psychology of Edwards, and make the will and the sensitivity one? Then
as the volition is always the strongest affection of the agreeable, if
the sensitivity be necessary, volitions are necessary, and we are
plunged headlong again into an absolute and universal necessity. If the
sensitivity be not necessary, then we have shown fully, above, that we
have to account for its various determinations just as we are supposed
to be called upon to account for the various determinations of the will
when considered as a power distinct from the sensitivity:--we are met
with the questions, why does the sensitivity represent this object as
more agreeable than that object?--or the same object as agreeable at one
time, and disagreeable at another? Or if these various determinations
are resolved into an antecedent necessity comprehending them, then we go
up to the antecedent cause in which this necessity resides, and question
it in like manner.
But one thing remains, and that is to consider the will as primary
cause, contingent in opposition to being necessitated--a cause having in
itself the power of making these various volitions or _nisus_, and
neither asking nor allowing of any explanation of its acts, or their
particular direction, save its own peculiarity and energy as will.
The question respecting the indifferency of will must now be considered.
The term _indifferency_ comes up in consequence of considering the will
as distinct from the sensitivity. It is not desire or feeling--it is a
power indifferent to the agreeableness or disagreeableness of objects.
It is also a power distinct from the reason; it is not conviction or
belief--it is a power indifferent to the true and the right, to the
false and the wrong, in the sense that it is not necessarily determined
by conviction and belief, by the true and the right, or by the false and
the wrong. The conception of will in its utmost simplicity is the
conception of pure power, self-moving, and self-conscious--containing
within itself the ground and the possibility of creation and of
modification. In God it is infinite, eternal, uncreated power; and every
_nisus_ in his will is really creative or modifying, according to its
self-directed aim. In man it is constituted, dependent, limited, and
accountable.
Now in direct connexion with power, we have the conception of law or
rule, or what power _ought_ to do. This law or rule is revealed in the
reason. In man as pure, and we conclude in God likewise, as the
archetype of all spirit, there is given a sensitivity or a capacity to
be affected agreeably by, and to be drawn towards the objects approved
and commanded by the reason. If this sensitivity does not move in
harmony with the reason, it is corrupted. Now will is placed in a
triunity with these two other powers. We can distinguish but not
separate it from them. A will without reason would be a power without
eyes, or light. A will without sensitivity would be a power stern and
isolated;--just as a reason and sensitivity without will, would be
without efficiency, or capacity of giving real manifestations.
The completeness and perfection of each, lies in a union with all; but
then each in its proper movements is in some sense independent and free
of the others. The convictions, beliefs, or perceptions of reason are
not made, nor can they be unmade by the energy of the will. Nor has the
will any direct command over the sensitivity. And yet the will can
excite and direct both the reason and the sensitivity, by calling up
objects and occasions. The sensitivity does not govern the reason, and
yet it supplies conditions which are necessary to its manifestations.
The reason does not govern the sensitivity, and yet the latter would
have no definite perception, and of course its highest sensibilities
would lie dormant without the reason.
So also the reason and the sensitivity do not determine the acts of the
will. The will has efficiency, or creative and modifying power in
itself--self-moved, self-directed. But then without reason and
sensitivity, the will would be without objects, without designs, without
rules,--a solitary power, conscious of ability to do, but not knowing
what to do.
It addition to the above, the will has this high and distinguishing
peculiarity. That it alone is free--that it alone is opposed to
necessity. Reason _must_ perceive, _must_ believe. Sensitivity _must_
feel when its objects are presented; but will, when the reason has given
its light and uttered its commands, and when the sensitivity has
awakened all its passions and emotions, is not compelled to obey. It is
as conscious of power not to do, as of power to do. It may be called a
power arbitrary and contingent; but this means only that it is a power
which absolutely puts forth its own _nisus_, and is free.
It follows from this, that the will can act irrespective of both reason
and sensitivity, if an object of action, bearing no relation to reason
or sensitivity, be possible. It is plain that an object bearing no such
relation, must be very trifling. If a case in illustration could not be
called up, it would not argue anything against the indifferency of
will;--it would only prove that all objects of action actually existing,
bear some relation to reason and sensitivity. There is a case, however,
frequently called up, and much disputed, which deserves some attention,
and which it appears to me, offers the illustration required. Let it be
required to select one of the squares of the chess-board. In selecting
one of the squares, does the will act irrespective of reason and
sensitivity, or not? Those who hold that the will is necessarily
determined, must make out some connexion between the act of selection,
and the reason and sensitivity. It is affirmed that there is a general
motive which determines the whole process, viz: the aim or desire to
illustrate, if possible, the question in dispute. The motive is, to
prove that the will can act without a motive.
I reply to this, that this is undoubtedly the motive of bringing the
chess-board before the eye, and in making all the preparations for a
selection;--but now the last question is, which square shall I select?
The illustration will have the same force whichever square is selected,
and there is no motive that can be drawn either from the reason or the
sensitivity for taking one square in preference to the other: under the
absence of all such motives, and affording each time the same attempt at
illustration, I can vary the selection sixty-four times: in making this
selection, therefore, it appears to me, there is an entire indifferency
as to which particular square is selected;--there is no command of the
reason directing to one square rather than another;--there is no
affection of the sensitivity towards one square rather than another, as
most agreeable and yet the will does select one of the squares.
It will be proper, in this place, to consider the following argument of
Edwards against indifferency of will: "Choice may be immediately _after_
a state of indifference, but cannot co-exist with it: even the very
beginning of it is not in a state of indifference. And, therefore, if
this be liberty, no act of the will, in any degree, is ever performed in
a state of liberty, or in the time of liberty. Volition and liberty are
so far from agreeing together, and being essential one to another, that
they are contrary one to another, and one excludes and destroys the
other, as much as motion and rest, light and darkness, or life and
death." (p. 73.)
Edwards reasons according to his own psychology: If the will and the
sensitivity are one, the will cannot well be conceived of as in a state
of indifference, and if it could be conceived of as in a state of
indifference before it exercises volition, inasmuch as, according to his
system again, volition is the sense of the most agreeable, the moment
volition begins, indifference ceases; and hence, if liberty consist in
indifference, liberty must cease when volition takes place, just as rest
ceases with motion.
But according to the system of psychology, which we adopt, and which I
shall verify hereafter, the will is not one with the sensitivity, but is
clearly distinguishable from it:--the sensitivity is the capacity of
feeling; the will is the causality of the soul:--a movement of the
sensitivity, under the quality of indifference, is self-contradictory;
and a movement of the will being a mere _nisus_ of cause, under the
quality of any sense and feeling whatever, would be self-contradictory
likewise; it would be confounding that which we had already
distinguished. From Edwards's very definition of will it cannot be
indifferent; from our very definition of will it cannot be otherwise
than indifferent. When it determines exclusively of both reason and
sensitivity, it of course must retain, in the action, the indifference
which it possessed before the action; but this is no less true when it
determines in the direction either of reason or sensitivity. When the
determination is in the direction of the reason, there is an exercise of
reason in connexion with the act, and all the interest of the reason is
wakened up, but the will considered in its entire simplicity, knows only
the _nisus_ of power. When the determination is in the direction of the
sensitivity, there is a play of emotions and passions, but the will
again knows only the _nisus_ of power which carries it in this
direction.
In the unity of the soul these powers are generally found acting
together. It may be difficult to distinguish them, and this, in
connexion with the constantly observed fact of the fixed correlation
between physical causes and the masses which they operate upon, may lead
to the conclusion that there is a fixed correlation likewise between the
will and its objects, regarding the will as the sensitivity; or at
least, that there is a fixed connexion between the will and the
sensitivity, so that the former is invariably governed by the latter. We
have already shown, that to identify sensitivity and will does not
relieve us from the difficulties of a self-determined and contingent
will, unless we plunge into absolute necessity; and that to make the
sensitivity govern the will, is only transferring to the sensitivity the
difficulties which we suppose, to encompass the will. In our
psychological investigations it will appear how clearly distinguishable
those powers are, and also how clearly independent and sovereign will
is, inasmuch as it does actually determine at one time, in opposition to
the most agreeable; at another, in opposition to reason; and at another,
in opposition to both conjoined. In the unity of our being, however, we
perceive that will is designed to obey the reason, and as subordinated
to reason, to move within the delights of the sensitivity; and we know
that we are acting _unreasonably_ and _senselessly_ when we act
otherwise; but yet _unreasonably_ and _senselessly_ do we often act. But
when we do obey reason, although we characterize the act from its
direction, will does not lose its simplicity and become reason; and when
we do obey the sensitivity, will does not become sensitivity--will is
still simply cause, and its act the _nisus_ of power: thought, and
conviction, and design, hold their place in the reason alone: emotion
and passion their place in the sensitivity alone.
ARGUMENT
FROM
THE DIVINE PRESCIENCE.
Edwards's argument against a contingent, self-determining will, drawn
from the divine prescience, remains to be considered.
The argument is introduced as follows: "That the acts of the wills of
moral agents are not contingent events, in such a sense as to be without
all necessity, appears by God's certain foreknowledge of such events."
(sec. xi. p. 98.) Edwards devotes this section to "the evidence of God's
certain foreknowledge of the volitions of moral agents." In the
following section, (sec. xii. p. 114,) he proceeds formally with his
argument. Before examining this argument, let us look at the
consequences of his position.
God foresees all volitions; that he foresees them makes their existence
necessary. If their existence were not necessary, he could not foresee
them; or, to express it still more generally, foreknowledge extends to
all events, and foreknowledge proves the necessary existence of
everything to which it extends. It follows from this, that all events
exist with an absolute necessity, all physical phenomena, all volitions,
and moral, phenomena, whether good or evil, and all the divine
volitions, for God cannot but foresee his own volitions. In no part of
his work, does Edwards lay down more summarily and decidedly, the
doctrine of absolute and universal necessity. We have already, in part
II. of this treatise, deduced the consequences of this doctrine. If then
we are placed upon the alternative of denying the divine prescience of
volitions, or of acknowledging the doctrine of necessity, it would
practically be most desirable and wisest to take the first part of the
alternative. "If it could be demonstrated," remarks Dugald Stewart,
(vol. 5. app. sec. viii.) "which in my opinion has not yet been done,
that the prescience of the volitions of moral agents is incompatible
with the free agency of man, the logical inference would be, _not_ in
favour of the scheme of necessity, but that there are some events, the
foreknowledge of which implies an impossibility. Shall we venture to
affirm, that it exceeds the power of God to permit such a train of
contingent events to take place, as his own foreknowledge shall not
extend to? Does not such a proposition detract from the omnipotence of
God, in the same proportion in which it aims to exalt his omniscience?"
If the divine foreknowledge goes to establish the doctrine of necessity,
there is nothing left that it is worth while to contend for; all moral
and theological interests vanish away. But let us examine the argument
of Edwards.
This argument consists of three parts; we shall consider them in order.
I. Edwards lays down, that a past event is necessary, "having already
made sure of existence;" but divine foreknowledge is such an event, and
is therefore necessary. This is equivalent to the axiom, that whatever
is, is. He next affirms, that whatever is "indissolubly connected with
other things that are necessary, are themselves necessary;" but events
infallibly foreknown, have an indissoluble connexion with the
foreknowledge. Hence, the volitions infallibly foreknown by God, have an
indissoluble connexion with his foreknowledge, and are therefore
necessary.
The force of this reasoning turns upon the connexion between
foreknowledge and the events foreknown. This connexion is affirmed to be
"indissoluble;" that is, the foreknowledge is certainly connected with
the event. But this only amounts to the certainty of divine
foreknowledge, and proves nothing as to the nature of the existence
foreknown. We may certainly know a past or present event, but our
knowledge of its existence defines nothing as to the manner in which it
came to exist. I look out of my window, and I see a man walking in a
certain direction: I have a positive knowledge of this event, and it
cannot but be that the man is walking; but then my knowledge of his
walking has no influence upon his walking, as cause or necessary
antecedent; and the question whether his walking be contingent or
necessary is entirely distinct, and relates to the cause of walking. I
looked out of my window yesterday, and saw a man walking; and the
knowledge of that event I now retain, so that it cannot but be that the
man walked yesterday: but this again leaves the question respecting the
mode of existence untouched:--Did the man walk of necessity, or was it a
contingent event? Now let me suppose myself endowed with the faculty of
prescience, sufficiently to know the events of to-morrow; then by this
faculty I may see a man walking in the time called to-morrow, just as by
the faculty of memory I see a man walking in the time called yesterday.
The knowledge, whether it relate to past, present, or future, as a
knowledge in relation to myself, is always a present knowledge; but the
object known may stand in various relations of time, place, &c. Now in
relation to the future, no more than in relation to the past and
present, does the act of knowledge on my part, explain anything in
relation to the mode of the existence of the object of knowledge.
Edwards remarks, (p. 121.) "All certain knowledge, whether it be
foreknowledge, or after-knowledge, or concomitant knowledge, proves the
thing known now to be necessary, by some means or other; or proves that
it is impossible that it should now be otherwise than true."
Edwards does not distinguish between the certainty of the mere _fact_ of
existence, and the necessity by which anything comes to exist.
Foreknowledge, after-knowledge, and concomitant knowledge,--that is, the
present knowledge of events, future, past, or present,--proves of course
the reality of the events; that they will be, have been, or are: or,
more strictly speaking, the knowledge of an event, in any relation of
time, is the affirmation of its existence in that relation; but the
knowledge of the event neither proves nor affirms the necessity of its
existence. If the knowledge of the event were the _cause_ of the event,
or if it _generically_ comprehended it in its own existence, then, upon
strict logical principles, the necessity affirmed of the knowledge would
be affirmed of the event likewise.
That God foreknows all volitions is granted; that as he foreknows them,
they will be, is also granted; his foreknowledge of them is the positive
affirmation of their reality in time future; but by supposition, God's
foreknowledge is not their cause, and does not generically comprehend
them; they are caused by wills acting in the future. Hence God's
foreseeing how the wills acting in the time future, will put forth or
determine their volitions, does not take away from these wills the
contingency and freedom belonging to them, any more than our witnessing
how wills act in the time present, takes away from them their
contingency and freedom. God in his prescience, _is the spectator of the
future, as really as we are the spectators of the present_.
Edwards's reasoning is a sort of puzzle, like that employed sometimes
for exercising the student of logic in the detection of fallacies: for
example, a man in a given place, must _necessarily_ either stay in that
place, or go away from that place; therefore, whether he stays or goes
away, he acts necessarily. Now it is necessary, in the nature of things,
that a man as well as any other body should be in some place, but then
it does not follow from this, that his determination, whether to stay or
go, is a necessary determination. His necessary condition as a body, is
entirely distinct from the question respecting the necessity or
contingency of his volitions. And so also in respect of the divine
foreknowledge: all human volitions as events occurring in time, are
subject to the necessary condition of being foreknown by that Being,
"who inhabiteth eternity:" but this necessary condition of their
existence neither proves nor disproves the necessity or the contingency
of their particular causation.
II. The second proposition in Edwards's argument is, "No future event
can be certainly foreknown, whose existence is contingent, and without
all necessity." His reasoning in support of this is as follows: 1. "It
is impossible for a thing to be certainly known to any intellect without
_evidence_." 2. A contingent future event is without evidence. 3.
Therefore, a contingent future event is not a possible object of
knowledge. I dispute both premises: That which is known by _evidence_ or
_proof_ is _mediate_ knowledge,--that is, we know it through something
which is immediate, standing between the faculty of knowledge and the
object of knowledge in question. That which is known _intuitively_ is
known without proof, and this is _immediate_ knowledge. In this way all
axioms or first truths and all facts of the senses are known. Indeed
evidence itself implies immediate knowledge, for the evidence by which
anything is known is itself immediate knowledge. To a Being, therefore,
whose knowledge fills duration, future and past events may be as
immediately known as present events. Indeed, can we conceive of God
otherwise than immediately knowing all things? An Infinite and Eternal
Intelligence cannot be thought of under relations of time and space, or
as arriving at knowledge through _media_ of proof or demonstration. So
much for the first premise. The second is equally untenable: "_A
contingent future event is without evidence_." We grant with Edwards
that it is not _self-evident_; implying by that the evidence arising
from "the necessity of its nature," as for example, 2 x 2 = 4. What is
self-evident, as we have already shown, does not require any evidence or
proof, but is known immediately; and a future contingent event may be
self-evident as a fact lying before the divine mind, reaching into
futurity, although it cannot be self-evident from "the necessity of its
nature."
But Edwards affirms, that "neither is there any _proof_ or evidence in
_anything else_, or evidence of connexion with something else that is
evident; for this is also contrary to the supposition. It is supposed
that there is now nothing existent with which the future existence of
the _contingent_ event is connected. For such a connexion destroys its
contingency and supposes necessity." (p. 116.) He illustrates his
meaning by the following example: "Suppose that five thousand seven
hundred and sixty years ago, there was no other being but the Divine
Being,--and then this world, or some particular body or spirit, all at
once starts out of nothing into being, and takes on itself a particular
nature and form--all in _absolute contingence_,--without any concern of
God, or any other cause in the matter,--without any manner of ground or
reason of its existence, or any dependence upon, or connexion at all
with anything foregoing;--I say that if this be supposed, there was no
evidence of that event beforehand. There was no evidence of it to be
seen in the thing itself; for the thing itself as yet was not; and there
was no evidence of it to be seen in _any thing else;_ for _evidence_ in
something else; is _connexion_ with something else; but such connexion
is contrary to the supposition." (p. 116.)
The amount of this reasoning is this: That inasmuch as a contingent
event exists "_without any concern of God, or any other cause in the
matter,--without any manner of ground or reason of its existence,--or
any dependence upon or connexion with anything foregoing_,"--there is
really nothing by which it can be proved beforehand. If Edwards be right
in this definition of a contingent event, viz.: that it is an event
without any cause or ground of its existence, and "that there is nothing
now existent with which the future existence of the contingent event is
connected," then this reasoning must be allowed to be conclusive. But I
do not accede to the definition: Contingence I repeat again, is not
opposed to cause but to necessity. The world may have sprung into being
by _absolute contingence_ more than five thousand years ago, and yet
have sprung into being at the command of God himself, and its existence
have been foreseen by him from all eternity. The contingence expresses
only the freedom of the divine will, creating the world by sovereign
choice, and at the moment of creation, conscious of power to withhold
the creative _nibus_,--creating in the light of his infinite wisdom, but
from no compulsion or necessity of motive therein found. Under this view
to foresee creation was nothing different from foreseeing his own
volitions.