THE BATTLE OF CANNAE.
B.C. 215
Interest excited by the battle of Cannae.--Various military
operations.--State of the public mind at Rome.--The plebeians
and patricians.--The consuls AEmilius and Varro.--A new army
raised.--Self-confidence of Varro.--Caution of AEmilius.--Views of
AEmilius.--Counsel of Fabius.--Conversation between Fabius and
AEmilius.--Resolution of AEmilius.--The consuls join the army.--Situation
of Hannibal.--Scarcity of food.--Sufferings of Hannibal's
troops.--Defeat of a foraging party.--Hannibal's pretended abandonment
of his camp.--Mission of Statilius.--The stratagem discovered.--Chagrin
of Hannibal and the Romans.--Apulia.--Hannibal marches into
Apulia.--The Romans follow him.--The new encampments.--Dissensions
between the consuls.--Flight of the inhabitants.--Maneuvers.--The
battle of Cannae.--Another stratagem.--Defeat of the Romans.--AEmilius
wounded.--Death of AEmilius.--Escape of Varro.--Condition of the
battle-field.--The wounded and dying.--The Roman and Carthaginian
soldier.--Immense plunder.
The battle of Cannae was the last great battle fought by Hannibal in
Italy. This conflict has been greatly celebrated in history, not only
for its magnitude, and the terrible desperation with which it was
fought, but also on account of the strong dramatic interest which the
circumstances attending it are fitted to excite. This interest is
perhaps, however, quite as much due to the peculiar skill of the
ancient historian who narrates the story, as to the events themselves
which he records.
It was about a year after the close of the dictatorship of Fabius that
this battle was fought. That interval had been spent by the Roman
consuls who were in office during that time in various military
operations, which did not, however, lead to any decisive results. In
the mean time, there were great uneasiness, discontent, and
dissatisfaction at Rome. To have such a dangerous and terrible foe, at
the head of forty thousand men, infesting the vicinage of their city,
ravaging the territories of their friends and allies, and threatening
continually to attack the city itself, was a continual source of
anxiety and vexation. It mortified the Roman pride, too, to find that
the greatest armies they could raise, and the ablest generals they
could choose and commission, proved wholly unable to cope with the
foe. The most sagacious of them, in fact, had felt it necessary to
decline the contest with him altogether.
This state of things produced a great deal of ill humor in the city.
Party spirit ran very high; tumultuous assemblies were held; disputes
and contentions prevailed, and mutual criminations and recriminations
without end. There were two great parties formed: that of the middling
classes on one side, and the aristocracy on the other. The former were
called the Plebeians, the latter the Patricians. The division between
these two classes was very great and very strongly marked. There was,
in consequence of it, infinite difficulty in the election of consuls.
At last the consuls were chosen, one from each party. The name of the
patrician was Paulus AEmilius. The name of the plebeian was Varro. They
were inducted into office, and were thus put jointly into possession
of a vast power, to wield which with any efficiency and success would
seem to require union and harmony in those who held it, and yet
AEmilius and Varro were inveterate and implacable political foes. It
was often so in the Roman government. The consulship was a
double-headed monster, which spent half its strength in bitter
contests waged between its members.
The Romans determined now to make an effectual effort to rid
themselves of their foe. They raised an enormous army. It consisted of
eight legions. The Roman legion was an army of itself. It contained
ordinarily four thousand foot soldiers, and a troop of three hundred
horsemen. It was very unusual to have more than two or three legions
in the field at a time. The Romans, however, on this occasion,
increased the number of the legions, and also augmented their size, so
that they contained, each, five thousand infantry and four hundred
cavalry. They were determined to make a great and last effort to
defend their city, and save the commonwealth from ruin. AEmilius and
Varro prepared to take command of this great force, with very strong
determinations to make it the means of Hannibal's destruction.
The characters of the two commanders, however, as well as their
political connections, were very dissimilar, and they soon began to
manifest a very different spirit, and to assume a very different air
and bearing, each from the other. AEmilius was a friend of Fabius, and
approved of his policy. Varro was for greater promptness and decision.
He made great promises, and spoke with the utmost confidence of being
able to annihilate Hannibal at a blow. He condemned the policy of
Fabius in attempting to wear out the enemy by delays. He said it was a
plan of the aristocratic party to protract the war, in order to put
themselves in high offices, and perpetuate their importance and
influence. The war might have been ended long ago, he said; and he
would promise the people that he would now end it, without fail, the
very day that he came in sight of Hannibal.
As for AEmilius, he assumed a very different tone. He was surprised, he
said, that any man could pretend to decide before he had even left the
city, and while he was, of course, entirely ignorant, both of the
condition of their own army, and of the position, and designs, and
strength of the enemy, how soon and under what circumstances it would
be wise to give him battle. Plans must be formed in adaptation to
circumstances, as circumstances can not be made to alter to suit
plans. He believed that they should succeed in the encounter with
Hannibal, but he thought that their only hope of success must be based
on the exercise of prudence, caution, and sagacity; he was sure that
rashness and folly could only lead in future, as they had always done
in the past, to discomfiture and ruin.
It is said that Fabius, the former dictator, conversed with AEmilius
before his departure for the army, and gave him such counsel as his
age and experience, and his knowledge of the character and operations
of Hannibal, suggested to his mind. "If you had a colleague like
yourself," said he, "I would not offer you any advice; you would not
need it. Or, if you were yourself like your colleague, vain,
self-conceited, and presumptuous, then I would be silent; counsel
would be thrown away upon you. But as it is, while you have great
judgment and sagacity to guide you, you are to be placed in a
situation of extreme difficulty and peril. If I am not mistaken, the
greatest difficulty you will have to encounter will not be the open
enemy you are going to meet upon the field. You will find, I think,
that Varro will give you quite as much trouble as Hannibal. He will be
presumptuous, reckless, and headstrong. He will inspire all the rash
and ardent young men in the army with his own enthusiastic folly, and
we shall be very fortunate if we do not yet see the terrible and
bloody scenes of Lake Thrasymene acted again. I am sure that the true
policy for us to adopt is the one which I marked out. That is always
the proper course for the invaded to pursue with invaders, where there
is the least doubt of the success of a battle. We grow strong while
Hannibal grows continually weaker by delay. He can only prosper so
long as he can fight battles and perform brilliant exploits. If we
deprive him of this power, his strength will be continually wasting
away, and the spirit and courage of his men waning. He has now scarce
a third part of the army which he had when he crossed the Iberus, and
nothing can save this remnant from destruction if we are wise."
AEmilius said, in reply to this, that he went into the contest with
very little of encouragement or hope. If Fabius had found it so
difficult to withstand the turbulent influences of his master of
horse, who was his subordinate officer, and, as such, under his
command, how could _he_ expect to restrain his colleague, who was
entitled, by his office, to full equality with him. But,
notwithstanding the difficulties which he foresaw, he was going to do
his duty, and abide by the result; and if the result should be
unfavorable, he should seek for death in the conflict, for death by
Carthaginian spears was a far lighter evil, in his view, than the
displeasure and censures of his countrymen.
The consuls departed from Rome to join the army, AEmilius attended by a
moderate number of men of rank and station, and Varro by a much larger
train, though it was formed of people of the lower classes of society.
The army was organized, and the arrangements of the encampments
perfected. One ceremony was that of administering an oath to the
soldiers, as was usual in the Roman armies at the commencement of a
campaign. They were made to swear that they would not desert the army,
that they would never abandon the post at which they were stationed in
fear or in flight, nor leave the ranks except for the purpose of
taking up or recovering a weapon, striking an enemy, or protecting a
friend. These and other arrangements being completed, the army was
ready for the field. The consuls made a different arrangement in
respect to the division of their power from that adopted by Fabius and
Minucius. It was agreed between them that they would exercise their
common authority alternately, each for a day.
In the mean time, Hannibal began to find himself reduced to great
difficulty in obtaining provisions for his men. The policy of Fabius
had been so far successful as to place him in a very embarrassing
situation, and one growing more and more embarrassing every day. He
could obtain no food except what he got by plunder, and there was now
very little opportunity for that, as the inhabitants of the country
had carried off all the grain and deposited it in strongly-fortified
towns; and though Hannibal had great confidence in his power to cope
with the Roman army in a regular battle on an open field, he had not
strength sufficient to reduce citadels or attack fortified camps. His
stock of provisions had become, therefore, more and more nearly
exhausted, until now he had a supply for only ten days, and he saw no
possible mode of increasing it.
His great object was, therefore, to bring on a battle. Varro was ready
and willing to give him battle, but AEmilius, or, to call him by his
name in full, Paulus AEmilius, which is the appellation by which he is
more frequently known, was very desirous to persevere in the Fabian
policy till the ten days had expired, after which he knew that
Hannibal must be reduced to extreme distress, and might have to
surrender at once to save his army from actual famine. In fact, it was
said that the troops were on such short allowance as to produce great
discontent, and that a large body of Spaniards were preparing to
desert and go over together to the Roman camp.
Things were in this state, when, one day, Hannibal sent out a party
from his camp to procure food, and AEmilius, who happened to hold the
command that day, sent out a strong force to intercept them. He was
successful. The Carthaginian detachment was routed. Nearly two
thousand men were killed, and the rest fled, by any roads they could
find, back to Hannibal's camp. Varro was very eager to follow them
there, but AEmilius ordered his men to halt. He was afraid of some
trick or treachery on the part of Hannibal, and was disposed to be
satisfied with the victory he had already won.
This little success, however, only inflamed Varro's ardor for a
battle, and produced a general enthusiasm in the Roman army; and, a
day or two afterward, a circumstance occurred which raised this
excitement to the highest pitch. Some reconnoiterers, who had been
stationed within sight of Hannibal's camp to watch the motions and
indications there, sent in word to the consuls that the Carthaginian
guards around their encampment had all suddenly disappeared, and that
a very extraordinary and unusual silence reigned within. Parties of
the Roman soldiers went up gradually and cautiously to the
Carthaginian lines, and soon found that the camp was deserted, though
the fires were still burning and the tents remained. This
intelligence, of course, put the whole Roman army into a fever of
excitement and agitation. They crowded around the consuls' pavilions,
and clamorously insisted on being led on to take possession of the
camp, and to pursue the enemy. "He has fled," they said, "and with
such precipitation that he has left the tents standing and his fires
still burning. Lead us on in pursuit of him."
Varro was as much excited as the rest. He was eager for action.
AEmilius hesitated. He made particular inquiries. He said they ought
to proceed with caution. Finally, he called up a certain prudent and
sagacious officer, named Statilius, and ordered him to take a small
body of horsemen, ride over to the Carthaginian camp, ascertain the
facts exactly, and report the result. Statilius did so. When he
reached the lines he ordered his troops to halt, and took with him two
horsemen on whose courage and strength he could rely, and rode in. The
three horsemen rode around the camp and examined every thing with a
view of ascertaining whether Hannibal had really abandoned his
position and fled, or whether some stratagem was intended.
When he came back he reported to the army that, in his opinion, the
desertion of the camp was not real, but a trick to draw the Romans
into some difficulty. The fires were the largest on the side toward
the Romans, which indicated that they were built to deceive. He saw
money, too, and other valuables strewed about upon the ground, which
appeared to him much more like a bait set in a trap, than like
property abandoned by fugitives as incumbrances to flight. Varro was
not convinced; and the army, hearing of the money, were excited to a
greater eagerness for plunder. They could hardly be restrained. Just
then, however, two slaves that had been taken prisoners by the
Carthaginians some time before, came into the Roman camp. They told
the consuls that the whole Carthaginian force was hid in ambush very
near, waiting for the Romans to enter their encampment, when they were
going to surround them and cut them to pieces. In the bustle and
movement attendant on this plan, the slaves had escaped. Of course,
the Roman army were now satisfied. They returned, chagrined and
disappointed, to their own quarters, and Hannibal, still more
chagrined and disappointed, returned to his.
He soon found, however, that he could not remain any longer where he
was. His provisions were exhausted, and he could obtain no more. The
Romans would not come out of their encampment to give him battle on
equal terms, and they were too strongly intrenched to be attacked
where they were. He determined, therefore, to evacuate that part of
the country, and move, by a sudden march, into Apulia.
Apulia was on the eastern side of Italy. The River Aufidus runs
through it, having a town named Cannae near its mouth. The region of
the Aufidus was a warm and sunny valley, which was now waving with
ripening grain. Being further south than the place where he had been,
and more exposed to the influence of the sun, Hannibal thought that
the crops would be sooner ripe, and that, at least, he should have a
new field to plunder.
He accordingly decided now to leave his camp in earnest, and move into
Apulia. He made the same arrangements as before, when his departure
was a mere pretense. He left tents pitched and fires burning, but
marched his army off the ground by night and secretly, so that the
Romans did not perceive his departure; and the next day, when they saw
the appearances of silence and solitude about the camp, they suspected
another deception, and made no move themselves. At length, however,
intelligence came that the long columns of Hannibal's army had been
seen already far to the eastward, and moving on as fast as possible,
with all their baggage. The Romans, after much debate and uncertainty,
resolved to follow. The eagles of the Apennines looked down upon the
two great moving masses, creeping slowly along through the forests and
valleys, like swarms of insects, one following the other, led on by a
strange but strong attraction, drawing them toward each other when at
a distance but kept asunder by a still stronger repulsion when near.
The Roman army came up with that of Hannibal on the River Aufidus,
near Cannae, and the two vast encampments were formed with all the
noise and excitement attendant on the movements of two great armies
posting themselves on the eve of a battle, in the neighborhood of each
other. In the Roman camp, the confusion was greatly aggravated by the
angry disputes which immediately arose between the consuls and their
respective adherents as to the course to be pursued. Varro insisted on
giving the Carthaginians immediate battle. AEmilius refused. Varro said
that he must protest against continuing any longer these inexcusable
delays, and insist on a battle. He could not consent to be responsible
any further for allowing Italy to lie at the mercy of such a scourge.
AEmilius replied, that if Varro did precipitate a battle, he himself
protested against his rashness, and could not be, in any degree,
responsible for the result. The various officers took sides, some with
one consul and some with the other, but most with Varro. The
dissension filled the camp with excitement, agitation, and ill will.
In the mean time, the inhabitants of the country into which these two
vast hordes of ferocious, though restrained and organized combatants,
had made such a sudden irruption, were flying as fast as they could
from the awful scene which they expected was to ensue. They carried
from their villages and cabins what little property could be saved,
and took the women and children away to retreats and fastnesses,
wherever they imagined they could find temporary concealment or
protection. The news of the movement of the two armies spread
throughout the country, carried by hundreds of refugees and
messengers, and all Italy, looking on with suspense and anxiety,
awaited the result.
The armies maneuvered for a day or two, Varro, during his term of
command, making arrangements to promote and favor an action, and
AEmilius, on the following day, doing every thing in his power to
prevent it. In the end, Varro succeeded. The lines were formed and the
battle must be begun. AEmilius gave up the contest now, and while he
protested earnestly against the course which Varro pursued, he
prepared to do all in his power to prevent a defeat, since there was
no longer a possibility of avoiding a collision.
The battle began, and the reader must imagine the scene, since no pen
can describe it. Fifty thousand men on one side and eighty thousand on
the other, at work hard and steadily, for six hours, killing each
other by every possible means of destruction--stabs, blows, struggles,
outcries, shouts of anger and defiance, and screams of terror and
agony, all mingled together, in one general din, which covered the
whole country for an extent of many miles, all together constituted a
scene of horror of which none but those who have witnessed great
battles can form any adequate idea.
It seems as if Hannibal could do nothing without stratagem. In the
early part of this conflict he sent a large body of his troops over to
the Romans as deserters. They threw down their spears and bucklers, as
they reached the Roman lines, in token of surrender. The Romans
received them, opened a passage for them through into the rear, and
ordered them to remain there. As they were apparently unarmed, they
left only a very small guard to keep them in custody. The men had,
however, daggers concealed about their dress, and, watching a
favorable moment, in the midst of the battle, they sprang to their
feet, drew out their weapons, broke away from their guard, and
attacked the Romans in the rear at a moment when they were so pressed
by the enemy in front that they could scarcely maintain their ground.
It was evident before many hours that the Roman forces were every
where yielding. From slowly and reluctantly yielding they soon began
to fly. In the flight, the weak and the wounded were trampled under
foot by the throng who were pressing on behind them, or were
dispatched by wanton blows from enemies as they passed in pursuit of
those who were still able to fly. In the midst of this scene, a Roman
officer named Lentulus, as he was riding away, saw before him at the
road-side another officer wounded, sitting upon a stone, faint and
bleeding. He stopped when he reached him, and found that it was the
consul AEmilius. He had been wounded in the head with a sling, and his
strength was almost gone. Lentulus offered him his horse, and urged
him to take it and fly. AEmilius declined the offer. He said it was too
late for his life to be saved, and that, besides, he had no wish to
save it. "Go on, therefore, yourself," said he, "as fast as you can.
Make the best of your way to Rome. Tell the authorities there, from
me, that all is lost, and they must do whatever they can themselves
for the defense of the city. Make all the speed you can, or Hannibal
will be at the gates before you."
AEmilius sent also a message to Fabius, declaring to him that it was
not his fault that a battle had been risked with Hannibal. He had done
all in his power, he said, to prevent it, and had adhered to the
policy which Fabius had recommended to the last. Lentulus having
received these messages, and perceiving that the Carthaginians were
close upon him in pursuit, rode away, leaving the consul to his fate.
The Carthaginians came on, and, on seeing the wounded man, they thrust
their spears into his body, one after another, as they passed, until
his limbs ceased to quiver. As for the other consul, Varro, he escaped
with his life. Attended by about seventy horsemen, he made his way to
a fortified town not very remote from the battle-field, where he
halted with his horsemen, and determined that he would attempt to
rally there the remains of the army.
The Carthaginians, when they found the victory complete, abandoned the
pursuit of the enemy, returned to their camp, spent some hours in
feasting and rejoicing, and then laid down to sleep. They were, of
course, well exhausted by the intense exertions of the day. On the
field where the battle had been fought, the wounded lay all night
mingled with the dead, filling the air with cries and groans, and
writhing in their agony.
Early the next morning the Carthaginians came back to the field
to plunder the dead bodies of the Romans. The whole field presented
a most shocking spectacle to the view. The bodies of horses and men
lay mingled in dreadful confusion, as they had fallen, some dead,
others still alive, the men moaning, crying for water, and feebly
struggling from time to time to disentangle themselves from the
heaps of carcasses under which they were buried. The deadly and
inextinguishable hate which the Carthaginians felt for their foes not
having been appeased by the slaughter of forty thousand of them, they
beat down and stabbed these wretched lingerers wherever they found
them, as a sort of morning pastime after the severer labors of the
preceding day. This slaughter, however, could hardly be considered a
cruelty to the wretched victims of it, for many of them bared their
breasts to their assailants, and begged for the blow which was to put
an end to their pain. In exploring the field, one Carthaginian soldier
was found still alive, but imprisoned by the dead body of his Roman
enemy lying upon him. The Carthaginian's face and ears were shockingly
mangled. The Roman, having fallen upon him when both were mortally
wounded, had continued the combat with his teeth when he could no
longer use his weapon, and had died at last, binding down his
exhausted enemy with his own dead body.
The Carthaginians secured a vast amount of plunder. The Roman army was
full of officers and soldiers from the aristocratic ranks of society,
and their arms and their dress were very valuable. The Carthaginians
obtained some bushels of gold rings from their fingers, which Hannibal
sent to Carthage as a trophy of his victory.