct
Sheridan's movement on the flank of the advancing rebels. It was too
late. The crowd of returning troops rolled back, and the enemy
advanced. Giving the troops directions to rally behind the ridges west
of the Dry Valley road, I passed down it, accompanied by General
Garfield, Major McMichael, and Major Bond, of my staff, and a few of
the escort, under the shower of grape, canister, and musketry, for two
or three hundred yards, and attempted to rejoin General Thomas and the
troops sent to his support, by passing to the rear of the broken
portion of our line, but found the routed troops far toward the left;
and hearing the enemy's advancing musketry and cheers, I became
doubtful whether the left had held its ground, and started for
Rossville. On consultation and further reflection, however, I
determined to send General Garfield there, while I went to Chattanooga
to give orders for the security of the pontoon bridges at Battle Creek
and Bridgeport, and to make preliminary disposition, either to forward
ammunition and supplies should we hold our ground, or to withdraw the
troops into good position.
"General Garfield despatched me from Rossville that the left and
centre still held its ground. General Granger had gone to its support.
General Sheridan had rallied his division, and was advancing toward
the same point, and General Davis was going up the Dry Valley road, to
our right. General Garfield proceeded to the front, remained there
until the close of the fight, and despatched me the triumphant defence
our troops there made against the assaults of the enemy."
[Illustration: MAJOR-GENERAL GORDON GRANGER.]
{302} General Rosecrans says concerning the general conduct of the
battle:
"The fight on the left, after two P.M., was that of the army. Never,
in the history of this war at least, have troops fought with greater
energy or determination. Bayonet charges, often heard of but seldom
seen, were repeatedly made by brigades and regiments in several of our
divisions. After the yielding and severance of the division of the
right, the enemy bent all efforts to break the solid portion of our
line. Under the pressure of the rebel onset, the flanks of the line
were gradually retired until they occupied strong, advantageous
ground, giving to the whole a flattened, crescent shape. From one to
half-past three o'clock the unequal contest was sustained throughout
our line. Then the enemy, in overpowering numbers, flowed around our
right, held by General Brannan, and occupied a low gap in the ridge of
our defensive position, which commanded our rear. The moment was
critical. Twenty minutes more, and our right would have been turned,
our position taken in reverse, and probably the army routed.
Fortunately Major-General Granger, whose troops had been posted to
cover our left and rear, with the instinct of a true soldier and a
general, hearing the roar of the battle, and being beyond the reach of
orders from the general commanding, moved to its assistance. He soon
encountered the enemy's skirmishers, whom he disregarded, well knowing
that at that stage of the conflict the battle was not there. Posting
Col. Daniel McCook's brigade to take care of anything in that vicinity
and beyond our line, he moved the remainder to the scene of action,
reporting to General Thomas, who directed him to our suffering right.
He discovered at once the peril and the point of danger--the gap--and
quick as thought directed his advance brigade upon the enemy. General
Steedman, taking a regimental color, led the column. Swift was the
charge and terrible the conflict, but the enemy was broken. A thousand
of our brave men, killed and wounded, paid for its possession, but we
held the gap. Two divisions of Longstreet's corps confronted the
position. Determined to take it, they successively came to the
assault. A battery of six guns, placed in the gorge, poured death and
slaughter into them. They charged to within a few yards of the pieces;
but our grape and canister and the leaden hail of our musketry,
delivered in sparing but terrible volleys, from cartridges taken, in
many instances, from the boxes of their fallen companions, was too
much even for Longstreet's men. About sunset they made their last
charge, when our men, being out of ammunition, rushed on them with the
bayonet, and gave way to return no more."
General Rosecrans adds that: "The battle of Chickamauga was absolutely
necessary to secure our concentration and cover Chattanooga. It was
fought in a country covered with woods and undergrowth, and wholly
unknown to us. Every division came into action opportunely, and fought
squarely on the 19th. We were largely outnumbered, yet we foiled the
enemy's flank movement on our left, and secured our own position on
the road to Chattanooga."
In this battle the National army expended two million six hundred and
fifty thousand rounds of musket cartridges and seven thousand three
hundred and twenty-five rounds of artillery ammunition. With figures
like these the reader may realize how nearly true is the saying that
it requires a man's own weight of metal to kill him in battle.
Rosecrans lost thirty-six pieces of artillery and eight thousand four
hundred and fifty stand of small arms. He took two thousand prisoners.
He says in his report: "A very great meed of praise is due to Capt.
Horace Porter, of the Ordnance, for the wise system of arming each
regiment with arms of the same calibre, and having the ammunition
wagons properly marked, by which most of the difficulties of supplying
ammunition where troops had exhausted it in battle were obviated."
[Illustration: BREVET BRIGADIER-GENERAL H. V. N. BOYNTON.]
[Illustration: COLONEL B. F. SCRIBNER. (Afterward Brevet
Brigadier-General.)]
[Illustration: BREVET MAJOR-GENERAL EMERSON OPDYKE.]
Gen. T. J. Wood says in his report, concerning the fight on his part
of the line: "A part of the contest was witnessed by that able and
distinguished commander Major-General Thomas. I think it must have
been two o'clock P.M. when he came to where my command was so hotly
engaged. His presence was most welcome. The men saw him, felt they
were battling under the eye of a great chieftain, and their {303}
courage and resolution received fresh inspiration from this
consciousness."
In this terrible two days' struggle there were innumerable instances
of the display of special personal courage and timely gallantry. When
the One Hundred and Fifteenth Illinois Regiment was struggling to
rally after being somewhat broken, General Steedman took the flag from
the color-bearer and advanced toward the enemy, saying to the
regiment: "Boys, I'll carry your flag if you'll defend it." Whereupon
they rallied around him and went into the fight once more.
William S. Bean, a quartermaster's sergeant, whose place was at the
rear, and who might properly have remained there, went forward to the
battle line, and is said to have done almost the work of a general in
encouraging the bold and animating the timid. Lieut. C. W. Earle, a
mere boy, was left in command of the color company of the Ninety-sixth
Ohio Regiment, and stood by his colors unfalteringly throughout the
fight, though all but two of the color-guard were struck down and the
flag was cut to pieces by the bullets of the enemy. The Twenty-second
Michigan Regiment did not participate in the first day's battle, but
went in on the second day with five hundred and eighty-four officers
and men, and lost three hundred and seventy-two. Its colonel, Heber
LeFavour, received high praise for the manner in which he led his
regiment in a bayonet charge after their ammunition was exhausted. He
was taken prisoner late in the action.
General Bragg, in his report of the battle, complains bitterly of
General Polk's dilatoriness in obeying orders to attack, and says:
"Exhausted by two days' battle, with very limited supply of
provisions, and almost destitute of water, some time in daylight was
absolutely essential for our troops to supply these necessaries and
replenish their ammunition before renewing the contest. Availing
myself of this necessary delay to inspect and readjust my lines, I
moved, as soon as daylight served, on the 21st.... Our cavalry soon
came upon the enemy's rear guard where the main road passes through
Missionary Ridge. He had availed himself of the night to withdraw from
our front, and his main body was already in position within his lines
at Chattanooga. Any immediate pursuit by our infantry and artillery
would have been fruitless, as it was not deemed practicable, with our
weak and exhausted forces, to assail the enemy, now more than double
our numbers, behind his intrenchments. Though we had defeated him and
driven him from the field with heavy loss in arms, men, and artillery,
it had only been done by heavy sacrifices, in repeated, persistent,
and most gallant assaults upon superior numbers strongly posted and
protected. Our loss was in proportion to the prolonged and obstinate
struggle. Two-fifths of our gallant troops had fallen, and the number
of general and staff officers stricken down will best show how these
troops were led. Major-General Hood, the model soldier and inspiring
leader, fell after contributing largely to our success, and has
suffered the irreparable loss of a leg."
General Bragg believed that although he did not gain possession of
Chattanooga by the battle of Chickamauga, he had only to make one more
move to secure the prize. And perhaps he would have been correct in
this calculation if the commander opposed to him had not been
succeeded about a month later by General Grant. Bragg advanced his
army to positions on Lookout Mountain and Missionary Ridge, and put
the town of Chattanooga into a state of siege, managing to stop the
navigation of the river below and cut off all Rosecrans's routes of
supply except one long and difficult wagon road. This campaign
virtually closed the military career of General Rosecrans. He had
shown many fine qualities as a soldier, and had performed some
brilliant feats of strategy; but, as with some other commanders, his
abilities appeared to stop suddenly short at a point where great
successes were within easy reach. It was not more science that was
wanted, but more energy. When Grant appeared on the scene, with no
more knowledge of the military art than Rosecrans, but with boundless
and tireless energy, the conditions quickly changed.
[Illustration: "DO NOT SKULK HERE--"]
[Illustration: BRIGADIER-GENERAL MARCELLUS A. STOVALL, C. S. A.]
[Illustration: MAJOR-GENERAL PATRICK R. CLEBURNE, C. S. A.]
{304} [Illustration: BRIDGE ACROSS TENNESSEE RIVER--CHATTANOOGA AND
LOOKOUT MOUNTAIN IN THE DISTANCE. (From a war-time photograph.)]
{305}