[16] Clarke and McArthur say the letter was to Lady Hamilton. Nicolas,

reprinting from the _Naval Chronicle_, has the addressee's name blank.

[17] Nelson to Captain Duff, October 4. The order to take her under his

command was despatched on September 20. Same to Marsden, October 10.

[18] Same to Lord Barham, September 30.

[19] See the note on Trafalgar dictated by him in _Memoirs of Sir

Edward Codrington_, edited by Lady Bourchier, 1873.

[20] _On the Principles of Naval Tactics_, 1846.

[21] _Great Sea Fights_, ii. 196, note.

[22] See _post_, p. 357 Appendix, where this interesting paper is set

out in full.

[23] _Life of Codrington_, ii. 57-8.

[24] It should be noted that the memorandum only enjoins this for an

attack from to-leeward, and not for the 'intended attack' from

to-windward.

[25] See _Nelson's Despatches_, vii. 154; _Life of Codrington_, ii. 77.

[26] Nicolas, vii. 122. Before this Mars and Colossus had had the

inside station. See Nelson to Collingwood, October 12.

[27] _Ibid._, vii. 122.

[28] Nicolas, vii. 115, 129, 133.

[29] Memorandum and Private Diary, Nicolas, pp. 136-7.

[30] Some doubt has been expressed as to the signals with which Nelson

opened at daybreak on the 21st. But their actual numbers are recorded in

the logs of the Mars, Defiance, Conqueror and Bellerophon, and all but

the first in the log of the Euryalus repeating frigate. They were No.

72: 'To form order of sailing in two columns or divisions of the fleet,'

which, by the memorandum was also to be the order of battle; No. 76,

with compass signal ENE, 'when lying by or sailing by the wind to bear

up and sail large on the course pointed out'; No. 13, Prepare for

battle. Collingwood has in his journal: 'At 6.30 the commander-in-chief

made the signal to form order of sailing in two columns, and at 7.0 to

prepare for battle. At 7.40 to bear up east.'

[31] _Life of Codrington_, ii. 59, 60.

[32] _Great Sea Fights_, ii. 278.

[33] A veteran French officer of the old wars took this view of

Nelson's threat in a study of the battle which he wrote. 'Nelson,' he

says, 'a d'abord feint de vouloir attaquer la tête et la queue de

l'armée. Ensuite il a rassemblé ses forces sur son centre, et a

abandonné le sort de la bataille à l'intelligence de ses capitaines.'

Mathieu-Dumas, _Précis des Evénements Militaires_, xiv. 408.

[34] The only trace of notice having been taken by anyone of a signal

from Nelson at the time stated was Collingwood's impatient remark when

Nelson began to telegraph 'England expects,' &c. 'I wish Nelson would

stop signalling,' he is reported to have said. 'We all know well enough

what we have to do,' as though Nelson had been signalling something just

before.

[35] _Monuments des Victoires et Conguêtes des Français_ from Nicolas,

vii. 271. It was also adopted by Mathieu-Dumas (_op. cit._ xiii. p. 178)

as the best and most impartial account. He says it was written by a

French naval officer called Parisot.

[36] Jurien de la Gravière, _Guerres Maritimes_, ii. 220, note.

[37] This highly important signal appears to have been generally

overlooked in accounts of the action. Yet Collingwood's journal is so

precise about signals that there can be no doubt he made it. Agamemnon

in Nelson's column answered it under the impression it was general. Her

log says, 'Answered signal No. 50'--that is, 'To keep on the larboard

line of bearing though then on the starboard tack. Ditto starboard

bearing if on larboard tack.' Captain Moorsom also says, 'My station was

sixth ship in the rear of the lee column; but as the Revenge sailed well

Admiral Collingwood made my signal to keep a line of bearing from him

which made me one of the leading ships through the enemy's line.' No

other ship records the signal. Probably few saw it, for in the

memorandum which Collingwood issued two years later he lays stress on

the importance of captains being particularly watchful for the signals

of their divisional commander. See _post_, pp. 324 and 329.

[38] Collingwood to Marsden, October 22. same to Parker, November 1.

Same to Pasley, December 16, 1805.

[39] See _supra_, p. 119. Villeneuve saw this. In his official despatch

from the Euryalus, November 5, he says 'Notre formation s'effectuait

avec beaucoup de peine; mais dans le genre d'attaque que je prévoyais

que l'ennemi allait nous faire, cette irrégularité même dans notre ligne

ne me paraissait pas un inconvénient.'--Jurien de la Gravière, _Guerres

Maritimes_, ii. 384.

_LORD NELSON_, 1803.

[+Clarke and McArthur, Life of Nelson, ii. 427+.[1]]

_Plan of Attack_.

The business of a commander-in-chief being first to bring an enemy's

fleet to battle on the most advantageous terms to himself (I mean that

of laying his ships close on board the enemy, as expeditiously as

possible, and secondly, to continue them there without separating

until the business is decided), I am sensible beyond this object it is

not necessary that I should say a word, being fully assured that the

admirals and captains of the fleet I have the honour to command will,

knowing my precise object, that of a close and decisive battle, supply

any deficiency in my not making signals, which may, if extended beyond

those objects, either be misunderstood, or if waited for very probably

from various causes be impossible for the commander-in-chief to

make. Therefore it will only be requisite for me to state in as few

words as possible the various modes in which it may be necessary for

me to obtain my object; on which depends not only the honour and glory

of our country, but possibly its safety, and with it that of all

Europe, from French tyranny and oppression.

If the two fleets are both willing to fight, but little manoeuvring is

necessary, the less the better. A day is soon lost in that

business. Therefore I will only suppose that the enemy's fleet being

to leeward standing close upon a wind, and that I am nearly ahead of

them standing on the larboard tack. Of course I should, weather

them. The weather must be supposed to be moderate; for if it be a gale

of wind the manoeuvring of both fleets is but of little avail, and

probably no decisive action would take place with the whole

fleet.[2]

Two modes present themselves: one to stand on just out of gun-shot,

until the van ship of my line would be about the centre ship of the

enemy; then make the signal to wear together; then bear up [and]

engage with all our force the six or five van ships of the enemy,

passing, certainly if opportunity offered, through their line. This

would prevent their bearing up, and the action, from the known bravery

and conduct of the admirals and captains, would certainly be

decisive. The second or third rear ships of the enemy would act as

they please, and our ships would give a good account of them, should

they persist in mixing with our ships.

The other mode would be to stand under an easy but commanding sail

directly for their headmost ship, so as to prevent the enemy from

knowing whether I should pass to leeward or to windward of him. In

that situation I would make the signal to engage the enemy to leeward,

and cut through their fleet about the sixth ship from the van, passing

very close. They being on a wind and you going large could cut their

line when you please. The van ships of the enemy would, by the time

our rear came abreast of the van ship, be severely cut up, and our van

could not expect to escape damage. I would then have our _rear_

ship and every ship in succession wear [and] continue the action with

either the van ship or the second as it might appear most eligible

from her crippled state; and this mode pursued I see nothing to

prevent the capture of the five or six ships of the enemy's van. The

two or three ships of the enemy's rear must either bear up or wear;

and in either case, although they would be in a better plight probably

than our two van ships (now the rear), yet they would be separated and

at a distance to leeward, so as to give our ships time to refit. And

by that time I believe the battle would, from the judgment of the

admiral and captains, be over with the rest of them. Signals from

these moments are useless when every man is disposed to do his

duty. The great object is for us to support each other, and to keep

close to the enemy and to leeward of him.

If the enemy are running away, then the only signals necessary will be

to engage the enemy on arriving up with them; and the other ships to

pass on for the second, third, &c., giving if possible a close fire

into the enemy on passing, taking care to give our ships engaged

notice of your intention.

FOOTNOTES:

[1] From the original in the St. Vincent Papers. Also in Nicolas,

_Despatches and Letters_, vi. 443. Obvious mistakes in punctuation have

been corrected in the text.

[2] _Cf._ the similar remark of De Chaves, _supra_, p. 5.

_LORD NELSON_, 1805.

[+Nicolas, Despatches and Letters, vii.+[1]]

_Memorandum_.

_Secret_. Victory, off Cadiz, 9th October, 1805.

Thinking it almost impossible to bring a fleet of forty sail of the

line into line of battle in variable winds, thick weather, and other

circumstances which must occur, without such a loss of time that the

opportunity would probably be lost of bringing the enemy to battle in

such a manner as to make the business decisive; I have therefore made

up my mind to keep the fleet in that position of sailing (with the

exception of the first and second in command), that the order of

sailing is to be the order of battle; placing the fleet in two lines

of sixteen ships each, with an advance squadron of eight of the

fastest sailing two-decked ships, _which_ will always make, if

wanted, a line of twenty-four sail on whichever line the

commander-in-chief may direct.

The second in command will,[2] after _my_ intentions are made

known to him, have the entire direction of his line; to make the

attack upon the enemy, and to follow up the blow until they are

captured or destroyed.

If the enemy's fleet should be seen to windward in line of battle, and

that the two lines and the advanced squadron can fetch them,[3] they

will probably be so extended that their van could not succour their

rear.

I should therefore probably make the second in command's[4] signal,

to lead through about the twelfth ship from the rear (or wherever

he[5] could fetch, if not able to get as far advanced). My line

would lead through about their centre; and the advanced squadron to

cut two, three, or four ships ahead of their centre, so far as to

ensure getting at their commander-in-chief on whom every effort must

be made to capture.

The whole impression of the British fleet must be to overpower from

two to three ships ahead of their commander-in-chief, supposed to be

in the centre, to the rear of their fleet. I will suppose twenty sail

of the enemy's line to be untouched; it must be some time before they

could perform a manoeuvre to bring their force compact to attack any

part of the British fleet engaged, or to succour their own ships;

which indeed would be impossible, without mixing with the ships

engaged.[6]

Something must be left to chance; nothing is sure in a sea fight

beyond all others. Shots will carry away the masts[7] and yards of

friends as well as foes; but I look with confidence to a victory

before the van of the enemy could succour their rear;[8] and then

the British fleet would most of them be ready to receive their twenty

sail of the line, or to pursue them, should they endeavour to make

off.

If the van of the enemy tacks, the captured ships must run to leeward

of the British fleet; if the enemy wears, the British must place

themselves between the enemy and the captured and disabled British

ships; and should the enemy close, I have no fears as to the result.

The second in command will, in all possible things, direct the

movements of his line, by keeping them as compact as the nature of the

circumstances will admit. Captains are to look to their particular

line as their rallying point. But in case signals can neither be seen

nor perfectly understood, no captain can do very wrong if he places

his ship alongside that of an enemy.

Of the intended attack from to-windward, the enemy in the line of

battle ready to attack.

[Illustration][9]

The divisions of the British fleet[10] will be brought nearly within

gunshot of the enemy's centre. The signal will most probably be made

for the lee line to bear up together, to set all their sails, even

steering sails[11] in order to get as quickly as possible to the

enemy's line and to cut through, beginning from the twelfth ship from

the enemy's rear.[12] Some ships may not get through their exact

place; but they will always be at hand to assist their friends; and if

any are thrown round the rear of the enemy, they will effectually

complete the business of twelve sail of the enemy.[13]

Should the enemy wear together, or bear up and sail large, still the

twelve ships, composing in the first position the enemy's rear, are to

be _the_ object of attack of the lee line, unless otherwise

directed by the commander-in-chief; which is scarcely to be expected,

as the entire management of the lee line, after the intention of the

commander-in-chief is signified, is intended to be left to the

judgment of the admiral commanding that line.

The remainder of the enemy's fleet, thirty-four sail, are to be left

to the management of the commander-in-chief, who will endeavour to

take care that the movements of the second in command are as little

interrupted as possible.

FOOTNOTES:

[1] Sir Harris Nicolas states that he took his text from an 'Autograph

[he means holograph] draught in the possession of Vice-Admiral Sir

George Mundy, K.C.B., except the words in italics which were added by

Mr. Scott, Lord Nelson's secretary: and from the original issued to

Captain Hope of the Defence, now in possession of his son, Captain Hope,

R.N.'

[2] Lord Nelson originally wrote here but deleted 'in fact command his

line and.'--Nicolas.

[3] Lord Nelson originally wrote here but deleted 'I shall suppose

them forty-six sail in the line of battle.'--Nicolas.

[4] Originally 'your' but deleted.--_Ibid_.

[5] Originally 'you' but deleted.--_Ibid_.

[6] In the upper margin of the paper Lord Nelson wrote and Mr. Scott

added to it a reference, as marked in the text--'the enemy's fleet is

supposed to consist of 46 sail of the line, British fleet 40. If either

be less, only a proportionate number of enemy's ships are to be cut off:

B. to be 1/4 superior to the E. cut off.--_Ibid_.

[7] The Barham copy reads 'a mast.'

[8] Originally 'friends.'--Nicolas.

[9] This is the only diagram found in either of Nelson's memoranda. It

is not in the Barham copy.

[10] Nelson presumably means the two main divisions as distinguished

from the 'advanced squadron.' This distinction is general in the

correspondence of his officers and accords with the arrangement as shown

in the diagram. The Barham copy has 'division' in the singular, as

though Nelson intended to specify one division only. It is probably a

copyist's error.

[11] In the upper margin of the paper, and referred to by Lord Nelson

as in the text 'Vide instructions for signal yellow with blue fly. Page

17, Eighth Flag, Signal Book, with reference to Appendix.'--Nicolas.

Steering-sail, according to Admiral Smyth (_Sailors' Word-Book_, p.

654), was 'an incorrect name for a studding sail,' but it seems to have

been in common use in Nelson's time.

[12] The Barham copy reads 'their rear.'

[13] The Barham copy ends here. The second sheet has not been found.

NELSON AND BRONTÉ.[1]

INSTRUCTIONS AFTER TRAFALGAR

INTRODUCTORY

The various tactical memoranda issued after Trafalgar by flag officers

in command of fleets are amongst the most interesting of the whole

series. The unsettled state of opinion which they display as the

result of Nelson's memorandum is very remarkable; for with one

exception they seem to show that the great tactical principles it

contained had been generally misunderstood to a surprising extent.

The failure to fathom its meaning is to be accounted for largely by

the lack of theoretical training, which made the science of tactics,

as distinguished from its practice, a sealed book to the majority of

British officers. But the trouble was certainly intensified by the

fact--as contemporary naval literature shows--that by Nelson's success

and death the memorandum became consecrated into a kind of sacred

document, which it was almost sacrilege to discuss. The violent

polemics of such men as James, the naval chronicler, made it appear

profanity so much as to consider whether Nelson's attack differed in

the least from his intended plan, and anyone who ventured to examine

the question in the light of general principles was likely to be

shouted down as a presumptuous heretic. Venial as was this attitude of

adulation under all the circumstances, it had a most evil influence on

the service. The last word seemed to have been said on tactics; and

oblivious of the fact that it is a subject on which the last word can

never be spoken, and that the enemy was certain to learn from Nelson's

practice as well as ourselves, admirals were content to produce a

colourable imitation of his memorandum, and everyone was satisfied not

to look ahead any further. To no one did it occur to consider how the

new method of attack was to be applied if the enemy adopted Nelson's

formation. They simply assumed an endless succession of Trafalgars.

The first outcome of this attitude of mind is an 'Order of Battle and

Sailing,' accompanied by certain instructions, issued by Admiral

Gambier from the Prince of Wales in Yarmouth Roads, on July 23, 1807,

when he was about to sail to seize the Danish fleet.[2] His force

consisted of thirty of the line, and its organisation and stations of

flag officers were as follows:

VAN SQUADRON

Division 1. Commodore Hood (No. 1 in line).

Division 2. Vice-Admiral Stanhope (No. 6).

CENTRE DIVISION

Division 1.} Admiral Gambier (No. 15).

Division 2.}

REAR SQUADRON

Division 1. Rear-Admiral Essington (No. 25).

Division 2. Commodore Keats (No. 30).

Gambier's fleet was thus organised in three equal squadrons (the

centre one called 'the centre division') and six equal subdivisions.

The commander-in-chief was in the centre and had no other flag in his

division, Similarly each junior flag officer was in the centre of his

squadron and led his subdivision, but he had a commodore to lead his

other subdivision. These two commodores also led the fleet on either

tack. So far all is plain, but when we endeavour to understand by the

appended instruction what battle formation Gambier intended by his

elaborate organisation it is very baffling. Possibly we have not got

the instruction exactly as Gambier wrote it; but as it stands it is

confused past all understanding, and no conceivable battle formation

can be constructed from it. All we can say for certain is that he

evidently believed he was adopting the principles of Trafalgar, and

perhaps going beyond them. The sailing order is to be also the battle

order, but whether in two columns or three is not clear. Independent

control of divisions and squadrons is also there, and even the

commodores are to control their own subdivisions 'subject to the

general direction' of their squadronal commanders, but whether the

formation was intended to follow that of Nelson the instruction

entirely fails to disclose.

The next is a tactical memorandum or general order, issued by Lord

Collingwood for the Mediterranean fleet in 1808, printed in

Mr. Newnham Collingwood's _Correspondence of Lord Collingwood_.

No order of battle is given; but two years later, in issuing an

additional instruction, he refers to his general order as still in

force. In this case we have the battle order, and it consists of

twenty of the line in two equal columns, with the commander-in-chief

and his second in command, second in their respective divisions. There

were no other flag officers in the fleet.[3] The memorandum which is

printed below will be seen to be an obvious imitation of Nelson's, and

nothing can impress us more deeply with the merit of Nelson's work

than to compare it with Collingwood's. Like Nelson, Collingwood begins

with introductory remarks emphasising the importance of 'a prompt and

immediate attack' and independent divisional control; and in order to

remedy certain errors of Trafalgar, he insists in addition on close

order being kept throughout the night and the strictest attention

being paid to divisional signals, thinking no doubt how slowly the

rear ships at Trafalgar had struggled into action, and how his signal

for line of bearing had been practically ignored. Then, after stating

broadly that he means with the van or weather division to attack the

van of the enemy, while the lee or larboard division simultaneously

attacks the rear, he differentiates like Nelson between a weather and

a lee attack. For the attack from to-windward he directs the two

divisions to run down in line abreast in such a way that they will

come into action together in a line parallel to the enemy; but,

whatever he intended, nothing is said about concentrating on any part

of the enemy, or about breaking the line in all parts or otherwise.

The attack from to-leeward is to be made perpendicularly in line

ahead. In this formation his own (the weather column) is to break the

line, so as to cut off the van quarter of the enemy's line from the

other three quarters, and the lee column is to sever this part of the

enemy's line a few ships in rear of their centre. So soon as the

leading ships have passed through and so weathered the enemy, they are

to keep away and lead down his line so as to engage the rear three

fourths to windward. This is of course practically identical with the

lee attack of Nelson's memorandum. The only addition is the course

that is to be taken after breaking the line. One cannot help wondering

how far the leading ships after passing the line would have been able

to lead down it before they were disabled, but the addition is

interesting as the first known direction as to what was to be done

after breaking the line in line ahead after Rodney's method. Seeing

the grave and obvious dangers of the movement it is natural that, like

Nelson, Collingwood hoped not to be forced to make it; what he desired

was a simple engagement on similar tacks. His 'intended attack' as in

Nelson's case is clearly that from to-windward.

Turning then again to the windward attack, we see at once its

superficial resemblance to Nelson's, but so entirely superficial is it

that it is impossible to believe Collingwood ever penetrated the

subtleties of his great chiefs design. The dual organisation is there

and the independent divisional control, but nothing else. The advance

squadron has gone, and with it all trace of a containing

movement. There is not even the feint--the mystification of the van.

Concentration too has gone, and instead of the sound main attack on

the rear, he is most concerned with attacking the van. True, he may

have meant what Nelson meant, but if he had really grasped his fine

intention he surely must have let some hint of it escape him in his

memorandum. But for the windward attack at least there is no trace of

these things, and Nelson's masterly conception sinks in Collingwood's

hands into a mere device for expediting the old parallel attack in

single line--that is to say, the line is to be formed in bearing down

instead of waiting to bear down till the line was complete. We can

only conclude, then, that both Collingwood and Gambier could see

nothing in the 'Nelson touch' but the swift attack, the dual

organisation, and independent divisional control.

There is a third document, however, which confirms us in the

impression already formed that there were officers who saw more

deeply. It is a tactical memorandum issued by Admiral the Hon. Sir

Alexander Forrester Inglis Cochrane, Bart., G.C.B., uncle of the more

famous Earl of Dundonald. It is printed by Sir Charles Ekin, in his

_Naval Battles_, from a paper which he found at the end of a book

in his possession containing 'Additional Signals, Instructions, &c.,'

issued by Sir A.I. Cochrane to the squadron under his command upon the

Leeward Islands station.' He commanded in chief on this station from

1805 to 1814, but appears never to have been directly under Nelson's

influence except for a few weeks, when Nelson came out in pursuit of

Villeneuve and attached him to his squadron. He was rather one of

Rodney's men, under whom he had served in his last campaigns, and this

may explain the special note of his tactical system. His partiality

for Rodney's manoeuvre is obvious, and the interesting feature of his

plan of attack is the manner in which he grafts it on Nelson's system

of mutually supporting squadrons. He does not even shrink from a very

free use of doubling which his old chiefs system entailed, and he

provides a special signal of his own for directing the execution of

the discarded manoeuvre. The 'explanation' of another of his new

signals for running aboard an enemy 'so as to disable her from getting

away' is also worthy of remark, as a recognition of Nelson's favourite

practice disapproved by Collingwood.

Yet, although we see throughout the marks of the true 'Nelson touch,'

Cochrane's memorandum bears signs of having been largely founded on an

independent study of tactical theory. His obligations to Clerk of

Eldin are obvious. There are passages in the document which seem as

though they must have been written with the _Essay on Naval

Tactics_ at his elbow, while his expression 'an attack by forcing

the fleet from to-leeward' is directly borrowed from Morogues' 'Forcer

l'ennemi au combat elant sous le vent.' On the other hand certain

movements are entirely his own, such as his excellent device of

inverting the line after passing through the enemy's fleet, a great

improvement on Collingwood's method of leading down it in normal

order.

The point is of some interest, for although Cochrane's memorandum is

over-elaborate and smells of the lamp, yet it seems clear that his

theoretical knowledge made him understand Nelson's principles far

better than most of the men who had actually fought at Trafalgar and

had had the advantage of Nelson's own explanations. All indeed that

Cochrane's memorandum seems to lack is that rare simplicity and

abstraction which only the highest genius can achieve.

FOOTNOTES:

[1] The signature does not occur to the draught but was affixed to the

originals issued to the admirals and captains of the fleet. To the copy

signed by Lord Nelson, and delivered to Captain George Hope, of the

Defence, was added: 'N.B.--When the Defence quits the fleet for England

you are to return this secret memorandum to the Victory' Captain Hope

wrote on that paper: 'It was agreeable to these instructions that Lord

Nelson attacked the combined fleets of France and Spain off Cape

Trafalgar on the 21st of October, 1805, they having thirty-three of the

line and we twenty-seven,'--Nicolas.

The injunction to return the memorandum may well have been added to all

copies issued, and this may account for their general disappearance.

[2] For this document the Society is indebted to Commander G.P.W.

Hope, R.N., who has kindly placed it at my disposal.

[3] For this document the Society is again indebted to Commander Hope,

R.N.

_ADMIRAL GAMBIER_, 1807.

[+MS. of Commander Hope, R.N. Copy+.]

_Order of Battle and Sailing_.[1]

The respective flag officers will have the immediate direction of the

division in which their ships are placed, subject to the general

direction of the admiral commanding the squadron to which they belong.

The ships in order of battle and sailing are to keep at the distance

of two cables' length from and in the wake of each other, increasing

that distance according to the state of the weather.[2]

The leading ship of the starboard division is to keep the admiral two

points on her weather bow. The leading ship of the lee division is

when sailing on a wind to keep the leader of the weather column two

points before her beam; when sailing large, abreast of her.

(Signed) J. GAMBIER.

Prince of Wales, Yarmouth Roads:

23 July, 1807.

FOOTNOTES:

[1] For the actual order to which the instructions are appended see

Introductory Note, _supra_, p. 322.

[2] The normal distance was then a cable and a half. See _post_, p.

330 note.

_LORD COLLINGWOOD_, 1808-10.

[+Correspondence of Collingwood, p. 359+.]

From every account received of the enemy it is expected they may very

soon be met with on their way from Corfu and Tarentum, and success

depends on a prompt and immediate attack upon them. In order to which

it will be necessary that the greatest care be taken to keep the

closest order in the respective columns during the night which the

state of the weather will allow, and that the columns be kept at such

a sufficient distance apart as will leave room for tacking or other

movements, so that in the event of calm or shift of wind no

embarrassment may be caused.

Should the enemy be found formed in order of battle with his whole

force, I shall notwithstanding probably not make the signal to form

the line of battle; but, keeping in the closest order, with the van

squadron attack the van of the enemy, while the commander of the lee

division takes the proper measures, and makes to the ships of his

division the necessary signals for commencing the action with the

enemy's rear, as nearly as possible at the same time that the van

begins. Of his signals therefore the captains of that division will be

particularly watchful.

If the squadron has to run to leeward to close with the enemy, the

signal will be made to alter the course together, the van division

keeping a point or two more away than the lee, the latter carrying

less sail; and when the fleet draws near the enemy both columns are to

preserve a line as nearly parallel to the hostile fleet as they can.

In standing up to the enemy from the leeward upon a contrary tack the

lee line is to press sail, so that the leading ship of that line may

be two or three points before the beam of the leading ship of the

weather line, which will bring them to action nearly at the same

period.

The leading ship of the weather column will endeavour to pass through

the enemy's line, should the weather be such as to make that

practicable, at one fourth from the van, whatever number of ships

their line may be composed of. The lee division will pass through at a

ship or two astern of their centre, and whenever a ship has weathered

the enemy it will be found necessary to shorten sail as much as

possible for her second astern to close with her, and to keep away,

steering in a line parallel to the enemy's and engaging them on their

weather side.

A movement of this kind may be necessary, but, considering the

difficulty of altering the position of the fleet during the time of

combat, every endeavour will be made to commence battle with the enemy

on the same tack they are; and I have only to recommend and direct

that they be fought with at the nearest distance possible, in which

getting on board of them may be avoided, which is alway

disadvantageous to us, except when they are flying.[1]

_Additional Instruction_.[2]

When the signal No. 43 or 44[3] is made to form the order, the fleet

is to form in one line, the rear shortening sail to allow the van to

take their station ahead. If such signal should not be made the

captains are referred to the general order of 23 March, 1808.

COLLINGWOOD.

Ville de Paris, 4th January, 1810.

FOOTNOTES:

[1] The remaining clauses of the memorandum do not relate to tactics.

[2] From the original in the possession of Commander Hope, R.N. It is

attached to an order of battle in two columns. See _supra_, p. 323.

[3] Sig. 43: 'Form line of battle in open order.' Sig. 44: 'Form line

of battle in close order at about a cable and a half distant'; with a

white pennant, 'form on weather column'; with a blue pennant, 'form on

lee column.'

_SIR ALEXANDER COCHRANE_, 1805-1814.

[+Printed in Skin's Naval Battles, pp. 394 seq. (First edit.)+]

_Modes of Attack from the Windward, &c._

When an attack is intended to be made upon the enemy's rear, so as to

endeavour to cut off a certain number of ships from that part of their

fleet, the same will be made known by signal No. 27, and the numeral

signal which accompanies it will point out the headmost of the enemy's

ships that is to be attacked, counting always from the van, as stated

in page 160, Article 31 (Instructions).[1] The signal will

afterwards be made for the division intended to make the attack, or

the same will be signified by the ship's pennants, and the pennants of

the ship in that division which is to begin the attack, with the

number of the ship to be first attacked in the enemy's line. Should it

be intended that the leading ship in the division is to attack the

rear ship of the enemy, she must bear up, so as to get upon the

weather quarter of that ship; the ships following her in the line will

pass in succession on her weather quarter, giving their fire to the

ship she is engaged with; and so on in succession until they have

closed with the headmost ship intended to be attacked.

The ships in reserve, who have no opponents, will break through the

enemy's line ahead of this ship, so as to cut off the ships engaged

from the rest of the enemy's fleet.

When it is intended that the rear ship of the division shall attack

the rear ship of the enemy's line, that ship's pennants will be shown;

the rest of the ships in the division will invert their order,

shortening sail until they can in succession follow the rear ship,

giving their fire to the enemy's ships in like manner as above stated;

and the reserve ships will cut through the enemy's line as already

mentioned.

When this mode of attack is intended to be put in force, the other

divisions of the fleet, whether in order of sailing or battle, will

keep to windward just out of gun-shot, so as to be ready to support

the rear, and prevent the van and centre of the enemy from doubling

upon them. This manoeuvre, if properly executed, may force the enemy

to abandon the ships on his rear, or submit to be brought to action on

equal terms, which is difficult to be obtained when the attack is made

from to-windward.

When the fleet is to leeward, and the commanding officer intends to

cut through the enemy's line, the number of the ship in their line

where the attempt is to be made will be shown as already stated.

If the ships after passing the enemy's line are to tack, and double

upon the enemy's ships ahead, the same will be made known by a blue

pennant over the Signal 27; if not they are to bear up and run to the

enemy's line to windward, engaging the ship they first meet with; each

succeeding ship giving her fire, and passing on to the next in the

rear. The ships destined to attack the enemy's rear will be pointed

out by the number of the last ship in the line that is to make this

movement, or the pennants of that ship will be shown; but, should no

signal be made, it is to be understood that the number of ships to

bear up is equal in number to the enemy's ships that have been cut

off; the succeeding ships will attack and pursue the van of the enemy,

or form, should it be necessary to prevent the enemy's van from

passing round the rear of the fleet to relieve or join their cut-off

ships.

If it is intended that the ships following those destined to engage

the enemy's rear to windward shall bear up, and prevent the part of

their rear which has been cut off from escaping to leeward, the same

will be made known by a red pennant being hoisted over the Signal

21,[2] and the number of ships so ordered will be shown by numeral

signals or pennants. If from the centre division, a white pennant will

be hoisted over the signal.

If the rear ships are to perform this service by bearing up, the same

will be made known by a red pennant under. The numeral signal or

pennants, counting always from the van, will show the headmost ship to

proceed on this service.[3] The ships not directed by those signals

are to form in close order, to cover the ships engaged from the rest

of the enemy's fleet.

When the enemy's ships are to be engaged by both van and centre, the

rear will keep their wind, to cover the ships engaged from the enemy

to windward, as circumstances may require.

When the signal shall be made to cut through the enemy's van from

to-leeward, the same will be made known by Signal 27, &c. In this

case, if the headmost ships are to tack and double upon the enemy's

van, engaging their ships in succession as they get up, the blue

pennant will be shown as already stated, and the numeral signal

pointing out the last ship from the van which is to tack, which in

general will be equal in number to the enemy's ships cut through. The

rest of the ships will be prepared to act as the occasion may require,

either by bearing up and attacking the enemy's centre and rear, or

tacking or wearing to cut off the van of the enemy from passing round

the rear of the fleet to rejoin their centre. And on this service, it

is probable, should the enemy's ships bear up, that some of the rear

ships will be employed--the signal No. 21 will be made accompanied

with the number or pennants of the headmost ship--upon which she, with

the ships in her rear, will proceed to the attack of the enemy.

When an attack is likely to be made by an enemy's squadron, by forcing

the fleet from to-leeward, Signal 109 will be made with a blue pennant

where best seen;[4] upon which each ship will luff up upon the

weather quarter of her second ahead, so as to leave no opening for the

leading ship of the enemy to pass through: this movement will expose

them to the collected fire of all that part of the fleet they intended

to force.[5]

It has been often remarked that Nelson founded no school of tactics,

and the instructions which were issued with the new Signal Book

immediately after the war entirely endorse the remark. They can be

called nothing else but reactionary. Nelson's drastic attempt to break

up the old rigid formation into active divisions independently

commanded seems to have come to nothing, and the new instructions are

based with almost all the old pedantry on the single line of

battle. Of anything like mutually supporting movements there is only a

single trace. It is in Article XIV., and that is only a resurrection

of the time-honoured _corps de réserve_, formed of superfluous

ships after your line has been equalised with that of a numerically

inferior enemy. The whole document, in fact, is a consecration of the

fetters which had been forged in the worst days of the seventeenth

century, and which Nelson had so resolutely set himself to break.

The new Signal Book in which the instructions appear was founded on

the code elaborated by Sir Home Riggs Popham, but there is nothing to

show whether or not he was the author of the instructions. He was an

officer of high scientific attainments, but although he had won

considerable distinction during the war, his service had been entirely

of an amphibious character in connection with military operations

ashore, and he had never seen a fleet action at sea. He reached flag

rank in 1814, and was one of the men who received a K.C.B. on the

reconstitution of the order in 1815. Of the naval lords serving with

Lord Melville at the time none can show a career or a reputation which

would lead us to expect from them anything but the colourless

instructions they produced. The controlling influence was undoubtedly

Lord Keith. The doyen of the active list, and in command of the

Channel Fleet till he retired after the peace of 1815, he was

all-powerful as a naval authority, and his flag captain, Sir Graham

Moore, had just been given a seat on the board. A devout pupil of

St. Vincent and Howe, correct rather than brilliant, Keith represented

the old tradition, and notwithstanding the patience with which he had

borne Nelson's vagaries and insubordination, the antipathy between the

two men was never disguised. However generously Keith appreciated

Nelson's genius, he can only have regarded his methods as an evil

influence in the service for ordinary men, nor can there be much doubt

that his apprehensions had a good deal to justify them.

The general failure to grasp the whole of Nelson's tactical principles

was not the only trouble. There are signs that during the later years

of the war a very dangerous misunderstanding of his teaching had been

growing up in the service. In days when there was practically no

higher instruction in the theory of tactics, it was easy for officers

to forget how much prolonged and patient study had enabled Nelson to

handle his fleets with the freedom he did; and the tendency was to

believe that his successes could be indefinitely repeated by mere

daring and vehemence of attack. The seed was sown immediately after

the battle and by Collingwood himself. 'It was a severe action,' he

wrote to Admiral Parker on November 1, 'no dodging or manoeuvring.'

And again on December 16, to Admiral Pasley, 'Lord Nelson determined

to substitute for exact order an impetuous attack in two distinct

bodies.' Collingwood of course with all his limitations knew well

enough it was not a mere absence of manoeuvring that had won the

victory. In the same letter he had said that although Nelson

succeeded, as it were, by enchantment, it was all the effect of system

and nice combination.' Yet such phrases as he and others employed to

describe the headlong attack, taken from their context and repeated

from mouth to mouth, would soon have raised a false impression that

many men were only too ready to receive. So the seed must have grown,

till we find the fruit in Lord Dundonald's oft-quoted phrase, 'Never

mind manoeuvres: always go at them.' So it was that Nelson's teaching

had crystallised in his mind and in the mind perhaps of half the

service. The phrase is obviously a degradation of the opening

enunciations in Nelson's memoranda, a degradation due to time, to

superficial study, and the contemptuous confidence of years of

undisputed mastery at sea.

The conditions which brought about this attitude to tactics are

clearly seen in the way others saw us. Shortly after Trafalgar a

veteran French officer of the war of American Independence wrote some

_Reflections_ on the battle, which contain much to the point. 'It

is a noteworthy thing,' he says in dealing with the defects of the

single-line formation, 'that the English, who formerly used to employ

all the resources of tactics against our fleets, now hardly use them

at all, since our scientific tacticians have disappeared. It may

almost be said that they no longer have any regular order of sailing

or battle: they attack our ships of the line just as they used to

attack a convoy.'[6] But here the old tactician was not holding up

English methods as an example. He was citing them to show to what

easy victories a navy exposed itself in which, by neglect of

scientific study and alert observation, tactics had sunk into a mere

senile formula. 'They know,' he continues, 'that we are in no state to

oppose them with well-combined movements so as to profit by the kind

of disorder which is the natural result of this kind of attack. They

know if they throw their attack on one part of a much extended line,

that part is soon destroyed.' Thus he arrives at two fundamental laws:

'1. That our system of a long line of battle is worthless in face of

an enemy who attacks with his ships formed in groups (_réunis en

pelotons_), and told off to engage a small number of ships at

different points in our line. 2. That the only tactical system to

oppose to theirs is to have at least a double line, with reserve

squadrons on the wings stationed in such a manner as to bear down most

easily upon the points too vigorously attacked.' The whole of his

far-sighted paper is in fact an admirable study of the conditions

under which impetuous attacks and elaborate combinations are

respectively called for. But from both points of view the single line

for a large fleet is emphatically condemned, while in our instructions

of 1816 not a hint of its weakness appears. They resume practically

the same standpoint which the Duke of York had reached a century and a

half before.

Spanish tacticians seem also to have shared the opinion that Trafalgar

had really done nothing to dethrone the line. One of the highest

reputation, on December 17, 1805, had sent to his government a

thoughtful criticism of the action, and his view of Nelson's attack

was this: 'Nothing,' he says, 'is more seamanlike or better tactics

than for a fleet which is well to windward of another to bear down

upon it in separate columns, and deploy at gun-shot from the enemy

into a line which, as it comes into action, will inflict at least as

much damage upon them as it is likely to suffer. But Admiral Nelson

did not deploy his columns at gun-shot from our line, but ran up

within pistol-shot and broke through it, so as to reduce the battle to

a series of single-ship actions. It was a manoeuvre in which I do not

think he will find many imitators. Where two fleets are equally well

trained, that which attacks in this manner must be defeated.'[7]

So it was our enemies rightly read the lesson of Trafalgar. The false

deductions therefore which grew up in our own service are all the more

extraordinary, even as we find them in the new instructions and the

current talk of the quarter-deck. But this is not the worst. It is not

till we turn to the Signal Book itself that we get a full impression

of the extent to which tactical thought had degenerated and Nelson's

seed had been choked. The movements and formations for which signals

are provided are stubbornly on the old lines of 1799. The influence of

Nelson, however, is seen in two places. The first is a group of

signals for 'attacking the enemy at anchor by passing either outside

them or between them and the land,' and for 'anchoring and engaging

either within or outside the enemy.' Here we have a rational

embodiment of the experience of the Nile. The second is a similar

attempt to embody the teaching of Trafalgar, and the way it is done

finally confirms the failure to understand what Nelson meant. So

extraordinary is the signification of the signal and its explanatory

note that it must be given in full.

'_Signal_.--Cut the enemy's line in the order of sailing in two

columns.

_'Explanatory Note_.--The admiral will make known what number of

ships from the van ship of the enemy the weather division is to break

through the enemy's line, and the same from the rear at which the lee

division is to break through their line.

'To execute this signal the fleet is to form in the order of sailing

in two columns, should it not be so formed already; the leader of each

column steering down for the position pointed out where he is to cut

through the enemy's line.

'If the admiral wishes any particular conduct to be pursued by the

leader of the division, in which he happens not to be, after the line

is broken, he will of course point it out. If he does not it is to be

considered that the lee division after breaking through the line is

left to its commander.

'In performing this evolution the second astern of the leader in each

column is to pass through the line astern of the ship next ahead

[_sic_] of where her leader broke through, and so on in succession,

breaking through all parts of the enemy's line ahead [_sic_] of

their leaders as described in the plate.'

The plate represents the two columns bearing down to attack in a

strictly formed line ahead, and the ships, after the leaders have cut

through, altering course each for its proper interval in the enemy's

line, and the whole then engaging from to-leeward. The note proceeds:

'By this arrangement no ship will have to pass the whole of the

enemy's line. If however, in consequence of any circumstance, the rear

ships should not be able to cut through in their assigned places, the

captains of those ships, as well as of the ships that are deprived of

opponents in the enemy's line by this mode of attack, are to act to

the best of their judgment for the destruction of the enemy, unless a

disposition to the contrary has been previously made.

'It will be seen that by breaking the line in this order the enemy's

van ships will not be able to assist either their centre or rear

without tacking or wearing for that purpose.'

This from cover to cover of the Signal Book is the sole trace to be

found of the great principles for which Nelson had lived and

died. That Lord Keith or anyone else could have believed that it

adequately represented the teaching of Trafalgar is almost incredible.

To begin with, the wording of the note contains an inexplicable

blunder. The last paragraph shows clearly that the idea of the signal

is an attack on the rear and centre, as at Trafalgar; yet the ships of

each column as they come successively into action are told to engage

the enemy's ship _ahead_ of the point where their leaders broke

through, a movement which would resolve itself into an attack on their

centre and van, and leave the rear free to come into immediate action

with an overwhelming concentration on the lee division.

That so grave an error should have been permitted to pass into the

Signal Book is bad enough, but that such a signal even if it had been

correctly worded should stand for Nelson's last word to the service is

almost beyond belief. The final outcome of Nelson's genius for tactics

lay of course in his memorandum, and not in the form of attack he

actually adopted. Yet this remarkable signal ignores the whole

principle of the memorandum. The fundamental ideas of concentration

and containing by independent squadrons are wholly missed; and not

only this. It distorts Nelson's lee attack into a weather attack, and

holds up for imitation every vice of the reckless movement in spite of

which Nelson had triumphed. Not a word is said of its dangers, not a

word of the exceptional circumstances that alone could justify it, not

a word of how easily the tables could be turned upon a man who a

second time dared to fling to the winds every principle of his art. It

is the last word of British sailing tactics, and surely nothing in

their whole history, not even in the worst days of the old Fighting

Instructions, so staggers us with its lack of tactical sense.[8]

FOOTNOTES:

[1] _I.e._ the Instructions of 1799, _supra_, p. 278. For Signal 27

see p. 255.

[2] 'To attack on bearing indicated.'

[3] In Ekin's text the punctuation of this sentence is obviously wrong

and destroys the sense. It should accord, as I have ventured to amend

it, with that of the previous paragraph.

[4] Signal 109, 'To close nearer the ship or ships indicated.'

[5] Sir Charles Elkin adds, 'In the same work he has also a signal

(No. 785) under the head "Enemy" to "Lay on board," with the following

observation:--

'"N.B.--This signal is not meant that your people should board the enemy

unless you should find advantage by so doing; but it is that you should

run your ship on board the enemy, so as to disable her from getting

away."'

[6] Mathieu-Dumas, _Précis des Evénements Militaires: Pièces

Justificatives_, vol. xiv. p. 408.

[7] Fernandez Duro, _Armada Española_, viii. 353.

[8] The anonymous veteran of the old French navy, cited by

Mathieu-Dumas, explains exactly how Villeneuve might have turned the

tables on Nelson by forming two lines himself. 'There is,' he concludes,

'no known precedent of a defensive formation in two lines; but I will

venture to assert that if Admiral Villeneuve had doubled his line at the

moment he saw Nelson meant to attack him in two lines, that admiral

would never have had the imprudence of making such an

attack.'--_Evénements Militaires_, xiv. 411.

_THE INSTRUCTIONS OF_ 1816.

[+Signal Book, United Service Institution+.]

_Instructions relating to the Line of Battle and the Conduct of the

Fleet preparatory to their engaging and when engaged with an

enemy_.

I. The chief purposes for which a fleet is formed in line of battle

are, that the ships may be able, to assist and support each other in

action; that they may not be exposed to the fire of the enemy's ships

greater in number than themselves, and that every ship may be able to

fire on the enemy without risk of firing into the ships of her own

fleet.

II. On whichever tack the fleet may be sailing, when the line of

battle is formed, the van squadron is to form the van, the centre

squadron the centre, and the rear squadron the rear of the line,

unless some other arrangement be pointed out by signal. But if a

change of wind, or tacking, or wearing, or any other circumstance,

should alter the order in which the line of battle was formed, the

squadrons are to remain in the stations in which they may so happen to

be placed, till the admiral shall direct them to take others.

III. When the signal is made for the fleet to form the line of battle,

each flag officer and captain is to get into his station as

expeditiously as possible; and to keep in close order, if not

otherwise directed, and under a proportion of sail suited to that

carried by the admiral, or by the senior flag officer remaining in the

line, when the admiral has signified his intention to quit it.

IV. In forming the line of battle, each ship should haul up a little

to windward rather than to leeward of her second ahead, as a ship a

little to leeward will find great difficulty in getting into her

station, if it should be necessary to keep the line quite close to the

wind; and it may also be better to form at a distance a little

greater, rather than smaller, than the prescribed distance, as it is

easier to close the line than to extend it.

V. If the admiral should haul out of the line, the ships astern of him

are to close up to fill the vacancy he has made, and the line is to

continue on its course, and to act in the same manner as if the

admiral had not left it All signals made to the centre will be

addressed to the senior officer remaining in it, who, during the

absence of the admiral, is to be considered as the commander of the

centre squadron.

VI. The repeating frigates are to be abreast of the commanders of the

squadrons to which they belong, and the fireships and frigates to

windward of their squadrons, if no particular station be assigned to

them.

VII. When the signal to form a line of bearing for either tack is

made, the ships (whatever course they may be directed to steer) are to

place themselves in such a manner that, if they were to haul to the

wind together on the tack for which the line of bearing is formed,

they would immediately form a line of battle on that tack. To do this,

every ship must bring the ship which would be her second ahead, if the

line of battle were formed, to bear on that point of the compass on

which the line of battle would sail, viz. on that point of the compass

which is six points from the direction of the wind.

As the intention of a line of bearing is to keep the fleet ready to

form suddenly a line of battle, the position of the division or

squadron flags, shown with the signals for such a line, will refer to

the forming the line of battle; that division or squadron whose flag

is _uppermost_ (without considering whether it do or do not form

the van of the line of bearing) is to place itself in that station

which would become the van if the fleet should haul to the wind, and

form the line of battle; and the division whose flag is

_undermost_ is to place itself in that station in which it would

become the rear if by hauling to the wind the line of battle should be

formed.

VIII. When a line of bearing has been formed the ships are to preserve

their relative bearing from each other, whenever they are directed to

alter their course together; but if they are directed to alter their

course in succession, as the line of bearing would by that

circumstance be destroyed, it is to be no longer attended to.

IX. If after having made the signal to prepare to form the line of

battle, or either line of bearing, the admiral, keeping the

preparative flag flying, should make several signals in succession to

point out the manner in which the line is to be formed, those signals

are to be carefully written down, that they may be carried into

execution, when the signal for the line is hoisted again. They are to

be executed in the order in which they are made, excepting such as the

admiral may annul previously to his again hoisting the signal for the

line.

X. If the wind should come _forward_ when the fleet is formed in

line of battle, or is sailing by the wind on a line of bearing, the

leading ship is to steer seven points from the wind, and every ship is

to haul as close to the wind as possible till she has got into the

wake of the leading ship, or till she shall have brought it on the

proper point of bearing; but if the wind should come _aft_, the

ships are to bear up until they get into the wake, or on the proper

point of bearing from the leading ship.

XI. Ships which have been detached from the body of the fleet on any

separate service are not to obey the signal for forming the line of

battle unless they have been previously called back to the fleet by

signal.

XII. Ships which cannot keep their stations are to quit the line, as

directed in Article XIX. in the General Instructions, though in the

presence of an enemy. The captains of such ships will not thereby be

prevented from distinguishing themselves, as they will have the

opportunities of rendering essential service by placing their ships

advantageously when they get up with the enemy already engaged with

the other part of the fleet.

XIII. If the ship of any flag officer be disabled in battle, the flag

officer may repair on board, and hoist his flag in any other ship (not

already carrying a flag) that he shall think proper, but he is to

hoist it in one of his own squadron or division, if there be one near

and fit for the purpose.

XIV. If the fleet should engage an enemy inferior to it in number, or

which, by the flight of some of their ships, becomes inferior, the

ships, which at either extremity of the line are thereby left without

opponents, may, after the action is begun, quit the line, without

waiting for a signal to do so; and they are to distress the enemy, or

assist the ships of the fleet in the best manner that circumstances

will allow.

XV. Great care is at all times to be taken not to fire at the enemy

either over or very near to any ships of the fleet, nor, though the

signal for battle should be flying, is any ship to fire till she is

placed in a proper situation, and at a proper distance from the enemy.

XVI. No ship is to separate from the body of the fleet in time of

action to pursue any small number of the enemy's ships which have been

beaten out of the line, unless the commander-in-chief, or some other

flag officer, be among them; but the ships which have disabled their

opponents, or forced them to quit the line, are to assist any ship of

the fleet appearing to be much pressed, and to continue their attack

till the main body of the enemy be broken or disabled, unless by

signal, or particular instruction, they should be directed to act

otherwise.

XVII. If any ship should be so disabled as to be in great danger of

being destroyed or taken by the enemy, and should make a signal

expressive of such extremity, the ships nearest to her, and which are

the least engaged with the enemy, are strictly enjoined to give her

immediately all possible aid and protection; and any fireship, in a

situation which admits of its being done, is to endeavour to burn the

enemy's ship opposed to her; and any frigate that may be near is to

use every possible exertion for her relief, either by towing her off,

or by joining in the attack on the enemy, or by covering the fireship,

or, if necessity requires it, by taking out the crew of the disabled

ship, or by any other means which circumstances at the time will

admit.

XVIII. Though a ship be disabled and hard pressed by the enemy in

battle, she is not to quit her station in the line if it can possibly

be avoided, till the captain shall have obtained permission so to do

from the commander of the division or squadron to which he belongs, or

from some other flag officer. But if he should be ordered out of the

line, or should be obliged to quit it before assistance can be sent to

him, the nearest ships are immediately to occupy the space become

vacant to prevent the enemy from taking advantage of it.

XIX. If there should be a captain so lost to all sense of honour and

the great duty he owes his country as not to exert himself to the

utmost to get into action with the enemy, or to take or destroy them

when engaged, the commander of the squadron or division to which he

belongs, or the nearest flag officer, is to suspend him from the

command, and is to appoint some other officer to command the ship till

the admiral's pleasure shall be known.

APPENDIX

_FURTHER PARTICULARS OF THE TRAFALGAR FIGHT_

[+Sir Charles Ekin's Naval Battles, pp. 271 et seq. Extract+.]

The intelligent officer to whom the writer is indebted for this

important manuscript was an eye-witness of what he has so ably

related, and upon which he has reasoned with so much judgment.[1]

'The combined fleet, after veering from the starboard to the larboard

tack, gradually fell into the form of an irregular crescent; in which

they remained to the moment of attack. Many have considered that the

French admiral intended this formation of the line of battle; but from

the information I obtained after the action, connected with some

documents found on board the Bucentaur, I believe it was the intention

to have formed a line ahead, consisting of twenty-one sail--the

supposed force of the British fleet--and a squadron of observation

composed of twelve sail of the line, under Admiral Gravina, intended

to act according to circumstances after the British fleet were

engaged. By wearing together, the enemy's line became inverted, and

the light squadron which had been advanced in the van on the starboard

tack, was left in the rear after wearing; and the ships were

subsequently mingled with the rear of the main body. The wind being

light, with a heavy swell, and the fleet lying with their main

topsails to the mast, it was impossible for the ships to preserve

their exact station in the line; consequently scarce any ship was

immediately ahead or astern of her second. The fleet had then the

appearance, generally, of having formed in two lines, thus: so that

the ship to leeward seemed to be opposite the space left between two

in the weather-line.

[Illustration]

'In the rear, the line was in some places trebled; and this

particularly happened where the Colossus was, who, after passing the

stern of the French Swiftsure, and luffing up under the lee of the

Bahama, supposing herself to leeward of the enemy's line, unexpectedly

ran alongside of the French Achille under cover of the smoke. The

Colossus was then placed between the Achille and the Bahama, being on

board of the latter; and was also exposed to the fire of the

Swiftsure's after-guns. All these positions I believe to have been

merely accidental; and to accident alone I attribute the concave

circle of the fleet, or crescent line of battle. The wind shifted to

the westward as the morning advanced; and of course the enemy's ships

came up with the wind, forming a bow and quarter line. The ships were

therefore obliged to edge away, to keep in the wake of their leaders;

and this manoeuvre, from the lightness of the wind, the unmanageable

state of the ships in a heavy swell, and, we may add, the inexperience

of the enemy, not being performed with facility and celerity,

undesignedly threw the combined fleets into a position, perhaps the

best that could have been planned, had it been supported by the

skilful manoeuvring of individual ships, and with efficient practice

in gunnery.

'Of the advantages and disadvantages of the mode of attack adopted by

the British fleet, it may be considered presumptuous to speak, as the

event was so completely successful; but as the necessity of any

particular experiment frequently depends upon contingent

circumstances, not originally calculated upon, there can be no

impropriety in questioning whether the same plan be likely to succeed

under all circumstances, and on all occasions.

'The original plan of attack, directed by the comprehensive mind of

our great commander, was suggested on a supposition that the enemy's

fleet consisted of forty-six sail of the line and the British forty;

and the attack, as designed from to-windward, was to be made under the

following circumstances:

'Under a supposition that the hostile fleet would be in a line ahead

of forty-six sail, the British fleet was to be brought within gun-shot

of the enemy's centre, in two divisions of sixteen sail each, and a

division of observation consisting of the remaining eight.

'The lee division was by signal to make a rapid attack under all

possible sail on the twelve rear ships of the enemy. The ships were to

break through the enemy's line; and such ships as were thrown out of

their stations were to assist their friends that were hard

pressed. The remainder of the enemy's fleet, of thirty-four sail, were

to be left to the management of the commander-in-chief.'

This able officer then proceeds to describe, by a figure, the plan of

attack as originally intended; bearing a very close resemblance to

that already given in Plate XXVIII. fig. 1; but making the enemy's

fleet, as arranged in a regular line ahead, to extend the distance of

five miles; and the van, consisting of sixteen ships, left unoccupied;

the whole comprising a fleet of forty-six sail of the line. He then

observes:

'If the regulated plan of attack had been adhered to, the English

fleet should have borne up together, and have sailed in a line abreast

in their respective divisions until they arrived up with the

enemy. Thus the plan which consideration had matured would have been

executed, than which perhaps nothing could be better; the victory

would have been more speedily decided, and the brunt of the action

would have been more equally felt, &c.

'With the exception of the Britannia, Dreadnought, and Prince, the

body of the fleet sailed very equally; and I have no doubt could have

been brought into action simultaneously with their leaders. This

being granted, there was no time gained by attacking in a line ahead,

the only reason, I could suppose, that occasioned the change.

'The advantages of an attack made in two great divisions, with a

squadron of observation, seem to combine every necessary precaution

under all circumstances.

'The power of bringing an overwhelming force against a particular

point of an enemy's fleet, so as to ensure the certain capture of the

ships attacked, and the power of condensing such a force afterwards

[so] as not only to protect the attacking ships from any offensive

attempt that may be made by the unoccupied vessels of the hostile

fleet, but also to secure the prizes already made, will most probably

lead to a victory; and if followed up according to circumstances, may

ultimately tend to the annihilation of the whole, or the greater part

of the mutilated fleet.

'Each ship may use her superiority of sailing, without being so far

removed from the inferior sailing ships as to lose their support.

'The swifter ships, passing rapidly through the enemy's fire, are less

liable to be disabled; and, after closing with their opponents, divert

their attention from the inferior sailers, who are advancing to

complete what their leaders had begun. The weather division, from

being more distant, remain spectators of the first attack for some

little time, according to the rate of the sailing; and may direct

their attack as they observe the failure or success of the first

onset, either to support the lee division, if required, or to extend

the success they may appear to have gained, &c.

'If the enemy bear up to elude the attack, the attacking fleet is well

collected for the commencement of a chase, and for mutual support in

pursuit.

'The mode of attack, adopted with such success in the Trafalgar

action, appears to me to have succeeded from the enthusiasm inspired

throughout the British fleet from their being commanded by their

beloved Nelson; from the gallant conduct of the leaders of the two

divisions; from the individual exertions of each ship after the attack

commenced, and the superior practice of the guns in the English fleet.

'It was successful also from the consternation spread through the

combined fleet on finding the British so much stronger than was

expected; from the astonishing and rapid destruction which followed

the attack of the leaders, witnessed by the whole of the hostile

fleets, inspiring the one and dispiriting the other and from the loss

of the admiral's ship early in the action.

'The disadvantages of this mode of attack appear to consist in

bringing forward the attacking force in a manner so leisurely and

alternately, that an enemy of equal spirit and equal ability in

seamanship and gunnery would have annihilated the ships one after

another in detail, carried slowly on as they were by a heavy swell and

light airs.

'At the distance of one mile five ships, at half a cable's length

apart, might direct their broadsides effectively against the head of

the division for seven minutes, supposing the rate of sailing to have

been four miles an hour; and within the distance of half a mile three

ships would do the same for seven minutes more, before the attacking

ship could fire a gun in her defence.

'It is to be observed that, although the hull of the headmost ship

does certainly in a great measure cover the hulls of those astern, yet

great injury is done to the masts and yards of the whole by the fire

directed against the leader; and that, if these ships are foiled in

their attempt to cut through the enemy's line, or to run on board of

them, they are placed, for the most part, _hors de combat_ for

the rest of the action.

'Or should it fall calm, or the wind materially decrease about the

moment of attack, the van ships must be sacrificed before the rear

could possibly come to their assistance.

'In proceeding to the attack of October 21, the weather was exactly

such as might have caused this dilemma, as the sternmost ships of the

British were six or seven miles distant. By the mode of attacking in

detail, and the manner in which the combined fleet was drawn up to

receive it, instead of doubling on the enemy, the British were, on

that day, themselves doubled and trebled on; and the advantage of

applying an overwhelming force collectively, it would seem, was

totally lost.

'The Victory, Téméraire, Sovereign, Belleisle, Mars, Colossus

and Bellerophon were placed in such situations in the onset, that

nothing but the most heroic gallantry and practical skill at their

guns could have extricated them. If the enemy's vessels had closed up

as they ought to have done, _from van to rear_, and had possessed

a nearer equality in active courage, it is my opinion that even

British skill and British gallantry could not have availed. The

position of the combined fleet at one time was precisely that in which

the British were desirous of being placed; namely, to have part of an

opposing fleet doubled on, and separated from the main body.

'The French admiral, with his fleet, showed the greatest passive

gallantry; and certainly the French Intrépide, with some others,

evinced active courage equal to the British; but there was no nautical

management, no skilful manoeuvring.

'It may appear presumptuous thus to have questioned the propriety of

the Trafalgar attack; but it is only just, to point out the advantages

and disadvantages of every means that may be used for the attainment

of great results, that the probabilities and existing circumstances

may be well weighed before such means are applied. A plan, to be

entirely correct, must be suited to all cases. If its infallibility is

not thus established, there can be no impropriety in pointing out the

errors and dangers to which it is exposed, for the benefit of others.

'Our heroic and lamented chief knew his means, and the power he had to

deal with; he also knew the means he adopted were sufficient for the

occasion; and that sufficed.

'The Trafalgar attack might be followed under different circumstances,

and have a different result: it is right, therefore, to discuss its

merits and demerits. It cannot take one atom from the fame of the

departed hero, whose life was one continued scene of original ability,

and of superior action.'

FOOTNOTE:

[1] The concluding part of the MS. is devoted to a detailed account of

the part played in the action by the Conqueror and her two seconds,

Neptune and Leviathan, with the special purpose of showing that

Villeneuve really struck to the Conqueror. In a note the author says, 'I

have been thus particular, as the capture of the French admiral has been

unblushingly attributed to others without any mention being made of the

ship that actually was the principal in engaging her, wishing to do

justice to a gallant officer who on that day considered his task not

complete until every ship was either captured or beyond distance of

pursuit.' The inference is that the author was an officer of the

Conqueror, defending his captain, Israel Pellew, younger brother of the

more famous Edward, Lord Exmouth. It is possible therefore, and even

probable, that this criticism of Trafalgar represents the ideas of the

Pellews.

INDEX

Additional Instructions, 113, 115, 126-8, 203-229

Admiral, station of, inline, 12, 15, 16, 22, 24, 61, 77, 88, 91, 100,

123, 127, 166, 243-5, 276, 317.

_See also_ Flag, and Flagship

Advanced squadron, Nelson's, 294, 300-6, 316-7, 319 _n._, 325

Ammunition, supply of, 69

Anchor, engaging at, 264, 277,

d'Annibault, Admiral, 18

Anson, Lord, 116, 204, 209-10, 216, 218 _n._, 285 _n_.

Argall, Sir Samuel, 49

Armada, 27-9, 32-5, 75, 283, 288

Attack, from to-windward, 31, 33-5, 42, 59, 95, 113, 126, 153, 155-6,

170-1, 227, 246, 330-3.

_See also_ Line, breaking the

Oblique, 143-5

Parallel, 143, 148, 155-6, 170-1, 186, 191-2, 197, 218 _n_.,

245, 266, 273, 324-5

Perpendicular, 265, 307, 324

On contrary tacks, 245;

on opposite number, 211-2, 217-8, 227-3, 265, 377;

in coming up, 277

By defiling, 42-3, 51, 59, 65

On superior fleet, 180-2, 236, 262-3, 276, 308, 346

Audley, Sir Thomas, 14-17

Augers, for scuttling, 13

Badiley, Captain Richard, 84

Ball, Admiral Sir Alexander, 303

Banckers, Admiral Adriaen, 156 _n._

Barham, Admiral Lord, 293

Barrington, Admiral the Hon. Samuel, 258

Baskerville, Sir Thomas, his battle order, 29

Battle orders, _see_ Order of Battle

Battles.

Gravelines (1588), 75, 283, 288

Isla de Pinos (1596), 29

Oquendo and Tromp (1639), 85

Monte Christo (1652), 84

Dungeness (1652), 93

Portland (Feb. 1653), 94

The Gabbard (June 1653), 97

Lowestoft or Texel, No. 2 (1665), 113-4

Four Days' Battle (1066), 116-9, 134, 136-7

St. James's Fight (1666), 122 _n._, 138, 140-1

Holmes's action (1672), 169

Solebay (1672), 138-9, 155 _n._, 169

Schoonveldt (1673) 133, 156

Texel, No. 3 (1673), 154 _n_., 157 _n_., 162 _n_., 182

Beachy Head or Bevesier (1690), 177, 181

La Hogue (1692), 180

Malaga (1704), 184, 186, 195-6, 198 _n._

Toulon (1744), 188 _n._, 196, 205, 210

Finisterre (Anson and De la Jonquière, 1747), 209

Finisterre (Hawke and L'Etenduère, 1747), 226 _n._

Havana (1748), 224 _n._

Minorca (1756), 218 _n._

Quiberon (1759), 186, 312

Granada (1779), 258

Martinique (1780), 211, 227 _n._

Chesapeake (1781), 212

Les Saintes (1782), 211-2, 237

First of June (1794), 256, 265, 283

St. Vincent (1797), 254, 265, 267

Camperdown (1797), 254, 266, 287

The Nile (1798), 262, 312

Copenhagen (1801), 264

Trafalgar (1805), 257, 264, 266, 282 _et seq._, 321-7, 335-42, 351-8

Berkley, Admiral Sir William, 116

Berry, Sir John, 169

Berry, Captain Edward, 262, 288

Bilboes, 33

Blake, Admiral Robert, 83-5, 92-9;

orders of, 99-104

Boarding, 7, 13, 15, 42, 51, 59, 62, 68, 97, 119, 326

Boats in action, 10-13, 15, 89-90, 248, 275-6

Boscawen, Admiral Edward, 197, 203-4, 208, 210;

his Additional Instructions, 219-25

Boswall, Captain, his translation of Hoste, 236 _n._, 287 _n._

Boteler, Captain Nathaniel, on tactics, 27, 73-6

Breaking the line, _see_ Line

Browne, Lieutenant G.L., 299

Buckingham, George Villiers, Duke of, 33, 76

Byng, Admiral Sir George, 204, 218 _n._

Cabins, 61

Calder, Admiral Sir Robert Bart., 294

Calthrops, 11

Captains, lists of, 65-6, 71

Captains, removal of, in action, 247, 274-5, 347

Carteret, Admiral Sir George, 121

Cartouches, 69

Cavalry tactics at sea, 7, 119

Cecil, Sir Edward, Viscount Wimbledon, 31, 49, 51-72, 73, 75, 83, 85

Changing station, _see_ Station

Charles V, Emperor, 1, 18

Chasing, 43, 56, 60, 127-9, 155, 162, 204.

_See_ also General chase

Chaves, Alonso de, 1 _et seq._ 18-9, 52, 73, 75, 291, 296

Chaves, Hieronymus de, 2

Clearing for action, 41, 58, 62, 69

Clerk of Eldin, 235, 262, 265, 285, 326

Close action, 41, 68, 112, 159, 215, 220

Cochrane, Admiral Sir Alexander, 185, 326-7, 330-4

Codrington, Admiral Sir Edward, 295, 301-7

Collingwood, Admiral Lord, 283, 292, 295, _et seq._;

his memorandum, 323-30, 336-7

'Commander-in-chief,' 100 _n._

Concentration, 142-5, 154 _n._, 177, 213, 228, and _n._, 259, 284, 330-4

By doubling, _see_ Doubling;

On rear, _see_ Rear-concentration

On van, 143-4, 213, 314-5

Confusing, 36, 144, 213, 284, 291, 315

Containing, 135-8, 214, 284, 297, 318-20, 325

By feinting, _see_ Feints

Convoy, method of attacking, 219, 227, 288;

of protecting, 94

Corporal of the field, 40

Corps de réserve, _see_ Réserve

Coventry, Sir William, 111, 114, 128, 133

Cowardice, _see_ Captains, removal of

Cross-bows, 11

Crossing the T, 210, 221

Cruisers, 29, 71-3, 88-90, 99, 103-4, 109, 122, 125,152;

duties of, in action, 151, 219, 251

Cruising formations, 209, 220, 228

Dartmouth, Admiral George Legge, first lord, 141;

his instructions, 168-172, 177

Dartmouth MSS. 110, 133, 139

Deane, Admiral Richard, 93, 95

Decrès, 310

Defeat, 247

Debug, William Fielding, First Earl of, 49

Detached ships, 240, 244, 249, 269, 272-3, 276, 345

Disabled ships, 101, 103, 112-3, 123-4, 127, 146, 161-2, 192-3, 246-7,

274, 346-7;

question of following up, 224, 246, 273, 346

Disrobe, Colonel John, general at sea, 98;

orders of, 99-104

Discipline, 40, 43-5, 52-4, 58, 93

Dispersing, instructions for, 247, 275

Divisions, independent control of, 287-9, 294-6, 316-9, 323, 327.

_See also_ Sub squadrons; Order of battle

Doubling, 117, 179-85, 210, 236, 262, 326, 331-3.

Drake, Sir Francis, 17 _n._, 283;

his sailing order, 29, 50

Duff, Captain George, 303

Demeanor, Vice-Admiral, 310

Duncan, Admiral Viscount, 254, 266, 287

Duodenal, Admiral the Earl of, 337

Tuques, Admiral Abraham, 164

Engaging, _see_ Attack

Equalizing speed, 228, 241, 243, 269, 271, 273

Essex, Robert Devereux, Earl of, 49

Essington, Rear-Admiral, 322

d'Estrées, Maréchal, 154 _n._, 179, 182

Etenduère, Admiral des Herbiers de l', 226 _n_.

Exmouth, Admiral Edward Pellew, Lord, 351 _n_.

Expeditional orders, 204-6

Feints, 302, 307-12

Fire discipline, 41-3, 51, 54, 60, 62, 68, 70, 103, 125, 159, 172, 245,

273, 346

Fire, precautions against, 37, 41, 54, 58-9, 70

Fireships, 89, 90, 103-4;

instructions for, 139, 149, 159-60, 172, 223-4, 227, 248 and _n._,

250-1, 274-5

Flag, shifting the, 130, 141, 162 _n._, 248-9, 276, 345-6

Flags, squadronal, 16, 22-3, 55;

abolished, 251

Flagship as objective, 12, 15, 273. 317, 346.

_See also_ Admiral, station of

Forcing, 227, 334

Foreign views of British tactics, 97-8, 118-9, 337-9

Frederick, Rear-Admiral, 254 _n._, 255

Frigates, _see_ Cruisers

Galen, Admiral Johann van, 84

Galleys, tactics of, 6;

used with sailing ships, 18-24

Gambier, Admiral Lord, 322-3, 325;

his instructions, 327-8

Gambling, 43-4, 52

General chase, 130, 193, 221, 226

'General' for naval conmander-in-chief, 82, 93, 99

General Instructions, 268, 342

George of Denmark, Prince, 195

Gibraltar, 196, 225, 235-6

Glanville, Sir John, 63 _n_.

Gorges, Sir William, 32-5, 50

Grain, 101 and _n_.

Grappling, 7, 12, 248, 250

Grasse, Vice-Admiral Comte de, 238, 285-6

Graves, Admiral Lord, 212

Gravina, Admiral, 264

Greenwood, Jonathan, his signal book, 233 _n_.

Grenades, 11

Grenier, Vicomte de, his tactical treatise, 285

Group tactics, 50-1, 74, 85-7, 338

Guiche, Comte de, on English and Dutch tactics, 118-9

Guides, 239, 240-1, 278-9

Gunfire as basis of tactics, 120

Gunners and gun crews, 35, 62, 69.

_See also_ Seamen gunners

Gunnery, 69, 97, 263.

_See also_ Close action, and Fire discipline

Hand-guns, 11

Harpoons, 11

Harvey, Captain Eliab, 297, 310

Hawke, Lord, 116,209,210-1;

his Additional Instructions, 217-8, 312

Hawkins, Sir Richard, 34

Henry VIII, 14, 18

Herbert, Admiral, _See_ Torrington

Hill, General Lord, 292

Holmes, Admiral Sir Robert, 132 _n_.

Hood, Vice-Admiral Sir Samuel, 322

Hood, Viscount, 211-4;

his additional signals, 228-9, 236-8, 255

Hope, Captain George, 295, 303, 320 _n_.

Hoste, Père Paul, his _Evolutions Navales_, 97-8, 113-4, 179-83,

225 _n._, 235-6, 257, 262-3, 308

Howard of Effingham, Lord, 27, 29

Howard, Sir Edward, 14

Howe, Earl, 184-5, 225 _n._;

as first lord, 233-8, 252 _et seq._, 262-5, 267;

his great manoeuvre, 255-62, 265, 267, 287, 308, 311, 336

Hygiene, 44, 60

Initiative, 267-8, 279, 314.

_See also_ Divisions, independent control of

Intervals, 67, 113, 127, 158, 191, 220, 222-3, 244, 327-8, 330 _n_.

Jack-flag, 108 and _n_.

James II, 168.

_See also_ York, Duke of

Jervis, Admiral Sir John, Earl of St. Vincent, 254, 265-6

Jonquière, Admiral de la, 209

Jordan, Admiral Sir Joseph, 141, 155 _n_.

Keats, Admiral Sir Richard Goodwin, 290-2, 295-6, 304, 311, 322

Keith, Admiral Lord, 336, 341

Keppel, Admiral Augustus, Viscount, 235, 258

Knowles, Admiral Sir Charles, 1st bart. (_ob._ 1777), 224 _n._, 235,

258

Knowles, Admiral Sir Charles Henry, 2nd bart. (1754-1831), 185, 210,

235 _n._, 235-7, 257-8, 260-1

Landing, 16

Lasking, 171

Lawson, Admiral Sir John, 112

Lestock, Admiral, 188 _n._, 205-8

Lindsey, Robert Bertie, Earl of, 76-7, 85

Line. _See also_ Orders of battle.

Abreast, 75, 107-9, 165-6, 220

Ahead, origin of, 28-36, 42, 59, 62, 82-7;

first instructions for, 92, 95-9, 100-2, 108-9, 124-6;

insistence on, 134-5, 149, 155, 159, 335-9;

close hauled, first use of, 113;

invented by English, 118-21

of bearing, _see_ Quarter line

Breaking the, 114, 136-7, 142, 149, 153, 158 _n._, 169-70,

176-8, 182, 212, 229, 237, 289, 314-5, 324-5;

early objections to, 145, 153 _n._, 183-4, 256;

the two methods of, 255-62, 264-6, 279, 326-7, 330-3;

synonyms for, 261

Closing up, 192, 198, 241, 243

Equalising, 205, 219, 221, 227, 346.

_See also_ Reserve, corps de

Forming, as convenient, 170-1, 221, 226, 277

Inverting, 226-7, 238, 331-2

Position of squadrons in, 239-40

Principles of, stated, 269, 342

Quitting the, 161, 193, 198, 247, 273-4.

_See also_ Equalising

Early Spanish use of, 8-10;

early English, 28-36, 42, 59, 62

Reactions against, 115-6, 159 _n._, 186, 283-9, 335-9

Reduplication of, 118-9, 312-3, 338, 342 _n._, 352

Linstocks, 11

Lisle, John Dudley, Lord, 18-24, 291, 296

Louisbourg, 203

Love, Sir Thomas, 49-51, 61 _n._

Macpherson, Alexander, 225

Malta, 164

Mathews, Admiral, 188 _n._, 190 _n._, 196, 205-8, 210

Medows, Captain Charles, 225

_Mêlée_, 259, 267, 291

Monck, George, Duke of Albemarle, 93-9;

orders of, 99-104, 107, 111-5, 134-6

Monson, Sir William, on tactics, 76

Moore, Admiral Sir Graham, 336

Moorsom, Vice-Admiral Constantine, 298-9

Moorsom, Captain Robert, 298-9, 311 _n._

Morogues, Bigot de, his _Tactique navale_, 171 _n._, 185,

285 _n._, 327

Mortemart, Duc de, 179

Moulton, Captain Robert, his seabook, 112, 126 _n._, 129 _n._,

151 _n._

Musket-arrows, 34

Mutual support, 61, 67, 74, 85-6, 89, 91, 100-1, 123, 129, 172, 266-7,

283

Myngs, Admiral Sir Christopher, 136-7

Narbrough, Admiral Sir John, 164-7

Nelson, Admiral Lord, 116, 185, 214, 257, 259, 261, 266, 321-7, 335-42

His general orders (1798-1801), 264, 287-9

His memorandum (1803) 261, 280-1, 289-90, 313-6

His memorandum (1805), 272 _n._, 282-313, 316-20, 353-4

'Nelson touch,' the, 283, 293, 296, 299-313, 326

Norris, Admiral Sir John, 196, 206-7

Oar propulsion, 18-24

O'Bryen, Lieutenant Christopher, his translation of Hoste, 236 _n._

Order of battle, forming, as convenient, 70-1

Orders of battle.

Early Spanish, 8-10;

English, 19-24, 50-1, 65 _et seq_,, 74-5;

wedge-shaped, 9, 19;

Baskerville's, 30;

Boteler on, 73-6;

crescent, 75, 94, 351;

in two lines, 209, 214, 220, 226, 229, 285, 294-300, 305, 323;

in three lines, 286, 289-296, 354

Order of sailing, 29, 50, 225 _n._, 235;

as order of battle, 316, 322, 327, 340

Parisot, his account of Trafalgar, 310 _n._

Pellew, Captain Israel, 299, 351 _n._

Penn, Admiral Sir William, 81, 92, 96, 98, 135;

orders of, 99-104, 114;

his talk with Pepys, 120-1

Pepys, Samuel, 117 _n._, 120-1, 168-9

Perez de Grandallana, Don Domingo, 267

Pigot, Admiral Hugh, 212, 228-9 _n._, 237, 255, 260

Popham, Admiral Sir Home, 254, 335-6

Prayers, 33, 36, 52

Preparative signals, 269

Prizes, treatment of, 103, 112

Quarter line, 209, 216-7, 225, 242, 269-71, 344;

at Trafalgar, 311-2

Quarters, 41-2, 58-9, 62, 69-70

Raking, 170, 221

Ralegh, Sir Walter, 27 _et seq._, 50

Rear-concentration, 143-4, 145 _n._, 180, 221, 226, 238, 249, 263, 289,

293, 310, 313-9, 330-3, 339-41

Repeating ships, 142, 199, 243, 271, 305 _n._, 308, 344

Réserve, Corps de, 205, 214, 219, 221, 227, 241, 243, 269, 272, 276,

331,

335. 345.

_See also_ Equalising and Quitting the line

Reserve squadrons, 7, 12, 50-1, 67, 71

Retreat, order of, 94 and _n._, 165.

_See also_ Dispersing

Rockets as signals, 163 _n_.

Rodney, Lord, 184-5, 2O9, 211-3;

Additional Instructions used by, 225, 227 _n._, 228 _n._, 236-7,

255-62, 284-5, 287

Rooke, Admiral Sir George, 187, 195-9, 207

Rupert, Prince, 111-2, 115-7;

Instructions of, 129-30, 133-6, 159 _n._, 169

Russell, Admiral Edward, Earl of Orford, 175 _et seq._, 187-96,

233 _n_.

Ruyter, Admiral Michiel de, 87, 119, 156 _n_.

Sailing order, _see_ Order of sailing

Sailors serving ashore, 37, 56

Sandwich, Edward Mountagu, Earl of, 82, 107-9, 111-2, 165

Saumarez, Admiral Lord de, 262

Scouts, _see_ Cruisers

Sealed orders, 38

Seamen gunners, 35, 41

Ship-money fleets, 76-7

Ships, lists of, 20-2, 65-6, 71, 166

Achille, 352

Agamemnon, 301, 303-4, 311 _n._

Anne Royal, 63, 65

Assurance, 81

Bahama, 352

Belleisle, 294, 300, 304, 357

Bellerophon, 300, 304, 305 _n._, 357

Britannia, 195, 354

Bucentaure, 309, 351

Colossus, 300-1, 303-6, 352, 357

Conqueror, 299,305 _n._, 351 _n_.

Defence, 295, 301, 303-4

Defiance, 305 _n_.

Dreadnought (1578), 65;

(1805), 354

Euryalus, 305 _n._, 308-9

Leviathan, 304, 351 _n_.

Marlborough, 253

Mars, 300-1, 303-6, 357

Neptune, 351 _n_.

Orion, 301-2, 304-5

Pembroke, 169

Polyphemus, 304

Prince, 354

Prince of Wales, 322

Queen Charlotte, 252

Redoutable, 309

Revenge, 298, 311 _n_.

Royal Catherine, 169

Royal Charles, 111, 128-9

Royal James, 112 _n_.

Royal Sovereign, 300, 357

St. George, 264

Santa Ana, 309

Santísima Trinidad, 309-10

Shannon, 225

Superb, 290

Swiftsure, 352

Téméraire, 300, 308, 310, 357

Vanguard, 287

Victory, 293, 299, 300, 305, 3O7-8, 357

Shot-holes, 62, 69

Shovell, Admiral Sir Clowdisley, 195, 198 _n._

Sidmouth, Lord, 292, 295

Sign (for signal), 82

Signal books, introduction of, 233 and _n._, 234 and _n._

Signal officers, 216, 299

Signals, early forms of, 10, 38, 54-8, 73;

improvements in, 242, 152 _n._, 155 _n._, 163 _n._, 233,

_et seq._, 254 _n._;

numerical, 235

Slinging yards, 70

Smoke, tactical value of, 8, 10, 15, 16

Soldiers at sea, 35, 37, 41, 53, 56, 59,69;

as admirals, 29-30, 49, 73-6, 96

Spain, orders adopted from, 18, 33 _n._, 41 _n._

Spanish Armament, the (1790), 253

Squadronal organisation, 50-1, 55, 65-7, 73-4, 85-7, 186-9, 193-4, 322

Stanhope, Vice-Admiral, 322

Station, changing, 218, 226, 243, 276;

keeping, 222, 224, 228,

_See also_ Line, quitting the

Stinkballs, 11

Strickland, Admiral Sir Roger, 169

Sub-squadrons, 50-1, 65-7, 85, 87, 322-3.

_See also_ Divisions

Tacking in succession, first signal for, 113, 127-8

Tactical exercises, 209, 253, 285 _n._

Tactics, principles of, 283-4, 286.

_See also_ Concentration, Confusing, Containing, Mutual support

Oscillations in, 178, 213

Dutch, 50, 66-7, 73, 85-7, 97-8, 114, 118-20, 313

French, 185, 258-9, 267-8, 285-6

Spanish, 267-8.

_See also_ Chaves, Alonso de

Treatises on, _see_ Hoste, Morogues, Clerk, Grenier, Knowles

Tangier, 168

Telegraphing, 254 _n._

Tobacco smoking, 37

Torrington, Admiral Arthur Herbert, Earl of, 141, 177, 181, 187, 236

Toulouse, Comte de, 196

Tourville, Maréchal de, 179-181

Transports, 71

Tromp, Admiral Marten Harpertszoon, 83-7, 93-4;

orders of, 91

Tromp, Admiral Cornelis Martenszoon, 118, 156 _n._

Van, concentration on, 142-5, 154 _n._

Vane, Sir Harry, 93

Vernon, Admiral, 205-7, 210;

his Additional Instructions, 214-216

Villeneuve, Admiral, 264, 286, 308-9, 312-3, 342 _n._

Walsh, Lieutenant John, his signal book, 253

Warren, Vice-Admiral Sir Peter, 285 _n._

Weapons for close quarters, 11, 15

Weather-gage, 8, 15, 16, 23-4, 62, 68, 102, 114, 154, 238

Weft, waft or wheft, 89, 99

Wimbledon, _see_ Cecil

Wing squadrons, 18-24, 73

With, Admiral Witte de, 86

Wren, Dr. Mathew, F.R.S., 133, 138-9

York, James, Duke of, 82;

his instructions, 110-28, 133-63, 177;

his school, 134-5, 178, 338;

end of his career, 140

Zamorano, Roderigo, 4

Zante, 164, 167

THE NAVY RECORDS SOCIETY

* * * * *

_PATRON_

H.R.H. THE PRINCE OF WALES, K.G., K.T., K.P.

_PRESIDENT_

EARL SPENCER, K.G.

THE NAVY RECORDS SOCIETY, which has been established for the purpose

of printing rare or unpublished works of naval interest, aims at

rendering accessible the sources of our naval history, and at

elucidating questions of naval archæology, construction,

administration, organisation and social life.

The Society has already issued:--

In 1894: Vols. I. and II. _State Papers relating to the Defeat of

the Spanish Armada, Anno_ 1588. Edited by Professor J.K. Laughton.

(30s.)

In 1895: Vol. III. _Letters of Lord Hood_, 1781-82. Edited by

Mr. David Hannay. (_None available_.)

Vol. IV. _Index to James's Naval History_, By Mr. C.G. Toogood.

Edited by the Hon. T.A. Brassey. (12_s._ 6_d._)

Vol. V. _Life of Captain Stephen Martin_, 1666-1740. Edited by

Sir Clements R. Markham. (_None available_.)

In 1896: Vol. VI. _Journal of Rear-Admiral Bartholomew James_,

1752-1828. Edited by Professor J.K. Laughton and Commander

J.Y.F. Sulivan. (10_s._ 6_d._)

Vol. VII. _Hollond's Discourses of the Navy_, 1638 and

1658. Edited by Mr. J.R. Tanner. (12_s._ 6_d._)

Vol. VIII. _Naval Accounts and Inventories in the Reign of Henry

VII_. Edited by Mr. M. Oppenheim. (10_s._ 6_d._)

In 1897: Vol. IX. _Journal of Sir George Rooke_. Edited by

Mr. Oscar Browning. (10_s._ 6_d._)

Vol. X. _Letters and Papers relating to the War with France_,

1512-13. Edited by M. Alfred Spont. (10_s._ 6_d._)

Vol. XI. _Papers relating to the Spanish War_, 1585-87. Edited

by Mr. Julian Corbett. (10_s._ 6_d._)

In 1898: Vol. XII. _Journals and Letters of Admiral of the Fleet Sir

Thomas Byam Martin_, 1773-1854 (Vol. II.). Edited by Admiral Sir

R. Vesey Hamilton. (_See_ XXIV.)

Vol. XIII. _Papers relating to the First Dutch War_, 1652-54

(Vol. I.). Edited by Mr. S.R. Gardiner. (10_s._ 6_d._)

Vol. XIV. _Papers relating to the Blockade of Brest_, 1803-5

(Vol. I.). Edited by Mr. J. Leyland. (_See_ XXI.)

In 1899: Vol. XV. _History of the Russian Fleet during the Reign of

Peter the Great. By a Contemporary Englishman_. Edited by Admiral

Sir Cyprian Bridge. (10_s._ 6_d._)

Vol. XVI. _Logs of the Great Sea Fights_, 1794-1805

(Vol. I.). Edited by Vice-Admiral Sir T. Sturges Jackson. (_See_

XVIII.)

Vol. XVII. _Papers relating to the First Dutch War_, 1652-54

(Vol. II.). Edited by Mr. S.R. Gardiner, (10_s._ 6_d._)

In 1900: Vol. XVIII. _Logs of the Great Sea Fights_

(Vol. II.). Edited by Sir T.S. Jackson. (_Two vols._ 25_s._)

Vol. XIX. _Journals and Letters of Sir T. Byam Martin_

(Vol. III.). Edited by Sir R. Vesey Hamilton. (_See_ XXIV.)

In 1901: Vol. XX. _The Naval Miscellany_ (Vol. I.). Edited by

the Secretary. (15_s._)

Vol. XXI. _Papers relating to the Blockade of Brest_, 1803-5

(Vol. II.). Edited by Mr. John Leyland (_Two vols._ 25_s._)

In 1902: Vols. XXII. and XXIII. _The Naval Tracts of Sir

William. Monson_ (Vols. I. and II.). Edited by Mr. M. Oppenheim.

(_Two vols._ 25_s._)

Vol XXIV. _Journals and Letters of Sir T. Byam Martin_

(Vol. I.). Edited by Sir R. Vesey Hamilton. (_Three vols._

31_s._ 6_d._)

In 1903: Vol. XXV. _Nelson and the Neapolitan Jacobins_. Edited

by Mr. H.C. Gutteridge.(12_s._ 6_d._)

Vol. XXVI. _A Descriptive Catalogue of the Naval MSS. in the

Pepysian Library_ (Vol. I.). Edited by Mr. J.R. Tanner.

(15_s._)

In 1904: Vol. XXVII. _A Descriptive Catalogue of the Naval MSS. in

the Pepysian Library_ (Vol. II.). Edited by Mr. J.R. Tanner.

(12_s_. 6_d._)

Vol. XXVIII. _The Correspondence of Admiral John Markkam_,

1801-7. Edited by Sir Clements R. Markham. (12_s._ 6_d._)

In 1905: Vol. XXIX. _Fighting Instructions_, 1530-1816. Edited

by Mr. Julian Corbett.

_To follow:_

Vol. XXX. _Papers relating to the First Dutch War_, 1652-54

(Vol. III.). Edited by Mr. C.T. Atkinson.

Other works in preparation, in addition to further volumes of

Mr. Tanner's _Descriptive Catalogue_, of _Sir William Monson's

Tracts_, of _The First Dutch War_, which will be edited by

Mr. C.T. Atkinson, and of _The Naval Miscellany_, are _The

Journal of Captain_ (afterwards Sir John) _Narbrough_, 1672-73,

to be edited by Professor J.K. Laughton; _Official Documents

illustrating the Social Life and Internal Discipline of the Navy in

the XVIIIth Century_, to be edited by Professor J.K. Laughton; _Select

Correspondence of the great Earl of Chatham and his Sons_, to be

edited by Professor J.K. Laughton; _Select Correspondence of Sir

Charles Middleton, afterwards Lord Barham_, 1778-1806, to be edited by

Professor J.K. Laughton; _Reminiscences of Commander James Anthony

Gardner_, 1775-1806, to be edited by Sir R. Vesey Hamilton; and a

_Collection of Naval Songs and Ballads_, to be edited by Professor

C.H. Firth and Mr. Henry Newbolt.

Any person wishing to become a Member of the Society is requested to

apply to the Secretary (Professor Laughton, 9 Pepys Road, Wimbledon,

S.W.), who will submit his name to the Council. The Annual

Subscription is One Guinea, the payment of which entitles the Member

to receive one copy of all works issued by the Society for that

year. The publications are not offered for general sale; but Members

can obtain a complete set of the volumes on payment of the back

subscriptions. Single volumes can also be obtained by Members at the

prices marked to each.

_May_ 1905.

PRINTED BY

SPOTTISWOODE AND CO. LTD., NEW-STREET SQUARE

LONDON

NAVY RECORDS SOCIETY

* * * * *

REPORT OF THE COUNCIL

* * * * *

_Read at the Thirteenth Annual General Meeting, Thursday, June_

28, 1906.

* * * * *

THE COUNCIL have to report that the number of members and subscribers

on the Society's list is 536; a net increase of 28 over last

year. This is largely due to the additional support received from the

Admiralty, which has increased the number of its subscriptions to

fourteen, as well as to the accession of other departments of the

public service and of public institutions, including

The War Course College, Devonport;

The War Course College, Portsmouth;

The Staff College, Camberley;

The University of Liverpool;

The Public Libraries, Cardiff;

The Public Libraries, Croydon;

and, in his private capacity, the Secretary of State for War. The

Society of Swedish Naval Officers, Stockholm, has also been admitted

as a subscriber.

On the other hand, death has removed nine of our members, and among

them two who have, from the beginning, been most active in furthering

the ends and promoting the interests of the Society. These are:--

Captain MONTAGU BURROWS, R.N., Chichele Professor of History in the

University of Oxford, and known to all of us as the author of the

_Life of Hawke_; and

Rear-Admiral Sir WILLIAM WHARTON, K.C.B., Hydrographer to the

Admiralty.

The names of the others are:--

Sir W. LAIRD CLOWES;

Earl COWPER;

Lord CURRIE, G.C.B.;

Commander W.M. LATHAM, R.N.;

Mr. C.A. NANKIVELL;

Mr. G.R. STEVENS;

Commander W.H. WATSON, R.N.R.

While congratulating the Society on the improving appearance of the

list, the Council would again urge on every member the necessity of

his individual co-operation in the endeavour to make the work of the

Society more generally and widely known. To this end they also invite

the assistance of the Press. It is only by such increased publicity

that the numbers, the funds, and therefore the work and usefulness, of

the Society can be maintained.

Since the date of the last General Meeting the Society has issued:

For 1905. Vol. XXX. _The First Dutch War_ (Vol. III.). Edited by

the late Dr. S.R. GARDINER and Mr. C.T. ATKINSON.

For this year it is proposed to issue _The Reminiscences of

Commander James Anthony Gardner_, 1775-1806, edited by Sir R. VESEY

HAMILTON; and _Select Correspondence of Sir Charles Middleton,

afterwards Lord Barham_, edited by Professor J.K. LAUGHTON.

These are now well advanced, and will, it is hoped, be issued in the

course of the autumn.

Of the several works in preparation--a list of which will be found in

the Advertisement at the end of Vol. XXX--it is unnecessary to speak

here.

The Society will, however, be interested to learn that copies have

been found of the Fighting Instructions of Hawke and Rodney. These

were described at some length by Mr. Julian S. Corbett in the

_Times_ of December 19, and, by the kind permission of the owner,

Mr. Pritchard, will be edited for the Society by Mr. Corbett, and

issued--probably next year--either as a separate volume or included in

a volume of the Miscellany.

The Balance Sheet is appended.

ABSTRACT OF ACCOUNTS.--JANUARY 1 TO DECEMBER 31, 1905.

RECEIPTS.

£ s. d. £ s. d. |

Balance brought forward:-- |

At Messrs. Coutts & Co. 202 5 10 |

With Treasurer 0 18 0 |

With Secretary 8 17 1 |

--------- 212 0 11 |

612 Subscriptions 642 12 0 |

Over-payment on same 0 1 4 |

--------- 642 13 4 |

Volumes sold 60 1 0 |

--------- |

£914 15 3 |

========== |

Audited and found correct:--

W.A. JAMES, } _Auditors_.

P.H. PRIDHAM WIPPELL,}

_May 1906_.

PAYMENTS.

£ s. d.

Printing, &c. 370 3 3

Indexing and Transcribing 7 8 0

Salaries and Wages 110 18 9

Miscellaneous 9 18 5

Balance carried forward:--

At Messrs. Coutts & Co. £412 10 5

With Treasurer 1 1 0

With Secretary 2 15 5

--------- 416 6 10

---------

£914 15 3

=========

W. GRAHAM GREENE,

_Hon. Treasurer_.