GRAHAM'S ADVANCE AND WITHDRAWAL FROM THE EASTERN SOUDAN.
On the 26th March, another convoy was attacked, this time about two
miles only from Souakim. The enemy on this occasion charged the head of
the square, and were repulsed with considerable loss, none of them
getting within five yards of the square. The British casualties were
three wounded. It was said that 100 of the enemy were killed in this
affair. The heat of the weather was now beginning to make itself felt,
and several cases of sunstroke occurred amongst the troops engaged.
The first part of the Australian Contingent arrived at Souakim on the
29th March. The troops consisted of twenty-eight officers, 500 men of
the battalion of Infantry, thirty men of the Artillery, and thirty-three
men of the Ambulance Corps. The Contingent, which was commanded by
Colonel Richardson, met with an enthusiastic reception from the naval
and military forces at Souakim.
The railway was now vigorously pushed forward in the direction of
Handoub, and on the 2nd April General Graham determined to advance and
attack Osman Digna in his position at Tamaai, although there was some
doubt whether he would accept battle.
Accordingly at three a.m. the General paraded his troops in the
moonlight, and at four marched them to McNeill's zeriba. This zeriba
(No. 1) was reached at 9 a.m., and the force halted until 10.15 a.m. for
rest and refreshment. During this time arrangements were made for the
defence of the zeriba, at which the 28th Bombay Native Infantry were
left with two Gardner guns manned by marine artillery. The balloon was
filled and made ready for use for reconnoitring purposes.
The troops were joined at the zeriba by the Grenadier Guards, the
Berkshire Regiment, the 24th Company of the Royal Engineers, two Gardner
guns, manned by the Naval Brigade, the Mounted Infantry, and one troop
of the 9th Bengal Cavalry.
A finer body of men than that which was now assembled was probably never
got together. They were in the best of spirits, and looked forward with
eagerness to meeting the enemy. The size and composition of the force
were such as to render any possibility of it receiving a check from
Osman Digna out of the question.
The place where it was hoped the engagement would come off was the spot
where Graham had encountered such severe resistance just twelve months
before. This time it was determined to be prepared to meet any number of
the enemy.
The march was resumed at 10.15 a.m., the whole force marching in square.
It was composed of 8,175 officers and men, 1,361 horses, 1,639 camels,
930 mules, and 1,773 camp-followers.
Soon after starting, an attempt was made to reconnoitre from the
balloon, and parties of the enemy were reported to be discovered some
miles in front. The wind, however, increased to such an extent as to
render the balloon unserviceable, and at eleven it had to be packed up.
The following details of the operations are taken mainly from General
Graham's despatch.
"The square advanced slowly with frequent halts, owing to the
density of bush in the neighbourhood of the zeriba.
"At 12.15 p.m., about three miles from zeriba No. 1, the
Cavalry and Mounted Infantry reported the presence of the enemy
in the bush in scattered groups, a few being on camels and the
main portion on foot. These appeared to be at first advancing
through the bush, but gradually fell back before the advance of
the Cavalry.
"At 12.45 p.m. the force halted for a short time, and at 1.30
p.m. the enemy were reported as retiring towards the Teselah
Hills and Tamaai. At 2 p.m., about three miles from the Teselah
Hills, the force halted for water and food, and the Mounted
Infantry and a squadron of the 9th Bengal Cavalry were ordered
to reconnoitre the position on these hills, reported to be
lined with the enemy.
"At first the enemy seemed inclined to defend the position, but
their flanks being threatened they fell back on Tamaai.
Teselah, a group of bare rocky hills, about 100 feet high, but
practicable for guns, was occupied by the Mounted Infantry and
Bengal Cavalry at three o'clock. From these hills an excellent
view was obtained of the scattered villages of New Tamaai,
lying between the ridges of low hills beyond Teselah, and the
deep ravine Khor Ghoub, beyond which the country becomes
exceedingly mountainous and intersected by ravines with
precipitous sides.
"The Mounted Infantry were ordered to push on to the village,
find out if it was occupied, and then, if practicable, move on
to the water and water the horses. One company advanced about a
mile south through a village, when fire was opened on them from
another village further south; while the company moving towards
the water in the Khor Ghoub were fired upon by the enemy on the
ridges near. The fire was returned, and the Mounted Infantry
fell back to the Teselah Hill, where they were ordered to join
the Cavalry, and return to No. 1 zeriba for the night."
The main body of the force reached the Teselah Hills at 5 p.m., when the
usual zeriba (2) was formed.
About 1 a.m., on the 3rd, shots were fired into the camp from about 800
to 1,000 yards. The moon was shining brightly, and the men at once stood
to their arms, and the Grenadier Guards answered by a volley. This and a
shrapnel shell silenced the enemy, not, however, before one of Graham's
men had been killed and two wounded.
At 4.30, on the 3rd, the troops were aroused, and the zeriba being left
in charge of McNeill with the East Surrey and Shropshire Regiments, the
advance was resumed at eight.
Graham's object was to gain possession of a cluster of villages at New
Tamaai which had long been Osman Digna's head-quarters, and to secure
the water supply, either by attacking the enemy's position, or by
drawing them into an engagement on the open ground near the villages.
The ground over which the men advanced was rough and broken. It was free
from bush, but was intersected with deep gullies, and studded with
jutting rocks and boulders.
At 8.45 fire was opened at long range by about 200 Arabs on the Mounted
Infantry and Bengal Cavalry in front. This was replied to. It soon
became evident that the enemy were unable to oppose any serious
resistance to the advance of the column.
The force proceeded through the villages, which were found to have been
recently deserted, and at 9.30 the crest of the north side of the Khor
Ghoub was gained.
The Mounted Infantry and Bengal Cavalry were all this time engaging the
enemy on the right flank, but were unable to draw them from their
positions.
The 2nd Brigade, under General Hudson, now moved to the right, advanced
across the Khor Ghoub, and ascended the hill on the opposite bank. The
Berkshire Regiment, with the Marines on their right, opened fire from
the highest point in the centre of the hill, and the Scots Guards threw
out a company to fire up the khor. The Guards' Brigade and Australian
Regiment moved forward in support of the 2nd Brigade, crowning the
ridges on the north side of the khor. G Battery of the Royal Horse
Artillery came into action on the left flank of the 1st Brigade, and
opened fire on some parties of the enemy.
During those operations the enemy were keeping up a distant fire, which
resulted in one man being killed, and one officer and fifteen men
wounded. The enemy's numbers and loss it was impossible to estimate with
any accuracy, but a steady, well-aimed fire was kept up on such bodies
as showed themselves, and the effect of the fire was to overcome any
opposition they may have intended to make.
On descending to the bed of the khor it was found that at the spot where
the previous year was running water, there were no signs of water beyond
a little moisture, and well-holes partly filled in. By digging about
four feet down only a small supply of brackish water could be obtained,
and at a short distance there was a shallow pool on a bed of black mud.
It is probable that this failure of the water supply had had much to do
with the disappearance of Osman Digna's forces.
Graham's force had brought with it only three days' supply of water, and
this failure of the wells at Tamaai rendered it dangerous to advance
against Tamanieb, for should the wells there be found to be also
waterless, the position of the army would become very serious.
Under these circumstances, and in view of the retirement of the enemy,
and their evident inability or indisposition to meet the force, the
General considered it best to withdraw, as it would have been fruitless
to attempt to follow Osman Digna into the mountainous country with no
water for the transport animals.
At 10.20 a.m. Graham ordered the withdrawal of the force, by alternate
brigades, from the position which had been taken up. By 10.40 a.m. the
troops had recrossed the khor, the movement being covered by two Horse
Artillery guns on the ridge to the north, which fired a few rounds of
shrapnel at detached parties of the enemy.
New Tamaai was ordered to be destroyed, and it was fired as the troops
retired through it. Considerable quantities of ammunition were
destroyed. Osman Digna's residence is believed to have been among the
huts burnt.
At noon the force reached No. 2 zeriba at the Teselah Hill. As the
troops fell back a handful of Arabs made their way, parallel to the line
of march, along the distant hills to the right, keeping up a running
fire on the British column. From zeriba No. 2 the force moved gradually
back to the other zeriba, and thence to Souakim.
The total casualties were one man killed and six wounded. Only seven men
fell out during the march.
It was a severe disappointment to the troops that, after all their
exertions, the marches in the blazing sun to and from the zeribas, and
the loss of life in previous engagements, the enemy should refuse to
await the attack, and that the want of water should prevent the column
following him up. The temporary occupation, followed by the destruction,
of a wretched village, was a very inadequate result to show after such
extensive preparation, and so much labour and effort.
From the 11th to the 20th April, Graham was occupied in making
reconnaissances to Hasheen, Otao, Deberet, and Tambouk, taking a few
prisoners, and capturing sheep and cattle.
The construction of the railway was at the same time pushed forward,
till it was close to Otao, making altogether a total distance of
eighteen miles.
Meanwhile, Osman Digna's followers amused themselves cutting the
telegraph wires and damaging the railway works as opportunities offered.
They also made nightly attacks on Graham's camp. In order to check this,
a series of automatic mines, to explode when trodden on, was placed
outside the British lines. It does not appear that this measure answered
the purpose intended, although an accidental explosion of one of the
mines resulted in the loss of a promising young officer, Lieutenant
Askwith, of the Royal Engineers.
Osman Digna's exact position at this period seems to have been somewhat
of a puzzle to Graham, but on the 22nd he was able to telegraph that
Osman was for the time without any large following, and that his people
were greatly discouraged by their losses in the various engagements, and
also in want of food.
The question of withdrawing the expedition now arose. Graham was most
unwilling to retire without having achieved something decisive, and on
the 26th he telegraphed that he strongly recommended crushing Osman
before the expedition should be withdrawn. He added, that with Osman
crushed, the country would be at peace, and the native allies safe;
whereas if the British force were withdrawn he would soon become as
strong as ever, would threaten Souakim, and punish the friendly tribes.
In the beginning of May Lord Wolseley arrived at Souakim and from that
moment the question of what was to be done was taken out of Graham's
hands.
The Government had made up its mind, so far as such an operation was
possible, not to go on with the railway to Berber at all events for the
present, and the inutility of keeping the expedition in Souakim in face
of the policy of abandoning the Soudan, referred to in the following
chapter, generally, naturally struck Lord Wolseley.
On the 4th May he telegraphed to Lord Hartington that if it was
positively decided not to push forward the railway as part of the
campaign against the Mahdi at Khartoum, he advised the immediate
embarkation of the Guards, the navvies, and Australians, leaving only
the Indian Contingent and one British battalion for a garrison at
Souakim. He added, on the 5th, that the heat was increasing, and the men
of the expedition would soon become sickly; that he did not think the
further operations wished for by Graham were, in face of the hot
weather, desirable. Among other suggestions he proposed to the
Government to send back to England the ships laden with railway
material, and to take up the railway before the troops fell back.
This despatch suggests the idea that Wolseley was beginning to get a
little tired of giving advice to a Government which was always asking
his opinion and never acting upon it.
On the 8th he was instructed that the Government adhered to the decision
to adopt the proposal for defence of the frontier in his despatch of
14th April, but that the Government did not approve of his suggestion to
take up the railway and ship off the plant; but that he should arrange
to hold the line, pending consideration whether it would be carried
onwards.
This last despatch was too much for Wolseley, who appears to have
thought it hard enough to have to carry out a policy of which he
disapproved, without having the initiation of it attributed to himself;
and in his despatch of the 11th he replied, "What you term my proposals,
were the military dispositions recommended in order to give effect to
your policy at Souakim, to stop the railway, and send away as many
troops as could be spared for service elsewhere. If the garrison here
is to be seriously reduced, the railway must be either taken up or
abandoned." He added, "Unless you have some clearly defined Soudan
policy to initiate, any military operations, such as the extension of
the railway would entail, would be to throw away uselessly valuable
lives."
On the 13th Wolseley was instructed that the Government adopted the
dispositions recommended in his telegram of the 5th. This was followed
by preparations for the immediate embarkation of the expedition.
Before this, Graham had on the 5th made a raid on Takool, a village ten
miles south of Otao, and twenty west of Souakim, and driven out the
enemy, reported to be 700 strong. Graham's force burnt Takool, and
captured between 1,500 and 2,000 sheep and goats in this the last
exploit of the campaign.
The railway works were now discontinued, the troops called in from Otao,
and the navvies withdrawn. As the last truckload came in from the front,
it was followed and fired on by jeering Soudanese.
The store-ships, which had for weeks been lying in the roads with rails,
plant, and machinery not yet unloaded, were ordered back to England with
their cargoes.
On the 17th May Graham and his staff left Souakim with the Coldstream
Guards. The Grenadiers, as well as the Australians and Scots Guards,
sailed the following day.
The remainder of the troops followed shortly after, and before the end
of the month the whole of the expedition, with the exception of the
Shropshire Regiment and a portion of the Indian Contingent, had left
Souakim.
Of the results obtained by the expedition, there is but little to say.
Its departure left Osman Digna still uncrushed, and the Souakim-Berber
route still unopened; and Osman was enabled in 1885 to boast, as he had
done in 1884, that he had driven the British out of the country.[136]
This expedition was of far greater strength than its predecessor, and it
is no disparagement to the officers and men engaged in it to say that
their exploits did not equal those of the expedition of 1884. Tamaai,
Handoub, and other positions had been taken and occupied temporarily,
and a small portion of the railway had been made. This represented about
the sum total of results.[137]