THE DICTATOR FABIUS.
B.C. 216
Alarm at Rome.--The consul Flaminius.--Another stratagem.--Confidence
of Flaminius.--Complete rout of the Romans.--Effects of the
battle.--Panic of the Romans.--Their superstitious fears.--Omens and
bad signs.--Curious transformations.--Their influence.--Importance
attached to these stories.--Feverish excitement at Rome.--News of the
battle.--Gatherings of the people.--Arrival of stragglers.--Appointment
of a dictator.--Fabius.--Measures of Fabius.--Religious
ceremonies.--Minucius.--Supreme authority of a dictator.--Proclamation
of Fabius.--Progress of Hannibal.--Policy of Fabius.--He declines
fighting.--Hannibal's danger.--Stratagem of the fiery
oxen.--Unpopularity of Fabius.--Hannibal's sagacity.--Plots against
Fabius.--He goes to Rome.--Minucius risks a battle.--Speech of
Fabius.--Fabius returns to the army.--He is deprived of the supreme
power.--Division of power.--Ambuscade of Hannibal.--Hannibal's
success.--Fabius comes to the rescue.--Speech of Minucius.--The Roman
army again united.--Character of Fabius.--His integrity.
In the mean time, while Hannibal was thus rapidly making his way
toward the gates of Rome, the people of the city became more and more
alarmed, until at last a general feeling of terror pervaded all the
ranks of society. Citizens and soldiers were struck with one common
dread. They had raised a new army and put it under the command of a
new consul, for the terms of service of the others had expired.
Flaminius was the name of this new commander, and he was moving
northward at the head of his forces at the time that Hannibal was
conducting his troops with so much labor and difficulty through the
meadows and morasses of the Arno.
This army was, however, no more successful than its predecessors had
been. Hannibal contrived to entrap Flaminius by a stratagem, as he had
entrapped Sempronius before. There is in the eastern part of Etruria,
near the mountains, a lake called Lake Thrasymene. It happened that
this lake extended so near to the base of the mountains as to leave
only a narrow passage between--a passage but little wider than was
necessary for a road. Hannibal contrived to station a detachment of
his troops in ambuscade at the foot of the mountains, and others on
the declivities above, and then in some way or other to entice
Flaminius and his army through the defile. Flaminius was, like
Sempronius, ardent, self-confident, and vain. He despised the power of
Hannibal, and thought that his success hitherto had been owing to the
inefficiency or indecision of his predecessors. For his part, his only
anxiety was to encounter him, for he was sure of an easy victory. He
advanced, therefore, boldly and without concern into the pass of
Thrasymene, when he learned that Hannibal was encamped beyond it.
Hannibal had established an encampment openly on some elevated ground
beyond the pass, and as Flaminius and his troops came into the
narrowest part of the defile, they saw this encampment at a distance
before them, with a broad plain beyond the pass intervening. They
supposed that the whole force of the enemy was there, not dreaming of
the presence of the strong detachments which were hid on the slopes of
the mountains above them, and were looking down upon them at that
very moment from behind rocks and bushes. When, therefore, the Romans
had got through the pass, they spread out upon the plain beyond it,
and were advancing to the camp, when suddenly the secreted troops
burst forth from their ambuscade, and, pouring down the mountains,
took complete possession of the pass, and attacked the Romans in the
rear, while Hannibal attacked them in the van. Another long, and
desperate, and bloody contest ensued. The Romans were beaten at every
point, and, as they were hemmed in between the lake, the mountain, and
the pass, they could not retreat; the army was, accordingly, almost
wholly cut to pieces. Flaminius himself was killed.
The news of this battle spread every where, and produced the strongest
sensation. Hannibal sent dispatches to Carthage announcing what he
considered his final victory over the great foe, and the news was
received with the greatest rejoicings. At Rome, on the other hand, the
news produced a dreadful shock of disappointment and terror. It seemed
as if the last hope of resisting the progress of their terrible enemy
was gone, and that they had nothing now to do but to sink down in
despair, and await the hour when his columns should come pouring in
through the gates of the city.
The people of Rome were, in fact, prepared for a panic, for their
fears had been increasing and gathering strength for some time. They
were very superstitious in those ancient days in respect to signs and
omens. A thousand trifling occurrences, which would, at the present
day, be considered of no consequence whatever, were then considered
bad signs, auguring terrible calamities; and, on occasions like these,
when calamities seemed to be impending, every thing was noticed, and
circumstances which would not have been regarded at all at ordinary
times, were reported from one to another, the stories being
exaggerated as they spread, until the imaginations of the people were
filled with mysterious but invincible fears. So universal was the
belief in these prodigies and omens, that they were sometimes formally
reported to the senate, committees were appointed to inquire into
them, and solemn sacrifices were offered to "expiate them," as it was
termed, that is, to avert the displeasure of the gods, which the omens
were supposed to foreshadow and portend.
A very curious list of these omens was reported to the senate during
the winter and spring in which Hannibal was advancing toward Rome. An
ox from the cattle-market had got into a house, and, losing his way,
had climbed up into the third story, and, being frightened by the
noise and uproar of those who followed him, ran out of a window and
fell down to the ground. A light appeared in the sky in the form of
ships. A temple was struck with lightning. A spear in the hand of a
statue of Juno, a celebrated goddess, shook, one day, of itself.
Apparitions of men in white garments were seen in a certain place. A
wolf came into a camp, and snatched the sword of a soldier on guard
out of his hands, and ran away with it. The sun one day looked smaller
than usual. Two moons were seen together in the sky. This was in the
daytime, and one of the moons was doubtless a halo or a white cloud.
Stones fell out of the sky at a place called Picenum. This was one of
the most dreadful of all the omens, though it is now known to be a
common occurrence.
These omens were all, doubtless, real occurrences, more or less
remarkable, it is true, but, of course, entirely unmeaning in respect
to their being indications of impending calamities. There were other
things reported to the senate which must have originated almost wholly
in the imaginations and fears of the observers. Two shields, it was
said, in a certain camp, sweated blood. Some people were reaping, and
bloody ears of grain fell into the basket. This, of course, must have
been wholly imaginary, unless, indeed, one of the reapers had cut his
fingers with the sickle. Some streams and fountains became bloody;
and, finally, in one place in the country, some goats turned into
sheep. A hen, also, became a cock, and a cock changed to a hen.
Such ridiculous stories would not be worthy of a moment's attention
now, were it not for the degree of importance attached to them then.
They were formally reported to the Roman senate, the witnesses who
asserted that they had seen them were called in and examined, and a
solemn debate was held on the question what should be done to avert
the supernatural influences of evil which the omens expressed. The
senate decided to have three days of expiation and sacrifice, during
which the whole people of Rome devoted themselves to the religious
observances which they thought calculated to appease the wrath of
Heaven. They made various offerings and gifts to the different gods,
among which one was a golden thunderbolt of fifty pounds' weight,
manufactured for Jupiter, whom they considered the thunderer.
All these things took place before the battle at Lake Thrasymene, so
that the whole community were in a very feverish state of excitement
and anxiety before the news from Flaminius arrived. When these tidings
at last came, they threw the whole city into utter consternation. Of
course, the messenger went directly to the senate-house to report to
the government, but the story that such news had arrived soon spread
about the city, and the whole population crowded into the streets and
public squares, all eagerly asking for the tidings. An enormous throng
assembled before the senate-house calling for information. A public
officer appeared at last, and said to them in a loud voice, "We have
been defeated in a great battle." He would say no more. Still rumors
spread from one to another, until it was generally known throughout
the city that Hannibal had conquered the Roman army again in a great
battle, that great numbers of the soldiers had fallen or been taken
prisoners, and that the consul himself was slain.
The night was passed in great anxiety and terror, and the next day,
and for several of the succeeding days, the people gathered in great
numbers around the gates, inquiring eagerly for news of every one that
came in from the country. Pretty soon scattered soldiers and small
bodies of troops began to arrive, bringing with them information of
the battle, each one having a different tale to tell, according to his
own individual experience in the scene. Whenever these men arrived,
the people of the city, and especially the women who had husbands or
sons in the army, crowded around them, overwhelming them with
questions, and making them tell their tale again and again, as if the
intolerable suspense and anxiety of the hearers could not be
satisfied. The intelligence was such as in general to confirm and
increase the fears of those who listened to it; but sometimes, when it
made known the safety of a husband or a son, it produced as much
relief and rejoicing as it did in other cases terror and despair. That
maternal love was as strong an impulse in those rough days as it is in
the more refined and cultivated periods of the present age, is evinced
by the fact that two of these Roman mothers, on seeing their sons
coming suddenly into their presence, alive and well, when they had
heard that they had fallen in battle, were killed at once by the
shock of surprise and joy, as if by a blow.
In seasons of great and imminent danger to the commonwealth, it was
the custom of the Romans to appoint what they called a dictator, that
is, a supreme executive, who was clothed with absolute and unlimited
powers; and it devolved on him to save the state from the threatened
ruin by the most prompt and energetic action. This case was obviously
one of the emergencies requiring such a measure. There was no time for
deliberations and debates; for deliberations and debates, in periods
of such excitement and danger, become disputes, and end in tumult and
uproar. Hannibal was at the head of a victorious army, ravaging the
country which he had already conquered, and with no obstacle between
him and the city itself. It was an emergency calling for the
appointment of a dictator. The people made choice of a man of great
reputation for experience and wisdom, named Fabius, and placed the
whole power of the state in his hands. All other authority was
suspended, and every thing was subjected to his sway. The whole city,
with the life and property of every inhabitant, was placed at his
disposal; the army and the fleets were also under his command, even
the consuls being subject to his orders.
Fabius accepted the vast responsibility which his election imposed
upon him, and immediately began to take the necessary measures. He
first made arrangements for performing solemn religious ceremonies, to
expiate the omens and propitiate the gods. He brought out all the
people in great convocations, and made them take vows, in the most
formal and imposing manner, promising offerings and celebrations in
honor of the various gods, at some future time, in case these
divinities would avert the threatening danger. It is doubtful,
however, whether Fabius, in doing these things, really believed that
they had any actual efficiency, or whether he resorted to them as a
means of calming and quieting the minds of the people, and producing
that composure and confidence which always results from a hope of the
favor of Heaven. If this last was his object, his conduct was
eminently wise.
Fabius, also, immediately ordered a large levy of troops to be made.
His second in command, called his _master of horse_, was directed to
make this levy, and to assemble the troops at a place called Tibur, a
few miles east of the city. There was always a master of horse
appointed to attend upon and second a dictator. The name of this
officer in the case of Fabius was Minucius. Minucius was as ardent,
prompt, and impetuous, as Fabius was cool, prudent, and calculating.
He levied the troops and brought them to their place of rendezvous.
Fabius went out to take the command of them. One of the consuls was
coming to join him, with a body of troops which he had under his
command. Fabius sent word to him that he must come without any of the
insignia of his authority, as all his authority, semi-regal as it was
in ordinary times, was superseded and overruled in the presence of a
dictator. A consul was accustomed to move in great state on all
occasions. He was preceded by twelve men, bearing badges and insignia,
to impress the army and the people with a sense of the greatness of
his dignity. To see, therefore, a consul divested of all these marks
of his power, and coming into the dictator's presence as any other
officer would come before an acknowledged superior, made the army of
Fabius feel a very strong sense of the greatness of their new
commander's dignity and power.
Fabius then issued a proclamation, which he sent by proper messengers
into all the region of country around Rome, especially to that part
toward the territory which was in possession of Hannibal. In this
proclamation he ordered all the people to abandon the country and the
towns which were not strongly fortified, and to seek shelter in the
castles, and forts, and fortified cities. They were commanded, also,
to lay waste the country which they should leave, and destroy all the
property, and especially all the provisions, which they could not take
to their places of refuge. This being done, Fabius placed himself at
the head of the forces which he had got together, and moved on,
cautiously and with great circumspection, in search of his enemy.
In the mean time, Hannibal had crossed over to the eastern side of
Italy, and had passed down, conquering and ravaging the country as he
went, until he got considerably south of Rome. He seems to have
thought it not quite prudent to advance to the actual attack of the
city, after the battle of Lake Thrasymene; for the vast population of
Rome was sufficient, if rendered desperate by his actually threatening
the capture and pillage of the city, to overwhelm his army entirely.
So he moved to the eastward, and advanced on that side until he had
passed the city, and thus it happened that Fabius had to march to the
southward and eastward in order to meet him. The two armies came in
sight of each other quite on the eastern side of Italy, very near the
shores of the Adriatic Sea.
The policy which Fabius resolved to adopt was, not to give Hannibal
battle, but to watch him, and wear his army out by fatigue and delays.
He kept, therefore, near him, but always posted his army on
advantageous ground, which all the defiance and provocations of
Hannibal could not induce him to leave. When Hannibal moved, which he
was soon compelled to do to procure provisions, Fabius would move too,
but only to post and intrench himself in some place of security as
before. Hannibal did every thing in his power to bring Fabius to
battle, but all his efforts were unavailing.
In fact, he himself was at one time in imminent danger. He had got
drawn, by Fabius's good management, into a place where he was
surrounded by mountains, upon which Fabius had posted his troops, and
there was only one defile which offered any egress, and this, too,
Fabius had strongly guarded. Hannibal resorted to his usual resource,
cunning and stratagem, for means of escape. He collected a herd of
oxen. He tied fagots across their horns, filling the fagots with
pitch, so as to make them highly combustible. In the night on which he
was going to attempt to pass the defile, he ordered his army to be
ready to march through, and then had the oxen driven up the hills
around on the further side of the Roman detachment which was guarding
the pass. The fagots were then lighted on the horns of the oxen. They
ran about, frightened and infuriated by the fire, which burned their
horns to the quick, and blinded them with the sparks which fell from
it. The leaves and branches of the forests were set on fire. A great
commotion was thus made, and the guards, seeing the moving lights and
hearing the tumult, supposed that the Carthaginian army were upon the
heights, and were coming down to attack them. They turned out in great
hurry and confusion to meet the imaginary foe, leaving the pass
unguarded, and, while they were pursuing the bonfires on the oxens'
heads into all sorts of dangerous and impracticable places, Hannibal
quietly marched his army through the defile and reached a place of
safety.
Although Fabius kept Hannibal employed and prevented his approaching
the city, still there soon began to be felt a considerable degree of
dissatisfaction that he did not act more decidedly. Minucius was
continually urging him to give Hannibal battle, and, not being able to
induce him to do so, he was continually expressing his discontent and
displeasure. The army sympathized with Minucius. He wrote home to Rome
too, complaining bitterly of the dictator's inefficiency. Hannibal
learned all this by means of his spies, and other sources of
information, which so good a contriver as he has always at command.
Hannibal was, of course, very much pleased to hear of these
dissensions, and of the unpopularity of Fabius. He considered such an
enemy as he--so prudent, cautious, and watchful--as a far more
dangerous foe than such bold and impetuous commanders as Flaminius and
Minucius, whom he could always entice into difficulty, and then easily
conquer.
Hannibal thought he would render Minucius a little help in making
Fabius unpopular. He found out from some Roman deserters that the
dictator possessed a valuable farm in the country, and he sent a
detachment of his troops there, with orders to plunder and destroy
the property all around it, but to leave the farm of Fabius untouched
and in safety. The object was to give to the enemies of Fabius at Rome
occasion to say that there was secretly a good understanding between
him and Hannibal, and that he was kept back from acting boldly in
defense of his country by some corrupt bargain which he had
traitorously made with the enemy.
These plans succeeded. Discontent and dissatisfaction spread rapidly,
both in the camp and in the city. At Rome they made an urgent demand
upon Fabius to return, ostensibly because they wished him to take part
in some great religious ceremonies, but really to remove him from the
camp, and give Minucius an opportunity to attack Hannibal. They also
wished to devise some method, if possible, of depriving him of his
power. He had been appointed for six months, and the time had not yet
nearly expired: but they wished to shorten, or, if they could not
shorten, to limit and diminish his power.
Fabius went to Rome, leaving the army under the orders of Minucius,
but commanding him positively not to give Hannibal battle, nor expose
his troops to any danger, but to pursue steadily the same policy
which he himself had followed. He had, however, been in Rome only a
short time before tidings came that Minucius had fought a battle and
gained a victory. There were boastful and ostentatious letters from
Minucius to the Roman senate, lauding the exploit which he had
performed.
Fabius examined carefully the accounts. He compared one thing with
another, and satisfied himself of what afterward proved to be the
truth, that Minucius had gained no victory at all. He had lost five or
six thousand men, and Hannibal had lost no more, and Fabius showed
that no advantage had been gained. He urged upon the senate the
importance of adhering to the line of policy he had pursued, and the
danger of risking every thing, as Minucius had done, on the fortunes
of a single battle. Besides, he said, Minucius had disobeyed his
orders, which were distinct and positive, and he deserved to be
recalled.
In saying these things Fabius irritated and exasperated his enemies
more than ever. "Here is a man," said they, "who will not only not
fight the enemies whom he is sent against himself, but he will not
allow any body else to fight them. Even at this distance, when his
second in command has obtained a victory, he will not admit it, and
endeavors to curtail the advantages of it. He wishes to protract the
war, that he may the longer continue to enjoy the supreme and
unlimited authority with which we have intrusted him."
The hostility to Fabius at last reached such a pitch, that it was
proposed in an assembly of the people to make Minucius his equal in
command. Fabius, having finished the business which called him to
Rome, did not wait to attend to the discussion of this question, but
left the city, and was proceeding on his way to join the army again,
when he was overtaken with a messenger bearing a letter informing him
that the decree had passed, and that he must thenceforth consider
Minucius as his colleague and equal. Minucius was, of course,
extremely elated at this result. "Now," said he, "we will see if
something can not be done."
The first question was, however, to decide on what principle and in
what way they should share their power. "We can not both command at
once," said Minucius. "Let us exercise the power in alternation, each
one being in authority for a day, or a week, or a month, or any other
period that you prefer."
"No," replied Fabius, "we will not divide the time, we will divide the
men. There are four legions. You shall take two of them, and the other
two shall be mine. I can thus, perhaps, save half the army from the
dangers in which I fear your impetuosity will plunge all whom you have
under your command."
This plan was adopted. The army was divided, and each portion went,
under its own leader, to its separate encampment. The result was one
of the most curious and extraordinary occurrences that is recorded in
the history of nations. Hannibal, who was well informed of all these
transactions, immediately felt that Minucius was in his power. He knew
that he was so eager for battle that it would be easy to entice him
into it, under almost any circumstances that he himself might choose
to arrange. Accordingly, he watched his opportunity when there was a
good place for an ambuscade near Minucius's camp, and lodged five
thousand men in it in such a manner that they were concealed by rocks
and other obstructions to the view. There was a hill between this
ground and the camp of Minucius. When the ambuscade was ready,
Hannibal sent up a small force to take possession of the top of the
hill, anticipating that Minucius would at once send up a stronger
force to drive them away. He did so. Hannibal then sent up more as a
re-enforcement. Minucius, whose spirit and pride were now aroused,
sent up more still, and thus, by degrees, Hannibal drew out his
enemy's whole force, and then, ordering his own troops to retreat
before them, the Romans were drawn on, down the hill, till they were
surrounded by the ambuscade. These hidden troops then came pouring out
upon them, and in a short time the Romans were thrown into utter
confusion, flying in all directions before their enemies, and entirely
at their mercy.
All would have been irretrievably lost had it not been for the
interposition of Fabius. He received intelligence of the danger at his
own camp, and marched out at once with all his force, and arrived upon
the ground so opportunely, and acted so efficiently, that he at once
completely changed the fortune of the day. He saved Minucius and his
half of the army from utter destruction. The Carthaginians retreated
in their turn, Hannibal being entirely overwhelmed with disappointment
and vexation at being thus deprived of his prey. History relates that
Minucius had the candor and good sense, after this, to acknowledge
his error, and yield to the guidance and direction of Fabius. He
called his part of the army together when they reached their camp, and
addressed them thus: "Fellow-soldiers, I have often heard it said that
the wisest men are those who possess wisdom and sagacity themselves,
and, next to them, those who know how to perceive and are willing to
be guided by the wisdom and sagacity of others; while they are fools
who do not know how to conduct themselves, and will not be guided by
those who do. We will not belong to this last class; and since it is
proved that we are not entitled to rank with the first, let us join
the second. We will march to the camp of Fabius, and join our camp
with his, as before. We owe to him, and also to all his portion of the
army, our eternal gratitude for the nobleness of spirit which he
manifested in coming to our deliverance, when he might so justly have
left us to ourselves."
The two legions repaired, accordingly, to the camp of Fabius, and a
complete and permanent reconciliation took place between the two
divisions of the army. Fabius rose very high in the general esteem by
this transaction. The term of his dictatorship, however, expired soon
after this, and as the danger from Hannibal was now less imminent,
the office was not renewed, but consuls were chosen as before.
The character of Fabius has been regarded with the highest admiration
by all mankind. He evinced a very noble spirit in all that he did. One
of his last acts was a very striking proof of this. He had bargained
with Hannibal to pay a certain sum of money as ransom for a number of
prisoners which had fallen into his hands, and whom Hannibal, on the
faith of that promise, had released. Fabius believed that the Romans
would readily ratify the treaty and pay the amount; but they demurred,
being displeased, or pretending to be displeased, because Fabius had
not consulted them before making the arrangement. Fabius, in order to
preserve his own and his country's faith unsullied, sold his farm to
raise the money. He did thus most certainly protect and vindicate his
own honor, but he can hardly be said to have saved that of the people
of Rome.