THE THIRD DUTCH WAR TO THE REVOLUTION
I. THE DUKE OF YORK, 1672-3
II. SIR JOHN NARBROUGH, 1678
III. THE EARL OF DARTMOUTH, 1688
PROGRESS OF TACTICS DURING THE THIRD DUTCH WAR
INTRODUCTORY
For the articles issued by the Duke of York at the outbreak of the
Third Dutch War in March 1672 we are again indebted to Lord
Dartmouth's naval manuscripts. They exist there, copied into the
beginning of an 'Order Book' which by internal evidence is shown to
have belonged to Sir Edward Spragge. It is similar to the so-called
'Royal Charles Sea Book,' and is nearly all blank, but contains two
orders addressed by Rupert to Spragge, April 29 and May 22, 1673, and
a resolution of the council of war held on board the Royal Charles on
May 27, deciding to attack the Dutch fleet in the Schoonveldt and to
take their anchorage if they retired into Flushing.
The orders are not dated, but, as they are signed 'James' and
countersigned 'M. Wren,' their date can be fixed to a time not later
than the spring of 1672, for Dr. Matthew Wren, F.R.S., died on June 14
in that year, having served as the lord admiral's secretary since
1667, when Coventry resigned his commissionership of the navy. They
consist of twenty-six articles, which follow those of the late war so
closely that it has not been thought worth while to print them except
in the few cases where they vary from the older ones.
They are accompanied however in the 'Sea Book' by three 'Further
Instructions,' which do not appear in any previous set. They are of
the highest importance and mark a great stride in naval tactics, a
stride which owing to Granville Penn's error is usually supposed to
have been taken in the previous war. For the first time they
introduced rules for engaging when the two fleets get contact on
opposite tacks, and establish the much-abused system of stretching the
length of the enemy's line and then bearing down together. But it must
be noted that this rule only applies to the case where the fleets are
approaching on opposite tacks and the enemy is to leeward. There is
also a peremptory re-enunciation of the duty of keeping the line and
the order enforced by the penalty of death for firing 'over any of our
own ships.' Here then we have apparently a return to the Duke of
York's belief in formal tactics, and it is highly significant that,
although the twenty-six original articles incorporate and codify all
the other scattered additional orders of the last war, they entirely
ignore those issued by Monck and Rupert during the Four Days' Battle.
We have pretty clear evidence of the existence at this period of two
schools of tactical opinion, which after all is no more than
experience would lead us to suspect, and which Pepys's remarks have
already indicated. As usual there was the school, represented by the
Duke of York and Penn, which inclined to formality, and by pedantic
insistence on well-meant principles tended inevitably to confuse the
means with the end. On the other hand we have the school of Monck and
Rupert, which was inclined anarchically to submit all rules to the
solvent of hard fighting, and to take tactical risks and unfetter
individual initiative to almost any extent rather than miss a chance
of overpowering the enemy by a sudden well-timed blow. Knowing as we
do the extent to which the principles of the Duke of York's school
hampered the development of fleet tactics till men like Hawke and
Nelson broke them down, we cannot but sympathise with their
opponents. Nor can we help noting as curiously significant that
whereas it was the soldier-admirals who first introduced formal
tactics, it was a seaman's school that forced them to pedantry in the
face of the last of the soldier-school, who tried to preserve their
flexibility, and keep the end clear in view above the means they had
invented.
Still it would be wrong to claim that either school was right. In
almost every department of life two such schools must always exist,
and nowhere is such conflict less inevitable than in the art of war,
whether by sea or land. Yet just as our comparatively high degree of
success in politics is the outcome of the perpetual conflict of the
two great parties in the state, so it is probably only by the conflict
of the two normal schools of naval thought that we can hope to work
out the best adjusted compromise between free initiative and
concentrated order.
It was the school of Penn and the Duke of York that triumphed at the
close of these great naval wars. The attempt of Monck and Rupert to
preserve individual initiative and freedom to seize opportunities was
discarded, and for nearly a century formality had the upper hand. Yet
the Duke of York must not be regarded as wholly hostile to initiative
or unwilling to learn from his rivals. The second and most remarkable
of the new instructions acquits him. This is the famous article in
which was first laid down the principle of cutting off a part of the
enemy's fleet and 'containing' the rest.
Though always attributed to the Duke of York it seems almost certainly
to have been suggested by the tactics of Monck and Rupert on the last
day of the Four Days' Battle, June 4, 1666. According to the official
account, they sighted the Dutch early in the morning about five
leagues on their weather-bow, with the wind at SSW. 'At eight
o'clock,' it continues, 'we came up with them, and they having the
weather-gage put themselves in a line to windward of us. Our ships
then which were ahead of Sir Christopher Myngs [who was to lead the
fleet] made an easy sail, and when they came within a convenient
distance lay by; and the Dutch fleet having put themselves in order we
did the like. Sir Christopher Myngs, vice-admiral of the prince's
fleet, with his division led the van. Next his highness with his own
division followed, and then Sir Edward Spragge, his rear-admiral; and
so stayed for the rest of the fleet, which came up in very good
order. By such time as our whole fleet was come up we held close upon
a wind, our starboard tacks aboard, the wind SW and the enemy bearing
up to fall into the middle of our line with part of their fleet. At
which, as soon as Sir Christopher Myngs had their wake, he tacked and
stood in, and then the whole line tacked in the wake of him and stood
in. But Sir C. Myngs in fighting being put to the leeward, the prince
thought fit to keep the wind, and so led the whole line through the
middle of the enemy, the general [Monck] with the rest of the fleet
following in good order.'
The account then relates how brilliantly Rupert fought his way
through, and proceeds, 'After this pass, the prince being come to the
other side and standing out, so that he could weather the end of their
fleet, part of the enemy bearing up and the rest tacking, he tacked
also, and his grace [Monck] tacking at the same time bore up to the
ships to the leeward, the prince following him; and so we stood along
backward and forward, the enemy being some to windward and some to
leeward of us; which course we four times repeated, the enemy always
keeping the greatest part of their fleet to windward, but still at so
much distance as to be able to reach our sails and rigging with their
shot and to keep themselves out of reach of our guns, the only
advantage they thought fit to take upon us at this time. But the
fourth time we plying them very sharply with our leeward guns in
passing, their windward ships bore up to relieve their leeward party;
upon which his highness tacked a fifth time and with eight or ten
frigates got to the windward of the enemy's whole fleet, and thinking
to bear in upon them, his mainstay and main topmast being terribly
shaken, came all by the board.' Monck not being able to tack for
wounded masts 'made up to the prince,' and then the Dutch, after a
threat to get between the two admirals, suddenly bore away before the
wind for Flushing.[1]
The manoeuvre by which Myngs attempted from to windward to divide the
enemy's fleet and so gain the wind of part of it seems to be exactly
what the new instruction contemplated, while its remarkable provision
for a containing movement seems designed to prevent the disastrous
confusion that ensued after the Dutch line had been broken. This
undoubtedly is the great merit of the new instruction, and it is the
first time, so far as is known, that the principle of containing was
ever enunciated. In this it compares favourably with everything we
know of until Nelson's famous memorandum. Its relations to Rodney's
and Howe's manoeuvres for breaking the line must be considered
later. For the present it will suffice to note that it seems designed
rather as a method of gaining the wind than as a method of
concentration, and that the initiation of the manoeuvre is left to the
discretion of the leading flag officer, and cannot be signalled by the
commander-in-chief.
As to the date at which these three 'Further Instructions' were first
drawn up there is some difficulty. It is possible that they were not
entirely new in 1672, but that their origin, at least in design, went
back to the close of the Second War. In Spragge's first 'Sea Book'
there is another copy of them identical except for a few verbal
differences with those in the second 'Sea Book.' In the first 'Sea
Book' they appear on the back of a leaf containing some 'Sailing
Instructions by the Duke of York,' which are dated November 16, 1666,
and this is the latest date in the book. Moreover in this copy they
are headed 'Additional Instructions to be observed in the next
engagement,' as though they were the outcome of a previous
action. Now, as Wren died on June 10 (o.s.), and the battle of
Solebay, the first action of the Third War, was fought on May 28
(o.s.), it is pretty clear that it must have been the Second War and
not the Third that was in Spragge's mind at the time. Still if we have
to put them as early as November 1666 it leaves the question much
where it was. Besides the idea of containing the main body of the
enemy after cutting off part of his fleet, the death penalty for
firing over the line is obviously designed to meet certain regrettable
incidents known to have occurred in the Four Days' Battle. Nor is
there any evidence that they were used in the St. James's fight of
July 25, and as this was the last action in the war fought, the 'next
engagement' did not take place till the Third War. It is fairly clear
therefore that we must regard these remarkable orders as resulting
from the experience of the Second War, and as having been first put in
force during the Third one.
After the battle of Solebay these supplementary articles were
incorporated into the regular instructions as Articles 27 to 29. This
appears from a MS. book belonging to Lord Dartmouth entitled 'Copies
of instructions and other papers relating to the fleets. Anno 1672' It
contains a complete copy of both Sailing and Fighting Instructions,
with a detailed 'order of sailing' for the combined Anglo-French
fleet, dated July 2, 1672, and a corresponding 'order of battle' dated
August 1672. It also contains the flag officers' reports made to the
Duke of York after the battle.
Instructions for the 'Encouragement for the captains and companies of
fireships, small frigates, and ketches,' now appear for the first
time, and were repeated in some form or other in all subsequent
orders.
Finally, it has been thought well to reprint from Granville Penn's
_Memorials of Penn_ the complete set of articles which he gives
in Appendix L. No date is attached to them; Granville Penn merely says
they were subsequent to 1665, and has thereby left an unfortunate
impression, adopted by himself and almost every naval historian, both
British and foreign, that followed him, that they were used in the
campaign of 1666, that is, in the Second Dutch War. From the fact
however that they incorporate the 'Further Instructions for Fighting'
countersigned by Wren, we know that they cannot have been earlier than
1667, while the newly discovered MS. of Lord Dartmouth makes it
practically certain they must have been later than August 1672. We may
even go further.
For curiously enough there is no evidence that these orders, on which
so much doubtful reasoning has been based, were ever in force at all
as they stand. No signed copy of them is known to exist. The copy
amongst the Penn papers in the British Museum which Granville Penn
followed is a draft with no signature whatever. It is possible
therefore that they were never signed. In all probability they were
completed by James early in 1673 for the coming campaign, but had not
actually been issued when, in March of that year, the Test Act
deprived him of his office of lord high admiral, and brought his
career as a seaman to an end. What orders were used by his successor
and rival Rupert is unknown.
Of even higher interest than this last known set of the Duke of York's
orders are certain additions and observations which were subsequently
appended to them by an unknown hand. As it has been found impossible
to fix with certainty either their date or author, I have given them
by way of notes to the text. They are to be found in a beautifully
written and richly bound manuscript in the Admiralty Library. At the
end of the volume, following the Instructions, are diagrammatic
representations of certain actions in the Third Dutch War, finely
executed in water-colour to illustrate the formation for attack, and
to every plan are appended tactical notes relating to the actions
represented, and to others which were fought in the same way. The
first one dealt with is the 'St. James's Fight,' fought on July 25,
1666, and the dates in the tactical notes, as well as in the
'Observations' appended to the articles, range as far as the last
action fought in 1673. The whole manuscript is clearly intended as a
commentary on the latest form of the duke's orders, and it may safely
be taken as an expression of some tactician's view of the lessons that
were to be drawn from his experience of the Dutch Wars.
As to the authorship, the princely form in which the manuscript has
been preserved might suggest they were James's own meditations after
the war; but the tone of the 'Observations,' and the curious revival
of the word 'general' for 'commander-in-chief,' are enough to negative
such an attribution. Other indications that exist would point to
George Legge, Lord Dartmouth. His first experience of naval warfare
was as a volunteer and lieutenant under his cousin, Sir Edward
Spragge, in 1665. Spragge was in fact his 'sea-daddy,' and with one
exception all the examples in the 'Observations' are taken from
incidents and movements in which Spragge was the chief actor. One long
observation is directed to precautions to be taken by flag officers in
shifting their flags in action, so as to prevent a recurrence of the
catastrophe which cost Spragge his life. Indeed, with the exception of
Jordan, Spragge is the only English admiral mentioned. Dartmouth was
present at all the actions quoted, and succeeded in constituting
himself a sufficient authority on naval affairs to be appointed in
1683 to command the first important fleet that was sent out after the
termination of the war. These indications however are far too slight
to fix him with the authorship, and his own orders issued in 1688 go
far to rebut the presumption.[2]
Another possible author is Arthur Herbert, afterwards Lord
Torrington. He too had served a good deal under Spragge, and had been
present at all the battles named. This conjecture would explain the
curious expression used in the observation to the seventh instruction,
'The battle fought in 1666.' There was of course more than one battle
fought in 1666, but Herbert was only present in that of July 25th, the
'St. James's Fight,' represented in the manuscript--and it was his
first action. But here again all is too vague for more than a mere
guess.
But whoever was the author, the manuscript is certainly inspired by
someone of position who had served in the last two Dutch Wars, and its
undeniable importance is that it gives us clearly the development of
tactical thought which led to the final form of Fighting Instructions
adopted under William III, and continued till the end of the
eighteenth century. The developments which it foreshadows will
therefore be best dealt with when we come to consider those
instructions. For the present it will be sufficient to note the
changes suggested. In the first place we have a desire to simplify
signals and to establish repeating ships. Secondly, for the sake of
clearness the numbering of the articles is changed, every paragraph to
which a separate signal is attached being made a separate instruction,
so that with new instructions we have thirty-three articles instead of
James's twenty-four. Thirdly, we have three new instructions
proposed: viz., No. 5, removing from flag officers the right to divide
the enemy's fleet at their discretion without signal from the admiral;
No. 8, giving a signal for any squadron that has weathered part of the
enemy by dividing or otherwise to bear down and come to close action;
and No. 17, for such a squadron to bear down through the enemy's line
and rejoin the admiral. All of these rules are obviously the outcome
of known incidents in the late war. There are also suggested additions
or alterations to the old articles to the following effect: (1) When
commanders are in doubt or out of sight of the admiral, they are to
press the headmost ships of the enemy all they can; (2) When the enemy
'stays to fight' they are to concentrate on his weathermost ships,
instead of his headmost, as under the old rule; (3) Finally, while
preserving the line, they are to remember that their first duty is 'to
press the weathermost ships and relieve such as are in distress.'
It is this last addition to the Duke of York's sixteenth article that
contains the pith of the author's ideas. All his examples are chosen
to show that the system of bearing down together from windward in a
line parallel to that of the enemy is radically defective, even if all
the advantages of position and superior force are with you, and for
this reason--that if you succeed in defeating part of the enemy's line
you cannot follow up your success with the victorious part of your own
without sacrificing your advantage of position, and giving the enemy a
chance of turning the tables on you. Thus, if your rear defeats the
enemy's rear and follows it up, your own line will be broken, and as
your rear in pressing its beaten opponents falls to leeward of the
enemy's centre and van it will expose itself to a fatal
concentration. His own view of the proper form of attack from windward
is to bear down upon the van or weathermost ships of the enemy in line
ahead on a course oblique to the enemy's line. In this way, he points
out, you can concentrate on the ships attacked, and as they are beaten
you can deal with the next in order. For so long as you keep your own
line intact and in good order, regardless of your rear being at first
too distant to engage, you will always have fresh ships coming into
action at the vital point, and will thus be able gradually to roll up
the enemy's line without ever disturbing your own order. Fortifying
himself with the reflection that 'there can be no greater
justification than matter of fact,' he proceeds to instance various
battles in the late wars to show that this oblique form of attack
always led to a real victory, whereas whenever the parallel form was
adopted, though in some cases we had everything in our favour and had
fairly beaten the Dutch, yet no decisive result was obtained.
From several points of view these observations are of high
interest. Not only do they contain the earliest known attempt to get
away from the unsatisfactory method of engaging in parallel lines ship
to ship, but in seeking a substitute for it they seem to foreshadow
the transition from the Elizabethan idea of throwing the enemy into
confusion to the eighteenth century idea of concentration on his most
vulnerable part. In so far as the author recommends a concentration on
the weathermost ships his idea is sound, as they were the most
difficult for the enemy to support; but since the close-hauled line
had come in, they were also the van, and a concentration on the van is
theoretically unsound, owing to the fact that the centre and rear came
up naturally to its relief. To this objection he appears to attach no
weight, partly because no doubt he was still influenced by the old
intention of throwing the enemy into confusion.[3] For since the
line ahead had taken the place of the old close formations it seemed
that to disable the leading ships came to the same thing as disabling
the weathermost. The solution eventually arrived at was of course a
concentration on the rear, but to this at the time there were
insuperable objections. The rear was normally the most leewardly end
of the line, and an oblique attack on it could be parried by wearing
together. The rear then became the van, and the attack if persisted in
would fall on the leading squadron with the rest of the fleet to
windward--the worst of all forms of attack. The only possible way
therefore of concentrating on the rear was to isolate it and contain
the van by cutting the line. But in the eyes of our author and his
school cutting the line stood condemned by the experience of war.[4]
In his 'Observations' he clearly indicates the reasons. He would
indeed forbid the manoeuvre altogether except when your own line
outstretches that of the enemy, or when you are forced to pass through
the enemy's fleet to save yourself from being pressed on a lee
shore. The reasons given are the disorder it generally causes, the
ease with which it is parried, and the danger of your own ships firing
on each other when as the natural consequence of the manoeuvre they
proceed to double on the enemy. The fact is that fleet evolutions were
still in too immature a condition for so difficult a manoeuvre to be
admissible. Presumably therefore our author chose the attack on the
weathermost ships, although they were also the van, as the lesser evil
in spite of its serious drawbacks.
The whole question of the principles involved in his suggestion is
worthy of the closest consideration. For the difficulty it reveals of
effecting a sound form of concentration without breaking the line as
well as of adopting any form that involved breaking the line gives us
the key of that alleged reaction of tactics in the eighteenth century
which has been so widely ridiculed.
FOOTNOTES:
[1] The original draft corrected by Lord Addington, principal
secretary of state, is in _S.P. Domestic_, Car. II, 158.
[2] See _post_, p. 170.
[3] _Cf_. Hoste's second Remark, _post_, p. 180.
[4] In the Instructions which Sir Chas. H. Knowles drew up about 1780,
for submission to the Admiralty he has at p. 16 a remark upon rear
concentration which helps us to see what was in the author's mind. It is
as follows: 'N.B.--In open sea the enemy (if of equal force) will never
suffer you to attack their rear, but will pass you on opposite tacks to
prevent your doing it: therefor the attempt is useless and only losing
time.'
_THE DUKE OF YORK_, 1672.[1]
[+Spragge's Second Sea Book. Dartmouth MSS.+]
_Instructions for the better ordering of his majesty's fleet in
fighting_.
1. Discovery of a fleet, striking the admiral's flag and making a
weft.[2]
2. To come into the order of battle.[2]
3. A red flag on the fore topmast-head, to engage.[2]
4. If overcharged or distressed, a pennant.[2]
5. Ditto, a weft with his jack and ensign.[2]
6. A pennant on the mizen peak or ensign staff if any ship bear away
from the enemy to stop a leak.
If any ship shall be necessitated to bear away from the enemy to stop
a leak or mend what is amiss which cannot otherwise be repaired, he is
to put out a pennant on the mizen peak or ensign staff, whereby the
rest of that ship's squadron may have notice what it is for; and if
the admiral or any flagship should be so, the ships of the fleet or of
the respective squadrons are to endeavour to get up as close in line
between him and the enemy as they can, having always an eye to defend
him in case the enemy should come to annoy him in that condition; and
in case any flagship or any other ship in the fleet shall be forced to
go out of the line for stopping of leaks or repairing any other
defects in the ships, then the next immediate ships are forthwith to
endeavour to close the line either by making or shortening sail, or by
such other ways and means as they shall find most convenient for doing
of it; and if any ship, be it flagship or other that shall happen to
be disabled and go out of the line, then all the small craft shall
come in to that ship's assistance, upon signal made of her being
disabled. If any of the chief flagships or other flagships shall
happen to be so much disabled as that thereby they shall be rendered
unable for present service, in such case any chief flag officer may
get on board any other ship which he may judge most convenient in his
own squadron, and any other flag officer in that case may go on board
any ship in his division.
7. A blue flag on the mizen yard or topmast.[3]
8. To make sail, a red flag on the spritsail, topmast shrouds,
&c.[3]
9. A red flag on the mizen shrouds, to come into the wake or grain of
us.[3]
10. Not to endanger one another.[4]
11. The small craft to attend the motion of the enemy's
fireships.[4]
12. A white flag on the mizen yard-arm or topmast-head, all the small
frigates of the admiral's squadron.[4]
13. To retreat, four guns.[4]
14. None to fire guns till within distance.[5]
15. For the larboard and starboard tacks.[6]
16. To keep the line.[7]
17. If we have the wind of the enemy.[7]
18. If the enemy have the wind of us.[7]
19. The distance of each ship in time of fight.[8]
20. Not to pursue any small number of enemy's ships.[9]
21. For leaving chase.[9]
22. If any ship be disabled in fight.[9]
23. The van of the fleet to tack first.[9]
24. The rear of the fleet to tack first.[9]
25. To fall into the order of battle.[10]
26. To make sail.[10]
JAMES.
By command of his royal highness.
M. WREN.
FOOTNOTES:
[1] This set of orders has marginal rubrics indicating the contents of
each article, and where the article does not differ from the orders of
1665 I have given the rubric only in the text.
[2] Identical with corresponding article of April 10, 1665.
[3] Same as corresponding article of April 10, 1665. Article 10 of
those instructions relating to 'not staying to take possession of
disabled ships' is here omitted.
[4] These four articles are identical with 11, 12, 13 and 14 of April
10, 1665.
[5] Same as Article 16 of April 10, 1665.
[6] Same as Article 15 of April 10, 1665.
[7] These three articles are the same as 1, 2, and 3, of 'Additional
Instructions' of April 18, 1665. The complete set used by Monck and
Rupert in 1666 must have been numbered as above.
[8] Same as 4 and 5 of 'Additional Instructions,' April 18,1665.
[9] These five articles are the same as 6 to 10 of the 'Additional
Instructions,' April 18, 1665.
[10] These two articles are the same as the two 'Additional
Instructions' of April 27, 1665.
_THE DUKE OF YORK'S SUPPLEMENTARY ORDERS_, 1672.
[+Spragge's Second Sea Book. Dartmouth MSS.+]
_Further Instructions for Fighting_.
1. To keep the enemy to leeward.
In case we have the wind of the enemy, and that the enemy stands
towards us and we towards them, then the van of our fleet shall keep
the wind, and when _the rear comes_[1] to a convenient distance
of the enemy's rear shall stay until our whole line is come up within
the same distance of the enemy's van, and then our whole line is to
stand along with them the same tacks on board, still keeping the enemy
to leeward, and not suffering them to tack in the van, and in case the
enemy tack in the rear first, then he that leads the van of our fleet
is to tack first, and the whole line is to follow, standing all along
with the same tacks on board as the enemy does.
2. To divide the enemy's fleet.
In case the enemy have the wind of us and we have sea-room enough,
then we are to keep the wind as close as we can lie until such time as
we see an opportunity by gaining their wakes to divide their fleet;
and if the van of our fleet find that they have the wake of any part
of them, they are to tack and to stand in, and strive to divide the
enemy's body, and that squadron which shall pass first being come to
the other side is to tack again, and the middle squadron is to bear up
upon that part of the enemy so divided, which the last is to second,
either by bearing down to the enemy or by endeavouring to keep off
those that are to windward, as shall be best for service.
3. To keep the line.
The several commanders of the fleet are to take special care that they
keep their line, and upon pain of death that they fire not over any of
our own ships.
(Signed) JAMES.
By command of his royal highness.
(Signed) M. WREN.
FOOTNOTE:
[1] This must be a copyist's error. In Lord Dartmouth's MS. book (see
_ante_, p. 139) it reads 'when they are come.'
__THE DUKE OF YORK_, 1672-3_.
[+Spragge's Second Sea Book. Dartmouth MSS.+]
_Encouragement for the captains and companies of fireships, small
frigates and ketches_.
Although it is the duty of all persons employed in his majesty's fleet
even to the utmost hazard of their lives to endeavour as well the
destroying of his majesty's enemies, as the succouring of his
majesty's subjects, and in most especial manner to preserve and defend
his majesty's ships of war (the neglect whereof shall be at all times
strictly and severely punished), nevertheless, that no inducement may
be wanting which may oblige all persons serving in his majesty's
service valiantly and honourably to acquit themselves in their several
stations, we have thought fit to publish and declare, and do hereby
promise on his majesty's behalf:
That if any of his majesty's fireships perform the service expected of
them in such manner that any of the enemy's ships of war of forty guns
or more shall be burnt by them, every person remaining in the fireship
till the service be performed shall receive on board the admiral,
immediately after the service done, ten pounds as a reward for that
service over and above his pay due to him; and in case any of them
shall be killed in that service it shall be paid to his executors or
next relation over and above the ordinary provision made for the
relations of such as are slain in his majesty's service; and the
captains of such fireships shall receive a medal of gold to remain as
a token of honour to him and his posterity, and shall receive such
other encouragement by preferment and command as shall be fit to
reward him, and induce others to perform the like service. The
inferior officers shall receive each ten pounds in money and be taken
care of, and placed in other ships before any persons whatsoever.
In case any of the enemy's flagships shall be so fired, the recompense
shall be double to each man performing it, and the medal to the
commander shall be such as shall particularly express the eminence of
the service, and his and the other officers' preferments shall be
suitable to the merit of it.
If any of his majesty's fifth or sixth rate frigates, or any ketches,
smacks or hoys in his majesty's service, shall board or destroy any
fireships of the enemy, and so prevent any of them from going on board
any of his majesty's ships, above the fifth rate, besides the
preferment which shall be given to the commanders and officers of such
ships performing such service answerable to the merit, the companies
of such ships or vessels, or in case they shall be killed in that
service, their executors or nearest relations, shall receive to every
man forty shillings as a reward, and such persons who shall by the
testimony of the commanders appear to have been eminently instrumental
in such service shall receive a further reward according to their
merit.
If the masters of any ketches, hoys, smacks, and other vessels hired
for his majesty's service shall endeavour to perform any of the
services aforesaid, and shall by such his attempt lose his vessel or
ship, the full reward thereof shall be paid by the treasurer of his
majesty's navy, upon certificate of the service done by the council of
war, and the said commanders and men serving in her shall receive the
same recompense with those serving in his majesty's ships or vessels.
JAMES.[1]
By command of his royal highness.
FOOTNOTE:
[1] In Capt. Moulton's Sea Book _(Harleian MSS._ 1247, f. 53) is
another copy of these articles which concludes, 'given on board the
Royal Charles the 20th of April 1665. James.' And at foot is written 'a
copy of His Royal Highness's command received from his Excellency the
Earl of Sandwich.' They probably therefore originated in the Second War
and were reissued in the Third.
_FINAL FORM OF THE DUKE OF YORK'S ORDERS, 1673_.
_With the additions and observations subsequently made_.[1]
[+G. Penn, Memorials of Penn+.]
_James, Duke of York and Albany, Earl of Ulster, Lord High Admiral
of England, Scotland, and Ireland, Constable of Dover Castle, Lord
Warden of the Cinque Ports, and Governor of Portsmouth, &c._
_Instructions for the better ordering his majesty's fleet in
fighting_.
Instruction I. Upon discovery of a fleet, and receiving of a signal
from the admiral (which is to be the striking of the admiral's ensign,
and making a weft), such frigates as are appointed (that is to say,
one out of each squadron) are to make sail, and to stand with them, so
nigh as they can conveniently, the better to gain knowledge what they
are, and of what quality; how many fireships, and others; and what
posture their fleet is in; which being done, the frigates are to speak
together, and conclude on the report they are to give; and,
accordingly, to repair to their respective squadrons and
commanders-in-chief; and not to engage (if the enemy's ships exceed
them in number), unless it shall appear to them on the place that they
have an advantage.
Instruction II. At sight of the said fleet, the vice-admiral (or he
who commands in chief in the second place), with his squadron; and the
rear-admiral (or he who commands in chief in the third squadron), with
his squadron; are to make what sail they can to come up, and to put
themselves into that order of battle which shall be given them; for
which the signal shall be the union flag put on the mizen peak of the
admiral's ship; at sight whereof, as well the vice- and rear-admirals
of the red squadron, as the admirals, vice-admirals, and rear-admirals
of the other squadrons, are to answer it by doing the like.
Instruction III. In case the enemy have the wind of the admiral and
fleet, and they have sea-room enough, then they are to keep the wind
as close as they can lie, until such time as they see an opportunity
by gaining their wakes to divide the enemy's fleet; and if the van of
his majesty's fleet find that they have the wake of any considerable
part of them, they are to tack and stand in, and strive to divide the
enemy's body; and that squadron that shall pass first, being got to
windward, is to bear down on those ships to leeward of them; and the
middle squadron is to keep her wind, and to observe the motion of the
enemy's van, which the last squadron is to second; and both of these
squadrons are to do their utmost to assist or relieve the first
squadron that divided the enemy's fleet.[2]
Instruction IV. If the enemy have the wind of his majesty's fleet, and
come to fight them, the commanders of his majesty's ships shall
endeavour to put themselves in one line, close upon a wind, according
to the order of battle.[3]
Instruction V. If the admiral would have any of the fleet to make
sail, or endeavour, by tacking or otherwise, to gain the wind of the
enemy, he will put a red flag upon the spritsail [_sic_], topmast
shrouds, fore-stay, fore topmast-stay; and he who first discovers this
signal shall make sail, and hoist and lower his jack and ensign, that
the rest of the fleet may take notice thereof, and follow.[4]
Instruction VI.[5] If the admiral should have the wind of the enemy
when other ships of the fleet are in the wind of the admiral, then,
upon hoisting up a blue flag at the mizen yard, or mizen topmast,
every ship is to bear up into his wake or grain, upon pain of severe
punishment.
If the admiral be to leeward of the enemy, and his fleet or any part
thereof be to leeward of him, to the end such ships that are to
leeward may come up in a line with the admiral (if he shall put a flag
as before and bear up); none that are to leeward are to bear up, but
to keep his or their ship's luff, thereby to give his ship wake or
grain.
If it shall please God that the enemy shall be put to run, all the
frigates are to make all the sail that possibly they can after them,
and to run directly up their broadsides, and to take the best
opportunity they can of laying them on board; and some ships which are
the heavy sailers (with some persons appointed to command them) are to
keep in a body in the rear of the fleet, that so they may take care of
the enemy's ships which have yielded, and look after the manning of
the prizes.[6]
Instruction VII.[7] In case his majesty's fleet have the wind of the
enemy, and that the enemy stand towards them, and they towards the
enemy, then the van of his majesty's fleet shall keep the wind; and
when they are come within a convenient distance from the enemy's rear,
they shall stay until their whole line is come up within the same
distance from the enemy's van; and then their whole line is to tack
(every ship in his own place), and to bear down upon them so nigh as
they can (without endangering their loss of wind); and to stand along
with them, the same tacks aboard, still keeping the enemy to leeward,
and not suffering them to tack in their van; and in case the enemy
tack in the rear first, he who is in the rear of his majesty's is to
tack first, with as many ships, divisions, or squadrons as are those
of the enemy's; and if all the enemy's ships tack, their whole line is
to follow, standing along with the same tacks aboard as the enemy
doth.
Instruction VIII.[8] If the enemy stay to fight (his majesty's fleet
having the wind), the headmost squadron of his majesty's fleet shall
steer for the headmost of the enemy's ships.[9]
Instruction IX.[10] If, when his majesty's fleet is going before the
wind, the admiral would have the vice-admiral and the ships of the
starboard quarter to clap by the wind and come to their starboard
tack, then he will hoist upon the mizen topmast-head a red flag.
And in case he would have the rear-admiral and the ships of the
larboard quarter to come to their larboard tack, then he will hoist up
a blue flag in the same place.
Instruction X.[11] If the admiral would have the van of the fleet to
tack first, he will put abroad the union flag at the staff on the fore
topmast-head, if the red flag be not abroad; but if the red flag be
abroad, then the fore topsail shall be lowered a little, and the union
flag shall be spread from the cap of the fore topmast downwards.
When the admiral would have the rear of the fleet to tack first, the
union flag shall be put abroad on the flagstaff of the mizen
topmast-head; and for the better notice of these two signals through
the fleet, each flagship is, upon sight of either of the said signals,
to make the same signals, that so every ship may know what they are to
do; and they are to continue out the same signals until they be
answered.[12]
Instruction XI.[13] If the admiral put a red flag on the mizen
shrouds, or the mizen peak, all the flagships are to come up into his
wake or grain.
Instruction XII.[13] When the admiral would have the other squadrons
to make more sail, though himself shorten sail, a white ensign shall
be put on the ensign staff of the admiral's ships.
Instruction XIII.[13] As soon as the fleet shall see the admiral
engage, or make a signal, by putting out a red flag on the fore
topmast-head, each squadron shall take the best advantage to engage
the enemy, according to such order of battle as shall be given them.
Instruction XIV.[13] In time of fight, if the weather be reasonable,
the commanders of his majesty's fleet shall endeavour to keep about
the distance of half a cable one from another; but so as they may also
(according to the direction of their commanders) vary that distance,
as the weather shall prove, and as the occasion of succouring any of
his majesty's ships or of assaulting those of the enemy shall require.
And as for the flag officers, they shall place themselves according to
such order of battle as shall be given.
Instruction XV.[14] No commander of any of his majesty's ships shall
suffer his guns to be fired until the ship be within distance to do
good execution; and whoever shall do the contrary shall be strictly
examined, and severely punished, by a court-martial.
Instruction XVI.[14] In all cases of fight with the enemy, the
commanders of his majesty's ships are to keep the fleet in one line,
and (as much as may be) to preserve the order of battle which they
have been directed to keep before the time of fight.[15]
Instruction XVII.[16] None of the ships of his majesty's fleet shall
pursue any small number of the enemy's ships before the main body of
their fleet shall be disabled, or run.
Instruction XVIII.[16] None shall fire upon the ships of the enemy's
that are laid on board by any of his majesty's ships, but so as he may
be sure he do not endamage his friend.
Instruction XIX.[16] The several commanders in the fleet are to take
special care, upon pain of death, that they fire not over any of their
own ships.
Instruction XX.[17] It is the duty of all commanders of the small
frigates, ketches, and smacks, belonging to the several squadrons (who
are not otherwise appointed by the admiral), to know the fireships
belonging to the enemies, and accordingly observing their motion, to
do their utmost to cut off their boats (if possible); or, if they have
an opportunity, to lay them on board, seize, and destroy them; and, to
this purpose, they are to keep to windward of their squadron, in time
of service. But in case they cannot prevent the fireships from coming
on board of his majesty's ships, by clapping between them (which by
all possible means they are to endeavour), they are in such an exigent
to show themselves men, by steering on board them with their boats,
and, with grapnels and other means, to clear his majesty's ships from
them, and to destroy them. Which service, if honourably performed,
shall be rewarded according to its merit; but if neglected, shall be
strictly examined, and severely punished.[18]
Instruction XXI.[19] The fireships in the several squadrons are to
endeavour to keep the wind; and they (with their small frigates) to be
as near the great ships as they can, attending the signal from the
admiral, and acting accordingly.
If the admiral hoist up a white flag at the mizen yard-arm or
topmast-head, all the small frigates in his squadron are to come under
his stern for orders.
Instruction XXII.[20] In case it should please God that any ships of
his majesty's fleet be lamed in fight, and yet be in no danger of
sinking, nor encompassed by the enemy, the following ships shall not
stay, under pretence of succouring them, but shall follow their
leaders, and endeavour to do what service they can against the enemy;
leaving the succouring of the lame ships to the sternmost of the
fleet; being assured that nothing but beating the body of the enemy's
fleet can effectually secure the lame ships,
Nevertheless, if any ship or ships shall be distressed or disabled, by
loss of mast, shot under water, or the like, so that it is really in
danger of sinking or taking; that or those ship or ships thus
distressed shall make a sign by the weft of his or their jack or
ensign, and those next to them are strictly required to relieve them.
And if any ships or squadron shall happen to be overcharged or
distressed, the next squadron, or ships, are immediately to make
towards their relief and assistance.
And if any ship shall be necessitated to bear away from the enemy, to
stop a leak, or mend what is amiss (which cannot otherwise be
repaired), he is to put a pennant on the mizen peak, or ensign staff,
whereby the rest of that ship's squadron may have notice what it is
for.
If the admiral or any flagship should be so, then the ships of the
fleet, or of the respective squadrons, are to endeavour to get up as
close into a line between him and the enemy as they can; having always
an eye to defend him in case the enemy should come to annoy him in
that condition.
And in case any flagship, or any other ship in the fleet, shall be
forced to go out of the line, for stopping of leaks, or repairing of
any other defect, then the next immediate ships are forthwith to
endeavour to close the line again, either by making or shortening
sail, or by such other ways and means as they shall find most
convenient for doing of it; and all the small craft shall come in to
that ship's assistance, upon a signal made of her being disabled.
And if any of the chief flagships, or other flagships shall happen to
be so much disabled as that they shall be unfit for present service,
in such a case any chief flag officer may go on board any other ship
of his own squadron, as he shall judge most convenient; and any other
flag officer, in that case, may go on board any ship in his
division.[21]
Instruction XXIII.[22] In case of fight, none of his majesty's ships
shall chase beyond sight of the admiral; and at night all chasing
ships are to return to the fleet.
Instruction XXIV.[23] If any engagement by day shall continue till
night, and the admiral shall please to anchor, all the fleet are, upon
a signal, to anchor, in as good, order as may be, which signal will be
the same as in the 'Instructions for Sailing' _(vid._ Instr.
XVIII.); that is to say, the admiral fires two guns, a small distance
one from another, &c.
And if the admiral please to retreat without anchoring, then he will
fire four guns, one after another, so as the report may only be
distinguished; and about three minutes after he will do the like with
four guns more.[24]
FOOTNOTES:
[1] The later _Admiralty MS._ is prefaced by the following
_Observation_: 'There have happened several misfortunes and disputes for
want of a sufficient number of signals to explain the general's
pleasure, without which it is not to be avoided; and whereas it hath
often happened for want of a ready putting forth and apprehending to
what intent the signals are made, they are contracted into a shorter
method so that no time might be lost. It is most certain that in all sea
battles the flags or admiral-generals are equally concerned in any
conflict, and no manner of knowledge can be gained how the rest of the
battle goes till such time as it is past recovery. To prevent this let a
person fitly qualified command the reserve, who shall by signals make
known to the general in what condition or posture the other parts of the
fleet are in, he having his station where the whole can best be
discovered, and his signals, answering the general's, may also be
discerned by the rest of the fleet.'
[2] The _Admiralty MS._ has this _Observation_: 'Unless you can
outstretch their headmost ships there is hazard in breaking through the
enemy's line, and [it] commonly brings such disorders in the line of
battle that it may be rather omitted unless an enemy press you near a
lee shore. For if, according to this instruction, when you have got the
wind you are to press the enemy, then those ships which are on each side
of them shall receive more than equal damages from each other's shot if
near, and in case the enemy but observed the seventh instruction--that
is, to tack with equal numbers with you--then is your fleet divided and
not the enemy's.
[3] The _Admiralty MS._ here inserts an additional instruction,
numbered 5, as follows: 'If in time of fight any flagship or squadron
ahead of the fleet hath an opportunity of weathering any of the enemy's
ships, they shall put abroad the same signal the general makes them for
tacking, which, if the general would have them go about, he will answer
by giving the same again, otherwise they are to continue on the same
line or station.'
_Observation_.--'For it may prove not convenient in some cases to break
the line.'
[4] The _Admiralty MS._ adds, 'And as soon as they have the wind to
observe what other signals the general makes; and in case they lose
sight of the general, they are to endeavour to press the headmost ships
of the enemy all they can, or assist any of ours that are annoyed by
them.' The whole makes Instruction VI. of the _Admiralty MS._ An
_Observation_ is attached to the old instruction as follows:--'This
signal was wanting in the battle fought 11th August, 1673. The fourth
squadron followed this instruction and got the wind of the enemy about
four in the afternoon, and kept the wind for want of another signal to
bear down upon the enemy, as Monsieur d'Estrées alleged at the council
of war the next day. For want of this the enemy left only five or six
ships to attend their motion, and pressed the other squadrons of ours to
such a degree they were forced to give way.' _Cf._ note, p. 181.
[5] The _Admiralty MS._ makes of the three paragraphs of this
instruction three separate instructions, numbered 7, 9, and 10, and
inserts after the first paragraph a new instruction numbered 8, with an
_Observation_ appended. It is as follows: _Additional Instruction, No.
VIII.:_ 'When any of his majesty's ships that have gained the wind of
the enemy, and that the general or admiral would have them bear down and
come to a close fight, he will put abroad the same signal as for their
tacking, and hoist and lower the same till it be discerned; at which,
they that are to windward shall answer by bearing down upon the enemy.
_Observation_.--The same in the battle of Solebay, Sir Joseph Jordan got
the wind and kept it for want of a signal or fireships.' This
_Observation_ appears to be intended as a continuation of the previous
one, the new instruction supplies the missing signal there referred to.
[6] The _Admiralty MS._ has this _Observation_: 'The 28th May, '73,
the battle fought in the Schooneveld, the rear-admiral of their fleet
commanded by Bankart (? Adriaen Banckers) upon a signal from De Ruyter
gave way for some time, and being immediately followed by Spragge and
his division, it proved only a design to draw us to leeward, and that De
Ruyter might have the advantage of weathering us. So that for any small
number giving way it is not safe for the like number to go after them,
but to press the others which still maintain the fight according to the
article following.
[7] No.11 in the _Admiralty MS_. with the following _Observation_: 'In
bearing down upon an enemy when you have the wind, or standing towards
them and they towards you, if it is in your power to fall upon any part
of their ships, those to windward will be the most exposed; therefore
you must use your utmost endeavour to ruin that part. The battle fought
in _1666_, the headmost or winderly ships were beaten in three hours and
put to run before half the rest of the fleet were engaged. We suffered
the like on the 4th of June, for Tromp and De Ruyter never bore down to
engage the body of our fleet, but pressed the leading ships where
Spragge and his squadron had like to have been ruined.'
[8] _Admiralty MS._ No. 12.
[9] For 'headmost of the enemy's ships' the _Admiralty MS_. has
'windmost ships of the enemy's fleet, and endeavour all that can be to
force them to leeward.' Also this _Observation_: 'It may happen that the
headmost of their fleet may be the most leewardly, then in such case you
are to follow this instruction, whereas before it was said to stand with
the headmost ships of the enemy.'
[10] _Admiralty MS_. Nos. 13 and 14. It has the _Observation_: 'This
ought to be for each squadron apart.'
[11] _Admiralty MS_. Nos. 15 and l6. To the first paragraph, or No. 15,
it has the _Observation_: 'It may happen that by the winds shifting
there may be neither van nor rear; then in that case a signal for each
squadron would be better understood, so that you are to follow the 14th
and 15th of the "Sailing Instructions." For in the battle of August '73
the wind shifted and put the whole line out of order.'
[12] The _Admiralty MS_. here inserts a new article, No. 17: 'If the
general would have those ships to windward of the enemy to bear down
through their line to join the body of the fleet, he will put abroad a
white flag with a cross from corner to corner where it can best be
discovered.'
[13] _Admiralty MS_. Nos. 18 to 23.
[14] _Admiralty MS_. Nos, 18 to 23.
[15] _Admiralty MS_. adds: 'having regard to press the weathermost
ships and relieve such as are in distress.' It is worth noting that this
important relaxation of strict line tactics practically embodies the
idea of Rupert's Additional Instruction of 1666. _Supra_, p. 129.
[16] _Admiralty MS_. Nos. 24 to 26.
[17] _Admiralty MS_. No. 27. It adds this _Observation_: 'When the
fleet is to leeward of the enemy you to take care to put yourself in
such a station as that you may (when any signal is given) without loss
of time tack and stand in to the line. And when any part of the fleet or
ships wherein you are concerned are ordered to tack and gain the wind of
the enemy, you are to make all the sail you can and keep up with the
headmost ships that first tack.'
[18] _Admiralty MS. 'Observation_: The reward of saving a friend to be
equal to that of destroying an enemy.'
[19] _Admiralty MS._ Nos. 28 and 29.
[20] _Admiralty MS._ No. 30.
[21] The _Admiralty MS._ has the _Observation:_ 'in changing ships be
as careful as you can not to give the enemy any advantage or knowledge
thereof by striking the flag. In case of the death of any flag officer,
the flag to be continued aloft till the fight be over, notice to be
given to the next commander-in-chief, and not to bear out of the line
unless in very great danger. It hath been observed what very great
encouragement the bare shooting of an admiral's flag gives the enemy,
but this may be prevented by taking in all the flags before going to
engage. It was the ruin of Spragge in the battle of August '73 by taking
his flag in his boat, which gave the enemy an opportunity to discover
his motion, when at the same [time] we saw three flags flying on board
the main topmast-head of three ships which Tromp had quitted.'
[22] _Admiralty MS._ No. 31.
[23] _Admiralty MS._ Nos. 32 and 33.
[24] The _Admiralty MS._ has the _Observation_: 'By reason that guns
are not so well to be distinguished at the latter end of a battle from
chose of the enemy, sky-rockets would be proper signals.' This appears
to be the earliest recorded suggestion for the use of rockets for naval
signalling.
II
MEDITERRANEAN ORDERS, 1678
INTRODUCTORY
In 1677 Narbrough had been sent for the second time as
commander-in-chief to the Mediterranean, to deal with the Barbary
corsairs. To enable him to operate more effectively against Tripoli,
arrangements were on foot to establish a base for him at Malta, and
meanwhile he had been using the Venetian port of Zante. It was at this
time that Charles II, in a last effort to throw off the yoke of Louis
XIV, had married his eldest niece, the Princess Mary, to the French
king's arch-enemy William of Orange, and relations between France and
England were at the highest tension. Preparations were set on foot in
the British dockyards for equipping a 'grand fleet' of eighty sail; on
February 15 was issued a new and enlarged commission to Narbrough
making him 'admiral of his majesty's fleet in the Straits'; Sicily,
which the French had occupied, was hurriedly evacuated; Duquesne, who
commanded the Toulon squadron, was expecting to be attacked at any
moment, and Colbert gave him strict orders to keep out of the British
admiral's way.[1]
It will be seen that it was in virtue of his new commission, and in
expectation of encountering a superior French force, that Narbrough
issued his orders, and they may be profitably compared with those of
Lord Sandwich on the eve of the Second Dutch War as the typical
Fighting Instructions for a small British fleet. No collision however
occurred; for Louis could not face the threatened coalition between
Spain, Holland, and England, and was forced to assent to a general
peace, which was signed at Nymwegen in the following September.
FOOTNOTE:
[1] Corbett, _England in the Mediterranean_, ii. 97-104. The official
correspondence will be found in Mr. Tanner's _Calendar of the Pepys
MSS._, vol. i., and in the _Lettres de Colbert_, vol. iii.
_SIR JOHN NARBROUGH_, 1678.
[+Egerton MSS. 2543, f. 839+.]
_Sir John Narbrough, Knight, admiral of his majesty's fleet in the
Mediterranean seas for this expedition.
Instructions for all commanders to place their ships for their better
fighting and securing the whole fleet if a powerful enemy sets upon
us_.
When I hoist my union flag at the mizen peak, I would have every
commander in this fleet place himself in order of sailing and battle
as prescribed, observing his starboard and larboard ship and leader,
either sailing before or by the wind, and so continue sailing in order
so long as the signal is abroad.
In case a powerful squadron of ships falls with our fleet, and will
fight us, and we see it most convenient to fight before the wind, and
the enemy follow us, I would have every commander place his ships in
this order of sailing prescribed as followeth, and so continue sailing
and fighting, doing his utmost to annoy the enemy, so long as shall be
required for defence of himself and whole fleet.
_Larboard side_. Portsmouth frigate.
Newcastle frigate.
Samuel and Henry 30
Advice 20
Diamond.
Friendship 12
Lion 20
Bonaventure. 11
John and Joseph 10
Pearl frigate.
Return 10
Benjamin and Elizabeth 14
Concord 26
Fountain 8
Leopard 20
Boneto sloop, Baltam^r.[1]
Plymouth, Admiral.
Spragge frigate, Batchelor.[1]
St. Lucar Merchant 20
Prosperous 30
Sapphire frigate
Mary and Martha 30
Delight 9
Olive Branch 10
Italian Merchant 30
Tiger 30
James galley
Dragon 18
Samuel and Mary 24
Mediterranean 16
James Merchant 20
King-fisher frigate.
_Starboard side_. Portland frigate.
In case the enemy be to leeward of us, and force us to fight by the
wind, then I would have each ship in this fleet to follow each other
in a line as afore prescribed, either wing leading the van as the
occasion shall require.
In case I would have the van to tack first (in time of service) I will
spread the union flag at the flagstaff at the fore topmast-head, and
if I would have the rear of the fleet to tack first I will spread the
union flag at the flagstaff at the mizen topmast-head, each commander
being [ready] to take notice of the said signals, and to act
accordingly, following each other as prescribed, and be careful to
assist and relieve any that is in necessity.
In case of separation by foul weather, or by any inevitable accident,
and the wind blows hard westerly, then Zante Road is the place
appointed for rendezvous.
Given under my hand and on board his majesty's ship Plymouth, at an
anchor in Zante Road.
This 4th of May, 1678.
JOHN NARBROUGH.
FOOTNOTE:
[1] Neither Baltimore nor Batchelor nor any similar names of
commissioned officers occur in Pepys's Navy List, 1660-88. Tanner, _op.
cit._
III
THE LAST STUART ORDERS
INTRODUCTORY
The next set of orders we have are those drawn up by George Legge,
first Lord Dartmouth, for the fleet with which he was entrusted by
James II, to prevent the landing of William of Orange in 1688. The
only known copy of them is in the _Sloane MSS._ 3650. It is
unfortunately not complete, the last few articles with the date and
signature being missing, so that there is no direct evidence that it
related to this fleet. There can however be no doubt about the
matter. For it is followed by the battle order of a fleet in which
both ships and captains correspond exactly with that which Dartmouth
commanded in 1688. The only other fleet which he commanded was that
which in 1683 proceeded to the Straits to carry out the evacuation of
Tangier, and it was not large enough to require such a set of
instructions.
We know moreover that in this year he did actually draw up some
Fighting Instructions, shortly after September 24, the day his
commission was signed, and that he submitted them to King James for
approval. On October 14 Pepys, in the course of a long official letter
to him from the admiralty, writes: 'His majesty, upon a very
deliberate perusal of your two papers, one of the divisions of your
fleet and the other touching your line of battle, does extremely
approve the same, commanding me to tell you so.[1]
Lord Dartmouth's articles follow those which James had last drawn up
in 1673 almost word for word, and the only alterations of any
importance all refer to the handling of the line in action. There can
be practically no doubt therefore that we here have the instructions
which Pepys refers to, and that the new matter relating to the line of
battle originated with Dartmouth, as the result of a considerable
experience of naval warfare. After leaving Cambridge he joined, at the
age of 17, the ship of his cousin, Sir Edward Spragge, and served with
him as a volunteer and lieutenant throughout the Second Dutch War. In
1667, before he was 20, he commanded the Pembroke, and in 1671 the
Fairfax, in Sir Robert Holmes's action with the Dutch Smyrna fleet,
and in the battle of Solebay. In 1673 he commanded the Royal Catherine
(84), and served throughout Rupert's campaign with distinction. Since
then, as has been said, he had successfully conducted the evacuation
of Tangier. If on this occasion he needed advice he had at hand some
of the best, in the person of his flag officers, Sir Roger Strickland
and Sir John Berry, two of the most seasoned old 'tarpaulins' in the
service, and both in high estimation as naval experts with James.
The amendments introduced into these instructions, although not
extensive, point to a continued development. We note first that
James's Articles 3 and 4 are combined in Dartmouth's Article 3, so as
to ensure the close-hauled line being formed before any attempt is
made to divide the enemy's fleet. No such provision existed in the
previous instructions. Another noteworthy change under the new article
is that, whether by intention or not, any commander of a ship is given
the initiative in weathering a part of the enemy's fleet if he sees an
opportunity. If this was seriously intended it seems to point to a
reaction to the school of Monck and Rupert, perhaps under Spragge's
influence. Dartmouth's next new article, No. 5, for reforming line of
battle as convenient, regardless of the prescribed order of battle,
points in the same direction.
The only other change of importance is the note inserted in the sixth
article, in which Dartmouth lays his finger on one of the weak points
in James's method of attack from windward by bearing down all
together, and suggests a means by which the danger of being raked as
the ships come down may be minimised.
FOOTNOTE:
[1] _Dartmouth MSS. (Historical MSS. Commission_, XI. v. 160.)
_LORD DARTMOUTH, Oct._ 1688.
[+Sloane MSS. 3650, ff. 7-11+.]
_George, Lord Dartmouth, admiral of his majesty's fleet for the
present expedition_.
_Instructions for the better ordering his majesty's fleet in
fighting_.
1 and 2. _[Same as in Duke of York's_, 1673.]
3. If the enemy have the wind of his majesty's fleet, and come to
fight them, the commanders of his majesty's ships shall endeavour to
put themselves into one line as close upon a wind as they can lie,
according to the order of battle given, until such time as they shall
see an opportunity by gaining their wakes to divide the enemy's fleet,
&c. _[rest as in Article 3 of_ 1673].
4. [_Same as_ 5 _of_ 1673.] [1]
5. If the admiral should have the wind of the enemy, when other ships
of the fleet are in the wind of the admiral, then upon hoisting up a
blue flag at the mizen yard or mizen topmast, every such ship is to
bear up into his wake or grain upon pain of severe punishment. In this
case, whether the line hath been broke or disordered by the shifting
of the wind, or otherwise, each ship or division are not unreasonably
to strive for their proper places in the first line of battle given,
but they are to form a line, the best that may be with the admiral,
and with all the expedition that can be, not regarding what place or
division they fall into or between.
If the admiral be to leeward of the enemy, &c. [_rest as in 6
of 1673_].
6. In case his majesty's fleet have the wind of the enemy, and that
the enemy stands towards them and they towards the enemy, then the van
of his majesty's fleet shall keep the wind, and when they are come at
a convenient distance from the enemy's rear they shall stay until
their own whole line is come up within the same distance from the
enemy's van; and then the whole line is to tack, every ship in his own
place, and to bear down upon them so nigh as they can without
endangering the loss of the wind--[Note that they are not to bear down
all at once, but to observe the working of the admiral and to bring to
as often as he thinks fit, the better to bring his fleet to fight in
good order; and at last only to lask away[2] when they come near
within shot towards the enemy as much as may be, and not bringing
their heads to bear against the enemy's broadsides]--and to stand
along with them the same tacks on board, still keeping the enemy to
leeward, and not suffering them to tack in their van. And in case the
enemy tack in the rear first, he who is in the rear of his majesty's
fleet is to tack first with as many ships or divisions as are those of
the enemy's, and if all the enemy's ships tack, their whole line is to
follow, standing along with the same tacks aboard as the enemy doth.
7 to 9. [_Same as 8 to 10 of 1673_.]
10. [_Same as 11 of 1673, but with yellow flag instead of red_.]
11. When the admiral would have the other divisions to make more
sail, though himself shorten sail, a white ensign shall be put on the
ensign staff for the vice-admiral, a blue for the rear, and for both a
striped.
12. As soon as the fleet shall see the admiral engage or make a
signal by putting out a red flag on the fore topmast-head, each
division shall take the best advantage they can to engage the enemy,
according to such order of battle as shall be given them, and no ship
or division whatsoever is upon any pretence to lie by to fight or
engage the enemy whereby to endanger parting the main body of the
fleet till such time as the whole line be brought to fight by this
signal.
13 to 18. [_Same as 14 to 19 of 1673_.]
18. The several commanders in the fleet are to take special care, upon
pain of severe punishment, that they fire not over any of their own
ships.
19. [_Same as 20 of 1673_.]
20. The fireships in their several divisions are to endeavour to keep
the wind, and they with the small frigates to be as near the great
ships as they can, attending the signal and acting accordingly.
21. [_Same as 22 of 1673_.][3]
FOOTNOTES:
[1] Article 4 of 1673 is omitted, being included in Article 3 above.
[2] To sail with a quartering wind. Morogues urged this precaution a
century later (_Tactique Navale_, p. 209).
[3] The MS. ends abruptly in the middle of this article.