Contradictory Statements as to the Numbers of the Egyptian
Army—Reason for abiding by the Reports of the British
Officers—Colonel Alderson’s Detail of the Retreat—General
Jochmus’s Statement—Lieutenant Loring’s Mission.
It appears rather difficult to get at the exact amount of Ibrahim’s
army, either when it left Damascus, or when its two divisions arrived at
Gaza and Akaba. In the _Levant Papers_ are several statements upon the
subject; but they are rather contradictory[64]. This is not to be
wondered at, as the framers of some of them must have been sorely
puzzled to account for the numbers, who, in spite of famine, cold, and
“the sword of the fierce and revengeful Haouranees[65],” unquestionably
made their appearance[66] at the places I have named. I shall,
therefore, prefer to abide by the statements of the British officers at
Gaza, who had no former reports to bolster up, and who undoubtedly have
described things precisely as they fell under their observation.
By Colonel Bridgeman’s report[67], Ibrahim brought to Gaza 15,000
infantry and 6000 or 7000 cavalry. Lieutenant Loring, who was charged by
me with superintending the evacuation, gave the infantry at 23,550 men,
and the cavalry 6440, independent of Souliman’s division of 5000 men,
and 175 pieces of artillery[68] who marched from El-Mezereib to Akaba
and Suez, by the way of Maan, at which latter place he provisioned
himself for his march, arrived safely at Cairo, and by all the
information I received at Alexandria, and what Souliman Pacha
communicated to Colonel Napier at the former place, he did not lose a
gun, and the Colonel was himself an eye-witness to the excellent state
of his cavalry. This enumeration of Lieutenant Loring’s does not include
the noncombatants.
Colonel Alderson, who was with the naval officer, carried up the amount
of Ibrahim’s army to 33,000 men[69], besides Souliman’s force. He
remarks, in a private document with which I have keen favoured:
“It appears Ibrahim commenced his retreat from Damascus on the 29th of
December to El-Mezereib: at the latter place he divided his forces into
five columns[70]: 1st, the artillery and guns[71], women, &c., _via_ the
Desert and Suez, under Souliman Pacha; 2nd, the cavalry, consisting of
ten regiments, under Achmet Menekli Pacha; two of them (the cavalry of
the Guards) were recalled to join Ibrahim, after he recrossed the
Jordan, near Jericho; the 3rd and 4th, each consisting of five regiments
of infantry; and lastly Ibrahim himself, with three regiments of foot
guards, the two cavalry regiments of the guard as before stated, and
from 300 to 400 Arnauts, Henadi, and 300 rifles. Each of these last four
divisions had orders to make the best of their way to Gaza.
“When they left Damascus they had only sixteen days’ provisions, in
addition to which they obtained a small supply of flour at El-Mezereib.
The cavalry were sixteen days on the march, the infantry twenty-seven
and twenty-eight, and Ibrahim’s corps thirty-four. Small supplies were
occasionally received from the villages, but they avoided the great
towns, and made for the Dead Sea, which they kept sight of, and
approached as near as the nature of the country would allow.”
Colonel Alderson, who was an eye-witness of their arrival at Gaza, and
collected all the information he could, states that Ibrahim left
Damascus with 62,499 souls, including women and children; there arrived
at Gaza, independent of women and children, 27,000 regular troops, of
which 4250 were cavalry, and 3200 irregulars; the garrison of Gaza
consisted of 2800 men. Thus, then, 33,000 men either embarked from Gaza
or marched from thence between the 23rd of January and the 19th of
February, besides 9215 under Souliman Pacha, who marched to Suez.
Colonel Alderson’s account stands thus:
Arrived at Gaza 30,200
Marched with Souliman 9,215
Regular troops missing 8,859
Irregular troops supposed to have gone to their 8,440
homes
Women and children supposed to have arrived at 2,000
Gaza
Perished 3,786
—————
62,500
Be it remembered this loss of human life took place after the submission
of Mehemet Ali on the 11th of December, and the greater part after his
submission had been accepted by the Porte. The poor sufferers had taken
no interest in the contest, but had been dragged from their homes to
gratify the ambition of Mehemet Ali; why, then, after his submission
were they not allowed to retire in safety? Where was the merit of
forcing Ibrahim through the Desert, when he might have taken the
shortest road to Gaza, where he had depôts of provisions? These men lost
their lives, not in open war with the Turkish army, which they never
saw, but were plundered and butchered by the Arabs; therefore there was
no great credit due to those who were the authors of such measures,
barbarous in themselves, and, as I have already shown, contrary to the
opinion of Austria, (who would most probably be supported by the Allied
Powers,) who had declared they would disavow any attack on Ibrahim
Pacha[72].
General Jochmus, in his letter to Sir Robert Stopford, dated the 15th of
February[73], states the remains of Ibrahim’s army to be 19,000 men; and
from the reports of the Turkish and European staff-officers sent to
ascertain the numbers, the estimate, he says, is quite correct. General
Jochmus makes his calculation from the reports of his officers, which
must be received with caution. Captain de L’Or gave Ibrahim’s losses in
five days at 10,000 men; this was considered by the English officers
very much exaggerated, nor do I see how Ibrahim and Souliman, who were
both good generals, could have met with such a loss, unpursued as they
were by a regular army, and having nearly 10,000 cavalry to cover their
retreat and protect them from the few irregulars that followed them, and
who, if they did not behave better than those Colonel Napier had under
his command[74], would never have come within sight of them, and it is
more than probable, picked up the stragglers only.
Lieutenant Loring, in his report[75]; states that he did not reach
Caiffa till the 15th of January; the weather had been very boisterous
and the steamers were hardly seaworthy. Having procured horses at Acre,
he proceeded along the coast, through Tortura and Cesarea, and arrived
on the 17th at Jaffa, where were stationed the greater part of the
Turkish forces, having returned from their demonstration on Gaza the day
before.
On the same evening, by the advice of General Michell, he proceeded to
Jerusalem in company with Major Wilbraham and Selim Bey, who was the
bearer of a letter from the Seraskier to Ibrahim; he was also provided
with a firman to the Governor and Scheiks to assist them on the road. On
arriving at Jerusalem they found Hassan Pacha had marched on Halil
(Hebron) with 8000 men and six pieces of artillery.
Thither they proceeded and arrived the same evening. On acquainting
Hassan Pacha with their mission, he was easily persuaded to return to
Jerusalem; they then pushed forward, but instead of getting information
from the authorities, Abder Rahman, the scheik of the El-Halil district,
plainly told them that he would neither give them information nor
assistance, and there is no doubt whatever he was acting under orders
from the Turkish authorities. Abder Rahman must have known where
Ibrahim’s army was, because he had just returned from Maan, to which
place he had accompanied the Baron Dumont on his excursion to destroy
the magazines; in which, however, the Baron failed, as Souliman’s
division had passed through the day before and pretty nearly cleared the
stores. Finding it impossible to advance with any prospect of meeting
Ibrahim, they returned to Gaza, where they found Achmet Menekli Pacha
had arrived with the greater part of the cavalry. He made bitter
complaints of the conduct of the Arabs, and Lieutenant Loring
immediately proceeded to Jaffa to remonstrate with the Turkish
authorities on the conduct of their officers. From Jaffa he returned to
Gaza with Captain Stewart and Colonel Rose, accompanied by Rechid Pacha,
and everything appeared settled in an amicable manner with Achmet Pacha
to facilitate as much as possible the evacuation of Syria.
Mr. Loring was present some hours after, when Rechid Pacha, to the utter
astonishment of the British officers, declared his intention of
immediately returning to Jaffa, confessing at the same time that he had
sent orders for the advance of the Turkish troops to endeavour to cut
off the communication between the division at Gaza and those hourly
expected from the Desert. As has been already shown[76], the spirited
remonstrance of Captain Stewart and Colonel Bridgeman put a stop to this
infamous proceeding.
Footnote 64:
See _Levant Papers_, Part III., pp. 292, 301, 307, 366, 367.
Footnote 65:
See page 124.
Footnote 66:
See General Jochmus’s letter and accompanying statement, in _Levant
Papers_, Part III., pp. 305-307.
Footnote 67:
See _Levant Papers_, Part III., pp. 282, 332.
Footnote 68:
Ibid., pp. 309, 310.
Footnote 69:
Ibid., p. 307.
Footnote 70:
“Does not this division of Ibrahim’s army at El-Mezereib at once
convince any military man that he considered peace as concluded; and
that a want of provisions was the only enemy he had to fear? he
therefore divided his troops, so that one arm should not retard the
other.
“Cavalry, by forced marches, were enabled to get on faster than the
infantry, encumbered as they were by women, &c., and barley was no
doubt very scarce.
“In a military point of view, either in advancing or retreating in an
enemy’s country, it would be considered very injudicious to have
infantry without cavalry on the route; that Ibrahim knew this well,
his sending for the two regiments of cavalry of the guard, on finding
at Rieha (Jericho) that the Turkish troops were in position to resist
his march _via_ Hebron, fully shows.”
Footnote 71:
“The number of the guns has been variously stated, but I believe they
were between 150 and 200.”
Footnote 72:
See pp. 46, 54.
Footnote 73:
See _Levant Papers_, Part III., p. 305.
Footnote 74:
See page 151.
Footnote 75:
A private document furnished by him to me. His public report appears
in the _Levant Papers_, Part III., p. 309.
Footnote 76:
See pages 175, 176.