SCIPIO.
B.C. 215-201
Reason of Hannibal's success.--The Scipios.--Fragments of the
Roman army.--Scipio elected commander.--Scipio's energy.--Case of
Metellus.--Metellus yields.--Consternation at Rome.--The senate
adjourns.--Hannibal refuses to march to Rome.--Hannibal makes his
head-quarters at Capua.--Hannibal sends Mago to Carthage.--Mago's
speech.--The bag of rings.--Debate in the Carthaginian senate.--The
speech of Hanno in the Carthaginian senate.--Progress of the
war.--Enervation of Hannibal's army.--Decline of the Carthaginian
power.--Marcellus.--Success of the Romans.--Siege of Capua.--Hannibal's
attack on the Roman camp.--He marches to Rome.--Preparations for a
battle.--Prevented by storms.--Sales at auction.--Hasdrubal crosses the
Alps.--Livius and Nero.--Division of the provinces.--The intercepted
letters.--Nero's perplexity.--Laws of military discipline.--Their
strictness and severity.--Danger of violating discipline.--An
illustration.--Plan of Nero.--A night march.--Livius and Nero attack
Hasdrubal.--Hasdrubal orders a retreat.--Butchery of Hasdrubal's
army.--Hasdrubal's death.--Progress of the Roman arms.--Successes of
Scipio.--Scipio in Africa.--Carthage threatened.--A truce.--Hannibal
recalled.--Hannibal raises a new army.--The Romans capture his
spies.--Negotiations.--Interview between Hannibal and Scipio.--The
last battle.--Defeat of the Carthaginians.
The true reason why Hannibal could not be arrested in his triumphant
career seems not to have been because the Romans did not pursue the
right kind of policy toward him, but because, thus far, they had no
general who was his equal. Whoever was sent against him soon proved to
be his inferior. Hannibal could out-maneuver them all in stratagem,
and could conquer them on the field. There was, however, now destined
to appear a man capable of coping with Hannibal. It was young Scipio,
the one who saved the life of his father at the battle of Ticinus.
This Scipio, though the son of Hannibal's first great antagonist of
that name, is commonly called, in history, the elder Scipio; for there
was another of his name after him, who was greatly celebrated for his
wars against the Carthaginians in Africa. These last two received from
the Roman people the surname of Africanus, in honor of their African
victories, and the one who now comes upon the stage was called Scipio
Africanus the elder, or sometimes simply the elder Scipio. The deeds
of the Scipio who attempted to stop Hannibal at the Rhone and upon the
Po were so wholly eclipsed by his son, and by the other Scipio who
followed him, that the former is left out of view and forgotten in
designating and distinguishing the others.
Our present Scipio first appears upon the stage, in the exercise of
military command, after the battle of Cannae. He was a subordinate
officer and on the day following the battle he found himself at a
place called Canusium, which was at a short distance from Cannae, on
the way toward Rome, with a number of other officers of his own rank,
and with broken masses and detachments of the army coming in from time
to time, faint, exhausted, and in despair. The rumor was that both
consuls were killed. These fragments of the army had, therefore, no
one to command them. The officers met together, and unanimously agreed
to make Scipio their commander in the emergency, until some superior
officer should arrive, or they should get orders from Rome.
An incident here occurred which showed, in a striking point of view,
the boldness and energy of the young Scipio's character. At the very
meeting in which he was placed in command, and when they were
overwhelmed with perplexity and care, an officer came in, and reported
that in another part of the camp there was an assembly of officers and
young men of rank, headed by a certain Metellus, who had decided to
give up the cause of their country in despair, and that they were
making arrangements to proceed immediately to the sea-coast, obtain
ships, and sail away to seek a new home in some foreign lands,
considering their cause in Italy as utterly lost and ruined. The
officer proposed that they should call a council and deliberate what
was best to do.
"Deliberate!" said Scipio; "this is not a case for deliberation, but
for action. Draw your swords and follow me." So saying, he pressed
forward at the head of the party to the quarters of Metellus. They
marched boldly into the apartment where he and his friends were in
consultation. Scipio held up his sword, and in a very solemn manner
pronounced an oath, binding himself not to abandon his country in this
the hour of her distress, nor to allow any other Roman citizen to
abandon her. If he should be guilty of such treason, he called upon
Jupiter, by the most dreadful imprecations, to destroy him utterly,
house, family, fortune, soul, and body.
"And now, Metellus, I call upon you," said he, "and all who are with
you, to take the same oath. You must do it, otherwise you have got to
defend yourselves against these swords of ours, as well as those of
the Carthaginians." Metellus and his party yielded. Nor was it wholly
to fear that they yielded. It was to the influence of hope quite as
much as to that of fear. The courage, the energy, and the martial
ardor which Scipio's conduct evinced awakened a similar spirit in
them, and made them hope again that possibly their country might yet
be saved.
The news of the awful defeat and destruction of the Roman army flew
swiftly to Rome, and produced universal consternation. The whole city
was in an uproar. There were soldiers in the army from almost every
family, so that every woman and child throughout the city was
distracted by the double agitation of inconsolable grief at the death
of their husband or their father, slain in the battle, and of terrible
fear that Hannibal and his raging followers were about to burst in
through the gates of the city to murder them. The streets of the city,
and especially the Forum, were thronged with vast crowds of men,
women, and children, who filled the air with loud lamentations, and
with cries of terror and despair.
The magistrates were not able to restore order. The senate actually
adjourned, that the members of it might go about the city, and use
their influence and their power to produce silence at least, if they
could not restore composure. The streets were finally cleared. The
women and children were ordered to remain at home. Armed patrols were
put on guard to prevent tumultuous assemblies forming. Men were sent
off on horseback on the road to Canusium and Cannae, to get more
accurate intelligence, and then the senate assembled again, and began
to consider, with as much of calmness as they could command, what was
to be done.
The panic at Rome was, however, in some measure, a false alarm, for
Hannibal, contrary to the expectation of all Italy, did not go to
Rome. His generals urged him very strongly to do so. Nothing could
prevent, they said, his gaining immediate possession of the city. But
Hannibal refused to do this. Rome was strongly fortified, and had an
immense population. His army, too, was much weakened by the battle of
Cannae, and he seems to have thought it most prudent not to attempt
the reduction of Rome until he should have received re-enforcements
from home. It was now so late in the season that he could not expect
such re-enforcements immediately, and he accordingly determined to
select some place more accessible than Rome and make it his
head-quarters for the winter. He decided in favor of Capua, which was
a large and powerful city one or two hundred miles southeast of Rome.
Hannibal, in fact, conceived the design of retaining possession of
Italy and of making Capua the capital of the country, leaving Rome to
itself, to decline, as under such circumstances it inevitably must, to
the rank of a second city. Perhaps he was tired of the fatigues and
hazards of war, and having narrowly escaped ruin before the battle of
Cannae, he now resolved that he would not rashly incur any new dangers.
It was a great question with him whether he should go forward to Rome,
or attempt to build up a new capital of his own at Capua. The question
which of these two he ought to have done was a matter of great debate
then, and it has been discussed a great deal by military men in every
age since his day. Right or wrong, Hannibal decided to establish his
own capital at Capua, and to leave Rome, for the present, undisturbed.
He, however, sent immediately to Carthage for re-enforcements. The
messenger whom he sent was one of his generals named Mago. Mago made
the best of his way to Carthage with his tidings of victory and his
bushel of rings, collected, as has been already said, from the field
of Cannae. The city of Carthage was greatly excited by the news which
he brought. The friends and patrons of Hannibal were elated with
enthusiasm and pride, and they taunted and reproached his enemies with
the opposition to him they had manifested when he was originally
appointed to the command of the army of Spain.
Mago met the Carthaginian senate, and in a very spirited and eloquent
speech he told them how many glorious battles Hannibal had fought, and
how many victories he had won. He had contended with the greatest
generals that the Romans could bring against him, and had conquered
them all. He had slain, he said, in all, over two hundred thousand
men. All Italy was now subject to his power; Capua was his capital,
and Rome had fallen. He concluded by saying that Hannibal was in need
of considerable additional supplies of men, and money, and provisions,
which he did not doubt the Carthaginians would send without any
unnecessary delay. He then produced before the senate the great bag of
rings which he had brought, and poured them upon the pavement of the
senate-house as a trophy of the victories which he had been
announcing.
This would, perhaps, have all been very well for Hannibal if his
friends had been contented to have left the case where Mago left it;
but some of them could not resist the temptation of taunting his
enemies, and especially Hanno, who, as will be recollected, originally
opposed his being sent to Spain. They turned to him, and asked him
triumphantly what he thought now of his factious opposition to so
brave a warrior. Hanno rose. The senate looked toward him and were
profoundly silent, wondering what he would have to reply. Hanno, with
an air of perfect ease and composure, spoke somewhat as follows:
"I should have said nothing, but should have allowed the senate to
take what action they pleased on Mago's proposition if I had not been
particularly addressed. As it is, I will say that I think now just as
I always have thought. We are plunged into a most costly and most
useless war, and are, as I conceive, no nearer the end of it now than
ever, notwithstanding all these boasted successes. The emptiness of
them is clearly shown by the inconsistency of Hannibal's pretensions
as to what he has done, with the demands that he makes in respect to
what he wishes us to do. He says he has conquered all his enemies, and
yet he wants us to send him more soldiers. He has reduced all
Italy--the most fertile country in the world--to subjection, and
reigns over it at Capua, and yet he calls upon us for corn. And then,
to crown all, he sends us bushels of gold rings as a specimen of the
riches he has obtained by plunder, and accompanies the offering with a
demand for new supplies of money. In my opinion, his success is all
illusive and hollow. There seems to be nothing substantial in his
situation except his necessities, and the heavy burdens upon the state
which these necessities impose."
Notwithstanding Hanno's sarcasms, the Carthaginians resolved to
sustain Hannibal, and to send him the supplies that he needed. They
were, however, long in reaching him. Various difficulties and delays
occurred. The Romans, though they could not dispossess Hannibal from
his position in Italy, raised armies in different countries, and waged
extended wars with the Carthaginians and their allies, in various
parts of the world, both by sea and land.
The result was, that Hannibal remained fifteen or sixteen years in
Italy, engaged, during all this time, in a lingering struggle with the
Roman power, without ever being able to accomplish any decisive
measures. During this period he was sometimes successful and
victorious, and sometimes he was very hard pressed by his enemies. It
is said that his army was very much enervated and enfeebled by the
comforts and luxuries they enjoyed at Capua. Capua was a very rich and
beautiful city, and the inhabitants of it had opened their gates to
Hannibal of their own accord, preferring, as they said, his alliance
to that of the Romans. The officers--as the officers of an army almost
always do, when they find themselves established in a rich and
powerful city, after the fatigues of a long and honorable
campaign--gave themselves up to festivities and rejoicing, to games,
shows, and entertainments of every kind, which they soon learned
infinitely to prefer to the toil and danger of marches and battles.
Whatever may have been the cause, there is no question about the fact
that, from the time Hannibal and his army got possession of their
comfortable quarters in Capua, the Carthaginian power began gradually
to decline. As Hannibal determined to make that city the Italian
capital instead of Rome, he, of course, when established there, felt
in some degree settled and at home, and was less interested than he
had been in plans for attacking the ancient capital. Still, the war
went on; many battles were fought, many cities were besieged, the
Roman power gaining ground all the time, though not, however, by any
very decisive victories.
In these contests there appeared, at length, a new Roman general named
Marcellus, and, either on account of his possessing a bolder and more
active temperament, or else in consequence of the change in the
relative strength of the two contending powers, he pursued a more
aggressive policy than Fabius had thought it prudent to attempt.
Marcellus was, however, cautious and wary in his enterprises, and he
laid his plans with so much sagacity and skill that he was almost
always successful. The Romans applauded very highly his activity and
ardor, without, however, forgetting their obligations to Fabius for
his caution and defensive reserve. They said that Marcellus was the
_sword_ of their commonwealth, as Fabius had been its _shield_.
The Romans continued to prosecute this sort of warfare, being more and
more successful the longer they continued it, until, at last, they
advanced to the very walls of Capua, and threatened it with a siege.
Hannibal's intrenchments and fortifications were too strong for them
to attempt to carry the city by a sudden assault, nor were the Romans
even powerful enough to invest the place entirely, so as completely to
shut their enemies in. They, however, encamped with a large army in
the neighborhood, and assumed so threatening an attitude as to keep
Hannibal's forces within in a state of continual alarm. And, besides
the alarm, it was very humiliating and mortifying to Carthaginian
pride to find the very seat of their power, as it were, shut up and
overawed by an enemy over whom they had been triumphing themselves so
short a time before, by a continued series of victories.
Hannibal was not himself in Capua at the time that the Romans came to
attack it. He marched, however, immediately to its relief, and
attacking the Romans in his turn, endeavored to compel them to _raise
the siege_, as it is technically termed, and retire. They had,
however, so intrenched themselves in the positions that they had
taken, and the assaults with which he encountered them had lost so
much of their former force, that he could accomplish nothing decisive.
He then left the ground with his army, and marched himself toward
Rome. He encamped in the vicinity of the city, and threatened to
attack it; but the walls, and castles, and towers with which Rome, as
well as Capua, was defended, were too formidable, and the preparations
for defense too complete, to make it prudent for him really to assail
the city. His object was to alarm the Romans, and compel them to
withdraw their forces from his capital that they might defend their
own.
There was, in fact, some degree of alarm awakened, and in the
discussions which took place among the Roman authorities, the
withdrawal of their troops from Capua was proposed; but this proposal
was overruled; even Fabius was against it. Hannibal was no longer to
be feared. They ordered back a small detachment from Capua, and added
to it such forces as they could raise within the city, and then
advanced to give Hannibal battle. The preparations were all made, it
is said, for an engagement, but a violent storm came on, so violent as
to drive the combatants back to their respective camps. This happened,
the great Roman historian gravely says, two or three times in
succession; the weather immediately becoming serene again, each time,
as soon as the respective generals had withdrawn their troops from the
intended fight. Something like this may perhaps have occurred, though
the fact doubtless was that both parties were afraid, each of the
other, and were disposed to avail themselves of any excuse to postpone
a decisive conflict. There was a time when Hannibal had not been
deterred from attacking the Romans even by the most tempestuous
storms.
Thus, though Hannibal did, in fact, in the end, get to the walls of
Rome, he did nothing but threaten when he was there, and his
encampment near the city can only be considered as a bravado. His
presence seems to have excited very little apprehension within the
city. The Romans had, in fact, before this time, lost their terror of
the Carthaginian arms. To show their contempt of Hannibal, they sold,
at public auction the land on which he was encamped, while he was
upon it besieging the city, and it brought the usual price. The
bidders were, perhaps, influenced somewhat by a patriotic spirit, and
by a desire to taunt Hannibal with an expression of their opinion that
his occupation of the land would be a very temporary encumbrance.
Hannibal, to revenge himself for this taunt, put up for sale at
auction, in his own camp, the shops of one of the principal streets of
Rome, and they were bought by his officers with great spirit. It
showed that a great change had taken place in the nature of the
contest between Carthage and Rome, to find these vast powers, which
were a few years before grappling each other with such destructive and
terrible fury on the Po and at Cannae, now satisfying their declining
animosity with such squibbing as this.
When the other modes by which Hannibal attempted to obtain
re-enforcements failed, he made an attempt to have a second army
brought over the Alps under the command of his brother Hasdrubal. It
was a large army, and in their march they experienced the same
difficulties, though in a much lighter degree, that Hannibal had
himself encountered. And yet, of the whole mighty mass which set out
from Spain, nothing reached Hannibal except his brother's _head_. The
circumstances of the unfortunate termination of Hasdrubal's attempt
were as follows:
When Hasdrubal descended from the Alps, rejoicing in the successful
manner in which he had surmounted those formidable barriers, he
imagined that all his difficulties were over. He dispatched couriers
to his brother Hannibal, informing him that he had scaled the
mountains, and that he was coming on as rapidly as possible to his
aid.
The two consuls in office at this time were named, the one Nero, and
the other Livius. To each of these, as was usual with the Roman
consuls, was assigned a particular province, and a certain portion of
the army to defend it, and the laws enjoined it upon them very
strictly not to leave their respective provinces, on any pretext
whatever, without authority from the Roman Legislature. In this
instance Livius had been assigned to the northern part of Italy, and
Nero to the southern. It devolved upon Livius, therefore, to meet and
give battle to Hasdrubal on his descent from the Alps, and to Nero to
remain in the vicinity of Hannibal, to thwart his plans, oppose his
progress, and, if possible, conquer and destroy him, while his
colleague prevented his receiving the expected re-enforcements from
Spain.
Things being in this state, the couriers whom Hasdrubal sent with his
letters had the vigilance of both consuls to elude before they could
deliver them into Hannibal's hands. They did succeed in passing
Livius, but they were intercepted by Nero. The patrols who seized
these messengers brought them to Nero's tent. Nero opened and read the
letters. All Hasdrubal's plans and arrangements were detailed in them
very fully, so that Nero perceived that, if he were at once to proceed
to the northward with a strong force, he could render his colleague
such aid as, with the knowledge of Hasdrubal's plans, which he had
obtained from the letters, would probably enable them to defeat him;
whereas, if he were to leave Livius in ignorance and alone, he feared
that Hasdrubal would be successful in breaking his way through, and in
ultimately effecting his junction with Hannibal. Under these
circumstances, he was, of course, very earnestly desirous of going
northward to render the necessary aid, but he was strictly forbidden
by law to leave his own province to enter that of his colleague
without an authority from Rome, which there was not now time to
obtain.
The laws of military discipline are very strict and imperious, and in
theory they are never to be disobeyed. Officers and soldiers, of all
ranks and gradations, must obey the orders which they receive from the
authority above them, without looking at the consequences, or
deviating from the line marked out on any pretext whatever. It is, in
fact, the very essence of military subordination and efficiency, that
a command, once given, suspends all exercise of judgment or discretion
on the part of the one to whom it is addressed; and a good general or
a good government would prefer generally that harm should be done by a
strict obedience to commands, rather than a benefit secured by an
unauthorized deviation from them. It is a good principle, not only in
war, but in all those cases in social life where men have to act in
concert, and yet wish to secure efficiency in action.
And yet there are cases of exception--cases where the necessity is so
urgent, or the advantages to be derived are so great; where the
interests involved are so momentous, and the success so sure, that a
commander concludes to disobey and take the responsibility. The
responsibility is, however, very great, and the danger in assuming it
extreme. He who incurs it makes himself liable to the severest
penalties, from which nothing but clear proof of the most imperious
necessity, and, in addition to it, the most triumphant success, can
save him. There is somewhere in English history a story of a naval
commander, in the service of an English queen, who disobeyed the
orders of his superiors at one time, in a case of great emergency at
sea, and gained by so doing a very important victory. Immediately
afterward he placed himself under arrest, and went into port as a
prisoner accused of crime instead of a commander triumphing in his
victory. He surrendered himself to the queen's officers of justice,
and sent word to the queen herself that he knew very well that death
was the penalty for his offense, but that he was willing to sacrifice
his life _in any way_ in the service of her majesty. He was pardoned!
Nero, after much anxious deliberation, concluded that the emergency in
which he found himself placed was one requiring him to take the
responsibility of disobedience. He did not, however, dare to go
northward with all his forces, for that would be to leave southern
Italy wholly at the mercy of Hannibal. He selected, therefore, from
his whole force, which consisted of forty thousand men, seven or
eight thousand of the most efficient and trustworthy; the men on whom
he could most securely rely, both in respect to their ability to bear
the fatigues of a rapid march, and the courage and energy with which
they would meet Hasdrubal's forces in battle at the end of it. He was,
at the time when Hasdrubal's letters were intercepted, occupying a
spacious and well-situated camp. This he enlarged and strengthened, so
that Hannibal might not suspect that he intended any diminution of the
forces within. All this was done very promptly, so that, in a few
hours after he received the intelligence on which he was acting, he
was drawing off secretly, at night, a column of six or eight thousand
men, none of whom knew at all where they were going.
He proceeded as rapidly as possible to the northward, and, when he
arrived in the northern province, he contrived to get into the camp of
Livius as secretly as he had got out from his own. Thus, of the two
armies, the one where an accession of force was required was greatly
strengthened at the expense of the other, without either of the
Carthaginian generals having suspected the change.
Livius was rejoiced to get so opportune a re-enforcement. He
recommended that the troops should all remain quietly in camp for a
short time, until the newly-arrived troops could rest and recruit
themselves a little after their rapid and fatiguing march; but Nero
opposed this plan, and recommended an immediate battle. He knew the
character of the men that he had brought, and he was, besides,
unwilling to risk the dangers which might arise in his own camp, in
southern Italy, by too long an absence from it. It was decided,
accordingly, to attack Hasdrubal at once, and the signal for battle
was given.
It is not improbable that Hasdrubal would have been beaten by Livius
alone, but the additional force which Nero had brought made the Romans
altogether too strong for him. Besides, from his position in the front
of the battle, he perceived, from some indications that his watchful
eye observed, that a part of the troops attacking him were from the
southward; and he inferred from this that Hannibal had been defeated,
and that, in consequence of this, the whole united force of the Roman
army was arrayed against him. He was disheartened and discouraged, and
soon ordered a retreat. He was pursued by the various divisions of the
Roman army, and the retreating columns of the Carthaginians were soon
thrown into complete confusion. They became entangled among rivers and
lakes; and the guides who had undertaken to conduct the army, finding
that all was lost, abandoned them and fled, anxious only to save their
own lives. The Carthaginians were soon pent up in a position where
they could not defend themselves, and from which they could not
escape. The Romans showed them no mercy, but went on killing their
wretched and despairing victims until the whole army was almost
totally destroyed. They cut off Hasdrubal's head, and Nero sat out the
very night after the battle to return with it in triumph to his own
encampment. When he arrived, he sent a troop of horse to throw the
head over into Hannibal's camp, a ghastly and horrid trophy of his
victory.
Hannibal was overwhelmed with disappointment and sorrow at the loss of
his army, bringing with it, as it did, the destruction of all his
hopes. "My fate is sealed," said he; "all is lost. I shall send no
more news of victory to Carthage. In losing Hasdrubal my last hope is
gone."
[Illustration: HASDRUBAL'S HEAD.]
While Hannibal was in this condition in Italy, the Roman armies, aided
by their allies, were gaining gradually against the Carthaginians in
various parts of the world, under the different generals who had been
placed in command by the Roman senate. The news of these victories
came continually home to Italy, and encouraged and animated the
Romans, while Hannibal and his army, as well as the people who were in
alliance with him, were disheartened and depressed by them. Scipio was
one of these generals commanding in foreign lands. His province was
Spain. The news which came home from his army became more and more
exciting, as he advanced from conquest to conquest, until it seemed
that the whole country was going to be reduced to subjection. He
overcame one Carthaginian general after another until he reached New
Carthage, which he besieged and conquered, and the Roman authority was
established fully over the whole land.
Scipio then returned in triumph to Rome. The people received him with
acclamations. At the next election they chose him consul. On the
allotment of provinces, Sicily fell to him, with power to cross into
Africa if he pleased. It devolved on the other consul to carry on the
war in Italy more directly against Hannibal. Scipio levied his army,
equipped his fleet, and sailed for Sicily.
The first thing that he did on his arrival in his province was to
project an expedition into Africa itself. He could not, as he wished,
face Hannibal directly, by marching his troops into the south of
Italy, for this was the work allotted to his colleague. He could,
however, make an incursion into Africa, and even threaten Carthage
itself, and this, with the boldness and ardor which marked his
character, he resolved to do.
He was triumphantly successful in all his plans. His army, imbibing
the spirit of enthusiasm which animated their commander, and confident
of success, went on, as his forces in Spain had done, from victory to
victory. They conquered cities, they overran provinces, they defeated
and drove back all the armies which the Carthaginians could bring
against them, and finally they awakened in the streets and dwellings
of Carthage the same panic and consternation which Hannibal's
victorious progress had produced in Rome.
The Carthaginians being now, in their turn, reduced to despair, sent
embassadors to Scipio to beg for peace, and to ask on what terms he
would grant it and withdraw from the country. Scipio replied that _he_
could not make peace. It rested with the Roman senate, whose servant
he was. He specified, however, certain terms which he was willing to
have proposed to the senate, and, if the Carthaginians would agree to
them, he would grant them a _truce_, that is, a temporary suspension
of hostilities, until the answer of the Roman senate could be
returned.
The Carthaginians agreed to the terms. They were very onerous. The
Romans say that they did not really mean to abide by them, but acceded
for the moment in order to gain time to send for Hannibal. They had
great confidence in his resources and military power, and thought
that, if he were in Africa, he could save them. At the same time,
therefore, that they sent their embassadors to Rome with their
propositions for peace, they dispatched expresses to Hannibal,
ordering him to embark his troops as soon as possible, and, abandoning
Italy, to hasten home, to save, if it was not already too late, his
native city from destruction.
When Hannibal received these messages, he was overwhelmed with
disappointment and sorrow. He spent hours in extreme agitation,
sometimes in a moody silence, interrupted now and then by groans of
despair, and sometimes uttering loud and angry curses, prompted by the
exasperation of his feelings. He, however, could not resist. He made
the best of his way to Carthage. The Roman senate, at the same time,
instead of deciding on the question of peace or war, which Scipio had
submitted to them, referred the question back to him. They sent
commissioners to Scipio, authorizing him to act for them, and to
decide himself alone whether the war should be continued or closed,
and if to be closed, on what conditions.
Hannibal raised a large force at Carthage, joining with it such
remains of former armies as had been left after Scipio's battles, and
he went forth at the head of these troops to meet his enemy. He
marched five days, going, perhaps, seventy-five or one hundred miles
from Carthage, when he found himself approaching Scipio's camp. He
sent out spies to reconnoiter. The patrols of Scipio's army seized
these spies and brought them to the general's tent, as they supposed,
for execution. Instead of punishing them, Scipio ordered them to be
led around his camp, and to be allowed to see every thing they
desired. He then dismissed them, that they might return to Hannibal
with the information they had obtained.
Of course, the report which they brought in respect to the strength
and resources of Scipio's army was very formidable to Hannibal. He
thought it best to make an attempt to negotiate a peace rather than to
risk a battle, and he accordingly sent word to Scipio requesting a
personal interview. Scipio acceded to this request, and a place was
appointed for the meeting between the two encampments. To this spot
the two generals repaired at the proper time, with great pomp and
parade, and with many attendants. They were the two greatest generals
of the age in which they lived, having been engaged for fifteen or
twenty years in performing, at the head of vast armies, exploits which
had filled the world with their fame. Their fields of action had,
however, been widely distant, and they met personally now for the
first time. When introduced into each other's presence, they stood for
some time in silence, gazing upon and examining one another with
intense interest and curiosity, but not speaking a word.
At length, however, the negotiation was opened. Hannibal made Scipio
proposals for peace. They were very favorable to the Romans, but
Scipio was not satisfied with them. He demanded still greater
sacrifices than Hannibal was willing to make. The result, after a long
and fruitless negotiation, was, that each general returned to his
camp and prepared for battle.
In military campaigns, it is generally easy for those who have been
conquering to go on to conquer: so much depends upon the expectations
with which the contending armies go into battle. Scipio and his troops
expected to conquer. The Carthaginians expected to be beaten. The
result corresponded. At the close of the day on which the battle was
fought, forty thousand Carthaginians were dead and dying upon the
ground, as many more were prisoners in the Roman camp, and the rest,
in broken masses, were flying from the field in confusion and terror,
on all the roads which led to Carthage. Hannibal arrived at the city
with the rest, went to the senate, announced his defeat, and said that
he could do no more. "The fortune which once attended me," said he,
"is lost forever, and nothing is left to us but to make peace with our
enemies on any terms that they may think fit to impose."