POINT VIII

THE SENTENCE OF CONDEMNATION PRONOUNCED AGAINST JESUS BY THE SANHEDRIN

WAS ILLEGAL BECAUSE IT WAS FOUNDED UPON HIS UNCORROBORATED CONFESSION

LAW

"We have it as a fundamental principle of our jurisprudence that no

one can bring an accusation against himself. Should a man make

confession of guilt before a legally constituted tribunal, such

confession is not to be used against him unless properly attested

by two other witnesses."--MAIMONIDES, Sanhedrin IV. 2.

"Not only is self-condemnation never extorted from the defendant by

means of torture, but no attempt is ever made to lead him on to

self-incrimination. Moreover, a voluntary confession on his part

is not admitted in evidence, and therefore not competent to

convict him, unless a legal number of witnesses minutely

corroborate his self-accusation."--MENDELSOHN, "Criminal

Jurisprudence of the Ancient Hebrews," p. 133.

FACT AND ARGUMENT

MORE than one system of jurisprudence has refused to permit a conviction

for crime to rest upon an uncorroborated confession. But it remained for

the ancient Hebrews to discover the peculiar reason for the rule, that

the witness who confessed was "his own relative"; and relatives were not

competent witnesses under Hebrew law. Modern Jewish writers, however,

have assigned other reasons for the rule. Rabbi Wise says:

"Self-accusation in cases of capital crime was worthless. For if not

guilty he accuses himself of a falsehood; if guilty he is a wicked man,

and no wicked man, according to Hebrew law, is permitted to testify,

especially not in penal cases."[270] Mendelsohn says that "the reason

assigned for this enactment is the wish to avoid the possibility of

permitting judicial homicide on self-accusing lunatics, or on persons

who, in desperation, wish to cut short their earthly existence, and to

effect this falsely accuse themselves of some capital crime."[271]

Modern jurists have assigned still other reasons for the rule as it has

existed in modern law.[272] Men have been known to confess that they

were guilty of one crime to avoid punishment for another. Morbid and

vulgar sentimentality, such as love of newspaper notoriety, have induced

persons of inferior intelligence, who were innocent, to assume

responsibility for criminal acts.

But whatever the reason of the rule, Jesus was condemned to death upon

His uncorroborated confession, in violation of Hebrew law.

"For many bare false witness against him, but their witness agreed not

together. And there arose certain, and bare false witness against him,

saying, We heard him say, I will destroy this temple that is made with

hands, and within three days I will build another made without hands.

But neither so did their witness agree together. And the high priest

stood up in the midst, and asked Jesus, saying, Answerest thou nothing?

what is it which these witness against thee? But he held his peace, and

answered nothing. Again the high priest asked him, and said unto him,

Art thou the Christ, the Son of the Blessed? And Jesus said, I am: and

ye shall see the Son of Man sitting on the right hand of power, and

coming in the clouds of Heaven. Then the high priest rent his clothes,

and saith, What need we any further witnesses? ye have heard the

blasphemy: what think ye? And they all condemned him to be guilty of

death. And some began to spit on him, and to cover his face, and to

buffet him, and to say unto him, Prophesy."[273]

It will be seen from a perusal of this report of the trial that it was

sought to condemn Jesus first on the charge of sedition, that is, that

He had threatened the destruction of the Temple and thereby endeavored

to seduce the people from their national allegiance. "But their witness

agreed not together"; and under Hebrew law they were required to reject

contradictory testimony and discharge the prisoner, if the state was

unable to prove its case. This is what should have been done at this

point in the trial of Jesus. But, instead, the judges, in their total

disregard at law, turned to the accused and said: "Answerest thou

nothing? what is it which these witness against thee?" "But he held his

peace, and answered nothing." By remaining silent, Jesus only exercised

the ordinary privilege of a Jewish prisoner to refuse to incriminate

himself. The modern rule that the accused cannot be made to testify

against himself, unless he first voluntarily takes the witness stand in

his own behalf, was substantially true among the ancient Hebrews. But

here we find Caiaphas insisting that Jesus incriminate Himself. And he

continues to insist in the matter of the second charge, that of

blasphemy. "And the high priest asked him, and said unto him, Art thou

the Christ, the Son of the Blessed?" That question was illegal, because

it involved an irregular mode of criminal procedure, and because it

asked for a confession of guilt to be made the basis of a conviction.

The false witnesses had failed to agree and had evidently been rejected

and dismissed. The judges were then without witnesses to formulate a

charge and furnish proof of its truth. They were thus forced to the

despicable and illegal method of asking the accused to condemn Himself,

when they knew that no confession could be made the basis of a

conviction. They were also guilty of the illegality of formulating a

charge without witnesses. We have seen that only leading witnesses could

present an indictment, but here the judges became the accusers, in

violation of law.

In answer to the high priest's question, Jesus, feeling that He could

not afford at such an hour and in such a place to longer conceal His

Messiahship, answered boldly and emphatically: "I am."[274] "And they

all condemned him to be guilty of death." It will thus be seen that upon

His own confession and not upon the testimony of at least two competent

witnesses agreeing in all essential details, as the law required, was

the Nazarene condemned to death.

If it be argued, as it has been, that the two charges of threatening to

destroy the Temple and of pretending to be the "Christ, the Son of God,"

were in fact but different phases of the same charge of blasphemy, and

that the two witnesses were the corroborators of the confession of

Jesus, then reply must be made that the witnesses were not competent,

being false witnesses, nor was their testimony legally corroborated,

because it was false and contradictory.

Again, it was the rule of Hebrew law that both witnesses had to testify

to all the essential elements of a complete crime. One could not furnish

one link, and another another link, in order to construct a chain of

evidence. Each had to testify to all the essential elements necessary to

constitute the legal definition of a crime. But the false witnesses did

not do this. Under any view of the case, then, the testimony of these

witnesses was wholly worthless, and the confession of Jesus was the

solitary and illegal basis of His conviction.

The failure of the Sanhedrin to secure sufficient and competent evidence

to convict Jesus must not be regarded as accidental, or as attributable

to the hour and to the surroundings. The popularity of the Nazarene,

outside the narrow circle of the Temple authorities, was immense. The

friendship of Nicodemus and Joseph of Arimathea is proof that He had

standing even in the Sanhedrin itself. It was therefore difficult to

find witnesses who were willing to testify against Him. Besides, the

acts of His ministry, while in no sense cowardly or hypocritical, had

been, in general, very cautious and diplomatic. He seems to have

retired, at times, into the desert or the wilderness to avoid

disagreeable and even dangerous complications with the civil and

ecclesiastical authorities.[275] Jesus was in no sense a politician, but

He was not lacking in mother wit and practical resources. He saw through

the designs of Herod Antipas, who wished to get Him out of his

dominions. It will be remembered that certain Pharisees, pretending

friendship for Him, warned Him to flee from Galilee to avoid being

killed by Herod. The courage and manliness of Jesus are shown by the

fact that He remained in His native province, and even sent a

contemptuous message to the Tetrarch, whom He styled "that fox."[276]

At other times, Christ was compelled to defend Himself against the swarm

of spies that hovered over His pathway through Samaria, along the

Jordan, and around the Sea of Galilee. In His discussions with His

enemies who sought to entrap Him, He displayed consummate skill in

debate. His pithy sayings and incomparable illustrations usually left

His questioners defenseless and chagrined. Oftentimes in these

encounters He proclaimed eternal and universal truths which other

nations and later ages were to develop and enjoy. When, holding in His

hand a penny with Cæsar's image upon it, He said, "Render therefore unto

Cæsar the things which are Cæsar's, and unto God the things that are

God's," he foretold and stamped with approval the immortal principle

that was to be embodied in the American constitution and to remain the

cornerstone of the American Commonwealth; a truth repeated by Roger

Williams when in the forests of Rhode Island he declared that the

magistrate should rule in civil matters only and that man was answerable

for his religious faith to God alone. This declaration of the Nazarene

is the spiritual and intellectual basis of the sublime doctrine of civil

liberty and religious freedom that finds its highest expression in that

separation of the Church and State which enables men of different creeds

and different parties to live side by side as patriots and religionists

and as comrades, though antagonists.

The replies of Jesus to those who came to "entangle him in his talk"

usually left them disconcerted and defeated, and little disposed to

renew their attacks upon Him.[277] The efforts of the Pharisees to

entrap Him seem to have resulted in failure everywhere and at all times.

And at the trial the Sanhedrin found itself in possession of a prisoner

but with no competent evidence to establish His guilt. It was least of

all prepared to convict Him of the crime of blasphemy as founded upon

the claim of Messiahship, for Jesus had been exceedingly cautious,

during His ministry, in declaring Himself to be the Messiah. Except in

the presence of the woman of Samaria, who came to draw water from the

well, there is no recorded instance of an avowal of His Messiahship

outside the immediate circle of the disciples.[278] He forbade the

devils whom He had cast out, and that recognized Him, to proclaim His

Messiahship.[279] When the Jews said to Him, "How long dost thou make us

doubt? if thou be the Christ, tell us plainly," Jesus simply referred

them to His works, and made no further answer that could be used as

testimony against Him.[280] He revealed Himself to His followers as the

Messiah, and permitted them to confess Him as such, but forbade them to

make the matter public. "Then charged he his disciples that they should

tell no man that he was Jesus, the Christ."[281]

It will thus be seen that probably no two witnesses who were legally

competent to testify could have been secured to condemn Jesus upon the

charge preferred at the trial. In their desperation, then, the members

of the Sanhedrin were compelled to employ false testimony and a

confession which was equally illegal.

POINT IX

THE CONDEMNATION OF JESUS WAS ILLEGAL BECAUSE THE VERDICT OF THE

SANHEDRIN WAS UNANIMOUS

LAW

"A simultaneous and unanimous verdict of guilt rendered on the day

of the trial has the effect of an acquittal."--MENDELSOHN,

"Criminal Jurisprudence of the Ancient Hebrews," p. 141.

"If none of the judges defend the culprit, i.e., all pronounce him

guilty, having no defender in the court, the verdict of guilty was

invalid and the sentence of death could not be executed."--RABBI

WISE, "Martyrdom of Jesus," p. 74.

FACT AND ARGUMENT

FEW stranger rules can be found in the jurisprudence of the world than

that provision of Hebrew law which forbade a conviction to rest upon the

unanimous vote of the judges. A comparison instantaneously and almost

inevitably arises in the mind between the Saxon and Hebrew requirement

in the matter of unanimity in the verdict. The finest form of mind of

antiquity, with the possible exception of the Greek and Roman, was the

Hebrew. One of the finest types of intellect of the modern world is that

of the Anglo-Saxon. The Hebrew organized the Sanhedrin, and, under God,

endowed it with judicial and spiritual attributes. The Anglo-Saxon, on

the shores of the German Ocean, originated the modern jury and invested

it with its distinctive legal traits. With the Anglo-Saxon jury a

unanimous verdict is necessary to convict, but with the Hebrew Sanhedrin

unanimity was fatal, and resulted in an acquittal. A great modern

writer[282] has declared that law is the perfection of reason. But when

we contemplate the differences in Hebrew and Saxon laws we are inclined

to ask, in seeking the degree of perfection, whose law and whose reason?

But, after all, the Jewish rule is not so unreasonable as it first

appears, when we come to consider the reason of its origin. In the first

place, as we have seen in Part II, there were no lawyers or advocates,

in the modern sense, among the ancient Hebrews. The judges were his

defenders. Now if the verdict was unanimous in favor of condemnation it

was evident that the prisoner had had no friend or defender in court. To

the Jewish mind this was almost equivalent to mob violence. It argued

conspiracy, at least. The element of mercy, which was required to enter

into every Hebrew verdict, was absent in such a case.

Again, this rule of unanimity was only another form or statement of the

requirement that the court defer final action, in case of conviction, to

the next day in order that time for deliberation and reflection might

intervene. In other words, Hebrew law forbade precipitancy in capital

proceedings. And what could be more precipitate than an instantaneous

and unanimous verdict? "But where all suddenly agree on conviction, does

it not seem," asks a modern Jewish writer, "that the convict is a victim

of conspiracy and that the verdict is not the result of sober reason and

calm deliberation?"

But how did they convict under Hebrew law? By a majority vote of at

least two. A majority of one would acquit. A majority of two, or any

majority less than unanimity, would convict.[283] If the accused had one

friend in court, the verdict of condemnation would stand, since the

element of mercy was present and the spirit of conspiracy or mob

violence was absent. Seventy-one constituted the membership of the Great

Sanhedrin. If all the members were present and voted, at least

thirty-seven were required to convict. Thirty-six would acquit. If a

bare quorum, twenty-three members, was present, at least thirteen were

required to convict. Twelve would acquit.

This rule seems ridiculous and absurd, when viewed in the light of a

brutal and undeniable crime. If the facts constituting such a crime had

been proved against a Jewish prisoner beyond any possibility of doubt,

if such facts were apparent to everybody, still it seems that the rule

above stated required that the defendant have at least one advocate and

one vote among the judges; else, the verdict was invalid and could not

stand. Such a procedure could be justified on no other ground than that

exceptional cases should not be permitted to destroy a rule of action

that in its general operation had been found to be both generous and

just.

Now the condemnation of Jesus was illegal because the verdict of the

Sanhedrin was unanimous. We learn this from Mark, who says: "Then the

high priest rent his clothes and saith, What need we any further

witnesses? ye have heard the blasphemy: what think ye? And they _all_

condemned him to be guilty of death."[284] If they _all_ condemned Him,

the verdict was unanimous and therefore illegal. The other Evangelists

do not tell us that the verdict was unanimous; neither do they deny it.

Mark's testimony stands alone and uncontradicted; therefore we must

assume that it is true.

Rabbi Wise[285] and Signor Rosadi[286] call attention to the fact that

the verdict was unanimous. The former seeks to ridicule Mark as an

authority because a unanimous verdict was illegal under Hebrew law, and

the distinguished Hebrew writer does not conceive that Hebrew judges

could have made such a mistake. Such argument, reduced to ultimate

analysis, means, according to Rabbi Wise, that there were certain rules

of Hebrew law that could not be and were never violated.

In this connection, it has been frequently asked: Was the entire

Sanhedrin present at the night trial of Jesus? Were Nicodemus and Joseph

of Arimathea present? If they were present, did they vote against Jesus?

These questions can be answered only in the light of the authorities.

Only two of the Gospel writers, Matthew and Mark, tell us of the night

trial. Both declare that "all the council" were present.[287] The

"council" (concilium) is the Vulgate, the Latin New Testament

designation of the Great Sanhedrin. Then, if all the "council" were

present, the Great Sanhedrin were all present.

[Illustration: THE BETRAYING KISS (SCHEFFER)]

Concerning the number of judges at the second or daybreak meeting of the

Sanhedrin, both Matthew and Mark again declare that the full membership

was present. Matthew says: "When the morning was come, _all_ the chief

priests and elders of the people took counsel against Jesus to put him

to death."[288] Mark says: "And straightway in the morning the chief

priests held a consultation with the elders and scribes and the _whole

council_, and bound Jesus, and carried him away, and delivered him to

Pilate."[289] It should be remembered that neither Luke nor John

contradicts even remotely the statements of Matthew and Mark concerning

the full attendance of the members of the Sanhedrin at either the night

or morning trial. The first and second Gospel writers therefore

corroborate each other, and the presumption of the law is that each told

the truth.

And yet most commentators and writers seem to be of the opinion that all

the members of the Sanhedrin were not present at the night trial of

Jesus. They insist that both Matthew and Mark were employing a figure of

speech, synecdoche, when they said that "all the council" were present.

But these same writers seem to think that these same Evangelists were in

earnest and speaking literally when they declared that "_all_ the chief

priests and elders" and the "_whole_ council" were present at the

morning trial. We shall not attempt to settle the question but will

leave it to the reader to draw his own inferences. Suffice it to say

that as far as the rule stated in connection with Point IX is concerned,

it was immaterial whether the full council was present at either

meeting. The rule against unanimity applied to a bare quorum or to any

number less than the full Sanhedrin. It was the unanimity itself, of

however few members, that carried with it the spirit and suggestion of

mob violence and conspiracy against which Hebrew law protested.

The question of the number of members that were present at the different

meetings of the Sanhedrin has been discussed in the light of history,

and as bearing upon the conduct of Nicodemus and Joseph of Arimathea,

who were friends of Jesus. Nicodemus was certainly a member of the Great

Sanhedrin. This we learn from two passages of New Testament

scripture.[290] It is also believed that Joseph of Arimathea was a

member from a mere suggestion in another passage.[291] Did these friends

of the Christ vote against Him? If they were members of the court; if

Matthew and Mark wrote literally when they said that "all the council"

were present; and if Mark wrote literally and truthfully when he said

that "they _all_ condemned him to be guilty of death"; then it naturally

and inevitably follows that both Nicodemus and Joseph voted against

Jesus.

[Illustration: THE ARREST OF JESUS (HOFFMAN)]

A number of arguments have been offered against this contention. In the

first place, it is said that at a previous meeting of the Sanhedrin

Nicodemus defended Jesus by asking his fellow-judges this question:

"Doth our law judge any man before it hear him and know what he

doeth?"[292] It is asserted that there is no good reason to believe that

Nicodemus defended Jesus at this meeting and turned against Him at a

subsequent one, that there is a presumption of a continuance of

fidelity. But is this good reasoning? Did not Peter cut off the ear of

the high priest's servant, Malchus, in defense of Jesus at midnight, in

the garden, and then within three hours afterwards deny that he knew

Jesus? There is no good reason to believe that Nicodemus was braver or

more constant than Peter, for the former seems to have been either

ashamed or afraid to express his affection for the Master during the

daytime, but preferred to do it at night.[293]

Concerning the part taken by Nicodemus in the final proceedings, Rosadi

says: "The verdict was unanimous. The members of the Sanhedrin who were

secretly favorable to the Accused were either absent or else they voted

against him. Nicodemus was amongst the absentees, or amongst those that

voted against him. At all events, he did not raise his voice against the

pronouncement expressed by acclamation."

If Joseph of Arimathea was a member of the Great Sanhedrin, it seems

that he "had not consented to the counsel and the deed of them."[294]

But it is impossible to tell certainly to which one of the three

meetings of the Sanhedrin, held within the six months preceding the

crucifixion, this language refers. The defense of Jesus offered by

Nicodemus was certainly not at the final meeting which condemned Jesus.

It may be that the reference to the protest of Joseph of Arimathea also

referred to a prior meeting. Its connection in Luke seems to make it

refer to the last trial, but this is not certain. Neither is it certain

that Joseph was a member of the Great Sanhedrin, and his failure to

consent, if he were not a member, would not disturb the contention made

in Point IX of the Brief. Even if he were a member, his failure to

consent would not destroy the contention, since ancient Hebrew judges,

like modern American jurors, could have first protested against their

action and then have voted with them. The polling of the jury, under

modern law, has reference, among other things, to this state of affairs.

But we may admit that both Nicodemus and Joseph of Arimathea, as well as

many others, were absent, as Rosadi suggests, and still contend that the

verdict against Jesus was illegal because it was unanimous, as Mark

assures us, since the number of judges present was immaterial, provided

there was a quorum of at least twenty-three and their verdict was

unanimous against the accused. According to the second Gospel writer,

there seems to be no doubt that this was the case in the judgment

pronounced against Jesus.

POINT X

THE PROCEEDINGS AGAINST JESUS WERE ILLEGAL IN THAT: (1) THE SENTENCE OF

CONDEMNATION WAS PRONOUNCED IN A PLACE FORBIDDEN BY LAW; (2) THE HIGH

PRIEST RENT HIS CLOTHES; (3) THE BALLOTING WAS IRREGULAR

LAW

"After leaving the hall Gazith no sentence of death can be passed

upon anyone soever."--TALMUD, Bab., Abodah Zarah, or of Idolatry,

Chap. I. fol. 8.

"A sentence of death can be pronounced only so long as the Sanhedrin

holds its sessions in the appointed place."--MAIMONIDES, Sanhedrin

XIV.

"And he that is the high priest among his brethren, upon whose head

the anointing oil was poured, and that is consecrated to put on

the garments, shall not uncover his head, nor rend his

clothes."--LEVITICUS xxi. 10.

"And Moses said unto Aaron, and unto Eleazar, and unto Ithamar, his

sons, Uncover not your heads, neither rend your clothes; lest ye

die, and lest wrath come upon all the people."--LEVITICUS x. 6.

"Let the judges each in his turn absolve or condemn."--MISHNA,

Sanhedrin XV. 5.

"The members of the Sanhedrin were seated in the form of a

semicircle at the extremity of which a secretary was placed, whose

business it was to record the votes. One of these secretaries

recorded the votes in favor of the accused, the other those

against him."--MISHNA, Sanhedrin IV. 3.

"In ordinary cases the judges voted according to seniority, the

oldest commencing; in a capital trial, the reverse order was

followed. That the younger members of the Sanhedrin should not be

influenced by the views or arguments of their more mature, more

experienced colleagues, the junior judge was in these cases always

the first to pronounce for or against a conviction."--BENNY,

"Criminal Code of the Jews," pp. 73, 74.

FACT AND ARGUMENT

IN the trial of capital cases, the Great Sanhedrin was required to meet

in an apartment of the National Temple at Jerusalem, known as the Hall

of Hewn Stones (Lishkhath haggazith). Outside of this hall no capital

trial could be conducted and no capital sentence could be

pronounced.[295] This place was selected in obedience to Mosaic

injunction: "Thou shalt do according to the tenor of the sentence, which

they may point out to thee _from the place which the Lord shall

choose_."[296] The Rabbis argued that the Great Council could not try a

capital case or pronounce a death sentence, unless it met and remained

in the place chosen by God, which, they contended, should be an

apartment of the Great Temple. The Lishkhath haggazith was chosen, and

continued for many years to be the meeting place of the supreme

tribunal.

But Jesus was not tried or condemned to death in the Hall of Hewn

Stones, as Hebrew law required. It is clearly evident, from the Gospels,

that He was tried and sentenced in the palace of Caiaphas, probably on

Mount Zion. It is contended by the Jews, however, that soon after the

Roman conquest of Judea the Great Sanhedrin removed from the sacred

place to Bethany, and from there to other places, as occasion required.

And there is a Jewish tradition that the court returned to the

accustomed place on the occasion of the trial and condemnation of

Jesus.[297]

In opposition to this, Edersheim says: "There is truly not a tittle of

evidence for the assumption of commentators that Christ was led from the

palace of Caiaphas into the Council Chamber (Lishkhath haggazith). The

whole proceedings took place in the former, and from it Christ was

brought to Pilate."[298] St. John emphatically declares: "Then led they

Jesus from Caiaphas into the hall of judgment."[299] This Hall of

Judgment was the Prætorium of Pilate.

The first irregularity, then, noted under Point X is that Jesus was

tried and condemned in the palace of Caiaphas instead of the Hall of

Hewn Stones, the regular legal meeting place of the Great Sanhedrin.

The second error noted under Point X is that which relates to the

rending of garments by the high priest. "An ordinary Israelite could, as

an emblem of bereavement, tear his garments, but to the high priest it

was forbidden, because his vestments, being made after the express

orders of God, were figurative of his office."[300]

When Jesus confessed that He was Christ the Son of God, Caiaphas seems

to have lost his balance and to have committed errors with all the

rapidity of speech. "Then the high priest rent his clothes, and saith,

What need we any further witnesses? ye have heard the blasphemy: what

think ye? And they all condemned him to be guilty of death."[301] In

this language and conduct of the son-in-law of Annas there were several

irregularities in procedure. The first was the rending of garments

reported by Matthew and Mark, which act was forbidden by the provisions

of the Mosaic Code, recorded in Leviticus and cited above.

But it is only fair to state the dissenting opinion on this point. In

the times of Christ it seems to have been the custom among the Jews to

rend the garments as a sign of horror and execration, whenever

blasphemous language was heard. Edersheim states the rule: "They all

heard it--and, as the law directed, when blasphemy was spoken, the high

priest rent both his outer and inner garment, with a rent that might

never be repaired."[302] The law here referred to, however, is the

Rabbinic or Talmudic and not the Mosaic law. It should be remembered

that the Mosaic Code was the constitution or fundamental law of the

ancient Hebrews. The Talmudic law embodied in the Mishna was, in a

sense, a mere commentary upon the Mosaic law. We have seen in Chapter I

of Part II of this volume that the traditional law was based upon,

derived from, and inspired by the written law contained in the

Pentateuch. It is true that the Talmud, while professing subordination

to the Pentateuch, finally virtually superseded it as an administrative

code. But the doctors never repealed a Mosaic injunction, since it was

an emanation of the mind of Jehovah and could not be abrogated by human

intelligence. When an ancient ordinance ceased to be of practical value

the Jewish legists simply declared that it had fallen into desuetude.

And whenever a new law was proclaimed to meet an emergency in the life

of the Hebrew people the Rabbins declared that it was derived from and

inspired by some decree which God had handed down to Moses for the

benefit of the nation. In other words, the Mosaic Code was Israel's

divine constitution which was to serve as a standard for all future

legislation. And as the Jewish lawmakers were not permitted to repeal a

Mosaic ordinance, neither were they allowed to establish a rule in

contravention of it. Now the Pentateuch forbade the rending of garments.

Then did the Talmudists have a right to declare that the law might be

changed or broken in the case of blasphemy? That they did is denied by

many writers.

But admitting the validity of the Talmudic rule, it is nevertheless

beyond dispute that the high priest was forbidden to rend his clothes on

Sabbaths and holidays. And as Jesus was condemned on both a Sabbath and

a festival day, the high priest's action in rending his clothes on that

day was illegal.[303]

Again, the proceedings against Jesus were illegal because the balloting

was irregular. This is the third error noted under Point X.

The Hebrew law required that each judge, when his time came to vote upon

the guilt or innocence of the accused, should rise in his place, declare

his vote, and state his reasons for so voting. In capital cases the

youngest judge was required to vote first, in order that he might not be

unduly influenced by the example of his seniors in age and authority.

The balloting continued in this manner from the youngest member to the

high priest, who was generally among the oldest. Two scribes--according

to some writers, three--were present to record the votes and to note the

reasons stated. These records were to be used on the second day of the

trial in comparing the arguments of the judges on that day with those

offered on the first day. Judges who had voted for acquittal on the

first day could not change their votes on the second day. Those who had

voted for conviction on the first day might change their votes on the

second day, by assigning good reasons. Those who had voted for

conviction on the first day could not vote for conviction on the second

day, if the reasons assigned on the second day were radically different

from those assigned on the first day.[304] It will thus be seen how very

essential were the records of the scribes and how important it was that

they should be correctly kept. Hence the necessity, according to Benny,

of a third scribe whose notes might be used to correct any discrepancies

in the reports of the other two.

Now are we justified in assuming that this was the method employed in

counting votes at the trial of Jesus? The law will not permit us to

presume errors. We must rather assume that this was the method employed,

unless the Gospel record indicates, either by plain statement or by

reasonable construction, that it was not the method used.

In this connection, let us review the language of the Scriptures. "Ye

have heard the blasphemy: what think ye? And they all condemned him to

be guilty of death." Is it not clearly evident, from this passage, that

the balloting was not done singly, the youngest voting first, as Hebrew

law required? Can it not be seen at a glance that the judges voted _en

masse_? If they did, was it possible for the scribes to record the votes

and make a note of the reasons assigned, as the law required? If these

things were not done, were the proceedings regular?

According to Matthew, Caiaphas, before calling for the votes exclaimed:

"He hath spoken blasphemy."[305] Instead of doing this should he not,

under the law, have carefully concealed his opinion until the younger

members of the court had voted? Is it not a matter of history that the

opinion of the high priest was regarded as almost infallible authority

among the ancient Hebrews? Did not this premature declaration of guilt

on the part of the high priest rob the subordinate judges of freedom of

suffrage?

The conduct of the case at the close, when the balloting took place,

seems to justify the view of those writers who assert that there was no

regular trial of Jesus, but rather the action of a mob.

POINT XI

THE MEMBERS OF THE GREAT SANHEDRIN WERE LEGALLY DISQUALIFIED TO TRY

JESUS

LAW

"The robe of the unfairly elected judge is to be respected not more

than the blanket of the ass."--MENDELSOHN, "Hebrew Maxims and

Rules," p. 182.

"As Moses sat in judgment without the expectation of material

reward, so also must every judge act from a sense of duty

only."--MENDELSOHN, "Hebrew Maxims and Rules," p. 177.

"Nor must there be on the judicial bench either a relation, or a

particular friend, or an enemy of either the accused or of the

accuser."--MENDELSOHN, "Criminal Jurisprudence of the Ancient

Hebrews," p. 108.

"He (the Hebrew judge) was, in the first instance, to be modest, of

good repute among his neighbors, and generally liked."--BENNY,

"Criminal Code of the Jews," p. 38.

"Nor under any circumstances, was a man known to be _at enmity with

the accused person_ permitted to occupy a position among his

judges."--BENNY, "Criminal Code of the Jews," p. 37.

FACT AND ARGUMENT

THE Gospel records disclose the fact that the members of the Great

Sanhedrin were legally disqualified to try Jesus. This disqualification

was of two kinds: (1) A general disqualification, under Hebrew law, to

act as judges in any case; (2) a special disqualification to sit in

judgment upon the life of Jesus.

Among all the great systems of jurisprudence of the world the ancient

Hebrew system was the most exacting in the matter of judicial fitness.

In the palmiest days of the Hebrew Commonwealth the members of the Great

Sanhedrin represented the most perfect mental, moral, and physical

development of the Hebrew people. A man could not be a member of this

court who had any serious mental, moral, or physical defect. He must

have been "learned in the law," both written and unwritten. He must have

had judicial experience; that is, he must have filled three offices of

gradually increasing dignity, beginning with one of the local courts and

passing successively through two magistracies at Jerusalem. He must have

been an accomplished linguist; that is, he must have been thoroughly

familiar with the languages of the surrounding nations. He must have

been modest, popular, of good appearance, and free from haughtiness. He

must have been pious, strong, and courageous. And above all, he must

have been friendly in his attitude toward the accused.[306]

These were the qualifications of Israel's judges before Roman politics

had corrupted them. But at the time of Christ they had grown to be

time-serving, degenerate, and corrupt. Judea was then passing through a

period of religious and political revolution. At such a time in any

state, as all history teaches us, the worst elements of society

generally get the upper hand and control the political currents of the

day. Many members of the Sanhedrin had themselves been guilty of

criminal acts in both public and private life. Many of them held office

by purchase--they had bought their seats. They were thus unfitted to be

judges in any case; especially in one involving the great question of

life and death.

In order to show the general disqualification, under the test of Hebrew

law, of the members of the Great Sanhedrin, at the time of Christ, to

exercise judicial functions, it is necessary to quote only Jewish

authorities. In "The Martyrdom of Jesus," Rabbi Wise says: "The chief

priests, under the iron rule of Pilate and his wicked master, Sejan,

were the tools of the Roman soldiers who held Judea and Samaria in

subjection. Like the high priest, they were appointed to and removed

from office by the Roman governor of the country, either directly or

indirectly. They purchased their commissions for high prices and, like

almost all Roman appointees, used them for mercenary purposes. They were

considered wicked men by the ancient writers and must have stood very

low in the estimation of the people over whom they tyrannized. The

patriots must have looked upon them as hirelings of the foreign despot

whose rule was abhorred. Although there was, here and there, a good,

pious and patriotic man among them, he was an exception. As a general

thing, and under the rule of Pilate, especially, they were the corrupt

tools of a military despotism which Rome imposed upon enslaved

Palestine."

Again, the Talmud, in which we never look for slurs upon the Hebrew

people, where slurs are not deserved, contains this bitter denunciation

of the high-priestly families of the times of Christ: "What a plague is

the family of Simon Boethus; cursed be their lances! What a plague is

the family of Ananos; cursed be their hissing of vipers! What a plague

is the family of Cantharus; cursed be their pens! What a plague is the

family of Ismael ben Phabi; cursed be their fists! They are high priests

themselves, their sons are treasurers, their sons-in-law are commanders,

and their servants strike the people with staves."

In like manner the Talmud, in withering rebuke and sarcasm, again

declares that "The porch of the sanctuary cried out four times. The

first time, Depart from here, descendants of Eli; ye pollute the Temple

of the Eternal! The second time, Let Issachar ben Keifar Barchi depart

from here, who polluted himself and profaneth the victims consecrated to

God! The third time, Widen yourselves, ye gates of the sanctuary and let

Israel ben Phabi, the wilful, enter that he may discharge the functions

of the priesthood! Yet another cry was heard, Widen yourselves, ye

gates, and let Ananias ben Nebedeus, the gourmand, enter, that he may

glut himself on the victims."[307]

It should be borne in mind that the high-priestly families so

scathingly dealt with by the Talmud were the controlling spirits in the

Great Sanhedrin at the time of Christ. Were they legally qualified,

then, under the ancient and honorable tests of Hebrew law, to be members

of the highest court in the land? If they bought their offices and used

them for mercenary purposes, as Wise asserts, were they worthy of the

great exemplar, Moses, who "sat in judgment without the expectation of

material reward"? If they thus secured their places and prostituted them

to selfish purposes, were their robes to be respected any more than the

blanket of the ass?

The ancient Hebrew judges, in the days of Israel's purity and glory,

submitted their claims to judicial preferment to the suffrage of a

loving and confiding people.[308] They climbed the rungs of the judicial

ladder by slow and painful degrees. Integrity and ability marked each

advance toward the top. Was this the process of promotion in the case of

Caiaphas and his fellow-judges? Did their bought and corrupted places

not brand them with the anathema of the law?

We come now to consider the special disqualifications of members of the

Sanhedrin to sit in judgment upon the life of Jesus. The reasons for

these disqualifications were two: (1) The members of this court were, in

the language of Jost, "burning enemies" of Jesus, and were therefore

disqualified, under Hebrew law, to act as His judges; (2) they had

determined upon His guilt, and had sentenced Him to death before the

trial began; and had thus outraged not only a specific provision of

Hebrew law but also a principle of universal justice.

The various causes of the hatred of the members of the Sanhedrin for

Jesus are too numerous and profound to admit of exhaustive treatment

here. A thorough analysis of these causes would necessitate a review of

the life of Christ from the manger to the sepulcher. A few reasons will

suffice.

But at this point a distinction should be made between that personal

hatred which disqualifies and the hatred and loathing of the crime that

do not disqualify. Every just and righteous judge should loathe and hate

the crime itself; and a certain amount of loathing and dislike for the

criminal is most natural and almost inevitable. But no judge is

qualified to sit in judgment upon the rights of life, liberty, or

property of another whom he hates as the result of a personal grudge,

born of personal experience with the prisoner at the bar. The hatred

that disqualified the members of the Sanhedrin, under Hebrew law, was

that kind of hatred that had been generated by personal interest and

experience. The most merciless invective, barbed with incomparable wit,

ridicule, and satire, had been daily hurled at them by Jesus with

withering effect. With a touch more potent than that of Ithuriel's spear

He had unmasked their wicked hypocrisy and had blazoned it to the skies.

Every day of His active ministry, which lasted about three years, had

been spent in denouncing their shameless practices and their guilty

lives. The Scribes and Pharisees were proud, haughty, and conceited

beyond description. They believed implicitly in the infallibility of

their authority and in the perfection of their souls. How galling, then,

to such men must have been this declaration of an obscure and lowly

Nazarene: "Verily, I say unto you, That the publicans and the harlots go

into the kingdom of God before you."[309] What impetuous invective this:

"Woe unto you, scribes and Pharisees, hypocrites! for ye devour widows'

houses, and for a pretense make long prayer: therefore ye shall receive

the greater damnation. Woe unto you, scribes and Pharisees, hypocrites!

for ye compass sea and land to make one proselyte, and when he is made,

ye make him twofold more the child of hell than yourselves."[310] We can

well imagine how these fiery darts pierced and tore the vanity of a

haughty and contemptuous priesthood.

Consider for a moment the difference in the spheres of Jesus and of His

enemies. He, an obscure prophet from Nazareth in Galilee; they, the

leaders of Israel and the guardians of the Temple at Jerusalem. He, the

single advocate of the New Dispensation; they, the manifold upholders of

the Old. He, without earthly authority in the propagation of His faith;

they, clothed with the sanction of the law and the prestige of a mighty

past. Imagine, then, if you can, the intensity of the hatred engendered

by the language and the conduct of Jesus.

That we may fully appreciate the tension of the situation let us cast a

single glance at the character of the Scribes. Edersheim has written

these wonderfully graphic lines about them:

He pushes to the front, the crowd respectfully giving way, and

eagerly hanging on his utterances, as those of a recognized

authority. He has been solemnly ordained by the laying on of hands;

and is the Rabbi, "my great one," Master, amplitudo. Indeed, his

hyper-ingenuity in questioning has become a proverb. There is not

measure of his dignity, nor yet limit to his importance. He is the

"lawyer," the "well-plastered pit," filled with the water of

knowledge, "out of which not a drop can escape," in opposition to

the "weeds of untilled soil" of ignorance. He is the divine

aristocrat, among the vulgar herd of rude and profane "country

people," who "know not the law," and are "cursed." Each scribe

outweighed all the common people, who must accordingly pay him

every honor.... Such was to be the respect paid to their sayings

that they were to be absolutely believed, even if they were to

declare that to be at the right hand which was at the left, or

vice-versa.[311]

What could, then, be more terrific than the hatred of such a character

for an unlettered Galilean who descended from the mountains of His

native province to rebuke and instruct the "divine aristocrats" in

religious matters and heavenly affairs? Imagine his rage and chagrin

when he heard these words: "Woe unto you, scribes and Pharisees,

hypocrites! for ye are like unto whited sepulchres, which indeed appear

beautiful outward, but are within full of dead men's bones, and all

uncleanness.... Woe unto you, scribes and Pharisees, hypocrites! because

ye build the tombs of the prophets, and garnish the sepulchres of the

righteous, And say, If we had been in the days of our fathers, we would

not have been partakers with them in the blood of the prophets.

Wherefore ye be witnesses unto yourselves, that ye are the children of

them which killed the prophets. Fill ye up then the measure of your

fathers. Ye serpents, ye generation of vipers, how can ye escape the

damnation of hell?"[312]

"His exquisite irony," says Renan, "His stinging remarks, always went to

the heart. They were everlasting stings, and have remained festering in

the wound. This Nessus-shirt of ridicule which the Jew, son of the

Pharisees, has dragged in tatters after him during eighteen centuries,

was woven by Jesus with a divine skill. Masterpieces of fine raillery,

their features are written in lines of fire upon the flesh of the

hypocrite and the false devotee. Incomparable traits worthy of a Son of

God! A god alone knows how to kill in this way. Socrates and Molière

only grazed the skin. The former carried fire and rage to the very

marrow."[313]

Are we not now justified in asserting, with Jost, that the members of

the Sanhedrin, who were none other than the Scribes and Pharisees above

described by Jesus, were the "burning enemies" of the prisoner at the

bar? If they were, were they legally qualified to be His judges?

But it may be argued that their hatred was simply a form of righteous

indignation provoked by His repeated assaults upon the national religion

and the national institutions; that it was their duty as guardians of

both to both hate and try Him; and that they would have been derelict in

duty if they had not done so. But it is apparent from the record and is

evident to any fair-minded reader that the enmity of the judges toward

Jesus was more personal than political, more a private than a public

affair. In support of this contention, in addition to the withering

language addressed to them, the matter of the purification of the Temple

may be mentioned. It will be remembered how Jesus, with a scorpion lash,

scourged the money-changers and traders from the Sanctuary. Now it is

historically true that Annas and Caiaphas and their friends owned and

controlled the stalls, booths, and bazaars connected with the Temple and

from which flowed a most lucrative trade. The profits from the sale of

lambs and doves, sold for sacrifice, alone were enormous. When Jesus

threatened the destruction of this trade He assaulted the interests of

Annas and his associates in the Sanhedrin in a vital place. This

grievance was certainly not so religious as it was personal. The driving

of the cattle from the stalls was probably more effective in compassing

the destruction of the Christ than any miracle that He performed or any

discourse that He delivered. But whatever the cause the fact is historic

and indisputable that the Sanhedrists were enemies of Jesus, and

therefore disqualified under Hebrew law to try Him.

A second reason for the special disqualification of the members of the

Sanhedrin to sit as judges at the trial of Christ was the fact that they

had determined upon His guilt and had sentenced Him to death before the

trial began. This point needs no extensive argument or illustration.

Under every enlightened system of justice the first great qualification

of judges has been that they should be unbiased and unprejudiced.

Judicial proceedings are murderous and no better than mob violence when

judges and jurors enter upon the trial of the case with a determination

to convict the accused, regardless of the testimony. The principles

underlying this proposition are fundamental and self-evident.

Now the Gospel narratives disclose the fact that three different

meetings of the Sanhedrin were held in the six months preceding the

crucifixion, to discuss the miracles and discourses of Jesus, and to

devise ways and means to entrap Him and put Him to death.

The first meeting was held in the latter part of the month of September,

A.D. 29, about six months before the night trial in the palace of

Caiaphas. This meeting is recorded by St. John in Chap. vii., verses

37-53. The occasion was the Feast of Tabernacles, when Jesus made many

converts by His preaching, and at the same time caused much apprehension

among the Pharisees, who assembled the Sanhedrin to adopt plans to check

His career. It was on this occasion that Nicodemus defended Christ and

asked the question that shows the nature of the proceedings at that

time. "Doth our law judge any man before it hear him and know what he

doeth?" This was the voice, not only of Hebrew but of universal justice

demanding a hearing before a condemnation. Nothing definite seems to

have been accomplished at this meeting.

The second session of the Sanhedrin took place in the month of

February, A.D. 30, about six weeks before the crucifixion. The occasion

of this meeting was the resurrection of Lazarus, an account of which is

given in John xi. 41-53. The chief priests and Pharisees seem to have

been seized with consternation by the reports of the progress of the

propaganda of Jesus. They had often listened contemptuously and in

sullen silence to the accounts of His miraculous performances. But when

He began to raise the dead to life, they decided that it was about time

to act. At this meeting Caiaphas appealed to his associates in the name

of the common weal. "Ye know nothing at all," he said, "nor consider

that it is expedient for us, that one man should die for the people, and

that the whole nation perish not."[314] This seems to have been a form

of condemnation in which the other judges joined. "Then from that day

forth they took counsel together for to put him to death."[315] At this

second session of the Sanhedrin the death of Jesus seems to have been

decreed in an informal way and an opportunity was awaited for its

accomplishment.

The third meeting of the Sanhedrin took place just a few days before the

Paschal Feast.

"Now the feast of unleavened bread drew nigh, which is called the

Passover. And the chief priests and scribes sought how they might kill

him; for they feared the people."[316] "Then assembled together the

chief priests, and the scribes, and the elders of the people, unto the

palace of the high priest, who was called Caiaphas, and consulted that

they might take Jesus by subtilty, and kill him. But they said, Not on

the feast day, lest there be an uproar among the people."[317]

At this third session of the court it was agreed that the arrest and

execution of Jesus should be accomplished at the earliest possible date.

It will be seen that at these different sessions of the Sanhedrin in the

six months preceding the regular trial the judges had resolved that

Jesus should be done away with at the first convenient opportunity. In

short, and in fact, their hatred was formed and their determination

fixed in the matter of the proceedings to be instituted against Him.

Were they, then, legally qualified to act as His judges?

Again, besides prejudging Him to death had they not demonstrated their

total unfitness for any righteous administration of justice by seeking

false witnesses against Him? Hebrew law forbade them to seek for

witnesses of any kind. They were the defenders of the accused and, under

the Hebrew system, were required to search for pretexts to acquit and

not for witnesses to condemn.[318] It was a maxim that "the Sanhedrin

was to save, not to destroy life."[319] Much more were they forbidden to

seek for false witnesses. Hebrew law denounced false witnesses and

condemned them to the very punishment prescribed for those whom they

sought to convict.

"And the judges shall make diligent inquisition; and, behold, if the

witness be a false witness, and hath testified falsely against his

brother; then shall ye do unto him, as he had thought to do unto his

brother.... And thine eye shall not pity; but life shall go for life,

eye for eye, tooth for tooth, hand for hand, foot for foot."[320]

But here we find the judges actually seeking testimony which the law

pointedly prohibited. This matter alone establishes their utter

unfitness to try Jesus, and is explicable only on the ground of the

degradation into which they had fallen at the time of Christ and on the

hypothesis that their burning hatred had overwhelmed their judgment and

sense of justice.

If it be objected that the points of disqualification above alleged were

not applicable to all the judges, a single sentence of Scripture meets

the objection: "And the chief priests and _all the council_ sought for

witness against Jesus to put Him to death."[321] The fact that "all the

council" were willing to outrage a provision of the fundamental law is

sufficient proof that they were all disqualified to try Christ.

Another conclusive proof of the total unfitness of the members of the

Sanhedrin to try Jesus is the fact that they so far forgot themselves

that they abandoned all sense of self-respect and judicial dignity by

brutally striking Him and spitting in His face. We would like to believe

that this outrageous conduct was limited to the servants of the priests,

but the Gospel of St. Mark, Chap. xiv., verse 65, clearly indicates that

the judges themselves were also guilty.

POINT XII

THE CONDEMNATION OF JESUS WAS ILLEGAL BECAUSE THE MERITS OF THE DEFENSE

WERE NOT CONSIDERED

LAW

"Then shalt thou inquire, and make search, and ask

diligently."--DEUTERONOMY xiii. 14.

"The judges shall weigh the matter in the sincerity of their

conscience."--MISHNA, Sanhedrin IV. 5.

"The primary object of the Hebrew judicial system was to render the

conviction of an innocent person impossible. All the ingenuity of

the Jewish legists was directed to the attainment of this

end."--BENNY, "Criminal Code of the Jews," p. 56.

FACT AND ARGUMENT

THE actual trial of any criminal case shows, upon the record, two

essential parts: (1) The accusation; (2) the defense. The absence of the

elements of defense makes the proceeding _ex parte_; and there is really

no trial. And it is impossible to conceive a proper administration of

justice where a defense is not allowed, since the right to combat the

allegations of the indictment is the essential principle of liberty

under the law. The destruction of this right is the annihilation of

freedom by subjecting the individual citizen to the whims and caprices

of the governing power. An ideal code of criminal procedure would embody

rules of evidence and practice perfectly adapted to establish truth in

the matter at issue between the commonwealth and the prisoner. Neither

the people nor the accused would be favored or prejudiced by the

admission or exclusion of any kind of evidence. An exact interpretation

and administration of this code would result in a perfect intellectual

balance between the rights of the state and the defendant. But such a

code has never been framed, and if one were in existence, it would be

impossible to enforce it, as long as certain judges insisted on aiding

the prosecution and others on helping the accused, in violation of

standard rules of evidence.

Now, the ancient Hebrew system of criminal procedure was no such ideal

one as that above described. It should be remembered that there was no

body, under that system, corresponding to our modern Grand Jury, to

present indictments. There were no prosecuting officers and no

counselors-at-law, in the modern sense. The leading witnesses preferred

charges and the judges did the rest. They examined and cross-examined

witnesses, did the summing up and were, above all, the defenders of the

accused. The rights of the defendant seem to have alone been seriously

considered. This startling maxim was a constant menace to the integrity

of the government and to the rights of the commonwealth: "The Sanhedrin

which so often as once in seven years condemns a man to death, is a

slaughter-house."[322] Lightfoot is of the opinion that the Jews did not

lose the power of capital punishment as the result of the Roman

conquest, but that they voluntarily abandoned it because the rules of

criminal procedure which they had from time to time adopted finally

became wholly unfitted for convicting anyone. This view is unsupported

by historic fact, but it is nevertheless true that the legal safeguards

for the protection of the rights of the accused had, in the later years

of Jewish nationality, become so numerous and stringent that a

condemnation was practically impossible. The astonishing provision of

Hebrew law to which we have referred in Part II known as Antecedent

Warning had the effect of securing an acquittal in nearly every case. It

is contended by many that this peculiar provision was intended to

abolish capital punishment by rendering conviction impossible.

In the light of the principles above suggested let us review the action

of the Sanhedrin in condemning Jesus to death upon His uncorroborated

confession. The standard of thoroughness in investigating criminal

matters is thus prescribed in the Mosaic Code: "Then shalt thou inquire,

and make search, and ask diligently." The Mishna supplements the

fundamental law by this direction: "The judges shall weigh the matter in

the sincerity of their conscience." From what we know of the peculiar

tendency of the Hebrew system to favor the accused we are justified in

assuming that the two rules just cited were framed for the protection

of the prisoner more than for the security of the commonwealth.

Now at this point we are led to ask: Were these rules applied in the

trial of Jesus in any sense either for or against the accused? Did

Caiaphas and the other members of the Sanhedrin "inquire, and make

search and ask diligently" concerning the facts involved in the issue

between Jesus and the Hebrew people? Did they weigh the whole matter "in

the sincerity of their conscience?" Is it not clearly evident from the

record that the false witnesses contradicted themselves, were rejected

and dismissed, and that Jesus was then condemned upon His uncorroborated

confession that He was the Christ, the Son of God? The usual and natural

proceeding in a Jewish criminal trial was to call witnesses for the

defendant, after the leading witnesses had testified for the people. Was

this done in the case of Jesus? His own apostles deserted Him in the

garden, although two of them seem to have returned to the scene of the

trial. Is it probable, in the light of the record, that witnesses were

called for the defendant? We have seen that they could not legally

convict Him upon His own confession. And there is nowhere the faintest

suggestion that witnesses other than the false ones were called to

testify against Him. The record is clear and unequivocal that the

conviction of Jesus was upon His uncorroborated confession. This was

illegal. When Caiaphas said, "I adjure thee by the living God that thou

tell us whether thou be the Christ, the Son of God," Jesus answered,

"Thou hast said"; that is, "I am," according to Mark. Here was an issue

squarely joined between the Commonwealth of Israel and Jesus of

Nazareth. It was incumbent upon the state to establish His guilt by two

competent witnesses who agreed in all essential details. If these

witnesses were not present, or could not be secured, it was the duty of

the court to discharge Christ at once. This the law provided and

demanded. But this was not done.

If, as has been contended, the false witnesses were relied upon by the

Sanhedrin to corroborate the confession of Jesus, then under Hebrew law

the judges should at least have sought witnesses in His behalf, or

should have allowed His friends time to find them and bring them in. In

other words, His defense should have been considered. However

overwhelming the conviction of the judges of the Sanhedrin that the

claims of Jesus were false and blasphemous, they were not justified in

refusing to consider the merits of His pretensions. If a midnight

assassin should stealthily creep into the room of a sleeping man and

shoot him to death, a judge would not be legally justified in

instructing the jury, at the close of the people's case, to bring in a

verdict of guilty, on the ground that nothing that the defendant could

prove would help his case. However weak and ridiculous his defense, the

prisoner should at least be heard; and a failure to accord him a hearing

would certainly result in reversal on appeal. A refusal to consider the

defense of a prisoner under ancient Hebrew law was nothing less than an

abrogation of the forms of government and a proclamation of mob

violence in the particular case, for it must be remembered that Hebrew

criminal law was framed especially for the protection of the accused.

It should also be kept in mind that it would not have been incumbent

upon Caiaphas and his fellow-judges to acquit Jesus simply because a

defense had been made. In other words, they were not bound to accept His

explanations and arguments. If they had heard Him and His witnesses,

they could have rejected His pretensions as false and blasphemous,

although they were truthful and righteous, without incurring the censure

of mankind and the curse of Heaven, for it would be preposterous to

require infallible judgment of judicial officers. All that can be

demanded of judges of the law is that they act conscientiously with the

lights that are in front of them. The maledictions of the human race

have been hurled at Caiaphas and his colleagues during nineteen

centuries, not because they pronounced an illegal judgment, but because

they outraged rules of law in their treatment of the Christ; not because

they misinterpreted His defense, but because they denied Him all

defense.

We should constantly keep in mind that Jesus was entitled to have the

two requirements, "Then shalt thou inquire, and make search, and ask

diligently," and "The judges shall weigh the matter in the sincerity of

their conscience," applied not only for but against Him. That is, before

the Hebrew Commonwealth rested its case against Him, He had a right to

demand that a _prima facie_ case be made, or in case of failure to do

so, that He be at once discharged. This rule was as pointed and

imperative under ancient as under modern law, and before the merits of

the defense were required to be considered the state had to close its

case against the defendant, with a presumption of guilt against Him, as

a result of the introduction of competent and satisfactory evidence.

If rules of law had been properly observed in the trial of Jesus the

question of the merits of His defense would never have been raised; for

it was practically impossible to convict Him under the circumstances

surrounding the night trial in the palace of Caiaphas. As has been

before suggested, Jesus was very popular outside the circle of the

Temple authorities. So great was His popularity that it is almost

certain that two competent witnesses could not have been secured to

convict Him of blasphemy in the sense that He had claimed to be the

Messiah. We have seen, under Point VIII, that Jesus had confessed His

Messiahship to no one excepting the Samaritan woman, outside the

Apostolic company. Judas, then, was probably the only witness who had

heard Him declare Himself to be the Messiah that could have been

secured; and his testimony was incompetent, under Hebrew law, because,

under the supposition that Jesus was a criminal, Judas, His apostle, was

an accomplice. As to the charge of blasphemy in the broader sense of

having claimed equality with God, upon which, according to Salvador,

Jesus was convicted, it seems from the Gospel record that there would

have been no difficulty in legally convicting Him, if the Sanhedrin had

met regularly and had taken time to summon witnesses in legal manner.

For on many occasions Jesus had said and done things in the presence of

both friends and enemies that the Jews regarded as blasphemous; such as

claiming that He and His Father were one; that He had existed before

Abraham; and that He had power to forgive sins. But these charges were

not made at the trial, and we have no right to consider them except as

means of interpreting the mind of Caiaphas in connection with the

meaning of the claim of Jesus that He was the Christ, the Son of God. If

Caiaphas was justified in construing these words to mean that Jesus

claimed identity with Jehovah, then he was justified in inferring that

Jesus had spoken blasphemy, for from the standpoint of ancient Judaism

and considering Jesus simply as a Jewish citizen, blasphemy was the

crime that resulted from such a claim. But even from this point of view

Caiaphas was not justified in refusing Jesus ample opportunity to prove

His equality with Jehovah, or at least that He was gifted with divine

power. This was all the more true because the claim of Jesus was that of

Messiahship, and according to one line of authorities in Hebrew

Messianic theology the Messiah was to be clothed with divine authority

and power as the messenger and vicegerent of Jehovah on earth.

But it is clearly certain that a _prima facie_ case of guilt was not

made by the Sanhedrin against Jesus; and, as a matter of law, He was not

called upon to make any defense. He could have refused to say a word in

answer to the accusation. He could have asserted His legal rights by

objecting that a case against Him had not been made, by demanding that

the charges against Him be dismissed and that He be set at liberty at

once. But Jesus did not do this. He simply confessed His Messiahship and

Sonship of the Father. This confession was not legal evidence upon which

He could have been convicted, but it did help to create an issue, the

truth or falsity of which should have been investigated by the court.

Now, let us suppose, for argument's sake, that a _prima facie_ case of

guilt against Jesus was made before the Sanhedrin. What was the next

legal step under Hebrew law? What should the judges have done after

hearing the witnesses against Him? It is beyond dispute that they should

have begun at once to "inquire, and make search, and ask diligently"

concerning all matters pertaining to the truthfulness and righteousness

of His claims to Messiahship. They should have assisted Him in securing

witnesses whose testimony would have helped to establish those claims.

Having secured such testimony, they should have weighed it "in the

sincerity of their conscience." But this they did not do.

It may be asked: What proofs could have been offered that Jesus was "the

Christ, the Son of God," if complete rights of defense had been

accorded? That question is difficult to answer, nearly two thousand

years after the trial. But if a _prima facie_ case of guilt had been

made against Him, shifting the burden of proof, and requiring that His

claims be proved, it may be reasonably contended that a complete defense

would have necessitated proofs: (1) That Jesus was the Christ, that is,

that He was the Messiah; (2) that He was also the Son of God, that is,

that He was identical with God Himself. Let us consider these two phases

of the subject and their attendant proofs in order.

And first, what evidence could have been offered that Jesus was the

Christ, that is, the Messiah? What method of procedure should have been

employed by the Sanhedrin in investigating His claims? Let us suppose

that Caiaphas understood that Jesus claimed to be the long-looked-for

Messiah who had come from Jehovah with divine authority to redeem

mankind and to regenerate and rule the world. Let us not forget that the

Jews were expecting a Messiah, and that the mere claim of Messiahship

was not illegal. Such a claim merely raised an issue as to its truth or

falsity which was to be investigated like any other proposition of

theology or law. It was not one to be either accepted or rejected

without demonstration. Then when Jesus acknowledged His Messiahship in

answer to the high priest's question it was the duty of the court either

to admit His claim and discharge Him at once, or to summon competent

witnesses, by daylight, to prove that His pretensions were false and

blasphemous. Having rested their case, it was their duty to aid the

prisoner in securing witnesses to substantiate His claims, and according

to the spirit of Hebrew law to view rather favorably than unfavorably

such claims. It was also incumbent upon them to apply to Jesus all the

Messianic tests of each and every school. It should be remembered that

at the time of Christ there were radically different views of the

attributes of the expected Messiah. No two schools agreed upon all the

signs by which the future Deliverer would be recognized. Only one sign

was agreed upon by all--that He would be a scion of the House of David.

The followers of Judas of Galilee believed that the Messiah would be an

earthly hero of giant stature--a William Tell, a Robert Bruce, an

Abraham Lincoln--who would emancipate the Jews by driving out the Romans

and permanently restoring the kingdom of David on the earth. The school

of Shammai believed that he would be not only a great statesman and

warrior, but a religious zealot as well; and that to splendid victories

on the battlefield, he would add the glorious triumphs of religion.

Radically different from both these views, were the teachings of the

gentle Hillel and his disciples. According to these, the Messiah was to

be a prince of peace whose sublime and holy spirit would impress itself

upon all flesh, would banish all wars, and make of Jerusalem the grand

center of international brotherhood and love. But even these conceptions

were not exhaustive of the various Messianic ideas that were prevalent

in Palestine in the days of Jesus. Some of the Messianic notions were

not only contradictory but diametrically opposite in meaning. A "prince

of peace" and a "gigantic warrior" could not well be one and the same

person. And for this reason it is apparent that, had an examination been

made, the claims of Jesus to the Messiahship could not have been

rejected by Caiaphas and the Sanhedrin, simply because this or that

attribute did not meet the approval of this or that sect or school.

Instead of condemning Him to death for blasphemy, when Jesus answered

that He was the Christ, the Son of God, Caiaphas should have asked a

second question: "What sign shewest thou then, that we may see and

believe thee?" It has been contended by Jewish writers that, far from

denying Jesus the privilege of proving His Messiahship, He was

frequently asked to give signs and perform wonders. The reply to this is

that as far as the legal merits of the case are concerned Jesus was not

invited at the trial in the palace of Caiaphas to show signs or give

proofs of His Messiahship. And as to the chances afforded Him at other

times and places, they were extra-judicial and were mere street affairs

in which Jesus probably refused to gratify vulgar curiosity and by which

He was not remotely bound legally or religiously. It is only when

properly arraigned and accused that a citizen under modern law can be

compelled to answer a charge of crime. The rule was more stringent under

the ancient Hebrew dispensation. Private preliminary examinations, even

by judicial officers, were not permitted by Hebrew law, as Salvador

explicitly states. It was only when confronted by proper charges before

a legally constituted tribunal in regular session, that a Hebrew

prisoner was compelled to answer. And at the regular trial before the

full Sanhedrin Jesus was not asked to give evidence that would serve to

exculpate Him. What Caiaphas should have done was to notify Jesus, at

the time of the arraignment in his own house, that His life was at

stake and that now was the time to produce testimony in His own behalf.

It was the duty, furthermore, of the high priest and his associates to

consult the sacred books to see if the Messianic prophecies therein

contained were fulfilled in the birth, life, and performances of Jesus,

as these matters were developed at the trial by witnesses duly summoned

in His behalf.

It was a matter personally within the knowledge of the judges that the

time was ripe for the appearance of the Deliverer. Not only the people

of Israel, but all the surrounding nations were expecting the coming of

a great renovator of the world. Of such an arrival Virgil had already

sung at Rome.[323]

A great national misfortune had already foreshadowed the day of the

Messiah more potently than had any individual event in the life of

Jesus. When Jacob lay dying upon his deathbed, he called around him his

twelve sons and began to pronounce upon each in turn the paternal and

prophetic blessing. When the turn of Judah came, the accents of the

dying patriarch became more clear and animated, as he said: "Judah, thou

art he whom thy brethren shall praise: thy hand shall be in the neck of

thine enemies; thy father's children shall bow down before thee. Judah

is a lion's whelp: from the prey, my son, thou art gone up: he stooped

down, he couched as a lion, and as an old lion; who shall rouse him up?

The _sceptre_ shall not depart from Judah, nor a lawgiver from between

his feet, until Shiloh come; and unto him shall the gathering of the

people be."[324] The Jewish Rabbinical commentators of antiquity were

unanimously of the opinion that this prophecy of Jacob referred to the

day of the Messiah. And for ages the people had been told to watch for

two special signs which would herald the coming of the great Deliverer:

(1) The departure of the scepter from Judah; (2) the loss of the

judicial power.

The Talmudists, commenting on the above passage from Genesis, say: "The

son of David shall not come unless the royal power has been taken from

Judah"; and in another passage: "The son of David shall not come unless

the judges have ceased in Israel."[325] Now both these signs had

appeared at the time of the Roman conquest, shortly before the birth of

Christ. At the deposition of Archelaus, A.D. 6, Judea became a Roman

province with a Roman procurator as governor. Sovereignty then passed

away forever from the Jews. And not only was sovereignty taken from

them, but its chief attribute, the power of life and death in judicial

matters, was destroyed. Thus the legal and historical situation was

produced that had been prophesied by Jacob. The _scepter_ had passed

from Judah and the _lawgiver_ from between his feet, when Jesus stood

before the Sanhedrin claiming to be the Messiah.

A fair trial in full daylight, it is believed, would have called before

His judges a host of witnesses friendly to Jesus, whose testimony would

have established an exact fulfilment of ancient Messianic prophecy in

His birth, life, arrest, and trial. A judicial record would have been

made of which the following might be regarded as an approximately

correct transcript:

(1) _That the Messiah was to be born in Bethlehem_:

PROPHECY--But thou, Beth-lehem Ephratah, though thou be little among

the thousands of Judah, yet out of thee shall he come forth unto

me that is to be ruler in Israel; whose goings forth have been

from of old, from everlasting.--MICAH v. 2.

FULFILLMENT--Now when Jesus was _born in Bethlehem_ of Judea in the

days of Herod the king, behold, there came wise men from the east

to Jerusalem.--MATT. ii. 1.

And Joseph also went up from Galilee, out of the city of Nazareth,

into Judea, unto the city of David, which is called Bethlehem

(because he was of the house and lineage of David), To be taxed

with Mary his espoused wife, being great with child. And so it

was, that, while they were there, the days were accomplished that

she should be delivered. And she brought forth her firstborn son,

and wrapped him in swaddling clothes, and laid him in a manger;

because there was no room for them in the inn.--LUKE ii. 4-7.

(2) _That the Messiah was to be born of a virgin_:

PROPHECY--Therefore the Lord himself shall give you a sign; Behold,

a virgin shall conceive, and bear a son, and shall call his name

Immanuel.--ISA. vii. 14.

FULFILLMENT--And in the sixth month the angel Gabriel was sent from

God unto a city of Galilee, named Nazareth, To a virgin espoused

to a man whose name was Joseph, of the house of David; and the

virgin's name was Mary.... And the angel said unto her, Fear not,

Mary: for thou hast found favor with God. And, behold, thou shalt

conceive in thy womb, and bring forth a son, and shalt call his

name Jesus.--LUKE i. 26-30.

Then Joseph being raised from sleep did as the angel of the Lord

had bidden him, and took unto him his wife: and knew her not till

she had brought forth her firstborn son: and he called his name

Jesus--MATT. i. 24, 25.

(3) _That the Messiah was to spring from the house of David_:

PROPHECY--Behold, the days come, saith the Lord, that I will raise

unto David a righteous Branch, and a King shall reign and prosper,

and shall execute judgment and justice in the earth. In his days

Judah shall be saved, and Israel shall dwell safely: and this is

his name whereby he shall be called, THE LORD OUR

RIGHTEOUSNESS.--JER. xxiii. 5, 6.

FULFILLMENT--He shall be great, and shall be called the Son of the

Highest; and the Lord God shall give unto him the throne of his

father David.--LUKE i. 32.

But while he thought on these things, behold, the angel of the

Lord appeared unto him in a dream, saying, Joseph, thou son of

David, fear not to take unto thee Mary thy wife: for that which is

conceived in her is of the Holy Ghost.--MATT. i. 20.

(4) _That the Messiah should not come until the scepter had departed

from Judah and the lawgiver from between his feet_:

PROPHECY--The Sceptre shall not depart from Judah, nor a lawgiver

from between his feet, until Shiloh come.--GEN. xlix. 10.

FULFILLMENT--And he saith unto them, Whose is this image and

superscription? They say unto him, Cæsar's. Then saith he unto

them, Render therefore unto Cæsar the things which are Cæsar's;

and unto God the things that are God's.--MATT. xxii. 20, 21.

Then said Pilate unto them, Take ye him, and judge him according

to your law. The Jews therefore said unto him, It is not lawful

for us to put any man to death.--JOHN xviii. 31.

(5) _That a forerunner like unto Elijah should prepare the way of the

Messiah_:

PROPHECY--Behold, I will send my messenger, and he shall prepare the

way before me: and the Lord, whom ye seek, shall suddenly come to

his temple, even the messenger of the covenant, whom ye delight

in: behold, he shall come, saith the Lord of hosts.--MAL. iii. 1.

The voice of him that crieth in the wilderness, Prepare ye the way

of the Lord, make straight in the desert a highway for our

God.--ISA. xl. 3.

FULFILLMENT--In those days came John the Baptist, preaching in the

wilderness of Judea, And saying, Repent ye: for the kingdom of

heaven is at hand. For this is he that was spoken of by the

prophet Esaias, saying, The voice of one crying in the wilderness,

Prepare ye the way of the Lord, make his paths straight.--MATT.

iii. 1-3.

This is he, of whom it is written, Behold, I send my messenger

before thy face, which shall prepare thy way before thee. For I

say unto you, Among those that are born of women there is not a

greater prophet than John the Baptist.--LUKE vii. 27, 28.

(6) _That the Messiah should begin to preach in Galilee_:

PROPHECY--In Galilee of the nations, the people that walked in

darkness have seen a great light.--ISA. ix. 1, 2.

FULFILLMENT--Now when Jesus had heard that John was cast into

prison, He departed into Galilee.... The people which sat in

darkness, saw great light; and to them which sat in the region and

shadow of death light is sprung up. From that time, Jesus began to

preach, and to say, Repent: for the kingdom of heaven is at

hand.--MATT. iv. 12-17.

(7) _That the Messiah should perform many miracles:_

PROPHECY--Then the eyes of the blind shall be opened, and the

ears of the deaf shall be unstopped. Then shall the lame man leap

as a hart, and the tongue of the dumb sing: for in the wilderness

shall waters break out, and streams in the desert.--ISA. xxxv. 5,

6.

FULFILLMENT--Then was brought unto him one possessed with a devil,

blind, and dumb, and he healed him, insomuch that the blind and

dumb both spake and saw.--MATT. xii. 22.

But that ye may know that the Son of man hath power upon earth to

forgive sins (he said unto the sick of the palsy), I say unto thee,

Arise, and take up thy couch, and go into thine house. And

immediately he rose up before them, and took up that whereon he

lay, and departed to his own house, glorifying God.--LUKE v. 24,

25.

Jesus answered and said unto them, Go and shew John again those

things which ye do hear and see: The blind receive their sight,

and the lame walk, the lepers are cleansed, and the deaf hear,

the dead are raised up, and the poor have the gospel preached to

them.--MATT. xi. 4, 5.

(8) _That the Messiah should make his public entry into Jerusalem riding

upon an ass:_

PROPHECY--Rejoice greatly, O daughter of Zion; shout, O daughter

of Jerusalem: behold, thy King cometh unto thee: he is just, and

having salvation; lowly, and riding upon an ass, and upon a colt

the foal of an ass.--ZECH. ix. 9.

FULFILLMENT--And the disciples went, and did as Jesus commanded

them, And brought the ass, and the colt, and put on them their

clothes, and they set him thereon. And a very great multitude

spread their garments in the way; others cut down branches from

the trees, and strewed them in the way. And the multitudes that

went before, and that followed, cried, saying, Hosanna to the Son

of David: Blessed is he that cometh in the name of the Lord;

Hosanna in the highest.--MATT. xxi. 6-9.

(9) _That the Messiah should be betrayed by one of his followers for

thirty pieces of silver which would finally be thrown into the potter's

field:_

PROPHECY--Yea, mine own familiar friend, in whom I trusted, which

did eat of my bread, hath lifted up his heel against me.--PSA.

xli. 9.

And I said unto them, If ye think good, give me my price; and if

not, forbear. So they weighed for my price thirty pieces of

silver. And the Lord said unto me, Cast it unto the potter: a

goodly price that I was prized at of them. And I took the thirty

pieces of silver, and cast them to the potter in the house of the

Lord.--ZECH. xi. 12, 13.

FULFILLMENT--Then one of the twelve, called Judas Iscariot, went

unto the chief priests, And said unto them, What will ye give me,

and I will deliver him unto you? And they covenanted with him for

thirty pieces of silver.--MATT. xxvi. 14, 15.

Then Judas, which had betrayed him, when he saw that he was

condemned, repented himself, and brought again the thirty pieces

of silver to the chief priests and elders, Saying, I have sinned in

that I have betrayed the innocent blood. And they said, What is

that to us? see thou to that. And he cast down the pieces of silver

in the temple, and departed, and went and hanged himself. And the

chief priests took the silver pieces, and said, It is not lawful

for to put them into the treasury, because it is the price of

blood. And they took counsel, and bought with them the potter's

field, to bury strangers in.--MATT. xxvii. 3-8.

(10) _That the Messiah should be a man of poverty and of suffering; and

should be despised and rejected of men:_

PROPHECY--He is despised and rejected of men; a man of sorrows, and

acquainted with grief: and we hid as it were our faces from him;

he was despised, and we esteemed him not.--ISA. liii. 3.

FULFILLMENT--And Jesus said unto him, Foxes have holes, and birds of

the air have nests; but the Son of man hath not where to lay his

head.--LUKE ix. 58.

And they smote him on the head with a reed, and did spit upon him,

and bowing their knees worshipped him. And when they had mocked

him, they took off the purple from him, and put his own clothes on

him, and led him out to crucify him.--MARK xv. 19, 20.

Through reasonable diligence, witnesses might have been secured to

testify to a majority, at least, of the points above enumerated,

touching Messianic prophecy and fulfillment. Besides these are many

others too numerous to mention in a treatise of this kind.

The question then arises at once: Admitting that all the evidence above

suggested, marked "Prophecy" and "Fulfillment," could have been

introduced in evidence at the trial before the Sanhedrin; were the

judges morally and legally bound to acquit and release Jesus, if they

believed this testimony to be true? We answer unhesitatingly, yes; as

far as the count in the accusation relating to Messiahship was

concerned. But we must remember that the charge against Jesus was not

limited to His claims to Messiahship. The indictment against Him was

that He claimed to be "the Christ, the Son of God." "Christ" is the

English form of the Greek translation of the word meaning "Messiah." The

real nature of the charge against the prisoner, then, was that He

claimed to be not only the Messiah but also the Son of God. We have seen

that "Son of God" conveyed to the Sanhedrin the notion of divine origin

and of equality with Jehovah. Even to-day there is no dispute between

Jews and Christians in regard to this construction. Jews charge that

Jesus made such a claim and Christians agree with them. They are

compelled to do so, indeed, or else abjure the fundamental dogma of

their faith--the doctrine of the Trinity.

Now we approach the consideration of a phase of the subject where

theology and law meet and blend. It has been sought to ridicule the

contention that Jesus should have been heard on the charge of being the

Son of God, in the sense that He was God Himself, because such a claim

was not only ridiculous and frivolous as a plea, but because it was

blasphemous upon its face; as being opposed, by bare assertion, to the

most fundamental and sacred precept of the Mosaic Code and of the

teachings of the Prophets: that God was purely and wholly spiritual;

that He was not only incorporeal but invisible, indivisible, and

incomprehensible. The advocates of this theory declare that Jesus

asserted, in the face of this primary belief of the Hebrews, a plurality

of gods of which He was a member, and that this assertion destroyed the

very cornerstone of Judaism, founded in the teaching of the celebrated

passage: "Hear, O Israel: The Lord our God is one Lord." They further

declare that when Jesus presented Himself in the flesh, and declared

that He was God, He insulted both the intelligence and religious

consciousness of His judges by a complete anthropomorphism; and that

when He did this, He was not entitled to be heard.

One of the most radical of this class is Rabbi Wise who, in "The

Martyrdom of Jesus," says: "Had Jesus maintained before a Jewish court

to be the Son of God, in the trinitarian sense of the terms, viz., that

He was part, person, or incarnation of the Deity, He must have said it

in terms to be understood to that effect, as ambiguous words amount to

nothing. But if even clearly understood, the court could only have found

Him insane, but not guilty of any crime." This is strong language,

indeed, and deserves serious consideration. It means nothing less than

that Jesus, upon His confession of equality and identity with God,

should have been committed as a lunatic, and not tried as a criminal.

And the real meaning of this too extreme view is that the claims of

Jesus, being a man in the flesh, to membership in a plurality of gods

was such an outrageous and unheard-of thing that it amounted to

insanity; and that an insane person was not one to be listened to, but

to be committed and protected. The purpose of the distinguished Hebrew

theologian was to show by the absurdity of the thing that Jesus was

never tried before a Hebrew court; that He never claimed to be the Son

of God, and that the Evangelical narratives are simply false. The same

writer thus continues in the same connection: "Mark reports furthermore,

that Jesus did not simply affirm the high priest's question but added:

'And ye shall see the Son of Man sitting on the right hand of power, and

coming in the clouds of heaven.' Jesus cannot have said these words. Our

reasons are: they are not true; none of the judges and witnesses present

ever did see him either sitting on the right hand of power or coming in

the clouds of heaven. These words could have originated only after the

death of Jesus, when the Jewish Christians expected his immediate return

as the Messiah and restorer of the kingdom of heaven, so that those very

men could see him coming in the clouds of heaven. Besides, Jesus, the

Pharisean Jew, could not have entertained the anthropomorphism that God

had a _right hand_."[326] It is only necessary to add that Rabbi Wise

may be right, if the Gospel writers were untruthful men. Suffice it to

say that we have said enough in support of the veracity of the

Evangelists in Part I of this volume. If we are right that they were

truthful historians when they published these biographies to the world,

Rabbi Wise is wrong; for according to these writers the Sanhedrin did

not take the view that Jesus was a crazy man, but that He was a

criminal. They accordingly tried Him to the extent of bringing an

accusation against Him and of supporting it with a certain kind and

amount of testimony, and by then leading Him away to be crucified by the

Romans. Our contention is that the trial was not complete, in that His

judges did not consider the merits of the defense of Jesus in the

proceedings which they conducted against Him.

It would be entirely consistent with the plan of this treatise and of

the special treatment of this theme to ignore completely the question of

the divinity of Jesus; since we have announced a legal and not a

theological consideration of the subject. But we repeat that the

theological and the legal are inseparably interwoven in a proper

handling of Point XII. If Rabbi Wise and others are right that the

anthropomorphic pretensions of Jesus robbed Him of the protection of the

law, in the sense that His claims to be God in the flesh were not worthy

of consideration by a Hebrew court, then we are wrong in making the

point that the merits of His defense should have been considered.

Our contention is that the claims of Jesus were not so strange and

shocking as to place Him without the pale of the law and to deny Him its

ordinary protection; that His pretensions were not those of an insane

man; that if He was not the Son of God He was guilty of blasphemy; and

that if He was the Son of God He was innocent. We further contend that

all these things were subjects of legitimate judicial examination by

Hebrew judges under Hebrew law, and that Jesus should have had His day

in court.

A very brief examination of the question of anthropomorphism in its

connection with the claims of Jesus will demonstrate the fallacy of the

arguments of Rabbi Wise and of those who agree with him. Candor compels

us to admit that the Jewish conception of Jehovah at the time of the

crucifixion was very foreign to the notion of a God of flesh and bone.

Hebrew monotheism taught the doctrine of one God who was purely

spiritual, and therefore invisible, intangible, and unapproachable.

Judaism delighted to lift its deity above the sensual, material, and

corporeal things of earth, and to represent Him as a pure and sinless

spirit in a state of awful and supreme transcendence. Our first

impression, then, is that this dogma of divine unity and spirituality

must have received a dreadful shock when Jesus, a carpenter of Nazareth,

whose mother, father, brothers, and sisters were known, confronted the

high priest and declared to him that He was God. But the shock was

certainly not so great that Caiaphas and his colleagues, after a

moment's composure and reflection, could not have concluded that the

pretensions of Jesus were not wholly at variance with the revelations of

Hebrew theology in the earlier years of the Commonwealth of Israel. They

might have judged His claims to be unfounded, but they were certainly

not justified in pronouncing Him insane, or in ignoring His rights under

the law to be heard and to have His defense considered. Their arrest and

trial of the prisoner was the consummation of a number of secret

meetings in which the astounding personality and marvelous performances

of Jesus were debated and discussed with fear and trembling. The

raising of Lazarus from the dead had created a frightful panic among the

Sadducean oligarchy. Far from regarding Him as an obscure person whose

claims were ridiculous and whose mind was unbalanced, the priests feared

lest all men might believe on Him, and boldly declared that such was the

influence of His deeds that His single life might be balanced against

the existence of a whole nation.[327]

What the judges of the Sanhedrin should have done in examining the

merits of the defense of Jesus was: (1) To consider whether, in the

light of Hebrew scripture and tradition, a god of flesh and bone,

representing the second person of a Duality or a Trinity of gods, was

possible; (2) to weigh thoroughly the claims of Jesus, in the light of

testimony properly adduced at the trial, that He was this second person

of a Duality or Trinity of gods.

In making this examination, let us bear in mind, the members of the

court were not to look forward, but backward. They were to examine the

past, not the future, in reference to the present. Furthermore, they

were not to consider so much a Trinity as a Duality of gods; for it must

be remembered that the Holy Ghost was not a feature of the trial. The

Athanasian creed and the proceedings of the Nicene Council were not

binding upon Caiaphas and his fellow-judges. Nor were the teachings of

the New Testament scriptures published to the world more than a

generation after the trial. They were to consider the divine pretensions

of Jesus in the light of the teachings and revelations of the Law and

the Prophets. They were to measure His claims by these standards in the

light of the evidence adduced before them.

With a view to a thorough and systematic examination of the merits of

the defense of Jesus, Caiaphas, as presiding officer of the Sanhedrin,

should have propounded to his fellow-judges the following initial

questions: (1) Do the Law and the Prophets reveal the doctrine of a

plurality of gods among the Israelites? That is, has Jehovah ever

begotten, or has He ever promised to beget, a Son of equal divinity with

Himself? Was this Son to be, or is He to be born of a woman; and to

have, therefore, the form of a man and the attributes of a human being?

Was this Son to be, or is He to be at any time identical with the

Father? Do the Law and the Prophets tell us unmistakably that Jehovah

ever appeared upon the earth in human form and exhibited human

attributes? Do they contain a promise from the Father that He would send

His Son to the earth to be the Redeemer of men and the Regenerator of

the world? (2) Do the credentials of Jesus, the prisoner at the bar, in

the light of the evidence before us, entitle Him to be considered this

Son and Ambassador of God, sent from the Father to redeem mankind?

It follows logically and necessarily that if affirmative answers were

not given to the first set of questions an examination of the second

would be useless. Let us conceive, then, that the judges of the

Sanhedrin had employed this method. What answers, we may ask, would

they have developed to these questions from the Sacred Books?

At the outset it is safe to say that negative answers would have been

given, if the judges had considered the claims of Jesus with reference

alone to the prevailing Pharisaic teachings of the days of Jesus. And in

this connection let us note that the Hebrew conception of Jehovah had

materially changed in the time intervening between the Mosaic

dispensation and the coming of the Christ. The spiritual growth of the

nation had been characterized at every step by marked aversion to

anthropomorphism--the ascription to God of human form and attributes. In

the Pentateuch there is a prevailing anthropomorphic idea of Jehovah. He

is frequently talked about as if He were a man. Human passions and

emotions are repeatedly ascribed to Him. This was inevitable among a

primitive people whose crude religious consciousness sought to frame

from the analogy of human nature a visible symbol of the Deity and a

sensible emblem of religious faith. All early religions have manifested

the same anthropomorphic tendencies. Both Judaism and Christianity have

long since planted themselves upon the fundamental proposition that God

is a spirit. But both these systems of religion have in all ages been

compelled to run the gantlet of two opposing tendencies: one of which

sought by a living, personal communion with God through Moses and

through Christ, by means of human attributes and symbols, an intimate

knowledge and immediate benefit of the divine nature; the other, from a

horror of anthropomorphism, tending to make God purely passionless and

impersonal, thus reducing Him to a bare conception without form or

quality, thus making Him a blank negation.

The successive steps in the progress of weeding out anthropomorphisms

from the Pentateuch may be clearly traced in later Hebrew literature.

The Prophets themselves were at times repelled by the sensuous

conceptions of God revealed by the writings of Moses. The great lawgiver

had attributed to Jehovah the quality of repentance, a human attribute.

"And it _repented_ the Lord that he had made man on the earth, and it

grieved him at his heart," says Genesis vi. 6. But a later writer, the

prophet Samuel, denied that God had such a quality. "And also the

Strength of Israel will not lie nor repent: for he is not a man, that he

should repent."[328] And the prophet Hosea affirms this declaration when

he places in the mouth of Jehovah the affirmation: "For I am God and not

man."[329]

At a still later age, when the notion of the supreme transcendence of

Jehovah had become prevalent, it was considered objectionable to make

God say, "I will dwell in your midst"; as a substitute, "I shall cause

you to dwell" was adopted. "To behold the face of God" was not a

repulsive phrase in the ancient days of Hebrew plainness and simplicity,

but later times sought to eradicate the anthropomorphism by saying

instead, "to appear before God."

The Septuagint, the Greek version of the Bible in use at the time of

Christ, reveals the same tendency toward paraphrasing or spiritualizing

the anthropomorphic phrases of the older Bible. In this translation the

"image of God" of the older Hebrew literature becomes "the glory of

God," and "the mouth of God" is expressed by "the voice of the Lord."

The Septuagint was written more than a century before the birth of

Jesus, and we may safely assert that at the beginning of our era the

Jews not only affirmatively proclaimed the doctrine of divine unity and

pure spirituality, in relation to the person and character of Jehovah,

but that they boldly and indignantly denied and denounced any attempt to

make of God a man or to attribute to Him human qualities. But when we

say "the Jews," we mean the dominant religious sect of the nation, the

Pharisees. We should not forget, in this connection, that the primary

difference between the Sadducees and the Pharisees was in the varying

intensity with which they loved the Law of Moses and adhered to its

teachings. We have seen in Part II of this volume that the Mishna, the

oral law, was really more highly esteemed by the Pharisaic Jews than was

the Mosaic Code. But the Sadducees planted themselves squarely upon the

Pentateuch and denied that the traditions of the Scribes were of binding

force. "The Sadducees were a body of aristocrats opposed to the oral law

and the later developments of Judaism."

Now what views, we may ask, did the Sadducees entertain of the

possibility of God appearing to men in the flesh? In other words, what

was their notion, at the time of Christ, of the anthropomorphisms of the

Pentateuch, which was their ultimate guide and standard in all matters

of legal and religious interpretation? These questions are important in

this connection, since Caiaphas and the large majority of his colleagues

in the Great Sanhedrin were Sadducees and held the fate of Jesus in

their hands. Candor compels us to admit that we believe that the

Sadducees agreed with the Pharisees that Jehovah was a pure and sinless

spirit. But we feel equally sure that their knowledge of the Pentateuch,

in which at times anthropomorphism is strongly accentuated, taught them

that Jehovah had not only appeared in the flesh among men in olden

times, but that it was not at all impossible or unreasonable that He

should come again in the same form. But this much is certain: that in

determining whether Jesus could be both man and God the Sadducees would

be disposed to ignore the traditions of the Pharisees and "the later

developments of Judaism," and appeal direct to the law of Moses. Jesus

Himself, if He had been disposed to make a defense of His claims, and

His judges had been disposed to hear Him, would have appealed to the

same legal standard. Christ more than once manifested a disposition to

appeal to the Mosaic Code, as a modern citizen would appeal from mere

statutes and the decisions of the courts, to the constitution, as the

fundamental law of the land. Mark tells us that in denouncing the

Pharisees, He used this language: "And he said unto them, Full well ye

reject the commandment of God, that ye may keep your own tradition....

Making the word of God of none effect through your tradition, which ye

have delivered: and many such like things do ye."[330] Hebrew sacred

literature is filled with anecdotes, often characterized by raillery and

jests, of how the Sadducces denounced the Pharisees for their attempts

to nullify Mosaic injunction by their peculiar interpretation.

Now in view of what we have just said, are we not justified in assuming

that if the judges had accorded Jesus full liberty of defense He would

have appealed to the Pentateuch, with the approbation of His judges, to

show that God had appeared among men in the flesh, and that a plurality

in the Godhead was plainly taught? Would He not then have appealed to

the Prophets to show that Jehovah had spoken of a begotten Son who was

none other than Almighty God Himself? Would He not have shown from both

the Law and the Prophets that the angel of Jehovah, who was none other

than Himself, had frequently, in ages past, acted as the ambassador of

God in numerous visits to the earth, on missions of love and mercy among

men? Would He not have proved to them that this angel of Jehovah had

been at certain times in the past none other than Jehovah Himself? Could

He not have pointed out to them that their whole sacred literature was

filled with prophecies foretelling the coming of this Son and Ambassador

of God to the earth to redeem fallen man? Could He not then have

summoned a hundred witnesses to prove His own connection with these

prophecies, to show His virgin birth, and to give an account of the

numerous miracles which He had wrought, and that were the best evidence

of His divine character?

Let us imagine that Caiaphas, as judge, had demanded of Jesus, the

prisoner, to produce Biblical evidence that God had ever begotten or had

promised to beget a Son who was equal with Himself. The following

passages might have been produced:

Psa. ii. 7: Thou art my son; this day have I begotten thee.

Isa. ix. 6: For unto us a child is born, unto us a son is given: and

the government shall be upon his shoulder: and his name shall be

called Wonderful, Counselor, The mighty God, The everlasting

Father, The Prince of Peace.

What closer identity, we may ask, could be demanded between the Father

and the Son than is revealed by this language of Isaiah, "and his (the

son's) name shall be called The mighty God, The everlasting Father?"

What more exact equality could be asked than the same words suggest?

What stronger proof of plurality in the Godhead could be demanded?

Again, let us suppose that His judges had demanded of Jesus scriptural

proof that the divine Son of God was to be born of a woman, and was to

have, therefore, the form of a man and the attributes of a human being.

The following passages might have been produced:

Isa. vii. 14: Therefore the Lord himself shall give you a sign;

Behold, a virgin shall conceive and bear a son, and shall call his

name Immanuel.

Gen. iii. 15: And I will put enmity between thee and the woman, and

between thy seed and her seed; it shall bruise thy head, and thou

shalt bruise his heel.

Enoch lxii. 5: And one Portion of them will look on the other, and

they will be terrified, and their countenance will fall, and they

will seize them when they see _that Son of Woman_ sitting on the

throne of his glory.

The first of these passages needs no comment. It is perfectly clear and

speaks for itself. Regarding the second, it may be observed that after

the fall of Adam and Eve in the Garden of Eden it was announced that the

seed of the woman should bruise the serpent's head. This announcement

contained, when viewed in the light of subsequent revelations, both a

promise and a prophecy; a promise of a Redeemer of fallen man, and a

prophecy that He would finally triumph over all the powers of sin and

darkness whose father was Satan, who had entered into the serpent. The

"seed of the woman" foretold that the Redeemer would have a human

nature; His triumph over Satan suggested His divine origin and power.

Again, continuing the examination, let us suppose that Caiaphas had

informed Jesus that His pretensions to be God in the flesh were not only

not sanctioned by but were offensive to the current teachings of Judaism

in relation to the person and character of Jehovah. Let us suppose,

further, that the high priest had informed the prisoner that he and his

fellow-judges, who were Sadducees in faith and a majority in number of

the Sanhedrin, did not feel themselves bound by Pharisaic tradition and

"the later developments of Judaism"; that they preferred the Mosaic Code

as a standard of legal and religious judgment; that the anthropomorphisms

of the Pentateuch were not particularly offensive to them, for the

reason that they had not been to Moses; and that if He, the prisoner at

the bar, could cite instances related by Moses where Jehovah had

appeared among men, having the form of a human being, His case would be

greatly strengthened; on the ground that if God had ever appeared in the

flesh on one occasion it was not unreasonable, or at least impossible,

that He should so appear again.

In proof that God had appeared in the flesh, or at least in human form,

among men, the following passages might have been adduced:

Gen. xviii. 1-8: And the Lord appeared unto him in the plains of

Mamre: and he sat in the tent door in the heat of the day; And he

lifted up his eyes and looked, and, lo, three men stood by him:

and when he saw them, he ran to meet them from the tent door, and

bowed himself toward the ground, And said, My Lord, if now I have

found favour in thy sight, pass not away, I pray thee, from thy

servant: ... And Abraham ran unto the herd, and fetched a calf

tender and good, and gave it unto a young man; and he hasted to

dress it. And he took butter, and milk, and the calf which he had

dressed, and set it before them; and he stood by them under the

tree, and they did eat.

Gen. xvi. 10-13: And the angel of the Lord said unto her, I will

multiply thy seed exceedingly, that it shall not be numbered for

multitude. And the angel of the Lord said unto her, Behold, thou

art with child, and shalt bear a son, and shalt call his name

Ishmael; because the Lord hath heard thy affliction.... And she

called the name of the Lord that spake unto her, Thou God seest

me: for she said, Have I also here looked after him that seeth me?

Gen. xxii. 11, 12: And the angel of the Lord called unto him out of

heaven, and said, Abraham, Abraham: and he said, Here am I. And he

said, Lay not thine hand upon the lad, neither do thou any thing

unto him: for now I know that thou fearest God, seeing thou hast

not withheld thy son, thine only son, from me.

Ex. iii. 2-6: And the Angel of the Lord appeared unto him in a flame

of fire out of the midst of a bush: and he looked, and, behold,

the bush burned with fire, and the bush was not consumed. And

Moses said, I will not turn aside, and see this great sight, why

the bush is not burnt. And when the Lord saw that he turned aside

to see, God called unto him out of the midst of the bush, and

said, Moses, Moses. And he said, Here am I. And he said, Draw not

nigh hither: put off thy shoes from off thy feet; for the place

whereon thou standest is holy ground. Moreover he said, I am the

God of thy father, the God of Abraham, the God of Isaac, and the

God of Jacob. And Moses hid his face; for he was afraid to look

upon God.

From the first passage above cited it is clear that Jehovah, in the form

of a man, appeared to Abraham in the plains of Mamre. A contributor to

"The Jewish Encyclopedia" declares that these three men were angels in

the shape of human beings of extraordinary beauty but that they were not

at once recognized as angels.[331] The Christian commentators are

generally agreed that it was Jehovah who was present in human form.[332]

The other members of the company are declared by some of them to be the

second and third persons of the Trinity. Plausibility is given to this

contention by the fact that Abraham first saw one person, the Lord;

then he looked up and saw three; he then advanced to meet the three,

and, addressing them, used a singular epithet, "My Lord." The form of

the address, together with the movements of Abraham, seem to suggest

three in one and one in three. But with this theory we are not seriously

concerned, as our present purpose is to show that Jehovah occasionally

appeared in human form upon the earth in the olden days. A plurality of

gods is suggested, however, by the passage, if Christian interpretation

be applied; for if one of these men was Jehovah, as Abraham's language

seems to indicate, and as modern Christian interpretation generally

maintains, why could not the other two men have also been gods in the

form of the Son and the Holy Spirit? If the Jewish commentator's

opinion, to which we have referred heretofore, be plausible--that the

three men were angels in human form--why is it not equally as plausible

to suppose that a god or gods should also appear in human form? But at

all events these three men were not ordinary human beings. He who

maintains that they were assaults the intelligence of either the

translators of the Bible or of Abraham, or both; for the Hebrew

patriarch believed that Jehovah was present as a guest in his house, and

he spread a hospitable meal for him. The language of Genesis very

clearly indicates as much. And the question may be asked: If Abraham

could not recognize Jehovah, who could or can?

In the second of the above extracts from Genesis the angel of the Lord

appeared unto Hagar and said to her: "I will multiply thy seed

exceedingly, that it shall not be numbered for multitude." And Hagar

made reply: "And she called the name of the Lord that spake unto her,

Thou God seest me." This passage plainly teaches that the angel of the

Lord and Jehovah were sometimes identical.

The third passage heretofore cited from Genesis also teaches the

identity of the angel of the Lord and of God Himself, in the matter of

the attempted sacrifice of Isaac by Abraham. It was the same voice, that

of the angel of the Lord, that said: "For now I know that thou fearest

God, seeing thou hast not withheld thy son, thine only son from me."

Again, the identity of the angel of the Lord and of Jehovah is

unmistakably shown from the account of the voice that cried from the

burning bush: "I am the God of thy father, the God of Abraham, the God

of Isaac, and the God of Jacob. And Moses hid his face, for he was

afraid to look upon God."

Concerning the manifestation of Jehovah to men in angelic and human form

a modern writer says: "Much has been written concerning a certain

Mal'akh Yaweh (messenger of Jehovah) who appears in the Old Testament. I

say 'a certain' Mal'akh Yaweh, because it is not every Mal'akh Yaweh

that appears to which I refer. In most passages the Mal'akh Yaweh is

simply an angel sent by the Almighty to communicate his will or purposes

to men. These angels are distinctly apprehended as created

intelligences, wholly separate and diverse from God. But there is a

class of passages in which the Mal'akh Yaweh appears as a

self-manifestation of God. He appears indeed in human form and speaks

of God in the third person. But those to whom he appears are oppressed

by the consciousness that they have seen God and must die. They see in

him an impersonation of Deity such as is found in no other angel. He is

to their minds not merely a messenger from God but the revelation of the

being of God. The Christian fathers for the most part identify him with

the Logos of the New Testament. But there is as much reason to adopt the

opinion of many modern writers who hold that he is Jehovah himself

appearing in human form, for he is explicitly addressed as Jehovah

(Judges vi. 11-24)."[333]

The identity of the angel of Jehovah and of Jehovah Himself could not be

more conclusively proved than in the appearance to Gideon, related in

the passage above cited, Judges vi. 11-24. The absolute identity is

revealed in verses 22, 23: "And when Gideon perceived that he was an

angel of the Lord, Gideon said, Alas, O Lord God! for because I have

seen an angel of the Lord face to face. And the Lord said unto him,

Peace be unto thee; fear not: thou shalt not die."

Now let us suppose that Caiaphas and the Sanhedrin had received these

passages favorably; that they had become convinced that Jehovah had

appeared in the olden days in the form of angels and of men; that at one

time He was identical with a man, and at another with an angel whom He

had sent. Let us suppose further that the judges of Jesus had demanded

of Him a passage of ancient Scriptures connecting Him even remotely

with this messenger of God. The following passage might have been

produced:

Ex. xxiii. 20, 21: Behold, I send an Angel before thee, to keep

thee in the way, and to bring thee into the place which I have

prepared. Beware of him, and obey his voice, provoke him not; for

he will not pardon your transgressions: for my name is in him.

The concluding paragraph of the last cited passage, "My name is in him,"

is equivalent to "I am in him." The mere name of God is often used to

denote God Himself as manifested. For instance, in I Kings viii. 29 is

contained the statement, "My name shall be there"; that is, "There will

I dwell." And when it is said that the name of Jehovah would be in the

angel of Jehovah it is equivalent to saying that Jehovah Himself would

be present in His messenger which He had sent before Him. The passage

further teaches that the messenger of Jehovah to the earth bore a

commission to pardon sin, or not to, according to his pleasure. The

Sanhedrin were undoubtedly aware that Jesus claimed the same power by

virtue of authority vested in Him by His Father.

But it may be imagined that Caiaphas was perfectly willing to concede

that Jehovah had appeared in human form upon the earth, but was not

inclined to believe that He had ever manifested human passions and

emotions, as Jesus had done when He denounced on several occasions the

hypocrisy of the Pharisees; and, above all, when He overthrew the tables

in the Temple, and, applying a lash to their backs, drove out the

money-changers.[334] Let us imagine that the high priest demanded of the

prisoner proof from the ancient Scriptures that Jehovah was possessed of

ordinary human attributes; and particularly that He was at times

disposed to fight. Jesus might have produced the following passages to

show that Jehovah, His Father, had manifested in times past the ordinary

human passions and emotions of repentance, grief, jealousy, anger,

graciousness, love, and hate:

Ex. xv. 3, 6: The Lord is a man of war.... Thy right hand, O

Lord, is become glorious in power: thy right hand, O Lord, hath

dashed in pieces the enemy.

Gen. vi. 6: And it _repented_ the Lord that he had made man on the

earth, and it grieved him at his heart.

Deut. vi. 15: For the Lord thy God is a _jealous_ God among you,

lest the anger of the Lord thy God be kindled against thee, and

destroy thee from off the face of the earth.

Psa. cxi. 4: He hath made his wonderful works to be remembered: the

Lord is _gracious_ and full of _compassion_.

I Kings x. 9: Because the Lord _loved_ Israel forever, therefore

made he thee king, to do judgment and justice.

Prov. vi. 16: These six things doth the Lord _hate_: yea, seven are

an abomination unto him.

And as a final step in the examination let us imagine that Caiaphas and

his colleagues had stated to Jesus that they were satisfied, from the

authorities cited, that Jehovah had, in ancient days, appeared upon the

earth in human form and had exhibited human attributes; that Jehovah had

begotten a Son who was equal in power and majesty with Himself; that

this Son had been begotten of a woman and possessed, therefore, human

form and attributes; that this Jehovah had sent an angel messenger to

the earth with a commission to pardon sins. Let us imagine further that

the judges had demanded of the prisoner that He present and prove His

credentials as the divine ambassador of God from heaven to men on earth;

that He conform His personal claims to heavenly Messiahship to ancient

prophecy by producing evidence before them in court. What facts, we may

ask, could Jesus have shown to establish His claims to Messiahship and

to Sonship of the Father?

To attempt to originate a defense for Jesus would be unnecessary, if not

actually impertinent and sacrilegious. We are fully justified, however,

in assuming that if called upon to prove His claims to Messiahship He

would have made the same reply to the Sanhedrin that He had already made

to the Jews out of court who asked Him: "What sign shewest thou, then,

that we may see, and believe thee? what dost thou work?"[335] "How long

dost thou make us to doubt? If thou be the Christ, tell us plainly.

Jesus answered them, I told you, and ye believed not: _the works that I

do in my Father's name, they bear witness of me_."[336] Again, He would

have doubtless made the same reply to Caiaphas that He did to the

embassy from John the Baptist who came to inquire if He was really the

Messiah. "Jesus answered and said unto them, Go and shew John again

those things which ye do hear and see: The blind receive their sight,

and the lame walk, the lepers are cleansed, and the deaf hear, the dead

are raised up, and the poor have the gospel preached to them."[337]

Under a fair trial, in daylight, with full freedom of defense to the

accused, abundant evidence could have been secured of the miraculous

powers of Jesus and of the truthfulness of His pretensions to a divine

origin. Testimony could have been introduced that would have been not

only competent but entirely satisfactory. The New Testament narratives

tell us of about forty miracles that Jesus performed during His life.

The closing verse of St. John intimates that He performed many that were

never reported. The circumstances surrounding the working of these

wonders were such as to make them peculiarly competent as evidence and

to carry conviction of their genuineness, when they were once

introduced.

In the first place, miracles were entirely capable of being proved by

testimony. If those persons who had known Lazarus intimately during his

lifetime saw him dead on one day, and on the fourth day afterwards saw

him alive and walking the streets, the senses would be perfectly

competent to decide and the fact that a miracle had been performed would

be conclusively proved. And it may be added that a dozen witnesses who

were entirely competent to testify could have been summoned to the

defense of Jesus in the matter of raising Lazarus from the dead.

Again, we must remember that the miracles of Jesus were performed in the

most public manner, in the street, on the highway, in far-away Galilee,

and at the very gates of Jerusalem. Both His friends and enemies, men

and women, were witnesses of their performance. The number and publicity

of these wonder-working performances rendered it possible for the

Sanhedrin to call before them hundreds and thousands of competent

witnesses who had seen and felt the manifestation of the divine power of

the prisoner in their presence.

Again, the miracles of Jesus were such as to render them subject to the

test of the senses, when submitted to examination. If Caiaphas and his

fellow-judges had decided that there was fraud in the matter of the

alleged raising of Lazarus from the dead, because the brother of Martha

and Mary was not really dead, but simply swooned or slept; if they had

decided that the man sick of the palsy was not cured by miracle, but by

faith; nevertheless, they could not have charged fraud and faith cure in

the matter of the stilling of the tempest or the feeding of the five

thousand or the walking on the sea. They would have been forced to

conclude that the witnesses had lied or that miracles had been wrought.

In the case of the feeding of the five thousand, the witnesses would

have been too numerous to brand with falsehood.

But, we may ask, was the performance of miracles by Jesus, if believed

by the Sanhedrin, sufficient evidence of the divine origin of Jesus?

This question we are not prepared to answer positively, either yes or

no. We can only venture the personal opinion that the act of raising a

person indisputably dead, to life again, would be an astounding

miracle, an achievement that could be wrought by the hand of a God

alone. The trouble with the question is that men like Elijah raised the

dead.[338] It is true that there is no pretension that Elijah was divine

or that he wrought the miracle by virtue of any peculiar power within

himself. The Scriptures plainly state that he asked God to raise the

dead to life through him. The same is true of the raising of Lazarus by

Jesus.[339] But Christ seems to have raised the daughter of Jairus[340]

and the son of the widow of Nain[341] from the dead by virtue of the

strength of His own divinity; for there is no suggestion that the power

of God was either previously invoked or subsequently acknowledged.

As to the weight which the testimony of the miracles of Jesus should

have had with Caiaphas and the other members of the court, we have a

valuable indication in the opinion expressed by Nicodemus, who was

himself a member of the Sanhedrin, when he said to Jesus: "We know that

thou art a teacher come from God: for no man can do these miracles that

thou doest, except God be with him."[342] If Nicodemus, "a ruler of the

Jews" and one of the leading members of their highest tribunal, believed

that Jesus was divine because of the wonders that He had wrought, why

should not a knowledge of these miracles by the other members of the

Sanhedrin have produced the same impression? Nicodemus, it is true, was

a friend of Jesus, but he was not a disciple. And the very timidity

with which he expressed his friendship, having come at night to pay his

compliments to the Master, demonstrates the deep impression that the

miraculous powers of the Christ had made upon him.

But the judges of Jesus were not limited to the evidence of miracles as

a proof of the divinity of the prisoner in their midst. They should have

weighed "in the sincerity of their conscience" the fact that Jesus was

born in Bethlehem in fulfillment of the prophecy contained in Micah v.

2; that He was sprung from the House of David in conformity with the

teachings in Jeremiah xxiii. 5, 6; that John the Baptist was His

forerunner like unto Elijah, who had come to prepare the way according

to the prophecy in Malachi iii. 1; that He had begun to preach in

Galilee, as foretold in Isaiah ix. 1, 2; that the scepter had departed

from Judah and the lawgiver from between his feet, as prophesied in

Genesis xlix. 10, which fact it was believed would herald the approach

of the Messiah; that He had made His public entry into Jerusalem riding

upon an ass, as foretold in Zechariah ix. 9; and that He had been

betrayed into their hands by one of His own friends, in fulfillment of

prophecies contained in Psalms xli. 9 and Zechariah xi. 12, 13.

This cumulative evidence, this collective proof, must have carried

overwhelming conviction to the minds and the hearts of fair and

impartial judges. More than one Nicodemus would have arisen to plead the

cause of Jesus if this testimony had been adduced before a free-minded,

open-hearted, disinterested tribunal. More than one Joseph of Arimathea

would have refused assent in a hostile verdict against a prisoner in

whose favor the record of fact was so pronounced.

In determining the weight that this evidence should have had in

affecting the decision of the judges we must not forget that a Jewish

prisoner was not required to prove his innocence. It was incumbent upon

the Commonwealth of Israel to establish guilt beyond all doubt. We

should also remember that the peculiar tendency of the Hebrew system of

criminal procedure was in the direction of complete protection to the

accused. Not reasonable doubt merely, but all doubt was resolved in his

favor. It was a maxim of the Hebrew law that "the Sanhedrin was to save,

not to destroy life." Pretext after pretext was sought to acquit. "The

primary object of the Hebrew judicial system," says Benny, "was to

render the conviction of an innocent person impossible. All the

ingenuity of the Jewish legists was directed to the attainment of this

end." If this generous and merciful tendency of Hebrew law had been duly

observed, would not the production of the evidence above noted have

resulted in the acquittal of Jesus?

But, at this point, let us return to the consideration of the real

meaning of the objection urged in Point XII. The irregularity therein

alleged is that the Sanhedrin paid no attention whatever to the defense

of Jesus. And herein was the real error. The members of that court might

have rejected as false the claims of the Nazarene to Messiahship. They

might have denounced as fraudulent his pretensions to miraculous

powers. They could not for this reason have been charged with judicial

unfairness, if they had first heard his defense and had then "weighed it

in the sincerity of their conscience." Infallibility of judgment cannot

be demanded of judicial officers.

In closing the discussion of errors committed at the night trial in the

palace of Caiaphas, the reader should be reminded that the twelve Points

above mentioned are not exhaustive of the irregularities. Others might

be mentioned. It seems that Jesus, being the accused, should not have

been put under oath.[343] On the days on which capital verdicts were

pronounced Hebrew judges were required to mourn and fast.[344] But there

was evidently no mourning and fasting by Caiaphas and his colleagues at

the time of the condemnation of Jesus. Again, there is no evidence that

Antecedent Warning was properly administered. Still other errors might

be noted, if a legal presumption in favor of the correctness of the

record did not prevent. The irregularities which we have heretofore

discussed, it is believed, exhaust all the material errors committed at

the first session of the Sanhedrin. At least, no others are revealed by

the Gospel records.

_The Morning Session of the Sanhedrin._--About three hours after the

close of the night session in the palace of Caiaphas, that is about six

o'clock in the morning, the Sanhedrin reconvened in a second session.

In the interval between these sittings Jesus was brutalized by His

keepers. Exactly what the priests were doing we do not know. They were

probably busily engaged in perfecting plans for the destruction of the

prisoner in their charge.

The daylight meeting is thus reported in Matthew xxvii. 1: "When the

morning was come, all the chief priests and elders of the people took

counsel against Jesus to put him to death." In Mark xv. 1 the same

session is thus recorded: "And straightway in the morning the chief

priests held a consultation with the elders and scribes and the whole

council, and bound Jesus, and carried him away, and delivered him to

Pilate."

The exact nature of this morning sitting, whether a regular trial or an

informal gathering, is not certainly known. Meyer, Ellicott, and

Lichtenstein maintain that this second session was nothing more than a

prolongation of the night trial, perhaps with a brief recess, and that

its special object was to convene for consultation concerning the

carrying out of the sentence which had already been pronounced against

Jesus.[345] But this view is entirely exceptional. It is maintained by

the greater number of reputable authorities that the second sitting was

in the nature of a second trial. The solution of the difficulty seems to

turn upon the account given by St. Luke, for St. John records the

details of neither the night nor the morning session. St. Luke describes

a regular trial, but it is not positively known whether his account

refers to the night or to the morning meeting. If his report refers to

the same trial as that described in Matthew xxvi. 57-68 and in Mark xiv.

53-65, then we have only the brief notices in Matthew xxvii. 1 and in

Mark xv. 1 concerning the morning session, which indicate only a very

brief and informal meeting of the Sanhedrin at daybreak. On the other

hand, if the report of St. Luke refers to the daylight meeting of the

Sanhedrin referred to by St. Matthew and St. Mark then we have received

from the third Evangelist a description of a regular trial at the second

session of the Sanhedrin. Andrews has thus expressed himself very

cogently concerning this matter:

Our decision as to a second and distinct session of the Sanhedrin

will mainly depend upon the place we give to the account in Luke

xxii. 66-71. Is this examination of Jesus identical with that first

session of Matthew xxvi. 57-68, and of Mark xiv. 53-65? Against

this identity are some strong objections: First, The mention of

time by Luke: "As soon as it was day." This corresponds well to the

time of the morning session of Matthew and Mark, but not to the

time when Jesus was first led before the Sanhedrin, which must have

been two or three hours before day. Second, The place of the

meeting: "They led Him into their council," [Greek: anêgagon auton

eis to synedrion heautôn]. This is rendered by some: "They led Him

up into their council chamber," or the place where they usually

held their sessions. Whether this council chamber was the room

Gazith at the east corner of the court of the temple, is not

certain. Lightfoot (on Matthew xxvi. 3) conjectures that the

Sanhedrin was driven from this its accustomed seat half a year or

thereabout before the death of Christ. But if this were so, still

the "Tabernæ," where it established its sessions, were shops near

the gate Shusan, and so connected with the temple. They went up to

that room where they usually met. Third, The dissimilarity of the

proceedings, as stated by Luke, which shows that this was no formal

trial. There is here no mention of witnesses--no charges brought to

be proved against Him. He is simply asked to tell them if He is the

Christ ("If thou art the Christ, tell us," R. V.); and this seems

plainly to point to the result of the former session. Then, having

confessed Himself to be the Christ, the Son of God, He was

condemned to death for blasphemy. It was only necessary now that He

repeat His confession, and hence this question is put directly to

Him: "Art thou the Christ? tell us." His reply, "If I tell you, ye

will not believe; and if I also ask you, ye will not answer me, nor

let me go," points backward to his former confession. To His reply

they only answer by asking, "Art thou then the Son of God?" The

renewed avowal that He is the Son of God, heard by them all from

His own lips, opens the way for His immediate delivery into

Pilate's hands. Fourth, The position which Luke gives (xxii. 63-65)

to the insults and abuse heaped upon Jesus. There can be no doubt

that they are the same mentioned by Matthew and Mark as occurring

immediately after the sentence had been first pronounced.

From all this it is a probable, though not a certain conclusion,

that Luke (xxii. 66-71) refers to the same meeting of the Sanhedrin

mentioned by Matthew (xxvii. 1) and Mark (xv. 1), and relates, in

part, what then took place. (Alford thinks that Luke has confused

things and relates as happening at the second session what really

happened at the first.) This meeting was, then, a morning session

convened to ratify formally what had been done before with haste

and informality. The circumstances under which its members had been

earlier convened, at the palace of Caiaphas, sufficiently show that

the legal forms, which they were so scrupulous in observing, had

not been complied with.[346]

If then the second session of the Sanhedrin was in the nature of a

regular trial, what were the facts of the proceedings? St. Luke says:

"And as soon as it was day, the elders of the people and the chief

priests and the scribes came together, and led him into their council,

saying, Art thou the Christ? tell us. And he said unto them, If I tell

you, ye will not believe: And if I also ask you, ye will not answer me,

nor let me go. Hereafter shall the Son of man sit on the right hand of

the power of God. Then said they all, Art thou then the Son of God? And

he said unto them, Ye say that I am. And they said, What need we any

further witness? for we ourselves have heard of his own mouth."[347]

The reader will readily perceive the source of the difficulty which we

have just discussed. This report of St. Luke points both ways, toward

both the night and morning sessions. "_And as soon as it was day_"

clearly indicates a daybreak meeting, but the remainder of the account

bears a most striking resemblance to the reports of the night trial

given by St. Matthew and St. Mark. This seeming discrepancy is very

easily reconciled, however, when we reflect that the second trial

required by Hebrew law to be held in every case where a verdict of guilt

had been pronounced, was virtually a repetition of the first trial.

Benny tells us that the second trial was a critical examination of the

trial of the first day, in which the questions and answers originally

asked and made were carefully reviewed and reëxamined.[348] Is it very

strange, then, that at the morning trial described by St. Luke

substantially the same questions are asked and answers given as are

found in the reports of the night trial by St. Matthew and St. Mark?