WILLIAM III AND ANNE
I. RUSSELL, 1691
II. ROOKE, 1703
LORD TORRINGTON, TOURVILLE AND HOSTE
INTRODUCTORY
No one document probably possesses so much importance for the history
of naval tactics as the instructions issued by Admiral Russell in
1691. Yet it is a remarkable thing that their tenour was
unknown--indeed their existence was wholly unsuspected--until a copy
of them was happily discovered in Holland by Sir William Laird
Clowes. By him it was presented to the United Service Institution, and
the thanks of the Society are due to him and the Institution that
these instructions are now at last available for publication.
They form part of a complete printed set of Fleet Instructions,
entitled 'Instructions made by the Right Honourable Edward Russell,
admiral, in the year 1691, for the better ordering of the fleet in
sailing by day and night, and in fighting.' Besides the Fighting
Instructions we have a full set of signals both for day and night
properly indexed, instructions for sailing in a fog, instructions to
be observed by younger captains to the elder, instructions for
masters, pilots, ketches, hoys, and smacks attending the fleet, and
the usual instructions for the encouragement of captains and companies
of fireships, small frigates and ketches. Now this is the precise form
in which all fleet instructions were issued, with scarcely any
alteration, up to the conclusion of the War of American
Independence,[1] and the peculiar importance of this set of articles
therefore is, that in them we have the first known example of those
stereotyped Fighting Instructions to which, as all modern writers seem
agreed, was due the alleged decadence of naval tactics in the
eighteenth century.
This being so, they clearly demand the most careful
consideration. 'The English,' says Captain Mahan in his latest
discussion of the subject, 'in the period of reaction which succeeded
the Dutch Wars produced their own caricature of systematised
tactics,[2] and this may be taken as well representing the current
judgment. But when we come to study minutely these orders of Russell,
and to study them in the light of the last of the Duke of York's and
the observations thereon in the _Admiralty Manuscript_, as well
as of the views of the great French admirals of the time, we may well
doubt whether the judgment does not require modification. We may
doubt, that is, whether Russell's orders, so far from being a
caricature of what had gone before, were not rather a sagacious
attempt to secure that increase of manoeuvring power and squadronal
control which had been found essential to any real advance in tactics.
In the first place, after noting that these instructions begin
logically with two articles for the formation of line ahead and
abreast, we are struck by this disappearance of the Duke of York's
article relating to 'dividing the enemy's fleet.' It is certainly to
this disappearance that is mainly due the belief that the new
instructions were retrograde. The somewhat hasty conclusion is
generally drawn that the manoeuvre of 'breaking the line' had been
introduced during the Dutch Wars, and forgotten immediately
afterwards. But, as we have already seen, the Duke of York's article
can hardly be construed as embodying the principle of concentration by
'breaking the line,' and 'containing.' As we know, it only applied to
an attack from the leeward which the English, and indeed every power
up to that time, did all they knew to avoid, and it cannot safely be
assumed to mean anything more than a device for gaining the wind of
part of the enemy when you cannot weather his whole fleet; while the
'containing' was intended to prevent the enemy's concentrating on the
squadron that performed the manoeuvre. Now, although Russell's
instructions lay down no rule for isolating and containing, they do
provide three new and distinct articles by which the admiral can do so
if he sees fit. Under the Duke of York's instructions, it will be
remembered, it was left to the van commander to execute the manoeuvre
of dividing the enemy's fleet as he saw his opportunity, and under
those of Lord Dartmouth it was left apparently to 'any commander.'
With all that can be said for leaving the greatest possible amount of
initiative to individual officers, such a system can hardly be called
satisfactory, and in any case so important a movement ought certainly
to be as far as possible under the control of the commander-in-chief.
But under the previous instructions he could not even initiate it by
signal. The defect had already been seen, and it will be remembered
that the additions and observations to this and the following articles
which the _Admiralty Manuscript_ contains are all directed to
remedying the omission. It is to exactly the same end that Russell's
orders seem designed, and if, as we shall see to be most probable,
they were really drawn up by Lord Torrington, we know that they were
used in this way at Beachy Head. Whether the idea of concentration and
containing was in the mind of their author we cannot tell for certain,
but at any rate the new instructions provide signals by which the
admiral can order such movements not only by any squadron, but even by
any subdivision he pleases. The freedom of individual initiative it is
true is gone, but this, as the _Admiralty MS_. indicates, was
done deliberately, not as a piece of reactionary pedantry, but as the
result of experience in battle. In all other respects the tactical
flexibility that was gained is obvious, and was fully displayed in the
first engagements in which the instructions were used.
So far as we can judge, the current view at this time was that where
fleets were equal, every known form of concentration was unadvisable
upon an unshaken enemy. The methods of the Duke of York's school were
regarded as having failed, and the result appears to have been to
convince tacticians that with the means at their disposal a strict
preservation of the line gave a sure advantage against an enemy who
attempted an attack by concentration. Tactics, in fact, in accordance
with a sound and inevitable law, having tended to become too
recklessly offensive, were exhibiting a reaction to the defensive. If
the enemy had succeeded in forming his line, it had come to be
regarded as too hazardous to attempt to divide his fleet unless you
had first forced a gap by driving ships out of the line. This idea we
see reflected in the 6th paragraph of the Duke of York's twenty-second
article (1673) and in Russell's new twenty-third article, enjoining
ships to close up any gap that may have been caused by the next ahead
or astern having been forced out of the line. Briefly stated, it may
be said that the preoccupation of naval tactics was now not so much to
break the enemy's line, as to prevent your own being broken.
But the matter did not end here. It was seen that when your own fleet
was superior, concentration was still practicable in various ways, and
particularly by doubling. Tacticians were now mainly absorbed in
working out this form of attack and the methods of meeting it, and
Russell's elaborate articles for handling squadrons and subdivisions
independently may well have had this intention.
The new phase of tactical opinion is that which we find expounded in
Père Hoste's famous work, _L' Art des armées navales, ou
Traité des évolutions navales_, published in 1697 at the
instigation of the Comte de Tourville. The author was a Jesuit, but
claims that he is merely giving the result of his experience while
serving with the great French admirals of that time, who had learned
all they knew either as allies or enemies of the English. 'For twelve
years,' he says in his apology for touching naval subjects, 'I have
had the honour of serving with Monsieur le Maréchal d'Estrées,
Monsieur le Duc de Mortemart, and Monsieur le Maréchal de Tourville
in all the expeditions they made in command of naval fleets; and
Monsieur le Maréchal de Tourville has been kind enough to
communicate to me his lights, bidding me write on a matter which I
think has never before been the subject of a treatise.'
The whole system of tactics that he develops is based, like Russell's,
on the single line ahead and the independent action of squadrons. The
passages in which he elaborates the central battle idea of
concentration by doubling are as follows: 'The fleet which is the more
numerous will try to extend on the enemy in such a manner as to leave
its rearmost ships astern, which will immediately turn [_se
repliera_] upon the enemy to double him, and put him between two
fires. _Remark I_.--If the more numerous fleet has the wind it
will be able more easily to turn its rear upon that of the enemy, and
put him between two fires. But if the more numerous fleet is to
leeward it ought none the less to leave its rear astern, because the
wind may shift in the fight. Besides, the fleet that is to leeward can
edge away insensibly in fighting to give its rearmost ships a chance
of doubling on the enemy by hugging the wind. _Remark II_.--I
know that many skilful people are persuaded that you ought to double
the enemy ahead; because, if the van of the enemy is once in disorder
it falls on the rest of the fleet and throws it infallibly into
confusion.' And by the aid of diagrams he proceeds to show that this
view is unsound, because the van can easily avoid the danger while the
rear cannot. To support his view he instances the entire success with
which at the battle of La Hogue, Russell, having the superior fleet,
doubled on Tourville's rear.
'To prevent being doubled,' he proceeds, 'you must absolutely prevent
the enemy from leaving ships astern of you, and to that end you may
adopt several devices when you are much inferior in number.
'I. If we have the wind we may leave some of the enemy's leading ships
alone, and cause our van to fall on their second division. In this
manner their first division will be practically useless, and if it
forces sail to tack upon us it will lose much time, and will put
itself in danger of being isolated by the calm which generally befalls
in this sort of action by reason of the great noise of the guns. We
may also leave a great gap in the centre of our fleet, provided the
necessary precautions be taken to prevent our van being cut off. By
these means, however inferior we be in numbers, we may prevent the
enemy leaving ships astern of us. _Example_.--Everyone did not
disapprove the manner in which Admiral Herbert disposed his fleet when
he engaged the French in the action of Bevesier [_i.e._ Beachy
Head] in the year 1690. He had some ships fewer than ours, and he had
determined to make his chief effort against our rear. That is why he
ordered the Dutch leading division to fall on our second division.
Then he opened his fleet in the centre, leaving a great gap opposite
our centre. After which, having closed up the English to very short
intervals, he opposed them to our rear, and held off somewhat with his
own division so as to prevent the French profiting by the gap which he
had left in his fleet to double the Dutch. This order rendered our
first division nearly useless, because it had to make a very long
board to tack on the enemy's van, and the wind having fallen, it was
put to it to be in time to share the glory of the action.[3]
'II. If the less numerous fleet is to leeward, the gap may be left
more in the centre and less in the van, but it is necessary to have a
small detachment of men-of-war and fireships so as to prevent the
enemy profiting by the gaps in the fleet to divide it.
'III. Others prefer to give as a general rule, that the flag officers
of the less numerous fleet attack the flag officers of the enemy's
fleet;[4] for by this means several of the enemy's ships remain
useless in the intervals, and the enemy cannot double you.
'IV. Others prefer that the three squadrons of the less numerous fleet
each attack a squadron of the more numerous fleet, taking care that
each squadron ranges up to the enemy in such a manner as not to leave
any of his ships astern, but rather leaving several vessels ahead.
'V. Finally, there are those who would have the less numerous fleet
put so great an interval between the ships as to equalise their line
with that of the enemy. But this last method is, without doubt, the
least good, because it permits the enemy to employ the whole of its
strength against the less numerous fleet. I agree, however, that this
method might be preferred to others in certain circumstances; as when
the enemy's ships are considerably less powerful than those of the
less numerous fleet.'
Having thus explained the system of doubling, he proceeds to give the
latest ideas of his chief on breaking the enemy's line, or, as it was
then called, passing through his fleet. 'We find,' he says, 'that in
the relations of the fights in the Channel between the English and the
Dutch that their fleets passed through one another.... In this manner
the two fleets passed through one another several times, which exposed
them to be cut off, taken, and mutually to lose several
ships. _Remark_.--This manoeuvre is as bold as it is delicate,
and consummate technical skill is necessary for it to succeed as
happily as it did with the Comte d'Estrées ... in the battle of the
Texel, in the year 1673, for he passed through the Zealand squadron,
weathered it, broke it up, and put the enemy into so great a disorder
that it settled the victory which was still in the balance.'[5]
After pointing out by diagrams various methods of parrying the
manoeuvre, he proceeds: 'I do not see, then, that we need greatly fear
the enemy's passing through us; and I do not even think that this
manoeuvre ought ever to be performed except under one of the three
following conditions: (1) If you are compelled to do it in order to
avoid a greater evil; (2) If the enemy by leaving a great gap in the
midst of his squadrons renders a part of his fleet useless; (3) If
several of his ships are disabled....
'Sometimes you are compelled to pass through the enemy's fleet to
rescue ships that the enemy has cut off, and in this case you must
risk something, but you should observe several precautions: (1) You
should close up to the utmost; (2) You should carry a press of sail
without troubling to fight in passing through the enemy; (3) The ships
that have passed ought to tack the moment they can to prevent the
enemy standing off on the same tack as the fleet that passes through
them.'
It is clear, then, that in the eyes of perhaps the finest fleet leader
of his time, and one of the finest France ever had, a man who
thoroughly understood the value of concentration, the method of
securing it by breaking the line was dangerous and unsound. In this
he thoroughly endorses the views contained in the 'Observations' of
the _Admiralty MS._ and the modifications of the standing order
which they suggest. Indeed, Hoste's remarks on breaking the line are,
in effect, little more than a logical elaboration of those ideas and
suggestions. In the 'Observations' we have the monition not to attempt
the manoeuvre 'unless an enemy press you on a lee shore.' We have the
signal for a squadron breaking the enemy's line, but only in order to
rejoin the main body, and we have the simple method of parrying the
move by tacking with an equal number of ships. The fundamental
principles of the problem in both the English and the French author
are the same, and a comparison of the two enables us to assert, with
no hesitation, that the manoeuvre of breaking the line was abandoned
by the tacticians of that era, not from ignorance nor from lack of
enterprise, but from a deliberate tactical conviction gained by
experience in war. In judging the apparent want of enterprise which
our own admirals began to display in action at this time, we should
probably be careful to refrain from joining in the unmitigated
contempt with which modern historians have so freely covered them. In
the typical battle of Malaga, for instance, Rooke did nothing but
carry out the principles which were the last word of Tourville's
brilliant career. Nor must it be forgotten that, although Rodney
executed the manoeuvre in 1782, and Hood provided a signal for its
revival which Howe at first adopted, it was never in much favour in
the British service, seeing that it was only adapted for an attack
from to leeward. The manoeuvre of breaking the line which Howe
eventually introduced was something wholly different both in form and
intention from what Rodney executed and from what was understood by
'dividing the fleet' in the seventeenth century.[6] How far the
system of doubling was approved by English admirals is doubtful. We
have seen that an 'Observation' in the _Admiralty Manuscript_
distrusts it,[7] but I have been able to find no other expression of
opinion on the point earlier than 1780, and that entirely condemns
it. It occurs in a set of fleet instructions drawn up for submission
to the admiralty by Admiral Sir Charles H. Knowles, Bart. As Knowles
was a pupil and _protégé_ of Rodney's, we may assume he was
in possession of the great tactician's ideas on the point; and in
these _Fighting and Sailing Instructions_ the following, article
occurs: 'To double the enemy's line--that is, to send a few unengaged
ships on one side to engage, while the rest are fighting on the
other--is rendering those ships useless. Every ship which is between
two, has not only her two broadsides opposed to theirs, but has
likewise their shot which cross in her favour.'[8] No signal was
provided for 'doubling' in Lord Howe's or the later signal books,
though Nelson certainly executed the manoeuvre at the Nile. It
survived however in the French service, and the English books provided
a signal for preventing its execution by a numerically superior
enemy. Sir Alexander Cochrane also revived it after Trafalgar.
Knowles's objection to the manoeuvre makes it easy to understand that,
however well it suited the French tactics of long bowls or boarding,
it was not well adapted to the English method of close action with the
guns. With the French service it certainly continued in favour, and
the whole of Hoste's rules were reproduced by the famous naval expert
Sébastien-Francois Bigot, Vicomte de Morogues--in his elaborate
_Tactique navale, ou traits des évolutions et des signaux_,
which appeared in 1763, and was republished at Amsterdam in 1779. Not
only was he the highest French authority on naval science of his time,
but a fine seaman as well, as he proved when in command of the
_Magnifique_ on the disastrous day at Quiberon.[9]
The remainder of the new instructions, though less important than the
expansion of the Duke of York's third article, all tend in the same
direction. So far from insisting on a rigid observance of the single
line ahead in all circumstances, the new system seems to aim at
securing flexibility, and the power of concentration by independent
action of squadrons. This is to be specially noted in the new
article, No. 30, in which signals are provided for particular
squadrons and particular divisions forming line of battle abreast. It
is true that the old rigid form of an attack from windward is
retained, but, ineffective as the system proved, it was certainly not
inspired, as is so often said, by a mediæval conception of naval
battle as a series of single ship actions. From what has been already
said, the well-considered tactical idea that underlay it is
obvious. The injunction to range the length of the enemy's line van to
van, and rear to rear, or _vice versa_, was aimed at avoiding
being doubled at either end of the line; while the injunction to bear
down together was obviously the quickest mode of bringing the whole
fleet into action without giving the enemy a chance of weathering any
part of it by 'gaining its wake.' That it was inadequate for this
purpose is well known. It would only work when the two fleets were
exactly parallel at the moment of bearing down--as was made apparent
at the battle of Malaga, where the French from leeward almost
succeeded in dividing Rooke's fleet as it bore down. Still the idea
was sound enough. The trouble was that it did not make sufficient
allowance for the unhandiness of ships of the line in those days, and
their difficulty in taking up or preserving exact formations.
As to the authorship of the articles, it must be remembered that the
mere fact that they were issued by Russell is not enough to attribute
them to him. He had had practically no previous experience as a flag
officer, and in all probability they followed more or less closely
those used by Lord Torrington in the previous year. Torrington was
first lord of the admiralty in 1689, and commander-in-chief of the
main fleet in 1690. It was not till after his acquittal in December of
that year that he was superseded by Russell. The instructions moreover
seem generally to be designed in close accordance with all we know of
Torrington's tactical practice, and it is scarcely doubtful that they
are due to his ripe experience and not to Russell.
That the point cannot be settled with absolute certainty is to be the
more lamented because henceforth this set of Fighting Instructions,
and not those of Rooke in 1703, must be taken as the dominating factor
of eighteenth-century tactics. Rooke's instructions, except for the
modification of a few articles, are the same as Russell's, and
consequently it has not been thought necessary to print them in
full. For a similar reason it has been found convenient to print such
slight changes as are known to have been made in the standing form
after 1703 as notes to the corresponding articles of Russell's
instructions.
FOOTNOTES:
[1] See Introductory Note to Rooke's Instructions of 1703, p. 197.
[2] _Types of Naval Officers_, p. 15.
[3] This plan of attack bears a strong resemblance to that which
Nelson intended to adopt at Trafalgar. 'Nelson,' says Captain Mahan,
'doubtless had in mind the dispositions of Tourville and De
Ruyter.'--_Life of Nelson_, ii. 351. Hoste, however, it would seem,
though a devout admirer of both Tourville and De Ruyter, gives the
credit to Lord Torrington. It was not introduced officially into the
British tactical system until Lord Howe adopted it in 1792. It was
retained in the subsequent Signal Books and Instructions.
[4] This proviso was added to the signal in the edition of 1799, and a
corresponding explanatory instruction (No. 24) was provided. See _post_,
p. 262.
[5] It should be remembered that neither the Dutch nor the English
accounts of the action at all endorse this view of D'Estrées's
behaviour. See also the _Admiralty MS._, p. 153, note 1.
[6] See _post_, pp. 245-9.
[7] _Ante_, p.152, note 1.
[8] Printed in 1798. A MS. note says 'These instructions were written
in 1780 and afterwards very much curtailed, though the general plan is
the same.'
[9] Lacour Gayet, _La marine militaire de la France sous Louis_ XV,
1902, pp. 214-5.
_ADMIRAL EDWARD RUSSELL_, 1691.
[+From a printed copy in the Library of the United Service
Institution+.]
_Fighting Instructions_.
I. When the admiral would have the fleet draw into a line of battle,
one ship ahead of another (according to the method given to each
captain), he will hoist a union flag at the mizen peak, and fire a
gun; and every flagship in the fleet is to make the same signal.[1]
II. When the admiral would have the fleet draw into a line of battle,
one ship abreast of another (according to the method given to each
captain), he will hoist a union flag and a pennant at the mizen-peak,
and fire a gun; and every flagship in the fleet is to do the same.
III. When the admiral would have the admiral of the white and his
whole squadron to tack, and endeavour to gain the wind of the enemy,
he will spread a white flag under the flag at the main top-mast-head,
and fire a gun, which is to be answered by the flagships in the fleet;
and when he would have the admiral of the blue do the same, he will
spread a blue flag on that place.
IV. When the admiral would have the vice-admiral of the red, and his
division, tack and endeavour to gain the wind of the enemy, he will
spread a red flag from the cap at the fore topmast-head downward on
the backstay. If he would have the vice-admiral of the white do the
same, a white flag; if the vice-admiral of the blue, a blue flag at
the same place.
V. When the admiral would have the rear-admiral of the red and his
division tack and endeavour to gain the wind of the enemy, he will
hoist a red flag at the flagstaff at the mizen topmast-head; if the
rear-admiral of the white, a white flag; if the rear-admiral of the
blue, a blue flag at the same place, and under the flag a pennant of
the same colour.
VI. If the admiral be to leeward of the fleet, or any part of the
fleet, and he would have them bear down into his wake or grain, he
will hoist a blue flag at the mizen peak.
VII. If the admiral be to leeward of the enemy, and his fleet, or any
part of them, to leeward of him, that he may bring those ships into a
line, he will bear up with a blue flag at the mizen peak under the
union flag, which is the signal for the line of battle; and then those
ships to leeward are to use their utmost endeavour to get into his
wake or grain, according to their stations in the line of battle.
VIII. If the fleet be sailing before the wind, and the admiral would
have the vice-admiral and the ships of the starboard quarter to clap
by the wind, and come to the starboard tack, then he will hoist upon
the mizen topmast-head a red flag. And in case he would have the
rear-admiral and the ships of the larboard quarter to come to their
larboard tack, then he will hoist up a blue flag at the same place.
IX. When the admiral would have the van of the fleet to tack first,
he will put abroad the union flag at the flagstaff on the fore
topmast-head, and fire a gun, if the red flag be not abroad; but if
the red flag be abroad, then the fore topsails shall be lowered a
little, and the union flag shall be spread from the cap of the fore
topmast downwards, and every flagship in the fleet is to do the same.
X. When the admiral would have the rear-admiral of the fleet tack
first, he will hoist the union flag on the flagstaff at the mizen
topmast-head, and fire a gun, which is to be answered by every
flagship in the fleet.
XI. When the admiral would have all the flagships in the fleet come
into his wake or grain, he will hoist a red flag at the mizen peak,
and fire a gun; and the flagships in the fleet are to make the same
signal.
XII. When the admiral would have the admiral of the white and his
squadron make more sail, though himself shorten sail, he will hoist a
white flag on the ensign staff; if the admiral of the blue, or he that
commands in the third post, a blue flag at the same place; and every
flagship in the fleet is to make the same signal.
XIII. As soon as the admiral shall hoist a red flag on the flagstaff
at the fore topmast-head, every ship in the fleet is to use their
utmost endeavour to engage the enemy, in the order the admiral has
prescribed unto them.[2]
XIV. When the admiral hoisteth a white flag at the mizen peak, then
all the small frigates of his squadron that are not in the line of
battle are to come under his stern.
XV. If the fleet is sailing by a wind in a line of battle, and the
admiral would have them brace their headsails to the mast, he will
hoist a yellow flag on the flagstaff at the mizen topmast-head, and
fire a gun; which the flagships in the fleet are to answer. Then the
ships in the rear are to brace to first.
XVI. The fleet lying in a line of battle, with their headsails to the
mast, and if the admiral would have them fill and stand on, he will
hoist a yellow flag on the flagstaff at the fore topmast-head, and
fire a gun; which the flagships in the fleet are to answer. Then the
ships in the van are to fill first, and to stand on. If it happen,
when this signal is to be made, that the red flag is abroad on the
flagstaff at the fore topmast-head, the admiral will spread the yellow
flag under the red.
XVII. If the admiral see the enemy's fleet standing towards him, and
he has the wind of them, the van of the fleet is make sail till they
come the length of the enemy's rear, and our rear abreast of the
enemy's van; then he that is in the rear of our fleet is to tack
first, and every ship one after another, as fast as they can,
throughout the line, that they may engage on the same tack with the
enemy. But in case the enemy's fleet should tack in their rear, our
fleet is to do the same with an equal number of ships; and whilst they
are in fight with the enemy, to keep within half a cable's length one
of another, or if the weather be bad, according to the direction of
the commanders.
When the admiral would have the ship that leads the van of the fleet
(or the headmost ship in the fleet) when they are in a line of battle,
hoist, lower, set or haul up any of his sails, the admiral will spread
a yellow flag under that at the main topmast-head, and fire a gun;
which the flagships that have flags at the main topmast-head are to
answer; and those flagships that have not, are to hoist the yellow
flag on the flagstaff at the main topmast-head, and fire a gun. Then
the admiral will hoist, lower, set or haul up the sail he would have
the ship that leads the van do.
XVIII. If the admiral and his fleet have the wind of the enemy, and
they have stretched themselves in a line of battle, the van of the
admiral's fleet is to steer with the van of the enemy's and there to
engage them.
XIX. Every commander is to take care that his guns are not fired till
he is sure he can reach the enemy upon a point-blank; and by no means
to suffer his guns to be fired over by any of our own ships.
XX. None of the ships in the fleet shall pursue any small number of
the enemy's ships till the main body be disabled or run.
XXI. If any of the ships in the fleet are in distress, and make the
signal, which is a weft with the jack or ensign, the next ship to them
is strictly required to relieve them.
XXII. If the admiral, or any flagship, should be in distress, and
make the usual signal, the ships in the fleet are to endeavour to get
up as close into a line, between him and the enemy, as they can;
having always an eye to defend him, if the enemy should come to annoy
him in that condition.
XXIII. In case any ship in the fleet should be forced to go out of
the line to repair damages she has received in battle the next ships
are to close up the line.
XXIV. If any flagship be disabled, the flag may go on board any ship
of his own squadron or division.
XXV. If the enemy be put to the run, and the admiral thinks it
convenient the whole fleet shall follow them, he will make all the
sail he can himself after the enemy, and fire two guns out of his
fore-chase; then every ship in the fleet is to use his best endeavour
to come up with the enemy, and lay them on board.
XXVI. If the admiral would have any particular flagship, and his
squadron, or division, give chase to the enemy, he will make the same
signal that is appointed for that flagship's tacking with his squadron
or division, and weathering the enemy.
XXVII. When the admiral would have them give over chase, he will
hoist a white flag at the fore topmast-head and fire a gun.
XXVIII. In case any ship in the line of battle should be disabled in
her masts, rigging or hull, the ship that leads ahead of her shall
take her a-tow and the division she is in shall make good the line
with her. But the commander of the ship so disabled is not on any
pretence whatever to leave his station till he has acquainted his flag
or the next flag officer with the condition of his ship, and received
his directions therein. And in case any commander shall be wanting in
his duty, his flag or the next flag officer to him is immediately to
send for the said commander from his ship and appoint another in his
room.
XXIX. If the admiral would have any flag in his division or squadron
cut or slip in the daytime, he will make the same signals that are
appointed for those flagships, and their division or squadron, to tack
and weather the enemy, as is expressed in the third, fourth, fifth,
and sixth articles before going.
XXX. When the admiral would have the red squadron draw into a line of
battle, abreast of one another, he will put abroad a flag striped red
and white on the flagstaff at the main topmast-head, with a pennant
under it, and fire a gun. If he would have the white squadron, or
those that have the second post in the fleet, to do the like, the
signal shall be a flag striped red, white, and blue, with a pennant
under it, at the aforesaid place. And if he would have the blue
squadron to do the like he will put on the said place a Genoese
ensign, together with a pennant. But when he would have either of the
said squadrons to draw into a line of battle, ahead of one another, he
will make the aforesaid signals, without a pennant; which signals are
to be answered by the flagships only of the said squadrons, and to be
kept out till I take in mine. And if the admiral would have any
vice-admiral of the fleet and his division draw into a line of battle
as aforesaid, he will make the same signals at the fore topmast-head
that he makes for that squadron at the main topmast-head. And for any
rear-admiral in the fleet and his division, the same signals at the
mizen topmast-head; which signals are to be answered by the vice- or
rear-admiral.
FOOTNOTES:
[1] The instructions under which Mathews fought his action off Toulon
in 1744 add here the words 'and every ship is to observe and keep the
same distance those ships do which are next the admiral, always taking
it from the centre.' They were a MS. addition made by Mathews himself.
See 'V. A----l L----k's Rejoinder to A----l M----ws's Replies' in a
pamphlet entitled _Original Letters and Papers between Adm----l M----ws
and V. Adm----l L----k_. London, 1744, p. 31. From an undated copy of
Fighting Instructions in the Admiralty Library we know that this
addition was subsequently incorporated into the standing form.
[2] The instructions of 1744, as quoted in the Mathews-Lestock
controversy, add here the words 'and strictly to take care not to fire
before the signal be given by the admiral.' This appears also to have
been an addition made by Mathews in 1744. It was clumsily incorporated
in the subsequent standing form thus: 'to engage the enemy and on no
account to fire before the admiral shall make the signal, in the order
the admiral has prescribed unto them.' See note to Article I., _supra._
THE PERMANENT INSTRUCTIONS, 1703-1783
INTRODUCTORY
These like Russell's are extracted from a complete printed set, also
presented to the United Service Institution by Sir W. Laird Clowes,
and entitled, 'Instructions for the directing and governing her
majesty's fleet in sailing and fighting, by the Right Honourable Sir
George Rooke, Knight, Vice-Admiral of England, and admiral and
commander-in-chief of her majesty's fleet. In the year 1703.' They
also contain all the other matter as in Russell's, while another copy
has bound with it all the fleet articles of war under the hand of
Prince George of Denmark, then lord high admiral.
As they were not issued till 1703, the second year of the war, in
which Rooke did nothing but carry out a barren cruise in the Bay of
Biscay, we may assume that the Cadiz expedition of 1702 proceeded
under Russell's old instructions of the previous war. It was under
Rooke's new instructions, however, that the battle of Malaga was
fought in 1704. They were certainly in force in 1705, for a copy of
them exists in the log book of the Britannia for that year (_British
Museum, Add. MSS_. 28126, ff. 21-27). They were also used by Sir
Clowdisley Shovell during his last command; as we know by a printed
copy with certain manuscript additions of his own, relating to chasing
and armed boats, which he issued to his junior flag officer, Sir John
Norris, in the Mediterranean, on April 25, 1707 (_British Museum,
Add. MSS._ 28140). Nor is there any trace of their having been
changed during the remainder of the war. At the battle of Malaga they
were very strictly observed, and in the opinion of the time with an
entirely satisfactory result; that is to say that, although Rooke's
ships were foul and very short of ammunition, he was able to prevent
Toulouse breaking his line and so to fight a defensive action, which
saved Gibraltar from recapture, and discredited the French navy to
such an extent that thenceforth it was entirely neglected by Louis
XIV's government, and gave little more trouble to our fleets.
Though no copy of these Fighting Instructions has been found with a
later date than 1707, we know that with very slight modifications they
continued in use down to the peace of 1783. The evidence is to be
found scattered in proceedings of courts-martial, in chance references
in admirals despatches, and in signal books. For instance, in the
'Mathews and Lestock Tracts' _(British Museum_, 518, g), which
deal with the courts-martial that followed the ill-fought action off
Toulon in 1744, eight of the articles then in force are printed. All
of them have the same numbering as the corresponding articles of 1703,
six are identical in wording, and two, Numbers I. and XIII., have only
the slight modifications which Admiral Mathews made, and which have
been given above in notes to the similar articles in Russell's
set. These modifications, as we have seen, were subsequently
incorporated into the standing form, and appear in the undated copy of
the complete Fighting Instructions in the Admiralty Library. Again,
Article XIV. of 1703 is referred to in the Additional Fighting
Instructions issued by Boscawen in 1759.[1] According to a MS. note
by Sir C.H. Knowles they were re-issued in 1772 and 1778, and Keppel
in 1778 was charged under Article XXXI. of 1703. Finally, there is in
the Admiralty Library a manuscript signal book prepared by an officer,
who was present at Rodney's great action of April 12, 1782. In this
book, in which 1783 is the last date mentioned, there is inserted
beside each signal the number of the article in the printed Fighting
Instructions to which it related. In this way we are able to fix the
purport of some twenty articles, and all of these correspond exactly
both in intention and number with those of 1703.
FOOTNOTE:
[1] See below, p. 224.
_SIR GEORGE ROOKE_, 1703.
[+From a printed copy in the Library of the United Service
Institution+.]
Articles I. to XVI.--[_The same as Russell's of_ 1691, _except
for slight modifications of wording and signals_.][1]
Art. XVII.--If the admiral see the enemy's fleet standing towards him
and he has the wind of them, the van of the fleet is to make sail till
they come the length of the enemy's rear and our rear abreast of the
enemy's van; then he that is in the rear of our fleet is to tack
first, every ship one after another as fast as they can, throughout
the line. And if the admiral would have the whole fleet tack
together, the sooner to put them in a posture of engaging the enemy,
then he will hoist the union flag on the flagstaff's[2] at the fore
and mizen mast-heads and fire a gun; and all the flagships in the
fleet are to do the same. But in case the enemy's fleet should tack in
their rear, our fleet is to do the same with an equal number of ships,
and whilst they are in fight with the enemy to keep within half a
cable's length one of another, or if the weather be bad, according to
the direction of the commander.
Art. XVIII.--[_Same as the remainder of Russell's XVII_.] When
the admiral would have the ship that leads the van ... by the
flagships of the fleet.
Arts. XIX. to XXIII.--[_Same as Russell's XVIII. to XXII_.]
Art. XXIV.--[_Replacing Russell's XXIII. and XXVIII_.] No ship in
the fleet shall leave his station upon any pretence whatsoever till he
has acquainted his flag or the next flag officer to him with the
condition of his ship and received his direction herein. But in case
any ship shall do so, the next ships are to close up the line.[3]
And if any commander shall be wanting in doing his duty, his flag or
the next flag officer to him is immediately to send for the said,
commander from his ship and appoint another in his room.[4]
Arts. XXV. to XXVII., XXIX. and XXX.--[_Same as Russell's_.]
Art. XXXI.--When the admiral would have the fleet draw into a line of
battle one astern of the other with a large wind, and if he would have
those lead who are to lead with their starboard tacks aboard by a
wind, he will hoist a red and white flag at the mizen peak and fire a
gun; and if he would have those lead who are to lead with their
larboard tacks aboard by a wind, he will hoist a Genoese flag at the
same place and fire a gun; which is to be answered by the flagships of
the fleet.
Art. XXXII.--When the fleet is in the line of battle, the signals that
are made by the admiral for any squadron or particular division are to
be repeated by all the flags that are between the admiral and that
squadron or division to whom the signal is made.
FOOTNOTES:
[1] The modifications consist mainly in adding a gun to several of the
flag signals, and enjoining the flagships to repeat them.
[2] The undated admiralty copy (_post_ 1744) has 'flagstaves.'
[3] This manoeuvre was finely executed by Sir Clowdisley Shovell with
the van squadron at the battle of Malaga.
[4] Burchett, the secretary of the navy, in his _Naval History_
censures Benbow for not having acted on this instruction in 1702 or
rather on No. 28 of 1691.