The Infantile Sexuality
The precocious manifestations of sexual phantasy as cause of the shock
now seemed to be the source of neurosis. This, logically, attributed to
children a far more developed sexuality than had been hitherto admitted.
Many cases of precocious sexuality had been recorded in literature long
before the time of psychoanalysis. For instance, a girl of two years old
with normal menstruation, or cases of boys of three and four and five
years of age having normal erections, and so far ready for cohabitation.
These were, however, curiosities. Great astonishment was caused when
Freud began to attribute to the child, not only ordinary sexuality, but
even polymorphic perverse sexuality; all this based upon the most
exhaustive investigation. People inclined much too lightly to the
superficial view, that all this was merely suggested to the patients,
and was a highly disputable artificial product. Hence Freud’s[4] “Three
Contributions to the Sexual Theory” not only provoked opposition, but
even violent indignation. It is surely unnecessary to insist upon the
fact that science is not furthered by indignation, and that arguments of
moral resentment may perhaps please the moralist—that is his
business—but not a scientific man, for whom truth must be the guide, and
not moral indignation. If matters are really as Freud describes them,
all indignation is absurd; if they are not so, again indignation will
avail nothing. The conclusion as to what is the truth can only be
arrived at on the field of observation and research, and nowhere else.
The opponents of psychoanalysis with certain honorable exceptions,
display rather ludicrously a somewhat pitifully inadequate realization
of the situation. Although the psychoanalytic school could unfortunately
learn nothing from their critics, as the criticism took no notice of its
investigations, and although it could not get any useful hints, because
the psychoanalytic method of investigation was, and still is unknown to
these critics, it remains a serious duty for our school to explain
thoroughly the contrast between the existing conceptions. It is not our
endeavor to put forward a paradoxical theory contradicting all existing
theories, but rather to introduce a certain category of new observations
into science. Therefore we regard it as a duty to do whatever we can to
promote agreement. It is true, we must renounce all hope of obtaining
the approval of those who blindly oppose us, but we do hope to come to
an understanding with scientific men. This will be my endeavor now in
attempting to sketch the further intellectual development of the
psychoanalytic conception, so far as the so-called sexual theory of the
neuroses is concerned.
Objections to the Sexual Hypothesis
As I said, the finding of precocious sexual phantasies, which seemed the
source of the neurosis, forced Freud to the view of a highly developed
sexuality in infancy. As you know, the reality of this observation has
been contested by many, who maintain that crude error, that
narrow-minded delusion, misled Freud and his whole school, alike in
Europe and in America, so that the Freudians saw things that never
existed. They regarded them as people in the grip of an intellectual
epidemic. I have to admit that I possess no way of defending myself
against criticism of this kind. The only thing I can do is to refer to
my own work, asking thoughtful persons if they discover there any clear
indications of madness. Moreover, I must maintain that science has no
right to start with the idea that certain facts do not exist. At the
most one can say: “This seems very improbable—we want still more proofs
and more research.” This is also our reply to the objection: “It is
impossible to discover anything trustworthy by the psychoanalytic
method, as this method is practically absurd.” No one believed in
Galileo’s telescope, and Columbus discovered America on a false
hypothesis. The psychoanalytic method may be full of errors, but this
should not prevent its use. Many chronological and medical observations
have been made with inadequate instruments. We must regard the
objections to the method as pretexts until our opponents come to grip
with the facts. It is there a decision must be reached—not by wordy
warfare.
Our opponents also call hysteria a psychogenic disease. We believe that
we have discovered the etiological determinants of this disease and we
present, without fear, the results of our investigation to open
criticism. Whoever cannot accept our results should publish his own
analyses of cases. So far as I know, that has never been done, at least
not in European literature. Under these circumstances, critics have no
right to deny our conclusions a priori. Our opponents have likewise
cases of hysteria, and those cases are surely as psychogenic as our own.
There is nothing to prevent their pointing out the psychological
determinants. The method is not the real question. Our opponents content
themselves with disputing and reviling our researches, but they do not
point out any better way.
Many other critics are more careful and more just, and do admit that we
have made many valuable observations, and that the associations of ideas
given by the psychoanalytic method will very probably stand, but they
maintain that our point of view is wrong. The alleged sexual phantasies
of childhood, with which we are here chiefly concerned, must not be
taken, they say, as real sexual functions, being obviously something
quite different, since at the approach of puberty the characteristic
peculiarities of sexuality are acquired.
This objection, being calmly and reasonably made, deserves to be taken
seriously. Such objections must also have occurred to every one who has
taken up analytic work, and there is reason enough for deep reflection.
The Conception of Sexuality
The first difficulty arises with the conception of sexuality. If we
take sexuality as meaning the fully-developed function, we must
confine this phenomenon to maturity, and then, of course, we have no
right to speak of sexuality in childhood. If we so limit our
conception, then we are confronted again with new and much greater
difficulties. The question arises, how then must we denominate all
those correlated biological phenomena pertaining to the sexual
functions sensu strictiori, as, for instance, pregnancy, childbirth,
natural selection, protection of the offspring, etc. It seems to me
that all this belongs to the conception of sexuality as well, although
a very distinguished colleague did once say, “Childbirth is not a
sexual act.” But if these things do pertain to this concept of
sexuality, then there must also belong innumerable psychological
phenomena. For we know that an incredible number of the pure
psychological functions are connected with this sphere. I shall only
mention the extraordinary importance of phantasy in the preparation
for the sexual function. Thus we arrive rather at a biological
conception of sexuality, which includes both a series of psychological
phenomena as well as a series of physiological functions. If we might
be allowed to make use of an old but practical classification, we
might identify sexuality with the so-called instinct of the
preservation of the species, as opposed in some way to the instinct of
self-preservation.
Looking at sexuality from this point of view, we shall not be astonished
to find that the root of the instinct of race-preservation, so
extraordinarily important in nature, goes much deeper than the limited
conception of sexuality would ever allow. Only the more or less grown-up
cat actually catches mice, but the kitten plays at least as if it were
catching mice. The young dog’s playful indications of attempts at
cohabitation begin long before puberty. We have a right to suppose that
mankind is no exception to this rule, although we do not notice similar
things on the surface in our well brought-up children. Investigation of
the children of the lower classes proves that they are no exceptions to
the biological rule. It is of course infinitely more probable that this
most important instinct, that of the preservation of the race, is
already nascent in the earliest childhood, than that it falls at one
swoop from heaven, full-fledged, at the age of puberty. The sexual
organs also develop long before the slightest sign of their future
function can be noticed. Where the psychoanalytic school speaks of
sexuality, this wider conception of its function must be linked to it,
and we do not mean simply that physical sensation and function generally
designated by the term sexual. It might be said that, in order to avoid
any misunderstanding on this point, the term sexuality should not be
given to these preparatory phenomena in childhood. This demand is surely
not justified, since the anatomical nomenclature is taken from the
fully-developed system, and special names are not generally given to
more or less rudimentary formations.
After all, the objections to the terminology do not spring so much from
objective arguments, as from those tendencies which lie at the base of
moral indignation. But then no objection can be made to the
sex-terminology of Freud, as he rightly gives to the whole sexual
development the general name of sexuality. But certain conclusions have
been drawn which, so far as I can see, cannot be maintained.
The “Sexuality” of the Suckling
When we examine how far back in childhood the first traces of sexuality
reach, we have to admit implicitly that sexuality already exists ab ovo,
but only becomes manifest a long time after intrauterine life. Freud is
inclined to see in the function of taking the mother’s breast already a
kind of sexuality. Freud was bitterly reproached for this view, but it
must be admitted that it is very ingenious, if we follow his hypothesis,
that the instinct of the preservation of the race has existed separately
from the instinct of self-preservation ab ovo and has undergone a
separate development. This way of thinking is not, however, a biological
one. It is not possible to separate the two ways of manifestation of the
hypothetical vital process, and to credit each with a different order of
development. If we limit ourselves to judging by what we can actually
observe, we must reckon with the fact that everywhere in nature we see
that the vital processes in an individual consist for a considerable
space of time in the functions of nutrition and growth only. We see this
very clearly in many animals; for instance, in butterflies, which as
caterpillars pass an asexual existence of nutrition and growth. To this
stage of life we may allot both the intrauterine life and the
extrauterine time of suckling in man. This time is marked by the absence
of all sexual function; hence to speak of manifest sexuality in the
suckling would be a contradictio in adjecto.
The most we can do is to ask if, among the life-functions of the
suckling, there are any that have not the character of nutrition, or of
growth, and hence could be termed sexual. Freud points out the
unmistakable emotion and satisfaction of the child while suckling, and
compares this process with that of the sexual act. This similarity leads
him to assume the sexual quality in the act of suckling. This conclusion
is only admissible if it can be proved that the tension of the need, and
its gratification by a release, is a sexual process. That the act of
suckling has this emotional mechanism proves, however, just the
contrary. Therefore we can only say this emotional mechanism is found
both in nutrition and in the sexual function. If Freud by analogy
deduces the sexual quality of sucking from this emotional mechanism,
then his biological empiricism would also justify the terminology
qualifying the sexual act as a function of nutrition. This is
unjustifiably exceeding the bounds in either case. It is evident that
the act of sucking cannot be qualified as sexual.
We are aware, however, of functions in the suckling stage which have
apparently nothing to do with the function of nutrition, such as sucking
the finger, and its many variations. This is perhaps the place to
discuss whether these things belong to the sexual sphere. These acts do
not subserve nutrition, but produce pleasure. Of that there is no doubt,
but nevertheless it is disputable whether this pleasure which comes by
sucking should be called by analogy a sexual satisfaction. It might be
called equally pleasure by nutrition. This latter qualification has even
the further justification that the form and kind of pleasure belong
entirely to the function of nutrition. The hand which is used for
sucking finds in this way preparation for future use in feeding one’s
self. Under these circumstances nobody will be inclined by a petitio
principii to characterize the first manifestation of human life as
sexual. The statement which we make that the act of sucking is attended
by a feeling of satisfaction leaves us in doubt whether the sucking does
contain anything else but the character of nutrition. We notice that the
so-called bad habits shown by a child as it grows up are closely linked
with early infantile sucking, such for instance as putting the finger in
the mouth, biting the nails, picking the nose, ears, etc. We see, too,
how closely these habits are connected with later masturbation. By
analogy, the conclusion that these infantile habits are the first step
to onanism, or to actions similar to onanism, and are therefore of a
well-marked sexual character cannot be denied: it is perfectly
justified. I have seen many cases in which a correlation existed between
these childish habits and later masturbation. If this masturbation takes
place in later childhood, before puberty, it is nothing but an infantile
bad habit. From the fact of the correlation between masturbation and the
other childish bad habits, we conclude that these habits have a sexual
character, in so far as they are used to obtain physical satisfaction
from the child’s own body.
This new standpoint is comprehensible and perhaps necessary. It is only
a few steps from this point of view to regarding the infant’s act of
sucking as of a sexual character. As you know, Freud took the few steps,
but you have just heard me reject them. We have come to a difficulty
which is very hard to solve. It would be relatively easy if we could
accept two instincts side by side, each an entity in itself. Then the
act of sucking the breast would be both an action of nutrition and a
sexual act. This seems to be Freud’s conception. We find in adults the
two instincts separated, yet existing side by side, or rather we find
that there are two manifestations, in hunger, and in the sexual
instinct. But at the sucking age, we find only the function of
nutrition, rewarded by both pleasure and satisfaction. Its sexual
character can only be argued by a petitio principii, for the facts show
that the act of sucking is the first to give pleasure, not the sexual
function. Obtaining pleasure is by no means identical with sexuality. We
deceive ourselves if we think that in the suckling both instincts exist
side by side, for then we project into the psyche of the child the facts
taken from the psychology of adults. The existence of the two instincts
side by side does not occur in suckling, for one of these instincts has
no existence as yet, or, if existing, is quite rudimentary. If we are to
regard the striving for pleasure as something sexual, we might as well
say paradoxically that hunger is a sexual striving, for this instinct
seeks pleasure by satisfaction. If this were true, we should have to
give our opponents permission to apply the terminology of hunger to
sexuality. It would facilitate matters, were it possible to maintain
that both instincts existed side by side, but it contradicts the
observed facts and would lead to untenable consequences.
Before I try to resolve this opposition, I must first say something more
about Freud’s sexual theory, and its transformations.
The Polymorphic Perverse Sexuality of Infancy
We have already reached the conclusion, setting out from the idea of the
shock being apparently due to sexual phantasies, that the child must
have, in contradiction to the views hitherto prevailing, a nearly fully
formed sexuality, and even a _polymorphic perverse sexuality_. Its
sexuality does not seem concentrated on the genital functions or on the
other sex, but is occupied with its own body; whence it is said to be
auto-erotic. If its sexual instinct is directed to another person, no
distinction, or but the very slightest, is made as to sex. It can,
therefore, be very easily homo-sexual. In place of non-existing local
sexual function there exists a series of so-called bad habits, which
from this standpoint look like a series of perversities, since they have
the closest analogy with the later perversities. In consequence of this
way of regarding the subject, sexuality, whose nature is ordinarily
regarded as a unit, becomes decomposed into a multiplicity of isolated
striving forces. Freud then arrived at the conception of the so-called
“erogenous zones,” by which he understood mouth, skin, anus, etc. (It
is, of course, a universal tacit presumption that sexuality has its
origin in the sexual organs.)
The term “erogenous zone” reminds us of “spasmo-genic zones,” and the
underlying image is at all events the same; just as the spasmo-genic
zone is the place whence the spasm arises, so the erogenous zone is the
place whence arises an affluent to sexuality. Based upon the model of
the genital organs as the anatomical origin of sexuality, the erogenous
zones must be conceived as being so many genitals out of which the
streams of sexuality flow together. This is the condition of the
_polymorphic perverse sexuality of childhood_. The expression “perverse”
seems to be justified by the close analogy with the later perversities
which present, so to speak, but a new edition of certain early infantile
perverse habits. They are very often connected with one or other of the
different erogenous zones, and are the cause of those exchanges in sex,
which are so characteristic for childhood.
According to this view, the later normal and monomorphic sexuality is
built up out of several components. The first division is into homo- and
hetero-sexual components, to which is linked an auto-erotic component,
as also there are components of the different erogenous zones. This
conception can be compared with the position of physics before Robert
Mayer, when only isolated forces, having elementary qualities, were
recognized, whose interchanges were little understood. The law of the
conservation of energy brought order into the inter-relationship of the
forces, at the same time abolishing the conception of those forces as
absolute elements, but regarding them as interchangeable manifestations
of one and the same energy.
The Sexual Components as Energic Manifestations
Conceptions of great importance do not arise only in one brain, but are
floating in the air and dip here and there, appearing even under other
forms, and in other regions, where it is often very difficult to
recognize the common fundamental idea. Thus it happened with the
splitting up of sexuality into the polymorphic perverse sexuality of
childhood.
Experience forces us to accept a constant exchange of isolated
components as we notice more and more that, for instance, perversities
exist at the expense of normal sexuality, or that the increase of
certain kinds of sex-manifestations causes corresponding deficiencies of
another kind. To make the matter clearer, let me give you an instance: A
young man had a homo-sexual phase lasting for some years, during which
time women had no interest for him. This abnormal condition changed
gradually toward his twentieth year and his erotic interest became more
and more normal. He began to take great interest in girls, and soon the
last traces of his homo-sexuality were conquered. This condition lasted
several years, and he had some successful love-affairs. Then he wished
to get married; he had here to suffer a great disappointment, as the
girl to whom he proposed refused him. During the ensuing phase he
absolutely abandoned the idea of marriage. After that he experienced a
dislike of all women, and one day he discovered that he was again
perfectly homo-sexual, that is, young men had an unusually irritating
influence upon him. To regard sexuality as composed of a fixed
hetero-sexual component, and a like homo-sexual element, will never
suffice to explain this case, for the conception of the existence of
fixed components excludes any kind of transformation.
To understand the case, we have to admit a great mobility of the sexual
components, which even goes so far that one of the components can
practically disappear completely, whilst the other comes to the front.
If only substitution took place, if for instance the homo-sexual
component entered the unconscious, leaving the field of consciousness to
the hetero-sexual component, modern scientific knowledge would lead us
to conclude that equivalent effects arose from the unconscious sphere.
Those effects would have to be conceived as resistances against the
activity of the hetero-sexual component, as a repugnance towards women.
Experience tells us nothing about this. There have been some small
traces of influences of this kind, but of such slight intensity that
they cannot be compared with the intensity of the former homo-sexual
component. On the conception that has been outlined, it is also
incomprehensible how this homo-sexual component, regarded as so firmly
fixed, can ever disappear without leaving active traces. To explain
things, the process of development is called in, forgetting that this is
only a word and explains nothing. You see, therefore, the urgent
necessity of an adequate explanation of such a change of scene. For this
we must have a dynamic hypothesis. Such commutations are only
conceivable as dynamic or energic processes. I cannot conceive how
manifestations of functions can disappear if I do not accept a change in
the relation of one force to another. Freud’s theory did have regard to
this necessity in the conception of components. The presumption of
isolated functions existing side by side began to be somewhat weakened,
more in practice than theoretically. It was replaced by an energic
conception. The term chosen for this conception is “libido.”
Footnote 4:
No. 7 of this Monograph Series.