THE APENNINES.
B.C. 217
Hannibal pursues the Romans.--He takes some prisoners.--Revolt of
some Gauls from the Romans.--Hannibal crosses the river.--Dismay of
the Romans.--Sempronius recalled to Italy.--Sufferings of Scipio
from his wound.--He is joined by Sempronius.--The Roman commanders
disagree.--Skirmishes.--Sempronius eager for a battle.--Hannibal's
stratagem.--Details of Hannibal's scheme.--The ambuscade.--Two
thousand chosen men.--Hannibal's manner of choosing them.--Attack on
the Roman camp.--Success of Hannibal's stratagem.--Sempronius crosses
the river.--Impetuous attack of Hannibal.--Situation of the Roman
army.--Terrible conflict.--Utter defeat of the Romans.--Scene after
the battle.--Various battles of Hannibal.--Scarcity of food.--Valley
of the Arno.--Crossing the Apennines.--Terrific storm.--Death of the
elephants.--Hannibal's uneasiness.--He crosses the Apennines.--Perilous
march.--Hannibal's sickness.
As soon as Hannibal was apprised in the morning that Scipio and his
forces had left their ground, he pressed on after them, very earnest
to overtake them before they should reach the river. But he was too
late. The main body of the Roman army had got over. There was,
however, a detachment of a few hundred men, who had been left on
Hannibal's side of the river to guard the bridge until all the army
should have passed, and then to help in cutting it away. They had
accomplished this before Hannibal's arrival, but had not had time to
contrive any way to get across the river themselves. Hannibal took
them all prisoners.
The condition and prospects of both the Roman and Carthaginian cause
were entirely changed by this battle, and the retreat of Scipio across
the Po. All the nations of the north of Italy, who had been subjects
or allies of the Romans, now turned to Hannibal. They sent embassies
into his camp, offering him their friendship and alliance. In fact,
there was a large body of Gauls in the Roman camp, who were fighting
under Scipio at the battle of Ticinus, who deserted his standard
immediately afterward, and came over in a mass to Hannibal. They made
this revolt in the night, and, instead of stealing away secretly, they
raised a prodigious tumult, killed the guards, filled the encampment
with their shouts and outcries, and created for a time an awful scene
of terror.
Hannibal received them, but he was too sagacious to admit such a
treacherous horde into his army. He treated them with great
consideration and kindness, and dismissed them with presents, that
they might all go to their respective homes, charging them to exert
their influence in his favor among the tribes to which they severally
belonged.
Hannibal's soldiers, too, were very much encouraged by the
commencement they had made. The army made immediate preparations for
crossing the river. Some of the soldiers built rafts, others went up
the stream in search of places to ford. Some swam across. They could
adopt these or any other modes in safety, for the Romans made no stand
on the opposite bank to oppose them, but moved rapidly on, as fast as
Scipio could be carried. His wounds began to inflame, and were
extremely painful.
In fact, the Romans were dismayed at the danger which now threatened
them. As soon as news of these events reached the city, the
authorities there sent a dispatch immediately to Sicily to recall the
other consul. His name was Sempronius. It will be recollected that,
when the lots were cast between him and Scipio, it fell to Scipio to
proceed to Spain, with a view to arresting Hannibal's march, while
Sempronius went to Sicily and Africa. The object of this movement was
to threaten and attack the Carthaginians at home, in order to distract
their attention and prevent their sending any fresh forces to aid
Hannibal, and, perhaps, even to compel them to recall him from Italy
to defend their own capital. But now that Hannibal had not only passed
the Alps, but had also crossed the Po, and was marching toward
Rome--Scipio himself disabled, and his army flying before him--they
were obliged at once to abandon the plan of threatening Carthage. They
sent with all dispatch an order to Sempronius to hasten home and
assist in the defense of Rome.
Sempronius was a man of a very prompt and impetuous character, with
great confidence in his own powers, and very ready for action. He came
immediately into Italy, recruited new soldiers for the army, put
himself at the head of his forces, and marched northward to join
Scipio in the valley of the Po. Scipio was suffering great pain from
his wounds, and could do but little toward directing the operations of
the army. He had slowly retreated before Hannibal, the fever and pain
of his wounds being greatly exasperated by the motion of traveling. In
this manner he arrived at the Trebia, a small stream flowing northward
into the Po. He crossed this stream, and finding that he could not go
any further, on account of the torturing pain to which it put him to
be moved, he halted his army, marked out an encampment, threw up
fortifications around it, and prepared to make a stand. To his great
relief, Sempronius soon came up and joined him here.
There were now two generals. Napoleon used to say that one bad
commander was better than two good ones, so essential is it to success
in all military operations to secure that promptness, and confidence,
and decision which can only exist where action is directed by one
single mind. Sempronius and Scipio disagreed as to the proper course
to be pursued. Sempronius wished to attack Hannibal immediately.
Scipio was in favor of delay. Sempronius attributed Scipio's
reluctance to give battle to the dejection of mind and discouragement
produced by his wound, or to a feeling of envy lest he, Sempronius,
should have the honor of conquering the Carthaginians, while he
himself was helpless in his tent. On the other hand, Scipio thought
Sempronius inconsiderate and reckless, and disposed to rush heedlessly
into a contest with a foe whose powers and resources he did not
understand.
In the mean time, while the two commanders were thus divided in
opinion, some skirmishes and small engagements took place between
detachments from the two armies, in which Sempronius thought that the
Romans had the advantage. This excited his enthusiasm more and more,
and he became extremely desirous to bring on a general battle. He
began to be quite out of patience with Scipio's caution and delay. The
soldiers, he said, were full of strength and courage, all eager for
the combat, and it was absurd to hold them back on account of the
feebleness of one sick man. "Besides," said he, "of what use can it be
to delay any longer? We are as ready to meet the Carthaginians now as
we shall ever be. There is no _third_ consul to come and help us; and
what a disgrace it is for us Romans, who in the former war led our
troops to the very gates of Carthage, to allow Hannibal to bear sway
over all the north of Italy, while we retreat gradually before him,
afraid to encounter now a force that we have always conquered before."
Hannibal was not long in learning, through his spies, that there was
this difference of opinion between the Roman generals, and that
Sempronius was full of a presumptuous sort of ardor, and he began to
think that he could contrive some plan to draw the latter out into
battle under circumstances in which he would have to act at a great
disadvantage. He did contrive such a plan. It succeeded admirably; and
the case was one of those numerous instances which occurred in the
history of Hannibal, of successful stratagem, which led the Romans to
say that his leading traits of character were treachery and cunning.
Hannibal's plan was, in a word, an attempt to draw the Roman army out
of its encampment on a dark, cold, and stormy night in December, and
get them into the river. This river was the Trebia. It flowed north
into the Po, between the Roman and Carthaginian camps. His scheme, in
detail, was to send a part of his army over the river to attack the
Romans in the night or very early in the morning. He hoped that by
this means Sempronius would be induced to come out of his camp to
attack the Carthaginians. The Carthaginians were then to fly and
recross the river, and Hannibal hoped that Sempronius would follow,
excited by the ardor of pursuit. Hannibal was then to have a strong
reserve of the army, that had remained all the time in warmth and
safety, to come out and attack the Romans with unimpaired strength and
vigor, while the Romans themselves would be benumbed by the cold and
wet, and disorganized by the confusion produced in crossing the
stream.
A part of Hannibal's reserve were to be placed in an ambuscade. There
were some meadows near the water, which were covered in many places
with tall grass and bushes. Hannibal went to examine the spot, and
found that this shrubbery was high enough for even horsemen to be
concealed in it. He determined to place a thousand foot soldiers and a
thousand horsemen here, the most efficient and courageous in the
army. He selected them in the following manner:
He called one of his lieutenant generals to the spot, explained
somewhat of his design to him, and then asked him to go and choose
from the cavalry and the infantry, a hundred each, the best soldiers
he could find. This two hundred were then assembled, and Hannibal,
after surveying them with looks of approbation and pleasure, said,
"Yes, you are the men I want, only, instead of two hundred, I need two
thousand. Go back to the army, and select and bring to me, each of
you, nine men like yourselves." It is easy to be imagined that the
soldiers were pleased with this commission, and that they executed it
faithfully. The whole force thus chosen was soon assembled, and
stationed in the thickets above described, where they lay in ambush
ready to attack the Romans after they should pass the river.
Hannibal also made arrangements for leaving a large part of his army
in his own camp, ready for battle, with orders that they should
partake of food and refreshments, and keep themselves warm by the
fires until they should be called upon. All things being thus ready,
he detached a body of horsemen to cross the river, and see if they
could provoke the Romans to come out of their camp and pursue them.
"Go," said Hannibal, to the commander of this detachment, "pass the
stream, advance to the Roman camp, assail the guards, and when the
army forms and comes out to attack you, retreat slowly before them
back across the river."
The detachment did as it was ordered to do. When they arrived at the
camp, which was soon after break of day--for it was a part of
Hannibal's plan to bring the Romans out before they should have had
time to breakfast--Sempronius, at the first alarm, called all the
soldiers to arms, supposing that the whole Carthaginian force was
attacking them. It was a cold and stormy morning, and the atmosphere
being filled with rain and snow, but little could be seen. Column
after column of horsemen and of infantry marched out of the camp. The
Carthaginians retreated. Sempronius was greatly excited at the idea of
so easily driving back the assailants, and, as they retreated, he
pressed on in pursuit of them. As Hannibal had anticipated, he became
so excited in the pursuit that he did not stop at the banks of the
river. The Carthaginian horsemen plunged into the stream in their
retreat, and the Romans, foot soldiers and horsemen together,
followed on. The stream was usually small, but it was now swelled by
the rain which had been falling all the night. The water was, of
course, intensely cold. The horsemen got through tolerably well, but
the foot soldiers were all thoroughly drenched and benumbed; and as
they had not taken any food that morning, and had come forth on a very
sudden call, and without any sufficient preparation, they felt the
effects of the exposure in the strongest degree. Still they pressed
on. They ascended the bank after crossing the river, and when they had
formed again there, and were moving forward in pursuit of their still
flying enemy, suddenly the whole force of Hannibal's reserves, strong
and vigorous, just from their tents and their fires, burst upon them.
They had scarcely recovered from the astonishment and the shock of
this unexpected onset, when the two thousand concealed in the
ambuscade came sallying forth in the storm, and assailed the Romans in
the rear with frightful shouts and outcries.
All these movements took place very rapidly. Only a very short period
elapsed from the time that the Roman army, officers and soldiers, were
quietly sleeping in their camp, or rising slowly to prepare for the
routine of an ordinary day, before they found themselves all drawn out
in battle array some miles from their encampment, and surrounded and
hemmed in by their foes. The events succeeded each other so rapidly as
to appear to the soldiers like a dream; but very soon their wet and
freezing clothes, their limbs benumbed and stiffened, the sleet which
was driving along the plain, the endless lines of Carthaginian
infantry, hemming them in on all sides, and the columns of horsemen
and of elephants charging upon them, convinced them that their
situation was one of dreadful reality. The calamity, too, which
threatened them was of vast extent, as well as imminent and terrible;
for, though the stratagem of Hannibal was very simple in its plan and
management, still he had executed it on a great scale, and had brought
out the whole Roman army. There were, it is said, about forty thousand
that crossed the river, and about an equal number in the Carthaginian
army to oppose them. Such a body of combatants covered, of course, a
large extent of ground, and the conflict that ensued was one of the
most terrible scenes of the many that Hannibal assisted in enacting.
The conflict continued for many hours, the Romans getting more and
more into confusion all the time. The elephants of the Carthaginians,
that is, the few that now remained, made great havoc in their ranks,
and finally, after a combat of some hours, the whole army was broken
up and fled, some portions in compact bodies, as their officers could
keep them together, and others in hopeless and inextricable confusion.
They made their way back to the river, which they reached at various
points up and down the stream. In the mean time, the continued rain
had swollen the waters still more, the low lands were overflowed, the
deep places concealed, and the broad expanse of water in the center of
the stream whirled in boiling and turbid eddies, whose surface was
roughened by the December breeze, and dotted every where with the
drops of rain still falling.
When the Roman army was thoroughly broken up and scattered, the
Carthaginians gave up the further prosecution of the contest. They
were too wet, cold, and exhausted themselves to feel any ardor in the
pursuit of their enemies. Vast numbers of the Romans, however,
attempted to recross the river, and were swept down and destroyed by
the merciless flood, whose force they had not strength enough
remaining to withstand. Other portions of the troops lay hid in
lurking-places to which they had retreated, until night came on, and
then they made rafts on which they contrived to float themselves back
across the stream. Hannibal's troops were too wet, and cold, and
exhausted to go out again into the storm, and so they were unmolested
in these attempts. Notwithstanding this, however, great numbers of
them were carried down the stream and lost.
It was now December, too late for Hannibal to attempt to advance much
further that season, and yet the way before him was open to the
Apennines, by the defeat of Sempronius, for neither he nor Scipio
could now hope to make another stand against him till they should
receive new re-enforcements from Rome. During the winter months
Hannibal had various battles and adventures, sometimes with portions
and detachments of the Roman army, and sometimes with the native
tribes. He was sometimes in great difficulty for want of food for his
army, until at length he bribed the governor of a castle, where a
Roman granary was kept, to deliver it up to him, and after that he was
well supplied.
The natives of the country were, however, not at all well disposed
toward him, and in the course of the winter they attempted to impede
his operations, and to harass his army by every means in their power.
Finding his situation uncomfortable, he moved on toward the south, and
at length determined that, inclement as the season was, he would cross
the Apennines.
By looking at the map of Italy, it will be seen that the great valley
of the Po extends across the whole north of Italy. The valley of the
Arno and of the Umbro lies south of it, separated from it by a part of
the Apennine chain. This southern valley was Etruria. Hannibal decided
to attempt to pass over the mountains into Etruria. He thought he
should find there a warmer climate, and inhabitants more well-disposed
toward him, besides being so much nearer Rome.
But, though Hannibal conquered the Alps, the Apennines conquered him.
A very violent storm arose just as he reached the most exposed place
among the mountains. It was intensely cold, and the wind blew the hail
and snow directly into the faces of the troops, so that it was
impossible for them to proceed. They halted and turned their backs to
the storm, but the wind increased more and more, and was attended with
terrific thunder and lightning, which filled the soldiers with alarm,
as they were at such an altitude as to be themselves enveloped in the
clouds from which the peals and flashes were emitted. Unwilling to
retreat, Hannibal ordered the army to encamp on the spot, in the best
shelter they could find. They attempted, accordingly, to pitch their
tents, but it was impossible to secure them. The wind increased to a
hurricane. The tent poles were unmanageable, and the canvas was
carried away from its fastenings, and sometimes split or blown into
rags by its flapping in the wind. The poor elephants, that is, all
that were left of them from previous battles and exposures, sunk down
under this intense cold and died. One only remained alive.
Hannibal ordered a retreat, and the army went back into the valley of
the Po. But Hannibal was ill at ease here. The natives of the country
were very weary of his presence. His army consumed their food, ravaged
their country, and destroyed all their peace and happiness. Hannibal
suspected them of a design to poison him or assassinate him in some
other way. He was continually watching and taking precautions against
these attempts. He had a great many different dresses made to be used
as disguises, and false hair of different colors and fashion, so that
he could alter his appearance at pleasure. This was to prevent any spy
or assassin who might come into his camp from identifying him by any
description of his dress and appearance. Still, notwithstanding these
precautions, he was ill at ease, and at the very earliest practicable
period in the spring he made a new attempt to cross the mountains, and
was now successful.
On descending the southern declivities of the Apennines he learned
that a new Roman army, under a new consul, was advancing toward him
from the south. He was eager to meet this force, and was preparing to
press forward at once by the nearest way. He found, however, that this
would lead him across the lower part of the valley of the Arno, which
was here very broad, and, though usually passable, was now overflowed
in consequence of the swelling of the waters of the river by the
melting of the snows upon the mountains. The whole country was now, in
fact, a vast expanse of marshes and fens.
Still, Hannibal concluded to cross it, and, in the attempt, he
involved his army in difficulties and dangers as great, almost, as he
had encountered upon the Alps. The waters were rising continually;
they filled all the channels and spread over extended plains. They
were so turbid, too, that every thing beneath the surface was
concealed, and the soldiers wading in them were continually sinking
into deep and sudden channels and into bogs of mire, where many were
lost. They were all exhausted and worn out by the wet and cold, and
the long continuance of their exposure to it. They were four days and
three nights in this situation, as their progress was, of course,
extremely slow. The men, during all this time, had scarcely any sleep,
and in some places the only way by which they could get any repose was
to lay their arms and their baggage in the standing water, so as to
build, by this means, a sort of couch or platform on which they could
lie. Hannibal himself was sick too. He was attacked with a violent
inflammation of the eyes, and the sight of one of them was in the end
destroyed. He was not, however, so much exposed as the other officers;
for there was one elephant left of all those that had commenced the
march in Spain, and Hannibal rode this elephant during the four days'
march through the water. There were guides and attendants to precede
him, for the purpose of finding a safe and practicable road, and by
their aid, with the help of the animal's sagacity, he got safely
through.
[Illustration: CROSSING THE MARSHES.]