EVACUATION.
Towards the end of March, 1885, the force at Korti was gradually
withdrawn to the town of Dongola, where Wolseley again fixed his
head-quarters. A small garrison of black troops only was left at Korti.
The detachment at Merawi, under Colonel Butler, still remained there as
a rear guard.
Although it had been decided to postpone further operations until the
autumn, there is no reason to suppose that Wolseley entertained any idea
that the enterprise against Berber and Khartoum was ever going to be
abandoned. But early in April an unexpected contingency had to be
reckoned with. On 9th April Mr. Gladstone announced to the House of
Commons the Russian attack on the Afghan frontier, and the calling out
of the Reserves in the United Kingdom.
This led the British Government to reconsider the whole question of the
Soudan Expedition, and Wolseley was instructed to proceed to Cairo and
confer with Sir E. Baring and General Stephenson on the military
situation.
On 13th April, Lord Hartington telegraphed to Wolseley as follows:--
"In the condition of Imperial affairs it is probable that the
expedition to Khartoum may have to be abandoned, and the troops
brought back as soon as possible to Egypt. Consider at once what
measures should, in that case, be taken for safe withdrawal of
troops. This would involve stopping advance from Souakim, but
not hurried withdrawal."
On the 14th April Wolseley telegraphed that in the event of the
Government determining to withdraw the troops from the Soudan, before
completion of arrangements he must know whether it was intended to
retain Dongola, Wady Halfa, Korosko, or Assouan, as the frontier post.
He said that if the position on the southern frontier of Egypt was to be
exclusively one of defence, he would hold Wady Halfa and Korosko as
outposts, with a strong brigade at Assouan. There would be no difficulty
in withdrawing troops, but for the position in Egypt it was most
essential that the announcement of withdrawal should be accompanied by
an authoritative statement that the Government was determined to
maintain a British garrison.
The next day Wolseley telegraphed his opinion on the question of
withdrawal, strongly advising the retention of Dongola. His message,
omitting irrelevant passages, was as follows:--
"At, and south of Assouan, I have about 7,500 British fighting
soldiers. Retreat policy will require at least 2,500 on the
frontier, leaving 5,000 available. For the sake of this handful,
is it advisable to reverse Soudan policy? Retreat from Dongola
hands that province over to the Mahdi, and renders loyalty of
Ababdehs and other frontier tribes very doubtful. Withdraw
Graham's force if necessary; this will not seriously disturb
Egypt; but hold on to Dongola province."
There are few unprejudiced persons who will not agree in the soundness
of the views above expressed. The reply was as follows:--
"_War Office, April 15th, 1885._
"Your telegrams of the 14th and 15th received. Decision will
probably be to adopt proposal for defence of Egyptian frontier
at Wady Halfa and Assouan, as in your telegram of 14th. It is
desirable that troops not required for this purpose should be
concentrated as soon as possible, and available for any other
service."
The Government at this time had fully made up their minds to withdraw
from the Soudan altogether as early as possible.
Wolseley, on the other hand, was anxious that before this step should be
finally taken, the Mahdi should be crushed once for all, and in a very
able despatch, dated the 16th April, set forth his views.
The document, which reads very like a protest against the policy of the
Gladstone Cabinet, omitting some passages, is as follows:--
"Both from a military and financial point of view, and also with
regard to the general well-being of Egypt proper, the growing
power of the Mahdi must be met, not by a purely defensive policy
on the frontier, whether at Assouan or Wady Halfa, but by his
overthrow in the neighbourhood of Khartoum."
The despatch concludes:--
"To sum up. The struggle with the Mahdi, or rather, perhaps,
with Mahdi-ism, must come sooner or later. We can accept it now,
and have done with it once and for all, or we can allow all the
military reputation we have gained at the cost of so much toil
and hard fighting, all the bloodshed and all the expenditure of
the past campaign, to go for nothing, and try and stave the
final struggle off for a few years. These years will be years of
trouble and disturbance for Egypt, of burden and strain to our
military resources, and the contest that will come in the end
will be no less than that which is in front of us now. This is
all we shall gain by a defensive policy."
The Afghan question still troubled the Ministry, and on the 20th April
Lord Hartington telegraphed that the "Government were about to announce
that it was necessary to hold all the military resources of the Empire,
including the forces in the Soudan, available for service wherever
required. The Government would not," he said, "therefore make provision
for further offensive operations in the Soudan, or for military
preparations for an early advance on Khartoum, beyond such as could not
be stopped with advantage, and did not involve hostile action, viz.,
river steamboats contracted for, and the completion of the Wady Halfa
Railway. As to ulterior steps, the Government reserved their liberty of
action. With the cessation of active operations on the Nile, any
considerable extension of the Souakim-Berber Railway was to be
suspended; but as Souakim must be held for the present, it might be
necessary to occupy one or more stations in the neighbourhood, and the
Government would retain a garrison in Egypt, and defend the frontier."
On the 23rd April Wolseley proposed that he should go to Souakim in
order to form an opinion on the spot as to the points which it would be
desirable to hold.
This was approved by the Government, and on the 24th Wolseley
communicated the arrangements made for the disposition of the Nile force
in his absence as follows:--
"On 1st June, troops at Merawi start for Dongola, at which place
and Abu Fatmeh I propose to concentrate force now up the Nile.
This movement will be completed by 1st July.
"In the meantime, railway to Ferket will be in a forward state,
and able to assist greatly in the movement of troops and Civil
Government officers on Wady Halfa. At present nearly all the
troops are in huts; to move them in this present hot weather
will be very trying to their health.
"When troops are concentrated at Dongola and Abu Fatmeh I shall
expect orders before I move them to Wady Halfa."
On the 27th April Wolseley was informed that he was to act in accordance
with the proposals contained in his telegram of the 24th. The
concentration, he was instructed, should be deliberate, but the movement
from Merawi was to begin at once.
Wolseley and his staff left Cairo on April 29th and immediately embarked
for Souakim.
General Buller and Sir Charles Wilson being asked their opinions, both
reported strongly against a withdrawal from Dongola, and their views
were supported by Sir Evelyn Baring.
All argument, however, was in vain. The Government remained unconvinced.
In the beginning of May the Merawi detachment moved down to Dongola, and
on the 13th the evacuation of the latter place commenced.
The Soudan having to be abandoned, the Government evinced some desire to
consider how far some sort of government could be set on foot for the
province of Dongola.
Sir E. Baring, to whom a question was addressed on the subject, referred
to Wolseley and General Buller. The former, regarding the matter from a
military point of view, replied that a railway ought to be made to
Hannek (just below the town of New Dongola), and the end of the line
held by a British battalion, and Dongola itself should be garrisoned by
2,000 black troops. The present "Wekil," according to Wolseley, should
be appointed Mudir. "It was safer," added his Lordship, "to attempt this
than to hand Dongola over to the Mahdi and anarchy."
Buller replied that he did not think it possible to establish a
government as proposed, and that the first thing to be considered was
who was to take charge of it. His opinion was that no force of blacks
that could be got together would be sufficient to hold the province. He
added that he did not believe the railway to Hannek to be anything but a
waste of money; it would besides require all the present force as a
covering party; he believed the British were withdrawing just as the
fruit was falling into their hands; concluding with the sentence, "I do
not believe that when we leave Dongola any one else will keep the Mahdi
out."
Sir E. Baring, in forwarding the above opinions, said that "in view of
the decision of the Government he thought that instructions should be
given to send down all troops, and as many of the civil population as
wished to leave, to Wady Halfa," and concluded in the following words:--
"Your Lordship will understand that we make this recommendation
only because we consider it to be the necessary consequence of
the decision of Her Majesty's Government to abandon the province
of Dongola at once, but that it must in no way be taken to imply
our agreement with that decision.
"Nubar Pasha, on behalf of the Egyptian Government, requests me
to make a final and most earnest appeal to the Government of
Her Majesty to postpone the departure of the British troops
from Dongola for, say, six months, in order that there may be
at least a chance of establishing a government there.
"Nubar Pasha fears that the retreat of the British from Dongola
will react on Egypt, and especially on the southern provinces,
to such an extent as will render it impossible for the
Khedive's Government to maintain order, and that they will be
forced to appeal to Her Majesty's Government for help to
preserve order in the country, and that thus the present system
of government which Her Majesty's Government have been at so
much trouble to maintain will be found no longer possible."
Nubar's appeal had no effect, and the question of the future government
of Dongola occupied the British Cabinet no more. On the 14th May, Sir E.
Baring was informed that it was the intention to withdraw the whole
force to Wady Halfa.
On the 16th Wolseley telegraphed his idea as to the British force which
should remain at Korosko and Wady Halfa.
This was approved by the Government, and the troops continued their
journey down the Nile.
The departure of the soldiers from Dongola was accompanied by the exodus
of a large portion of the native population, who feared to be left
exposed to the vengeance of the Mahdi.
Mr. Gladstone's Ministry retired from office on 12th June, and on the
Conservative Cabinet coming into power, one of the first questions with
which it occupied itself was that of Egypt.
It was impossible for the Ministry of Lord Salisbury to at once reverse
the Egyptian policy of their predecessors, but the new Premier declared
that "England had a mission in Egypt, and that until it was accomplished
it was idle to talk of withdrawal."
The evacuation of the Soudan, however, stood on a different footing. The
steps taken by Mr. Gladstone's Government were so far advanced that the
measure was already practically a _fait accompli_. As Lord Salisbury
stated, "the whole of the Soudan down to Dongola had been already
evacuated, and the whole of the province of Dongola, with the exception
of a rear-guard left at Debbeh, had been evacuated also; and 12,000 of
the luckless population, to avoid the vengeance of the Mahdi, had fled
from their houses and taken refuge in Upper Egypt."
It was not, however, without inquiry that Lord Salisbury's Cabinet
determined to proceed with the evacuation. Wolseley was again consulted,
and in a despatch of 27th June he wrote:--
"You cannot get out of Egypt for many years to come. If the
present policy of retreat be persisted in the Mahdi will become
stronger and stronger, and you will have to increase your
garrisons and submit to the indignity of being threatened by
him. Eventually you will have to fight him to hold your position
in Egypt, which you will then do with the population round you
ready on any reverse to rise against you. No frontier force can
keep Mahdism out of Egypt, and the Mahdi sooner or later must be
smashed, or he will smash you.
"To advance in the autumn on Khartoum and discredit the Mahdi
by a serious defeat on his own ground would certainly finish
him. The operation, if done deliberately, would be a simple
one; and, as far as anything can be a certainty in war, it
would be a certainty. Until this is done there will be no peace
in Egypt, and your military expenditure will be large and
increasing. My advice, therefore, is, carry out autumn campaign
up the Nile, as originally intended. I would leave Souakim as
it is."
On the 2nd July the Government telegraphed that--
"Her Majesty's Government, after a full consideration of all the
circumstances, were not prepared to reverse the orders given by
their predecessors by countermanding the retreat of the force
from Dongola."
Thus the policy of evacuation was affirmed.
General Brackenbury with the last of the rear-guard left Dongola on the
5th, and followed the rest of the troops down to Cairo.
On the 6th July Wolseley handed over the command of the British troops
to General Stephenson, and in a few weeks the greater part of the
officers and men forming the expedition had left Egypt.
The services of the officers and men forming the Gordon Relief
Expedition were referred to by Lord Salisbury on the 12th August in
moving in the House of Lords a vote of thanks in the following words:--
"In considering their merits you must keep out of sight
altogether the precise results and outcome of the labours they
have gone through and the dangers they have incurred. Of course
this is not the moment at which to broach controversial topics,
and I only wish to say that you must look upon this fact--that
they failed to fulfil the main purpose for which they were sent
out through no fault of their own. The prize of success was
taken from them, as it were by an overmastering destiny, by the
action of causes, whatever their nature, over which they
themselves had no more control than they would have over a
tempest or earthquake."[138]
There can be no doubt that Lord Salisbury's eulogium was well deserved.
The merits of the officers and men were unquestionable. That they did
not succeed was owing to the incapacity of those who sent them, at the
wrong time, by the wrong route, on their fruitless errand.