Examination of the Conduct of the Allied Ministers at
Constantinople—Lord Ponsonby’s Propositions regarding the Hereditary
Government of Egypt—Approved by the other Allied Ministers, but on
consideration rejected by them—Lord Palmerston’s Conversation with
the Turkish Minister—Note of the Four Powers in favour of the
Hereditary Tenure.
It is now proper to examine a little into the conduct of the Allied
Ministers at Constantinople, who, of course, had some influence over the
Porte, and exercised it, in framing the Hatti Sheriff reinstating
Mehemet Ali in the government of Egypt; and I shall take the _Levant
Correspondence_ to guide me in my criticism; for although a great deal
of that is no doubt suppressed, there still remains enough to form an
opinion on the wisdom of the Allied Ministers.
I shall take the British Ambassador in hand first, as he had more
influence, and took a more prominent part than the Ambassadors and
Ministers of the other powers.
After the news of the surrender of the Turkish fleet arrived at
Constantinople, Lord Ponsonby wrote to the Internuncio and to M.
Titow[81], recommending conditions which should be attached to the grant
of the hereditary pachalic of Egypt to Mehemet Ali, which they approved
of in the first instance, but on reconsideration, they, like wise men,
rejected.
Lord Ponsonby, in his letter to Lord Palmerston[82], states, that he
will follow his Lordship’s instructions of the 17th of December, and do
all he can to secure the Sultan against the evil designs of Mehemet Ali,
and preserve the people of Egypt in future from the oppression which
they have hitherto endured. “I am convinced there is no way of doing
both, so certain, as that which your Lordship says you wish would be
taken, viz.: taking the collection of the revenue out of the hands of
the Pacha.” I see nothing of the sort in Lord Palmerston’s letter; he
gives an opinion that the Porte will be able to make certain regulations
for the government of Egypt, but not one word is said about the
collection of the revenue; and surely it was not statesmanlike of Lord
Ponsonby advising the Porte to impose conditions on Mehemet Ali which
they had no power of enforcing, for Lord Ponsonby knew full well that
neither England, or the other Powers, could touch Egypt, without
provoking a war with France. He says, “The Austrians desire to put a
sudden end (as they suppose they can do) to the question here, by
yielding every thing to the Pacha. Your Lordship desires to establish
future security both for the Sultan and his Egyptian subjects. My duty
is to follow your orders; but could I be shaken in that duty by the
exertions of the Austrians, I should be still deterred from acting with
them for such a purpose, by my own knowledge that all this question is
to be most rigidly scrutinized in Parliament, and that severe censure
would fall upon me if I deviated from your instructions[83].”
I do indeed hope that Parliament will scrutinize his conduct, and
ascertain whether or not it is true that the Ambassador instructed
General Jochmus to follow up hostilities after the submission of Mehemet
Ali[84], and thereby cause the death of some thousands of human beings,
which was just as bad, if not worse than the chase of the negroes in
Nubia, of which Lord Ponsonby speaks with such horror[85]. The only
difference between the two is, that the chase of the negroes was the
custom of the country, whereas the chase of the Egyptians from Syria was
not according to the custom of civilized nations, as it was carried on
after the submission of Mehemet Ali, and when there was not the least
necessity for it.
The British Ambassador, in writing to Baron Stürmer and M. Titow, quotes
the 3rd, 5th, and 6th Articles of the Treaty of the 15th of July[86],
and makes a budget for the Pacha, showing the resources of Egypt in the
year 1833[87] to be 62,778,750 piastres, while the expenditure was only
49,951,500, which may have been correct or not; but it appears to me
that the tribute Mehemet was to pay to the Porte on his being reinstated
in the government of Egypt, ought to have been fixed by the state of the
revenue and expenditure in 1841, when the war ceased.
The proposition his Excellency makes is, that the Sultan should issue a
firman, giving the hereditary government of Egypt to Mehemet Ali; but he
is to bear in mind that Egypt was just to be considered like any other
pachalic of the Turkish empire, and at a future time he should be made
acquainted with the nature and extent of his administrative powers[88].
All this would have been very well had the power of the Porte alone put
down Mehemet Ali, and then had the means of enforcing the firman; but
the Ambassador must have known full well, that had Mehemet Ali been left
to himself, he could have dictated terms to the Sultan, and that, even
after all the losses he met with in Syria, occasioned by the Allied
Powers, and the losses he met with in his retreat by the bad faith of
the Turks, he was still in a position to resist the whole power of the
Turkish empire.
M. Titow, as well as Baron Stürmer and Count Königsmark, as I have
before stated, at first agreed with Lord Ponsonby[89], but asked his
opinion about the restrictive clause relating to the nomination of the
successor of Mehemet Ali. Their approval of the British Ambassador’s
proposal seems to have thrown his Excellency off his guard, and he wrote
to M. Titow:
“I reply at once to your question, and I say that I think it will be
more prudent to keep everything like specific arrangement for the
settlement that will flow from the assertion and establishment of the
Sultan’s sovereign authority and right. You will observe that I used the
expression, ‘hereditary in the family of Mehemet Ali,’ which cannot tie
up the Sultan’s right to specify the mode in which the succession shall
take place; and if it should be argued hereafter that the succession
should be in the direct line, (and, as it is called, by representation,)
the answer would be easy, that nothing of the sort is known to Turkish
law, nor is usual in the East, succession being commonly regulated by
very different principles.
“I do not see any inconvenience in leaving this matter untouched, but I
do fear that any thing that might give Mehemet Ali ground for discussion
and dispute at this moment might be inconvenient, and would be seized
upon by him. He cannot deny the Sultan’s sovereignty, which he has
already admitted; it will be impossible for him to refuse the hereditary
right, as it is expressed, without denying, at the same time, the
sovereignty of the Sultan already acknowledged.”
The alteration of the opinion of the Allied Ministers only appears in
Lord Ponsonby’s letter to Baron Stürmer two days after, in which he
withdraws his proposal[90]. He, however, alludes to a letter from Baron
Stürmer, communicating this change of opinion, in which the Baron asks,
“Have we any right to act according to our fancies, when the route we
have to pursue is clearly traced to us?”
To which Lord Ponsonby replies, “Certainly not; and in conformity with
your just notions, I will continue to act, without the smallest
deviation, upon the instructions of December 17, which have already been
made known to you, but which, to avoid error, I transcribe _literatim_
from the document.
“‘It will indeed be necessary, that in reinstating Mehemet Ali in the
Pachalic of Egypt, care should be taken to make such arrangements as
would protect the people of Egypt from a continuance of the tyrannical
oppression by which they have of late years been crushed, and should
secure the Sultan against a renewal of those hostilities which have
compelled him to have recourse to the aid of his Allies. But the means
of effecting all these purposes may be found in the stipulations of the
Treaty of the 15th of July, without removing Mehemet Ali from his
Pachalic. The Treaty says, that all the laws of the Turkish Empire, and
all the Treaties of the Porte, shall apply to Egypt, just as much as to
any other province of the Sultan’s dominions; and the land and sea
forces which may be maintained by the Pacha of Egypt, shall be part of
the forces of the empire, and be kept up for the service of the State.
“‘Under these stipulations, the Sultan will of course be able, by an
exercise of his legislative authority, to establish unity of flag, and
of military and naval uniform, throughout all his provinces; to limit
the number of troops which each province shall, according to its
population, maintain; to regulate the mode of enforcing the
conscription, so as to protect the people from undue burthens and
oppressive levies; to fix the number and class of ships of war which
shall belong to the several naval ports of his dominions; to fix the
manner in which commissions in the army and navy shall be granted in his
name, and by his authority; to determine that a single monetary system
shall prevail throughout all his dominions, and that there shall be but
one Mint. The Treaty specifies, that none but the legal imposts should
be levied in Egypt, which will secure the people from undue exactions;
and the execution of the Convention of 1838, by which all monopolies are
to be abolished, will at once free the industry of the people of Egypt
from those oppressive restrictions which have hitherto kept the great
mass of the population in the most abject poverty, and which have
gradually thrown out of cultivation extensive tracts of land that were
formerly tilled and productive.
“‘By such means it seems to Her Majesty’s Government, that future
security might be afforded, both to the Sultan and to his Egyptian
subjects, against the disposition of Mehemet Ali to rebel against his
Sovereign, and to oppress the people of the province he would have to
govern.’
“The above constitute the sole rule I can follow, and they are the only
words I am at liberty to use in the counsel I shall consent to give to
the Sublime Porte.”
The reader will observe these instructions were merely general, and
ought to have been followed only so far as the Porte had the power of
enforcing them; besides, at the time they were given, Lord Palmerston
was not aware what force Mehemet Ali had in Egypt; and there is not a
word in these instructions to lead Lord Ponsonby to suppose that Lord
Palmerston would have recommended the Porte to set aside Ibrahim Pacha,
which was evidently Lord Ponsonby’s aim.
His Lordship finishes his letter to the Baron by observing, that as
Mehemet Ali had rejected the Treaty of the 15th of July, the Allies are
free to act as they think proper. However free they might have been,
they always declared they should abide by the basis of the Treaty of the
15th of July, which was acknowledged by my Convention, and also by the
instructions of the 15th of October, which Lord Palmerston quotes in his
despatch of the 17th of December,—that despatch which the British
Ambassador takes for the guide of conduct, viz.: “Your Excellency and
your colleagues will, of course, have given to the Porte the advice
specified in my despatch of the 15th of October to your Excellency:” and
again, “In fact these articles of agreement were substantially a
complete surrender on the part of Mehemet Ali, and he was led to
suppose, that in asking for hereditary tenure, he was only asking that
which the Porte was willing to give[91].”
Lord Palmerston writes still more strongly to the Ambassador, under date
of the 29th January[92], in which, relating a conversation he had had
with the Turkish Minister in London, he says, in reply to the
unwillingness of the Porte to grant the hereditary pachalic communicated
to him by Chekib Effendi, “I said, that in all affairs, one must be
content with what is practicable, and not endanger what has been
obtained by striving after that which is unattainable. I said, that it
is clear that Mehemet Ali has made his submission in the expectation
that he should obtain hereditary tenure in Egypt: now if, after all,
this tenure were to be refused to him, what would probably be the
consequence?—renewed revolt, or an attitude, at least, of passive
resistance. What would then be the remedy? Such a state of things could
not be allowed to continue, because if it lasted, it would amount to the
separation of Egypt from the Turkish Empire. But the Sultan, has not, at
present, naval or military means sufficient to enforce his authority, in
such a case, over Mehemet Ali in Egypt. The Sultan, would, therefore, be
obliged to have recourse for aid to his Allies. But the measures
hitherto agreed upon by the Four Powers in virtue of the Treaty of July,
are confined to the expulsion of the Egyptians from Syria, Arabia, and
Candia, and to the driving of Mehemet Ali’s forces and authorities back
within the limits of Egypt. If, then, the Sultan were to apply to the
Four Powers for assistance to attack Mehemet Ali in Egypt itself, a new
deliberation of the Conference would become necessary.
“Now, I said to Chekib, I could tell him beforehand what would be the
result of that deliberation, if the assistance asked for by the Sultan
were required in consequence of the Sultan’s refusal to comply with the
advice given him by the Four Powers, to confer upon Mehemet Ali
hereditary tenure of his Egyptian pachalic. I said I knew perfectly well
that the Four Powers would decline giving the Sultan such assistance;
and what then would happen? Why, the Sultan would, in consequence, find
himself, for want of sufficient means of his own, obliged to grant to
Mehemet Ali, with a bad grace, and after an ineffectual attempt to avoid
doing so, that which he might now make a merit of conferring willingly;
and thus, instead of performing, as he now may do, an act of sovereign
power, at the suggestion of his Allies, he would appear to all the world
as making an extorted concession to a subject.
“I said that I would not attempt to represent as being of no value or
importance a sacrifice which is unquestionably a great one, because such
a representation could not convince the Sultan. But I begged Chekib
Effendi to request his Government to consider the immense importance of
the moral and physical strength which the Sultan has gained by the
events of the few last months, and to remember that all which the Sultan
has gained, Mehemet Ali has lost. That thus their relative positions
have been so entirely changed, that the Pacha can never again become
really dangerous or seriously troublesome to the Sultan, if the Sultan
avails himself properly of the stipulations of the Treaty of July; and
if he shall well organize his army, navy, and finances, and shall place
those branches of his public service upon an efficient footing. I
desired Chekib Effendi to bear in mind that the Sultan has recovered,
for his direct authority, the whole of Syria, Arabia, and Candia; points
which, with reference to military, naval, financial, and religious
considerations, are of the utmost importance, and for the recovery of
which the Sultan would, at this time last year, have gladly made very
considerable sacrifices. I further reminded him, that a faithful
execution of that stipulation of the Treaty of July, which says, that
all the laws and treaties of the empire are to apply to Egypt as to any
other province, will afford a most essential security for the sovereign
authority of the Sultan. I therefore requested Chekib Effendi to urge
his Government to conclude this matter without further delay, because it
is of great importance for all parties concerned, that it should be
brought to a final settlement as soon as possible.
“Chekib Effendi promised me to write to Rechid Pacha to this effect, and
he said that he had no doubt that the Sultan will comply with the advice
of his Allies.”
The day after this conversation, and in conformity with Lord
Palmerston’s views, the Allied Ministers sent a note to Chekib Effendi,
expressing their opinion that the Sultan should confer on the
descendants of Mehemet Ali in the direct line, the Pachalic of
Egypt[93].
Footnote 81:
See _Levant Papers_, Part III., p. 221.
Footnote 82:
Ibid., p. 207.
Footnote 83:
See _Levant Papers_, Part III., p. 208.
Footnote 84:
I think there could not be much difficulty in proving that he did give
such orders, when we consider the terms in which his Lordship speaks
of General Jochmus’s conduct, in his letter to Viscount Palmerston,
already given. See p. 195.
Footnote 85:
See _Levant Papers_, Part III., p. 226.
Footnote 86:
See Appendix, Vol. I.
Footnote 87:
See _Levant Papers_, Part III., p. 219.
Footnote 88:
See _Levant Papers_, Part III., p. 221.
Footnote 89:
Ibid., p. 222.
Footnote 90:
See _Levant Papers_, Part III., p. 224.
Footnote 91:
See _Levant Papers_, Part III., pp. 88, 89.
Footnote 92:
Ibid., p. 169.
Footnote 93:
See _Levant Papers_, Part III., p. 171.