Embarkation of the Egyptians—Mode in which it was conducted—Departure of
Ibrahim Pacha—Retreat of Souliman’s Division—Complete Evacuation of
Syria—Letter of Lord Ponsonby—Delivery of the Turkish Fleet—Anxiety
of Mehemet Ali for the safety of his Army—Letter from Boghos Bey to
the Author on the subject.
The season of the year was very unpropitious for embarking troops on the
coast of Syria, nevertheless Mehemet Ali, who had no idea of
difficulties or the risk he ran of losing his ships at Gaza, which is at
the very bottom of the Mediterranean, and from whence there is no escape
should the wind blow on the land, sent three transports, two steamers,
two corvettes, and a brig of war, from Alexandria, with directions to
carry the troops to Damietta. The surf is generally so high on the coast
that six days out of seven embarking troops is attended with great
danger. The Egyptian admiral and generals were indefatigable in their
exertions; they seldom left the beach night or day, and Ibrahim himself,
when he recovered, was frequent in his attendance. The poor Arabs,
whether sick or well, were obliged to strip, take their clothes on their
heads, and wade up to their armpits, and were then bundled into the
boats like so much lumber; the women and children were treated in the
same manner. Human life is little thought of amongst either Turks or
Egyptians.
Ibrahim Pacha remained to the last, and embarked on the 18th of February
on board the Hadji Baba, and landed at Damietta; the same day a regiment
of cavalry or of cuirassiers, and two corps of irregular horse, marched
for El-Arish, and the town was shortly after taken possession of by a
Turkish regiment of cavalry.
As to the retreat of Souliman Pacha’s column I am not able to speak very
particularly. Some documents that would have given the whole detail, had
they arrived, have not reached me. I believe, however, that after
parting from the main body at El-Mezereib on the 4th of January, the
column reached Maan on the 13th, supplied themselves with provisions,
and then pursued their route to Akaba, where the guns and stores were
embarked and carried to Suez, to which port the troops repaired
overland, and arrived there in tolerable condition and with very little
loss, reaching Cairo about the middle of February.
Thus terminated the evacuation of Syria, and after comparing the
different reports, the loss of the Egyptians could not have been less
than 10,000 men, (besides women and children,) the greater part of whom
most probably deserted, and were destroyed by the Arabs. The Turkish
army never came in contact with them, except in the affair at Medjdel;
they were, however, followed and harassed by irregulars, and also
suffered from want of provisions; but under all circumstances the
retreat seems to have been well conducted. Ibrahim’s crossing the Jordan
was a masterly manœuvre; it alarmed the Turks, saved Gaza, and
greatly facilitated his arrival there. The Turkish army appear to have
followed a very prudent course by taking up a position to cover
Jerusalem, Acre, and Jaffa, thereby securing those places against a
breach of faith on the part of Ibrahim, had he entertained any notion of
the sort; and it is just as well they never came in contact: Ibrahim was
well provided with cavalry, and that is an arm of which the Turkish
soldiers are very apprehensive, and I have no idea they could have
maintained themselves steady enough in square to resist an attack of
cavalry.
Had the Convention been adopted by Sir Robert Stopford in the first
instance the loss of life incurred in this retreat might have been
saved, and the country would have suffered much less than it did.
Nothing has been gained by its rejection; it stipulated for the delivery
of the Turkish fleet, the evacuation of Syria, and the confirmation of
Mehemet Ali in the hereditary government of Egypt, all of which have now
been obtained, with the loss, it is true, of some thousands of human
beings, who were not at all interested in the war. General Jochmus
thinks that the military question has been decided, and that the Turks
drove Ibrahim out of Syria; it is very certain that Ibrahim marched out
of Syria, harassed by the different tribes, but the Turkish army might
just as well have been at Constantinople; in fact, they were just where
they ought to have been, and the only fault committed by the Turkish
authorities was giving directions to the different tribes to harass
Ibrahim’s retreat, which was quite improper after the unconditional
submission Mehemet Ali sent to the Porte by Captain Fanshawe. This
submission, too, was well known in Syria at the time they were thus
acting, for we learn from Captain Stewart that on the 9th of January the
Gorgon arrived at Jaffa, bringing the news that the Pacha’s submission
had been accepted by the Porte[77].
The British Ambassador, I find, has not hesitated to take upon himself
the responsibility of the attempts made by General Jochmus to destroy
Ibrahim’s whole army. The following is his letter to Lord Palmerston,
for he shall speak for himself:—
“My Lord, “Therapia, February 23, 1841.
“I transmit copy of one of General Jochmus’s despatches to Admiral Sir
Robert Stopford[78], that I may insure its being known to your Lordship,
as it affords information essential to a correct judgment of the affairs
of this country.
“It is shown in the despatch, that had it not been for the perseverance
of General Jochmus in taking measures against Ibrahim Pacha, it would
have been easy for Ibrahim to remain with his army in Damascus until,
the arrangement with Mehemet Ali having been completed, he might have
retreated with a great unbroken force to Egypt, instead of having his
army defeated and nearly destroyed, and wholly demoralized.
“Had Ibrahim remained at Damascus, the military question would have been
undecided, and it would have been easy to assert that victory might
still have been on the side of the Pasha, had Mehemet Ali thought it
politic to continue the war.
“If Ibrahim had taken back to Egypt his large army unharmed, Mehemet Ali
would possess a force that might encourage him to resist, and might
possibly make him stronger than ever. The energy of General Jochmus has
rendered all doubt and delusion on the subject of the military question
impossible, and has shown, that under able command the Turkish troops
are more than a match for the Egyptian army and General; his energy has
also taken from Mehemet Ali the best means he could have to support
resistance, and therefore has afforded the best ground for hoping he
will submit.
“All this good is due to the energy of General Jochmus. The praises
General Jochmus gives to those who have done good service, are proofs of
his honourable and just feelings.
“I have, &c.,
(Signed) “PONSONBY.”
“Right Hon. Viscount Palmerston.”
I have already mentioned the arrival of the Turkish Commissioners at
Alexandria, and the formal delivery of the fleet[79] on the 11th of
January, which sailed on the 20th of that month from Alexandria; and the
greatest credit is due to Admiral Walker for his exertions in fitting
out that fleet, many of which were obliged to be lightened even to their
ballast, and take in their guns and stores outside; this they did
without anchoring, and got clear of the land before sunset. Mehemet Ali
having parted in good faith with this valuable deposit, became alarmed
about the fate of his son and his army, and though he complained little
to me in person, desired Boghos Bey to write to me on the subject.
“Commodore, “Alexandria, Jan. 30, 1841.
“I have the honour of informing you that, according to the last
despatches received from Gaza, almost all the Egyptian army is already
assembled in that town; that it is believed there that Ibrahim Pacha
will arrive to-day or to-morrow; that although the cavalry regiments are
already on their way towards Egypt, the infantry being too much
fatigued, it will be desirable on every account to transport it to Egypt
by sea, and thus, according to the desire of both parties, to spare the
loss of men; but that the English officers who are in authority at Gaza
object to the Egyptian troops embarking with their arms, a circumstance
which appears inexplicable, it being mentioned in the Convention
concluded between you and the Egyptian Government, that the Egyptian
troops should be transported to Egypt by sea with their arms and
baggage. Seeing, then, this opposition on the part of the English
officers, it appears probable that they are not acquainted with the
contents of the Convention above-mentioned. You are therefore requested,
Commodore, to write to the authorities at Gaza, in order that they may
no longer oppose the Egyptian troops embarking with their arms and
baggage for Alexandria; to send your letter to His Excellency Abbas
Pacha, so that it may reach his address in time; and to have the
goodness also to inform me of it, in order that a sufficient number of
vessels may be sent to Gaza.
“Receive, Commodore, &c.,
“BOGHOS JOUSSOUF.”
“To Commodore Napier,
&c., &c., &c.”
In consequence of this application, I wrote the letters to the British
and Turkish authorities in Syria already given[80], and did everything I
could to tranquillize the Pacha’s mind, and assured him that I felt
perfectly satisfied Captain Stewart would do all in his power to oblige
the Turks to keep faith.
Footnote 77:
See _Levant Papers_, Part III., pp. 164, 311.
Footnote 78:
Ibid., p. 288; and p. 119, _et seq._ of this volume.
Footnote 79:
See page 71.
Footnote 80:
See pp. 92, 95.