PART IX

THE LAST PHASE

I. LORD HOWE'S FIRST SIGNAL BOOK

II. SIGNAL BOOKS OF THE GREAT WAR

III. NELSON'S TACTICAL MEMORANDA

IV. ADMIRAL GAMBIER, 1807

V. LORD COLLINGWOOD, 1808-1810

VI. SIR ALEXANDER COCHRANE'S INSTRUCTIONS

VII. THE SIGNAL BOOK OF 1816

THE NEW SIGNAL BOOK INSTRUCTIONS

INTRODUCTORY

The time-worn Fighting Instructions of Russell and Rooke with their

accretion of Additional Instructions did not survive the American War.

Some time in that fruitful decade of naval reform which elapsed

between the peace of 1783 and the outbreak of the Great War they were

superseded. It was the indefatigable hand of Lord Howe that dealt

them the long-needed blow, and when the change came it was

sweeping. It was no mere substitution of a new set of Instructions,

but a complete revolution of method. The basis of the new tactical

code was no longer the Fighting Instructions, but the Signal

Book. Signals were no longer included in the Instructions, and the

Instructions sank to the secondary place of being 'explanatory' to the

Signal Book.[1]

The earliest form in which these new 'Explanatory Instructions' are

known is a printed volume in the Admiralty Library containing a

complete set of Fleet Instructions, and entitled 'Instructions for the

conduct of ships of war explanatory of and relative to the Signals

contained in the Signal Book herewith delivered.' The Signal Book is

with it.[2] Neither volume bears any date, but both are in the old

folio form which had been traditional since the seventeenth

century. They are therefore presumably earlier than 1790 when the

well-known quarto form first came into use, and as we shall see from

internal evidence they cannot have been earlier than 1782. Nor is

there any direct evidence that they are the work of Lord Howe, but the

'significations' of the signals bear unmistakable marks of his

involved and cumbrous style, and the code itself closely resembles

that he used during the Great War. With these indications to guide us

there is little difficulty in fixing with practical certainty both

date and authorship from external sources.[3]

In a pamphlet published by Admiral Sir Charles Henry Knowles in 1830,

when he was a very old man, he claims to have invented the new code of

numerical signals which Howe adopted. The pamphlet is entitled

'Observations on Naval Tactics and on the Claims of Clerk of Eldin,'

and in the course of it he says that about 1777 he devised this new

system of signals, and gave it to Howe on his arrival in the summer of

that year at Newport, in Rhode Island, 'and his lordship,' he says,

'afterwards introduced them into the Channel Fleet.' Further, he

says, he soon after invented the tabular system of flags suggested by

the chess-board, and published them in the summer of 1778. To this

work he prefixed as a preface the observations of his father, Sir

Charles Knowles, condemning the existing form of sailing order, and

recommending Père Hoste's old form in three columns, and this

order, he says, Howe adopted for the relief of Gibraltar in September

1782. He also infers that the alleged adoption of his signals in the

Channel Fleet was when Lord Howe commanded it before he became first

lord of the admiralty for the second time--that is, before he

succeeded Keppel in December 1783. For during the peace Knowles tells

us he made a second communication to Howe on tactics, of which more

must be said later on. The inference therefore is that when Knowles

says that Howe adopted his code in the Channel Fleet it must have been

the first time he took command of it--that is, on April 2, 1782.[4]

Now if, as Knowles relates--and there is no reason to doubt this part

of his story--Howe did issue a new code of signals some time before

sailing for Gibraltar in 1782, and if at the time, as Knowles also

says, he had been studying Hoste, internal evidence shows almost

conclusively that these folios must be the Signal Book in

question. From end to end the influence of Hoste's Treatise and of

Rodney's tactics in 1782 is unmistakable.[5]

From Hoste it takes not only the sailing formation in three columns,

but re-introduces into the British service the long-discarded

manoeuvre of 'doubling.' For this there are three signals, Nos.

222-4, for doubling the van, doubling the rear, and for the rear to

double the rear. From Hoste also it borrows the method of giving

battle to a superior force, which the French writer apparently

borrowed from Torrington. The signification of the signal is as

follows: 'No. 232. When inferior in number to the enemy, and to

prevent being doubled upon in the van or rear, for the van squadron to

engage the headmost ships of the enemy's line, the rear their

sternmost, and the centre that of the enemy, whose surplus ships will

then be left out of action in the vacant spaces between our

squadrons.'

The author's obligations to the recent campaigns of Rodney and Hood

are equally clear. Signal 236 is, 'For ships to steer for independent

of each other and engage respectively the ships opposed to them in the

enemy's line,' and this was a new form of the signal, which, according

to the MS. Signal Book of 1782, was introduced by Hood.[6] Still

more significant is Signal 235, 'when fetching up with the enemy to

leeward, and on the contrary tack, to break through their line and

endeavour to cut off part of their van or rear.' This is clearly the

outcome of Rodney's famous manoeuvre, and is adopted word for word

from the signification of the signal that Hood added. Pigot, it will

be remembered, on succeeding Rodney, added two more on the same

subject, viz. (1) 'For the leading ship to cut through the enemy's

line of battle,' and (2) 'For a particular ship specified to cut

through the enemy's line of battle, and for all the other ships to

follow her in close order to support each other.' Neither of these

later signals is in the code we are considering, and the presumption

is that it was drawn up very soon after Rodney's victory and before

Pigot's signals were known at home.

Finally there is a MS. note added by Sir Charles H. Knowles to his

'Fighting and Sailing Instructions,' to the effect that in the

instructions issued by Howe in 1782 he modified Article XXI. of the

old Fighting Instructions (_i.e._ Article XX. of Russell's).

'His lordship in 1782,' it says, 'directed by his instructions that

the line [_i.e._ his own line] should not be broken until all the

enemy's ships gave way and were beaten.' And this is practically the

effect of Article XIV. of the set we are considering. In the absence

of contrary evidence, therefore, there seems good ground for calling

these folio volumes 'Howe's First Signal Book, 1782,' and with this

tentative attribution the Explanatory Instructions are printed below.

As has been already said, these instructions, divorced as they now

were from the signals, give but a very inadequate idea of the tactics

in vogue. For this we must go to the tactical signals themselves. In

the present case the more important ones (besides those given above)

are as follows:

'No. 218. To attack the enemy's rear in succession by ranging up with

and opening upon the sternmost of their ships; then to tack or veer,

as being to windward or to leeward of the enemy, and form again in the

rear.' This signal, which at first sight looks like a curious

reversion to the primitive Elizabethan method of attack, immediately

follows the signals for engaging at anchor, and may have been the

outcome of Hood's experience with De Grasse in 1782.

'No. 232. In working to gain the wind of the enemy, for the headmost

and sternmost ships to signify when they can weather them by Signal

17, p. 66; or if to windward of the enemy and on the contrary tack,

for the sternmost ship to signify when she is far enough astern of

their rear to be able to lead down out of their line of fire.'

'No. 234. When coming up astern and to windward of the enemy to engage

by inverting the line'--that is, for the ship leading the van to

engage the sternmost of the enemy, the next ship to pass on under

cover of her fire and engage the second from the enemy's rear, and so

on.

FOOTNOTES:

[1] The first attempt to provide a convenient Signal Book separate

from the Instructions was made privately by one Jonathan Greenwood about

1715. He produced a small 12mo. volume dedicated to Admiral Edward

Russell, Earl of Orford, and the other lords of the admiralty who were

then serving with him. It consists of a whole series of well-engraved

plates of ships flying the various signals contained in the Sailing and

Fighting Instructions, each properly coloured with its signification

added beneath. The author says he designed the work as a pocket

companion to the Printed Instructions and for the use of inferior

officers who had not access to them. Copies are in the British Museum

and the R.U.S.I. Library.

[2] _Catalogue_, Nos. 252/27 and 252/26.

[3] A still earlier Signal Book attributed to Lord Howe is in the

United Service Institution, but it is no more than a condensed and

amended form of the established one. Its nature and intention are

explained by No. 10 of the 'explanatory observations' which he attached

to it. It is as follows; 'All the signals contained in the general

printed Signal Book which are likely to be needful on the present

occasion being provided for in this Signal Book, the signals as

appointed in the general Signal Book will only be made either in

conformity to the practice of some senior officer present, or when in

company for the time being with other ships not of the fleet under the

admiral's command, and unprovided with these particular signals.' It was

therefore probably issued experimentally, but what the 'present

occasion' was is not indicated. It contains none of the additional

signals of 1782-3.

[4] Knowles was of course too old in 1830 for his memory to be trusted

as to details. A note in his handwriting upon a copy of his code in

possession of the present baronet gives its story simply as follows:

'These signals were written in 1778, as an idea--altered and

published--then altered again in 1780--afterwards arranged differently

in 1787, and finally in 1794; but not printed at Sir C.H. Knowles's

expense until 1798, when they were sent to the admiralty, but they were

not published, although copies have been given to sea officers.'

[5] A partial translation of Hoste had been published by Lieutenant

Christopher O'Bryen, R.N., in 1762. Captain Boswall's complete

translation was not issued till 1834.

[6] Note that the signal differs from that which Rodney made under

Article 17 of the Additional Fighting Instructions in his action of

April 17, 1780, and which being misunderstood spoilt his whole attack.

_LORD HOWE_, 1782.

[+Admiralty Library 252/27+.]

_Instructions respecting the Order of Battle and conduct of the

fleet, preparative to and in action with the enemy_.

Article I. When the signal is made for the fleet to form in order of

battle, each captain or commander is to get most speedily into his

station, and keep the prescribed distance from his seconds ahead and

astern upon the course steered, and under a proportion of sail suited

to that carried by the admiral.

But when the signal is made for tacking, or on any similar occasion,

care is to be taken to open, in succession, to a sufficient distance

for performing the intended evolution. And the ships are to close back

to their former distance respectively as soon as it has been executed.

II. In line of battle, the flag of the admiral commanding in chief is

always to be considered as the point of direction to the whole fleet,

for forming and preserving the line.

III. The squadron of the second in command is to lead when forming the

line ahead, and to take the starboard side of the centre when forming

the line abreast, unless signal is made to the contrary; these

positions however are only restrained to the first forming of the

lines from the order of sailing.

For when the fleet is formed upon a line, then in all subsequent

evolutions the squadrons are not to change their places, but preserve

the same situation in the line whatever position it may bring them

into with the centre, with respect to being in the van or the rear, on

the starboard or larboard side, unless directed so to do by signal.

Suppose the fleet sailing in line ahead on the larboard tack, the

second in command leading, and signal is made to form a line abreast

to sail large or before the wind, the second squadron in that case is

to form on the larboard side of the centre.

Again, suppose in this last situation signal is made to haul to the

wind, and form a line ahead on the starboard tack, in this case the

squadron of the third in command is to lead, that of the second in

command forming the rear.

And when from a line ahead, the squadron of the second in command

leading, the admiral would immediately form the line on the contrary

tack by tacking or veering together, the squadron of the third in

command will then become the van.

These evolutions could not otherwise be performed with regularity and

expedition.

When forming the line from the order of sailing, the ships of each

squadron are to be ranged with respect to each other in the line in

the same manner as when in order of sailing each squadron in one line;

and, as when the second in command is in the van, the headmost ship of

his squadron (in sailing order) becomes the leading ship of the line,

so likewise the headmost ship of the third squadron (in sailing order)

becomes the leading ship of the line, when the third in command takes

the van, except when the signal is made to form the line reversed.

Ships happening to have been previously detached on any service,

separate from the body of the fleet, when the signal for forming in

order of battle is made, are not meant to be comprehended in the

intention of it, until they shall first have been called back to the

fleet by the proper signal.

IV. When the fleet is sailing in line of battle ahead, the course is

to be taken from the ship leading the van upon that occasion; the

others in succession being to steer with their seconds ahead

respectively, whilst they continue to be regulated by the example of

the leading ship.[1]

V. The ships, which from the inequality of their rates of sailing

cannot readily keep their stations in the line, are not to obstruct

the compliance with the intent of the signal in others; nor to hazard

throwing the fleet into disorder by persisting too long in their

endeavours to preserve their stations under such circumstances; but

they are to fall astern and form in succession in the rear of the

line.

The captains of such ships will not be thereby left in a situation

less at liberty to distinguish themselves; as they will have an

opportunity to render essential service, by placing their ships to

advantage when arrived up with the enemy already engaged with the

other part of the fleet.

The ships next in succession in order of battle are to occupy in turn,

on this and every other similar occasion, the vacant spaces that would

be otherwise left in the line; so that it may be always kept perfect

at the appointed intervals of distance.

And when the fleet is sailing large, or before the wind, in order of

battle, and the admiral makes the signal for coming to the wind on

either tack, the ship stationed to lead the line on that tack, first,

and the others in succession, as they arrive in the wake of that ship

and of their seconds ahead respectively, are to haul to the wind

without loss of time accordingly.

And all the signals for regulating the course and motions of the fleet

by day or night, after the signal for forming in order of battle has

been made, are to be understood with reference to the continuance of

the fleet in such order, until the general signal to chase, or to form

again in order of sailing, is put abroad.

VI. When the fleet is formed on any line pointed out by the compass

signal, the relative bearing of the ships from each other is to be

preserved through every change of course made, as often as any

alteration thereof together shall be by signal directed.[2]

When, on the contrary, the signal to alter the course in succession

has been put abroad, the relative bearing of the ships from each other

will be then consequently changed; and any alteration of the course

subsequently directed to be made by the ships together will thereafter

have reference to the relative bearing last established. The same

distinction will take place so often as the alteration of course in

succession, as aforesaid, shall in future recur.

VII. If the admiral should observe that the enemy has altered his

course, and the disposition of his order of battle, one, two, three,

or any greater number of points (in which case it will be necessary to

make a suitable change in the bearing of the ships from each other in

the British fleet, supposed to be formed in such respects

correspondently to the first position of the enemy), he will make the

signal for altering course in succession, according to the nature of

the occasion. The leading ship of the line is thereupon immediately to

alter to the course pointed out; and (the others taking their places

astern of her in succession, as they arrive in the wake of that ship

and of their seconds ahead respectively) she is to lead the fleet in

line of battle ahead on the course so denoted, until farther order.

VIII. When it is necessary to shorten or make more sail whilst the

fleet is in order of battle, and the proper signal in either case has

been made, the fleet is to be regulated by the example of the frigate

appointed to repeat signals; which frigate is to set or take in the

sail the admiral is observed to do.

The ship referred to is thereupon to suit her sail to the known

comparative rate of sailing between her and the admiral's ship.

Hence it will be necessary that the captains of the fleet be very

attentive to acquire a perfect knowledge of the comparative rate of

sailing between their own and the admiral's ship, so as under whatever

sail the admiral may be, they may know what proportion to carry, to go

at an equal rate with him.

IX. When, the ships of the fleet being more in number than the enemy,

the admiral sees proper to order any particular ships to withdraw from

the line, they are to be placed in a proper situation, in readiness to

be employed occasionally as circumstances may thereafter require--to

windward of the fleet, if then having the weather-gage of the enemy,

or towards the van and ahead, if the contrary--to relieve, or go to

the assistance of any disabled ship, or otherwise act, as by signal

directed.

The captains of ships, stationed next astern of those so withdrawn,

are directly to close to the van, and fill up the vacant spaces

thereby made in the line.

When, in presence of an enemy, the admiral or commander of any

division of the fleet finds it necessary to change his station in the

line, in order to oppose himself against the admiral or commander in a

similar part of the enemy's line, he will make the signal for that

purpose; and the ships referred to on this occasion are to place

themselves forthwith against the ships of the enemy, that would

otherwise by such alteration remain unopposed.

X. When the fleet is sailing in a line of battle ahead, or upon any

other bearing, and the signal is made for the ships to keep in more

open order, it will be generally meant that they should keep from one

to two cables' length asunder, according as the milder or rougher

state of the weather may require; also that they should close to the

distance of half a cable, or at least a cable's length, in similar

circumstances, when the signal for that purpose is put abroad.

But in both cases, the distance pointed out to the admiral's second

ahead and astern, by the continuance of the flag abroad, as intimated

in the Signal Book, is to be signified from them respectively to the

ships succeeding them on either part, by signals.

These signals are to be continued either way, onward, throughout the

line if necessary.

Notice is to be taken, in the same manner, of any continued deviation

from the limited distance; and to commence between the several

commanders of private ships respectively, independent of the admiral's

previous example, when they observe their seconds ahead or astern to

be at any time separated from them, further than the regulated

distance kept by the ships next to the admiral, or that which was last

appointed.

When the admiral, being before withdrawn from the line, means to

resume his station therein, he will make the signal for the particular

ships, between which he means to place himself, to open to a greater

distance, whether it be in his former station, or in any other part of

the line, better suited for his future purpose.

XI. When any number of ships is occasionally detached from the fleet

for the same purpose, they are, during their separation from the body

of the fleet, to comply with all such signals as shall be made at any

time, whilst the signal flag appropriated for that occasion remains

abroad.

But the signals made to all ships so appointed, having the commander

of a squadron or division with them, will be under the flag

descriptive of such commander's squadron or division, whose signals

and instructions they are to obey.

XII. Great care is to be taken at all times when coming to action not

to fire upon the enemy either over or near any ships of the fleet,

liable to be injured thereby; nor, when in order of battle, until the

proper signal is made, and that the ships are properly placed in

respect to situation and distance, although the signal may have been

before put abroad.

And if, when the signal for battle is made, the ships are then

steering down for the enemy in an oblique direction from each other,

they are to haul to the wind, or to any order parallel with the enemy,

to engage them as they arrive in a proper situation and distance,

without waiting for any more particular signal or order for that

purpose: regard being only had by the several commanders in these

circumstances to the motions of the ships preceding them on the tack

whereunto the course more inclines, and upon and towards which the

enemy is formed for action, that they may have convenient space for

hauling up clear of each other.

When our fleet is upon the contrary tack to that of the enemy, and

standing towards them, and the admiral makes the signal to engage, the

van ship is then to lead close along their line, with a moderate sail,

and engage; the rest of the fleet doing the same, passing to windward

or to leeward of the enemy, as the admiral may direct.

XIII. When weathering the enemy upon the contrary tack, and signal is

made to engage their van, the leading ship is then to bear down to the

van ship of the enemy, and engage, passing along their line to

windward to the sternmost ship of their van squadron, then to haul off

close to the wind, the rest of the fleet doing the same in

succession.[3]

XIV. No ship is to separate in time of action from the body of the

fleet, in pursuit of any small number of the enemy's ships beaten out

of the line; nor until their main body be also disabled or broken: but

the captains, who have disabled or forced their opponents out of the

line, are to use their best endeavours to assist any ship of the fleet

appearing to be much pressed, or the ships nearest to them, to hasten

the defeat of the enemy, unless otherwise by signal, or particular

instruction, directed.[4]

XV. When any ship in the fleet is so much disabled as to be in the

utmost danger and hazard of being taken by the enemy, or destroyed,

and makes the signal expressive of such extremity; the Captains of the

nearest ships, most at liberty with respect to the state of their

opponents in the enemy's line, are strictly enjoined to give all

possible aid and protection to such disabled ship, as they are best

able. And the captain of any frigate (or fireship) happening to be at

that time in a situation convenient for the purpose, is equally

required to use his utmost endeavours for the relief of such disabled

ship, by joining in the attack of the ship of the enemy opposed to the

disabled ship, if he sees opportunity to place his ship to advantage,

by favouring the attempt of the fireship to lay the enemy on board, or

by taking out any of the crew of the disabled ship, if practicable and

necessary, as may be most expedient.

XVI. No captain, though much pressed by the enemy, is to quit his

station in time of battle, if possible to be avoided, without

permission first obtained from the commanding officer of his division,

or other nearest flag officer, for that purpose; but, when compelled

thereto by extreme necessity before any adequate assistance is

furnished, or that he is ordered out of the line on that account, the

nearest ships and those on each part of the disabled ship's station

are timely to occupy the vacant space occasioned by her absence,

before the enemy can take advantage thereof.

And if any captain shall be wanting in the due performance of his duty

in time of battle, the commander of the division, or other flag

officer nearest to him, is immediately to remove such deficient

captain from his post, and appoint another commander to take the

charge and conduct of the ship on that occasion.

XVII. When, from the advantage obtained by the enemy over the fleet,

or from bad weather, or otherwise, the admiral hath by signal

signified his intention to leave the captains and other commanders at

liberty to proceed at their discretion; they are then permitted to act

as they see best under such circumstances, for the good of the king's

service and the preservation of their ships, without regard to his

example. But they are, nevertheless, to endeavour at all times to gain

the appointed rendezvous in preference, if it can be done with safety.

XVIII. The ships are to be kept at all times prepared in readiness for

action. And in case of coming to an engagement with the enemy, their

boats are to be kept manned and armed, and prepared with hand and

fire-chain grapnels, and other requisites, on the off-side from the

enemy, for the purpose of assisting any ship of the fleet attempted by

the fireships of the enemy; or for supporting the fireships of the

fleet when they are to proceed on service.

The ships appointed to protect and cover these last, or which may be

otherwise in a situation to countenance their operations, are to take

on board their crews occasionally, and proceed before them down, as

near as possible, to the ships of the enemy they are destined to

attempt.

The captains of such ships are likewise to be particularly attentive

to employ the boats they are provided with, as well to cover the

retreat of the fireships boat, as to prevent the endeavours to be

expected from the boats of the enemy to intercept the fireship, or in

any other manner to frustrate the execution of the proposed

undertaking.[5]

XIX. If the ship of any flag officer be disabled in battle, the flag

officer may embark on board any private ship that he sees fit, for

carrying on the service: but it is to be of his own squadron or

division in preference when equally suitable for his purpose.

XX. The flag officers, or commanders of divisions, are on all

occasions to repeat generally, as well as with reference to their

respective divisions, the signals from the admiral, that they may be

thereby more speedily communicated correspondent to his intentions.

And the purpose of all signals for the conduct of particular divisions

is then only meant to be carried into execution when the signal has

been repeated, or made by the commanders of such particular divisions

respectively. In which circumstances they are to be always regarded

and complied with by the ships or divisions referred to, in the same

manner as if such signals had been made by the admiral commanding in

chief.

XXI. When ships have been detached to attack the enemy's rear, the

headmost ship of such detachment, and the rest in succession, after

having ranged up their line as far is judged proper, is then to fall

astern; and (the ship that next follows passing between her and the

enemy) is to tack or wear as engaged to windward or leeward, and form

in the rear of the detachment.

XXII. When the fleet is to tack in succession, the ship immediately

following the one going in stays should observe to bear up a little,

to give her room; and the moment for putting in stays is that when a

ship discovers the weather quarter of her second ahead, and which has

just tacked before her.

On this and every other occasion, when the fleet is in order of

battle, it should be the attention of each ship strictly to regulate

her motions by those of the one preceding her; a due regard to such a

conduct being the only means of maintaining the prescribed distance

between the ships, and of preserving a regular order throughout the

line.

XXIII. As soon as the signal is made to prepare for battle, the

fireships are to get their boarding grapnels fixed; and when in

presence of an enemy, and that they perceive the fleet is likely to

come to action, they are to prime although the signal for that purpose

should not have been made; being likewise to signify when they are

ready to proceed on service, by putting abroad the appointed signal.

They are to place themselves abreast of the ships of the line, and not

in the openings between them, the better to be sheltered from the

enemy's fire, keeping a watchful eye upon the admiral, so as to be

prepared to put themselves in motion the moment their signal is made,

which they are to answer as soon as observed.

A fireship ordered to proceed on service is to keep a little ahead and

to windward of the ship that is to escort her, to be the more ready to

bear down on the vessel she is to board, and to board if possible in

the fore shrouds. By proceeding in this manner she will not be in the

way of preventing the ship appointed to escort her from firing upon

the enemy, and will run less risk of being disabled herself; and the

ship so appointed and the two other nearest ships are to assist her

with their boats manned and armed.

She is to keep her yards braced up, that when she goes down to board,

and has approached the ship she is to attempt, she may have nothing to

do but to spring her luff.

Captains of fireships are not to quit them till they have grappled the

enemy, and have set fire to the train.

XXIV. Frigates have it in particular charge to frustrate the attempts

of the enemy's fireships, and to favour those of our own. When a

fireship of the enemy therefore attempts to board a ship of the line,

they are to endeavour to cut off the boats that attend her, and even

to board her, if necessary.

XXV. The boats of a ship attempted by an enemy's fireship, with those

of her seconds ahead and astern, are to use their utmost efforts to

tow her off, the ships at the same time firing to sink her.

XXVI. In action, all the ships in the fleet are to wear red ensigns.

FOOTNOTES:

[1] This and Article II. appear to be the first mention of working the

fleet by 'guides.'

[2] The original has here the following erasure: 'The same is to be

understood of the bearing indicated, though the admiral should shape his

course from the wind originally when the signal for forming upon a line

of bearing is made.'

[3] It was Nelson's improvement on this unscientific method of attack

that is the conspicuous feature of his Memorandum, 1803, but it must be

remembered that Howe had not yet devised the manoeuvre of breaking the

line in all parts on which Nelson's improvement was founded.

[4] _Cf._ note 1, p. 224.

[5] Howe's insistence on these points both here and in Articles

XXII.-XXV. is curious in view of the fact that the use of fireships in

action had gone out of fashion. From 1714 to 1763 only one English

fireship is known to have been 'expended,' and that was by Commander

Callis when he destroyed the Spanish galleys at St. Tropez in 1742. At

the peace of 1783 the Navy List contained only 17 fireships out of a

total of 468 sail. Howe had two fireships on the First of June, 1794,

but did not use them.

THE SIGNAL BOOKS OF THE GREAT WAR

INTRODUCTORY

The second form in which the new Fighting Instructions, originated by

Lord Howe, have come down to us, is that which became fixed in the

service after 1790; that is, instead of two folio volumes with the

Signals in one and the Explanatory Instructions in the other, we have,

at least after 1799, one small quarto containing both, and entitled

'Signal Book for Ships of War.' The earliest known example, however,

of the new quarto form is a Signal Book only, which refers to a set of

Instructions apparently similar to those of 1799. These have not been

found, but presumably they were in a separate volume. The Signal Book

is in the Admiralty Library labelled in manuscript '1792-3(?),' but,

as before, no date or signature appears in the body of it. From

internal evidence, however, as well as from collateral testimony,

there is little difficulty in identifying it as Lord Howe's second

code issued in 1790.

The feature of the book that first strikes us is that, though the bulk

of it is printed, all the most important battle signals, as well as

many others, have been added in MS., while at the end are the words,

'Given on board the Queen Charlotte, to Capt. ----, commander of his

majesty's ship the ----, by command of the admiral.' It is thus

obvious that the original printed form, which contains many further

unfilled blanks for additional signals, was used as a draft for a

later edition. No such edition is known to exist in print, but both

the original signals and the additions correspond exactly with the

MS. code which was used by Lord Howe in his campaign of 1794. In

editing this code for the Society in his _Logs of the Great Sea

Fights_, Admiral Sturges Jackson hazarded the conjecture that it

had not then been printed, but was supplied to each ship in the fleet

in MS. The admiralty volume goes far to support his conjecture, and it

is quite possible that we have here the final draft from which the

MS. copies were made.

As to the actual date at which the code was completed there is not

much difficulty. The Queen Charlotte was Howe's flagship in the

Channel fleet from 1792-4, but it was also his flagship in 1790 at the

time of the 'Spanish Armament,' when he put to sea in immediate

expectation of war with Spain. While the tension lasted he is known

to have used the critical period in exercising his fleet in tactical

evolutions, in order to perfect it in a new code of signals which he

had been elaborating for several years.[1] It is probable therefore

that this Signal Book belongs to that year, and that it is one of

several copies which Howe had printed with the battle signals blank

for his own use while he was elaborating his system by practical

experiment. This conjecture is brought to practical certainty by a

rough and much-worn copy of it in the United Service Institution. It

was made by Lieut. John Walsh, of H.M.S. Marlborough, one of Howe's

fleet, and inside the cover he has written 'Earl Howe's signals by

which the Grand Fleet was governed 1790, 1791, and 1794.'

It was upon the tactical system contained in this book that all the

great actions of the Nelson period were fought. The alterations which

took place during the war were slight. The codes used by Howe himself

in 1794, and by Duncan at Camperdown in 1797, follow it exactly. A

slightly modified form was issued by Jervis to the Mediterranean

fleet, and was used by him at St. Vincent in 1797. No copy of this is

known to exist, but from the logs of the ships there engaged it would

appear that, though the numbering of the code had been changed, the

principal battle signals remained the same. In 1799 a new edition was

printed in the small quarto form. In this the Signal Book and the

Instructions were bound together, and were issued to the whole navy,

but here again, though the numbers were changed, the alterations were

of no great importance.[2] Reprints appeared in 1806 and 1808, but

the code itself continued in use till 1816. In that year an entirely

new Signal Book based on Sir Home Popham's code was issued with a

fresh set of Explanatory Instructions, or, as they had come to be

called, 'Instructions relating to the line of battle and the conduct

of the fleet preparatory to their engaging and when engaged with an

enemy.'[3] Both these sets of 'Explanatory Instructions' are printed

below, but, as we have seen, they throw but little light by themselves

on the progress of tactical thought during the great period they

covered. They were no longer 'Fighting Instructions' in the old sense,

unless read with the principal battle signals, and to these we have to

go to get at the ideas that underlay the tactics of Nelson and his

contemporaries.

Now the most remarkable feature of Howe's Second Signal Book, 1790, is

the apparent disappearance from it of the signal for breaking the line

which in his first code, 1782, he had borrowed from Hood in

consequence of Rodney's manoeuvre. The other two signals introduced

by Hood and Pigot for breaking the line on Rodney's plan are equally

absent. In their stead appears a signal for an entirely new manoeuvre,

never before practised or even suggested, so far as is known, by

anyone. The 'signification' runs as follows: 'If, when having the

weather-gage of the enemy, the admiral means to pass between the ships

of their line for engaging them to leeward or, being to leeward, to

pass between them for obtaining the weather-gage. N.B.--The different

captains and commanders not being able to effect the specified

intention in either case are at liberty to act as circumstances

require.' In the Signal Book of 1799 the wording is changed. It there

runs 'To break through the enemy's line in all parts where

practicable, and engage on the other side,' and in the admiralty copy

delivered to Rear-Admiral Frederick there is added this MS. note, 'If

a blue pennant is hoisted at the fore topmast-head, to break through

the van; if at the main topmast-head, to break through the centre; if

at the mizen topmast-head, to break through the rear.'[4]

This form of the signification shows that the intention of the signal

was something different from what is usually understood in naval

literature by 'breaking the line.' By that we generally understand the

manoeuvre practised by Lord Rodney in 1782, a manoeuvre which was

founded on the conception of 'leading through' the enemy's line in

line ahead, and all the ships indicated passing through in succession

at the same point. Whereas in Lord Howe's signal the tactical idea is

wholly different. In his manoeuvre the conception is of an attack by

bearing down all together in line abreast or line of bearing, and each

ship passing through the enemy's line at any interval it found

practicable; and this was actually the method of attack which he

adopted on June 1, 1794. In intention the two signals are as wide as

the poles asunder. In Rodney's case the idea was to sever the enemy's

line and cut off part of it from the rest. In Howe's case the idea of

severing the line is subordinate to the intention of securing an

advantage by engaging on the opposite side from which the attack is

made. The whole of the attacking fleet might in principle pass through

the intervals in the enemy's line without cutting off any part of

it. In principle, moreover, the new attack was a parallel attack in

line abreast or in line of bearing, whereas the old attack was a

perpendicular or oblique attack in line ahead.

Nothing perhaps in naval literature is more remarkable than the fact

that this fundamental difference is never insisted on, or even, it may

be said, so much as recognised. Whenever we read of a movement for

breaking the line in this period it is almost always accompanied with

remarks which assume that Rodney's manoeuvre is intended and not

Howe's. Probably it is Nelson who is to blame. At Trafalgar, after

carefully elaborating an attack based on Howe's method of line

abreast, he delivered it in line ahead, as though he had intended to

use Rodney's method. His reasons were sound enough, as will be seen

later. But as a piece of scientific tactics it was as though an

engineer besieging a fortress, instead of drawing his lines of

approach diagonally, were to make them at right angles to the

ditch. When the greatest of the admirals apparently (but only

apparently) confused the two antagonistic conceptions of breaking the

line, there is much excuse for civilian writers being confused in

fact.

The real interest of the matter, however, is to inquire, firstly, by

what process of thought Howe in his second code discarded Rodney's

manoeuvre as the primary meaning of his signal after having adopted it

in his first, and, secondly, how and to what end did he arrive at his

own method.

On the first point there can be little doubt. Sir Charles H. Knowles

gives us to understand that Howe still had Hoste's Treatise at his

elbow, and with Hoste for his mentor we may be sure that, in common

with other tactical students of his time, he soon convinced himself

that Rodney's manoeuvre was usually dangerous and always

imperfect. Knowles himself in his old age, though a devout admirer of

Rodney, denounced it in language of characteristic violence, and

maintained to the last that Rodney never intended it, as every one now

agrees was the truth. Nelson presumably also approved Howe's cardinal

improvement, or even in his most impulsive mood he would hardly have

called him 'the first and greatest sea officer the world has ever

produced.'[5]

As to the second point--the fundamental intention of the new

manoeuvre--we get again a valuable hint from Knowles. Upon his second

visit to the admiralty, after Howe had succeeded Keppel at the end of

1783, Knowles brought with him by request a tactical treatise written

by his father, as well as certain of his own tactical studies, and

discussed with Howe a certain manoeuvre which he believed the French

employed for avoiding decisive actions. He showed that when engaged to

leeward they fell off by alternate ships as soon as they were hard

pressed, and kept reforming their line to leeward, so that the British

had continually to bear up, and expose themselves to be raked aloft in

order to close again. In this way, as he pointed out, the French were

always able to clip the British wings without receiving any decisive

injury themselves. In a MS. note to his 'Fighting and Sailing

Instructions,' he puts the matter quite clearly. 'In the battle off

Granada,' he says, 'in the year 1779 the French ships partially

executed this manoeuvre, and Sir Charles [H.] Knowles (then 5th

lieutenant of the Prince of Wales of 74 guns, the flagship of the

Hon. Admiral Barrington) drew this manoeuvre, and which he showed

Admiral Lord Howe, when first lord of the admiralty, during the

peace. His lordship established a signal to break through the enemy's

line and engage on the other side to leeward, and which he executed

himself in the battle of the 1st of June, 1794.' The note adds that

before Knowles drew Howe's attention to the supposed French manoeuvre

he had been content with his original Article XIV., modifying Article

XXI. of the old Fighting Instructions as already explained. Whether

therefore Knowles's account is precisely accurate or not, we may take

it as certain that it was to baffle the French practice of avoiding

close action by falling away to leeward that Howe hit on his brilliant

conception of breaking through their line in all parts.

No finer manoeuvre was ever designed. In the first place it developed

the utmost fire-face by bringing both broadsides into play. Secondly,

by breaking up the enemy's line into fragments it deprived their

admiral of any shadow of control over the part attacked. Thirdly, by

seizing the leeward position (the essential postulate of the French

method of fighting) it prevented individual captains making good their

escape independently to leeward and ensured a decisive _mêlée_,

such as Nelson aimed at. And, fourthly, it permitted a concentration

on any part of the enemy's line, since it actually severed it at any

desired point quite as effectually as did Rodney's method. Whether

Howe ever appreciated the importance of concentration to the extent it

was felt by Nelson, Hood and Rodney is doubtful. Yet his invention

did provide the best possible form of concentrated attack. It had over

Rodney's imperfect manoeuvre this inestimable advantage, that by the

very act of breaking the line you threw upon the severed portion an

overwhelming attack of the most violent kind, and with the utmost

development of fire-surface. Finally it could not be parried as

Rodney's usually could in Hoste's orthodox way by the enemy's standing

away together upon the same tack. By superior gunnery Howe's attack

might be _stopped_, but by no possibility could it be _avoided_

except by flight. It was no wonder then that Howe's invention was

received with enthusiasm by such men as Nelson.

Still it is clear that in certain cases, and especially in making an

attack from the leeward, as Clerk of Eldin had pointed out, and where

it was desirable to preserve your own line intact, Rodney's manoeuvre

might still be the best. Howe's manoeuvre moreover supplied its chief

imperfection, for it provided a method of dealing drastically with the

portion of the enemy's line that had been cut off. Thus, although it

is not traceable in the Signal Book, it was really reintroduced in

Howe's third code. This is clear from the last article of the

Explanatory Instructions of 1799 which distinguishes between the two

manoeuvres; but whether or not this article was in the Instructions of

1790 we cannot tell. The probability is that it was not, for in the

Signal Book of 1790 there is no reference to a modifying instruction.

Further, we know that in the code proposed by Sir Charles H. Knowles

the only signal for breaking the line was word for word the same as

Howe's. This code he drew up in its final form in 1794, but it was not

printed till 1798. The presumption is therefore that until the code of

1799 was issued Howe's method of breaking the line was the only one

recognised. In that code the primary intention of Signal 27 'for

breaking through the enemy's line in all parts' is still for Howe's

manoeuvre, but the instruction provides that it could be modified by a

red pennant over, and in that case it meant 'that the fleet is to

preserve the line of battle as it passes through the enemy's line, and

to preserve it in very close order, that such of the enemy's ships as

are cut off may not find an opportunity of passing through it to

rejoin their fleet.' This was precisely Rodney's manoeuvre with the

proviso for close order introduced by Pigot. The instruction also

provided for the combining of a numeral to indicate at which number in

the enemy's line the attempt was to be made. No doubt the distinction

between manoeuvres so essentially different might have been more

logically made by entirely different signals.[6] But in practice it

was all that was wanted. It is only posterity that suffers, for in

studying the actions of that time it is generally impossible to tell

from the signal logs or the tactical memoranda which movement the

admiral had in mind. Not only do we never find it specified whether

the signal was made simply or with the pennant over, but admirals seem

to have used the expressions 'breaking' and 'cutting' the line, and

'breaking through,' 'cutting through,' 'passing through,' and 'leading

through,' as well as others, quite indiscriminately of both forms of

the manoeuvre. Thus in Nelson's first, or Toulon, memorandum he speaks

of 'passing through the line' from to-windward, meaning presumably

Howe's manoeuvre, and of 'cutting through' their fleet from to-leeward

when presumably he means Rodney's. In the Trafalgar memorandum he

speaks of 'leading through' and 'cutting' the line from to-leeward,

and of 'cutting through' from to-windward, when he certainly meant to

perform Howe's manoeuvre. Whereas Howe, in his Instruction XXXI. of

1799, uses 'breaking the line' and 'passing through it' indifferently

of both forms.

All we can do is generally to assume that when the attack was to be

made from to-windward Howe's manoeuvre was intended, and Rodney's when

it was made from to-leeward. Yet this is far from being safe

ground. For the signification of the plain signal without the red

pennant over--_i.e._ 'to break through ... and engage on the other

side'--seems to contemplate Howe's manoeuvre being made both from

to-leeward and from to-windward.

The only notable disappearances in Howe's second code (1790) are the

signals for 'doubling,' probably as a corollary of the new

manoeuvre. For, until this device was hit upon, Rodney's method of

breaking the line apparently could only be made effective as a means

of concentration by doubling on the part cut off in accordance with

Hoste's method. This at least is what Clerk of Eldin seems to imply

in some of his diagrams, in so far as he suggests any method of

dealing with the part cut off. Yet in spite of this disappearance

Nelson certainly doubled at the Nile, and according to Captain Edward

Berry, who was captain of his flagship, he did it deliberately. 'It is

almost unnecessary,' he wrote in his narrative, 'to explain his

projected mode of attack at anchor, as that was minutely and precisely

executed in the action.... These plans however were formed two months

before, ... and the advantage now was that they were familiar to the

understanding of every captain in the fleet.' Nelson probably felt

that the dangers attending doubling in an action under sail are

scarcely appreciable in an action at anchor with captains whose

steadiness he could trust. Still Saumarez, his second in command,

regarded it as a mistake, and there was a good deal of complaint of

our ships having suffered from each other's fire.[7]

Amongst the more important retentions of tactical signals we find that

for Hoste's method of giving battle to a numerically superior force by

leaving gaps in your own line between van, centre and rear. The

wording however is changed. It is no longer enjoined as a means of

avoiding being doubled. As Howe inserted it in MS. the signification

now ran 'for the van or particular divisions to engage the headmost of

the enemy's van, the rear the sternmost of the enemy's rear, and the

centre the centre of the enemy. But with exception of the flag

officers of the fleet who should engage those of the enemy

respectively in preference.'[8] This signification again is

considerably modified by the Explanatory Instructions. Article XXIV.,

it will be seen, says nothing of engaging the centre or of leaving

regular gaps. The leading ship is to engage the enemy's leading ship,

and the rearmost the rearmost, while the rest are to select the

largest ships they can get at, and leave the weaker ones alone till

the stronger are disabled. It was in effect the adoption of Hoste's

fifth rule for engaging a numerically superior fleet instead of his

first, and it is a plan which he condemns except in the case of your

being individually superior to your enemy, as indeed the English

gunnery usually made them.

The curious signal No. 218 of 1782 for attacking the enemy's rear in

succession by 'defiling' on the Elizabethan plan was also retained. In

the Signal Book of 1799 it ran, 'to fire in succession upon the

sternmost ships of the enemy, then tack or wear and take station in

rear of the squadron or division specified (if a part of the fleet is

so appointed) until otherwise directed.'

It has been already said that the alterations in the edition of 1799

were not of great importance, but one or two additions must be

noticed. The most noteworthy is a new signal for carrying out the

important rule of Article IX. of the Instructions of 1782 (Article

X. of 1799), providing for the formation of a _corps de réserve_

when you are numerically superior to the enemy, as was done by

Villeneuve on Gravina's advice in 1805, although fortunately for

Nelson it was not put in practice at Trafalgar.

The other addition appears in MS. at the end of the printed signals.

It runs as follows: 'When at anchor in line of battle to let go a

bower anchor under foot, and pass a stout hawser from one ship to

another, beginning at the weathermost ship,' an addition which would

seem to have been suggested by what had recently occurred at the Nile.

Nelson's own order was as follows: '_General Memorandum_.--As the

wind will probably blow along shore, when it is deemed necessary to

anchor and engage the enemy at their anchorage it is recommended to

each line-of-battle ship of the squadron to prepare to anchor with the

sheet cable in abaft and springs, &c.'[9] Another copy of the signal

book has a similar MS. addition to the signal 'Prepare for battle and

for anchoring with springs, &c.'[10] It runs thus: 'A bower is to be

unbent, and passed through the stern port and bent to the anchor,

leaving that anchor hanging by the stopper only.--Lord Nelson, St.

George, 26 March, 1801. If with a red pennant over with a spring

only.--Commander-in-chiefs Order Book, 27 March, 1801.' These

therefore were additions made immediately before the attack on the

Danish fleet at Copenhagen.

No other change was made, and it may be said that Howe's new method of

breaking the line was the last word on the form of attack for a

sailing fleet. How far its full intention and possibilities were

understood at first is doubtful. The accounts of the naval actions

that followed show no lively appreciation on the part of the bulk of

British captains. On the First of June the new signal for breaking

through the line at all points was the first Howe made, and it was

followed as soon as the moment for action arrived by that 'for each

ship to steer for, independently of each other, and engage

respectively the ship opposed in situation to them in the enemy's

line.' The result was an action along the whole line, during which

Howe himself at the earliest opportunity passed through the enemy's

line and engaged on the other side, though as a whole the fleet

neglected to follow either his signal or his example.

In the next great action, that of St. Vincent, the circumstances were

not suitable for the new manoeuvre, seeing that the Spaniards had not

formed line. Jervis had surprised the enemy in disorder on a hazy

morning after a change of wind, and this was precisely the 'not very

probable case' which Clerk of Eldin had instanced as justifying a

perpendicular attack. Whether or not Jervis had Clerk's instance in

his mind, he certainly did deliver a perpendicular attack. The signal

with which he opened, according to the signification as given in the

flagship's log, was 'The admiral intends to pass through the enemy's

line.'[11] There is nothing to show whether this meant Howe's

manoeuvre or Rodney's, for we do not know whether at this time the

instruction existed which enabled the two movements to be

distinguished by a pennant over.

What followed however was that the fleet passed between the two

separated Spanish squadrons in line ahead as Clerk advised. The next

thing to do, according to Clerk, was for the British fleet to wear or

tack together, but instead of doing so Jervis signalled to tack in

succession, and then repeated the signal to pass through the enemy's

line although it was still unformed. It was at this moment that Nelson

made his famous independent movement that saved the situation, and

what he did was in effect as though Jervis had made the signal to tack

together as Clerk enjoined. Thereupon Jervis, with the intention

apparently of annulling his last order to pass through the line, made

the signal, which seems to have been the only one which the captains

of those days believed in--viz. to take suitable stations for mutual

support and engage the enemy on arriving up with them in

succession. In practice it was little more than a frank relapse to the

methods of the early Commonwealth, and it was this signal and not that

for breaking the line which made the action general.

Again, at the battle of Camperdown, Duncan, while trying to form

single line from two columns of sailing, began with the signal for

each ship to steer independently for her opponent. This was

followed--the fleet having failed to form line parallel to the enemy,

and being still in two disordered columns--by signals for the lee or

van division to engage the enemy's rear, and as some thought the

weather division his centre; and ten minutes later came the new signal

for passing through the line. The result was an action almost exactly

like that of Nelson at Trafalgar--that is, though the leading ships

duly acted on the combination of the two signals for engaging their

opposites and for breaking the line, each at its opposite interval,

the rest was a _mêlée_; for, since what was fundamentally a

parallel attack was attempted as a perpendicular one, it could be

nothing but a scramble for the rear ships.

In none of these actions therefore is there any evidence that Howe's

attempt to impress the service with a serious scientific view of

tactics had been successful, and the impression which they made upon

our enemies suggests that the real spirit that inspired British

officers at this time was something very different from that which

Howe had tried to instil. Writing of the battle of St. Vincent, Don

Domingo Perez de Grandallana, whose masterly studies of the French and

English naval systems and tactics raised him to the highest offices of

state, has the following passage: 'An Englishman enters a naval action

with the firm conviction that his duty is to hurt his enemies and help

his friends and allies without looking out for directions in the midst

of the fight; and while he thus clears his mind of all subsidiary

distractions, he rests in confidence on the certainty that his

comrades, actuated by the same principles as himself, will be bound by

the sacred and priceless law of mutual support. Accordingly, both he

and all his fellows fix their minds on acting with zeal and judgment

upon the spur of the moment, and with the certainty that they will not

be deserted. Experience shows, on the contrary, that a Frenchman or a

Spaniard, working under a system which leans to formality and strict

order being maintained in battle, has no feeling for mutual support,

and goes into action with hesitation, preoccupied with the anxiety of

seeing or hearing the commander-in-chief's signals for such and such

manoeuvres.... Thus they can never make up their minds to seize any

favourable opportunity that may present itself. They are fettered by

the strict rule to keep station, which is enforced upon them in both

navies, and the usual result is that in one place ten of their ships

may be firing on four, while in another four of their comrades may be

receiving the fire of ten of the enemy. Worst, of all, they are denied

the confidence inspired by mutual support, which is as surely

maintained by the English as it is neglected by us, who will not learn

from them.'[12]

This was probably the broad truth of the matter; it is summed up in

the golden signal which was the panacea of British admirals when in

doubt: 'Ships to take station for mutual support and engage as they

come up;' and it fully explains why, with all the scientific

appreciation of tactics that existed in the leading admirals of this

time, their battles were usually so confused and haphazard. The truth

is that in the British service formal tactics had come to be regarded

as a means of getting at your enemy, and not as a substitute for

initiative in fighting him.

FOOTNOTES:

[1] _Dictionary of National Biography, sub voce_ 'Howe,' p. 97.

[2] A copy of this is in the Admiralty Library issued to 'Thomas Lenox

Frederick esq., Rear-Admiral of the Blue,' and attested by the

autographs of Vice-Admiral James Gambier, Vice-Admiral James Young, and

another lord of the admiralty, and countersigned by William Marsden, the

famous numismatist and Oriental scholar, who was 'second secretary' from

1795 to 1804. Another copy, also in the Admiralty Library, is attested

by Gambier, Sir John Colpoys and Admiral Philip Patton, and

countersigned by the new second secretary, John Barrow, all of whom came

to the admiralty under Lord Melville on Pitt's return to office in 1804.

Two other copies are in the United Service Institution.

[3] Sir Home Popham's code had been in use for many years for

'telegraphing.' It was by this code Nelson's famous signal was made at

Trafalgar.

[4] In one of the United Service Institution copies the signal has

been added in MS. and the note is on a slip pasted in. In the other both

signal and note are printed with blanks in which the distinguishing

pennants have been written in.

[5] Nelson to Howe, January 8, 1799. _Nicolas_, iii. 230.

[6] Sir Charles H. Knowles did modify his code in this way some time

after 1798. For his original signal he substituted two in MS. with the

following neatly worded significations: 'No. 32. To break through the

enemy's line together and engage on the opposite side. No. 33. To break

through the enemy's line in succession and engage on the other side.'

Had these two lucid significations been adopted by Howe there would have

been no possible ambiguity as to what was meant.

[7] Laughton, _Nelson's Letters and Despatches_, p. 151. Ross, _Memoir

of Lord de Saumarez_, vol. i.

[8] This last mediæval proviso was omitted in the later editions. It

is not found in Hoste.

[9] Ross, _Memoir of Saumarez_, i. 212. Nelson refers to 'Signal 54,

Art. XXXVII. of the Instructions,' which must have been a special and

amplified set issued by Jervis. There is no Art. XXXVII. in Howe's set.

[10] In the United Service Institution.

[11] _Logs of the Great Sea Fights_, i. 210. The log probably only

gives an abbreviation of the signification. Unless Jervis had changed

it, its exact wording was 'The admiral means to pass between the ships

of their line for engaging them to leeward,' &c. See _supra_, p. 255.

[12] Fernandez Duro, _Armada Española_, viii. 111.

_LORD HOWE'S EXPLANATORY INSTRUCTIONS_.

[+Signal Book, 1799+.[1]]

_Instructions for the conduct of the fleet preparatory to their

engaging, and when engaged, with an enemy_.

I. When the signal is made for the fleet to form the line of battle,

each flag officer and captain is to get into his station as

expeditiously as possible, and to keep in close order, if not

otherwise directed, and under a proportion of sail suited to that

carried by the admiral, or by the senior flag officer remaining in the

line when the admiral has signified his intention to quit it.

II. The chief purposes for which a fleet is formed in line of battle

are: that the ships may be able to assist and support each other in

action; that they may not be exposed to the fire of the enemy's ships

greater in number than themselves; and that every ship may be able to

fire on the enemy without risk of firing into the ships of her own

fleet.

III. If, after having made a signal to prepare to form the line of

battle on either line of bearing, the admiral, keeping the preparative

flag flying, should make several signals in succession, to point out

the manner in which the line is to be formed, those signals are to be

carefully written down, that they may be carried into execution, when

the signal for the line is hoisted again; they are to be executed in

the order in which they were made, excepting such as the admiral may

annul previously to his hoisting again the signal for the line.

IV. If any part of the fleet should be so far to leeward, when the

signal is made for the line of battle, that the admiral should think

it necessary to bear up and stand towards them, he will do it with the

signal No. 105 hoisted.[2] The ships to leeward are thereupon to

exert themselves to get as expeditiously as possible into their

stations in the line.

V. Ships which have been detached from the body of the fleet, on any

separate service, are not to obey the signal for forming the line of

battle, unless they have been previously called back to the fleet by

signal.

VI. Ships which cannot keep their stations are to quit the line, as

directed in Article 9 of the General Instructions, though in the

presence of an enemy.[3] The captains of such ships will not thereby

be prevented from distinguishing themselves, as they will have

opportunities of rendering essential service, by placing their ships

advantageously when they get up with the enemy already engaged with

the other part of the fleet.

VII. When the signal to form a line of bearing for either tack is

made, the ships (whatever course they may be directed to steer) are to

place themselves in such a manner that if they were to haul to the

wind together on the tack for which the line of bearing is formed,

they would immediately form a line of battle on that tack. To do this,

every ship must bring the ship which would be her second ahead, if the

line of battle were formed, to bear on that point of the compass on

which the line of battle would sail, viz., on that point of the

compass which is seven points from the direction of the wind, or six

points if the signal is made to keep _close_ to the wind.

As the intention of a line of bearing is to keep the fleet ready to

form suddenly a line of battle, the position of the division or

squadron flags, shown with the signal for such a line, will refer to

the forming of the line of battle; that division or squadron whose

flag is uppermost (without considering whether it do or do not form

the van of the line of bearing) is to place itself in that station

which would become the van if the fleet should haul to the wind and

form the line of battle; and the division whose flag is undermost is

to place itself in that station in which it would become the rear if

by hauling to the wind the line of battle should be formed.[4]

VIII. When a line of bearing has been formed, the ships are to

preserve that relative bearing from each other, whenever they are

directed to alter the course together; but if they are directed to

alter the course in succession, as the line of bearing will by that be

destroyed, it is no longer to be attended to.

IX. If the signal to make more or less sail is made when the fleet is

in line of battle, the frigate appointed to repeat signals will set

the same sails as are carried by the admiral's ship; the ships are

then in succession (from the rear if to shorten, or the van, if to

make more, sail) to put themselves under a proportion of sail

correspondent to their comparative rate of sailing with the admiral's

ship.

To enable captains to do this it will be necessary that they acquire a

perfect knowledge of the proportion of sail required for suiting their

rate of sailing to that of the admiral, under the various changes in

the quantity of sail, and state of the weather; which will enable

them, not only to keep their stations in the line of battle, but also

to keep company with the fleet on all other occasions.

When the signal to make more sail is made, if the admiral is under his

topsails he will probably set the Foresail.

If the signal is repeated, or if the foresail is set he will probably

set Jib and staysails.

If the foresail, jib, and staysails are set, he will set the

Topgallant-sails.

Or in equally weather Mainsail.

When the signal to shorten sail is made, he will probably take in sail

in a gradation the reverse of the preceding.

X. Ships which are ordered by signal to withdraw from the line are to

place themselves to windward of the fleet if it has the weather-gage

of the enemy, or to leeward and ahead if the contrary; and are to be

ready to assist any ship which may want their assistance, or to act in

any other manner as directed by signal.

If the ships so withdrawn, or any others which may have been detached,

should be unable to resume their stations in the line when ordered by

signal to do so, they are to attack the enemy's ships in any part of

the line on which they may hope to make the greatest impression.[5]

XI. If the fleet should engage an enemy inferior to it in number, or

which, by the flight of some of their ships, becomes inferior, the

ships which, at either extremity of the line, are thereby left without

opponents may, after the action is begun, quit the line without

waiting for a signal to do so; and they are to distress the enemy, or

assist the ships of the fleet, in the best manner that circumstances

will allow.

XII. When any number of ships, not having a flag officer with them,

are detached from the fleet to act together, they are to obey all

signals which are accompanied by the flag appropriated to detachments,

and are not to attend to any made without that flag. But if a flag

officer, commanding a squadron, or division, be with such detachment,

all the ships of it are to consider themselves, for the time, as

forming part of the division, or squadron, of such flag officer; and

they are to obey those signals, and only those, which are accompanied

by his distinguishing flag.

XIII. Great care is at all times to be taken not to fire at the enemy,

either over, or very near to, any ships of the fleet; nor, though the

signal for battle should be flying, is any ship to fire till she is

placed in a proper situation, and at a proper distance from the enemy.

XIV. If, when the signal for battle is made, the ships are steering

down for the enemy, they are to haul to the wind, or to any course

parallel to the enemy, and are to engage them when properly placed,

without waiting for any particular signal; but every ship must be

attentive to the motions of that ship which will be her second ahead,

when formed parallel to the enemy, that she may have room to haul up

without running on board of her. The distance of the ships from each

other during the action must be governed by that of their respective

opponents on the enemy's line.

XV. No ship is to Separate from the body of the fleet, in time of

action, to pursue any small number of the enemy's ships which have

been beaten out of the line, unless the commander-in-chief, or some

other flag officer, be among them; but the ships which have disabled

their opponents, or forced them to quit the line, are to assist any

ship of the fleet appearing to be much pressed, and to continue their

attack till the main body of the enemy be broken or disabled; unless

by signal, or particular instruction, they should be directed to act

otherwise.

XVI. If any ship should be so disabled as to be in great danger of

being destroyed, or taken by the enemy, and should make a signal,

expressive of such extremity, the ships nearest to her, and which are

the least engaged with the enemy, are strictly enjoined to give her

immediately all possible aid and protection; and any fireship, in a

situation which admits of its being done, is to endeavour to burn the

enemy's ship opposed to her; and any frigate, that may be near, is to

use every possible exertion for her relief, either by towing her off,

or by joining in the attack of the enemy, or by covering the fireship;

or, if necessity require it, by taking out the crew of the disabled

ship; or by any other means which circumstances at the time will

admit.[6]

XVII. Though a ship be disabled, and hard pressed by the enemy in

battle, she is not to quit her station in the line, if it can possibly

be avoided, till the captain shall have obtained permission so to do

from the commander of the squadron, or division, to which he belongs,

or from some other flag officer. But if he should be ordered out of

the line, or should be obliged to quit it, before assistance can be

sent to him, the nearest ships are immediately to occupy the space

become vacant, to prevent the enemy from taking advantage of it.

XVIII. If there should be found a captain so lost to all sense of

honour and the great duty he owes his country, as not to exert himself

to the utmost to get into action with the enemy, or to take or destroy

them when engaged; the commander of the squadron, or division, to

which he belongs, or the nearest flag officer, is to suspend him from

his command, and is to appoint some other officer to command the ship,

till the admiral's pleasure shall be known.

XIX. When, from the advantage obtained by the enemy over the fleet, or

from bad weather, or from any other cause, the admiral makes the

signal for the fleet to disperse, every captain will be left to act as

he shall judge most proper for the preservation of the ship he

commands, and the good of the king's service; but he is to endeavour

to go to the appointed rendezvous, if it may be done with safety.

XX. The ships are to be kept at all times as much prepared for battle

as circumstances will admit; and if the fleet come to action with an

enemy which has the weather-gage, boats, well armed, are to be held in

readiness, with hand and fire-chain grapnels in them; and if the

weather will admit, they are to be hoisted out, and kept on the

offside from the enemy, for the purpose of assisting any ships against

which fireships shall be sent; or for supporting the fireships of the

fleet, if they should be sent against the enemy.[7]

XXI. The ships appointed to protect and cover fireships, when ordered

on service, or which, without being appointed, are in a situation to

cover and protect them, are to receive on board their crews, and,

keeping between them and the enemy, to go with them as near as

possible to the ships they are directed to destroy. All the boats of

those ships are to be well armed, and to be employed in covering the

retreat of the fireship's boats, and in defending the ship from any

attempts that may be made on her by the boats of the enemy.

XXII. If the ship of any flag officer be disabled in battle, the flag

officer may repair on board, and hoist his flag in any other ship (not

already carrying a flag) that he shall think proper; but he is to

hoist it in one of his own squadron or division if there be one near,

and fit for the purpose.

XXIII. If a squadron or any detachment be directed by signal to gain

or keep the wind of the enemy, the officer commanding it is to act in

such manner as shall in his judgment be the most effectual for the

total defeat of the enemy; either by reinforcing those parts of the

fleet which are opposed to superior force, or by attacking such parts

of the enemy's line as, by their weakness, may afford reasonable hopes

of their being easily broken,

XXIV. When the signal (30) is made to extend the line from one

extremity of the enemy's line to the other, though the enemy have a

greater number of ships, the leading ship is to engage the leading

ship, and the sternmost ship the sternmost of the enemy; and the other

ships are, as far as their situation will admit, to engage the ships

of greatest force, leaving the weaker ships unattacked till the

stronger shall have been disabled.[8]

XXV. If the admiral, or any commander of a squadron or division, shall

think fit to change his station in the line, in order to place himself

opposite to the admiral or the commander of a similar squadron or

division in the enemy's line, he will make the Signal 47 for quitting

the line in his own ship, without showing to what other part of the

line he means to go; the ships ahead or astern (as circumstances may

require) of the station opposed to the commander in the enemy's line

are then to close and make room for him to get into it. But if the

admiral, being withdrawn from the line, should think fit to return to

any particular place in it, he will make the signal No. 269 with the

distinguishing signal of his own ship, and soon after he will hoist

the distinguishing signal of the ship astern of which he means to

take, his station. And if he should direct by signal any other ship to

take a station in the line, he will also hoist the distinguishing

signal of the ship astern of which he would have her placed, if she is

not to take the station assigned her in the line of battle given out.

XXVI. When the Signal 29 is made for each ship to steer for her

opponent in the enemy's line, the ships are to endeavour, by making or

shortening sail, to close with their opponents and bring them to

action at the same time; but they must be extremely careful not to

pass too near each other, nor to do anything which may risk their

running on board each other: they may engage as soon as they are well

closed with their opponents, and properly placed for that purpose.

XXVII. When the Signal 28 is made, for ships to form as most

convenient, and attack the enemy as they get up with them; the ships

are to engage to windward or to leeward, as from the situation of the

enemy they shall find most advantageous; but the leading ships must be

very cautious not to suffer themselves to be drawn away so far from

the body of the fleet as to risk the being surrounded and cut off.

XXVIII. When Signal 14 is made to prepare for battle and for

anchoring, the ships are to have springs on their bower anchors, and

the end of the sheet cable taken in at the stern port, with springs on

the anchor to be prepared for anchoring without winding if they should

go to the attack with the wind aft. The boats should be hoisted out

and hawsers coiled in the launches, with the stream anchor ready to

warp them into their stations, or to assist other ships which may be

in want of assistance. Their spare yards and topmasts, if they cannot

be left in charge of some vessel, should in moderate weather be lashed

alongside, near the water, on the off-side from the battery or ship to

be attacked. The men should be directed to lie down on the off side of

the deck from the enemy, whenever they are not wanted, if the ship

should be fired at as they advance to the attack.

XXIX. When the line of battle has been formed as most convenient,

without regard to the prescribed form, the ships which happen to be

ahead of the centre are to be considered, for the time, as the

starboard division, and those astern of the centre as the larboard

division of the fleet; and if the triangular flag, white with a red

fly, be hoisted, the line is to be considered as being divided into

the same number of squadrons and divisions as in the established line

of battle. The ship which happens at the time to lead the fleet is to

be considered as the leader of the van squadron, and every other ship

which happens to be in the station of the leader of the squadron or

division is to be considered as being the leader of that squadron or

division, and the intermediate ships are to form the squadrons or

divisions of such leaders, and to follow them as long as the

triangular flag is flying, and every flag officer is to be considered

as the commander of the squadron or division in which he may be

accidentally placed.

XXX. If the wind should come forward when the fleet is formed in line

of battle, or is sailing by the wind in a line of bearing, the leading

ship is to continue steering seven points from the wind, and every

other ship is to haul as close to the wind as possible, till she has

got into the wake of the leading ship, or till she shall have brought

it on the proper point of bearing; but if the wind should come aft,

the sternmost ship is to continue steering seven points from the wind,

and the other ships are to haul close to the wind till they have

brought the sternmost ship into their wake, or on the proper point of

bearing.

XXXI. If Signal 27, to break through the enemy's line, be made without

a 'red pennant' being hoisted, it is evident that to obey it the line

of battle must be entirely broken; but if a 'red pennant' be hoisted

at either mast-head, that fleet is to preserve the line of battle as

it passes through the enemy's line, and to preserve it in very close

order, that such of the enemy's ships as are cut off may not find an

opportunity of passing through it to rejoin their fleet.

If a signal of number be made immediately after this signal, it will

show the number of ships of the enemy's van or rear which the fleet is

to endeavour to cut off. If the closing of the enemy's line should

prevent the ships passing through the part pointed out, they are to

pass through as near to it as they can.

If any of the ships should find it impracticable, in either of the

above cases, to pass through the enemy's line, they are to act in the

best manner that circumstances will admit of for the destruction of

the enemy.

FOOTNOTES:

[1] Similar but not identical instructions are referred to in the

Signal Book of 1790. The above were reproduced in all subsequent

editions till the end of the war.

[2] 'Ships to leeward to get in the admiral's wake.'

[3] The instructions referred to are the 'General Instructions for the

conduct of the fleet.' They are the first of the various sets which the

Signal Book contained, and relate to books to be kept, boats, keeping

station, evolutions and the like. Article IX. is 'If from any cause

whatever a ship should find it impossible to keep her station in any

line or order of sailing, she is not to break the line or order by

persisting too long in endeavouring to preserve it; but she is to quit

the line and form in the rear, doing everything she can to keep up with

the fleet.'

[4] See at p. 235, as to the new sailing formation in three columns.

[5] It should be noted that this is an important advance on the

corresponding Article IX. of the previous instructions, and that it

contains a germ of the organisation of Nelson's Trafalgar memorandum.

[6] The continued insistence on fireship tactics in this and Articles

XX. and XXI. should again be noted, although from 1793 to 1802 the

number of fireships on the Navy List averaged under four out of a total

that increased from 304 to 517.

[7] It should be remembered that at this time there were no davits and

no boats hoisted up. They were all carried in-board.

[8] This is a considerable modification of the signification of the

signal; see _supra_, p. 263.

NELSON'S TACTICAL MEMORANDA

INTRODUCTORY

The first of these often quoted memoranda is the 'Plan of Attack,'

usually assigned to May 1805, when Nelson was in pursuit of

Villeneuve, and it is generally accompanied by two erroneous diagrams

based on the number of ships which he then had under his command. But,

as Professor Laughton has ingeniously conjectured, it must really

belong to a time two years earlier, when Nelson was off Toulon in

constant hope of the French coming out to engage him.[1] The

strength and organisation of Nelson's fleet at that time, as well as

the numbers of the French fleet, exactly correspond to the data of the

memorandum. To Professor Laughton's argument may be added another,

which goes far actually to fix the date. The principal signal which

Nelson's second method of attack required was 'to engage to leeward.'

Now this signal as it stood in the Signal Book of 1799 was to some

extent ambiguous. It was No. 37, and the signification was 'to engage

the enemy on their larboard side, or to leeward if by the wind,' while

No. 36 was 'to engage the enemy on their starboard side if going

before the wind, or to windward if by the wind.' Accordingly we find

Nelson issuing a general order, with the object apparently of removing

the ambiguity, and of rendering any confusion between starboard and

larboard and leeward and windward impossible. It is in Nelson's order

book, under date November 22, 1803, and runs as follows:

'If a pennant is shown over signal No. 36, it signifies that ships are

to engage on the enemy's starboard side, whether going large or upon a

wind.

'If a pennant is shown in like manner over No. 37, it signifies that

ships are to engage on the enemy's larboard side, whether going large

or upon a wind.

'These additions to be noted in the Signal Book in pencil only.'[2]

The effect of this memorandum was, of course, that Nelson had it in

his power to let every captain know, without a shadow of doubt, under

all conditions of wind, on which side he meant to engage the enemy.

To the evidence of the Signal Book may be added a passage in Nelson's

letter to Admiral Sir A. Ball from the Magdalena Islands, November 7,

1803. He there writes: 'Our last two reconnoiterings: Toulon has

eight sail of the line apparently ready for sea ... a seventy-four

repairing. Whether they intend waiting for her I can't tell, but I

expect them every hour to put to sea.'[3] He was thus expecting to

have to deal with eight or nine of the line, which is the precise

contingency for which the memorandum provides. There can be little

doubt therefore that it was issued while Nelson lay at Magdalena, the

first week in November 1803.[4]

The second memorandum, which Nelson communicated to his fleet, soon

after he joined it off Cadiz, is regarded by universal agreement as

the high-water mark of sailing tactics. Its interpretation however,

and the dominant ideas that inspired it, no less than the degree to

which it influenced the battle and was in the mind of Nelson and his

officers at the time, are questions of considerable uncertainty. Some

of the most capable of his captains, as we shall see presently, even

disagreed as to whether Trafalgar was fought under the memorandum at

all. From the method in which the attack was actually made, so

different apparently from the method of the memorandum, some thought

Nelson had cast it aside, while others saw that it still applied. A

careful consideration of all that was said and done at the time gives

a fairly clear explanation of the divergence of opinion, and it will

probably be agreed that those officers who had a real feeling for

tactics saw that Nelson was making his attack on what were the

essential principles of the memorandum, while some on the other hand

who were possessed of less tactical insight did not distinguish

between what was essential and what was accidental in Nelson's great

conception, and, mistaking the shadow for the substance, believed that

he had abandoned his carefully prepared project.

For those who did not entirely grasp Nelson's meaning there is much

excuse. We who are able to follow step by step the progress of

tactical thought from the dawn of the sailing period can appreciate

without much difficulty the radical revolution which he was setting on

foot. It was a revolution, as we can plainly see, that was tending to

bring the long-drawn curve of tactical development round to the point

at which the Elizabethans had started. Surprise is sometimes expressed

that, having once established the art of warfare under sail in

broadside ships, our seamen were so long in finding the tactical

system it demanded. Should not the wonder be the converse: that the

Elizabethan seamen so quickly came so near the perfected method of the

greatest master of the art? The attack at Gravelines in 1588 with four

mutually supporting squadrons in échelon bears strong elementary

resemblance to that at Trafalgar in 1805. It was in dexterity and

precision of detail far more than in principle that the difference

lay. The first and the last great victory of the British navy had

certainly more in common with each other than either had with Malaga

or the First of June. In the zenith of their careers Nelson and Drake

came very near to joining hands. Little wonder then if many of

Nelson's captains failed to fathom the full depth of his profound

idea. Naval officers in those days were left entirely without

theoretical instruction on the higher lines of their profession, and

Nelson, if we may judge by the style of his memoranda, can hardly have

been a very lucid expositor. He thought they all understood what with

pardonable pride he called the 'Nelson touch.' The most sagacious and

best educated of them probably did, but there were clearly some--and

Collingwood, as we shall see, was amongst them--who only grasped some

of the complex principles which were combined in his brilliant

conception.

An analysis of the memorandum will show how complex it was. In the

first and foremost place there is a clear note of denunciation against

the long established fallacy of the old order of battle in single

line. Secondly, there is in its stead the reestablishment of the

primitive system of mutually supporting squadrons in line

ahead. Thirdly, there is the principle of throwing one squadron in

superior force upon one end of the enemy's formation, and using the

other squadrons to cover the attack or support it if need

arose. Fourthly, there is the principle of concealment--that is,

disposing the squadrons in such a manner that even after the real

attack has been delivered the enemy cannot tell what the containing

squadrons mean to do, and in consequence are forced to hold their

parrying move in suspense. The memorandum also included the idea of

concentration, and this is often spoken of as its conspicuous

merit. But in the idea of concentration there was nothing new, even if

we go back no further than Rodney. It was only the method of

concentration, woven out of his four fundamental innovations, that was

new. Moreover, as Nelson delivered the attack, he threw away the

simple idea of concentration. For a suddenly conceived strategical

object he deliberately exposed the heads of his columns to what with

almost any other enemy would have been an overwhelming superiority. On

the other hand, by making, as he did, a perpendicular instead of a

parallel attack, as he had intended, he accentuated--it is true at

enormous risk--the cardinal points of his design; that is, he departed

still further from the old order of battle, and he still further

concealed from the enemy what the real attack was to be, and after it

was developed what the containing squadron was going to do.

Concentration in fact was only the crude and ordinary raw material of

a design of unmatched subtlety and invention.

The keynote of his conception, then, was his revolutionary

substitution of the primitive Elizabethan and early seventeenth

century method for the fetish of the single line. For some time it is

true the established battle order had been blown upon from various

quarters, but no one as yet had been able to devise any system

convincing enough to dethrone it. It will be remembered that at least

as early as 1759 an Additional Instruction had provided for a battle

order in two lines, but it does not appear ever to have been

used.[5] Rodney's manoeuvre again had foreshadowed the use of parts

of the line independently for the purpose of concentration and

containing. In 1782 Clerk of Eldin had privately printed his

_Essay_, which contained suggestions for an attack from to-windward,

with the line broken up into écheloned divisions in close

resemblance to the disposition laid down in Nelson's memorandum. In

1790 this part of his work was published. Meanwhile an even more

elaborate and well-reasoned assault on the whole principle of the

single line had appeared in France. In 1787 the Vicomte de Grenier, a

French flag officer, had produced his _L'Art de la Guerre sur

Mer_, in which he boldly attacked the law laid down by De Grasse,

that so long as men-of-war carried their main armament in broadside

batteries there could never be any battle order but the single line

ahead. In Grenier's view the English had already begun to discard it,

and he insists that, in all the actions he had seen in the last two

wars, the English, knowing the weakness of the single line, had almost

always concentrated on part of it without regular order. The radical

defects of the line he points out are: that it is easily thrown into

disorder and easily broken, that it is inflexible, and too extended a

formation to be readily controlled by signals. He then proceeds to

lay down the principle on which a sound battle order should be framed,

and the fundamental objects at which it should aim[6]. His

postulates are thus stated:

'1. De rendre nulle une partie des forces de l'ennemi afin de

réunir toutes les siennes contre celles qui l'on attaque, ou qui

attaquent; et de vaincre ensuite le reste avec plus de facilité et

de certitude.

'2. De ne présenter à l'ennemi aucune partie de son armée qui

ne soit flanquée et où il ne pût combattre et vaincre s'il

vouloit se porter sur les parties de cette armée reconnues faibles

jusqu'à présent.'

Never had the fundamental intention of naval tactics been stated with

so much penetration, simplicity, and completeness. The order, however,

which Grenier worked out--that of three lines of bearing disposed on

three sides of a lozenge--was somewhat fantastic and cumbrous, and it

seems to have been enough to secure for his clever treatise complete

neglect. It had even less effect on French tactics than had Nelson's

memorandum on our own. This is all the more curious, for so

thoroughly was the change that was coming over English tactics

understood in France that Villeneuve knew quite well the kind of

attack Nelson would be likely to make. In his General Instructions,

issued in anticipation of the battle, he says: 'The enemy will not

confine themselves to forming a line parallel to ours.... They will

try to envelope our rear, to break our line, and to throw upon those

of our ships that they cut off, groups of their own to surround and

crush them.' Yet he could not get away from the dictum of De Grasse,

and was able to think of no better way of meeting such an attack than

awaiting it 'in a single line of battle well closed up.'

In England things were little better. In spite of the fact that at

Camperdown Duncan had actually found a sudden advantage by attacking

in two divisions, no one had been found equal to the task of working

out a tactical system to meet the inarticulate demands of the tendency

which Grenier had noticed. The possibilities even of Rodney's

manoeuvre had not been followed up, and Howe had contented himself

with his brilliant invention for increasing the impact and decision of

the single line. It was reserved for Nelson's genius to bring a

sufficiently powerful solvent to bear on the crystallised opinion of

the service, and to find a formula which would shed all that was bad

and combine all that was good in previous systems.[7]

The dominating ideas that were in his mind become clearer, if we

follow step by step all the evidence that has survived as to the

genesis and history of his memorandum. As early as 1798, when he was

hoping to intercept Bonaparte's expedition to Egypt, he had adopted a

system which was not based on the single line, and so far as is known

this was the first tactical order he ever framed as a fleet

commander. It is contained in a general order issued from the Vanguard

on June 8 of that year, and runs as follows, as though hot from the

lesson of St. Vincent: 'As it is very probable the enemy will not be

formed in regular order on the approach of the squadron under my

command, I may in that case deem it most expedient to attack them by

separate divisions. In which case the commanders of divisions are

strictly enjoined to keep their ships in the closest possible order,

and on no account whatever to risk the separation of one of their

ships.'[8] The divisional organisation follows, being his own

division of six sail and two others of four each. 'Had he fallen in

with the French fleet at sea,' wrote Captain Berry, who was sent home

with despatches after the Nile, 'that he might make the best

impression upon any part of it that should appear the most vulnerable

or the most eligible for attack, he divided his force into three

sub-squadrons [one of six sail and two of four each]. Two of these

sub-squadrons were to attack the ships of war, while the third was to

pursue the transports and to sink and destroy as many as it

could.'[9] The exact manner in which he intended to use this

organisation he had explained constantly by word of mouth to his

captains, but no further record of his design has been found. Still

there is an alteration which he made in his signal book at the same

time that gives us the needed light. We cannot fail to notice the

striking resemblance between his method of attack by separate

divisions on a disordered enemy, and that made by the Elizabethan

admirals at Gravelines upon the Armada after its formation had been

broken up by the fireships. That attack was made intuitively by

divisions independently handled as occasion should dictate, and

Nelson's new signal leaves little doubt that this was the plan which

he too intended. The alteration he ordered was to change the

signification of Signal 16, so that it meant that each of his flag

officers, from the moment it was made, should have control of his own

division and make any signals he thought proper.

But this was not all. By the same general order he made two other

alterations in the signal book in view of encountering the French in

order of battle. They too are of the highest interest and run as

follows: 'To be inserted in pencil in the signal book. At

No. 182. Being to windward of the enemy, to denote I mean to attack

the enemy's line from the rear towards the van as far as thirteen

ships, or whatsoever number of the British ships of the line may be

present, that each ship may know his opponent in the enemy's line.'

No. 183. 'I mean to press hard with the whole force on the enemy's

rear.'[10]

Thus we see that at the very first opportunity Nelson had of enforcing

his own tactical ideas he enunciated three of the principles upon

which his great memorandum was based, viz. breaking up his line of

battle into three divisional lines, independent control by divisional

leaders, and concentration on the enemy's rear. All that is wanting

are the elements of surprise and containing.

These, however, we see germinating in the memorandum he issued five

years later off Toulon. In that case he expected to meet the French

fleet on an opposite course, and being mainly concerned in stopping it

and having a slightly superior force he is content to concentrate on

the van. But, in view of the strategical necessity of making the

attack in this way, he takes extra precautions which are not found in

the general order of 1798. He provides for preventing the enemy's

knowing on which side his attack is to fall; instead of engaging an

equal number of their ships he provides for breaking their line, and

engaging the bulk of their fleet with a superior number of his own;

and finally he looks to being ready to contain the enemy's rear before

it can do him any damage.

Thus, taking together the general order of 1798 and the Toulon

memorandum of 1803, we can see all the tactical ideas that were

involved at Trafalgar already in his mind, and we are in a position to

appreciate the process of thought by which he gradually evolved the

sublimely simple attack that welded them together, and brought them

all into play without complication or risk of mistake. This process,

which crowns Nelson's reputation as the greatest naval tactician of

all time, we must now follow in detail.

Shortly before he left England for the last time, he communicated to

Keats, of the Superb, a full explanation of his views as they then

existed in his mind, and Keats has preserved it in the following paper

which Nicolas printed.

'Memorandum of a conversation between Lord Nelson and Admiral Sir

Richard Keats, the last time he was in England before the battle of

Trafalgar.[11]

'One morning, walking with Lord Nelson in the grounds of Merton,

talking on naval matters, he said to me, "No day can be long enough to

arrange a couple of fleets and fight a decisive battle according to

the old system. When _we_ meet them" (I was to have been with

him), "for meet them we shall, I'll tell you how I shall fight them. I

shall form the fleet into three divisions in three lines; one division

shall be composed of twelve or fourteen of the fastest two-decked

ships, which I shall keep always to windward or in a situation of

advantage, and I shall put them under an officer who, I am sure, will

employ them in the manner I wish, if possible. I consider it will

always be in my power to throw them into battle in any part I choose;

but if circumstances prevent their being carried against the enemy

where I desire, I shall feel certain he will employ them effectually

and perhaps in a more advantageous manner than if he could have

followed my orders" (he never mentioned or gave any hint by which I

could understand who it was he intended for this distinguished

service).[12] He continued, "With the remaining part of the fleet,

formed in two lines, I shall go at them at once if I can, about one

third of their line from their leading ship." He then said, "What do

you think of it?" Such a question I felt required consideration. I

paused. Seeing it he said, "But I will tell you what _I_ think

of it. I think it will surprise and confound the enemy. They won't

know what I am about. It will bring forward a pell-mell battle, and

that is what I want."[13]

Here we have something roughly on all-fours with the methods of the

First Dutch War. There are the three squadrons, the headlong 'charge'

and the _mêlée_. The reserve squadron to windward goes even

further back, to the treatise of De Chaves and the Instructions of

Lord Lisle in 1545. It was no wonder it took away Keats's breath. The

return to primitive methods was probably unconscious, but what was

obviously uppermost in Nelson's mind was the breaking up of the

established order in single line, leading by surprise and concealment

to a decisive _mêlée_. He seems to insist not so much upon

defeating the enemy by concentration as by throwing him into

confusion, upsetting his mental equilibrium in accordance with the

primitive idea. The notion of concentration is at any rate secondary,

while the subtle scheme for 'containing' as perfected in the

memorandum is not yet developed. As he explained his plan to Keats, he

meant to attack at once with both his main divisions, using the

reserve squadron as a general support. There is no clear statement

that he meant it as a 'containing' force, though possibly it was in

his mind.[14]

There is one more piece of evidence relating to this time when he was

still in England. According to this story Lord Hill, about 1840, when

still Commander-in-Chief, was paying a visit to Lord Sidmouth. His

host, who, better known as Addington, had been prime minister till

1804, and was in Pitt's new cabinet till July 1805, showed him a table

bearing a Nelson inscription. He told him that shortly before leaving

England to join the fleet Nelson had drawn upon it after dinner a plan

of his intended attack, and had explained it as follows: 'I shall

attack in two lines, led by myself and Collingwood, and I am confident

I shall capture their van and centre or their centre and rear.'

'Those,' concluded Sidmouth, 'were his very words,' and remarked how

wonderfully they had been fulfilled.[15] Hill and Sidmouth at the

time were both old men and the authority is not high, but so far as it

goes it would tend to show that an attack in two lines instead of one

was still Nelson's dominant idea. It cannot however safely be taken as

evidence that he ever intended a concentration on the van, though in

view of the memorandum of 1803 this is quite possible.

Finally, there is the statement of Clarke and McArthur that Nelson

before leaving England deposited a copy of his plan with Lord Barham,

the new first lord of the admiralty. This however is very

doubtful. The Barham papers have recently been placed at the disposal

of the Society, in the hands of Professor Laughton, and the only copy

of the memorandum he has been able to find is an incomplete one

containing several errors of transcription, and dated the Victory,

October 11, 1805. In the absence of further evidence therefore no

weight can be attached to the oft-repeated assertion that Nelson had

actually drawn up his memorandum before he left England.

Coming now to the time when he had joined the fleet off Cadiz, the

first light we have is the well-known letter of October 1 to Lady

Hamilton. In this letter, after telling her that he had joined on

September 28, but had not been able to communicate with the fleet till

the 29th, he says, 'When I came to explain to them the _Nelson

touch_ it was like an electric shock. Some shed tears and all

approved. It was new--it was singular--it was simple.' What he meant

exactly by the 'Nelson touch' has never been clearly explained, but he

could not possibly have meant either concentration or the attack on

the enemy's rear, for neither of these ideas was either new or

singular.

On October 3 he writes to her again: 'The reception I met with on

joining the fleet caused the sweetest sensation of my life.... As

soon as these emotions were past I laid before them the plan I had

previously arranged for attacking the enemy, and it was not only my

pleasure to find it generally approved, but clearly perceived and

understood.'[16]

The next point to notice is the 'Order of Battle and Sailing' given by

Nicolas. It is without date, but almost certainly must have been drawn

up before Nelson joined. It does not contain the Belleisle, which

Nelson knew on October 4 was to join him.[17] It also does include

the name of Sir Robert Calder and his flagship, and on September 30

Nelson had decided to send both him and his ship home.[18]

The order is for a fleet of forty sail, but the names of only

thirty-three are given, which were all Nelson really expected to get

in time. The remarkable feature of this order is that it contains no

trace of the triple organisation of the memorandum. The 'advanced

squadron' is absent, and the order is based on two equal divisions

only.

Then on October 9, after Calder had gone, there is this entry in

Nelson's private diary: 'Sent Admiral Collingwood the Nelson touch.'

It was enclosed in a letter in which Nelson says: 'I send you my Plan

of Attack, as far as a man dare venture to guess at the very uncertain

position the enemy may be found in. But, my dear friend, it is to

place you perfectly at your ease respecting my intentions and to give

full scope to your judgment for carrying them into effect.' The same

day Collingwood replies, 'I have a just sense of your lordship's

kindness to me, and the full confidence you have reposed in me

inspires me with the most lively gratitude. I hope it will not be long

before there is an opportunity of showing your lordship that it has

not been misplaced.' On these two letters there can be little doubt

that the 'Plan of Attack' which Nelson enclosed was that of the

memorandum. The draft from which Nicolas printed appears to have been

dated October 9, and originally had in one passage 'you' and 'your'

for the 'second in command,' showing that Nelson in his mind was

addressing his remarks to Collingwood, though subsequently he altered

the sentence into the third person. Only one other copy was known to

Nicolas, and that was issued in the altered form to Captain Hope, of

the Defence, a ship which in the order of battle was in Collingwood s

squadron, but Codrington tells us it was certainly issued to all the

captains.[19]

So far, then, we have the case thus--that whatever Nelson may have

really told Lord Sidmouth, and whatever may have been in his mind when

he drew up the dual order of battle and sailing, he had by October 9

reverted to the triple idea which he had explained to Keats. Meanwhile,

however, his conception had ripened. There are marked changes in

organisation, method and intention. In organisation the reserve

squadron is reduced from the original twelve or fourteen to eight, or

one fifth of his hypothetical fleet instead of about one third--reduced,

that is, to a strength at which it was much less capable of important

independent action. In method we have, instead of an attack with the

two main divisions, an attack with one only, with the other covering

it. In intention we have as the primary function of the reserve

squadron, its attachment to one or other of the other two main

divisions as circumstances may dictate.

The natural inference from these important changes is that Nelson's

conception was now an attack in two divisions of different strength,

the stronger of which, as the memorandum subsequently explains, was to

be used as a containing force to cover the attack of the other, and

except that the balance of the two divisions was reversed, this is

practically just what Clerk of Eldin had recommended and what actually

happened in the battle. It is a clear advance upon the original idea

as explained to Keats, in which the third squadron was to be used on

the primitive and indefinite plan of De Chaves and Lord Lisle as a

general reserve. It also explains Nelson's covering letter to

Collingwood, in which he seems to convey to his colleague that the

pith of his plan was an attack in two divisions, and, within the

general lines of the design, complete freedom of action for the second

in command. How largely this idea of independent control entered into

the 'Nelson touch' we may judge from the fact that it is emphasised in

no less than three distinct paragraphs of the memorandum.

Such, then, is the fundamental principle of the memorandum as

enunciated in its opening paragraphs. He then proceeds to elaborate

it in two detailed plans of attack--one from to-leeward and the other

from to-windward. It was the latter he meant to make if possible. He

calls it 'the intended attack,' and it accords with the opening

enunciation. The organisation is triple, but no special function is

assigned to the reserve squadron. The actual attack on the enemy's

rear is to be made by Collingwood, while Nelson with his own division

and the reserve is to cover him. In the event of an attack having to

be made from to-leeward, the idea is different. Here the containing

movement practically disappears. The fleet is still to attack the rear

and part of the centre of the enemy, but now in three independent

divisions simultaneously, in such a way as to cut his line at three

points, and to concentrate a superior force on each section of the

severed line. To none of the divisions is assigned the duty of

containing the rest of the enemy's fleet from the outset. It is to be

dealt with at a second stage of the action by all ships that are still

capable of renewing the engagement after the first stage. 'The whole

impression,' as Nelson put it, in case he was forced to attack from

to-leeward, was to overpower the enemy's line from a little ahead of

the centre to the rearmost ship. He does not say, however, that this

was to be 'the whole impression' of the intended attack from

to-windward. 'The whole impression' there appears to be for

Collingwood to overpower the rear while Nelson with the other two

divisions made play with the enemy's van and centre; but the

particular manner in which he would carry out this part of the design

is left undetermined.

The important point, then, in considering the relation between the

actual battle and the memorandum, is to remember that it provided for

two different methods of attacking the rear according to whether the

enemy were encountered to windward or to leeward. The somewhat

illogical arrangement of the memorandum tends to conceal this highly

important distinction. For Nelson interpolates between his explanation

of the windward attack and his opening enunciation of principle his

explanation of the leeward attack, to which the enunciation did not

apply. That some confusion was caused in the minds of some even of his

best officers is certain, but let them speak for themselves.

After the battle Captain Harvey, of the Téméraire, whom Nelson

had intended to lead his line, wrote to his wife, 'It was noon before

the action commenced, which was done according to the instructions

given us by Lord Nelson.... Lord Nelson had given me leave to lead and

break through the line about the fourteenth ship,' _i.e._ two or

three ships ahead of the centre, as explained in the memorandum for

the leeward attack but not for the windward.

On the other hand we have Captain Moorsom, of the Revenge, who was in

Collingwood's division, saying exactly the opposite. Writing to his

father on December 4, he says, 'I have seen several plans of the

action, but none to answer my ideas of it. A regular plan was laid

down by Lord Nelson some time before the action but not acted on. His

great anxiety seemed to be to get to leeward of them lest they should

make off to Cadiz before he could get near them.' And on November 1,

to the same correspondent he had written, 'I am not certain that our

mode of attack was the best: however, it succeeded.' Here then we have

two of Nelson's most able captains entirely disagreeing as to whether

or not the attack was carried out in accordance with any plan which

Nelson laid down.

Captain Moorsom's view may be further followed in a tactical study

written by his son, Vice-Admiral Constantine Moorsom.[20] His remarks

on Trafalgar were presumably largely inspired by his father, who lived

till 1835. In his view there was 'an entire alteration both of the

scientific principle and of the tactical movements,' both of which he

thinks were due to what he calls the _morale_ of the enemy's

attitude--that is, that Nelson was afraid they were going to slip

through his fingers into Cadiz. The change of plan--meaning presumably

the change from the triple to the dual organisation--he thinks was not

due to the reduced numbers which Nelson actually had under his flag,

for the ratio between the two fleets remained much about the same as

that of his hypothesis.

The interesting testimony of Lieutenant G.L. Browne, who, as Admiral

Jackson informs us, was assistant flag-lieutenant in the Victory and

had every means of knowing, endorses the view of the Moorsoms.[21]

After explaining to his parents the delay caused by the established

method of forming the fleets in two parallel lines so that each had an

opposite number, as set forth in the opening words of the memorandum,

he says, 'but by his lordship's mode of attack you will clearly

perceive not an instant of time could be lost. The frequent

communications he had with his admirals and captains put them in

possession of all his plans, so that his mode of attack was well known

to every officer of the fleet. Some will not fail to attribute

rashness to the conduct of Lord Nelson. But he well considered the

importance of a decisive naval victory at this time, and has

frequently said since we left England that, should he be so fortunate

as to fall in with the enemy, a total defeat should be the result on

the one side or the other.'

Next we have what is probably the most acute and illuminating

criticism of the battle that exists, from the pen of 'an officer who

was present.' Sir Charles Ekin quotes it anonymously; but from

internal evidence there is little difficulty in assigning it to an

officer of the Conqueror, though clearly not her captain, Israel

Pellew, in whose justification the concluding part was written.

Whoever he was the writer thoroughly appreciated and understood the

tactical basis of Nelson's plan, as laid down in the memorandum, and

he frankly condemns his chief for having exposed his fleet

unnecessarily by permitting himself to be hurried out of delivering

his attack in line abreast as he intended. It might well have been

done, so far as he could see, without any more loss of time than

actually occurred in getting the bulk of the fleet into action. Loss

of time was the only excuse for attacking in line ahead, and the only

reason he could suppose for the change of plan. If they had all gone

down together in line abreast, he is sure the victory would have been

more quickly decided and the brunt of the fight more equally

borne. Nothing, he thinks, could have been better than the plan of the

memorandum if it had only been properly executed. An attack in two

great divisions with a squadron of observation--so he summarises the

'Nelson touch'--seemed to him to combine every precaution under all

circumstances. It allows of concentration and containing. Each ship

can use her full speed without fear of being isolated. The fastest

ships will break through the line first, and they are just those which

from their speed in passing are liable to the least damage, while

having passed through, they cause a diversion for the attack of their

slower comrades. Finally, if the enemy tries to make off and avoid

action, the fleet is well collected for a general chase. But as Nelson

actually made the attack in his hurry to close, he threw away most of

these advantages, and against an enemy of equal spirit each ship must

have been crushed as she came into action. Instead of doubling

ourselves, he says, we were doubled and even trebled on. Nelson in

fact presented the enemy's fleet with precisely the position which the

memorandum aimed at securing for ourselves--that is to say, he

suffered a portion of his fleet, comprising the Victory,

Téméraire, Royal Sovereign, Belleisle, Mars, Colossus, and

Bellerophon, to be cut off and doubled on.[22]

The last important witness is Captain Codrington, of the Orion. No one

seems to have kept his head so well in the action, and this fact,

coupled with the high reputation he subsequently acquired, gives

peculiar weight to his testimony. It is on the question of the

advanced or reserve squadron that he is specially interesting. On

October 19 at 8 P.M., just after they had been surprised and rejoiced

by Nelson's signal for a general chase, and were steering for the

enemy, as he says, 'under every stitch of sail we can set,' he sat

down to write to his wife. In the course of the letter he tells her,

'Defence and Agamemnon are upon the look out nearest to

Cadiz; ... Colossus and Mars are stationed next. The above four and as

many more of us are now to form an advanced squadron; and I trust by

the morning we shall all be united and in sight of the enemy.'

Clearly then Nelson must have issued some modification of the dual

'order of battle and sailing.' Many years later in a note upon the

battle which Codrington dictated to his daughter, Lady Bourchier, he

says that on the 20th, in spite of Collingwood's advice to attack at

once, Nelson 'continued waiting upon them in two columns according to

the order of sailing and the memorable written instruction which was

given out to all the captains.'[23] Later still, when a veteran of

seventy-six years, he gave to Sir Harris Nicolas another note which

shows how in his own mind he reconciled the apparent discrepancy

between the dual and the triple organisation. It runs as follows: 'In

Lord Nelson's memorandum of October 9, 1805, he refers to "an advanced

squadron of eight of the fastest sailing two-decked ships" to be added

to either of the two lines of the order of sailing as may be required;

and says that this advanced squadron would probably have to cut

through "two, three or four ships of the enemy's centre so as to

ensure getting at their commander-in-chief, on whom every effort must

be made to capture";[24] and he afterwards twice speaks of the

enemy's van coming to succour their rear. Now I am under the

impression that I was expressly instructed by Lord Nelson (referring

to the probability of the enemy's van coming down upon us), being in

the Orion, one of the eight ships named, that he himself would

probably make a feint of attacking their van in order to prevent or

retard it.' Here then would seem to be still further confusion, due

to a failure to distinguish between the leeward and windward form of

attack. According to this statement Codrington believed the advanced

squadron was in either case to attack the centre, while Nelson with

his division contained the van. But curiously enough in a similar

note, printed by Lady Bourchier on Nicolas's authority, there is a

difference in the wording which, though difficult to account for,

seems to give the truer version of what Codrington really said. It is

there stated that Codrington told Nicolas he was strongly impressed

with the belief 'that Lord Nelson directed eight of the smaller and

handier ships, of which the Orion was one, to be ready to haul out of

the line in case the enemy's van should appear to go down to the

assistance of the ships engaged to meet and resist them: that to

prevent this manoeuvre on the part of the enemy Lord Nelson intimated

his intention of making a feint of hauling out towards their van,'

&c. There is little doubt that we have here the true distribution of

duties which Nelson intended for the windward attack--that is, the

advanced squadron was to be the real containing force, but he intended

to assist it by himself making a feint on the enemy's van before

delivering his true attack on the centre.[25]

From Codrington's evidence it is at any rate clear that some time

before the 19th Nelson had told off an 'advanced squadron' as provided

for in his memorandum, and that the ships that were forming the

connection between the fleet and the frigates before Cadiz formed part

of it. Now Nelson had begun to tell off these ships as early as the

4th. On that day he wrote to Captain Duff, of the Mars, 'I have to

desire you will keep with the Mars, Defence and Colossus from three to

four leagues between the fleet and Cadiz in order that I may get

information from the frigates stationed off that port as expeditiously

as possible.' On the 11th, writing to Sir Alexander Ball at Malta, he

speaks of having 'an advanced squadron of fast sailing ships between

me and the frigates.' The Agamemnon (64) was added on the 14th, the

day after she joined. On that day Nelson entered in his private diary,

'Placed Defence and Agamemnon from seven to ten leagues west of Cadiz,

and Mars and Colossus four leagues east of the fleet,' &c,[26] On the

15th he wrote to Captain Hope, of the Defence: 'You will with the

Agamemnon take station west from Cadiz from seven to ten leagues, by

which means if the enemy should move I hope to have constant

information, as two or three ships will be kept as at present between

the fleet and your two ships.'[27]

On the 12th he writes to Collingwood, of the Belleisle, the fastest

two-decker in the fleet, as though she too were an advanced ship, and

on the morning of the 19th he tells him the Leviathan was to relieve

the Defence, whose water had got low. Later in the day, when Mars and

Colossus had passed on the signal that the enemy was out, he ordered

'Mars, Orion, Belleisle, Leviathan, Bellerophon and Polyphemus to go

ahead during the night.'[28] On the eve of the battle therefore these

six ships, with Colossus and Agamemnon, made up the squadron of eight

specified on the memorandum.

The conclusion then is that, though some of the ships destined to form

the advanced squadron had not arrived by the 9th when the memorandum

was issued, Nelson had already taken steps to organise it, and that on

the evening of the 19th, the first moment he had active contact with

the enemy, it was detached from the fleet as a separate unit. Up to

this moment it would look as though he had intended to use it as his

memorandum directed. Since with the exception of the Agamemnon and

the Leviathan, which had only temporarily replaced the Defence while

she watered, the whole of the ships named belonged to Collingwood's

division, the resulting organisation would have been, lee-line nine

ships, weather-line eight ships, and eight for the advanced

squadron--an organisation which in relative proportion was almost

exactly that which he had explained to Keats. It would therefore still

have rendered Nelson's original plan of attack possible, although it

did not preserve the balance of the divisions prescribed in the

memorandum.

There can be little doubt, however, that Nelson on the morning of the

battle did abandon the idea of the advanced squadron altogether. Early

on the 20th it was broken up again. At 8 o'clock in the morning of

that day the captains of the Mars, Colossus and Defence (which

apparently was by this time ready again for service) were called on

board the Victory and ordered out to form a chain as before between

the admiral and his frigates.[29] The rest presumably resumed their

stations in the fleet. Even if he had not actually abandoned this part

of his plan, it is clear that in his hurry to attack Nelson would not

spend time in reforming the squadron as a separate unit, but chose

rather to carry out his design, so far as was possible, with two

divisions only. So soon as he sighted the enemy's fleet at daylight on

the 21st, he made the signal to form the line of battle in two

columns, and with one exception the whole of the advanced ships took

station in their respective divisions according to the original order

of battle and sailing.'[30] The exception was Codrington's ship, the

Orion. No importance however need be attached to this, for although he

was originally in Collingwood's division he may well have been

transferred to Nelson's some time before. It is only worthy of remark

because Codrington, of all the advanced squadron captains, was the

only one, so far as we know, who still considered the squadron a

potential factor in the fleet and acted accordingly. While Belleisle,

Mars, Bellerophon and Colossus rushed into the fight in the van of

Collingwood's line, Orion in the rear of Nelson's held her fire even

when she got into action, and cruised about the _mêlée_, carefully

seeking points where she could do most damage to an enemy, or best

help an overmatched friend--well-judged piece of service, on which he

dwells in his correspondence over and over again with pardonable

complacency. He was thus able undoubtedly to do admirable service in

the crisis of the action.

That the bulk of his colleagues thought all idea of a reserve squadron

had been abandoned by Nelson is clear, and the resulting change was

certainly great enough to explain why some of the captains thought the

plan of the memorandum had been abandoned altogether. For not only was

the attack made in two divisions instead of one, and in line ahead

instead of line abreast, but its prescribed balance was entirely

upset. Instead of Nelson having the larger portion of the fleet for

containing the van and centre, Collingwood had the larger portion for

the attack on the rear. In other words, instead of the advanced

squadron being under Nelson's direction, the bulk of it was attached

to Collingwood. If some heads--even as clear as Codrington's--were

puzzled, it is little wonder.

As to the way in which this impulsive change of plan was brought

about, Codrington says, 'They [the enemy] suddenly wore round so as to

have Cadiz under their lee, with every appearance of a determination

to go into that port. Lord Nelson therefore took advantage of their

confusion in wearing, and bore down to attack them with the fleet in

two columns.' This was in the note dictated to Lady Bourchier, and in

a letter of October 28, 1805, to Lord Garlies he says, 'We all

scrambled into battle as soon as we could.'[31]

Codrington's allusion to Nelson's alleged feint on the enemy's van

brings us to the last point; the question, that is, as to whether,

apart from the substitution of the perpendicular for the parallel

attack, and in spite of the change of balance, the two lines were

actually handled in the action according to the principles of the

memorandum for the intended attack from to-windward.

Lady Bourchier's note continues, after referring to Nelson's intention

to make a feint on the van, 'The Victory did accordingly haul to port:

and though she took in her larboard and weather studding sails, she

kept her starboard studding sails set (notwithstanding they had become

the lee ones and were shaking), thus proving that he proposed to

resume his course, as those sails would be immediately wanted to get

the Victory into her former station.' The note in Nicolas is to the

same effect, but adds that Codrington had no doubt that having taken

in his weather studding sails he kept the lee ones 'set and shaking in

order to make it clear to the fleet that his movement was merely a

feint, and that the Victory would speedily resume her course and

fulfil his intention of cutting through the centre.' And in admiration

of the movement Codrington called his first lieutenant and said, 'How

beautifully the admiral is carrying his design into effect!' Though

all this was written long after, when his memory perhaps was fading,

it is confirmed by a contemporary entry in his log: 'The Victory,

after making a feint as of attacking the enemy's van, hauled to

starboard so as to reach their centre.'[32] This is all clear enough

so far, but now we have to face a signal mentioned in the log of the

Euryalus which, as she was Nelson's repeating frigate, cannot be

ignored. According to this high authority Nelson, about a quarter of

an hour before making his immortal signal, telegraphed 'I intend to

push or go through the end of the enemy's line to prevent them from

getting into Cadiz.' It is doubtful how far this signal was taken in,

but those who saw it must have thought that Nelson meant to execute

Howe's manoeuvre upon the enemy's leading ships. At this time,

according to the master of the Victory, he was standing for the

enemy's van. Nelson also signalled to certain ships to keep away a

point to port. The Victory's log has this entry: 'At 4 minutes past 12

opened our fire on the enemy's van, in passing down their line.' At 30

minutes past 12 the Victory got up with Villeneuve's flagship and then

broke through the line. Now at first sight it might appear that Nelson

really intended to attack the van and not the centre, on the principle

of Hoste's old manoeuvre which Howe had reintroduced into the Signal

Book for attacking a numerically superior fleet--that is, van to van

and rear to rear, leaving the enemy's centre unoccupied.[33] For the

old signal provided that when this was done 'the flag officers are, if

circumstances permit, to engage the flag officers of the enemy,' which

was exactly what Nelson was doing. On this supposition his idea would

be that his ships should attack the enemy ahead of Villeneuve as they

came up. And this his second, the Téméraire, actually did.

But, as we have seen by Instruction XXIV. of 1799, the old rule of

1790 had been altered, and if Nelson intended to execute Hoste's plan

of attack he, as 'leading ship,' would or should have engaged the

enemy's 'leading ship,' leaving the rest as they could to engage the

enemy of 'greatest force.' The only explanation is that, if he really

intended to attack the van, he again changed his mind when he fetched

up with Villeneuve, and could not resist engaging him. More probably,

however, the signal was wrongly repeated by the Euryalus, and as made

by Nelson it was really an intimation to Collingwood that he meant to

cover the attack on the rear and centre by a feint on the van.[34]

However this may be, the French appear to have regarded Nelson's

movement to port as a real attack. Their best account (which is also

perhaps the best account that exists) says that just before coming

into gun-shot the two British columns began to separate. The leading

vessels of Nelson's column, it says, passed through the same interval

astern of the Bucentaure, and then it tells how 'les vaisseaux de

queue de cette colonne, au contraire, serrèrent un peu le vent,

comme pour s'approcher des vaisseaux de l'avant-garde de la flotte

combinée: mais après avoir reçu quelques bordées de ces

vaisseaux ils abandonnérent ce dessein et se portèrent vers les

vaisseaux placés entre le Redoutable et la Santa Anna ou vinrent

unir leurs efforts à ceux des vaisseaux anglais qui combattaient

déjà le Bucentaure et la Santísima Trinidad.'[35] This is to

some extent confirmed by Dumanoir himself, who commanded the allied

van, in his official memorandum addressed to Decrès, December 30,

1809. In defending his failure to tack sooner to Villeneuve's relief,

he says, 'Au commencement du combat, la colonne du Nord [_i.e._

Nelson's] se dirigea sur l'avant-garde qui engagea avec elle pendant

quarante minutes.'[36] In partial corroboration of this there is the

statement in the log of the Téméraire, the ship that was

immediately behind Nelson, that she opened her fire on the

Santísima Trinidad and the two ships ahead of her; that is, she

engaged the ships ahead of where Nelson broke the line, so that

Captain Harvey as well as Dumanoir may have believed that Nelson

intended his real attack to be on 'the end of the line.'

In the face of these facts it is impossible to say categorically that

Nelson intended nothing but a feint on the van. It is equally

impossible to say he intended a real attack. The point perhaps can

never be decided with absolute certainty, but it is this very

uncertainty that brings out the true merit and the real lesson of

Nelson's attack. As we now may gather from his captains' opinions, its

true merit was not that he threw his whole fleet on part of a superior

enemy--that was a commonplace in tactics. It was not concentration on

the rear, for that also was old; and what is more, as the attack was

delivered, so far from Nelson concentrating, he boldly, almost

recklessly, exposed himself for a strategical object to what should

have been an overwhelming concentration on the leading ships of his

two columns. The true merit of it above all previous methods of

concentration and containing was that, whether, as planned or as

delivered, it prevented the enemy from knowing on which part of their

line Nelson intended to throw his squadron, just as we are prevented

from knowing to this day. 'They won't know what I am about' were his

words to Keats.

The point is clearer still when we compare the different ways in which

Nelson and Collingwood brought their respective columns into

action. Collingwood in his Journal says that shortly before 11

o'clock, that is, an hour before getting into action, he signalled

'for the lee division to form the larboard line of bearing.' The

effect and intention of this would be that each ship in his division

would head on the shortest course to break the enemy's line in all

parts. It was the necessary signal for enabling him to carry out

regularly Howe's manoeuvre upon the enemy's rear, and his object was

declared for all to see.[37] Nelson, on the other hand, made no such

signal, but held on in line ahead, giving no indication of whether he

intended to perform the manoeuvre on the van or the centre, or whether

he meant to cut the line in line ahead. Until they knew which it was

to be, it was impossible for the enemy to take any step to concentrate

with either division, and thus Nelson held them both immobile while

Collingwood flung himself on his declared objective.

Nothing could be finer as a piece of subtle tactics. Nothing could be

more daring as a well-judged risk. The risk was indeed enormous,

perhaps the greatest ever taken at sea. Hawke risked much at Quiberon,

and much was risked at the Nile. But both were sea-risks of the class

to which our seamen were enured. At Trafalgar it was a pure

battle-risk--a mad, perpendicular attack in which every recognised

tactical card was in the enemy's hand. But Nelson's judgment was

right. He knew his opponent's lack of decision, he knew the individual

shortcomings of the allied ships, and he knew he had only to throw

dust, as he did, in their eyes for the wild scheme to succeed. As

Jurien de la Gravière has most wisely said 'Le génie de Nelson

c'est d'avoir compris notre faiblesse.'

Yet when all is said, when even full weight is given to the

strategical pressure of the hour and the uncertainty of the weather,

there still remains the unanswerable criticism of the officer of the

Conqueror: that by an error of judgment Nelson spoilt his attack by

unnecessary haste. The moral advantage of pushing home a bold attack

before an enemy is formed is of course very great; but in this case

the enemy had no intention of avoiding him, as they showed, and he

acknowledged, when they boldly lay-to to accept action. The confusion

of their line was tactically no weakness: it only resulted in a

duplication which was so nicely adapted for meeting Howe's manoeuvre

that there was a widespread belief in the British fleet, which

Collingwood himself shared, that Villeneuve had adopted it

deliberately.[38] Seeing what the enemy's accidental formation was,

every ship that pierced it must be almost inevitably doubled or

trebled on. It was, we know, the old Dutch manner of meeting the

English method of attack in the earliest days of the line.[39] Had he

given Villeneuve time for forming his line properly the enemy's battle

order would have been only the weaker. Had he taken time to form his

own order the mass of the attack would have been delivered little

later than it was, its impact would have been intensified, and the

victory might well have been even more decisive than it was, while the

sacrifice it cost would certainly have been less, incalculably less,

if we think that the sacrifice included Nelson himself.

FOOTNOTES:

[1] _Nelson's Letters and Despatches_, p. 382.

[2] Nicolas, _Nelson's Despatches_, v. 287, note. It is also given in

vol. vii. p. ccxvi, apparently from a captain's copy which is undated.

[3] _Ibid._ v. 283.

[4] Professor Laughton pointed out (_op. cit._) that the conditions

will fit June to August 1804, but that it might have been 'earlier,

certainly not later.'

[5] It is very doubtful whether this formation was ever intended for

anything but tactical exercises. Morogues has a similar signal and

instruction (_Tactique Navale_, p. 294, ed. 1779), 'Partager l'armée en

deux corps, ou mettre l'armée sur deux colonnes; et représentation d'un

combat.' Anson certainly used it for manoeuvring one half of his fleet

against the other during his tactical exercises in 1747. Warren to

Anson, _Add. MSS._ 15957, p. 172.

[6] Mathieu-Dumas, _Précis des Evénements Militaires_, xiii. 193.

[7] Captain Boswall, in the preface to his translation of Hoste, says

Grenier's work was translated in 1790. If this was so Nelson may well

have read it, but I have not been able to find a copy of the translation

either in the British Museum or elsewhere.

[8] Ross, _Memoir of Saumarez_, i. 212.

[9] Laughton, _Nelson's Letters and Despatches_, 150.

[10] No. 182 as it stood in the signal book meant, Ships before in tow

to proceed to port. No. 183. When at anchor to veer to twice the length

of cable. No. 16. Secret instructions to be opened.

[11] It was in the handwriting, Nicolas says, of Edward Hawke Locker,

Esq., the naval biographer and originator of the naval picture gallery

at Greenwich. He endorsed it, 'Copy of a paper communicated to me by Sir

Richard Keats, and allowed by him to be transcribed by me, 1st October,

1829.'

[12] It was certainly not Keats himself, though afterwards Nelson meant

to offer him command of the squadron he intended to detach into the

Mediterranean. In the expected battle Keats, had he arrived in time, was

to have been Nelson's 'second' in the line. _Nelson to Sir Alexander

Ball_, October 15, 1805.

[13] _Nelson's Despatches_, vii. 241, note.

[14] Nelson's 'advance squadron' must not be confused with the idea of

a reserve squadron which Gravina pressed on Villeneuve at the famous

Cadiz council of war before Trafalgar. Gravina's idea was nothing but

the old one of a reserve of superfluous ships after equalising the line,

as provided by the old English Fighting Instructions and recommended by

Morogues.

[15] Sidney, _Life of Lord Hill_, p. 368.