The Conception of Libido
Freud had already introduced the idea of libido in his[5] “Three
Contributions to the Sexual Theory” in the following words:
“In biology, the fact that both mankind and animals have a sexual want
is expressed by the conception of the sexual desire. This is done by
analogy with the want of nourishment, so-called hunger. Popular speech
has no corresponding characterization for the word ‘hunger,’ and so
science uses the word ‘libido.’”
In Freud’s definition, the term “libido” appears as exclusively a sexual
desire. “Libido” as a medical term is certainly used for sexual desire,
and especially for sexual lust. But the classical definition of this
word as found in Cicero, Sallust, and others, was not so exclusive. The
word is there used in a more general sense for every passionate desire.
I only just mention this definition here, as further on it plays an
important part in our considerations, and as it is important to know
that the term “libido” has really a much wider meaning than is
associated with it through medical language.
The idea of libido (while maintaining its sexual meaning in the author’s
sense as long as possible) offers us the dynamic value which we are
seeking in order to explain the shifting of the psychological scenery.
With this conception it is much simpler to formulate the phenomena in
question, instead of by the incomprehensible substitution of the homo-
by the hetero-sexual component. We may say now that the libido has
gradually withdrawn from its homo-sexual manifestation and is
transferred in the same measure into a hetero-sexual manifestation. Thus
the homo-sexual component practically disappears. It remains only an
empty possibility, signifying nothing in itself. Its very existence,
therefore, is rightly denied by the laity, just as we doubt the
possibility that any man selected at random would turn out to be a
murderer. By the use of this conception of libido many relations between
the isolated sexual functions are now easily explicable.
The early idea of the multiplicity of sexual components must be given
up: it savors too much of the ancient philosophical notion of the
faculties of the mind. Its place is taken by libido which is capable of
manifold applications. The earlier components only represent
possibilities of activities. With this conception of libido, the
original idea of a divided sexuality with different roots is replaced by
a dynamic unity, without which the formerly important components remain
but empty possibilities of activities. This development in our
conception is of great importance. We have here the same process which
Robert Mayer introduced into dynamics. Just as the conception of the
conservation of energy removed their character as elements from the
forces, imparting to them the character of a manifestation of energy, so
the libido theory similarly removes from the sexual components the idea
of the mental “faculties” as elements (“Seelen Vermögen”), and ascribes
to them merely phenomenal value. This conception represents the
impression of reality far more than the theory of components. With a
libido-theory we can easily explain the case of the young man. The
disappointment he met with, just at the time he had definitely decided
on a hetero-sexual life, drove his libido again from the hetero-sexual
manifestation into a homo-sexual form, thus calling forth his entire
homo-sexuality.
The Energic Theory of Libido
I must point out here that the analogy with the law of the conservation
of energy is very close. In both cases the question arises when an
effect of energy disappears, where is this energy meanwhile, and where
will it reemerge? Applying this point of view as a heuristic principle
to the psychology of human conduct, we shall make some astonishing
discoveries. Then we shall see how the most heterogeneous phases of
individual psychological development are connected in an energic
relationship. Every time we see a person who is splenetic or has a
morbid conviction, or some exaggerated mental attitude, we know here is
too much libido, and the excess must have been taken away from somewhere
else where there is too little. From this standpoint, psychoanalysis is
that method which discovers those places or functions where there is too
little or too much libido, and restores the just proportions. Thus the
symptoms of a neurosis must be considered as exaggerated and
correspondingly disturbed functional manifestations overflowing with
libido. The energy which has been used for this purpose has been taken
away from somewhere else, and it is the task of the psychoanalyst, to
restore it whence it was taken, or to bestow it where it was never
before given. Those complexes of symptoms which are mainly characterized
by lack of libido, for instance, the so-called apathetic conditions,
force us to reverse the question. Here we have to ask, where did the
libido go? The patient gives us the impression of having no libido, and
there are occasionally physicians who believe exactly what the patients
tell them. Such physicians have a primitive way of thinking, like the
savage who believes, when he sees an eclipse of the sun, that the sun
has been swallowed up and put to death. But the sun is only hidden, and
so it is with these patients. Although the libido is there, it is not
get-at-able, and is inaccessible to the patient himself. Superficially,
we have here a lack of libido. It is the task of psychoanalysis to
search for that hidden place where the libido dwells, and where it is as
a rule inaccessible to the patient. The hidden place is the
non-conscious, which may also be called the unconscious, without
ascribing to it any mysterious significance.
The Conception of Unconscious Phantasy
Psychoanalytic experience has taught us that there are non-conscious
systems which, by analogy with conscious phantasies, can be described as
phantasy-systems of the unconscious. In cases of neurotic apathy these
phantasy systems of the unconscious are the objects of the libido. We
know well that, when we speak of unconscious phantasy systems, we only
speak figuratively. We do not mean more by this than that we accept as
an indispensable postulate the conception of psychic entities existing
outside consciousness. Experience teaches us, we might say daily, that
there are unconscious psychic processes which influence the disposition
of the libido in a perceptible way. Those cases, known to every
psychiatrist in which complicated symptoms of delusions emerge with
relative great suddenness, show clearly that there must be unconscious
psychic development and preparation, for we cannot regard them as having
been just suddenly formed when they entered consciousness.
The Sexual Terminology
I feel myself justified in making this digression concerning the
unconscious. I have done it to point out that, with regard to shifting
of the manifestations of the libido, we have to deal not only with the
conscious, but also with another factor, the unconscious, whither the
libido sometimes disappears. We have not yet followed up the discussion
of the further consequences which result from the adoption of the
libido-theory.
Freud has taught us, and we see it in the daily practice of
psychoanalysis, that in earlier childhood, instead of the normal later
sexuality, we find many tendencies which in later life are called
perversions. We have to admit that Freud has the right to give to these
tendencies a sexual terminology. Through the introduction of the
conception of the libido, we see that in adults those elementary
components which seemed to be the origin and the source of normal
sexuality, lose their importance, and are reduced to mere
potentialities. The effective power, their life force, is to be found in
the libido. Without libido these components mean nothing. We saw that
Freud gives to the conception of libido an undoubted sexual definition,
somewhat in the sense of sexual desire. The general view is, that libido
in this sense only comes into being at the age of puberty. How are we
then to explain the fact that in Freud’s view a child has a
polymorphic-perverse sexuality, and that therefore, in children, the
libido brings into action not only one, but several possibilities? If
the libido, in Freud’s sense, begins its existence at puberty, it could
not be held accountable for earlier infantile perversions. In that case,
we should have to regard these infantile perversions as “faculties of
the mind,” in the sense of the theory of components. Apart from the
hopeless theoretical confusion which would thus arise, we must not
multiply explanatory principles in accordance with the philosophical
axiom: “principia praeter necessitatem non sunt multiplicanda.”
There is no other way but to agree that before and after puberty it is
the same libido. Hence, the perversities of childhood have arisen
exactly in the same way as those of adults. Common sense will object to
this, as obviously the sexual needs of children cannot possibly be the
same as those of adults. We might admit, with Freud, that the libido
before and after puberty is the same, but is different in its intensity.
Instead of the intense post-pubertal sexual desire, there would be first
a slight sexual desire in childhood, with diminishing intensity until,
as we reach back to the first year, it is but a trace. We might admit
that we are biologically in agreement with this formulation. It would
then have to be also agreed that everything that falls into the region
of this enlarged conception of sexuality is already pre-existing but in
miniature; for instance, all those emotional manifestations of
psycho-sexuality: desire for affection, jealousy, and many others, and
by no means least, the neuroses of childhood.
It must, however, be admitted that these emotional manifestations of
childhood by no means make the impression of being in miniature; their
intensity can rival that of an affect among adults. Nor must it be
forgotten that experience has shown that perverse manifestations of
sexuality in childhood are often more glaring, and indeed seem to have a
greater development, than in adults. If an adult under similar
conditions had this apparently excessive form of sexuality, which is
practically normal in children, we could rightly expect a total absence
of normal sexuality, and of many other important biological adaptations.
An adult is rightly called perverse when his libido is not used for
normal functions, and the same could be said of a child: it is
polymorphous perverse since it does not know normal sexual functions.
These considerations suggest the idea that perhaps the amount of libido
is always the same, and that no increase first occur at puberty. This
somewhat audacious conception accords with the example of the law of the
conservation of energy, according to which the quantity of energy
remains always the same. It is possible that the summit of maturity is
reached when the infantile diffuse applications of libido discharge
themselves into the one channel of definite sexuality, and thus lose
themselves therein. For the moment we must content ourselves with these
suggestions, for we must next pay attention to one point of criticism
concerning the quality of the infantile libido.
Many critics do not admit that the infantile libido is simply less
intense or is essentially of the same kind as the libido of adults. The
emotions among adults are correlated with the genital functions. This is
not the case in children, or it is only so in miniature, or
exceptionally, and this gives rise to an important distinction, which
must not be undervalued.
I believe such an objection is justified. There is really a considerable
difference between immature and fully developed functions, as there is a
difference between play and reality, between shooting with blank and
with loaded cartridges. That the childish libido has the harmlessness
demanded by common sense cannot be contested. But of course none can
deny that blank shooting is shooting. We must get accustomed to the idea
that sexuality really exists, even before puberty, right back in early
childhood, and that we have no right to pretend that manifestations of
this immature sexuality are not sexual. This does not indeed refute the
objection, which, while recognizing the existence of infantile sexuality
in the form already described, yet denies Freud’s claim to regard as
sexual early infantile manifestations such as sucking. We have mentioned
already the motives which induced Freud to enlarge the sexual
terminology in such a way. We mentioned, too, how this very act of
sucking, for instance, could be conceived from the standpoint of
pleasure in the function of nutrition, and that, on biological grounds,
there was more justification for this derivation than for Freud’s view.
It might be objected that these and similar activities of the oral zones
are found in later life in an undoubted sexual use. This only means that
these activities can in later life be used for sexual purposes, but that
does not tell us anything concerning the primitive sexual nature of
these forms. I must, therefore, admit that I find no ground for
regarding the activities of the suckling, which provoke pleasure and
satisfaction, from the standpoint of sexuality. Indeed there are many
objections against this conception. It seems to me, in so far as I am
capable of judging these difficult problems, that from the standpoint of
sexuality it is necessary to divide human life into three phases.
The Three Phases of Life
The first phase embraces the first years of life. I call this part of
life the pre-sexual stage. These years correspond to the
caterpillar-stage of butterflies, and are characterized almost
exclusively by the functions of nutrition and growth.
The second phase embraces the later years of childhood up to puberty,
and might be called the pre-pubertal stage.
The third phase is that of riper years, proceeding only from puberty
onwards, and could be called the time of maturity.
You cannot have failed to notice that we become conscious of the
greatest difficulty when we arrive at the question at what age we must
put the limit of the pre-sexual stage. I am ready to confess my
uncertainty with regard to this problem. If I survey the
psychoanalytical experiences with children, as yet insufficiently
numerous, at the same time keeping in mind the observations made by
Freud, it seems to me that the limit of this phase lies between the
third and fifth years. This, of course, with due consideration for the
greatest individual diversities. From various aspects this is an
important age. The child has emancipated itself already from the
helplessness of the baby, and a series of important psychological
functions have acquired a firm hold. From this period on, the obscurity
of the early infantile “amnesia,” or the _discontinuity of the early
infantile consciousness_, begins to clear up through the _sporadic
continuity of memory_. It seems as if, at this age, a considerable step
had been made towards emancipation and the formation of a new and
independent personality. As far as we know, the first signs of interest
and activity which may fairly be called sexual fall into this period,
although these sexual indications have still the infantile
characteristics of harmlessness and naiveté. I think I have sufficiently
demonstrated why a sexual terminology cannot be given to the pre-sexual
stage, and so we may now consider the other problems from the standpoint
we have just reached. You will remember that we dropped the problem of
the libido in childhood, because it seemed impossible to arrive at any
clearness in that way. But now we are obliged to take up the question
again, if only to see whether the energic conception harmonizes with the
principles just advanced. We saw, following Freud’s conception, that the
altered manifestations of the infantile sexuality, if compared with
those of maturity, are to be explained by the diminution of sexuality in
childhood.
The Sexual Definition of Libido Must be Abandoned
The intensity of the libido is said to be diminished relatively to the
early age. But we advanced just now several considerations to show why
it seems doubtful if we can regard the vital functions of a child,
sexuality excepted, as of less intensity than those of adults. We can
really say that, sexuality excepted, the emotional phenomena, and, if
nervous symptoms are present, then these likewise are quite as intense
as those of adults. On the energic conception of the libido all these
things are but manifestations of the libido. But it becomes rather
difficult to conceive that the intensity of the libido can ever
constitute the difference between a mature and an immature sexuality.
The explanation of this difference seems rather to postulate a change in
the localization of the libido (if the expression be allowed). In
contradistinction to the medical definition the libido in children is
occupied far more with certain side-functions of a mental and
physiological nature than with local sexual functions. One is here
already tempted to remove from the term libido the predicate “sexualis,”
and thus to have done with the sexual definition of the term given in
Freud’s “Three Contributions.” This necessity becomes imperative, when
we put it in the form of a question: The child in the first years of its
life is intensely living—suffering and enjoying—the question is, whether
his striving, his suffering, his enjoyment are by reason of his libido
sexualis? Freud has pronounced himself in favor of this supposition.
There is no need to repeat the reasons through which I am compelled to
accept the pre-sexual stage. The larva stage possesses a libido of
nutrition, if I may so express it, but not yet the libido sexualis. It
is thus we must put it, if we wish to keep the energic conception which
the libido theory offers us. I think there is nothing for it but to
abandon the sexual definition of libido, or we shall lose what there is
valuable in the libido theory, that is, the energic conception. For a
long time past the desire to extend the meaning of libido, and to remove
it from its narrow and sexual limitations, has forced itself upon
Freud’s school. One was never weary of insisting that sexuality in the
psychological sense was not to be taken too literally, but in a broader
connotation; but exactly how, that remained obscure, and thus too,
sincere criticism remained unsatisfied.
I do not think I am going astray if I see the real value of the libido
theory in the energic conception, and not in its sexual definition.
Thanks to the former, we are in possession of a most valuable heuristic
principle. We owe to the energic conception the possibility of dynamic
ideas and relationships, which are of inestimable value for us in the
chaos of the psychic world. The Freudians would be wrong not to listen
to the voice of criticism, which reproaches our conception of libido
with mysticism and inaccessibility. We deceived ourselves in believing
that we could ever make the libido sexualis the bearer of the energic
conception of the psychical life, and if many of Freud’s school still
believe they possess a well-defined and almost complete conception of
libido, they are not aware that this conception has been put to use far
beyond the bounds of its sexual definition. The critics are right when
they object to our theory of libido as explaining things which cannot
belong to its sphere. It must be admitted that Freud’s school makes use
of a conception of libido which passes beyond the bounds of its primary
definition. Indeed, this must produce the impression that one is working
with a mystical principle.
The Problem of Libido in Dementia Præcox
I have sought to show these infringements in a special work, “Wandlungen
und Symbole der Libido,” and at the same time the necessity for creating
a new conception of libido, which shall be in harmony with the energic
conception. Freud himself was forced to a discussion of his original
conception of libido when he tried to apply its energic point of view to
a well-known case of dementia præcox—the so-called Schreber case. In
this case, we had to deal, among other things, with that well-known
problem in the psychology of dementia præcox, the loss of adaptation to
reality, the peculiar phenomenon consisting in a special tendency of
these patients to construct an inner world of phantasy of their own,
surrendering for this purpose their adaptation to reality. As a part of
the phenomenon, the lack of sociability or emotional rapport will be
well known to you all, this representing a striking disturbance of the
function of reality. Through considerable psychological study of these
patients we discovered, that this lack of adaptation to reality is
compensated by a progressive increase in the creation of phantasies.
This goes so far that the dream-world is for the patient more real than
external reality. The patient Schreber, described by Freud, found for
this phenomenon an excellent figurative description in his delusion of
the “end of the world.” His loss of reality is thus very concretely
represented. The dynamic conception of this phenomenon is very clear. We
say that the libido withdrew itself more and more from the external
world, consequently entered the inner world, the world of phantasies,
and had there to create, as a compensation for the lost external world,
a so-called equivalent of reality. This compensation is built up piece
by piece, and it is most interesting to observe the psychological
materials of which this inner world is composed. This way of conceiving
the transposition and displacement of the libido has been made by the
every-day use of the term, its original pure sexual meaning being very
rarely recalled. In general, the word “libido” is used practically in so
harmless a sense that Claparède, in a conversation, once remarked that
we could as well use the word “interest.”
The manner in which this expression is generally used has given rise to
a way of using the term that made it possible to explain Schreber’s “end
of the world” by withdrawal of the libido. On this occasion, Freud
recalled his original sexual definition of the libido, and tried to
arrive at an understanding with the change which in the meantime had
taken place. In his article on Schreber, he discusses the question,
whether what the psychoanalytic school calls libido, and conceives of as
“interest from erotic sources” coincides with interest generally
speaking. You see that, putting the problem in this way, Freud asks the
question which Claparède practically answered. Freud discusses the
question here, whether the loss of reality noticed in dementia præcox,
to which I drew attention in my book,[6] “The Psychology of Dementia
Præcox,” is due entirely to the withdrawal of erotic interest, or if
this coincides with the so-called objective interest in general. We can
hardly agree that the normal “fonction du réel” [Janet] is only
maintained through erotic interest. The fact is that, in many cases,
reality vanishes altogether, and not a trace of psychological adaptation
can be found in these cases. Reality is repressed, and replaced by
phantasies created through complexes. We are forced to say that not only
the erotic interests, but interests in general—that is, the whole
adaptation to reality—are lost. I formerly tried, in my “Psychology of
Dementia Præcox,” to get out of this difficulty by using the expression
“psychic energy,” because I could not base the theory of dementia præcox
on the theory of transference of the libido in its sexual definition. My
experience—at that time chiefly psychiatric—did not permit me to
understand this theory. Only later did I learn to understand the
correctness of the theory as regards the neuroses by increased
experience in hysteria and the compulsion neurosis. As a matter of fact,
an abnormal displacement of libido, quite definitely sexual, does play a
great part in the neuroses. But although very characteristic repressions
of sexual libido do take place in certain neuroses, that loss of
reality, so typical for dementia præcox, never occurs. In dementia
præcox, so extreme is the loss of the function of reality that this loss
must also entail a loss of motive power, to which any sexual nature must
be absolutely denied, for it will not seem to anyone that reality is a
sexual function. If this were so, the withdrawal of erotic interests in
the neuroses would lead to a loss of reality—a loss of reality indeed
that could be compared with that in dementia præcox. But, as I said
before, this is not the case. These facts have made it impossible for me
to transfer Freud’s libido theory to dementia præcox. Hence, my view is,
that the attempt made by Abraham, in his article “The Psycho-Sexual
Differences Between Hysteria and Dementia Præcox,” is from the
standpoint of Freud’s conception of libido theoretically untenable.
Abraham’s belief, that the paranoidal system, or the symptomatology of
dementia præcox, arises by the libido withdrawing from the external
world, cannot be justified if we take “libido” according to Freud’s
definition. For, as Freud has clearly shown, a mere introversion or
regression of the libido leads always to a neurosis, and not to dementia
præcox. It is impossible to transfer the libido theory, with its sexual
definition, directly to dementia præcox, as this disease shows a loss of
reality not to be explained by the deficiency in erotic interests.
It gives me particular satisfaction that our master also, when he placed
his hand on the fragile material of paranoiac psychology, felt himself
compelled to doubt the applicability of his conception of libido which
had prevailed hitherto. My position of reserve towards the ubiquity of
sexuality which I allowed myself to adopt in the preface to my
“Psychology of Dementia Præcox”—although with a complete recognition of
the psychological mechanism—was dictated by the conception of the libido
theory of that time. Its sexual definition did not enable me to explain
those disturbances of functions which affect the indefinite sphere of
the instinct of hunger, just as much as they do those of sexuality. For
a long time the libido theory seemed to me inapplicable to dementia
præcox.
The Genetic Conception of Libido
With greater experience in my analytical work, I noticed that a slow
change of my conception of libido had taken place. A genetic conception
of libido gradually took the place of the descriptive definition of
libido contained in Freud’s “Three Contributions.” Thus it became
possible for me to replace, by the expression “psychic energy,” the term
libido. The next step was that I asked myself if now-a-days the function
of reality consists only to a very small extent of sexual libido, and to
a very large extent of other impulses. It is still a very important
question, considered from the phylogenetic standpoint, whether the
function of reality is not, at least very largely, of sexual origin. It
is impossible to answer this question directly, in so far as the
function of reality is concerned. We shall try to come to some
understanding by a side-path.
A superficial glance at the history of evolution suffices to teach us
that innumerable complicated functions, whose sexual character must be
denied, are originally nothing but derivations from the instinct of
propagation. As is well known, there has been an important displacement
in the fundamentals of propagation during the ascent through the animal
scale. The offspring has been reduced in number, and the primitive
uncertainty of impregnation has been replaced by a quite assured
impregnation, and a more effective protection of offspring. The energy
required for the production of eggs and sperma has been transferred into
the creation of mechanisms of attraction, and mechanisms for the
protection of offspring. Here we find the first instincts of art in
animals, used for the instinct of propagation, and limited to the
rutting season. The original sexual character of these biological
institutions became lost with their organic fixation, and their
functional independence. None the less, there can be no doubt as to
their sexual origin, as, for instance, there is no doubt about the
original relation between sexuality and music, but it would be a
generalization as futile, as unesthetic, to include music under the
category of sexuality. Such a terminology would lead to the
consideration of the Cathedral of Cologne under mineralogy, because it
has been built with stones. Those quite ignorant of the problems of
evolution are much astonished to find how few things there are in human
life which cannot finally be reduced to the instinct of propagation. It
embraces nearly everything, I think, that is dear and precious to us.
We have hitherto spoken of the libido as of the instinct of
reproduction, or the instinct of the preservation of the species, and
limited our conception to that libido which is opposed to hunger, just
as the instinct of the preservation of the species is opposed to that of
self-preservation. Of course in nature this artificial distinction does
not exist. Here we find only a continuous instinct of life, a will to
live, which tries to obtain the propagation of the whole race by the
preservation of the individual. To this extent this conception coincides
with that of Schopenhauer’s “will,” as objectively we can only conceive
a movement as a manifestation of an internal desire. As we have already
boldly concluded that the libido, which originally subserved the
creation of eggs and seed, is now firmly organized in the function of
nest-building, and can no longer be employed otherwise, we are similarly
obliged to include in this conception every desire, hunger no less. We
have no warrant whatever for differentiating essentially the desire to
build nests from the desire to eat.
I think you will already understand the position we have reached with
these considerations. We are about to follow up the energic conception
by putting the energic mode of action in place of the purely formal
functioning. Just as reciprocal actions, well known in the old natural
science, have been replaced by the law of the conservation of energy, so
here too, in the sphere of psychology, we seek to replace the reciprocal
activities of coordinated psychical faculties by energy, conceived as
one and homogeneous. Thus we must bow to the criticism which reproaches
the psychoanalytic school for working with a mystical conception of
libido. I have to dispel this illusion that the whole psychoanalytic
school possesses a clearly conceived and obvious conception of libido. I
maintain that the conception of libido with which we are working is not
only not concrete or known, but is an unknown _X_, a conceptual image, a
token, and no more real than the energy in the conceptual world of the
physicist. In this wise only can we escape those arbitrary
transgressions of the proper boundaries, which are always made when we
want to reduce coördinated forces to one another. Certain analogies of
the action of heat with the action of light are not to be explained by
saying that this tertium comparationis proves that the undulations of
heat are the same as the undulations of light; the conceptual image of
energy is the real point of comparison. If we regard libido in this way
we endeavor to simulate the progress which has already been made in
physics. The economy of thought which physics has already obtained we
strive after in our libido theory. We conceive libido now simply as
energy, so that we are in the position to figure the manifold processes
as forms of energy. Thus, we replace the old reciprocal action by
relations of absolute equivalence. We shall not be astonished if we are
met with the cry of vitalism. But we are as far removed from any belief
in a specific vital power, as from any other metaphysical assertion. We
term libido that energy which manifests itself by vital processes, which
is subjectively perceived as aspiration, longing and striving. We see in
the diversity of natural phenomena the desire, the libido, in the most
diverse applications and forms. In early childhood we find libido at
first wholly in the form of the instinct of nutrition, providing for the
development of the body. As the body develops, there open up,
successively, new spheres of influence for the libido. The last, and,
from its functional significance, most overpowering sphere of influence,
is sexuality, which at first seems very closely connected with the
function of nutrition. With that you may compare the well-known
influence on propagation of the conditions of nutrition in the lower
animals and plants.
In the sphere of sexuality, libido does take that form whose enormous
importance justifies us in the choice of the term “libido,” in its
strict sexual sense. Here for the first time libido appears in the form
of an undifferentiated sexual primitive power, as an energy of growth,
clearly forcing the individual towards division, budding, etc. The
clearest separation of the two forms of libido is found among those
animals where the stage of nutrition is separated by the pupa stage from
the stage of sexuality. Out of this sexual primitive power, through
which one small creature produces millions of eggs and sperm,
derivatives have been developed by extraordinary restriction of
fecundity, the functions of which are maintained by a special
differentiated libido. This differentiated libido is henceforth
_desexualized_, for it is dissociated from its original function of
producing eggs and sperm, nor is there any possibility of restoring it
to its original function. The whole process of development consists in
the increasing absorption of the libido which only created, originally,
products of generation in the secondary functions of attraction, and
protection of offspring. This development presupposes a quite different
and much more complicated relationship to reality, a true function of
reality which is functionally inseparable from the needs of
reproduction. Thus the altered mode of reproduction involves a
correspondingly increased adaptation to reality. This, of course, does
not imply that the function of reality is exclusively due to
differentiation in reproduction. I am aware that a large part of the
instinct of nutrition is connected with it. Thus we arrive at an insight
into certain primitive conditions of the function of reality. It would
be fundamentally wrong to pretend that the compelling source is still a
sexual one. It _was_ largely a sexual one originally. The process of
absorption of the primitive libido into secondary functions certainly
always took place in the form of so-called affluxes of sexual libido
(“libidinöse Zuschüsse”).
That is to say, sexuality was diverted from its original destination, a
definite quantity was used up in the mechanisms of mutual attraction and
of protection of offspring. This transference of sexual libido from the
sexual sphere to associated functions is still taking place (_e. g._,
modern neo-Malthusianism is the artificial continuation of the natural
tendency). We call this process _sublimation_, when this operation
occurs without injury to the adaptation of the individual; we call it
_repression_—when the attempt fails. From the descriptive standpoint
psychoanalysis accepts the multiplicity of instincts, and, among them,
the instinct of sexuality as a special phenomenon, moreover, it
recognizes certain affluxes of the libido to asexual instincts.
From the genetic standpoint it is otherwise. It regards the multiplicity
of instincts as issuing out of relative unity, the primitive libido. It
recognizes that definite quantities of the primitive libido are split
off, associated with the recently created functions, and finally merged
in them. From this standpoint we can say, without any difficulty, that
patients with dementia præcox withdraw their “libido” from the external
world and in consequence suffer a loss of reality, which is compensated
by an increase of the phantasy-building activities.
We must now fit the new conception of libido into that theory of
sexuality in childhood which is of such great importance in the theory
of neurosis. Generally speaking, we first find the libido as the energy
of vital activities acting in the zone of the function of nutrition.
Through the rhythmical movements in the act of sucking, nourishment is
taken with all signs of satisfaction. As the individual grows and his
organs develop, the libido creates new ways of desire, new activities
and satisfactions. Now the original model—rhythmic activity, creating
pleasure and satisfaction—must be transferred to other functions which
have their final goal in sexuality.
This transition is not made suddenly at puberty, but it takes place
gradually throughout the course of the greater part of childhood. The
libido can only very slowly and with great difficulty detach itself from
the characteristics of the function of nutrition, in order to pass over
into the characteristics of sexual function. As far as I can see, we
have two epochs during this transition, the epoch of _sucking_ and the
epoch of the _displaced rhythmic activity_. Considered solely from the
point of view of its mode of action, sucking clings entirely to the
domain of the function of nutrition, but it presents also a far wider
aspect, it is no mere function of nutrition, it is a rhythmical
activity, with its goal in a pleasure and satisfaction of its own,
distinct from the obtaining of nourishment. The hand comes into play as
an accessory organ. In the epoch of the displaced rhythmical activity it
stands out still more as an accessory organ, when the oral zone ceases
to give pleasure, which must now be obtained in other directions. The
possibilities are many. As a rule the other openings of the body become
the first objects of interest of the libido; then follow the skin in
general and certain places of predilection upon it.
The actions carried out at these places generally take the form of
rubbing, piercing, tugging, etc., accompanied by a certain rhythm, and
serve to produce pleasure. After a halt of greater or less duration at
these stations, the libido proceeds until it arrives at the sexual zone,
where it may next provoke the first onanistic attempts. During its
“march,” the libido carries over not a little from the function of
nutrition into the sexual zone; this readily explains the numerous close
associations between the function of nutrition and the sexual function.
This “march” of the libido takes place at the time of the pre-sexual
stage, which is characterized by the fact that the libido gradually
relinquishes the special character of the instinct of nutrition, and by
degrees acquires the character of the sexual instinct. At this stage we
cannot yet speak of a true sexual libido. Therefore we are obliged to
qualify the polymorphous perverse sexuality of early infancy
differently. The polymorphism of the tendencies of the libido at this
time is to be explained as the gradual movement of the libido away from
the sphere of the function of nutrition towards the sexual function.
_The Infantile “Perversity.”_—Thus rightly vanishes the term
“perverse”—so strongly contested by our opponents—for it provokes a
false idea.
When a chemical body breaks up into its elements, these elements are the
products of its disintegration, but it is not permissible on that
account to describe elements as entirely products of disintegration.
Perversities are disorders of fully-developed sexuality, but are never
precursors of sexuality, although there is undoubtedly an analogy
between the precursors and the products of disintegration. The childish
rudiments, no longer to be conceived as perverse, but to be regarded as
stages of development, change gradually into normal sexuality, as the
normal sexuality develops.
The more smoothly the libido withdraws from its provisional positions,
the more completely and the more quickly does the formation of normal
sexuality take place. It is proper to the conception of normal sexuality
that all those early infantile inclinations which are not yet sexual
should be given up. The less this is the case, the more is sexuality
threatened with perverse development. The expression “perverse” is here
used in its right place. The fundamental condition of a perversity is an
infantile, imperfectly developed state of sexuality.
Footnote 5:
No. 7 of this Monograph Series.
Footnote 6:
No. 3 of this Monograph Series.