The Theory of Psychoanalysis
Nervous and Mental Disease Monograph
Series, No. 19
The Theory of Psychoanalysis
BY
DR. C. G. JUNG
of Zurich
NEW YORK
THE JOURNAL OF NERVOUS AND MENTAL DISEASE
PUBLISHING COMPANY
1915
NERVOUS AND MENTAL DISEASE
MONOGRAPH SERIES
Edited by
Drs. SMITH ELY JELLIFFE and WM. A. WHITE
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Copyright, 1915, by
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CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION 1
CHAPTER I
CONSIDERATION OF EARLY HYPOTHESES 4
CHAPTER II
THE INFANTILE SEXUALITY 17
CHAPTER III
THE CONCEPTION OF LIBIDO 27
CHAPTER IV
THE ETIOLOGICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE INFANTILE SEXUALITY 45
CHAPTER V
THE UNCONSCIOUS 55
CHAPTER VI
THE DREAM 60
CHAPTER VII
THE CONTENT OF THE UNCONSCIOUS 67
CHAPTER VIII
THE ETIOLOGY OF THE NEUROSES 72
CHAPTER IX
THE THERAPEUTICAL PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOANALYSIS 96
CHAPTER X
SOME GENERAL REMARKS ON PSYCHOANALYSIS 111
INTRODUCTION
In these lectures I have attempted to reconcile my practical experiences
in psychoanalysis with the existing theory, or rather, with the
approaches to such a theory. Here is my attitude towards those
principles which my honored teacher Sigmund Freud has evolved from the
experience of many decades. Since I have long been closely connected
with psychoanalysis, it will perhaps be asked with astonishment how it
is that I am now for the first time defining my theoretical position.
When, some ten years ago, it came home to me what a vast distance Freud
had already travelled beyond the bounds of contemporary knowledge of
psycho-pathological phenomena, especially the psychology of the complex
mental processes, I no longer felt myself in a position to exercise any
real criticism. I did not possess the sorry mandarin-courage of those
people who—upon a basis of ignorance and incapacity—consider themselves
justified in “critical” rejections. I thought one must first work
modestly for years in such a field before one might dare to criticize.
The evil results of premature and superficial criticism have certainly
not been lacking. A preponderating number of critics have attacked with
as much anger as ignorance. Psychoanalysis has flourished undisturbed
and has not troubled itself one jot or tittle about the unscientific
chatter that has buzzed around it. As everyone knows, this tree has
waxed mightily, and not in one world only, but alike in Europe and in
America. Official criticism participates in the pitiable fate of
Proktophantasmist and his lamentation in the Walpurgis-night:
“You still are here? Nay, ’tis a thing unheard!
Vanish at once! We’ve said the enlightening word.”
Such criticism has omitted to take to heart the truth that all that
exists has sufficient right to its existence: no less is it with
psychoanalysis.
We will not fall into the error of our opponents, nor ignore their
existence nor deny their right to exist. But then this enjoins upon
ourselves the duty of applying a proper criticism, grounded upon a
practical knowledge of the facts. To me it seems that psychoanalysis
stands in need of this weighing-up from the inside.
It has been wrongly assumed that my attitude denotes a “split” in the
psychoanalytic movement. Such a schism can only exist where faith is
concerned. But psychoanalysis deals with knowledge and its ever-changing
formulations. I have taken William James’ pragmatic rule as a
plumb-line: “You must bring out of each word its practical cash-value,
set it at work within the stream of your experience. It appears less a
solution, then, than as a program for more work and more particularly as
an indication of the ways in which existing realities may be changed.
_Theories thus become instruments, not answers to enigmas, in which we
can rest._ We don’t lie back upon them, we move forward, and, on
occasion, make nature over again by their aid.”
And so my criticism has not proceeded from academic arguments, but from
experiences which have forced themselves on me during ten years earnest
work in this sphere. I know that my experience in no wise approaches
Freud’s quite extraordinary experience and insight, but none the less it
seems to me that certain of my formulations do present the observed
facts more adequately than is the case in Freud’s method of statement.
At any rate I have found, in my teaching, that the conceptions put
forward in these lectures have afforded peculiar aid in my endeavors to
help my pupils to an understanding of psychoanalysis. With such
experience I am naturally inclined to assent to the view of Mr. Dooley,
that witty humorist of the _New York Times_, when he says, defining
pragmatism: “Truth is truth ‘when it works.’” I am indeed very far from
regarding a modest and moderate criticism as a “falling away” or a
schism; on the contrary, through it I hope to help on the flowering and
fructification of the psychoanalytic movement, and to open a path
towards the scientific treasures of psychoanalysis for those who have
hitherto been unable to possess themselves of psychoanalytic methods,
whether through lack of practical experience or through distaste of the
theoretical hypothesis.
For the opportunity to deliver these lectures I have to thank my friend
Dr. Smith Ely Jelliffe, of New York, who kindly invited me to take part
in the “Extension Course” at Fordham University. These lectures were
given in September, 1912, in New York.
I must here also express my best thanks to Dr. Gregory, of Bellevue
Hospital, for his ready support of my clinical demonstrations.
For the troublesome work of translation I am greatly indebted to my
assistant, Miss M. Moltzer, and to Mrs. Edith Eder and Dr. Eder of
London.
Only after the preparation of these lectures did Adler’s book, “Ueber
den nervösen Character,” become known to me, in the summer of 1912. I
recognize that he and I have reached similar conclusions on various
points, but here is not the place to go into a more intimate discussion
of the matter; that must take place elsewhere.
CHAPTER I
Consideration of Early Hypotheses
It is not an easy task to speak about psychoanalysis in these days. I am
not thinking, when I say this, of the fact that psychoanalysis in
general—it is my earnest conviction—is among the most difficult
scientific problems of the day. But even when we put this cardinal fact
aside, we find many serious difficulties which interfere with the clear
interpretation of the matter. I am not capable of giving you a complete
doctrine elaborated both from the theoretical and the empirical
standpoint. Psychoanalysis has not yet reached such a point of
development, although a great amount of labor has been expended upon it.
Neither can I give you a description of its growth ab ovo, for you
already have in your country, with its great regard for all the progress
of civilization, a considerable literature on the subject. This
literature has already spread a general knowledge of psychoanalysis
among those who have a scientific interest in it.
You have had the opportunity of listening to Freud, the real explorer
and founder of this method, who has spoken in your own country about
this theory. As for myself, I have already had the honor of speaking
about this work in America. I have discussed the experimental foundation
of the theory of complexes and the application of psychoanalysis to
pedagogy.
It can be easily understood that under these circumstances I fear to
repeat what has already been said, or published in many scientific
journals in this country. A further difficulty lies in the fact that in
very many quarters there are already prevailing quite extraordinary
conceptions of our theory, conceptions which are often absolutely wrong,
and unfortunately wrong just in that which touches the very essence of
psychoanalysis. At times it seems nearly impossible to grasp even the
meaning of these errors, and I am constantly astonished to find any one
with a scientific education ever arriving at ideas so divorced from all
foundations in fact. Obviously it would be of no importance to cite
examples of these curiosities, and it will be more valuable to discuss
here those questions and problems of psychoanalysis which really might
provoke misunderstanding.
A Change in the Theory of Psychoanalysis
Although it has very often been repeated, it seems to be still an
unknown fact to many people, that in these last years the theory of
psychoanalysis has changed considerably. Those, for instance, who have
only read the first book, “Studies in Hysteria,” by Breuer and Freud,
still believe that psychoanalysis essentially consists in the doctrine
that hysteria, as well as other neuroses, has its root in the so-called
“traumata,” or shocks, of earliest childhood. They continue to condemn
this theory, and have no idea that it is fifteen years since this
conception was abandoned and replaced by a totally different one. This
change is of such great importance in the whole development of
psychoanalysis, as well for its technique as for its theory, that I must
give it in some detail. That I may not weary you with the complete
recitation of cases already well known, I will only just refer to those
in Breuer and Freud’s book, which I shall assume are known to you, for
the book has been translated into English.[1] You will there have read
that case of Breuer’s, to which Freud referred in his lectures at Clark
University. You will have found that the hysterical symptom has not some
unknown organic source, but is based on certain highly emotional psychic
events, so-called injuries of the heart, traumata or shocks. I think
that now-a-days every careful observer of hysteria will acknowledge from
his own experience that, at the root of this disease, such painful
events are to be found. This truth was already known to the physicians
of former days.
The Traumatic Theory
So far as I know it was really Charcot who, probably under the influence
of Page’s theory of nervous shock, made this observation of theoretical
value. Charcot knew, by means of hypnotism, at that time not understood,
that hysterical symptoms could be called forth by suggestion as well as
made to disappear through suggestion. Charcot believed that he saw
something like this in those cases of hysteria caused by accident, cases
which became more and more frequent. The shock can be compared with
hypnosis in Charcot’s sense. The emotion provoked by the shock causes a
momentary complete paralysis of will-power, during which the remembrance
of the trauma can be fixed as an auto-suggestion. This conception gives
us the original theory of psychoanalysis. Etiological investigation had
to prove whether this mechanism, or a similar one, was also to be found
in those cases of hysteria which could not be called traumatic. This
lack of knowledge of the etiology of hysteria was supplied by the
discovery of Breuer and Freud. They proved that even in those ordinary
cases of hysteria which cannot be said to be caused by shock the same
trauma-element was to be found, and seemed to have an etiological value.
It is natural that Freud, a pupil of Charcot, was inclined to suppose
that this discovery in itself confirmed the ideas of Charcot.
Accordingly the theory elaborated out of the experience of that period,
mainly by Freud, received the imprint of a traumatic etiology. The name
of trauma-theory is therefore justified; nevertheless this theory had
also a new aspect. I am not here speaking of the truly admirable
profoundness and precision of Freud’s analysis of symptoms, but of the
relinquishing of the conception of auto-suggestion, which was the
dynamic force in the original theory, and its substitution by a detailed
exposure of the psychological and psycho-physical effects caused by the
shock. The shock, the trauma, provokes a certain excitation which, under
normal circumstances, finds a natural outlet (“abreagieren”). In
hysteria it is only to a certain extent that the excitation does find a
natural outlet; a partial retention takes place, the so-called blocking
of the affect (“Affecteinklemmung”). This amount of excitation, which
can be compared with an amount of potential energy, is transmuted by the
mechanism of conversion into “physical” symptoms.
_The Cathartic Method._—According to this conception, therapy had to
find the means by which those retained emotions could be brought to a
mode of expression, thereby setting free from the symptoms that amount
of repressed and converted feeling. Hence this was called the cleansing,
or _cathartic method_; its aim was to discharge the blocked emotions.
From this it follows that analysis was then more or less closely
concerned with the symptoms, that is to say, the symptoms were
analyzed—the work of analysis began with the symptoms, a method
abandoned to-day. The cathartic method, and the theory on which it is
based, are, as you know, accepted by other colleagues, so far as they
are interested at all in psychoanalysis, and you will find some
appreciation and quotation of the theory, as well as of the method, in
several text-books.
The Traumatic Theory Criticized
Although, as a matter of fact, the discovery of Breuer and Freud is
certainly true, as can easily be proved by every case of hysteria,
several objections can be raised to the theory. It must be acknowledged
that their method shows with wonderful clearness the connection between
the actual symptoms and the shock, as well as the psychological
consequences which necessarily follow from the traumatic event, but
nevertheless, a doubt arises as to the etiological significance of the
so-called trauma or shock.
It is extremely difficult for any critical observer of hysteria to admit
that a neurosis, with all its complications, can be based on events in
the past, as it were on one emotional experience long past. It is more
or less fashionable at present to consider all abnormal psychic
conditions, in so far as they are of exogenic growth, as the
consequences of hereditary degeneration, and not as essentially
influenced by the psychology of the patient and the environment. This
conception is too narrow, and not justified by the facts. To use an
analogy, we know perfectly well how to find the right middle course in
dealing with the etiology of tuberculosis. There are, of course, cases
of tuberculosis where in earliest childhood the germ of the disease
falls upon a soil predisposed by heredity, so that even in the most
favorable conditions the patient cannot escape his fate. None the less,
there are also cases where, under favorable conditions, illness can be
prevented, despite a predisposition to the disease. Nor must we forget
that there are still other cases without hereditary disposition or
individual inclination, and, in spite of this, fatal infection occurs.
All this holds equally true of the neuroses, where matters are not
essentially different in their method of procedure than they are in
general pathology. Neither a theory in which the predisposition is
all-important, nor one in which the influence of the environment is
all-important, will ever suffice. It is true the shock-theory can be
said to give predominance to the predisposition, even insisting that
some past trauma is the condition sine qua non of the neurosis. Yet
Freud’s ingenious empiricism presented even in the “Studies in Hysteria”
some views, insufficiently exploited at the time, which contained the
elements of a theory that perhaps more accentuates the value of
environment than inherited or traumatic predisposition.
The Conception of “Repression”
Freud synthesized these observations in a form that was to extend far
beyond the limits of the shock-theory. This conception is the hypothesis
of repression (“Verdrängung”). As you know, by the word “repression” is
understood the psychic mechanism of the re-transportation of a conscious
thought into the unconscious sphere. We call this sphere the
“unconscious” and define it as the psyche of which we are not conscious.
The conception of repression was derived from the numerous observations
made upon neurotic patients who seemed to have the capacity of
forgetting important events or thoughts, and this to such an extent that
one might easily believe nothing had ever happened. These observations
can be constantly made by anyone who comes into close psychological
relations with his patients. As a result of the Breuer and Freud
studies, it was found that a very special method was needed to call
again into consciousness those traumatic events long since forgotten. I
wish to call attention to this fact, since it is decidedly astonishing
for a priori we are not inclined to believe that valuable things can
ever be forgotten. For this reason several critics object that the
reminiscences which have been called into consciousness by certain
hypnotic processes are only suggested ones, and do not correspond with
reality. Even granting this, it would certainly not be justifiable to
regard this in itself as a condemnation of “repression,” since there are
and have been not a few cases where the fact of repressed reminiscences
can be proved by objective demonstration. Even if we exclude this kind
of proof, it is possible to test the phenomena by experiment. The
association-tests provide us with the necessary experiences. Here we
find the extraordinary fact that associations pertaining to complexes
saturated with emotion emerge with much greater difficulty into
consciousness, and are much more easily forgotten.
As my experiments on this subject were never reëxamined, the conclusions
were never adopted, until just lately, when Wilhelm Peters, a disciple
of Kraepelin, proved in general my previous observation, namely, that
painful events are very rarely correctly reproduced (“die unlustbetonten
Erlebnisse werden am seltensten richtig reproduciert”).
As you see, the conception rests upon a firm empirical basis. There is
still another side of the question worth looking at. We might ask if the
repression has its root in a conscious determination of the individual,
or do the reminiscences disappear rather passively without conscious
knowledge on the part of the patient? In Freud’s works you will find a
series of excellent proofs of the existence of a conscious tendency to
repress what is painful. Every psychoanalyst will know more than a dozen
cases showing clearly in their history one particular moment at least in
which the patient knows more or less clearly that he will not allow
himself to think of the repressed reminiscences. A patient once gave
this significant answer: “Je l’ai mis de côté” (I have put it aside).
But, on the other hand, we must not forget that there are a number of
cases where it is impossible for us to show, even with the most careful
examination, the slightest trace of conscious repression; in these cases
it seems as if the mechanism of repression were much more in the nature
of a passive disappearance, or even as if the impressions were dragged
beneath the surface by some force operating from below. From the first
class of cases we get the impression of complete mental development,
accompanied by a kind of cowardice in regard to their own feelings; but
among the second class of cases you may find patients showing a more
serious retardation of development. The mechanism of repression seems
here to be much more an automatic one.
This difference is closely connected with the question I mentioned
before—that is, the question of the relative importance of
predisposition and environment. The first class of cases appears to be
mainly influenced by environment and education; in the other,
predisposition seems to play the chief part. It is pretty clear where
treatment will have more effect. (As I have already said, the conception
of repression contains an element which is in intrinsic contradiction
with the shock-theory.) We find, for instance, in the case of Miss Lucy
R.,[2] described by Freud, that the essential etiological moment is not
to be found in the traumatic scenes, but in the insufficient readiness
of the patient to set store upon the convictions passing through her
mind. But if we think of the later views we find in the “Selected Papers
on Hysteria,”[3] where Freud, forced through further experience,
supposes certain traumatic sexual events in early childhood to be the
source of the neurosis, then we get the impression of an incongruity
between the conception of repression and that of shock. The conception
of “repression” contains the elements of an etiological theory of
environment, while the conception of “shock” is a theory of
predisposition.
But at first the theory of neurosis developed along the lines of the
trauma conception. Pursuing Freud’s later investigations, we see him
coming to the conclusion that no such positive value can be ascribed to
the traumatic events of later life, as their effects could only be
conceivable if the particular predisposition of the patient were taken
into account. Evidently the enigma was to be resolved just at this
point. As the analytical work progressed, the roots of hysterical
symptoms were found in childhood; they reached back from the present far
into the past. The further end of the chain threatened to get lost in
the mists of early childhood. But it was just there that reminiscences
appeared of certain scenes where sexual activities had been manifested
in an active or passive way, and these were unmistakably connected with
the events which provoked the neurosis. (For further details of these
events you must consult the works of Freud, as well as the numerous
analyses which have already been published.)
The Theory of Sexual Trauma in Childhood
Hence arose the theory of sexual trauma in childhood which provoked
bitter opposition, not from theoretical objections against the
shock-theory in general, but against the element of sexuality in
particular. In the first place, the idea that children might be sexual,
and that sexual thoughts might play any part with them, aroused great
antagonism. In the second place, the possibility that hysteria had a
sexual basis was most unwelcome, for the sterile position that hysteria
was either a reflex neurosis of the uterus or arose from lack of sexual
satisfaction had just been given up. Naturally, therefore, the real
value of Freud’s observations was disputed. If critics had limited
themselves to that question, and had not adorned their opposition with
moral indignation, a calm discussion would have been possible. In
Germany, for instance, this method of attack made it impossible to get
any credit for Freud’s theory. As soon as the question of sexuality was
touched general resistance, as well as haughty contempt were awakened.
But in truth there was but one question at issue: were Freud’s
observations true or not? That alone could be of importance to a really
scientific mind. It is possible that these observations do not seem very
probable at first sight, but it is unjustifiable to condemn them a
priori as false. Wherever really sincere and thorough investigations
have been carried out it has been possible to corroborate his
observations. The fact of a psychological chain of consequences has been
absolutely confirmed, although Freud’s original conception, that real
traumatic scenes were always to be found, has not been.
Theory of Sexual Trauma Abandoned
Freud himself abandoned his first presentation of the shock-theory after
further and more thorough investigation. He could no longer retain his
original view as to the reality of the sexual shock. Excessive
sexuality, sexual abuse of children, or very early sexual activity in
childhood, were later on seen to be of secondary importance. You will
perhaps be inclined to share the suspicion of the critics that the
results derived from analytic researches were based on suggestion. There
might be some justification for this view if these assertions had been
published broadcast by some charlatan or ill-qualified person. But
anyone who has carefully read Freud’s works, and has himself similarly
sought to penetrate into the psychology of his patients, will know that
it is unjust to attribute to an intellect like Freud’s the crude
mistakes of a journeyman. Such suggestions only redound to the discredit
of those who make them. Ever since then patients have been examined by
every possible means from which suggestion could be absolutely excluded.
And still the associations described by Freud have been proved to be
true in principle. We are thus obliged in the first place to regard many
of these shocks of early childhood as phantoms, while other traumata
have objective reality. With this knowledge, at first somewhat
confusing, the etiological importance of the sexual trauma in childhood
declines, as it seems now quite irrelevant whether the trauma really
took place or not. Experience teaches us that phantasy can be, so to
speak, of the same traumatic value as real shock. In the face of such
facts, every physician who treats hysteria will recall cases where the
neurosis has indeed been provoked by violent traumatic impressions. This
observation is only in apparent contradiction with our knowledge,
already referred to, of the unreality of traumatic events in childhood.
We know perfectly well that many persons suffer shocks in childhood or
in adult life who nevertheless get no neurosis. Therefore the trauma
has, ceteris paribus, no absolute etiological importance, but owes its
efficacy to the nature of the soil upon which it falls.
The Predisposition for the Trauma
No neurosis will grow on an unprepared soil where no germ of neurosis is
already existing; the trauma will pass by without leaving any permanent
and effective mark. From this simple consideration it is pretty clear
that, to make it really effective, the patient must meet the shock with
a certain internal predisposition. This internal predisposition is not
to be understood as meaning that totally obscure hereditary
predisposition of which we know so little, but as a psychological
development which reaches its apogee and its manifestation at the
moment, and even through, the trauma.
I will show you first of all by a concrete case the nature of the trauma
and its psychological predisposition. A young lady suffered from severe
hysteria after a sudden fright. She had been attending a social
gathering that evening and was on her way home at midnight, accompanied
by several acquaintances, when a carriage came behind her at full speed.
Everyone else drew aside, but she, paralyzed by fright, remained in the
middle of the street and ran just in front of the horses. The coachman
cracked his whip, cursed and swore without any result. She ran down the
whole length of the street, which led to a bridge. There her strength
failed her, and to escape the horses’ feet she thought, in her extreme
despair, of jumping into the water, but was prevented in time by
passers-by. This very same lady happened to be present a little later on
that bloody day, the 22d of January, in St. Petersburg, when a street
was cleared by soldiers’ volleys. Right and left of her she saw people
dying or falling down badly wounded. Remaining perfectly calm and
clear-minded, she caught sight of a gate that gave her escape into
another street.
These terrible moments did not agitate her, either at the time, or later
on. Whence it must follow that the intensity of the trauma is of small
pathogenic importance: the special conditions form the essential
factors. Here, then, we have the key by which we are able to unlock at
least one of the anterooms to the understanding of predisposition. We
must next ask what were the special circumstances in this
carriage-scene. The terror and apprehension began as soon as the lady
heard the horses’ foot-steps. It seemed to her for a moment as if these
betokened some terrible fate, portending her death or something
dreadful. Then she lost consciousness. The real causation is somehow
connected with the horses. The predisposition of the patient, who acts
thus wildly at such a commonplace occurence, could perhaps be found in
the fact that horses had a special significance for her. It might
suffice, for instance, if she had been once concerned in some dangerous
accident with horses. This assumption does hold good here. When she was
seven years old, she was once out on a carriage-drive with the coachman;
the horses shied and approached the steep river-bank at full speed. The
coachman jumped off his seat, and shouted to her to do the same, which
she was barely able to do, as she was frightened to death. Still, she
sprang down at the right moment, whilst the horses and carriage were
dashed down below.
It is unnecessary to prove that such an event must leave a lasting
impression behind. But still it does not offer any explanation for the
exaggerated reaction to an inadequate stimulus. Up till now we only know
that this later symptom had its prologue in childhood, but the
pathological side remains obscure. To solve this enigma we require other
experiences. The amnesia which I will set forth fully later on shows
clearly the disproportion between the so-called shock and the part
played by phantasy. In this case phantasy must predominate to an
extraordinary extent to provoke such an effect. The shock in itself was
too insignificant. We are at first inclined to explain this incident by
the shock that took place in childhood, but it seems to me with little
success. It is difficult to understand why the effect of this infantile
trauma had remained latent so long, and why it only now came to the
surface. The patient must surely have had opportunities enough during
her lifetime of getting out of the way of a carriage going full speed.
The reminiscence of the danger to her life seems to be quite
insufficiently effective: the real danger in which she was at that one
moment in St. Petersburg did not produce the slightest trace of
neurosis, despite her being predisposed by an impressive event in her
childhood. The whole of this traumatic event still lacks explanation;
from the point of view of the shock-theory we are hopelessly in the
dark.
You must excuse me if I return so persistently to the shock-theory. I
consider this necessary, as now-a-days many people, even those who
regard us seriously, still keep to this standpoint. Thus the opponents
to psychoanalysis and those who never read psychoanalytic articles, or
do so quite superficially, get the impression that in psychoanalysis the
old shock-theory is still in force.
The question arises: what are we to understand by this predisposition,
through which an insignificant event produces such a pathological
effect? This is the question of chief significance, and we shall find
that the same question plays an important rôle in the theory of
neurosis, for we have to understand why apparently irrelevant events of
the past are still producing such effects that they are able to
interfere in an impish and capricious way with the normal reactions of
actual life.
The Sexual Element in the Trauma
The early school of psychoanalysis, and its later disciples, did all
they could to find the origin of later effects in the special kind of
early traumatic events. Freud’s research penetrated most deeply. He was
the first, and it was he alone, who discovered that a certain sexual
element was connected with the shock. It is just this sexual element
which, speaking generally, we may consider as unconscious, and it is to
this that the traumatic effect is generally due. The unconsciousness of
sexuality in childhood seems to throw a light upon the problem of the
persistent constellation of the primary traumatic event. The true
emotional meaning of the accident was all along hidden from the patient,
so that in consciousness this emotion was never brought into play, the
emotion never wore itself out, it was never used up. We might perhaps
explain the effect in the following way: this persistent constellation
was a kind of “suggestion à échéance,” for it is unconscious and the
action occurs only at the stipulated moment.
It is hardly necessary to give detailed examples to prove that the true
nature of sexual manifestations during infancy is not understood.
Physicians know, for instance, how often a manifest masturbation
persisting up to adult life, especially in women, is not understood as
such. It is, therefore, easy to realize that to a child the true nature
of certain actions would be far less conscious. And that is the reason
why the real meaning of these events, even in adult life, is still
hidden from our consciousness. In some cases, even, the traumatic events
are themselves forgotten, either because their sexual meaning is quite
unknown to the patient, or because their sexual character is
inacceptable, being too painful. It is what we call “repressed.”
As we have already mentioned, Freud’s observation, that the admixture of
a sexual element with the shock is essential for any pathological
effect, leads on to the theory of the _infantile sexual trauma_.
This hypothesis may be thus expressed: the pathogenic event is a sexual
one. This conception forced its way with difficulty. The general opinion
that children have no sexuality in early life made such an etiology
inadmissible, and at first prevented its acceptance.
The Infantile Sexual Phantasy
The change in the shock-theory already referred to, namely, that in
general the shock is not even real, but is essentially a phantasy, did
not make things better. On the contrary, still worse, since we are
forced to the conclusion that we find in the infantile phantasy at least
one positive sexual manifestation. It is no longer some brutal
accidental impression from the outside, but a positive sexual
manifestation created by the child itself, and this very often with
unmistakable clearness. Even real traumatic events of an outspoken
sexual type do not always happen to a child quite _without its
coöperation_, but are not infrequently apparently _prepared and brought
about by the child itself_. Abraham stated this, proving his statement
with evidence of the greatest interest, and this, in connection with
many other experiences of the same kind, makes it very probable that
even really sexual scenes are frequently called forth and supported by
the peculiar psychological state of the child’s mind. Perfectly
independently from psychoanalytic investigation, medical criminology has
discovered striking parallels to this psychoanalytic statement.
Footnote 1:
“Selected Papers on Hysteria and Other Psychoneuroses,” by Prof.
Sigmund Freud. Nervous and Mental Disease Monograph Series, No. 4.
Footnote 2:
Monograph No. 4, p. 14.
Footnote 3:
_Ibid._