Determination of the Allied Courts to secure the Hereditary Pachalic for
Mehemet Ali—Correspondence between Baron Sturmer and Lord
Ponsonby—Decisive Instructions from Lord Palmerston to Lord
Ponsonby—Conference of the Allied Ministers with Rechid
Pacha—Project for settling the Egyptian Question—Lord Ponsonby’s
Observations at the Conference—The Firmans decided on—Refusal of
Lord Ponsonby to allow the English Consul-General to return to
Egypt—Lord Ponsonby’s Letter to Rechid Pacha.
Before the last communication could reach the British Ambassador, indeed
before it was written, Baron Stürmer in a letter of the 7th of
January[94], had told him that Prince Metternich had written in the most
peremptory terms, that the Four Courts had pronounced _that the
hereditary succession in the functions of the Government of Egypt should
be granted to the family of Mehemet Ali_, and he finishes by condoling
with Lord Ponsonby, that the Allies have destroyed the hope they both
had of seeing the power of Mehemet Ali crumble to pieces. He adds, “My
part is played, and it only remains for me to await in silence the
orders which my Government may be pleased to transmit to me, and execute
them scrupulously.”
The English Ambassador, in no way daunted, replies[95], “It is wholly
indifferent what may be the private opinion of any of us as to this
question, which is the affair of our Governments, and for which none of
us are responsible; but it is another thing to act ‘without orders,’ and
I will not incur ‘that’ responsibility, and therefore I must decline
acting in concert with you until I am authorized to take the steps you
propose, by instructions to that effect. It is necessary I should
acquaint our colleagues and the Ottoman Ministers with my position, and
I shall do so without loss of time. I have been told by the best
authority, including yourself, if I mistake not, that your Government
had not decided to grant the hereditary right to Mehemet Ali; and at the
Conference it did appear that you had no authority to mention that
point. This matter, however, is not of a very recent date, and it is not
at all impossible that more than one alteration may have taken place in
the language or opinion of that Government, and that which is erroneous
now, may have been right before, or possibly may be so again, for in
this affair there has been a perpetual fluctuation of circumstances. If
my Government has not sent me orders, it cannot be for want of time, as
they would have reached me through Vienna as soon as the instruction you
have received.”
The Ambassador wrote in the same sense to M. Titow and Count
Königsmark[96], complaining of the breathless haste they were proceeding
in, in recommending the hereditary succession, and urging every argument
to prevent it in the first instance; all of which happily failed, and at
last he got decided instructions from home, which produced a couple of
short notes to the other Ministers and M. Pisani.
“My dear Sir, “Therapia, Jan. 10, 1841.
“I hasten to acquaint you, that in consequence of what I have received
from my Government by the messenger who has just arrived here, I have
instructed my Dragoman to inform his Excellency the Minister for Foreign
Affairs, that the British Government advises the Sublime Porte to grant
to Mehemet Ali the hereditary government of Egypt.
“I have, &c.,
(Signed) “PONSONBY.”
“To M. Titow.“
“Sir, “Therapia, Jan. 10, 1841.
“You will acquaint his Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs, that
I am ordered to counsel the Sublime Porte, in the name of the British
Government, to grant to Mehemet Ali the hereditary government of Egypt.
“I have, &c.,
(Signed) “PONSONBY.”
“To M. Frederick Pisani.”
Lord Palmerston, in a short letter of February 10[97], approves of the
Ambassador’s conduct, without stating whether it was the long
correspondence to endeavour to induce the Allied Ministers not to
recommend the grant of the hereditary tenure, or the short
correspondence recommending the grant to be confirmed.
Notwithstanding that Lord Ponsonby had been foiled in his first attempt
to prevent the Porte from conferring the hereditary pachalic on Mehemet
Ali, he was not discouraged, and returned to the charge with fresh
vigour, on the question of attaching such conditions to the hereditary
title, as would render it worse than useless; and I have shown that on
reflection, the Allied Ministers altered their opinion, and Lord
Ponsonby in consequence withdrew his proposal.
On the 4th of February the Allied Ministers were invited to a conference
with Rechid Pacha, who laid before them his project of definitively
settling the Egyptian question, which was as follows:—
“Hereditary succession of Egypt granted on condition that all the
Treaties and all the laws of the empire shall be applied to Egypt as to
every other part of the Ottoman empire.
“The Sultan reserves to himself to choose among the male descendants of
Mehemet Ali whom he shall please. The heir chosen for the Government of
Egypt shall not have the title of Vizier until he shall have received
the investiture of the Sultan, and after such investiture he shall be
styled Vizier, and treated like the other Viziers of the empire.
Considering the advanced age of Mehemet Ali, he is exempted from
proceeding to the capital; his successors are under an obligation to do
so.
“As the Porte contemplates an improvement in its coinage, the money
which Mehemet Ali may coin in Egypt should have the same alloy and value
as that of the Sultan.
“All appointments to civil and military employments must proceed from
the Sultan, and all promotions emanate from His Highness; wherefore
Mehemet Ali is prohibited from appointing to any employment, and making
provision for any office without the authorisation and consent of His
Highness; in order, however, to leave him means of military
organisation, he is permitted to appoint up to the rank of captain
inclusive.
“The tribute to be paid yearly shall be fixed separately.
“The distinctive marks (nischan) of every rank, as well civil as
military, are to be ordained by His Highness.
“The uniforms, as well civil as military, must resemble those worn by
the civil and military officers of the Sultan, the whole adapted to the
climate; it being well understood that the cut and shape must be
absolutely the same.
“With respect to the garrison for the maintenance of good order in
Egypt, the Porte proposes from 20,000 to 25,000 troops.
“The conscription which in the other provinces furnishes one man in a
hundred, shall not in Egypt furnish more than one in two hundred.
“The Government of Egypt has always been bound to provide for the wants
of the Holy Cities; Mehemet Ali must therefore, as a faithful subject,
act in conformity with what is imposed on him by the situation of
Governor of Egypt[98].”
Lord Ponsonby, being first called upon for his opinion, stated, he had
no objection to offer, but after his colleagues had spoken he should
make some observations on the Tribute. The other Ministers gave their
assent to the propositions of Rechid Pacha; the arguments they used Lord
Ponsonby does not report to Lord Palmerston, as they would appear in the
Protocol, but which Protocol is not, I suppose for some wise purpose,
inserted in the _Levant Papers_. We must, then, content ourselves with
the British Ambassador’s own observations. He begins by stating, that
Mehemet Ali having been deposed, and the Porte appealed to, to reinstate
him, sufficiently proves that the Treaty of the 15th of July does not
bind the Allies. His Lordship, I believe, was singular in this opinion,
for it has been distinctly and repeatedly stated by the Allied Ministers
both in London, Vienna, and Constantinople, that the Treaty of the 15th
of July should be the basis of the settlement of the Egyptian question;
and in no part of the correspondence does it appear that the Allies
approved of the deposition of Mehemet Ali, and it may therefore be
fairly inferred that they entirely disapproved of it.
His Lordship takes for granted the Treaty is not an absolute rule, and
thus observes:
“If the Treaty be not the absolute rule, why are we to counsel the
Sublime Porte to take a measure that was adopted in that Treaty, at a
time when affairs were in a state totally different from their actual
state? The Treaty was a compromise with Mehemet Ali, and all its
stipulations were conditional, and with a view to engage him to accept
it. Mehemet Ali decided to refuse the Treaty, and to try the chance of
arms. He has been vanquished, and he has made unconditional submission
to his Sovereign. How then can the Treaty be obligatory upon the Allies,
(of whom the Sultan is one,) to take the measures framed for another
position of affairs which has ceased to exist?
“If then the Treaty be not obligatory upon the Allies, the counsel to be
given by us to the Ottoman Porte is to be based upon the instructions we
have received from our Courts; and we are not to advise the Porte to
adopt measures that are impossible to be reconciled one with another,
and contradictory, so as that one measure, if adopted, shall defeat
almost every other measure which we are ordered to recommend.”
The document is much too long, but may be seen in the _Levant Papers_.
The burden of it is, that Mehemet Ali should be crippled in his finances
to prevent him doing further mischief; and the Ambassador finishes by
saying, “I have reason to believe my colleagues entertain an opinion
different from mine. They have had before them for their consideration
the instructions from Lord Palmerston so often referred to. They are
possibly better able to interpret them than I may be, but I understand
them in the sense I have described; and it is for others, not for me, to
decide, and to take such part as they may esteem the best. Those whom I
have now addressed can judge, as well as I can do, what is the opinion
of the British Government. My opinion is of little importance, excepting
to myself, but I must stand before my country and justify my acts[99].”
All this would have been right enough if the Porte had the power to
enforce it, but not having the power, they only exposed their own
weakness to Mehemet Ali, and gave him an opportunity of treating their
overtures with the contempt they deserved.
On the 15th of February Rechid Pacha officially delivered to M. Pisani,
Lord Ponsonby’s dragoman, copies of the firman granting the hereditary
succession, the firman for governing the provinces bordering on Egypt,
as likewise an official note to the four Ministers, and a letter from
the Vizier to Mehemet Ali[100], communicating to them at the same time,
that the Consuls might proceed to Alexandria in the steam-boat, which
would leave in the afternoon without fail. This information had been
privately communicated by the dragoman to Lord Ponsonby on the 13th.
Nothing was, however, further from his Lordship’s intention than
allowing the British Consul-General to return. He appears to have been
dissatisfied because he was not consulted before the measure was decided
on, and he informed the Turkish Minister that he should not require the
Consul-General to return, because it might not suit the British
Government to establish the Consul-General on the same footing as
before; that Mehemet Ali might refuse; and lastly, that Colonel Hodges
could not leave Constantinople so suddenly[101]. Of these three
arguments the only valid one seems to be, the probability of Mehemet
Ali’s refusing the conditions; but even granting that, it would have
been more politic to have sent the Consuls with the Turkish Commissioner
who bore the firmans, with orders to persuade Mehemet Ali, if possible,
to accept them, and to signify to him at the same time that the flags
would not be hoisted till that point was arranged. They being on the
spot, and in an official capacity, furnished with instructions from the
Ambassador at Constantinople, would have seen how far it was possible
for Mehemet Ali to accept the firman without risking the tranquillity of
Egypt, and would necessarily have more influence on the Pacha than I
could have, being totally unprovided with instructions, and not having
received a single line from the Ambassador to guide my conduct.
On the 15th of February Lord Ponsonby wrote officially to Rechid
Pacha[102], disowning having had any thing to do with the firman, and
stating that he never had been consulted at all, or knew any thing about
it, till every thing was decided, and ordered to be sent to Alexandria.
The fact is, the Porte saw that Lord Ponsonby was determined to keep the
question open, and therefore arranged the firman without asking his
advice. What that advice might have been is hard to say; but we must
infer that had he been consulted, the firman would have been much more
stringent than it was, and which, as it turned out, was not palatable to
the Pacha, who absolutely constrained the Porte to alter it, and give
him more favourable terms; in this, as we shall see, he was supported by
the majority of the Ambassadors.
Footnote 94:
See _Levant Papers_, Part III., p. 183.
Footnote 95:
See _Levant Papers_, Part III., p. 185.
Footnote 96:
See _Levant Papers_, Part III., p. 185, 192.
Footnote 97:
See _Levant Papers_, Part III., p. 197.
Footnote 98:
See _Levant Papers_, Part III., p. 229.
Footnote 99:
See _Levant Papers_, Part III., p. 229.
Footnote 100:
See these documents in the _Levant Papers_, Part III., pp. 247-252.
Footnote 101:
See _Levant Papers_, Part III., pp. 239, 240.
Footnote 102:
See _Levant Papers_, Part III., p. 325.