4. One trump and two queens is too weak, unless both queens are singly
guarded.
5. One trump, queen of one suit, and knave guarded of another should
not be played unless the queen is also guarded, or the card of the
fourth suit is a court card.
6. One trump, a king and a queen, both unguarded, should not be
played, unless the fourth suit contains a card as high as an ace.
7. Four court cards without a trump are too weak to play, unless they
are of three different suits.
Refuse with three queens, if two are singly guarded; otherwise,
accept.
Lead from your guarded suit, and lead the highest.
If the strong suit led is not trumped, persevere with it, unless with
king of trumps, or queen (king not having been announced), or knave
ace, when lead a trump before continuing your suit.
You should not lead trumps at starting, unless you hold king or queen,
knave, or knave ace, with court cards out of trumps.
The score has to be considered. If the dealer is at four, and the king
is not in your hand nor turned up, play any cards without proposing
which give an even chance of three tricks, e.g. a queen, a guarded
knave, and a guarded ten. The same rule applies to the dealer's
refusal.
At the adverse score of four, and king not being in hand or turned up,
any hand with one trump should be played, unless the plain cards are
very small and of different suits.
If the non-dealer plays without proposing when he is four to three,
and the dealer holds the king he ought not to mark it. The same rule
applies to the non-dealer after a refusal, if the dealer is four to
three.
At the score of non-dealer three, dealer four, the dealer should
refuse on moderate cards, as the player proposing at this score must
have a very bad hand.
At four a forward game should not be played in trumps, as there is no
advantage in winning the vole.
_Laws of Ecarte._--The following laws are abridged from the revised
code adopted by the Turf Club:--A cut must consist of at least two
cards. Card exposed in cutting, fresh cut. Order of distribution of
cards, whether by three and two, or vice versa, once selected, dealer
must not change it during game. Player announcing king when he has not
got it, and playing a card without declaring error, adversary may
correct score and have hand played over again. If offender wins point
or vole that hand, he scores one less than he wins. Proposal,
acceptance, or refusal made cannot be retracted. Cards discarded must
not be looked at. Cards exposed in giving cards to non-dealer, he has
option of taking them or of having next cards; dealer exposing his own
cards, no penalty. Dealer turning up top card after giving cards,
cannot refuse second discard. Dealer accepting when too few cards in
stock to supply both, non-dealer may take cards, and dealer must play
his hand. Card led in turn cannot be taken up again. Card played to a
lead can only be taken up prior to another lead, to save revoke or to
correct error of not winning trick. Card led out of turn may be taken
up prior to its being played to. Player naming one suit and leading
another, adversary has option of requiring suit named to be led. If
offender has none, no penalty. Player abandoning hand, adversary is
deemed to win remaining tricks, and scores accordingly. If a player
revokes or does not win trick when he can do so, the adversary may
correct score and have hand replayed.
See _Academie des jeux_ (various editions after the first quarter of
the 19th century); Hoyle's _Games_ (various editions about the same
dates); Ch. Van-Tenac et Louis Delanoue, _Traite du jeu de l'ecarte_
(Paris, 1845; translated in Bohn's _Handbook of Games_, London, 1850);
"Cavendish," _The Laws of Ecarte, adopted by the Turf Club, with a
Treatise on the Game_ (London, 1878); _Pocket Guide to Ecarte_
("Cavendish," 1897); Foster's _Encyclopaedia of Indoor Games_ (1903).
ECBATANA (_Agbatana_ in Aeschylus, _Hangmatana_ in Old Persian, written
_Agamtanu_ by Nabonidos, and _Agamatanu_ at Behistun, mod. _Hamadan_),
the capital of Astyages (Istuvegu), which was taken by Cyrus in the
sixth year of Nabonidos (549 B.C.). The Greeks supposed it to be the
capital of Media, confusing the Manda, of whom Astyages was king, with
the Mada or Medes of Media Atropatene, and ascribed its foundation to
Deioces (the _Daiukku_ of the cuneiform inscriptions), who is said to
have surrounded his palace in it with seven concentric walls of
different colours. Under the Persian kings, Ecbatana, situated at the
foot of Mount Elvend, became a summer residence; and was afterwards the
capital of the Parthian kings. Sir H. Rawlinson attempted to prove that
there was a second and older Ecbatana in Media Atropatene, on the site
of the modern Takht-i-Suleiman, midway between Hamadan and Tabriz
(_J.R.G.S._ x. 1841), but the cuneiform texts imply that there was only
one city of the name, and Takht-i-Suleiman is the Gazaca of classical
geography. The Ecbatana at which Cambyses is said by Herodotus (iii. 64)
to have died is probably a blunder for Hamath.
See Perrot and Chipiez, _History of Art in Persia_ (Eng. trans.,
1892); M. Dieulafoy, _L'Art antique de la Perse_, pt. i. (1884); J. de
Morgan, _Mission scientifique en Perse_, ii. (1894). See HAMADAN and
PERSIA: _Ancient History_, Sec. v. 2. (A. H. S.)
ECCARD, JOHANN (1553-1611), German composer of church music, was born at
Muehlhausen on the Unstrut, Prussia, in 1553. At the age of eighteen he
went to Munich, where he became the pupil of Orlando Lasso. In his
company Eccard is said to have visited Paris, but in 1574 we find him
again at Muehlhausen, where he resided for four years, and edited,
together with Johann von Burgk, his first master, a collection of sacred
songs, called _Crepundia sacra Helmboldi_ (1577). Soon afterwards he
obtained an appointment as musician in the house of Jacob Fugger, the
Augsburg banker. In 1583 he became assistant conductor, and in 1599
conductor, at Koenigsberg, to Georg Friedrich, margrave of
Brandenburg-Anspach, the administrator of Prussia. In 1608 he was called
by the elector Joachim Friedrich to Berlin as chief conductor, but this
post he held only for three years, owing to his premature death at
Koenigsberg in 1611. Eccard's works consist exclusively of vocal
compositions, such as songs, sacred cantatas and chorales for four or
five, and sometimes for seven, eight, or even nine voices. Their
polyphonic structure is a marvel of art, and still excites the
admiration of musicians. At the same time his works are instinct with a
spirit of true religious feeling. His setting of the beautiful words
"Ein' feste Burg ist unser Gott" is still regarded by the Germans as
their representative national hymn. Eccard and his school are
inseparably connected with the history of the Reformation.
Of Eccard's songs a great many collections are extant; see K.G.A. von
Winterfeld, _Der Evangelische Kirchengesang_ (1843); Doering
(_Choralkunde_, p. 47).
ECCELINO [or EZZELINO] DA ROMANO (1194-1259), Ghibelline leader, and
supporter of the emperor Frederick II., was born on the 25th of April
1194. He belonged to a family descended from a German knight named
Eccelin, who followed the emperor Conrad II. to Italy about 1036, and
received the fief of Romano near Padua. Eccelin's grandson was Eccelino
III., surnamed the Monk, who divided his lands between his two sons in
1223, and died in 1235. The elder of these two sons was Eccelino, who in
early life began to take part in family and other feuds, and in 1226, at
the head of a band of Ghibellines, seized Verona and became _podesta_ of
the city. He soon lost Verona, but regained it in 1230; and about this
time came into relations with Frederick II., who in 1232 issued a
charter confirming him in his possessions. In 1236 when besieged in
Verona he was saved by the advance of the emperor, who in November of
the same year took Vicenza and entrusted its government to Eccelino. In
1237 he obtained authority over Padua and Treviso; and on the 27th of
November in that year he shared in the victory gained by the emperor
over the Lombards at Cortenuova. In 1238 he married Frederick's natural
daughter, Selvaggia; in 1239 was appointed imperial vicar of the march
of Treviso; but in the same year was excommunicated by Pope Gregory IX.
He was constantly engaged in increasing his possessions; was present at
the siege of Parma in 1247, and after Frederick's death in 1250 he
supported his son, the German king Conrad IV. His cruelties had,
however, aroused general disgust, and in 1254 he was again
excommunicated. In 1256 Pope Alexander IV. proclaimed a crusade against
him, and a powerful league was soon formed under the leadership of
Philip, archbishop of Ravenna. Padua was taken from Eccelino, but on the
1st of September 1258 he defeated his enemies at Torricella. He then
made an attempt on Milan, and the rival forces met at Cassano on the
27th of September 1259, when Eccelino was wounded and taken prisoner.
Enraged at his capture, he tore the bandages from his wounds, refused to
take nourishment, and died at Soncino on the 7th of October 1259. In the
following year his brother Albert was put to death, and the Romano
family became extinct. Eccelino, who is sometimes called the _tyrant_,
acquired a terrible reputation on account of his cruelties, a reputation
that won for him the immortality of inclusion in Dante's _Inferno_; but
his unswerving loyalty to Frederick II. forms a marked contrast to the
attitude of many of his contemporaries.
Eccelino is the subject of a novel by Cesare Cantu and of a drama by J.
Eichendorff.
See J.M. Gittermann, _Ezzelino da Romano_ (Freiburg, 1890); S. Mitis,
_Storia d' Ezzelino IV. da Romano_ (Maddaloni, 1896); and F. Stieve,
_Ezzelino von Romano_ (Leipzig, 1909).
ECCENTRIC (from Gr. [Greek: ek], out of, and [Greek: kentron], centre),
literally "out from the centre," and thus used to connote generally any
deviation from the normal. In astronomy the word denotes a circle round
which a body revolves, but whose centre is displaced from the visible
centre of motion. In the ancient astronomy the ellipses in which it is
now known that the planets revolve around the sun could not be
distinguished from circles, but the unequal angular motion due to
ellipticity was observed. The theory of the eccentric was that the
centre of the epicycle of each planet moved uniformly in a circle, the
centre of which was displaced from that of the earth by an amount double
the eccentricity of the actual ellipse, as the case is now understood.
When measured around this imaginary centre, which is so situated on the
major axis of the ellipse that the focus, or place of the real sun, is
midway between it and the centre of the ellipse, the motion is
approximately uniform. In engineering, an eccentric is a mechanical
device for converting rotary into reciprocating motion (see
STEAM-ENGINE). For eccentric angle see ELLIPSE.
ECCHELLENSIS (or ECHELLENSIS), ABRAHAM (d. 1664), a learned Maronite,
whose surname is derived from Eckel in Syria, where he was born towards
the close of the 16th century. He was educated at the Maronite college
in Rome, and, after taking his doctor's degree in theology and
philosophy, returned for a time to his native land. He then became
professor of Arabic and Syriac in the college of the Propaganda at Rome.
Called to Paris in 1640 to assist Le Jay in the preparation of his
polyglot Bible, he contributed to that work the Arabic and Latin
versions of the book of Ruth and the Arabic version of the third book of
Maccabees. In 1646 he was appointed professor of Syriac and Arabic at
the College de France. Being invited by the Congregation of the
Propaganda to take part in the preparation of an Arabic version of the
Bible, Ecchellensis went again in 1652 or 1653 to Rome. He published
several Latin translations of Arabic works, of which the most important
was the _Chronicon Orientale_ of Ibnar-Rahib (Paris, 1653), a history of
the patriarchs of Alexandria. He was engaged in an interesting
controversy with John Selden as to the historical grounds of episcopacy,
in the course of which he published his _Eutychius vindicatus, sive
Responsio ad Seldeni Origines_ (Rome, 1661). Conjointly with Giovanni
Borelli he wrote a Latin translation of the 5th, 6th and 7th books of
the _Conics_ of Apollonius of Perga (1661). He died at Rome in 1664.
ECCLES, a municipal borough in the Eccles parliamentary division of
Lancashire, England, 4 m. W. of Manchester, of which it forms
practically a suburb. Pop. (1901) 34,369. It is served by the London &
North-Western railway and by the Birkenhead railway (North-Western and
Great Western joint). The Manchester Ship Canal passes through. The
church of St Mary is believed to date from the 12th century, but has
been enlarged and wholly restored in modern times. There are several
handsome modern churches and chapels, a town hall, and numerous cotton
mills, while silk-throwing and the manufacture of fustians and ginghams
are also among the industries, and there are also large engine works. A
peculiar form of cake is made here, taking name from the town, and has a
wide reputation. Eccles was incorporated in 1892, and the corporation
consists of a mayor, 6 aldermen and 18 councillors. The borough
maintains the tramway service, &c., but water and gas are supplied from
Manchester and Salford respectively. Area, 2057 acres.
Before the Reformation the monks of Whalley Abbey had a grange here at
what is still called Monks' Hall; and in 1864 many thousands of silver
pennies of Henry III. and John of England and William I. of Scotland
were discovered near the spot. Robert Ainsworth, the author of the Latin
and English dictionary so long familiar to English students, was born at
Eccles in 1660; and it was at the vicarage that William Huskisson
expired on the 15th of September 1830 from injuries received at the
opening of the Liverpool & Manchester railway. From early times "wakes"
were held at Eccles, and bull-baiting, bear-baiting and cock-fighting
were carried on. Under Elizabeth these festivals, which had become
notoriously disorderly, were abolished, but were revived under James I.,
and maintained until late in the 19th century on public ground. The
cockpit remained on the site of the present town hall. A celebration on
private property still recalls these wakes.
ECCLESFIELD, a township in the Hallamshire parliamentary division of the
West Riding of Yorkshire, England, 5 m. N. of Sheffield, on the Great
Central and Midland railways. The church of St Mary is Perpendicular,
with a central tower, and contains excellent woodwork. It formerly bore,
and must have deserved, the familiar title of the "Minster of the
Moors." Ecclesfield was the seat of a Benedictine priory, which passed
to the Carthusians in the 14th century. Cutlery and tools are largely
manufactured, and there are coal-mines, paper mills and iron and
fire-clay works. After the inclusion within the county borough of
Sheffield of part of the civil parish of Ecclesfield in 1901, the
population was 18,324.
ECCLESHALL, a market town in the north-western parliamentary division of
Staffordshire, England; 7 m. N.W. from Stafford, and 4 W. of Norton
Bridge station on the London & North-Western main line. Pop. (1901)
3799. The church of the Holy Trinity, one of the most noteworthy in
Staffordshire, is principally Early English, and has fine stained glass.
Several bishops of Lichfield are buried here, as Eccleshall Castle was
the episcopal residence from the 13th century until 1867. Of this the
ancient remains include a picturesque tower and bridge. To the west on
the borders of Shropshire is Blore Heath, the scene of a defeat of the
Lancastrians by the Yorkists in 1459.
ECCLESIA (Gr. [Greek: ekklesia], from [Greek: ek], out, and [Greek:
kalein], to call), in ancient Athens, the general assembly of all the
freemen of the state. In the primitive unorganized state the king was
theoretically absolute, though his great nobles meeting in the Council
(see BOULE) were no doubt able to influence him considerably. There is,
however, no doubt that in the earliest times the free people, i.e. the
fighting force of the state, were called together to ratify the
decisions of the king, and that they were gradually able to enforce
their wishes against those of the nobles. In Athens, as in Rome, where
the Plebs succeeded in their demand for the codification of the laws
(the Twelve Tables), it was no doubt owing to the growing power of the
people meeting in the Agora that Draco was entrusted with the task of
publishing a code of law and so putting an end to the arbitrary
judicature of the aristocratic party. But there is no evidence that the
Ecclesia had more than a _de facto_ existence before Solon's reforms.
The precise powers which Solon gave the people are not known. It is
clear that the executive power in the state (see ARCHON) was still
vested in the Eupatrid class. It is obvious, therefore, that a moderate
reformer would endeavour to give to the people some control over the
magistracy. Now in speaking of the Thetes (the lowest of the four
Solonian classes; see SOLON), Aristotle's _Constitution of Athens_ says
that Solon gave them merely "a share in the Ecclesia and the Law
Courts," and in the _Politics_ we find that he gave them the right of
electing the magistrates and receiving their accounts at the end of the
official year. Thus it seems that the "mixed" character of Solon's
constitution consisted in the fact that though the officials of the
state were still necessarily Eupatrid, the Ecclesia elected those of the
Eupatrids whom they could trust, and further had the right of
criticizing their official actions. Secondly, all our accounts agree
that Solon admitted the Thetes to the Ecclesia, thus recognizing them as
citizens. Under Cleisthenes the Ecclesia remained the sovereign power,
but the Council seems to have become to some extent a separate
administrative body. The relation of Boule and Ecclesia in the
Cleisthenic democracy was of the greatest importance. The Ecclesia
alone, a heterogeneous body of untrained citizens, could not have
passed, nor even have drawn up intelligible measures; all the
preliminary drafting was done by the small committee of the Boule which
was in session at any particular time. In the 5th century the functions
of the Ecclesia and the popular courts of justice were vastly increased
by the exigencies of empire. At the beginning of the 4th century B.C.
the system of payment was introduced (see below). In 308 B.C. Demetrius
of Phalerum curtailed the power of the Ecclesia by the institution of
the _Nomophylaces_ (Guardians of the Law), who prevented the Ecclesia
from voting on an illegal or injurious motion. Under Roman rule the
powers of the Ecclesia and the popular courts were much diminished, and
after 48 B.C. (the franchise being frequently sold to any casual alien)
the Demos (people) was of no importance. They still assembled to pass
psephisms in the theatre and to elect strategi, and, under Hadrian, had
some small judicial duties, but as a governing body the Ecclesia died
when Athens became a _civitas libera_ under Roman protection.
_Constitution and Functions._--Throughout the period of Athenian
greatness the Ecclesia was the sovereign power, not only in practice but
also in theory. The assembly met in early times near the sanctuary of
Aphrodite Pandemus (i.e. south of the Acropolis), but, in the 5th and
4th centuries, the regular place of meeting was the Pnyx. From the 5th
century it met sometimes in the theatre, which in the 3rd century was
the regular place. From Demosthenes we learn that in his time special
meetings were held at Peiraeus, and, in the last centuries B.C.,
meetings were held at Athens and Peiraeus alternately. Certain meetings,
however, for voting ostracism (q.v.) and on questions affecting
individual status took place in the Agora. Meetings were (1) ordinary,
(2) extraordinary, and (3) convened by special messengers ([Greek:
kyriai], [Greek: synkletoi] and [Greek: katakletoi]), these last being
called when it was desirable that the country people should attend. At
ordinary meetings the attendance was practically confined to Athenian
residents. According to Aristotle there were four regular meetings in
each prytany (see BOULE); probably only the first of these was called
[Greek: kyria]. It is certain, however, that the four meetings did not
fall on regular days, owing to the occurrence of feast days on which no
meeting could take place. In the [Greek: kyria ekklesia] of each month
took place the _Epicheirotonia_ (monthly inquiry) of the state
officials, and if it proved unsatisfactory a trial before the Heliaea
was arranged; the council reported on the general security and the
corn-supply, and read out lists of vacant inheritances and unmarried
heiresses. In the sixth prytany of each year at the [Greek: kyria
ekklesia] the question whether ostracism should take place that year was
put to the vote. For all meetings it was usual that the Prytaneis should
give five days' notice in the form of a _programma_ (agenda). On
occasions of sudden importance the herald of the council summoned the
people with a trumpet, and sometimes special messengers were despatched
to "bring in" the country people ([Greek: katakalein]).
After the archonship of Solon all Athenians over the age of eighteen
were eligible to attend the assembly, save those who for some reason had
suffered _atimia_ (loss of civil rights). To prevent the presence of any
disqualified persons, six _lexiarchs_ with thirty assistants were
present with the deme-rolls in their hands. These officers superintended
the payment in the 4th century and probably the _toxotae_ (police) also,
whose duty it was before the introduction of pay to drive the people out
of the Agora into the Ecclesia with a rope steeped in red dye which they
stretched out and used as a draw net (see Aristoph. _Acharn._ 22 and
_Eccles._ 378). The introduction of pay, which belongs to the early
years of the 4th century and by the _Constitution_ (c. 41 ad fin.) is
attributed to Agyrrhius, a statesman of the restored democracy, was a
device to secure a larger attendance. The rate rose from one to two
obols and then to three obols (Aristoph. _Eccles._ 300 sqq.), while at
the time of Aristotle it was one and a half drachmas for the [Greek:
kyria ekklesia] and one drachma for other meetings. Probably those who
were late did not receive payment.
_Procedure._--The proceedings opened with formalities: the purification
by the _peristiarchs_, who carried round slain sucking pigs; the curse
against all who should deceive the people; the appointment (in the 4th
century) of the _proedri_ and their _epistates_ (see BOULE); the report
as to the weather-omens. The assembly was always dismissed if there were
thunder, rain or an eclipse. These formalities over, the Prytaneis
communicated the _probouleuma_ of the council, without which the
Ecclesia could not debate. This recommendation either submitted definite
proposals or merely brought the agenda before the assembly. Its
importance lay largely in the fact that it _explained_ the business in
hand, which otherwise must often have been beyond the grasp of a
miscellaneous assembly. After the reading, a preliminary vote was taken
as to whether the council's report should be accepted _en bloc_. If it
was decided to discuss, the herald called upon people to speak. Any
person, without distinction of age or position, might obtain leave to
speak, but it seems probable that the man who had moved the
recommendation previously in the council would advocate it in the
assembly. The council was, therefore, a check on the assembly, but its
powers were to some extent illusory, because any member of the assembly
(1) might propose an amendment, (2) might draw up a new resolution
founded on the principal motion, (3) might move the rejection of the
motion and the substitution of another, (4) might bring in a motion
asking the council for a recommendation on a particular matter, (5)
might petition the council for leave to speak on a given matter to the
assembly. Voting usually was by show of hands, but in special cases
(ostracism, &c.) by ballot (i.e. by casting pebbles into one of two
urns). The decision of the assembly was called a _psephism_ and had
absolute validity. These decisions were deposited in the Metrooen where
state documents were preserved; peculiarly important decrees were
inscribed also on a column (_stele_) erected on the Acropolis. It has
been shown that the power of the council was far from sufficient. The
real check on the vagaries of amateur legislators was the Graphe
Paranomon. Any man was at liberty to give notice that he would proceed
against the mover of a given resolution either before or after the
voting in the Ecclesia. A trial in a Heliastic court was then arranged,
and the plaintiff had to prove that the resolution in question
contravened an existing law. If this contention were upheld by the
court, when the case was brought to it by the Thesmothetae, the
resolution was annulled, and the defendant had to appear in a new trial
for the assessment of the penalty, which was usually a fine, rarely
death. Three convictions under this law, however, involved a certain
loss of rights; the loser could no longer move a resolution in the
Ecclesia. After the lapse of a year the mover of a resolution could not
be attacked. In the 4th century the Graphe Paranomon took the place of
Ostracism (q.v.). In the 5th century it was merely an arrangement
whereby the people sitting as sworn juries ratified or annulled their
own first decision in the Ecclesia.
_Revision of Laws._--In the 4th century, the assembly annually, on the
eleventh day of Hecatombaeon (the first day of the official year), took
a general vote on the laws, to decide whether revision was necessary. If
the decision was in favour of alteration, it was open to any private
citizen to put up notice of amendments. The Nomothetae, a panel selected
by the Prytaneis from the Heliaea, heard arguments for and against the
changes proposed and voted accordingly. Against all new laws so passed,
there lay the Graphe; Paranomon. Thus the Nomothetae, not the Ecclesia,
finally passed the law.
_Judicial Functions._--The Ecclesia heard cases of Probole and
Eisangelia (see GREEK LAW). The Probole was an action against sycophants
and persons who had not kept their promises to the people, or had
disturbed a public festival. The verdict went by show of hands, but no
legal consequences ensued; if the plaintiff demanded punishment he had
to go to the Heliaea which were not at all bound by the previous vote in
the Ecclesia. Cases of Eisangelia in which the penalty exceeded the
legal competence of the council came before the Ecclesia in the form of
a _probouleuma_. To prevent vexatious accusations, it was (at some date
unknown) decided that the accuser who failed to obtain one-fifth of the
votes should be fined 1000 drachmas (L40). (For the procedure in case of
OSTRACISM see that article.)
_Summary._--Thus it will be seen that the Ecclesia, with no formal
organization, had absolute power save for the Graphe Paranomon (which,
therefore, constituted the dicasteries in one sense the sovereign power
in the state). It dealt with all matters home and foreign. Every member
could initiate legislation, and, as has been shown, the power of the
council was merely formal. As against this it must be pointed out that
it was by no means a representative assembly in practice. The phrase
used to describe a very special assembly ([Greek: katakletos ekklesia])
shows that ordinarily the country members did not attend ([Greek:
katakalein] always involving the idea of motion from a distance towards
Athens), and Thucydides says that 5000 was the maximum attendance,
though it must be remembered that he is speaking of the time when the
number of citizens had been much reduced owing to the plague and the
Sicilian expedition. From this we understand the necessity of payment in
the 4th century, although in that period the Ecclesia was supreme
(_Constitution of Athens_, xli. 2). The functions of the Ecclesia thus
differed in two fundamental respects from those which are in modern
times associated with a popular assembly. (1) It did not exercise, at
least in the period as to which we are best instructed, the power of
law-making ([Greek: nomothesia]) in the strict sense. It must be
remembered, however, in qualification of this statement that it
possessed the power of passing _psephismata_ which would in many cases
be regarded as law in the modern sense. (2) The Ecclesia was principally
concerned with the supervision of administration. Much of what we regard
as executive functions were discharged by the Ecclesia.
With this article compare those on SOLON; BOULE; AREOPAGUS; GREEK LAW,
and, for other ancient popular assemblies, APELLA; COMITIA. See also
A.H.J. Greenidge, _Handbook of Greek Constitutional History_ (1896);
Gilbert, _Greek Constitutional Antiquities_ (trans. Brooks and
Nicklin, 1895); Schoemann, _De comitiis Atheniensium_; L. Schmidt, "De
Atheniensis reipublicae indole democratica" in _Ind. Lect._ (Marburg,
1865); J.W. Headlam, _Election by Lot at Athens_ (Cambridge, 1891).
See also the histories of Greece by Meyer, Busolt, Grote, Evelyn
Abbott, and J.E. Sandys' edition of the _Constitution of Athens_
(1892); for a comparative study, E.A. Freeman, _Comparative Politics_.
(J. M. M.)
ECCLESIASTES (Heb. [Hebrew: Kohelet], _Kohelet_, "Koheleth"; Sept.
[Greek: ekklesiastes]; Jerome _concionator_), one of the Wisdom Books of
the Old Testament (see WISDOM LITERATURE). The book, as it stands, is a
collection of the discourses, observations and aphorisms of a sage
called Koheleth, a term the precise meaning of which is not certain. The
Greek _ecclesiastes_ means one who takes part in the deliberations of an
assembly (_ecclesia_), a debater or speaker in an assembly (Plato,
_Gorgias_, 452 E), and this is the general sense of the Hebrew word. Its
form (singular feminine) has been supposed to be the adoption or
imitation of the Arabic employment of a fem. sing. as the designation of
a high official person, as is the case in the title _caliph_ (whence the
rendering in the margin of the Revised Version, "Great orator"); but the
adoption of an Arabic idiom is not probable. This usage is not Hebrew;
it is not found either in the Old Testament or in the later (Mishnaic)
Hebrew. The form may have been suggested by that of the Hebrew word for
"wisdom." _Koheleth_, however, is employed in the book not as a title of
wisdom (for "wisdom" is never the speaker), but as the independent name
of the sage. It is intended to represent him as a member of an assembly
(_Kahal_)--not the Jewish congregation, but a body of students or
inquirers, such as is referred to in xii. 9-11, a sort of collegium, of
which he was the head; and as instructor of this body he gives his
criticism of life. The author begins, indeed, with identifying his sage
with King Solomon (i. 12-ii. 11, 12b); but he soon abandons this
literary device, and speaks in his own name. The rendering "preacher"
has a misleading connotation.
In the book as we have it there is no orderly exposition of a theory; it
rather has the appearance of a collection of remarks jotted down by a
pupil (somewhat after the manner of Xenophon's _Memorabilia_), or of
extracts from a sage's notebook. It is, however, characterized
throughout (except in some scribal additions) by a definite thought, and
pervaded by a definite tone of feeling. The keynote is given in the
classic phrase with which the discussion opens and with which it closes:
"Vanity of vanities (i.e. absolute vanity), all[1] is vanity!" Life,
says the author, has nothing of permanent value to offer. His attitude
is one not of bitterness but of calm hopelessness, with an occasional
tinge of disgust or contempt. He fancies that he has tried or observed
everything in human experience, and his deliberate conclusion is that
nothing is worth doing. He believes in an all-powerful but indifferent
God, and is himself an observer of society, standing aloof from its
passions and ambitions, and interested only in pointing out their
emptiness.
This general view is set forth in a number of particular observations.
1. His fundamental proposition is that there is a fixed, unchangeable
order in the world, a reign of inflexible law (i. 4-11, iii. 1-11, 14,
15, vii. 13, viii. 5-9): natural phenomena, such as sunrise and sunset,
recur regularly; for everything in human experience a time has been set;
birth and death, building up and destroying, laughing and weeping,
silence and speech, love and hate, war and peace, are to be regarded not
as utterances of a living, self-directing world, but as incidents in the
work of a vast machine that rolls on for ever; there is an endless
repetition--nothing is new, nothing is lost; if one thinks he has found
something new, inquiry shows that it was in existence long ago; God, the
author of all, seeks out the past in order to make it once more present;
it is impossible to add to or take from the content of the world,
impossible to change the nature of things, to effect any radical
betterment of life; the result is unspeakable weariness--a depressing
series of sights and sounds. No goal or purpose is discoverable in this
eternal round; if the sun rises and goes on his journey through the sky,
it is merely to come back to the place where he rose; rivers flow for
ever into the sea without filling it. To what end was the world created?
It is impossible to say. Such is Koheleth's view of life, and it is
obvious that such a conception of an aimless cosmos is thoroughly
non-Jewish, if we may judge Jewish thought by the great body of the
extant literature.
2. Further, says Koheleth, man is impelled to study the world, but under
the condition that he shall never comprehend it (iii. 11, vii. 23, 24,
viii. 16, 17). As to the meaning of the Hebrew term _olam_ in iii. 11,
there are various opinions, but "world" appears to be the rendering
favoured by the connexion: "God has made everything beautiful in its
time, and has put the _olam_ into men's minds, yet so that they cannot
understand His work": the _olam_, the sum of phenomena, is God's work.
The word is not found in this sense elsewhere in the Old Testament, but
it so occurs in the Mishna (_Pirke Aboth_, iv. 7), and the vocabulary of
Ecclesiastes is admittedly similar to that of the Mishna. Only here in
the Old Testament does it stand as a simple isolated noun; elsewhere it
is the definition of a noun (in "everlasting covenant," &c.), or it is
preceded by a preposition, in the phrases "for ever," "of old," or it
stands alone (sing. or plur.) in the same adverbial sense, "for ever."
The word means first a remote point in past or future, then a future
point without limit of time, then a period of history, and finally the
world considered as a mass of human experiences (cf. [Greek: aion]). The
renderings "eternity" and "future" in the present passage are
unsatisfactory; the former has an inappropriate metaphysical
connotation, and yields no distinct sense; the latter does not suit the
connexion, though there is reference to the future elsewhere (ix. 1).
God, the text here declares, has made the world an object of man's
thought, yet so that man can never find out the work that God has done
(iii. 11). The reference seems to be not so much to the variety and
complexity of phenomena as to the impossibility of construing them
rationally or in such a way that man may foresee and provide for his
future. Man is in the clutches of fate (ix. 11, 12): there is no
observable relation between exertion and result in life: the race is not
to the swift nor the battle to the strong; success does not attend
wisdom, knowledge and skill; men are like fish taken in a net or birds
caught in a snare.
3. Human life, Koheleth declares, is unsatisfying. He inquired, he says,
into everything that is done by men under the sun (i. 12-16): God has
inflicted on men a restless desire for movement and work[2], yet life is
but a catalogue of fruitless struggles. He gives a number of
illustrations. In his character of king he tried all the bodily
pleasures of life (ii. 1-11): he had houses, vineyards, gardens, parks,
ponds, forests, servants, flocks and herds, treasures of gold and
silver, singers, wives; all these he set himself to enjoy in a rational
way--indeed, he found a certain pleasure in carrying out his designs,
but, when all was done, he surveyed it only to see that it was weary and
unprofitable. Dropping the role of Solomon and speaking as an observer
of life, the author declares (iv. 4) that the struggle for success is
the result of rivalry among men, which has no worthy outcome. The
securing of riches is a fallacious achievement, for often wealth
perishes by some accident (v. 13 f.), or its possessor is unable to
enjoy it (vi. 1-3a), or he has no one to whom to leave it, and he cannot
keep it--naked man comes into the world, naked he goes out. He does not
consider the possibility of deriving enjoyment from wealth by helping
the poor or encouraging learning (this latter, indeed, he looks on as
vanity), and in general he recognizes no obligation on the part of a man
to his fellows. A noteworthy survival of an old belief is found in vi.
3: though a man have the great good fortune to live long and to have
many children, yet, if he have not proper burial the blank darkness of
an untimely birth is better than he: this latter is merely the negation
of existence; the former, it appears to be held, is positive misfortune,
the loss of a desirable place in Sheol, though elsewhere (ix. 5)
existence in Sheol is represented as the negation of real life. It is
not necessary to suppose that the writer has here any particular case in
mind.
If wealth be thus a vain thing, yet a sage might be supposed to find
satisfaction in wisdom, that is, practical good sense and sagacity; but
this also the author puts aside as bringing no lasting advantage, since
a wise man must finally give up the fruit of his wisdom to someone else,
who may be a fool, and in any case the final result for both fools and
wise men is the same--both are forgotten (ii. 12-23). A particular
instance is mentioned (ix. 13-15) of a beleaguered city saved by a wise
man; but the man happened to be poor, and no one remembered him. The
whole constitution of society, in fact, seems to the sage a lamentable
thing: the poor are oppressed, the earth is full of their cries, and
there is no helper (iv. 1); strange social upheavals may be seen: the
poor[3] set in high places, the rich cast down, slaves on horseback,
princes on foot (x. 5-7). He permits himself a sweeping generalization
(vii. 25-28): human beings as a rule are bad: one may occasionally find
a good man, never a good woman--woman is a snare and a curse. He (or an
editor) adds (vii. 29) that this condition of things is due to social
development: man was created upright (Gen. i. 27; Enoch lxix. 11), but
in the course of history has introduced corrupting complications into
life.
4. The natural outcome of these experiences of the author is that he
cannot recognize a moral government of the world. He finds, like Job,
that there are good men who die prematurely notwithstanding their
goodness, and bad men who live long notwithstanding their badness (vii.
15), though long life, it is assumed, is one of the great blessings of
man's lot; and in general there is no moral discrimination in the
fortunes of men (viii. 14, ix. 2).
5. There is no sacredness or dignity in man or in human life: man has no
pre-eminence over beasts, seeing that he and they have the same final
fate, die and pass into the dust, and no one knows what becomes of the
spirit, whether in man's case it goes up to heaven, and in the case of
beasts goes down into Sheol--death is practically the end-all; and so
poor a thing is life that the dead are to be considered more fortunate
than the living, and more to be envied than either class is he who never
came into existence (iv. 2, 3). It is a special grievance that the
wicked when they die are buried with pomp and ceremony, while men who
have acted well are forgotten[4] in the city (viii. 10).
6. That the author does not believe in a happy or active future life
appears in the passage (iv. 2, 3) quoted above. The old Hebrew view of
the future excluded from Sheol the common activities of life and also
the worship of the national god (Isa. xxxviii. 18); he goes even beyond
this in his conception of the blankness of existence in the underworld.
The living, he says, at least know that they shall die, but the dead
know nothing--the memory of them, their love, hate and envy, perishes,
they have no reward, no part in earthly life (ix. 5, 6); there is
absolutely no knowledge and no work in Sheol (ix. 10). His conclusion is
that men should do now with all their might what they have to do; the
future of man's vital part, the spirit, is wholly uncertain.
7. His conception of God is in accord with these views. God for him is
the creator and ruler of the world, but hardly more; he is the master of
a vast machine that grinds out human destinies without sympathy with man
and without visible regard for what man deems justice--a being to be
acknowledged as lord, not one to be loved. There can thus be no social
contact between man and God, no communion of soul, no enthusiasm of
service. Moral conduct is to be regulated not by divine law (of this
nothing is said) but by human experience. The author's theism is cold,
spiritless, without influence on life.
If now the question be asked what purpose or aim a man can have, seeing
that there is nothing of permanent value in human work, an answer is
given which recurs, like a refrain, from the beginning to the end of the
book, and appears to be from the hand of the original author: after
every description of the vanity of things comes the injunction to enjoy
such pleasures as may fall to one's lot (ii. 24, 25, iii. 12, 13, 22, v.
18, 19, viii. 15, ix. 7-10, xi. 7-xii. 7). Elsewhere (ii.), it is true,
it is said that there is no lasting satisfaction in pleasure; but the
sage may mean to point out that, though there is no permanent outcome to
life, it is the part of common-sense to enjoy what one has. The
opportunity and the power to enjoy are represented as being the gift of
God; but this statement is not out of accord with the author's general
position, which is distinctly theistic. All the passages just cited,
except the last (xi. 7-xii. 7), are simple and plain, but the bearing of
the last is obscured by interpolations. Obviously the purpose of the
paragraph is to point out the wisdom of enjoying life in the time of
youth while the physical powers are fresh and strong, and the impotency
of old age has not yet crept in. Omitting xi. 8c, 9b, 10b, xii. 1a, the
passage will read: "Life is pleasant in the bright sunshine--however
long a man may live, he must be cheerful always, only remembering that
dark days will come. Let the young man enjoy all the pleasures of youth,
putting away everything painful, before the time comes when his bodily
powers decay and he can enjoy nothing." To relieve the apparent
Epicureanism of this passage, an editor has inserted reminders of the
vanity of youthful pleasures, and admonitions to remember God and His
judgment. The author, however, does not recommend dissipation, and does
not mean to introduce a religious motive--he offers simply a counsel of
prudence. The exhortation to remember the Creator in the days of youth,
though it is to be retained in the margin as a pious editorial addition,
here interrupts the line of thought. In xii. 1a some critics propose to
substitute for "remember thy Creator" the expression of xi. 9, "let thy
heart cheer thee"; but the repetition is improbable. Others would read:
"remember thy cistern" (Bickell), or "thy well" (Haupt), that is, thy
wife. The wife is so called in Prov. v. 15-19 in an elaborate poetical
figure (the wife as a source of bodily pleasure), in which the reference
is clear from the context; but there is no authority, in the Old
Testament or in other literature of this period, for taking the term as
a simple prose designation of a wife. Nor would this reference to the
wife be appropriate in the connexion, since the writer's purpose is
simply to urge men to enjoy life while they can. The paragraph (and the
original book) concludes with a sustained and impressive figure, in
which the failing body of the old man is compared to a house falling
into decay: first, the bodily organs (xii. 3, 4a): the keepers of the
house (the arms and hands) tremble, the strong men (the legs and perhaps
the backbone) are bent, the grinding women (the teeth) cease to work,
those that look out of the windows (the eyes) are darkened, the
street-doors are shut, the sound of the mill being low (apparently a
summary statement of the preceding details: communication with the outer
world through the senses is cut off, the performance of bodily functions
being feeble); the rest of v. 4 may refer to the old man's inability to
make or hear music: in the house there is no sound of birds[5] or of
singers, there are none of the artistic delights of a well-to-do
household; further (v. 5a) the inmates of the house fear dangers from
all powerful things and persons (the old man is afraid of everything),
the almond tree blossoms (perhaps the hair turns white). The two next
clauses are obscure.[6] Then comes the end: man goes to his everlasting
home; the dust (the body) returns to the earth whence it came (Gen. ii.
7), and the breath of life, breathed by God into the body, returns to
him who gave it. This last clause does not affirm the immortality of the
soul; it is simply an explanation of what becomes of the vital principle
(the "breath of life" of Gen. ii. 7); its positive assertion is not in
accord with the doubt expressed in iii. 21 ("who knows whether the
spirit of man goes upward?"), and it seems to be from another hand than
that of the author of the original book.
There are other sayings in the book that appear to be at variance with
its fundamental thought. Wisdom is praised in a number of passages (iv.
13, vii. 5, 11, 12, 19, viii. 1, ix. 16, 17, x. 2, 3), though it is
elsewhere denounced as worthless. It may be said that the author, while
denying that wisdom (practical sagacity and level-headedness) can give
permanent satisfaction, yet admits its practical value in the conduct of
life. This may be so; but it would be strange if a writer who could say,
"in much wisdom is much grief," should deliberately laud wisdom. The
question is not of great importance and may be left undecided. It may be
added that there are in the book a number of aphorisms about fools (v.
3[4], vii. 5, 6, x. 1-3, 12-15) quite in the style of the book of
Proverbs, some of them contrasting the wise man and the fool; these
appear to be the insertions of an editor. Further, it may be concluded
with reasonable certainty that the passages that affirm a moral
government of the world are additions by pious editors who wished to
bring the book into harmony with the orthodox thought of the time. Such
assertions as those of ii. 26 (God gives joy to him who pleases him, and
makes the sinner toil to lay up for the latter), viii. 12 (it shall be
well with those that fear God, but not with the wicked), xii. 13 f.
(man's duty is simply to obey the commands of God, for God will bring
everything into judgment) are irreconcilable with the oft-repeated
statement that there is no difference in the earthly lots of the
righteous and the wicked, and no ethical life after death.
Many practical admonitions and homely aphorisms are scattered through
the book: iv. 5, quiet is a blessing; iv. 9-12, two are better than one;
iv. 17 (Eng. v. 1), be reverent in visiting the house of God (the temple
and the connected buildings)--to listen (to the service of song or the
reading of Scripture) is better than to offer a foolish (thoughtless)
sacrifice; v. 1 (2), be sparing of words in addressing God; v. 1-5
(2-6), pay your vows--do not say to the priest's messenger that you made
a mistake; vii. 2-4, sorrow is better than mirth; vii. 16-18, be not
over-righteous (over-attentive to details of ritual and convention) or
over-wicked (flagrantly neglectful of established beliefs and customs);
here "righteous" and "wicked" appear to be technical terms designating
two parties in the Jewish world of the 2nd and 1st centuries B.C., the
observers and the non-observers of the Jewish ritual law; these parties
represent in a general way the Pharisees and the Sadducees; viii. 2-4,
x. 20, it is well to obey kings and to be cautious in speaking about
them, for there are talebearers everywhere; vii. 20, no man is free from
sin; vii. 21, do not listen to all that you may overhear, lest you hear
yourself ill spoken of; ix. 4, a living dog is better than a dead lion;
xi. 1-6, show prudence and decision in business; do not set all your
goods on one venture; act promptly and hope for the best. At the close
of the book (xii. 9-12) there are two observations that appear to be
editorial recommendations and cautions. First, Koheleth is endorsed as
an industrious, discriminating and instructive writer. Possibly this is
in reply to objections that had been made to what he had written. There
follows an obscure passage (v. 11) which seems to be meant as a
commendation of the teaching of the sages in general: their words are
said to be like goads (inciting to action) and like nails driven in a
building (giving firmness to character); they issue from masters of
assemblies,[7] heads of academies (but not of the Sanhedrin). The
succeeding clause "they are given from one shepherd" may refer to a
collection or revision by one authoritative person, but its relevancy is
not obvious. The "shepherd" cannot be God (Gen. xlix. 24; Ps. xxiii. 1);
the poetical use of the word would not be appropriate here. The clause
is possibly a gloss, a comment on the preceding expression. A caution
against certain books is added (v. 12), probably works then considered
harmful (perhaps philosophic treatises), of which, however, nothing
further is known.
_Composition of the Book._--If the analysis given above is correct, the
book is not a unit; it contains passages mutually contradictory and not
harmonizable. Various attempts have been made to establish its unity.
The hypothesis of "two voices" is now generally abandoned; there is no
indication of a debate, of affirmations and responses. A more plausible
theory is that the author is an honest thinker, a keen observer and
critic of life, who sees that the world is full of miseries and unsolved
problems, regards as futile the attempts of his time to demonstrate an
ethically active future life, and, recognizing a divine author of all,
holds that the only wise course for men is to abandon the attempt to get
full satisfaction out of the struggle for pleasure, riches and wisdom,
and to content themselves with making the best of what they have. This
conception of him is largely true, as is pointed out above, but it does
not harmonize the contradictions of the book, the discrepancies between
the piety of some passages and the emotional indifference toward God
shown in others. Other of the Biblical Wisdom books (Job, Proverbs) are
compilations--why not this? It is not necessary to multiply authors, as
is done, for example, by Siegfried, who supposes four principal writers
(a pessimistic philosopher, an Epicurean glossator, a sage who upholds
the value of wisdom, and an orthodox editor) besides a number of
annotators; it is sufficient to assume that several conservative scribes
have made short additions to the original work. Nor is it worth while to
attempt a logical or symmetrical arrangement of the material. It has
been surmised (by Bickell) that the sheets of the original codex became
disarranged and were rearranged incorrectly;[8] by other critics
portions of the book are transferred hither and thither; in all cases
the critic is guided in these changes by what he conceives to have been
the original form of the book. But it is more probable that we have it
in the form in which it grew up--a series of observations by the
original author with interspersed editorial remarks; and it is better to
preserve the existing form as giving a record of the process of growth.
_Date._--As to the date of the book, though there are still differences
of opinion among scholars, there is a gradual approach to a consensus.
The Solomonic authorship has long since been given up: the historical
setting of the work and its atmosphere--the silent assumption of
monotheism and monogamy, the non-national tone, the attitude towards
kings and people, the picture of a complicated social life, the strain
of philosophic reflection--are wholly at variance with what is known of
the 10th century B.C. and with the Hebrew literature down to the 5th or
4th century B.C. The introduction of Solomon, the ideal of wisdom, is a
literary device of the later time, and probably deceived nobody. The
decisive considerations for the determination of the date are the
language, the historical background and the thought. The language
belongs to the post-classical period of Hebrew. The numerous Aramaisms
point to a time certainly not earlier than the 4th century B.C., and
probably (though the history of the penetration of Aramaic into Hebrew
speech is not definitely known) not earlier than the 3rd century. More
than this, there are many resemblances between the dialect of Koheleth
and that of Mishna. Not only are new words employed, and old words in
new significations, but the grammatical structure has a modern
stamp--some phrases have the appearance of having been translated out of
Aramaic into Hebrew. By about the beginning of our era the Jews had
given up Hebrew and wrote in Aramaic; the process of expulsion had been
going on, doubtless, for some time; but comparison with the later extant
literature (_Chronicles_, the Hebrew _Ecclesiasticus_ or _Ben-Sira_,
_Esther_) makes it improbable that such Hebrew as that of Koheleth would
have been written earlier than the 2nd century B.C. (for details see
Driver's _Introduction_). The general historical situation, also,
presupposed or referred to, is that of the period from the year 200 B.C.
to the beginning of our era; in particular, the familiar references to
kings as a part of the social system, and to social dislocations
(servants and princes changing places, x. 7), suggest the troublous time
of the later Greek and the Maccabean rulers, of which the history of
Josephus gives a good picture.
The conception of the world and of human life as controlled by natural
law, a naturalistic cosmos, is alien not only to the prophetic and
liturgical Hebrew literature but also to Hebrew thought in general.
Whether borrowed or not, it must be late; and its resemblance to Greek
ideas suggests Greek influence. The supposition of such influence is
favoured by some critics (Tyler, Plumptre, Palm, Siegfried, Cheyne in
his _Jewish Religious Life after the Exile_, and others), rejected by
some (Zeller, Renan, Kleinert and others). This disagreement comes
largely from the attempts made to find definitely expressed Greek
philosophical dogmas in the book; such formulas it has not, but the
general air of Greek reflection seems unmistakable. The scepticism of
Koheleth differs from that of Job in quality and scope: it is deliberate
and calm, not wrung out by personal suffering; and it relates to the
whole course and constitution of nature, not merely to the injustices of
fortune. Such a conception has a Greek tinge, and would be found in
Jewish circles, probably, not before the 2nd century B.C.
A precise indication of date has been sought in certain supposed
references or allusions to historical facts. The mention of persons who
do not sacrifice or take oaths (ix. 2) is held by some to point to the
Essenes; if this be so, it is not chronologically precise, since we have
not the means of determining the beginning of the movement of thought
that issued in Essenism. So also the coincidences of thought with
_Ben-Sira_ (_Ecclesiasticus_) are not decisive: cf. iii. 14 with _B.S._
xviii. 6; v. 2-6 (3-7) with _B.S._ xxxiv. 1-7; vii. 19 with _B.S._
xxxvii. 14; x. 8 with _B.S._ xxvii. 26a; xi. 10 with _B.S._ xxx. 21;
xii. 10, 11 with _B.S._ xxxix. 2 ff., xii. 13 with _B.S._ xliii. 27; if
there be borrowing in these passages, it is not clear on which side it
lies; and it is not certain that there is borrowing--the thoughts may
have been taken independently by the two authors from the same source.
In any case, since _Ben-Sira_ belongs to about 180 B.C., the date of
Koheleth, so far as these coincidences indicate it, would not be far
from 200 B.C. The contrast made in x. 16 f. between a king who is a boy
and one who is of noble birth may allude to historical persons. The
antithesis is not exact; we expect either "boy and mature man" or
"low-born and high-born." The "child" might be Antiochus V. (164 B.C.),
or Ptolemy V., Epiphanes (204 B.C.), but the reference is too general to
be decisive. The text of the obscure passage iv. 13-16 is in bad
condition, and it is only by considerable changes that a clear meaning
can be got from it. The two personages--the "old and foolish king" and
the "poor and wise youth"--have been supposed (by Winckler) to be
Antiochus Epiphanes (175-164 B.C.) and Demetrius (162-150 B.C.), or (by
Haupt) Antiochus and the impostor Alexander Balas (150-146 B.C.), or (by
others) Demetrius and Alexander; in favour of Alexander as the "youth"
it may be said that he was of obscure origin, was at first popular, and
was later abandoned by his friends. Such identifications, however, do
not fix the date of the book precisely; the author may have referred to
events that happened before his time. The reign of Herod, a period of
despotism and terror, and of strife between Jewish religious parties, is
preferred by some scholars (Graetz, Cheyne and others) as best answering
to the social situation depicted in the book, while still others (as
Renan) decide for the reign of Alexander Jannaeus (104-78 B.C.). The
data are not numerous and distinct enough to settle the question beyond
determining general limits: for reasons given above the book can hardly
have been composed before about 200 B.C., and if, as is probable, a
Septuagint translation of it was made (though the present Septuagint
text shows the influence of Aquila), it is to be put earlier than 50
B.C. Probably also, its different parts are of different dates.
Of the author nothing is known beyond the obvious fact that he was a man
of wide observation and philosophic thought, of the Sadducean type in
religion, but non-Jewish in his attitude toward life. He was, doubtless,
a man of high standing, but neither a king nor a high-priest, certainly
not the apostate priest Alcimus (1 Macc. vii. ix.); nor was he
necessarily a physician--there are no details in ch. xii. or elsewhere
that any man of good intelligence might not know. The book is written in
prose, some of which is rhythmical, with bits of verse here and there:
thus i. 2-11 is balanced prose, 12-14 plain prose, 15 a couplet, i.
16-ii. 25 simple prose, vii. contains a number of poetical aphorisms,
and so on. Some of the verses are apparently from the author, some from
editors.
The fortunes of the book are not known in detail, but it is clear that
its merciless criticism of life and its literary charm made it popular,
while its scepticism excited the apprehensions of pious conservatives.
Possibly the _Wisdom of Solomon_ (c. 50 B.C.) was written partly as a
reply to it. The claim of sacredness made for it was warmly contested by
some Jewish scholars. In spite of the relief afforded by orthodox
additions, it was urged that its Epicurean sentiments contradicted the
Torah and favoured heresy. Finally, by some process of reasoning not
fully recorded, the difficulties were set aside and the book was
received into the sacred canon; Jerome (on Eccl. xii. 13, 14) declares
that the decisive fact was the orthodox statement at the end of the
book: the one important thing is to fear God and keep His commandments.
The probability is that the book had received the stamp of popular
approbation before the end of the 1st century of our era, and the
leading men did not dare to reject it. It is not certain that it is
quoted in the New Testament, but it appears to be included in Josephus'
list of sacred books.
LITERATURE.--For the older works see Zoeckler (in Lange's _Comm._); for
Jewish commentaries see Zedner, _Cat. of Heb. books in Libry. of Brit.
Mus._ (1867), and for the history of the interpretations, C.D.
Ginsburg, _Coheleth_ (1861). _Introductions_ of A. Kuenen, S.R.
Driver, Cornhill, Koenig. Articles in Herzog-Hauck, _Realencykl._ (by
P. Kleinert); Hastings, _Dict. Bible_ (by A.S. Peake); T.K. Cheyne,
_Encycl. Bibl._ (by A.B. Davidson); _Jew. Encycl._ (by D.S.
Margoliouth). Commentaries: F. Hitzig (1847); C.D. Ginsburg (1861); H.
Graetz (1871); Tyler (1874); Delitzsch (1875); E.H. Plumptre (1881);
C.H.H. Wright (1883); Nowack, revision of Hitzig (1883); Volck (in
Strack u. Zoeckler's _Kurzgef. Komm._, 1889); Wildeboer (in Marti's
_Kurzer Hand-Comm._, 1898); C. Siegfried (in W. Nowack's _Handkomm._,
1898); Oort (in _De Oude Test._, 1899). Other works: C. Taylor, _Dirge
of Koh._ (1874); Wuensche, _Midrash_ on Koh. (in his _Biblioth.
rabbin._, 1880); E. Renan, _L'Ecclesiaste_ (1882); Bickell, _Der
Prediger_ (1884) and _Kohel.-Untersuchungen_ (1886; Engl. by E.J.
Dillon, _Sceptics of Old Test._, 1895); Schiffer, _Das Buch Koh. nach
d. Auffass. d. Weisen d. Talmuds_, &c. (1884); A. Palm, _Qoh. u. d.
nach-aristotel. Philosophie_ (1885) and _Die Qoh.-Lit._ (1886); E.
Pfleiderer, _Die Phil. d. Heraklit_, &c. (1886); Cheyne, _Job and
Solomon_ (1887) and _Jew. Relig. Life_, &c. (1898); W. Euringer, _Der
Masorahtext d. Koh._ (1890); W.T. Davison, _Wisdom-Lit. of Old Test._
(1894); H. Winckler, in his _Altorient. Forschungen_ (1898); J.F.
Genung, _Words of Koh._ (Boston, Mass., 1904); P. Haupt,
_Ecclesiastes_ (Baltimore, 1905). The rabbinical discussions of the
book are mentioned in _Shabbath_, 30b; _Megilla_, 7a; _Eduyoth_, v. 3;
_Mishna Yadaim_, iii. 5, iv. 6; _Midrash Koheleth_ (on xi. 9), _Aboth
d' Rab. Nathan_, i. (C. H. T.*)