THE FIRST DUTCH WAR
I. ENGLISH AND DUTCH ORDERS ON THE EVE OF THE WAR, 1648-52
II. ORDERS ISSUED DURING THE WAR, 1653-54
I
ENGLISH AND DUTCH ORDERS ON THE EVE OF THE WAR, 1648-53
INTRODUCTORY
From the foregoing examples it will be seen that at the advent of the
Commonwealth, which was to set on foot so sweeping a revolution in the
naval art, all attempts to formulate a tactical system had been
abandoned. This is confirmed by the following extract from the orders
issued by the Long Parliament in 1648. It was the time when the revolt
of a part of the fleet and a rising in the South Eastern counties led
the government to apprehend a naval coalition of certain foreign
powers in favour of Charles. It is printed by Granville Penn in his
_Memorials of Sir William Penn_ as having been issued in 1647,
but the original copy of the orders amongst the Penn Tracts (_Sloane
MSS._ 1709, f. 55) is marked as having been delivered on May 2,
1648, to 'Captain William Penn, captain of the Assurance frigate and
rear-admiral of the Irish Squadron.' They are clearly based on the
later precedents of Charles I, but it must be noted that Penn is told
'to expect more particular instructions' in regard to the fighting
article. We may assume therefore that the admiralty authorities
already recognised the inadequacy of the established fighting
instructions, and so soon as the pressure of that critical time
permitted intended to amplify them.
Amongst those responsible for the orders however there is no name that
can be credited with advanced views. They were signed by five members
of the Navy Committee, and at their head is Colonel Edward Mountagu,
afterwards Earl of Sandwich, but then only twenty-two years old.[1]
Whether anything further was done is uncertain. No supplementary
orders have been found bearing date previous to the outbreak of the
Dutch war. But there exists an undated set which it seems impossible
not to attribute to this period. It exists in the _Harleian
MSS._ (1247, ff. 43b), amongst a number of others which appear to
have been used by the Duke of York as precedents in drawing up his
famous instructions of 1665. To begin with it is clearly later than
the orders of 1648, upon which it is an obvious advance. Then the use
of the word 'general' for admiral, and of the word 'sign' for 'signal'
fixes it to the Commonwealth or very early Restoration. Finally,
internal evidence shows it is previous to the orders of 1653, for
those orders will be seen to be an expansion of the undated set so far
as they go, and further, while these undated orders have no mention of
the line, those of 1653 enjoin it. They must therefore lie between
1648 and 1653, and it seems worth while to give them here
conjecturally as being possibly the supplementary, or 'more particular
instructions,' which the government contemplated; particularly as this
hypothesis gains colour from the unusual form of the heading
'Instructions for the better ordering.' Though this form became fixed
from this time forward, there is, so far as is known, no previous
example of it except in the orders which Lord Wimbledon propounded to
his council of war in 1625, and those were also supplementary
articles.[2]
Be this as it may, the orders in question do not affect the position
that up to the outbreak of the First Dutch War we have no orders
enjoining the line ahead as a battle formation. Still we cannot
entirely ignore the fact that, in spite of the lack of orders on the
subject, traces of a line ahead are to be detected in the earliest
action of the war. Gibson, for instance, in his _Reminiscences_
has the following passage relating to Blake's brush with Tromp over
the honour of the flag on May 9, 1652, before the outbreak of the
war:[3] 'When the general had got half Channel over he could see the
Dutch fleet with their starboard tacks aboard standing towards him,
having the weather-gage. Upon which the general made a sign for the
fleet to tack. After which, having their starboard tacks aboard (the
general's ship, the Old James, being the southernmost and sternmost
ship in the fleet), the rest of his fleet tacking, first placed
themselves in a line ahead of the general, who after tacking hauled up
his mainsail in the brails, fitted his ship to fight, slung his yards,
and run out his lower tier of guns and clapt his fore topsail upon the
mast.' If Gibson could be implicitly trusted this passage would be
conclusive on the existence of the line formation earlier than any of
the known Fighting Instructions which enjoined it; but unfortunately,
as Dr. Gardiner pointed out, Gibson did not write his account till
1702, when he was 67. He is however to some extent corroborated by
Blake himself, who in his official despatch of May 20, relating the
incident, says that on seeing Tromp bearing down on him 'we lay by and
put ourselves into a fighting posture'--_i.e._ battle order--but
what the 'posture' was he does not say. If however this posture was
actually the one Gibson describes, we have the important fact that in
the first recorded instance of the complete line, it was taken as a
defensive formation to await an attack from windward.
The only other description we have of English tactics at this time
occurs in a despatch of the Dutch commander-in-chief in the
Mediterranean, Van Galen, in which he describes how Captain Richard
Badiley, then commanding a squadron on the station, engaged him with
an inferior force and covered his convoy off Monte Christo in August
1652. When the fleets were in contact, he says, as though he were
speaking of something that was quite unfamiliar to him, 'then every
captain bore up from leeward close to us to get into range, and so all
gave their broadsides first of the one side and then again of the
other, and then bore away with their ships before the wind till they
were ready again; and then as before with the guns of the whole
broadside they fired into my flagship, one after the other, meaning to
shoot my masts overboard.'[4] From this it would seem that Badiley
attacked in succession in the time-honoured way, and that the old
rudimentary form of the line ahead was still the ordinary practice.
The evidence however is far from strong, but really little is
needed. Experience teaches us that the line ahead formation would
never have been adopted as a standing order unless there had been some
previous practice in the service to justify it or unless the idea was
borrowed from abroad. But, as we shall see, the oft-repeated assertion
that it was imitated from the Dutch is contrary to all the evidence
and quite untenable. The only experience the framers of the order of
1653 can have had of a line ahead formation must have been in our own
service.
The clearest proof of this lies in the annexed orders which Tromp
issued on June 20, 1652, immediately before the declaration of war,
and after he had had his brush with Blake, in which, if Gibson is to
be trusted, Tromp had seen Blake's line. From these orders it is
clear that the Dutch conception of a naval action was still
practically identical with that of Lindsey's instructions of 1635,
that is, mutual support of squadrons or groups, with no trace of a
regular battle formation. In the detailed 'organisation' of the fleet
each of the three squadrons has its own three flag officers--that is
to say, it was organised, like that of Lord Wimbledon in 1625, in
three squadrons and nine sub-squadrons, and was therefore clearly
designed for group tactics. It is on this point alone, if at all, that
it can be said to show any advance on the tactics which had obtained
throughout the century, or on those which Tromp himself had adopted
against Oquendo in 1639.
Yet further proof is to be found in the orders issued by Witte
Corneliszoon de With to his captains in October 1652, as
commander-in-chief of the Dutch fleet. In these he very strictly
enjoins, as a matter of real importance, 'that they shall all keep
close up by the others and as near together as possible, to the end
that thereby they may act with united force ... and prevent any
isolation or cutting off of ships occurring in time of fight;' adding
'that it behoved them to stand by and relieve one another loyally, and
rescue such as might be hotly attacked.' This is clearly no more than
an amplification of Tromp's order of the previous June. It introduces
no new principle, and is obviously based on the time-honoured idea of
group tactics and mutual support. It is true that De Jonghe, the
learned historian of the Dutch navy, regards it as conclusive that the
line was then in use by the Dutch, because, as he says, several Dutch
captains, after the next action, were found guilty and condemned for
not having observed their instructions. But really there is nothing
in it from which a line can be inferred. It is all explained on the
theory of groups. And in spite of De Jonghe's deep research and his
anxiety to show that the line was practised by his countrymen as well
as by the English in the first Dutch War, he is quite unable to
produce any orders like the English instructions of 1653, in which a
line formation is clearly laid down.
But whether or not we can accept De Jonghe's conclusions as to the
time the line was introduced into the Dutch service, one thing is
clear enough--that he never ventured to suggest that the English
copied the idea from his own countrymen. It is evident that he found
nothing either in the Dutch archives or elsewhere even to raise such
an idea in his mind. But, on the other hand, his conspicuous
impartiality leads him to give abundant testimony that throughout
these wars thoughtful Dutch officers were continually praising the
order and precision of the English tactics, and lamenting the
blundering and confusion of their own. It may be added that Dr.
Gardiner's recent researches in the same field equally failed to
produce any document upon which we can credit the Dutch admirals with
serious tactical reforms. Even De Ruyter's improvements in squadronal
organisation consisted mainly in superseding a multiplicity of small
squadrons by a system of two or three large squadrons, divided into
sub-Squadrons, a system which was already in use with the English, and
was presumably imitated by De Ruyter, if it was indeed he who
introduced it and not Tromp, from the well-established Commonwealth
practice.[5]
FOOTNOTES:
[1] The others were John Rolle, member for Truro, a merchant and
politician, who died in November 1648, and who as early as 1645 had been
proposed, though unsuccessfully, for the Navy Committee; and three less
conspicuous members of Parliament: Sir Walter Earle (of the Presbyterian
party), Giles Greene, and Alexander Bence. They were all superseded the
following year by the new Admiralty Committee of the Council of State.
[2] _Supra_, p. 63. It may also be noted that these articles are
intended for a fleet not large enough to be divided into squadrons--just
such a fleet in fact as that in which Penn was flying his flag. The
units contemplated, _e.g._ in Articles 2-4, are 'ships,' whereas in the
corresponding articles of 1653 the units are 'squadrons.'
[3] Gardiner, _Dutch War_, i. 9.
[4] This at least is what Van Galen's crabbed old Dutch seems to mean.
'Alsoo naer bij quam dat se couden toe schieter dragen, de elcken heer
onder den windt, gaven so elck hare laghe dan vinjt d'eene sijde, dan
veer van d'anden sijde, hielden alsdan met haer schepen voor den vindt
tal dat se weer claer waren, dan wast alsvooren met cannoneren van de
heele lagh en in sonderheijt op mijn onderhebbende schip vier gaven van
meeninge masten aft stengen overboort to schieten.' A copy of Van
Galen's despatch is amongst Dr. Gardiner's _Dutch War_ transcripts.
[5] See De Jonghe's introduction to his Third Book on 'The Condition of
the British and Dutch Navies at the outbreak of and during the Second
English War,' _Geschiedenis van het Nederlandsche Zeewesen_, vol. ii.
part ii. pp. 132-141, and his digression on Tactics, pp. 290 _et seq._,
and p. 182 note. De Witte's order is p. 311.
_PARLIAMENTARY ORDERS_, 1648.
[+Sloane MSS. 1709, f. 55. Extract+]
_Instructions given by the Right Honourable the Committee of the
Lords and Commons for the Admiralty and Cinque Ports, to be duly
observed by all captains and officers whatsoever and common men
respectively in their fleet, provided to the glory of God, the honour
and service of Parliament, and the safety of the Kingdom of
England_. [_Fol._ 59.]
If any fleet shall be discovered at sea which may probably be
conjectured to have a purpose to encounter, oppose, or affront the
fleet in the Parliament's service, you may in that case expect more
particular directions. But for the present you are to take notice,
that in case of joining battle you are to leave it to the vice-admiral
to assail the enemy's admiral, and to match yourself as equally as you
can, to succour the rest of the fleet as cause shall require, not
wasting your powder nor shooting afar off, nor till you come side to
side.
_SUPPLEMENTARY INSTRUCTIONS,
circa_ 1650.
[+Harleian MSS. 1247, 43b. Draft unsigned+.]
_Instructions for the better ordering and managing the fleet in
fighting_.
1. Upon discovery of a fleet, receiving a sign from the general's
ship, which is putting abroad the sign made for each ship or frigate,
they are to make sail and stand with them so nigh as to gain knowledge
what they are and of what quality, how many fireships and others, and
what order the fleet is in; which being done the frigates or vessels
are to speak together and conclude on the report they are to give, and
accordingly report to the general or commander-in-chief of the
squadron, and not to engage if the enemy's ships exceed them in number
except it shall appear to them on the place that they have the
advantage.
2. At sight of the said fleet the vice-admiral or he that commands in
the second place, and the rear-admiral or he that commands in the
third place, are to make what sail they can to come up with the
admiral on each wing, as also each ship according to her quality,
giving a competent distance from each other if there be sea-room
enough.
3. As soon as they shall [see] the general engage, or [he] shall make
a sign by shooting off two guns and putting a red flag on the fore
topmast-head, that each ship shall take the best advantage they can to
engage with the enemy next unto him.
4. If any ship shall happen to be over-charged and distressed the next
ship or ships are immediately to make towards their relief and
assistance upon signal given; which signal shall be, if the admiral,
then a pennant in the fore topmast-head; the vice-admiral or commander
in the second place, a pennant in the main topmast-head; and the
rear-admiral the like.
5. In case any ship shall be distressed or disabled by loss of masts,
shot under water, or otherwise so as she is in danger of sinking or
taking, he or they are to give a signal thereof so as, the fleet
having knowledge, they may be ready to be relieved. Therefore the
flagships are to have a special care to them, that such provisions may
be made that they may not be left in distress to the mercy of the
enemy; and the signal is to be a weft[1] of the ensign of the ship so
distressed.
6. That it is the duty of the commanders and masters of all the small
frigates, ketches and smacks belonging to the fleet to know the
fireships that belong to the enemy, and accordingly by observing their
motion to do their utmost to cut off their boats (if possible), or if
opportunity serve that they lay them on board, fire and destroy them;
and to this purpose they are to keep to windward of the fleet in time
of service. But in case they cannot prevent the fireships from coming
on board us by coming between us and them, which by all means possible
they are to endeavour, that then, in such a case, they show themselves
men in such an exigent,[2] and shear aboard them, and with their
boats, grapnels, and other means clear them from us and destroy them;
which service, if honourably done, according to its merit shall be
rewarded, and the neglect thereof strictly and severely called to
account.
7. That the fireships belonging to the fleet endeavour to keep the
wind, and they with the small frigate's to be as near the great ships
as they can, and to attend the signal from the commander-in-chief and
to act accordingly.
8. If any engagement shall happen to continue until night and the
general please to anchor, that upon signal given they all anchor in as
good order as may be, the signal being as in the instructions for
sailing; and if the general please to retreat without anchoring, then
the signal to be firing two guns so nigh one the other as the report
may be distinguished, and within three minutes after to do the like
with two guns more. And the commander of this ship is to sign copies
of these instructions to all ships and other vessels of this
fleet. Given on board the ----
FOOTNOTES:
[1] See note, p. 99.
[Transcriber's note: The text for this note reads:
'_Waft_ (more correctly written _wheft_). It is any flag or ensign
stopped together at the head and middle portion, slightly rolled up
lengthwise, and hoisted at different positions at the after-part of a
ship.'--Admiral Smyth (_Sailors' Word-Book_).]
[2] 'Exigent' = exigence, emergency. Shakespeare has 'Why do you cross
me in this exigent?'--_Jul. Cæs._ v. i.
_MARTEN TROMP, June_ 20, 1652.
[+Dr. Gardiner's First Dutch War, vol. i. p. 321. Extract+.]
_June_ 20/30, 1652. _The resolution of Admiral Tromp on the
distribution of the fleet in case of its being attacked_.
Each captain is expressly ordered, on penalty of 300 guilders, _to
keep near_[1] the flag officer under whom he serves. Also he is to
have his guns in a serviceable condition. The squadron under
Vice-Admiral Jan Evertsen is to lie or sail immediately ahead of the
admiral. Further Captain Pieter Floriszoon (who provisionally carries
the flag at the mizen as rear-admiral) is always to remain with his
squadron close astern of the admiral; and the Admiral Tromp is to take
his station between both with his squadron. The said superior officers
and captains are to stand by one another with all fidelity; and each
squadron when another is vigorously attacked shall second and free the
other, using therein all the qualities of a soldier and seaman.
FOOTNOTE:
[1] The Dutch has 'troppen' = to gather round (_cf._ our 'trooping the
colour'). De With's corresponding order has 'dat zij allen bij den
anderen ... gesloten zou den blijven.' _Supra_, p. 86.
II
ORDERS ISSUED DURING THE WAR
1653 AND 1654
INTRODUCTORY
The earliest known 'Fighting Instructions' in any language which aimed
at a single line ahead as a battle formation, were issued by the
Commonwealth's 'generals-at-sea' on March 29, 1653, in the midst of
the Dutch War. This is placed beyond doubt by an office copy amongst
the Duke of Portland's MSS. at Welbeck Abbey.[1] It is of high
importance for the history of naval tactics that we are at last able
to fix the date of these memorable orders. Endless misapprehension on
the subject of our battle formations during the First Dutch War has
been caused by a chronological error into which Mr. Granville Penn was
led in his _Memorials of Penn_ (Appendix L). Sir William Penn's
copy of these Instructions is merely dated 'March 1653,'[2] and his
biographer hazarded the very natural conjecture that, as this is an
'old style' date, it meant 'March 1654.' This would have been true of
any day in March before the 25th, but as we now can fix the date as
the 29th, we know the year is really 1653 and not 1654.[3] There was
perhaps some anxiety on Mr. Penn's part to get his hero some share in
the orders, and as William Penn was not appointed one of the
'generals-at-sea' till December 2, 1653, he could not officially have
had the credit of orders issued in the previous March. This point
however is also set at rest by the Welbeck copy, which besides the
date has the signatures of the generals, and they are those of Blake,
Deane and Monck. Penn did not sign them at all, but this really in no
way affects his claim as a tactical reformer. For as he was
vice-admiral of the fleet and an officer of high reputation, his share
in the orders was probably as great as that of anyone else.
The winter of 1652-3 was the turning point of the war. The summer
campaign had shown how serious the struggle was to be, and no terms
for ending it could be arranged. Large reinforcements consequently had
been ordered, and Monck and Deane nominated to assist Blake as joint
generals-at-sea for the next campaign. Four days later, on November
30, 1652, Blake had been defeated by Tromp off Dungeness, and several
of his captains were reported to have behaved badly. An inquiry was
ordered, and the famous 'Laws of War and Ordinances of the Sea,'
prepared by Sir Harry Vane by order of Parliament for the better
enforcement of discipline, were put in force. Notwithstanding these
vigorous efforts to increase the strength and efficiency of the sea
service, it was not till after the first action of the new campaign
that an attempt was made to improve the fleet tactics. The action off
Portland on February 18, 1653, and the ensuing chase of Tromp, marked
the first real success of the war; but though the generals succeeded
in delivering a severe blow to the Dutch admiral and his convoy, it
must have been clear to everyone that they narrowly escaped defeat
through a want of cohesion between their squadrons. On the 19th and
20th Tromp executed a masterly retreat, with his fleet in a crescent
or obtuse-angle formation and his convoy in its arms, but nowhere is
there any hint that either side fought in line ahead.[4] On the 25th
the fleet had put into Stokes Bay to refit, and between this time and
March 29 the new orders were produced.[5]
The first two articles it will be seen are practically the same as the
'Supplementary Instructions' on p. 99, but in the third, relating to
'general action,' instead of the ships engaging 'according to the
order presented,' as was enjoined in the previous set, 'they are to
endeavour to keep in a line with the chief,' as the order which will
enable them 'to take the best advantage they can to engage with the
enemy.' Article 6 directs that where a flagship is distressed captains
are to endeavour to form line between it and the enemy. Article 7
however goes still further, and enjoins that where the windward
station has been gained the line ahead is to be formed 'upon severest
punishment,' and a special signal is given for the manoeuvre. Article
9 provides a similar signal for flagships.
Compared with preceding orders, these new ones appear nothing less
than revolutionary. But it is by no means certain that they were
so. Here again it must be remarked that it is beyond all experience
for such sweeping reforms to be so rigorously adopted, and
particularly in the middle of a war, without their having been in the
air for some time previously, and without their supporters having some
evidence to cite of their having been tried and tried successfully, at
least on a small scale. The natural presumption therefore is that the
new orders only crystallised into a definite system, and perhaps
somewhat extended, a practice which had long been familiar though not
universal in the service. A consideration of the men who were
responsible for the change points to the same conclusion. Blake, the
only one of the three generals who had had experience of naval
actions, was ashore disabled by a severe wound, but still able to take
part, at least formally, in the business of the fleet. Deane, another
soldier like Blake, though he had commanded fleets, had never before
seen an action, but had done much to improve the organisation of the
service, and at this time, as his letters show, was more active and
ardent in the work than ever. Monck before the late cruise had never
been to sea at all, since as a boy he sailed in the disastrous Cadiz
expedition of 1625; but he was the typical and leading scientific
soldier of his time, with an unmatched power of organisation and an
infallible eye for both tactics and strategy, at least so far as it
had then been tried. Penn, the vice-admiral of the fleet, was a
professional naval officer of considerable experience, and it was he
who by a bold and skilful movement had saved the action off Portland
from being a severe defeat for Blake and Deane. Monck's therefore was
the only new mind that was brought to bear on the subject. Yet it is
impossible to credit him with introducing a revolution in naval
tactics. All that can be said is that possibly his genius for war and
his scientific and well-drilled spirit revealed to him in the
traditional minor tactics of the seamen the germ of a true tactical
system, and caused him to urge its reduction into a definite set of
fighting instructions which would be binding on all, and would
co-ordinate the fleet into the same kind of homogeneous and handy
fighting machine that he and the rest of the Low Country officers had
made of the New Model Army. In any case he could not have carried the
thing through unless it had commended itself to the experience of such
men as Penn and the majority of the naval officers of the council of
war. And they would hardly have been induced to agree had they not
felt that the new instructions were calculated to bring out the best
of the methods which they had empirically practised.
How far the new orders were carried out during the rest of the war is
difficult to say. In both official and unofficial reports of the
actions of this time an almost superstitious reverence is shown in
avoiding tactical details. Nevertheless that a substantial improvement
was the result seems clear, and further the new tactics appear to have
made a marked impression upon the Dutch. Of the very next action, that
off the Gabbard on June 2, when Monck was left in sole command, we
have a report from the Hague that the English 'having the wind, they
stayed on a tack for half an hour until they put themselves into the
order in which they meant to fight, which was in file at half
cannon-shot,' and the suggestion is that this was something new to the
Dutch. 'Our fleet,' says an English report by an eye-witness, 'did
work together in better order than before and seconded one another.'
Then there is the important testimony of a Royalist intelligencer who
got his information at the Hague on June 9, from the man who had
brought ashore the despatches from the defeated Dutch fleet. After
relating the consternation which the English caused in the Dutch ranks
as well by their gunnery as their refusal to board, he goes on to say,
'It is certain that the Dutch in this fight (by the relation and
acknowledgment of Tromp's own express sent hither, with whom I spoke)
showed very great fear and were in very great confusion, and the
English he says fought in excellent order.'[6]
Again, for the next battle--that of the Texel--fought on July 31 in
the same year, we have the statement of Hoste's informant, who was
present as a spectator, that at the opening of the action the English,
but not the Dutch, were formed in a single line close-hauled. 'Le 7
Aoust' [_i.e._ N.S.], the French gentleman says, 'je découvris
l'armée de l'amiral composée de plus de cent vaisseaux de
guerre. Elle était rangée en trois escadrons et elle faisoit
vent-arrière pour aller tomber sur les Anglois, qu'elle rencontra
le même jour à peu près en pareil nombre rangez _[sic]_ sur une
ligne qui tenoit plus de quatre lieues Nord-Nord-Est et Sud-Sud-Ouest,
le vent étant Nord-Ouest. Le 8 et le 9 se passèrent en des
escarmouches, mais le 10 on en _[sic]_ vint à une bataille
decisive. Les Anglois avoient essaié de gagner le vent: mais
l'amiral Tromp en aiant toujours conservé l'avantage, et l'étant
rangé sur une ligne parallèle à celle des Anglois arriva sur
eux,' &c. This is the first known instance of a Dutch fleet forming in
single line, and, so far as it goes, would tend to show they adopted
it in imitation of the English formation.[7] At any rate, so far as
we have gone, the evidence tends to show that the English finally
adopted the regular line-ahead formation in consequence of the orders
of March 29, 1653, and there is no indication of the current belief
that they borrowed it from the Dutch.
By the English admirals the new system must have been regarded as a
success. For the Fighting Instructions of 1653 were reissued with
nothing but a few alterations of signals and verbal changes by Blake,
Monck, Disbrowe, and Penn, the new 'admirals and generals of the fleet
of the Commonwealth of England,' appointed in December 1653, when the
war was practically over. They are printed by Granville Penn
(_Memorials of Penn_, ii. 76), under date March 31, 1655, but
that cannot be the actual date of their issue, for Blake was then in
the Mediterranean, Penn in the West Indies, and Monck busy with his
pacification of the Highlands. We must suspect here then another
confusion between old and new styles, and conjecture the true date to
be March 31, 1654, that is just before Monck left for Scotland, and a
few days before the peace was signed. So that these would be the
orders under which Blake conducted his famous campaign in the
Mediterranean, Penn and Venables captured Jamaica, and the whole of
Cromwell's Spanish war was fought.
FOOTNOTES:
[1] _Hist. MSS. Com._ XIII. ii. 85. It is from a transcript of this copy
made for Dr. Gardiner that I have been permitted to take the text below.
A set of 'Instructions for the better ordering of the fleet in Sailing'
accompanies them.
[2] _British Museum, Shane MSS._ 3232, f. 81.
[3] The Sloane copy is not quite identical with that in the Portland
MSS. The variations, however, are merely verbal and in a few signals,
and are of such a nature as to be accounted for by careless
transcription.
[4] Hoste, the author of the first great treatise on Naval Tactics,
quotes Tromp's formation as a typical method of retreat; but his account
is vitiated by what seems a curious mistake. He says: 'Il rangea son
armée en demi-lune et il mit son convoi au milieu: c'est à dire que son
vaisseau faisait au vent l'angle obtus de la demi-lune, et les autres
s'étendoient de part (_sic_) et d'autre _sur les deux lignes du plus-
près_ pour former les faces de la demi-lune qui couvroient le convoi. Ce
fut en cet ordre qu'il fit vent arrière, foudroiant à droite et à gauche
tous les anglois qui s'approchent' But if with the wind aft his two
quarter lines bore from the flagship seven points from the wind, the
formation would have been concave to the enemy and the convoy could not
have been _au milieu_. (_Evolutions Navales_, pp. 90, 95, and plate 29,
p. 91.) The passage is in any case interesting, as showing that what was
then called the crescent or half-moon formation was nothing but our own
'order of retreat,' or 'order of retreat reverted,' of Rodney's time. As
defined by Sir Charles Knowles in 1780, the order of retreat reverted
was formed on two lines of bearing, _i.e._ by the seconds of the centre
ship keeping two points abaft her starboard and larboard beams
respectively. In the simple order of retreat they kept two points before
the beam.
[5] No reference to these orders appears in the correspondence of the
generals at this time, unless it be in a letter of John Poortmans,
deputy-treasurer of the fleet, to Robert Blackbourne, in which he writes
on March 9: 'The generals want 500 copies of the instructions for
commanders of the state's ships printed and sent down.' (_S.P. Dom._ 48,
f. 65.)
[6] _Clarendon MSS._ 45, f. 470.
[7] Hoste, _Evolutions Navales_, p. 78. Dr. Gardiner declared himself
sceptical as to the genuineness of the French gentleman's narrative,
mainly on the ground of certain inaccuracies of date and detail; but, as
Hoste certainly believed in it, it cannot well be rejected as evidence
of the main features of the action for which he used it.
_COMMONWEALTH ORDERS_, 1653.[1]
[+Duke of Portland's MSS.+]
_By the Right Honourable the Generals and Admirals of the Fleet.
Instructions for the better ordering of the fleet in fighting_.
First. Upon the discovery of a fleet, receiving a sign from the
general, which is to be striking the general's ensign, and making a
weft,[2] two frigates [3] appointed out of each squadron are to make
sail, and stand with them so nigh as they may conveniently, the better
to gain a knowledge of them what they are, and of what quality, and
how many fireships and others, and in what posture[4] the fleet is;
which being done the frigates are to speak together and conclude in
that report they are to give, and accordingly repair to their
respective squadrons and commanders-in-chief, and not to engage if the
enemy[5] exceed them in number, except it shall appear to them on the
place they have the advantage:
Ins. 2nd. At sight of the said fleet the vice-admiral, or he that
commands in chief in the 2nd place, and his squadron, as also the
rear-admiral, or he that commandeth in chief in the 3rd place, and his
squadron, are to make what sail they can to come up with the admiral
on each wing, the vice-admiral on the right wing, and the rear-admiral
on the left wing, leaving a competent distance for the admiral's
squadron if the wind will permit and there be sea-room enough.
Ins. 3rd. As soon as they shall see the general engage, or make a
signal by shooting off two guns and putting a red flag over the fore
topmast-head, that then each squadron shall take the best advantage
they can to engage with the enemy next unto them; and in order
thereunto all the ships of every squadron shall endeavour to keep in a
line with the chief unless the chief be maimed or otherwise disabled
(which God forbid!), whereby the said ship that wears the flag should
not come in to do the service which is requisite. Then every ship of
the said squadron shall endeavour to keep[6] in a line with the
admiral, or _he that commands in chief_[7] next unto him, and
nearest the enemy.
Inst. 4th. If any squadron shall happen to be overcharged or
distressed, the next squadron or ships are _speedily_[8] to make
towards their relief and assistance upon a signal given them; which
signal shall be, in the admiral's squadron a pennant on the fore
topmast-head, the vice-admiral or he that commands in chief in the
second place a pennant on the main topmast-head, [and] the
rear-admiral's squadron the like.
Inst. 5th. If in case any ship shall be distressed or disabled for
lack of masts, shot under water, or otherwise _in danger of sinking
or taking, he or they_,[9] thus distressed shall make a sign by
the weft of his jack or ensign, and those next him are strictly
required to relieve him.
Inst. 6th. That if any ship shall be necessitated to bear away from
the enemy to stop a leak or mend what else is amiss, which cannot be
otherwise repaired, he is to put out a pennant on the mizen yard-arm
or ensign staff, whereby the rest of the ships may have notice what it
is for; and if it should be that the admiral or any flagship should do
so, the ships of the fleet or the respective squadrons are to
endeavour to _keep up in a line as close_[10] as they can betwixt
him and the enemy, having always one eye to defend him in case the
enemy should come to annoy him in that condition.
Inst. 7th. In case the admiral should have the wind of the enemy, and
that other ships of the fleet are to windward of the admiral, then
upon hoisting up a blue flag at the mizen yard, or the mizen
topmast,[11] every such ship then is to bear up into his wake, _and
grain upon severest punishment_[12] In case the admiral be to
leeward of the enemy, and his fleet or any part thereof to leeward of
him, to the end such ships to leeward may come up into the line with
their admiral, if he shall put abroad a flag as before and bear up,
none that are to leeward are to bear up, but to keep his or their luff
to gain the wake or grain.
Inst. 8th. If the admiral will have any of the ships _to
endeavour_[13] by tacking or otherwise to gain the wind of the
enemy, he will put abroad a red flag at his spritsail, topmast
shrouds, forestay or main topmast[14] stay. He that first discovers
the signal shall make sail and hoist and lower his sail[15] or ensign,
that the rest of the ships may take notice of it and follow.
Inst. 9th. If we put out a red flag on the mizen shrouds, or mizen
yard-arm, we will have all the flagships to come up in the grain and
wake[16] of us.
Inst. 10th. If in time of fight God shall deliver any of the enemy's
ships into our hands, special care is to be taken to save their men as
the present state of our condition will permit in such a case, but
that the ships be immediately destroyed, by sinking or burning the
same, so that our own ships be not disabled or any work interrupted by
the departing of men or boats from the ships; and this we require all
commanders to be more than mindful of.[17]
Inst. 11th. None shall fire upon any ship of the enemy that is laid
aboard by any of our own ships, but so that he may be sure he endamage
not his friend.
Inst. 12th. That it is the duty of commanders and masters of all small
frigates,[18] ketches, and smacks belonging to the several squadrons
to know the fireships belonging to the enemy, and accordingly by
observing their motions to do their utmost to cut off their boats if
possible, or, if opportunity be, that they lay them aboard, seize or
destroy them. And to this purpose they are to keep to windward of
their squadrons in time of service. But in case they cannot prevent
the fireships [coming][19] on board by clapping between us and them
(which by all means possible they are to endeavour), that then in such
cases they show themselves men in such an exigent and steer on board
them, and with their boats, grapnels, and other means clear them from
us and destroy them; which service (if honourably done) according to
its merit shall be rewarded, but the neglect severely to be called to
accompt.
Inst. 13th. That the fireships in the several squadrons endeavour to
keep the wind; and they with the small frigates to be as near the
great ships as they can, to attend the signal from the general or
commander-in-chief, and to act accordingly. If the general hoist up a
white flag on the mizen yard-arm or topmast-head, all small frigates
in his squadron are to come under his stern for orders.
Inst. 14th. That if any engagement by day shall continue till night
and the general shall please to anchor, then upon signal given they
all anchor in as good order as may be, the signal being as in the
'Instructions for Sailing'; and if the general please to retreat
without anchoring, the signal to be firing two guns, the one so nigh
the other as the report may be distinguished, and within three minutes
after to do the like with two guns more.
Given under our hands at Portsmouth, this March 29th, 1653.
ROBERT BLAKE.
RICHARD DEANE.
GEORGE MONCK.
FOOTNOTES:
[1] Re-issued in March 1654, by Blake, Monck, Disbrowe, and Penn, with
some amendments and verbal alterations. As reissued they are in _Sloane
MSS._ 3232, f. 81, and printed in Granville Penn's _Memorials of Sir
William Penn_, ii. 76. All the important amendments in the new edition,
apart from mere verbal alterations, are given below in notes to the
articles in which they occur.
[2] '_Waft_ (more correctly written _wheft_). It is any flag or ensign
stopped together at the head and middle portion, slightly rolled up
lengthwise, and hoisted at different positions at the after-part of a
ship.'--Admiral Smyth (_Sailors' Word-Book_).
[3] The orders of 1654 have 'one frigate.'
[4] _I.e._ 'formation.'
[5] 1654, 'enemy's ships.'
[6] 1654, 'get.'
[7] 1654, 'or the commander-in-chief.'
[8] 1654, 'immediately.'
[9] 1654, 'so as she is in danger of being sunk or taken, then they.'
[10] 1654, 'to keep on close in a line.'
[11] 1654, 'mizen topmast-head.'
[12] 1654, 'or grain upon pain of severe punishment.' Nothing is more
curious in naval phraseology than the loss of this excellent word
'grain,' or 'grayne,' to express the opposite of 'wake.' To come into a
ship's grain meant to take station ahead of her. There is nothing now
which exactly supplies its place, and yet it has long fallen into
oblivion, so long, indeed, that its existence was unknown to the learned
editors of the new _Oxford Dictionary_. This is to be the more regretted
as its etymology is very obscure. It may, however, be traced with little
doubt to the old Norse 'grein,' a branch or prong, surviving in the word
'grains,' a pronged harpoon or fish spear. From its meaning, 'branch,'
it might seem to be akin to 'stem' and to 'bow,' which is only another
spelling of'bough.' But this is not likely. The older meaning of 'bows'
was 'shoulders,' and this, it is agreed, is how it became applied to the
head of a ship. There is, however, a secondary and more widely used
sense of 'grain,' which means the space between forking boughs, and so
almost any angular space, like a meadow where two rivers converge. Thus
'grain,' in the naval sense, might easily mean the space enclosed by the
planks of a ship where they spring from the stem, or if it is not
actually the equivalent of 'bows,' it may mean the diverging waves
thrown up by a ship advancing through the water, and thus be the exact
analogue of 'wake.'
[13] 1654, 'to make sail and endeavour.'
[14] 1654, 'Fore topmast.'
[15] 1654, 'jack.'
[16] 1654, 'wake or grain.'
[17] 1654, 'more than ordinarily careful of.'
[18] It should be remembered that 'frigate' at this time meant a
'frigate-built ship.' The larger ones were 'capital ships' and lay in
the line, while the smaller ones were used as cruisers.
[19] Inserted from 1654 copy.