all, nothing to account for the particular determination? I answer that
the particular determination is accounted for in the very quality or
attribute of the cause. In the case of a physical cause, the particular
determination is accounted for in the quality of the cause, which
quality is to be necessarily correlated to the object. In the case of
will, the particular determination is accounted for in the quality of
the cause, which quality is to have the power to make the particular
determination without being necessarily correlated to the object. A
physical cause is a cause fixed, determined, and necessitated. The will
is a cause contingent and free. A physical cause is a cause instrumental
of a first cause:--the will is first cause itself. The infinite will is
the first cause inhabiting eternity, filling immensity, and unlimited in
its energy. The human will is first cause appearing in time, confined to
place, and finite in its energy; but it is the same in kind, because
made in the likeness of the infinite will; as first cause it is self
moved, it makes its _nisus_ of itself, and of itself it forbears to make
it; and within the sphere of its activity, and in relation to its
objects, it has the power of selecting by a mere arbitrary act, any
particular object. It is a cause, all whose acts, as well as any
particular act, considered as phenomena demanding a cause, are accounted
for in itself alone. This does not make the created will independent of
the uncreated. The very fact of its being a created will, settles its
dependence. The power which created it, has likewise limited it, and
could annihilate it. The power which created it, has ordained and fixed
the instrumentalities by which volitions become productive of effects.
The man may make the volition or _nisus_, to remove a mountain, but his
arm fails to carry out the _nisus_. His volitions are produced freely of
himself; they are unrestrained within the capacity of will given him,
but he meets on every side those physical causes which are mightier than
himself, and which, instrumental of the divine will, make the created
will aware of its feebleness and dependence.
But although the will is an activity or cause thus contingent,
arbitrary, free, and indifferent, it is an activity or cause united with
sensitivity and reason; and forming the unity of the soul. Will, reason,
and, the sensitivity or the affections, constitute mind, or spirit, or
soul. Although the will is arbitrary and contingent, yet it does not
follow that it _must_ act without regard to reason or feeling.
I have yet to make my appeal to consciousness; I am now only giving a
scheme of psychology in order to prove the possibility of a contingent
will, that we have nothing else to oppose to an absolute and universal
necessity.
According to this scheme, we take the will as the _executive_ of the
soul or the _doer_. It is a doer having life and power in itself, not
necessarily determined in any of its acts, but a power to do or not to
do. _Reason_ we take as the _lawgiver_. It is the "source and substance"
of pure, immutable, eternal, and necessary truth. This teaches and
commands the executive will what ought to be done. The sensitivity or
the affections, or the desire, is the seat of enjoyment: it is the
capacity of pleasure and pain. Objects, in general, hold to the
sensitivity the relation of the agreeable or the disagreeable, are in
correlation with it; and, according to the degree of this correlation,
are the emotions and passions awakened.
Next let the will be taken as the chief characteristic of personality,
or more strictly, as the personality itself. By the personality, I mean
the me, or myself. The personality--the me--the will, a self-moving
cause, directs itself by an act of attention to the reason, and receives
the laws of its action. The perception of these laws is attended with
the conviction of their rectitude and imperative obligation; at the same
time, there is the consciousness of power to obey or to disobey them.
Again, let the will be supposed to direct itself in an act of attention
to the pleasurable emotions connected with the presence of certain
objects; and the painful emotions connected with the presence of other
objects; and then the desire of pleasure, and the wish to avoid pain,
become rules of action. There is here again the consciousness of power
to resist or to comply with the solicitations of desire. The will may
direct itself to those objects which yield pleasure, or may reject them,
and direct itself towards those objects which yield only pain and
disgust.
We may suppose again two conditions of the reason and sensitivity
relatively to each other; a condition of agreement, and a condition of
disagreement. If the affections incline to those objects which the
reason approves, then we have the first condition. If the affections are
repelled in dislike by those objects which reason approves, then we have
the second condition. On the first condition, the will, in obeying
reason, gratifies the sensitivity, and vice versa. On the second, in
obeying the reason, it resists the sensitivity, and vice versa.
Now if the will were always governed by the highest reason, without the
possibility of resistance, it would be a necessitated will; and if it
were always governed by the strongest desire, without the possibility of
resistance, it would be a necessitated will; as much so as in the system
of Edwards, where the strongest desire is identified with volition.
The only escape from necessity, therefore, is in the conception of a
will as above defined--a conscious, self-moving power, which may obey
reason in opposition to passion, or passion in opposition to reason, or
obey both in their harmonious union; and lastly, which may act in the
indifference of all, that is, act without reference either to reason or
passion. Now when the will obeys the laws of the reason, shall it be
asked, what is the cause of the act of obedience? The will is the cause
of its own act; a cause _per se_, a cause self-conscious and
self-moving; it obeys the reason by its own _nisus_. When the will obeys
the strongest desire, shall we ask, what is the cause of the act of
obedience? Here again, the will is the cause of its own act. Are we
called upon to ascend higher? We shall at last come to such a
self-moving and contingent power, or we must resign all to an absolute
necessity. Suppose, that when the will obeys the reason, we attempt to
explain it by saying, that obedience to the reason awakens the strongest
desire, or the sense of the most agreeable; we may then ask, why the
will obeys the strongest desire? and then we may attempt to explain this
again by saying, that to obey the strongest desire seems most
reasonable. We may evidently, with as much propriety, account for
obedience to passion, by referring to reason; as account for obedience
to reason, by referring to passion. If the act of the will which goes in
the direction of the reason, finds its cause in the sensitivity; then
the act of the will which goes in the direction of the sensitivity, may
find its cause in the reason. But this is only moving in a circle, and
is no advance whatever. Why does the will obey the reason? because it is
most agreeable: but why does the will obey because it is most agreeable?
because to obey the most agreeable seems most reasonable.
Acts of the will may be conceived of as analogous to intuitive or first
truths. First truths require no demonstration; they admit of none; they
form the basis of all demonstration. Acts of the will are first
movements of primary causes, and as such neither require nor admit of
antecedent causes, to explain their action. Will is the source and basis
of all other cause. It explains all other cause, but in itself admits of
no explanation. It presents the primary and all-comprehending _fact_ of
power. In God, will is infinite, primary cause, and untreated: in man,
it is finite, primary cause, constituted by God's creative act, but not
necessitated, for if necessitated it would not be will, it would not be
power after the likeness of the divine power; it would be mere physical
or secondary cause, and comprehended in the chain of natural antecedents
and sequents.
God's will explains creation as an existent fact; man's will explains
all his volitions. When we proceed to inquire after the characteristics
of creation, we bring in the idea of infinite wisdom and goodness. But
when we inquire _why_ God's will obeyed infinite wisdom and goodness, we
must either represent his will as necessitated by infinite wisdom and
goodness, and take with this all the consequences of an absolute
necessity; or we must be content to stop short, with will itself as a
first cause, not necessary, but contingent, which, explaining all
effects, neither requires nor admits of any explanation itself.
When we proceed to inquire after the characteristics of human volition,
we bring in the idea of right and wrong; we look at the relations of the
reason and the sensitivity. But when we inquire _why_ the will now obeys
reason, and now passion; and why this passion, or that passion; we must
either represent the will as necessitated, and take all the consequences
of a necessitated will, or we must stop short here likewise, with the
will itself as a first cause, not necessary, but contingent, which, in
explaining its own volitions, neither requires nor admits of any
explanation itself, other than as a finite and dependent will it
requires to be referred to the infinite will in order to account for the
fact of its existence.
Edwards, while he burdens the question of the will's determination with
monstrous consequences, relieves it of no one difficulty. He lays down,
indeed, a uniform law of determination; but there is a last inquiry
which he does not presume to answer. The determination of the will, or
the volition, is always as the most agreeable, and is the sense of the
most agreeable. But while the will is granted to be one simple power or
capacity, there arise from it an indefinite variety of volitions; and
volitions at one time directly opposed to volitions at another time. The
question now arises, how this one simple capacity of volition comes to
produce such various volitions? It is said in reply, that whatever may
be the volition, it is at the time the sense of the most agreeable: but
that it is always the sense of the most agreeable, respects only its
relation to the will itself; the volition, intrinsically considered, is
at one time right, at another wrong; at one time rational, at another
foolish. The volition really varies, although, relatively to the will,
it always puts on the characteristic of the most agreeable. The question
therefore returns, how this simple capacity determines such a variety of
volitions, always however representing them to itself as the most
agreeable? There are three ways of answering this. _First_, we may
suppose the _state_ of the will or sensitivity to remain unchanged, and
the different volitions to be effected by the different arrangements and
conditions of the objects relatively to it. _Secondly_, we may suppose
the arrangements and conditions of the objects to remain unchanged, and
the different volitions to be effected by changes in the _state_ of the
sensitivity, or will, relatively to the objects. Or, _thirdly_, we may
suppose both the state of the will, and the arrangements and conditions
of the objects to be subject to changes, singly and mutually, and thus
giving rise to the different volitions. But our questionings are not yet
at an end. On the first supposition, the question comes up, how the
different arrangements and conditions of the objects are brought about?
On the second supposition, how the changes in the state of the
sensitivity are effected? On the third supposition, how the changes in
both, singly and mutually, are effected? If it could be said, that the
sensitivity changes itself relatively to the objects, then we should ask
again, why the sensitivity chooses at one time, as most agreeable to
itself, that which is right and rational, and at another time, that
which is wrong and foolish? Or, if it could be said, that the objects
have the power of changing their own arrangements and conditions, then
also we must ask, why at one time the objects arrange themselves to make
the right and rational appear most agreeable, and at another time, the
wrong and foolish.
These last questions are the very questions which Edwards does not
presume to answer. The motive by which he accounts for the existence of
the volition, is formed of the correlation of the state of the will, and
the nature and circumstances of the object. But when the correlation is
such as to give the volition in the direction of the right and the
rational, in opposition to the wrong and the foolish,--we ask _why_ does
the correlation give the volition in this direction. If it be said that
the volition in this direction appears most agreeable, the answer is a
mere repetition of the question; for the question amounts simply to
this:--why the correlation is such as to make the one agreeable rather
than the other? The volition which is itself only the sense of the most
agreeable, cannot be explained by affirming that it is always as the
most agreeable. The point to be explained is, why the mind changes its
state in relation to the objects; or why the objects change their
relations to the mind, so as to produce this sense of the most agreeable
in one direction rather than in another? The difficulty is precisely of
the same nature which is supposed to exist in the case of a contingent
will. The will now goes in the direction of reason, and now in the
direction of passion,--but why? We say, because as will, it has the
power of thus varying its movement. The change is accounted for by
merely referring to the will.
According to Edwards, the correlation of will and its objects, now gives
the sense of the most agreeable, or volition, in the direction of the
reason; and now in the direction of passion--but why?--Why does the
reason _now_ appear most agreeable,--and now the indulgences of impure
desire? I choose this because it is most agreeable, says Edwards, which
is equivalent to saying,--I have the sense of the most agreeable in
reference to this, because it is most agreeable; but how do you know it
is the most agreeable? because I choose it, or have the sense of the
most agreeable in reference to it. It is plain, therefore, that on
Edwards's system, as well as on that opposed to it, the particular
direction of volition, and the constant changes of volition, must be
referred simply to the cause of volition, without giving any other
explanation of the different determinations of this cause, except
referring them to the nature of the cause itself. It is possible,
indeed, to refer the changes in the correlation to some cause which
governs the correlation of the will and its objects; but then the
question must arise in relation to this cause, why it determines the
correlation in one direction at one time, and in another direction at
another time? And this could be answered only by referring it to itself
as having the capacity of these various determinations as a power to do
or not to do, and a power to determine in a given direction, or in the
opposite direction; or by referring it to still another antecedent
cause. Now let us suppose this last antecedent to be the infinite will:
then the question would be, why the infinite will determines the
sensitivity, or will of his creatures at one time to wisdom, and at
another to folly? And what answer could be given? Shall it be said that
it seems most agreeable to him? But why does it seem most agreeable to
him? Is it because the particular determination is the most reasonable,
that it seems most agreeable? But why does he determine always according
to the most reasonable? Is it because to determine according to the most
reasonable, seems most agreeable? Now, inasmuch as according to Edwards,
the volition and the sense of the most agreeable are the same; to say
that God wills as he does will, because it is most agreeable to him, is
to say that he wills because he wills; and to say that he wills as he
does will, because it seems most reasonable to him, amounts to the same
thing, because he wills according to the most reasonable only because it
is the most agreeable.
To represent the volitions, or choices, either in the human or divine
will, as determined by motives, removes therefore no difficulty which is
supposed to pertain to contingent self-determination.
Let us compare the two theories particularly, although at the hazard of
some repetition.
Contingent self-determination represents the will as a cause making its
_nisus_ or volitions of itself, and determining their direction of
itself--now obeying reason, and now obeying passion. If it be asked why
it determines in a particular direction?--if this particular direction
in which it determines be that of the reason?--then it may be said, that
it determines in this direction because it is reasonable;--if this
particular direction be that of passion, as opposed to reason, then it
may be said that it determines in this direction, because it is
pleasing. But if it be asked why the will goes in the direction of
reason, rather than in that of passion, as opposed to reason?--we cannot
say that it is most reasonable to obey reason and not passion; because
the one is all reason, and the other is all passion, and of course they
cannot be compared under the reasonable; and no more can they be
compared under the pleasing,--when, by the pleasing, we understand, the
gratification of desire, as opposed to reason. To obey reason because it
is reasonable, is nothing more than the statement of the fact that the
will does obey reason. To obey desire because it is desirable, is
nothing more than the statement of the fact that the will does obey
desire. The will goes in one direction rather than in another by an act
of self-determination, which neither admits of, nor indeed requires any
other explanation than this, that the will has power to do one or the
other, and in the exercise of this power, it does one rather than the
other.
To this stands contrasted the system of Edwards; and what is this
system? That the will is determined by the strongest motive;--and what
is the strongest motive? The greatest apparent good, or the most
agreeable:--what constitutes the greatest apparent good, or the most
agreeable? The correlation of will or sensitivity and the object. But
why does the correlation make one object appear more agreeable than
another; or make the same object at one time appear agreeable, at
another time disagreeable? Now this question is equivalent to the
question,--why does the will go in the direction of one object rather
than of another; or go in the direction of a given object at one time,
and in opposition to it at another time? For the will to determine
itself toward an object in one system, answers to the will having the
sense of the most agreeable towards an object in Edwards's system. If
Edwards should attempt to give an answer without going beyond the
motive, he could only say that the sensitivity has the power of being
affected with the sense of the most agreeable or of the most
disagreeable; and that in the exercise of this power it is affected with
the one rather than with the other. He could not say that to obey reason
appears more agreeable than to obey passion as opposed to reason, for
the obedience of the will on his system, is nothing more than a sense of
the most agreeable. Nor could he say it is more reasonable to obey
reason, for reason cannot be compared with its opposite, under the idea
of itself; and if he could say this, it amounts to no more than this, on
his system, that it is most agreeable to obey the reasonable;--that is,
the reasonable is obeyed only as the most agreeable: but obedience of
will being nothing more than the sense of the most agreeable, to say it
is obeyed because most agreeable, is merely to say that it awakens the
sense of the most agreeable; that is, it is obeyed, because it is
obeyed.
To refer the motive to the divine determination makes volition necessary
to the man, and throws the difficulty in question, if it is to be
considered a difficulty, only farther back.
If God's will determines in the direction of the reasonable because it
is most agreeable, then we ask, why is it the most agreeable? If the
reply be, because it is most reasonable, then we are only moving in a
circle; but if the agreeable be taken as an ultimate fact, then inasmuch
as to will is only to have the sense of the most agreeable, it follows
that God has the sense of the most agreeable towards an object only
because it is most agreeable to him, or awakens this sense in him; and
thus the question why God wills in one direction rather than in another,
or what is the cause of his determination, is not answered by Edwards,
unless he says with us that the will in itself as a power to do or not
to do, or to do one thing, or its opposite, is a sufficient explanation,
and the only possible explanation;--or unless he refers the divine will
to an antecedent cause, and this again to another antecedent cause, in
an endless series--and thus introduce the two-fold error of an endless
series, and an absolute necessity.
All possible volitions, according to the scheme of psychology I have
above given, must be either in the direction of the reason or of the
sensitivity, or in the indifferency of both. If the volition be in the
direction of the reason, it takes the characteristics of rational, good,
&c. If in the direction of the sensitivity, it takes its characteristic
from the nature of the particular desire which it obeys:--it is
generous, benevolent, kind, &c.--or it is malicious, envious, unkind,
vicious, &c. What moves the will to go in the direction of the reason?
Nothing moves it; it is a cause _per se_; it goes in that direction
because it has power to go in that direction. What moves the will to go
in the direction of the sensitivity? Nothing moves it; it is a cause
_per se_; it goes in that direction because it has power to go in that
direction.
There are in the intelligence or reason, as united with the will in the
constitution of the mind, necessary convictions of the true, the just,
the right. There are in the sensitivity, as united in the same
constitution, necessary affections of the agreeable and the disagreeable
in reference to various objects. The will as the power which by its
_nisus_ produces changes or phenomena, is conscious of ability to go in
either of these directions, or in opposition to both. Now when it makes
its _nisus_ or volition in reference to the true, the just, the good;
should we attempt to explain this _nisus_ by saying that the true, the
just, the good, affect the sensitivity agreeably, this would only amount
to saying that the _nisus_ is made towards the true, not as the true,
but only as the agreeable; and then we would introduce the law that the
_nisus_ is always made in the direction of the agreeable. But then again
we might seek to explain why the _nisus_ is always made in the direction
of the agreeable. Is it of an antecedent necessity? Then we have an
absolute and universal necessity. Is it because to go in the direction
of the agreeable seems most rational? Then it follows that the _nisus_
is made towards the agreeable not as the agreeable, but only as the
rational; and then we would introduce the law that the _nisus_ is always
made in the direction of the rational. But then again we might seek to
explain why this _nisus_ is always made in the direction of the
rational. Is it of an antecedent necessity? Then here likewise we have
an absolute and universal necessity. Is it because to go in the
direction of the rational seems most agreeable? Then we are winding back
in a circle to our first position.