THE SECOND DUTCH WAR
I. THE EARL OF SANDWICH, 1665
II. THE DUKE OF YORK AND PRINCE RUPERT, 1665-6
I
ORDERS OF THE RESTORATION
INTRODUCTORY
Though several fleets were fitted out in the first years of the
Restoration, the earliest orders of Charles II's reign that have come
down to us are those which the Earl of Sandwich issued on the eve of
the Second Dutch War. Early in the year 1665, when hostilities were
known to be inevitable, he had sailed from Portsmouth with a squadron
of fifteen sail for the North Sea. On January 27th he arrived in the
Downs, and on February 9th sailed for the coast of Holland.[1] War
was declared on March 4th following. The orders in question are only
known by a copy given to one of his frigate captains, which has
survived amongst the manuscripts of the Duke of Somerset. So far as is
known no fresh complete set of Fighting Instructions was issued before
the outbreak of the war, and as Monck and Sandwich were still among
the leading figures at the admiralty it is probable that those used in
the last Dutch and Spanish Wars were continued. The four orders here
given are supplementary to them, providing for the formation of line
abreast, and for forming from that order a line ahead to port or
starboard. It is possible however that no other orders had yet been
officially issued, and that these simple directions were regarded by
Sandwich as all that were necessary for so small a squadron.
FOOTNOTE:
[1] _Domestic Calendar_, 1664-5, pp. 181, 183.
_THE EARL OF SANDWICH, Feb. 1, 1665_.
[+Duke of Somerset's MSS., printed by the Historical MSS. Commission.
Rep. XV. part vii. p. 100+.]
_Orders given by direction of the Earl of Sandwich to Captain Hugh
Seymour,[1] of the Pearl frigate_.
1665, February 1. On board the London in the Downs.
If we shall bear up, putting abroad the standard on the ancient[2]
staff, every ship of this squadron is to draw up abreast with the
flag, on either side, in such berth as opportunity shall present most
convenient, but if there be time they are to sail in the foresaid
posture.[3]
If the admiral put up a jack[4]-flag on the flagstaff on the mizen
topmast-head and fire a gun, then the outwardmost ship on the
starboard side is to clap upon a wind with his starboard tacks aboard,
and all the squadron as they lie above or as they have ranked
themselves are presently to clap upon a wind and stand after him in a
line.
And if the admiral make a weft with his jack-flag upon the flagstaff
on the mizen topmast-head and fire a gun, then the outwardmost ship on
the larboard side is to clap upon a wind with his larboard tacks
aboard, and all the squadrons as they have ranked themselves are
presently to clap upon a wind and stand after him in a line.
All the fifth and sixth rates[5] are to lie on that broadside of the
admiral which is away from the enemy, looking out well when any sign
is made for them. Then they are to endeavour to come up under the
admiral's stern for to receive orders.
If we shall give the signal of hanging a pennant under the flag at the
main topmast-head, then all the ships of this squadron are, with what
speed they can, to fall into this posture, every ship in the place and
order here assigned, and sail and anchor so that they may with the
most readiness fall into the above said posture.[6]
FOOTNOTES:
[1] Son of Colonel Sir Edward Seymour, 3rd baronet, Governor of
Dartmouth.
[2] _I.e._ ensign.
[3] _I.e._ in the 'order of battle' already given.
[4] The earliest known use of the word 'jack' for a flag in an official
document occurs in an order issued by Sir John Pennington to his pinnace
captains in 1633. He was in command of the Channel guard in search of
pirates, particularly 'The Seahorse lately commanded by Captain Quaile'
and 'Christopher Megges, who had lately committed some outrage upon the
Isle of Lundy, and other places.' The pinnaces were to work inshore of
the admiral and to endeavour to entrap the piratical ships, and to this
end he said, 'You are also for this present service to keep in your Jack
at your boultsprit end and your pendant and your ordnance.' (_Sloane
MSS._ 2682, f. 51.) The object of the order evidently was that they
should conceal their character from the pirates, and at this time
therefore the 'jack' carried at the end of the bowsprit and the pennant
must have been the sign of a navy ship. Boteler however, who wrote his
_Sea Dialogues_ about 1625, does not mention the jack in his remarks
about flags (pp. 327-334). The etymology is uncertain. The new _Oxford
Dictionary_ inclines to the simple explanation that 'jack' was used in
this case in its common diminutive sense, and that 'jack-flag' was
merely a small flag.
[5] _I.e._ his cruisers.
[6] In the Report of the Historical MSS. Commission it is stated that
the position of the ships is shown in a diagram, but I have been unable
to obtain access to the document.
II
MONCK, PRINCE RUPERT AND THE DUKE OF YORK
INTRODUCTORY
It has hitherto been universally supposed that the Dutch Wars of the
Restoration were fought under the set of orders printed as an appendix
to Granville Penn's _Memorials of Penn_. Mr. Penn believed them
to belong to the year 1665, but recent research shows conclusively
that these often-quoted orders, which have been the source of so much
misapprehension, are really much later and represent not the ideas
under which those wars were fought, but the experience that was gained
from them.
This new light is mainly derived from a hitherto unknown collection of
naval manuscripts belonging to the Earl of Dartmouth, which he has
generously placed at the disposal of the Society. The invaluable
material they contain enables us to say with certainty that the orders
which the Duke of York issued as lord high admiral and
commander-in-chief at the outbreak of the war were nothing but a
slight modification of those of 1654, with a few but not unimportant
additions. Amongst the manuscripts, most of which relate to the first
Lord Dartmouth's cousin and first commander, Sir Edward Spragge, is a
'Sea Book' that must have once belonged to that admiral. It is a kind
of commonplace book, the greater part unused, in which Spragge appears
to have begun to enter various important orders and other matter of
naval interest with which he had been officially concerned, by way of
forming a collection of precedents.[1] Amongst these is a copy of
the orders set out below, dated from the Royal Charles, the Duke of
York's flagship, 'the 10th of April, 1665,' by command of his royal
highness, and signed 'Wm. Coventry.' This was the well-known
politician Sir William Coventry, the model, if not the author, of the
_Character of a Trimmer_, who had been made private secretary to the
duke on the eve of the Restoration, and was now a commissioner of the
navy and acting as secretary on the duke's staff. So closely it will
be seen do they follow the Commonwealth orders of 1653, as modified in
the following year, that it would be scarcely worth while setting them
out in full, but for the importance of finally establishing their true
origin. The scarcely concealed doubts which many writers have felt as
to whether the new system of tactics can have been due to the Duke of
York may now be laid at rest, and henceforth the great reform must be
credited not to him, but to Cromwell's 'generals-at-sea.'
Nevertheless the credit of certain developments which were introduced
at this time must still remain with the duke and his advisers: Rupert,
Sandwich, Lawson, and probably above all Penn, his flag captain. For
instance, differences will be found in Articles 2 and 3, where,
instead of merely enjoining the line, the duke refers to a regular
'order of battle,' which has not come down to us, but which no doubt
gave every ship her station in the line, like those which Sandwich had
prepared for his squadron a few months earlier, and which Monck and
Rupert certainly drew up in the following year.[2] Then again the
truculent Article 10 of 1653 and 1654 ordering the immediate
destruction of disabled ships of the enemy after saving the crews if
possible, which contemporary authorities put down to Monck, is
reversed. At the end, moreover, two articles are added; one, numbered
15, embodying numbers 2 and 3 of Sandwich's orders of the previous
year, with such modifications as were necessary to adapt them to a
large fleet, and another numbered 16 enjoining 'close action.' Nor is
this all. Spragge's 'Sea Book' contains also a set of ten 'additional
instructions' all of which are new. They are undated, but from another
copy in Capt. Robert Moulton's 'Sea Book' we can fix them to April
18th, 1665.[3] Their whole tenour suggests that they were the
outcome of prolonged discussions in the council of war; and in the
variously dated copies which exist of sections of the orders we have
evidence that between the last week in March, when the duke hoisted
his flag, and April 21st, when he put to sea, much time must have been
spent upon the consideration of the tactical problem.[4]
The result was a marked advance. In these ten 'additional
instructions,' for instance, we have for the first time a clear
distinction drawn between attacks from windward and attacks from
leeward. We have also the first appearance of the close-hauled line
ahead, and it is enjoined as a defensive formation when the enemy
attacks from windward. A method of attack from windward is also
provided for the case where the enemy stays to receive it. Amongst
less important developments we have an article making the half-cable's
length, originally enjoined under the Commonwealth, the regular
interval between ships, and others to prevent the line being broken
for the sake of chasing or taking possession of beaten ships. Finally
there are signals for tacking in succession either from the van or the
rear, which must have given the fleet a quite unprecedented increase
of tactical mobility. Nor are we without evidence that increased
mobility was actually exhibited when the new instructions were put to
a practical test.
It was under the old Commonwealth orders as supplemented and modified
by these noteworthy articles of April 1665, that was fought the
memorable action of June 3rd, variously known as the battle of
Lowestoft or the Second Battle of the Texel. It is this action that
Hoste cites as the first in which two fleets engaged in close hauled
line ahead, and kept their formation throughout the day. After two
days' manoeuvring the English gained the wind, and kept it in spite of
all their enemy could do, and the various accounts of the action
certainly give the impression that the evolutions of the English were
smarter and more complex than those of the Dutch. It is true that
about the middle of the action one of the new signals, that for the
rear to tack first, threw the fleet into some confusion, and that
later the van and centre changed places; still, till almost the end,
the duke, or rather Penn, his flag captain, kept at least some control
of the fleet. Granville Penn indeed claims that the duke finally
routed the Dutch by breaking their line, and that he did it
intentionally. But this movement is only mentioned in a hasty letter
to the press written immediately after the battle. If the enemy's line
was actually cut, it must have been an accident or a mere instance of
the time-honoured practice of trying to concentrate on or 'overcharge'
a part of the enemy's fleet. Coventry in his official despatch to
Monck, who was ashore in charge of the admiralty, says nothing of it,
nor does Hoste, while the duke himself tells us the object of his
movement was merely to have 'a bout with Opdam.' Granville Penn was
naturally inclined to credit the statement in the Newsletter because
he believed the action was fought under Fighting Instructions which
contained an article about dividing the enemy's fleet. But even if
this article had been in force at the time--and we now know that it
was not--it would still have been inapplicable, for it was only
designed in view of an attack from leeward, a most important point
which modern writers appear unaccountably to have overlooked.[5]
But although we can no longer receive this questionable movement of
the Duke of York as an instance of 'breaking the line' in the modern
sense, it is certain that the English manoeuvres in this action were
more scientific and elaborate than ever before--so much so indeed that
a reaction set in, and it is this reaction which gave rise to the idea
in later times that the order in line ahead had not been used in
Commonwealth or Restoration times. We gather that in spite of the
victory there was a widespread conviction that it ought to have been
more decisive. It was felt that there had been perhaps too much
manoeuvring and not enough hard fighting. In the end the Duke of York
and Sandwich were both tenderly relieved of their command, and
superseded by Monck. He and Rupert then became joint admirals for the
ensuing campaign. They had the reputation of being two of the hardest
fighters alive, and both were convinced of their power of sweeping the
Dutch from the sea by sheer hard hitting, a belief which so far at
least as Monck was concerned the country enthusiastically shared. The
spirit in which the two soldier-admirals put to sea in May 1666 we see
reflected in the hitherto unknown 'Additional Instructions for
Fighting' given below. For the knowledge of these remarkable orders,
which go far to solve the mystery that has clouded the subject, we are
again indebted to Lord Dartmouth. They are entered like the others in
Sir Edward Spragge's 'Sea Book.' They bear no date, but as they are
signed 'Rupert' and addressed to 'Sir Edward Spragge, Knt.,
Vice-Admiral of the Blue,' we can with certainty fix them to this
time. For we know that Spragge sailed in Rupert's squadron, and on
the fourth day of the famous June battle was raised to the rank here
given him in place of Sir William Berkley, who had been killed in the
first day's action.[6] What share Monck had in the orders we cannot
tell, but Rupert, being only joint admiral with him, could hardly have
taken the step without his concurrence, and the probability is that
Rupert, who had been detached on special service, was issuing a
general fleet order to his own squadron which may have been
communicated to the rest of the fleet before he rejoined. It must at
any rate have been after he rejoined, for it was not till then that
Spragge received his promotion. Both Monck and Rupert must therefore
receive the credit of foreseeing the danger that lay in the new
system, the danger of tactical pedantry that was destined to hamper
the action of our fleets for the next half century, and of being the
first to declare, long before Anson or Hawke, and longer still before
Nelson, that line or no line, signals or no signals, 'the destruction
of the enemy is always to be made the chiefest care.'
In the light of this discovery we can at last explain the curious
conversation recorded by Pepys, which, wrongly interpreted, has done
so much to distort the early history of tactics. The circumstances of
Monck's great action must first be recalled. At the end of May, he and
Rupert, with a fleet of about eighty sail, had put to sea to seek the
Dutch, when a sudden order reached them from the court that the French
Mediterranean fleet was coming up channel to join hands with the
enemy, and that Rupert with his squadron of twenty sail was to go
westward to stop it. The result of this foolish order was that on June
1 Monck found himself in presence of the whole Dutch fleet of nearly a
hundred sail, with no more than fifty-nine of his own.[7] Seeing an
advantage, however, he attacked them furiously, throwing his whole
weight upon their van. Though at first successful shoals forced him
to tack, and his rear fell foul of the Dutch centre and rear, so that
he came off severely handled. The next day he renewed the fight with
forty-four sail against about eighty, and with so much skill that he
was able that night to make an orderly retreat, covering his disabled
ships with those least injured 'in a line abreadth.'[8] On the 3rd
the retreat was continued. So well was it managed that the Dutch
could not touch him, and towards evening he was able near the Galloper
Sand to form a junction with Rupert, who had been recalled. Together
on the 4th day they returned to the fight with as fierce a
determination as ever. Though to leeward, they succeeded in breaking
through the enemy's line, such as it was. Being in too great an
inferiority of numbers, however, they could not reap the advantage of
their manoeuvre.[9] It only resulted in their being doubled on, and
the two fleets were soon mingled in a raging mass without order or
control; and when in the end they parted after a four days' fight,
without example for endurance and carnage in naval history, the
English had suffered a reverse at least as great as that they had
inflicted on the Dutch in the last year's action.
Such a terrific object lesson could not be without its effects on the
great tactical question. But let us see how it looked in the eyes of a
French eye-witness, who was naturally inclined to a favourable view of
his Dutch allies. Of the second day's fight he says: 'Sur les six
heures du matin nous apperçumes la flotte des Anglais qui revenoit
dans une ordre admirable. Car ils marchent par le front comme seroit
une armée de terre, et quand ils approchent ils s'etendent et
tournent leurs bords pour combattre: parce que le front à la mer se
fait par le bord des vaisseaux': that is, of course, the English bore
down on the Dutch all together in line abreast, and then hauled their
wind into line ahead to engage. Again, in describing the danger Tromp
was in by having weathered the English fleet with his own squadron,
while the rest of the Dutch were to leeward, he says: 'J'ai déjà
dit que rien n'égale le bel ordre et la discipline des Anglais, que
jamais ligne n'a été tirée plus droite que celle que leurs
vaisseaux forment, qu'on peut être certain que lorsqu'on en
approche il les faux [_sic_] tous essuïer.' The very precision
of the English formation however, as he points out, was what saved
Tromp from destruction, because having weathered their van-ship, he
had the wind of them all and could not be enveloped. On the other
hand, he says, whenever an English ship penetrated the Dutch formation
it fared badly because the Dutch kept themselves 'redoublez'--that is,
not in a single line. As a general principle, then, he declares that
it is safer to 'entrer dans une flotte d'Angleterre que de passer
auprès' (_i.e._ stand along it), 'et bien mieux de passer
auprès d'une flotte Hollandaise que se mêler au travers, si elle
combat toujours comme elle fit pour lors.' But on the whole he
condemns the loose formation of the Dutch, and says it is really due
not to a tactical idea, but to individual captains shirking their
duty. It is clear, then, that whatever was De Ruyter's intention, the
Dutch did not fight in a true line. Later on in the same action he
says: 'Ruyter de son côté appliqua toute son industrie pour
donner une meilleure forme à sa ligne ... enfin par ce moyen nous
nous remismes sur une ligne parallèle à celle des Anglais.'
Finally, in summing up the tactical lesson of the stupendous battle,
he concludes: 'A la vérité l'ordre admirable de leur [the
English] armée doit toujours être imité, et pour moi je sais
bien que si j'étais dans le service de mer, et que je commandasse
des vaisseaux du Roi je songerois à battre les Anglois _par leur
propre manière et non par celle des Hollandoises, et de nous
autres, qui est de vouloir aborder_.' In defence of his view he
cites a military analogy, instancing a line of cavalry, which being
controlled 'avec règle' devotes itself solely to making the
opposing force give way, and keeps as close an eye on itself as on the
enemy. Supposing such a line engaged against another body of horse in
which the squadrons break their ranks and advance unevenly to the
charge, such a condition, he says, would not promise success to the
latter, and the parallel he contends is exact.[10]
From this account by an accomplished student of tactics we may deduce
three indisputable conclusions, 1. That the formation in line ahead
was aimed at the development of gun power as opposed to
boarding. 2. That it was purely English, and that, however far Dutch
tacticians had sought to imitate it, they had not yet succeeded in
forcing it on their seamen. 3. That the English certainly fought in
line, and had reached a perfection in handling the formation which
could only have been the result of constant practice in fleet tactics.
It remains to consider the precisely opposite impression we get from
English authority. To begin with, we find on close examination that
the whole of it, or nearly so, is to be traced to Pepys or Penn. The
_locus classicus_ is as follows from Pepys's _Diary_ of July
4th. 'In the evening Sir W. Penn came to me, and we walked together
and talked of the late fight. I find him very plain, that the whole
conduct of the late fight was ill.... He says three things must be
remedied, or else we shall be undone by their fleet. 1. That we must
fight in line, whereas we fight promiscuously, to our utter
demonstrable ruin: the Dutch fighting otherwise, and we whenever we
beat them. 2. We must not desert ships of our own in distress, as we
did, for that makes a captain desperate, and he will fling away his
ship when there are no hopes left him of succour. 3. That ships when
they are a little shattered must not take the liberty to come in of
themselves, but refit themselves the best they can and stay out, many
of our ships coming in with very little disableness. He told me that
our very commanders, nay, our very flag officers, do stand in need of
exercising amongst themselves and discoursing the business of
commanding a fleet, he telling me that even one of our flag men in the
fleet did not know which tack lost the wind or kept it in the last
engagement.... He did talk very rationally to me, insomuch that I
took more pleasure this night in hearing him discourse than I ever did
in my life in anything that he said.'
Pepys's enjoyment is easily understood. He disliked Penn--thought him
a 'mean rogue,' a 'coxcomb,' and a 'false rascal,' but he was very
sore over the supersession of his patron, Sandwich, and so long as
Penn abused Monck, Pepys was glad enough to listen to him, and ready
to believe anything he said in disparagement of the late battle. Penn
was no less bitter against Monck, and when his chief, the Duke of
York, was retired he had sulkily refused to serve under the new
commander-in-chief. For this reason Penn had not been present at the
action, but he was as ready as Pepys to believe anything he was told
against Monck, and we may be sure the stories of grumbling officers
lost nothing when he repeated them into willing ears. That Penn
really told Pepys the English had not fought in line is quite
incredible, even if he was, as Sir George Carteret, treasurer of the
navy, called him, 'the falsest rascal that ever was in the world.'
The fleet orders and the French testimony make this practically
impossible. But he may well have expressed himself very hotly about
the new instruction issued by Monck and Rupert which modified his own,
and placed the destruction of the enemy above a pedantic adherence to
the line. Pepys must clearly have forgotten or misunderstood what Penn
said on this point, and in any case both men were far too much
prejudiced for the passage to have any historical value. Abuse of
Monck by Penn can have little weight enough, but the same abuse
filtered through Pepys's acrid and irresponsible pen can have no
weight at all.[11]
FOOTNOTES:
[1] It is a folio parchment-bound volume, labelled 'Royal Charles Sea
Book,' but this is clearly an error, due to the fact that the first
order copied into it is dated from the Royal Charles, April 24, 1666.
The first entry, however, is the list of a ship's company which Spragge
commanded in 1661-2, as appears from his noting the deaths and
desertions which took place amongst the crew in those years. At this
time he is known to have commanded the Portland. For some years the book
was evidently laid aside, and apparently resumed when in 1665 he
commissioned the Triumph for the Dutch War.
[2] See notes _supra_, pp. 108-9, and in the _Dartmouth MSS., Hist. MSS.
Com. Rep._ XI. v. 15.
[3] _Harleian MSS._ 1247. It contains orders addressed to Moulton and
returns for the Centurion, Vanguard and Anne, the ships he commanded in
1664-6. At p. 52 it has a copy of the above 'Additional Instructions,'
but numbered 1 to 6, articles 1 to 5 of the Dartmouth copy being in one
long article. At p. 50 it has the original articles as far as No. 6.
Then come two articles numbered as 7 and 8, giving signals for a
squadron 'to draw up in line' and to come near the admiral. They are
subscribed 'Royal James, Admiral.' The Royal James was Rupert's flagship
in 1665, and the two articles may be squadronal orders of his. Then,
numbered 9 to 12, come four 'additional instructions for sailing' by the
Duke of York, relating to chasing, and dated April 24, 1665.
[4] Some of these articles are dated even as late as April 27, See in
the _Penn Tracts, Sloane MSS._ 3232, f. 33, _infra_, p. 128.
[5] See _post_, p. 177. For the despatches, &c., see G. Penn, _Memorials
of Penn_, II. 322-333, 344-350. He also quotes a work published at
Amsterdam in 1668 which says: 'Le Comte de Sandwich sépara la flotte
Hollandaise en deux vers l'une heure du midi.' He explains that by the
order for the rear to tack first, Sandwich was leading, forgetting
Coventry's despatch (_ibid._ p. 328), which tells how by that time the
duke had taken Sandwich's place and was leading the line himself, and
that it was he, not Sandwich, who led the movement upon Opdam's ship in
the centre of the Dutch line.
[6] Charnock, _Biographia Navalis_, i. 65.
[7] Pepys, it must be said, persuaded himself that this order was
suggested and approved by the admirals. He traced it to Spragge's desire
to get away with his chief on a separate command. Pepys however was
clearly not sure about it, and he almost certainly would have been if
the Duke of York was really innocent of the blunder. The truth probably
can never be known.
[8] Vice-Admiral Jordan to Penn, June 5, _Memorials of Penn_, II. 389.
This is the first known instance of the use of the term 'line abreast.'
In the published account a different term is used. 'By 3 or 4 in the
morning,' it says, 'a small breeze sprang up at N.E. and at a council of
flag officers, his grace the lord general resolved to draw the fleet
into a "rear line of battle" and make a fair retreat of it.' (_Brit.
Museum_, 816, m. 23(13), p. 5, and _S.P. Dom. Car. II_, vol. 158.) The
French and Dutch called it the 'crescent' formation. See note, p. 94.
[9] See _post_, pp. 136-7.
[10] _Mémoires d'Armand de Gramont, Comte de Guiche, concernant les
Provinces Unis des Pays-Bas servant de supplément et de confirmation à
ceux d'Aubrey du Maurier et du Comte d'Estrades_. Londres, chez Philippe
Changuion, 1744. (The italics are not in the original.) _Cf._ the
similar French account quoted by Mahan, _Sea Power_, 117 _et seq._
[11] _Cf._ a similar conversation that Pepys had on October 28 with a
certain Captain Guy, who had been in command of a small fourth-rate of
thirty-eight guns in Holmes's attack on the shipping at Vlie and
Shelling after the 'St. James's Fight' and of a company of the force
that landed to destroy Bandaris. The prejudice of both Pepys and Penn
comes out still more strongly in their remarks on Monck's and Rupert's
great victory of July 25, and their efforts to make out it was no
victory at all. The somewhat meagre accounts we have of this action all
point as before to the superiority of the English manoeuvring, and to
the inability or unwillingness of the Dutch, and especially of Tromp, to
preserve the line.
_THE DUKE OF YORK, April_ 10, 1665.
[+Sir Edward Spragge's Sea Book. The Earl of Dartmouth MSS.+]
_James, Duke of York and Albany, Earl of Ulster, Lord High Admiral
of England and Ireland, &c, Constable of Dover Castle, Lord Warden of
the Cinque Ports, and Governor of Portsmouth.
Instructions for the better ordering his majesty's fleet in time of
fighting_.
Upon discovery of a fleet receiving a sign from the admiral, which is
to be striking of the admiral's ensign, and making a weft, one frigate
appointed out of each squadron are to make sail and stand in with them
so nigh as conveniently they may, the better to gain a knowledge of
what they are and what quality, how many fireships and others, and in
what posture the fleet is; which being done the frigates are to meet
together and conclude on the report they are to give, and accordingly
to repair to their respective squadrons and commanders-in-chief, and
not engage if the enemy's ships exceed them in number, except it shall
appear to them on the place that they have an advantage.
2. At the sight of the said fleet the vice-admiral, or he that
commands in chief in the second place, and his squadron, and the
rear-admiral, or he that commands in chief in the third place, and his
squadron are to make what sail they can to come up and put themselves
into the place and order which shall have been directed them before in
the order of battle.
3. As soon as they shall see the admiral engage or shall make a signal
by shooting off two guns and putting out a red flag on the fore
topmast-head, that then each squadron shall take the best advantage
they can to engage with the enemy according to the order prescribed.
4. If any squadron shall happen to be overcharged and distressed, the
next squadron or ships are immediately to make towards their relief
and assistance upon a signal given them: which signal shall be in the
admiral's squadron a pennant on the fore topmast-head; if any ship in
the vice-admiral's squadron, or he that commands in chief in the
second place, a pennant on the main topmast-head; and the
rear-admiral's squadron the like.[1]
5. If any ship shall be disabled or distressed by loss of masts, shot
under water or the like, so as she is in danger of sinking or taking,
he or the [ship] thus distressed shall make a sign by the weft of his
jack and ensign, and those next to them are strictly required to
relieve them.[1]
6. That if any ship shall be necessitated to bear away from the enemy
to stop a leak or mend what else is amiss, which cannot otherwise be
repaired, he is to put out a pennant on the mizen yard-arm or on the
ensign staff, whereby the rest of the ship's squadron may have notice
what it is for--and if it should be that the admiral or any flagships
should do so, the ships of the fleet or of the respective squadrons
are to endeavour to get up as close in a line between him and the
enemy as they can, having always an eye to defend him in case the
enemy should come to annoy him in that condition.
7. If the admiral should have the wind of the enemy and that other
ships of the fleet are in the wind of the admiral, then upon hoisting
up a blue flag at the mizen yard or mizen topmast, every such ship is
then to bear up into his wake or grain upon pain of severe punishment.
If the admiral be to leeward of the enemy, and his fleet or any part
thereof to leeward of him, to the end such ships may come up into a
line with the admiral, if he shall put abroad a flag as before and
bear up, none that are to leeward are to bear up, but to keep his or
their ship or ships luff, thereby to gain his wake or grain.
8. If the admiral would have any of the ships to make sail or
endeavour by tacking or otherwise to gain the wind of the enemy, he
will put up a red flag upon the spritsail, topmast shrouds, forestay,
or fore topmast-stay. He that first discovers this signal shall make
sail, and hoist and lower his jack and ensign, that the rest of the
ships may take notice thereof and follow.
9. If we put a red flag on the mizen shrouds or the mizen yard-arm,
we would have all the flagships to come up in the wake or grain of us.
10. If in time of fight God shall deliver any of the enemy's ships
into our power by their being disabled, the commanders of his
majesty's ships in condition of pursuing the enemy are not during
fight to stay, take, possess, or burn any of them, lest by so doing
the opportunity of more important service be lost, but shall expect
command from the flag officers for doing thereof when they shall see
fit to command it.
11. None shall fire upon ships of the enemy that is laid on board by
any of our own ships but so as he may be sure he doth not endamage his
friends.
12. That it is the duty of all commanders and masters of the small
frigates, ketches and smacks belonging to the several squadrons to
know the fireships belonging to the enemy, and accordingly by
observing their motion do their utmost to cut off their boats if
possible, or if opportunity be that they lay them on board, seize and
destroy them, and for this purpose they are to keep to wind[ward] of
the squadron in time of service. But in case they cannot prevent the
fireships from coming aboard of us by clapping between them and us,
which by all means possible they are to endeavour, that then in such
case they show themselves men in such an exigent and steer on board
them, and with their boats, grapnels, and other means clear them from
us, and destroy them; which service if honourably done to its merit
shall be rewarded, and the neglect thereof strictly and severely
called to an account.
13. That the fireships in every squadron endeavour to keep the wind,
and they, with the small frigates, to be as near the great ships as
they can, to attend the signal from the admiral and to act
accordingly. If the admiral hoist up a white flag at the mizen
yard-arm or topmast-head all the small frigates of his squadron are to
come under his stern for orders.
14. If an engagement by day shall continue till night, and the
admiral shall please to anchor, that upon signal given they all anchor
in as good order as may be, the signal being as in the Instructions
for Sailing; and if the admiral please to retreat without anchoring,
then the sign to be by firing of two guns, so near one to the other as
the report may be distinguished, and within three minutes after to do
the like with two guns more.
15. If, the fleet going before the wind, the admiral would have the
vice-admiral and the ships of the starboard quarter to clap by the
wind and come to their starboard tack, then he will hoist upon the
mizen topmast-head a red flag, and in case he would have the
rear-admiral and the ships on the larboard quarter to come to their
larboard tack then he will hoist up a blue flag in the same place.
16. That the commander of any of his majesty's ships suffer not his
guns to be fired until the ship be within distance to [do] good
execution; the contrary to be examined and severely punished by the
court-martial.
FOOTNOTE:
[1] Modified by Article 8 of the 'Additional Instructions,' _post_, p.
127.
_THE DUKE OF YORK, April_ 10 _or_ 18, 1665.
[+Sir Edward Spragge's Sea Book+.[1]]
_Additional Instructions for Fighting_.
1. In all cases of fight with the enemy the commanders of his
majesty's ships are to endeavour to keep the fleet in one line, and as
much as may be to preserve the order of battle which shall have been
directed before the time of fight.[2]
2. If the enemy stay to fight us, we having the wind, the headmost
squadron of his majesty's fleets shall steer for the headmost of the
enemy's ships.
3. If the enemy have the wind of us and come to fight us, the
commanders of his majesty's fleet shall endeavour to put themselves in
one line close upon a wind.
4. In the time of fight in reasonable weather, the commanders of his
majesty's fleet shall endeavour to keep about the distance of half a
cable's length one from the other,[3] but so as that according to
the discretion of the commanders they vary that distance according as
the weather shall be, and the occasion of succouring our own or
assaulting the enemy's ships shall require.
5. The flag officers shall place themselves according to such order of
battle as shall be given.
6. None of the ships of his majesty's fleet shall pursue any small
number of ships of the enemy before the main [body] of the enemy's
fleet shall be disabled or shall run.
7. In case of chase none of his majesty's fleet or ships shall chase
beyond sight of the flag, and at night all chasing ships are to return
to the flag.
8. In case it shall please God that any of his majesty's ships be
lamed in fight, not being in probability of sinking nor encompassed by
the enemy, the following ships shall not stay under pretence of
securing them, but shall follow their leaders and endeavour to do what
service they can upon the enemy, leaving the securing of the lame
ships to the sternmost of our ships, being [assured] that nothing but
beating the body of the enemy's fleet can effectually secure the lame
ships. This article is to be observed notwithstanding any seeming
contradiction in the fourth or fifth articles of the [fighting]
instructions formerly given.
9. When the admiral would have the van of his fleet to tack first,
the admiral will put abroad the union flag at the staff of the fore
topmast-head if the red flag be not abroad; but if the red flag be
abroad then the fore topsail shall be lowered a little, and the union
flag shall be spread from the cap of the fore topmast downwards.
10. When the admiral would have the rear of the fleet to tack first,
the union flag shall be put abroad on the flagstaff of the mizen
topmast-head; and for the better notice of these signals through the
fleet, each flagship is upon sight of either of the said signals to
make the said signals, that so every ship may know what they are to
do, and they are to continue out the said signals until they be
answered. Given under my hand the 10th of April, 1665, from on board
the Royal Charles.
By command of his royal highness.
WM. COVENTRY.
FOOTNOTES:
[1] Also in Moulton's Sea Book, _Harl. MSS._ 1247, f. 52 but are there
dated April 18, differently numbered, and signed 'James.'
[2] This is Article 17 of the complete set, which was modified by
Rupert's subsequent order of 1666. See p. 130.
[3] It is interesting to note that the distance adopted by D'Estrées and
Tourville for the French service was a full cable. See Hoste, p. 65.
_THE DUKE OF YORK'S SUPPLEMENTARY ORDER, April 27, 1665_.
[+Penn's Tracts, Sloane MSS. 3232, f. 83+.]
_Additional Instructions for Fighting_.[1]
[1.] When the admiral would have all the ships to fall into the order
of 'Battailia' prescribed, the union flag shall be put into the mizen
peak of the admiral ship; at sight whereof the admirals of [the] other
squadrons are to answer it by doing the like.
[2.] When the admiral would have the other squadrons to make more
sail, though he himself shorten sail, a white ensign shall be put on
the ensign staff of the admiral ship.
_For Chasing_.[2]
[1.] When the admiral shall put a flag striped with white and red upon
the fore topmast-head, the admiral of the white squadron shall send
out ships to chase; when on the mizen topmast-head the admiral of the
blue squadron shall send out ships to chase.
[2.] If the admiral shall put out a flag striped with white and red
upon any other place, that ship of the admiral's own division whose
signal for call is a pennant in that place shall chase, excepting the
vice-admiral and rear-admiral of the admiral's squadron.
[3.] If a flag striped red and white upon the main topmast shrouds
under the standard, the vice-admiral of the red is to send ships to
chase.
If the flag striped red and white be hoisted on the ensign staff the
rear-admiral of the red is to send ships to chase.
On board the Royal Charles, 27 April, 1665.
FOOTNOTES:
[1] This is preceded by an additional 'Sailing Instruction,' with
signals for cutting and slipping by day or night.
[2] Also in Capt. Moulton's Sea Book (_Harl. MSS._ 1247, p. 51_b_),
headed 'James Duke of York &c. Additional Instructions for Sailing.' At
foot it has 'given under my hand on board the Royal Charles this 24 of
April, 1665. James,' and the articles are numbered 9 to 12, No. 3 above
forming 11 and 12.
_PRINCE RUPERT_, 1666.
[+Sir Edward Spragge's Sea Book+.]
_Additional Instructions for Fighting_.
1st. In case of an engagement the commander of every ship is to have a
special regard to the common good, and if any flagship shall, by any
accident whatsoever, stay behind or [be] likely to lose company, or be
out of his place, then all and every ship or ships belonging to such
flag is to make all the way possible to keep up with the admiral of
the fleet and to endeavour the utmost that may be the destruction of
the enemy, which is always to be made the chiefest care.
This instruction is strictly to be observed, not-withstanding the
seventeenth article in the Fighting Instructions formerly given
out.[1]
2ndly. When the admiral of the fleet makes a weft with his flag, the
rest of the flag officers are to do the like, and then all the best
sailing ships are to make what way they can to engage the enemy, that
so the rear of our fleet may the better come up; and so soon as the
enemy makes a stand then they are to endeavour to fall into the best
order they can.[2]
3rdly. If any flagship shall be so disabled as not to be fit for
service, the flag officer or commander of such ship shall remove
himself into any other ship of his division at his discretion, and
shall there command and wear the flag as he did in his own.
RUPERT.
For Sir Edward Spragge, Knt., vice-admiral of the blue squadron.
FOOTNOTES:
[1] Meaning, of course, Article 1 of the 'Additional Instructions' of
April 18, 1665, which would be No. 17 when the orders were collected and
reissued as a complete set. No copy of the complete set to which Rupert
refers is known to be extant.
[2] It should be noted that this instruction anticipates by a century
the favourite English signals of the Nelson period for bringing an
unwilling enemy to action, _i.e._ for general chase, and for ships to
take suitable station for neutral support and engage as they get up.