ADDITIONAL FIGHTING INSTRUCTIONS OF THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY
I. ADMIRAL VERNON, _circa_ 1740
II. LORD ANSON, _circa_ 1747
III. SIR EDWARD HAWKE, 1756
IV. ADMIRAL BOSCAWEN, 1759
V. SIR GEORGE RODNEY, 1782
VI. LORD HOOD, 1783
ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF THE ADDITIONAL INSTRUCTIONS
INTRODUCTORY
Although, as we have seen, the 'Fighting Instructions' of 1691
continued in force with no material alteration till the end of the
next century, it must not be assumed that no advance in tactics was
made. From time to time important changes were introduced, but instead
of a fresh set of 'Fighting Instructions' being drawn up according to
the earlier practice, the new ideas were embodied in what were called
'Additional Fighting Instructions.' They did not supersede the old
standing form, but were intended to be read with and be subsidiary to
it. It is to these 'Additional Instructions,' therefore, that we have
to look for the progress of tactics during the eighteenth century. By
one of those strange chances, however, which are the despair of
historians in almost every branch and period of their subject, these
Additional Instructions have almost entirely disappeared. Although it
is known in the usual way--that is, from chance references in
despatches and at courts-martial--that many such sets of Additional
Instructions were issued, only one complete set actually in force is
known to exist. They are those signed by Admiral Boscawen on April
27, 1759, in Gibraltar Bay, and are printed below.
After his capture of Louisbourg in the previous year, Boscawen had
been chosen for the command of the Mediterranean fleet, charged with
the important duty of preventing the Toulon squadron getting round to
Brest, and so effecting the concentration which the French had planned
as the essential feature of their desperate plan of invasion. He
sailed with the reinforcement he was taking out on April 14, and must
therefore have issued these orders so soon as he reached his
station. There is every reason to believe, however, that he was not
their author; that they were, in fact, a common form which had been
settled by Lord Anson at the admiralty. In the shape in which they
have come down to us they are a set of eighteen printed articles, to
which have been added in manuscript two comparatively unimportant
articles relating to captured chases and the call for lieutenants.
These may have been either mere 'expeditional' orders, as they were
called, issued by Boscawen in virtue of his general authority as
commander-in-chief on the station, or possibly recent official
additions. More probably they were Boscawen's own, for, strictly
speaking, they should not appear as 'Additional Fighting Instructions'
at all. From the series of signal books and other sources we know
there already existed a special set of 'Chasing Instructions,' and yet
another set in which officers' calls and the like were dealt with, and
both of Boscawen's articles were subsequently incorporated into these
sets. The printed articles to which Boscawen attached them were
certainly not new. Either wholly or in part they had been used by Byng
in 1756, for at his court-martial he referred to the 'First article of
the Additional Fighting Instructions as given to the fleet by me at
the beginning of the expedition,' and this article is identical with
No. 1 of Boscawen's set.
How much older the articles were, or, indeed, whether any were issued
before the Seven Years' War, has never yet been determined. From the
illogical order in which they succeed one another it would appear that
they were the result of a gradual development, during which one or
more orders were added from time to time by the incorporation of
'expeditional' orders of various admirals, as experience suggested
their desirability. Thus Article I. provides, in the case of the
enemy being inferior in number, for our superfluous ships to fall out
of the line and form a reserve, but it is not till Article VIII. that
we have a scientific rule laid down for the method in which the
reserve is to employ itself. Still, whatever may have been the exact
process by which these Additional Instructions grew up, evidence is in
existence which enables us to trace the system to its source with
exactitude, and there is no room for doubt that it originated in
certain expeditional orders issued by Admiral Vernon when he was in
command of the expedition against the Spanish Main in 1739-40. Amongst
the 'Mathews and Lestock' pamphlets is one sometimes attributed to
Lestock himself, but perhaps more probably inspired by him. It is
dedicated to the first lord of the admiralty, and entitled _A
Narrative of the Proceedings of his majesty's fleet in the
Mediterranean_, 1741-4, including, amongst other matter relating to
Mathews's action, 'some signals greatly wanted on the late occasion.'
At p. 108 are some 'Additional signals made use of by our fleet in the
West Indies,' meaning that of Admiral Vernon, which Lestock had
recently left. These signals relate to sailing directions by day and
by night, to 'seeing ships in the night' and to 'engaging an enemy in
the night,' and immediately following them are two 'Additional
Instructions to be added to the Fighting Instructions.' The inference
is that these two 'Additional Instructions' were something quite new
and local, since they were used by Vernon and not by Mathews. They are
given below, and will be found to correspond closely to Articles
I. and III. of the set used by Boscawen in the next war. Since,
therefore, in all the literature and proceedings relating to Mathews
and Lestock there is no reference to any 'Additional Instructions,' we
may conclude with fair safety that these two articles used by Vernon
in the West Indies were the origin and germ of the new system.
Nor is it a mere matter of inference only, for it is confirmed by a
direct statement by the author of the pamphlet. At p. 74 he has this
interesting passage which practically clears up the history of the
whole matter. 'Men in the highest stations at sea will not deny but
what our sailing and fighting instructions might be amended, and many
added to them, which by every day's experience are found to be
absolutely necessary. Though this truth is universally acknowledged
and the necessity of the royal navy very urgent, yet since the
institution of these signals nothing has been added to them excepting
the chasing signals, excellent in their kind, by the Right Honourable
Sir J---- N----.[1] Not but that every admiral has authority to make
any additions or give such signals to the captains under his command
as he shall judge proper, which are only expeditional. Upon many
emergencies our signals at this juncture [_i.e._ in the action
before Toulon] proved to be very barren. There was no such signal in
the book, expressing an order when the admiral would have the ships to
come to a closer engagement than when they begun. After what has been
observed, it is unnecessary now to repeat the great necessity and
occasion there was for it; and boats in many cases, besides their
delay and hindrance, could not always perform that duty.
'Mr. V[ernon], that provident, great admiral, who never suffered any
useful precaution to escape him, concerted some signals for so good a
purpose, wisely foreseeing their use and necessity, giving them to the
captains of the squadron under his command. And lest his vigilance
should be some time or other surprised by an enemy, or the exigencies
of his master's service should require him to attack or repulse by
night, he appointed signals for the line of battle, engaging, chasing,
leaving off chase, with many others altogether new, excellent and
serviceable, which show his judgment, abilities, and zeal. The author
takes the liberty to print them for the improvement of his brethren,
who, if they take the pains to peruse them, will receive benefit and
instruction.'
Here, then, we have indisputable evidence that the system which gave
elasticity to the old rigid Fighting Instructions began with Admiral
Vernon, who as a naval reformer is now only remembered as the inventor
of grog. The high reputation he justly held as a seaman and commander
amongst his contemporaries has long been buried under his undeserved
failure at Cartagena; but trained in the flagships of Rooke and
Shovell, and afterwards as a captain under Sir John Norris in the
Baltic, there was no one till the day of his death in 1757, at the age
of 73, who held so high a place as a naval authority, and from no one
was a pregnant tactical reform more likely to come. The Lestock
pamphlet, moreover, makes it clear that through all the time of his
service--the dead time of tactics as we regard it now--tacticians so
far from slumbering had been striving to release themselves from the
bonds in which the old instructions tied them.
This is confirmed by two manuscript authorities which have fortunately
survived, and which give us a clear insight into the new system as it
was actually set on foot. The first is a MS. copy of some Additional
Instructions in the Admiralty Library. They are less full and clearly
earlier than those used by Boscawen in 1759, and are bound up with a
printed copy of the regular Fighting Instructions already referred to,
which contain in manuscript the additions made by Mathews during his
Mediterranean command.[2] In so far as they differ from Boscawen's
they will be found below as notes to his set.
The second is a highly interesting MS. copy of a signal book dated
1756, in which the above instructions are referred to. It is in the
United Service Institution (_Register No._ 234). At the end it
contains a memorandum of a new article by which Hawke modified the
established method of attack, and for the first time introduced the
principle of each ship steering for her opposite in the enemy's
line. It is printed below, and as will be seen was to be substituted
for 'Articles V. and VI. of the Additional Fighting Instructions by
Day' then in force, which correspond to Articles XV. and XVI. of
Boscawen's set. It does not appear in the Boscawen set, and how soon
it was regularly incorporated we do not know. No reference has been
found to it till that by Rodney, in his despatch of April 1780
referred to below.
Of even higher interest for our purpose is another entry in the same
place of an article also issued by Hawke for forming 'line of
bearing.' Here again the older form of the Additional Fighting
Instructions is referred to, and the new article is to be inserted
after Article IV., which was for forming the line ahead or
abreast. The important point however is that the new article is
expressly attributed to Lord Anson. Now it is known that when Anson in
April 1747 was cruising off Finisterre for De la Jonquière he kept
his fleet continually exercising 'in forming line and in manoeuvres of
battle till then absolutely unknown.'[3]
The 'line of bearing' or 'quarter line' must have been one of these,
and we therefore reach two important conclusions: (1) that this great
tactical advance was introduced by Anson during the War of the
Austrian Succession, and (2) that the older set of Additional Fighting
Instructions was then in existence. Another improvement probably
assignable to this time was Article IV. (of Boscawen's set) for battle
order in two separate lines. Articles V., VI., VII., for extended
cruising formations certainly were then issued, for in his despatch
after his defeat of De la Jonquière Anson says: 'At daybreak I made
the signal for the fleet to spread in a line abreast, each ship
keeping at the distance of a mile from the other [Article V.] that
there might not remain the least probability for the enemy to pass by
us undiscovered.'[4]
Then we have the notable Article XVIII., not in the earlier sets,
enjoining captains to pursue any ship they force out of the line,
regardless of the contrary order contained in Article XXI. of the
regular Fighting Instructions. We have seen the point discussed
already in the anonymous commentary on the Duke of York's final
instructions, and it remained a bone of contention till the end. Men
like Sir Charles H. Knowles were as strongly in favour of immediately
following a beaten adversary as the anonymous commentator was in
favour of maintaining the line. Knowles's idea was that it was folly
to check the ardour of a ship's company at the moment of victory, and
he tells us he tried to persuade Howe to discard the old instruction
when he was drawing up his new ones.[5]
As to the further tactical progress which the Boscawen instructions
disclose, and which nearly all appear closely related to the events of
the War of the Austrian Succession, when Anson was supreme, we may
particularly note Article I., for equalising the lines and using
superfluous ships to form a reserve; Article III. for closer action;
Article VIII. for the reserve to endeavour to 'Cross the T,' instead
of doubling; and Articles IX. and X. for bringing a flying enemy to
action.
With these internal inferences to corroborate the direct evidence of
our documents the conclusion is clear--that during the War of the
Austrian Succession the new system initiated by Vernon was developed
by Anson as a consequence of Mathews's miserable action off Toulon in
1744, and that its first fruits were gathered in the brilliant
successes of Hawke and Anson himself in 1747.
Though no complete set later than those used by Boscawen is known to
exist, we may be certain from various indications that they continued
to be issued as affording a means of giving elasticity to tactics, and
that they were constantly issued in changing form. Thus Rodney, in his
report after the action off Martinique in April 1780, says, 'I made
the signal for every ship to bear down and steer for her opposite in
the enemy's line, agreeable to the twenty-first article of the
Additional Instructions.' Again in a MS. signal book in the Admiralty
Library, which was used in Rodney's great action of April 12, 1782,
and drawn up by an officer who was present, a similar article is
referred to. But there it appears as No. XVII. of the Additional
Instructions, and its effect is given in a form which closely
resembles the original article of Hawke:--'When in a line of battle
ahead and to windward of the enemy, to alter the course to lead down
to them; whereupon every ship is to steer for the ship of the enemy,
which from the disposition of the two squadrons it may be her lot to
engage, notwithstanding the signal for the line ahead will be kept
flying.' It is clear, therefore, that between 1780 and 1782 Rodney or
the admiralty had issued a new set of 'Additional Instructions.' The
amended article was obviously designed to prevent a recurrence of the
mistake that spoiled the action of 1780. In the same volume is a
signal which carries the idea further. It has been entered
subsequently to the rest, having been issued by Lord Hood for the
detached squadron he commanded in March 1783. There is no reference
to a corresponding instruction, but it is 'for ships to steer for
(independent of each other) and engage respectively the ships opposed
to them.' In Lord Howe's second signal book, issued in 1790,[6] the
signal reappears in MS. as 'each ship of the fleet to steer for,
independently of each other, and engage respectively the ship opposed
in situation to them in the enemy's line.' And in this case there is
a reference to an 'Additional Instruction, No. 8,' indicating that
Hood, who had meanwhile become first sea lord, had incorporated his
idea into the regular 'Additional Fighting Instructions.'
Take, again, the case of the manoeuvre of 'breaking the line' in line
ahead. This was first practised after its long abandonment by a sudden
inspiration in Rodney's action of April 12, 1782. In the MS. signal
book as used by Rodney in that year there is no corresponding signal
or instruction. But it does contain one by Hood which he must have
added soon after the battle. It is as follows:--
'When fetching up with the enemy to leeward and on the contrary tack
to break through their line and endeavour to cut off part of their van
or rear.' It also contains another attributed to Admiral Pigot which
he probably added at Hood's suggestion when he succeeded to the
command in July 1782. It is for a particular ship 'to cut through the
enemy's line of battle, and for all the other ships to follow her in
close order to support each other.' But in both cases there is no
corresponding instruction, so that the new signals must have been
based on 'expeditional' orders issued by Pigot and Hood. The same
book has yet another additional signal 'for the leading ship to cut
through the enemy's line of battle,' apparently the latest of the
three, but not specifically attributed either to Pigot or Hood.
With the Additional Instructions used by Rodney the system culminated.
For officers with any real feeling for tactics its work was adequate.
The criticisms of Hood and Rodney on Graves's heart-breaking action
off the Chesapeake in 1781 show this clearly enough. 'When the enemy's
van was out,' wrote Hood, 'it was greatly extended beyond the centre
and rear, and might have been attacked with the whole force of the
British fleet.' And again, 'Had the centre gone to the support of the
van and the signal for the line been hauled down ... the van of the
enemy must have been cut to pieces and the rear division of the
British fleet would have been opposed to ... the centre division.'
Here, besides the vital principle of concentration, we have a germ
even of the idea of containing, and Rodney is equally emphatic. 'His
mode of fighting I will never follow. He tells me that his line did
not extend so far as the enemy's rear. I should have been sorry if it
had, and a general battle ensued. It would have given the advantage
they wished and brought their whole twenty-four ships of the line
against the English nineteen, whereas by watching his opportunity
... by contracting his own line he might have brought his nineteen
against the enemy's fourteen or fifteen, and by a close action have
disabled them before they could have received succour from the
remainder.'[7]
Read with such remarks as these the latest Additional Fighting
Instructions will reveal to us how ripe and sound a system of tactics
had been reached. The idea of crushing part of the enemy by
concentration had replaced the primitive intention of crowding him
into a confusion; a swift and vigorous attack had replaced the
watchful defensive, and above all the true method of concentration had
been established; for although a concentration on the van was still
permissible in exceptional circumstances, the chief of the new
articles are devoted to concentrating on the rear. Thus our tacticians
had worked out the fundamental principles on which Nelson's system
rested, even to breaking up the line into two divisions. 'Containing'
alone was not yet clearly enunciated, but by Hood's signals for
breaking the line, the best method of effecting it was made
possible. Everything indeed lay ready for the hands of Howe and Nelson
to strike into life.
FOOTNOTES:
[1] Admiral Sir John Norris had been commander-in-chief in the
Mediterranean 1710-1, in the Baltic 1715-21 and 1727, in the Downs in
1734, and the Channel 1739 and following years. Professor Laughton tells
me that Norris's papers and orders for 1720-1 contain no such signals.
He must therefore have issued them later.
[2] Catalogue, 252/24. The reason this interesting set has been
overlooked is that the volume in which they are bound bears by error the
label 'Sailing and Fighting Instructions for H.M. Fleet, 1670. Record
Office Copy.' The Instructions of 1670 were of course quite different.
[3] _Dict. Nat. Biog._ vol. ii. p. 33.
[4] Barrow, _Life of Anson_, p. 162
[5] _Observations on Naval Tactics, &c._, p. 27.
[6] In the Admiralty Library. It is undated, but assigned to 1792-3.
For the reasons for identifying it as Howe's second code see _post_, pp.
234-7. In his first code Howe adopted Hood's wording almost exactly; see
_post_, p. 236.
[7] _Letters of Sir Samuel Hood_, p. 46; and cf. _post_, p. 228 _n._
_ADMIRAL VERNON, circa_ 1740.
[+Mathews-Lestock Pamphlets+.[1]]
_An Additional Instruction to be added to the Fighting
Instructions_.
In case of meeting any squadron of the enemy's ships, whose number may
be less than those of the squadron of his majesty's ships under my
command, and that I would have any of the smaller ships quit the line,
I will in such case make the signal for speaking with the captain of
that ship I would have quit the line; and at the same time I will put
a flag, striped yellow and white, at the flagstaff at the main
topmast-head, upon which the said ship or ships are to quit the line
and the next ships are to close the line, for having our ships of
greatest force to form a line just equal to the enemy's. And as, upon
the squadrons engaging, it is not to be expected that the ships
withdrawn out of the line can see or distinguish signals at such a
juncture, it is therefore strictly enjoined and required of such
captain or captains, who shall have their signal or signals made to
withdraw out of the line, to demean themselves as a _corps de
réserve_ to the main squadron, and to place themselves in the
best situation for giving relief to any ship of the squadron that may
be disabled or hardest pressed by the enemy, having in the first place
regard to the ship I shall have my flag on board, as where the honour
of his majesty's flag is principally concerned. And as it is morally
impossible to fix any general rule to occurrences that must be
regulated from the weather and the enemy's disposition, this is left
to the respective captain's judgment that shall be ordered out of the
line to govern himself by as becomes an officer of prudence, and as he
will answer the contrary at his peril.
_Memorandum_.--That whereas all signals for the respective
captains of the squadron are at some one of the mast-heads, and as
when we are in line of battle or in other situations it may be
difficult for the ships to distinguish their signal, in such case you
are to take notice that your signal will be made by fixing the pennant
higher upon the topgallant shrouds, so as it may be most conspicuous
to be seen by the respective ship it is made for.
_A second Additional Instruction to the Fighting Instructions_.
If, at any time after our ships being engaged with any squadron of the
enemy's ships, the admiral shall judge it proper to come to a closer
engagement with the enemy than at the distance we first began to
engage, the admiral will hoist a union flag at the main topmast-head
and fire a gun on the opposite side to which he is engaged with the
enemy, when every ship is to obey the signal, taking the distance from
the centre; and if the admiral would have any particular ship do so he
will make the same signal with the signal for the captain of that
ship.
And in case of being to leeward of the enemy, the admiral will at the
same time he makes this signal hoist the yellow flag at the fore
topmast-head for filling and making sail to windward.
And during the time of engagement, every ship is to appoint a proper
person to keep an eye upon the admiral and to observe signals.
FOOTNOTE:
[1] 'A Narrative of the Proceedings of his Majesty's Fleet in the
Mediterranean, &c. By a Sea Officer' London, 1744, pp. 111-2
_LORD ANSON, circa_ 1747_.
[+MS. Signal Book, 1756, United Service Institution+.]
_Lord Anson's Additional Fighting Instruction, to be inserted after
Article the 4th in the Additional Fighting Instructions by Day_.
Whereas it may often be necessary for ships in line of battle, to
regulate themselves by bearing on some particular point of the compass
from each other without having any regard to their bearing abreast or
ahead of one another;
You are therefore hereby required and directed to strictly observe the
following instructions:
When the signal is made for the squadron to draw into a line of battle
at any particular distance, and I would have them keep north and south
of each other, I will hoist a red flag with a white cross in the mizen
topmast shrouds to show the quarter of the compass, and for the
intermediate points I will hoist on the flagstaff at the mizen
top-mast-head, when they are to bear
N by E and S by W, one common pennant
NNE " SSW, two common pennants
NE by N " SW by S, three " "
NE " SW, a Dutch jack.
And I will hoist under the Dutch jack when I would have them bear
NE by E and SW by W, one common pennant
ENE " WSW, two common pennants
E by N " W by S, three " "
and fire a gun with each signal.
When I would have them bear from each other on any of the points on
the NW and SE quarters I will hoist a blue and white flag on the mizen
topmast shrouds, to show the quarter of the compass and distinguish
the intermediate points they are to form on from the N and S in the
same manner as in the NE and SW quarter.[1]
ED. HAWKE.
FOOTNOTE:
[1] From this article it would appear that the correct expression for
'line of bearing' is 'quarter line'--_i.e._ a line formed in a quarter
of the compass, and that 'bow and quarter line' is due to false
etymology. Though Hawke approved the formation, it does not appear in
the Additional Instructions used by Boscawen in 1759. It was however
regularly incorporated in those used in the War of American
Independence. See _post_, p. 225, Art. III.
_SIR EDWARD HAWKE_, 1756.
[+MS. Signal Book, United Service Institution+.]
_Memorandum_,
In room of Articles V. and VI. of the 'Additional Fighting
Instructions by Day'[1] it is in my discretion that this be
observed, viz.:
When sailing in a line of battle, one ship ahead of another, and I
would have the ship that leads with either the starboard or larboard
tacks aboard to alter her course in order to lead down to the enemy, I
will hoist a Dutch jack under my flag at the mizen topmast-head and
fire two guns. Then every ship of the squadron is to steer for the
ship of the enemy that from the disposition of the two squadrons must
be her lot to engage, notwithstanding I shall keep the signal for the
line ahead flying, making or shortening sail in such proportion as to
preserve the distance assigned by the signal for the line, in order
that the whole squadron as soon as possible may come to action at the
same time.[2]
ED. HAWKE.
_Additional Signals_.
If upon seeing an enemy I should think it necessary to alter the
disposition of the ships in the line of battle, and would have any
ships change station with each other, I will make the signal to speak
with the captains of such ships, and hoist the flag chequered red and
blue on the flagstaff at the mizen topmast-head.[3]
FOOTNOTES:
[1] _I.e._ the older set. They were Articles XV. and XVI. of the
remodelled set used by Boscawen in 1759.
[2] This article was presumably issued by Hawke when in July 1756 he
superseded Byng in the Mediterranean. It seems designed to prevent a
recurrence of the errors which lost the battle of Minorca, where the
British van was crushed by coming into action long before the centre and
rear. It is not in the Additional Instructions of 1759, but reappears in
a modified form in those of 1780.
[3] This article is entered in the same signal book, but has no
signature. It may therefore have been one of Anson's innovations.
_ADMIRAL BOSCAWEN_, 1759.[1]
[+From the original in the Admiralty Library, 252/29+.]
I. In case of meeting with a squadron of the enemy's ships that may be
less in number than the squadron under my command, if I would have any
of the smaller ships quit the line, that those of the greatest force
may be opposed to the enemy, I will put abroad the signal for speaking
with the captains of such ships as I would have leave the line, and
hoist a flag, striped yellow and white, at the flagstaff at the main
topmast-head; then the next ships are to close the line, and those
that have quitted it are to hold themselves in readiness to assist any
ship that may be disabled, or hard pressed, or to take her station, if
she is obliged to go out of the line: in which case, the strongest
ship that is withdrawn from the line is strictly enjoined to supply
her place, and fill up the vacancy.
II. And in case of meeting with any squadron, or ships of war of the
enemy that have merchant-men under their convoy, though the signal for
the line of battle should be out, if I would have any of the frigates
that are out of the line, or any ship of the line fall upon the
convoy, whilst the others are engaged, I will put abroad the pennant
for speaking with the captain of such ship or ships, and hoist the
flag above mentioned for quitting the line, with a pennant under it;
upon which signal, such ship or ships are to use their utmost
endeavours to take or destroy the enemy.
III. If at any time while we are engaged with the enemy, the admiral
shall judge it proper to come to a closer engagement than at the
distance we then are, he will hoist a red and white flag on the
flagstaff at the main topmast-head, and fire a gun. Then every ship
is to engage the enemy at the same distance the admiral does; and if
the admiral would have any particular ship do so, he will make the
same signal, and the signal for speaking with the captain.
IV.[2] When I would have the two divisions of the fleet form
themselves into a separate line of battle, one ship ahead of another
at the distance of a cable's length asunder, and each division to be
abreast of the other, when formed at the distance of one cable's
length and a half, I will hoist a flag chequered blue and yellow at
the mizen peak, and fire a gun, and then every ship is to get into her
station accordingly,
*V.[3] When I would have the fleet spread in a line abreast, each
ship keeping at the distance of one mile from the other, I will hoist
a flag chequered blue and yellow, on the flagstaff at the mizen
top-mast-head, and fire a gun.
*VI. When I would have the ships spread in a line directly ahead of
each other, and keep at the distance of a mile asunder, I will hoist a
flag chequered red and white at the mizen peak, and fire a gun.
*VII. And when the signal is made for the ships to spread either
abreast or ahead of one another, and I would have them keep at the
distance of two miles asunder, I will hoist a pennant under the
fore-mentioned flags: then every ship is to make sail, and get into
her station accordingly.
VIII. If I should meet with a squadron of the enemy's ships of war
inferior in number to the ships under my command, those ships of my
squadron (above the number of the enemy) that happen to fall in either
ahead of the enemy's van or astern of his rear, while the rest of the
ships are engaged, are hereby required, and directed to quit the line
without waiting for the signal, and to distress the enemy by raking
the ships in the van and rear, notwithstanding the first part of the
twenty-fourth article of the Fighting Instructions to the contrary.
IX. And if I should chase with the whole squadron, and would have a
certain number of the ships that are nearest the enemy draw into a
line of battle ahead of me, in order to engage till the rest of the
ships of the squadron can come up with them, I will hoist a white flag
with a red cross on the flagstaff at the main topmast-head, and fire
the number of guns as follows:--
When I would have five ships draw into a line of battle, ahead of each
other, I will fire one gun.
When I would have seven ships draw into a line of battle, ahead of
each other, I will fire three guns.
X. Then those ships are immediately to form the line without any
regard to seniority or the general form delivered, but according to
their distances from the enemy, viz., The headmost and nearest ship to
the enemy is to lead, and the sternmost to bring up the rear, that no
time may be lost in the pursuit; and all the rest of the ships are to
form and strengthen that line, as soon as they can come up with them,
without any regard to my general form of the order of battle.
XI. Whereas every ship is directed (when sailing in a line of battle)
to keep the same distances those ships do who are nearest the admiral,
always taking it from the centre: if at any time I think the ship
ahead of me is [at] too great a distance, I will make it known to him
by putting abroad a pennant at the jib-boom end, and keep it flying
till he is in his proper station: and if he finds the ship ahead of
him is at a greater distance from him than he is from the
[4]-----(or such ship as my flag shall be flying on board of), he
shall make the same signal at his jib-boom end, and keep it flying
till he thinks that ship is at a proper distance, and so on to the van
of the line.
XII. And when I think the ship astern of me is at too great a
distance, I will make it known to him by putting abroad a pennant at
the cross-jack yard-arm, and keep it flying till he is in his station:
and if he finds the ship astern of him is at a greater distance than
he is from the ---- (or such ship as my flag shall be flying aboard
of) he shall make the same signal at the cross-jack yard-arm, and keep
it flying till he thinks that the ship is at a proper distance, and so
on to the rear of the line.
XIII. And if at any time the captain of any particular ship in the
line thinks the ship without him is at a greater distance than those
ships who are next the centre, he shall make the above signal: and
then that ship is immediately to close, and get into his proper
station.
XIV.[5] When the signal is made for the squadron to draw into a line
of battle, one ship ahead of another, by hoisting a union flag at the
mizen peak and firing a gun, every ship is to make all the sail he can
into his station, and keep at the distance of half a cable's length
from each other: If I would have them to be a cable's length asunder,
I will hoist a blue flag, with a red cross under the union flag at the
mizen peak and fire a gun: and if two cables' length asunder, a white
and blue flag under the union flag at the mizen peak, and fire a gun:
but when I would have the squadron draw into a line of battle, one
ship abreast of another, and keep at those distances as above
directed, I will hoist a pennant under the said flags at the mizen
peak.
XV.[6] When sailing in a line of battle, one ship ahead of another,
and I would have the ship who leads to alter her course and lead more
to starboard, I will hoist a flag striped white and blue at the fore
topmast-head, and fire a gun for every point of the compass I would
have the course altered.
XVI.[6] And if I would have the ship that leads to alter her course
and lead more to port, I will hoist a flag striped blue and white on
the flagstaff at the mizen topmast-head, and fire a gun for every
point of the compass I would have the course altered, and every ship
in the squadron is to get into her wake as fast as possible.
XVII.[7] When I would have all the fireships to prime, I will hoist
a chequered blue and yellow pennant at the mizen topmast-head.
*XVIII.[8] Notwithstanding the general printed Fighting
Instructions, if at any time, when engaged with an equal number of the
enemy's ships, and the ship opposed to any of his majesty's ships is
forced out of the line, you are hereby required and directed to pursue
her, and endeavour to take and destroy her.
_Memorandum_.--When the squadron is in a line of battle ahead,
and the signal is made for the headmost and weathermost to tack, the
ship that leads on the former tack is to continue to lead after
tacking.[9]
*XIX.[10] When I would have the ship or ships that chase bring down
their chase to me, I will hoist a blue flag pierced with white on the
fore topgallant mast, not on the flagstaff.
*XX.[10] When I find it necessary to have the state and condition of
the ships in the squadron sent on board me, I will make the signal for
all lieutenants, and hoist a blue and white flag at the mizen peak and
fire a gun. If for the state and condition of a particular ship, I
make the signal for the lieutenant of that ship, with the flag at the
mizen peak.
Given under my hand on board his majesty's ship Namur, in Gibraltar
Bay, this 27 April, 1759.
E. BOSCAWEN
(autograph).
To Capt. Medows,
of his majesty's ship Shannon.
By command of the admiral
ALEX. MACPHERSON
(autograph).
FOOTNOTES:
[1] The articles marked with an asterisk are additions subsequent to
and not appearing in the earlier _Admiralty MS._ 252/24, 'Additional
Fighting Instructions by Day' (see p. 108).
[2] In the earlier _Admiralty MS._ this article is numbered VII. and
begins 'If the fleet should happen to be in two divisions and I would
have them form,' &c.
[3] Used by Lord Anson in 1747. See _supra_, p. 209.
[4] The earlier _Admiralty MS._ has simply 'the ship my flag shall be
aboard of.'
[5] Article IV, in the earlier _Admiralty MS_. It is practically
identical except that it has 'she' and 'her' throughout where ships are
spoken of, and a few other verbal differences.
[6] Articles V. and VI. in the earlier _Admiralty MS_.
[7] The equivalent of Article XIV. in the earlier _Admiralty MS_.
which reads thus, 'When I would have the fireships to prime I will hoist
a pennant striped red and white on the flagstaff at the fore
topmast-head and fire a gun, but in case we are at any time in chase of
the enemy's fleet, the fireships are to prime as fast as possible
whether the signal be made or not.' The _Admiralty MS_. ends here with
another article relating to fireships (No. XV.): 'You are to hold his
majesty's ship under your command in a constant readiness for action,
and in case of coming to an engagement with the enemy, if they have the
wind of us, to keep your barge manned and armed with hand and fire-chain
grapnels on the offside from them, to be ready to assist as well any
ship that may be attempted by the fireships of the enemy, as our own
fireships when they shall be ordered upon service.' This article
disappears from subsequent sets, and was perhaps incorporated into the
'General Instructions to Captains' to which it more properly belongs.
The MS. also contains 'Night Signals' and private signals for knowing
detached ships rejoining at night.
[8] Whoever was the author of this article, it was generally regarded
as too risky and subsequently disappeared. The article of the 'printed
Fighting Instructions' referred to is No. XXI.
[9] This memorandum, which concludes the printed portion, must have
been added in view of the misconception which occurred in Knowles's
action of 1748.
[10] MS. additions by Boscawen.
_SIR GEORGE RODNEY_, 1782.[1]
[+MS. Signal Book in the Admiralty Library+.]
1. Line ahead at one cable.
2. Line abreast at one cable.
3. Quarter lines on various compass bearings.
4. When in line ahead to alter course to starboard or port
together--one gun for every point.[2]
5. The same when in line abreast.[2]
6. To form order of sailing.[3]
7. When in line of battle for the whole fleet to tack together.
8. When in line of battle for the next ship ahead or on the starboard
beam, which is at too great a distance, to close.
9. The same for the next astern or on the larboard beam.
10. (_Undetermined_.)
11. The fleet to form in two separate lines ahead at one cable's
distance, each division abreast of the other at two cables'
distance.[4]
12. (?) Particular ships to come under the admiral's stern without
hail.[5]
13. Ships to change stations in the line of battle.
14. When in chase for the headmost ship to engage the sternmost of
the enemy, and the next ship to pass, under cover of her fire, and
take the ship next ahead, and so on in succession, without respect to
seniority or the prescribed order of battle. To engage to windward or
leeward as directed by signal.[6]
15. The whole fleet being in chase, for some of the headmost ships to
draw into line of battle and engage the enemy's rear, at the same time
endeavouring to get up with their van. _Note_.--These ships to
form without any regard to seniority or the order of battle. The ship
nearest the enemy is to lead and the sternmost to bring up the
rear. _Signal_.--Red flag with white cross at main topmast-head
with one gun for five ships, and three for seven.[7]
16. When turning to windward in line of battle for the leading ship
to make known when she can weather the enemy. To be repeated from ship
to ship to the commander-in-chief. If he should stand on till the
sternmost ship can weather them, she is to make it known by hoisting a
common pennant at the fore topgallant mast-head; to be repeated as
before. The sternmost ship is likewise to do so whenever the squadron
shall be to windward of the enemy, and her commander shall judge
himself far enough astern of their rear to lead down out of their line
of fire.
17. When in line of battle ahead and to windward of the enemy, to
alter course to lead down to them: whereupon every ship is to steer
for the ship of the enemy which from the disposition of the two
squadrons it may be her lot to engage, notwithstanding the signal for
the line ahead will be kept flying.[8]
18. When to windward of the enemy or in any other position that will
admit, for the headmost ship to lead down out of their line of fire
and attack their rear, the second from the leader to pass under her
fire, and take the second ship of the enemy, and so on in
succession. To engage to starboard or larboard according to signal.
19. To come to a closer engagement.[9]
20. For particular ships to quit the line.
21. For particular ships to attack the enemy's convoy.[10]
22. For all fireships to prime.[11]
23. On discovering a superior force.
24. For three-decked and heavy ships to draw out of their places in
the line of battle, and form in the van or rear of the fleet.
25. To attack the enemy's centre.[12]
26. To attack the enemy's rear.[12]
27. To attack the enemy's van.[12]
28. To make sail ahead on a bearing from the admiral.[13]
29. In cruising to form line ahead or abreast at one or two miles'
distance.[14]
FOOTNOTES:
[1] The actual Additional Fighting Instructions used by Rodney for his
famous campaign of 1782 are lost; what follows are merely the drift of
those instructions so far as they can be determined from the references
to them in his signal book. It should be noted that by this time those
used in the Seven Years' War had been entirely recast in a more logical
form.
[2] _Cf._ Boscawen's Nos. 15 and 16.
[3] According to Sir Chas. H. Knowles the regular sailing formation at
this time for a large fleet was in three squadrons abreast, each formed
in bow and quarter line to starboard and port of its flag. He says it
was his father's treatise on Tactics which induced Howe to revert to
Hoste's method, and adopt the formation of squadrons abreast in line
ahead. This, he adds, Howe used for the first time when sailing to
relieve Gibraltar in 1782. Thenceforth it became the rule of the
service, and the subsequent signal books contain signals for forming
line of battle from two, three, and six columns of sailing respectively.
This Knowles regards as the great reform on which modern tactics were
founded. See his _Observations on Tactics_, 1830.
[4] _Cf._ Boscawen's No. 4.
[5] This may be an Additional Sailing Instruction, the various sets of
Additional Instructions not being distinguished in the signal book.
[6] This article may well have been the outcome of Hawke's defeat of
L'Etenduère in 1747, when he chased and engaged practically as the
instruction directs, and with complete success.
[7] _Cf._ Boscawen's Nos. 9 and 10.
[8] This appears to correspond to Article XXI. of the Additional
Fighting Instructions in use in 1780, to which Rodney referred in his
report on the action of April 17 in that year.
[9] _Cf._ Boscawen's No. 3.
[10] _Cf._ Boscawen's No. 2.
[11] _Cf._ Boscawen's No. 17.
[12] In connection with these three articles the following dictum
attributed to Rodney should be recalled: 'During all the commands Lord
Rodney has been entrusted with he made it a rule to bring his whole
force against a part of the enemy's, and never was so absurd as to bring
ship to ship when the enemy gave him an opportunity of acting
otherwise.' And _cf. supra_, p. 213.
[13] This may be an Additional Sailing Instruction.
[14] _Cf._ Boscawen's Nos. 5, 6 and 7. A number of other Additional
Instructions are referred to, but they seem to relate to Sailing,
Chasing or General Instructions. No more Fighting Instructions can be
identified.
_LORD HOODS ADDITIONS_, 1783.[1]
[+MS. Signal Book in the Admiralty Library+.]
1. For the ships to steer for (independent of each other) and engage
respectively the ships opposed to them.
2. When in line of battle, for the leading ship to carry as much sail
as her commander judges the worst sailing ship can preserve her
station with all her plain sail set.
3. To prepare to reef topsails together.
4. When in line of battle or otherwise for the men to go to dinner.
5. After an action for the ships to signify whether they are in a
condition to renew it.[2]
6. For ships in chase or looking out to alter course to port or
starboard.
7. To stay by or repair to the protection of prizes or ships under
convoy.
8. When fetching up with the enemy and to leeward, or on a contrary
tack, to break through their line, and to endeavour to cut off part of
their van or rear.
9. For the leading ship to cut through the enemy's line of battle.
10. To signify that the admiral will carry neither top nor stern
lights. _Note_.--The fleet immediately to close.
11. For particular ships to reconnoitre the enemy in view, and to
return to make known their number and force.
12. For a particular ship to keep between the fleet and that of the
enemy during the night, to communicate intelligence.[3]
13. To signify to a ship that she mistakes the signal that was made to
her.
14. To prepare to hoist French or Spanish colours.
15. For a particular ship to open her fire on the ship opposed to her.
16. When a ship is in distress in battle.
17. Signal to call attention of larboard or starboard line of the
division only.[4]
FOOTNOTES:
[1] See pp. 211-2. These additional signals are all added in paler
ink, with those made by Admiral Pigot. In the original they occur on
various pages without numbers. In the text above they have merely been
numbered consecutively for convenience of reference. Hood was made a
viscount September 12, 1782, and began to issue these orders on March
11, 1783, when he had a squadron placed under his command.
[2] Ascribed also to Pigot.
[3] Also ascribed to Pigot.
[4] The MS. has also an additional signal ascribed to Pigot for a
particular ship to cut through the enemy's line of battle, and for the
other ships to follow her in close order to support each other.