THE ATTACK ON McNEILL'S ZERIBA.
After the operations on the 19th and 20th March, 1885, preparations were
made for the advance on Tamaai, Osman Digna's reputed head-quarters and
stronghold. Situated, as it was, some fourteen miles to the south-west
of Souakim, the distance was deemed too great to be traversed in a
single day's march. It became necessary then, as on previous occasions,
to establish an intermediate position in which, as an advanced camp, the
usual stores of water, provisions, and ammunition might be
accumulated.[134]
About an hour after daylight on the 22nd March the force detached for
this purpose started from Souakim. Ahead and on the flanks was one
squadron of the 5th Lancers scouting; next marched the British
regiments, the 49th Berkshire, and the Royal Marine Light Infantry,
formed up in square under the command of Major-General Sir John C.
McNeill. The Berkshire Regiment led the way, and the Marines brought up
the rear, a detachment of the Royal Engineers occupying places in the
flanks. The only representatives of the artillery arm were four Gardner
guns with detachments of sailors and Royal Marine Artillery.
Outside the British square, but close to its left flank, moved the
Field Telegraph waggon and party, which kept unrolling the telegraph
wire and covering it with loose soil as it went on, so maintaining the
communication with Souakim throughout the advance.
[Illustration]
Formed up in a still larger square a short distance in rear of the right
flank, the Indian Contingent marched in echelon under command of
Brigadier-General Hudson. The 15th Sikhs formed the front face and a
portion of the flanks. The remainder of the right flank and one half of
the rear face were formed by the 28th Bombay Native Infantry. The 17th
Bengal Native Infantry occupied a similar position on the left flank and
rear face. In reserve, immediately within the rear face, marched a
company of Madras Sappers. Within this square was inclosed a vast and
miscellaneous array of laden camels, mules, carts, and conveyances of
all kinds, forming the transport train. The camels alone numbered from
1,000 to 1,200, and there were in all some 1,500 animals. The combined
British and Indian forces amounted to 3,300 men.
The orders were for the whole force to proceed to a point eight miles
distant in the direction of Tamaai, there to form a zeriba (No. 2), in
which the stores, &c., were to be deposited. When this was accomplished
the Lancers, Indian Infantry, and empty transport train were to return,
stop at a point five miles from Souakim, construct another zeriba (No.
1), and leaving it to be garrisoned by the 15th Sikhs, go back to
Souakim.
General Graham accompanied the troops for about two and a half miles and
then returned to camp, the chief of his staff warning McNeill to "look
out for an attack," but, beyond this casual reference to the possibility
of an attack, nothing more was said on the subject, although at
head-quarters information had several days previously been received that
the force would be assailed by at least 5,000 of the enemy before there
should be time to form the zeriba. The importance of this circumstance
will be apparent later on in connection with the events which followed.
The route which the force was instructed to take was to the westward of
the comparatively well-known road followed by Baker Pasha, and also by
the British troops, in 1884, and though free from difficulty at first,
later on led through thick bush of ever-increasing height and density.
The rate of progress was necessarily slow, and frequent halts became
imperative.
As the force advanced the Lancers began to report that parties of the
enemy were seen hovering about.
The heat of the day, with a burning sun overhead, from which the bushes
afforded no protection, now began to tell on the men, and at 10 a.m.,
when a little over five miles had been traversed, it was calculated by
the two generals that, allowing time for the construction of the zeribas
(Nos. 1 and 2) and the return journey, it would be well towards midnight
before the Indian Brigade and transport train would get back to Souakim.
Accordingly at 10.30 it was determined to halt the force and make the
zeriba in an open space six miles from the camp at Souakim.
The spot selected formed a large oblong with very irregular outlines,
presenting an area in the clearest portions about half a square mile in
extent.
McNeill then telegraphed to head-quarters at Souakim the change which
the difficulties with the transport had necessitated, and received back
in reply the message, "Go on if you can; if not, zeriba." The reply also
stated that, as the halt had been made at only six miles distance, no
intermediate zeriba would be required at the five-mile point previously
ordered.
The site for the zeriba being fixed upon, no time was lost in making the
necessary dispositions. The troops marched upon the ground in the same
order in which they had advanced, and the British square, being the
first to emerge upon the open, turning up a little to the left halted in
its original formation, taking up a position on the north-east side of
the open space. Past it came the Indian Brigade with the transport train
under its charge, General Hudson disposing his troops so as to cover the
ground on the three remaining sides.
On the side opposite the British square were posted the 15th Sikhs, to
the right the Bombay Native Infantry, and to the left the Bengal Native
Infantry. The bush in front of the Bombay Infantry being very dense, and
comparatively open in front of the Bengal Infantry, two companies of the
latter were moved across and placed on the right of the former to
strengthen and prolong this face.
In order to protect the front of the various lines of infantry, small
pickets of from four to five men each were thrown forward about 120
yards. A quarter of a mile further out in front of these pickets were
the Lancers, arranged as "Cossack posts" of four men each. Another
"Cossack post," also of four men, was used as a connecting link, the
remainder constituting the picket and visiting patrols.
At once the task of measuring and pegging out the site for the proposed
works was taken in hand. The plan adopted was to form three separate
squares placed diagonally like squares on a chess-board, or, as it is
termed, "in echelon," the large or central square, intended to contain
the stores, non-combatants, and transport animals, being between the
other two. Attached to this, and communicating with it at its
north-west and south-east angles respectively, were the smaller squares
set apart for the north and south zeribas, of equal dimensions, with
accommodation in each for a battalion and two Gardner guns. By this
arrangement every side of the central square or zeriba was capable of
being swept by a flanking fire from the zeribas at the angles.
Working parties were organized for cutting down the bush and dragging it
into position. The chief work of construction fell upon the Royal
Engineers and the Madras Sappers, but to expedite matters working
parties were drawn both from the British and Indian troops. The
remainder of the British troops, retaining their original formation in
square, piled their arms, and were ordered to lie down and rest. The
Indian troops not engaged in cutting brushwood remained standing to
their arms in lines two deep.
At 12.30 the Marines had their rations served out, the men dining by
half-companies at a time.
At 1 p.m. Major Graves with a squadron of the 20th Hussars arrived from
the camp at Souakim, and stated that he had been sent by General Graham
to communicate with McNeill. The Major reported that on the way out he
had seen in his front stray parties of the enemy, who retired before the
cavalry without coming into collision. On receiving a despatch for
Graham's chief of the staff, stating that matters were proceeding
satisfactorily, the Major started with the Hussars on his return journey
at 1.30.
As the most vital part of the defences, attention had been first of all
directed to the formation of the north and south zeribas. Both of these
were pushed on with the utmost expedition, but, as has been seen, the
bush being thickest at the north side, in front of the Bombay Infantry,
the zeriba at this angle was in a more advanced state than that on the
south side. The former was completed shortly after 2 p.m., and the two
Gardner guns designed for it were got into position. The battalion of
Marines hitherto forming part of the British square was now transferred
to this zeriba, together with the reserve ammunition and the telegraph
waggon. With this transfer of Marines the Berkshire Battalion was
contracted into a smaller square.
Meanwhile the south zeriba was also being rapidly proceeded with, and
it being represented that the Berkshires had eaten nothing since 4 a.m.,
rations and water were ordered to be served out to them, the men taking
their food by half battalions. As soon as the first of the half
battalions had finished it was marched into the south zeriba, very soon
after the Marines had occupied that on the north. The time was now
getting on towards half-past two, and shortly after the half battalion
had gone into the zeriba the soldiers piled their arms inside, part of
the men going out in front of the Sikhs to cut bush in order to complete
the defences.[135]
The camels had been unloaded in the central zeriba, and were filing out
to form up for the return march, the bulk of them being collected on an
unoccupied space to the south-east. The lines were being held by eight
companies of the Bengal Infantry, by the 15th Sikhs, and by the Bombay
Infantry.
This was the situation when shortly after 2.30 one of the Lancers rode
up and informed McNeill that the enemy was gathering in front and
advancing rapidly. Orders were at once given for the working and
covering parties to come in and for the troops to stand to their arms.
Whilst these instructions were being carried into effect, the Cavalry
were seen galloping up on every side with the Soudanese close at their
heels.
The attack was delivered mainly on the southern and western sides, the
Soudanese surging onwards in one vast impetuous mass, enveloped in
clouds of dust and filling the air with shouts and yells as they made
frantic efforts to storm the position. The Berkshires and Marines, as
well as the Sikhs and Bombay Infantry, stood their ground, receiving and
repulsing the attack with a heavy fire. The 17th Bengal Native Infantry,
however, thrown into partial disorder by some of the Cavalry riding
through their ranks, fired one wild and scattered volley and fled for
such cover as the zeriba might afford, many of them being shot down by
the defenders. Every effort was made to rally the fugitives, and about
120 were got within the southern zeriba, where they fired another
ineffectual volley and again broke and fled.
The assailants now crowded in by the uncompleted salient at a point
where there was no brushwood, but merely a sandbag parapet, where the
Gardner guns, not being yet in position, could not be got into action,
and killed six of the sailors and four officers.
Other parties of the enemy following the retreat of the Madras Infantry
dashed into the central zeriba, and caused a stampede among the animals
there and a panic among the native drivers. A general rush of the latter
took place both to the open side, and also through the north zeriba,
where some of the Marines were for the moment carried away by it. At
this moment the rear rank of the Berkshire half battalion engaged in
defending the western face of the south zeriba faced about and occupied
the gap through which the Soudanese were now pouring. Meeting the enemy
half-way, the Berkshires despatched every Arab who had entered, 112
bodies being counted within the limits of this zeriba alone. They also
captured a flag which the enemy had planted on the sandbag parapet. In a
few minutes this zeriba was cleared, and no further serious attack was
made upon it.
The bulk of the enemy's force, repelled by the steady volleys from the
troops on the south and west sides of the position, swept round by the
great mass of the transport animals, gathered together outside and to
the eastward for the return journey to Souakim. It was to cover this
part of the ground that six companies of the Bengal Infantry had been
drawn up in line. Their unfortunate collapse, however, gave the enemy an
opportunity of which they were not slow to take advantage. With a wild
howl, peculiarly alarming to the camel, they rushed upon the
panic-stricken and helpless mass. Plying lance and sword, cutting,
stabbing, hacking, and hamstringing the beasts, and slaughtering their
drivers, the tribesmen of the Soudan drove before them an unwieldy and
terrified body, heedless of everything but flight. Thus driven, the
transport train broke up and scattered itself in all directions.
Impelled by the pursuers, part of it bore down upon the zeribas held by
the Berkshires and Marines respectively, and part on the central zeriba.
Mixed up as they were with the charging enemy, many of the animals were
unavoidably shot down by the troops as a matter of self-preservation.
The same thing happened in the attack made upon the half battalion of
the Berkshires which remained drawn up outside in square formation,
but, pursued by the Arabs, the great bulk of the baggage train went off
in their mad flight in the direction of Souakim.
After the southern zeriba the two main points of attack were the
northern zeriba, held by the Marines and the half battalion of the
Berkshires. Both these positions were in the direct line of the camel
stampede, and their occupants were placed at a serious disadvantage. In
spite of the completed mimosa fences, trampling their way over all
obstacles, a mass of the terror-stricken animals tore right through the
northern zeriba, for the time seriously disorganizing the defence. As
stated by Colonel Way, an eye-witness--
"Everything seemed to come at once, camels, transport of all
kinds, including water-carts, ammunition mules, 17th Native
Infantry, Madras Sappers, sick-bearers, Transport Corps, cavalry
and Arabs fighting in the midst. All these passed close by me,
and went out on the other side of the zeriba, carrying away with
them a number of the Marines and some officers, who eventually
got together and returned. The dust raised by this crowd was so
great that I could not see anything beyond our zeriba for a
minute or two, and it was impossible to say what might happen.
The men behaved splendidly, and stood quite still. It was about
the highest test of discipline I shall ever see, as in my
opinion nothing could beat it."
The stampede of the transport train is thus described by another
writer:--
"Suddenly from the bush all along the face of the zeriba
fronting Tamaai burst out a clamour of savage cries, and the
next instant the whole assemblage of transport animals plunged
forward. There was a multitude of roaring camels, apparently
heaped one upon another, with strings of kicking and screaming
mules, entangled in one moving mass. Crowds of camp-followers
were carried along by the huge animal wave, crying, shouting,
and fighting. All these surged up on the zeriba, any resistance
being utterly hopeless. This mass of brutes and terrified
natives swept all before it, and a scene of indescribable
confusion ensued."
Notwithstanding the rush of the transport which had passed through the
Marines' zeriba, comparatively few of the enemy seem to have penetrated
it, only twelve bodies being counted there. Outside the dead were much
more numerous, the position having been attacked on various sides. The
men behaved with the greatest coolness, and, after being rallied by
their officers when the living avalanche had swept past, were well in
hand.
The naval detachment in this zeriba, more fortunate than their
companions in the southern one, had their Gardner guns in action from
the first, discharging at least 400 rounds and doing great execution.
The half battalion of the Berkshires remaining, formed up in the open at
a distance of 250 yards east of the zeriba, had also a severe time of
it. Falling in and standing to their arms at the first alarm, they
formed a rallying square, and successfully defended themselves against
the repeated attacks made on them. It was found that 200 of the
assailants had fallen before the fire of their rifles, whilst amongst
themselves there was only one slight casualty.
Other small bodies of men who were outside the zeriba at the moment of
the attack, or had stampeded at its occurrence, were similarly collected
by their officers, and succeeded in making their way back to the zeriba.
The whole affair lasted only about twenty minutes, after which the
enemy, unable to stand any longer against the leaden hail of the
Martini-Henry and Snider rifles, recoiled at every point, and at twelve
minutes past three, as the assailants disappeared in the bush, the bugle
sounded "Cease firing." Up to the last moment individual Arabs came
forward, throwing up their hands above their heads, and facing the
rifles as if bent on suicide, and courting the death which they
received. Small groups of them also formed up as if to encourage each
other for a renewed assault, but without effecting anything they melted
away before the deadly fire of the soldiers.
When the smoke cleared away, and there was time to look around, a
dreadful spectacle presented itself. The dead bodies of friends and foes
lay thickly scattered within and about the zeribas. Everywhere were
wounded and slaughtered men and animals, whilst groans and cries filled
the air. Strewn upon the ground were arms and accoutrements of every
kind, with all the usual accompaniments of a savage and sanguinary
conflict.
The enemy's force was reported by General Graham in his despatch as not
less than 2,000, although, as he states, it was impossible to form an
accurate estimate.
The Soudanese as usual fought with the utmost courage. One man came
rushing on to the zeriba holding by the hand a boy armed with a knife.
Throwing the boy over the defensive works, he jumped in after him, and
immediately both were killed. At another point there stood between the
opposing forces another boy, apparently not more than twelve years old,
actually throwing stones at the British troops in one of the zeribas.
Among various mischievous devices resorted to may be noted that of a
Soudanese armed with a rifle, who during the attack managed to creep up
close to the mimosa fence of the southern zeriba, and from this cover
contrived in succession to shoot first one and then another of the
Berkshires, and though fired at in return, was missed. His third shot
was directed at a major of the regiment on duty inside the zeriba, who
narrowly escaped, the bullet carrying away his trousers pocket and part
of his coat, and not till then was the assailant shot. Another trick of
the assailants was to bring hides, and throwing them on the top of the
thorny bushes forming the fence, they would spring over into the zeriba
and rush at the defenders and engage in a hand-to-hand fight.
During the assault on the southern zeriba an interesting adventure
occurred to the Colonel of the Berkshires. He was sitting on his horse
close to his regiment when the attack took place, and was confronted by
a gigantic Soudanese who appeared from behind a camel, brandishing a
huge spear, and bent on slaughter. Their eyes met, and seeing the
Colonel's revolver levelled at his head, the expression on the
countenance of the savage suddenly changed from triumph to horror as the
Colonel fired, and the Arab, with the upper part of his head blown away,
fell to the ground a ghastly wreck.
McNeill's force suffered severely, having, exclusive of camp-followers,
6 officers and 94 men killed, and 6 officers and 136 men wounded, and 1
officer and 10 men missing. Amongst the killed were Captain Francis J.
Romilly, and Lieutenant C. M. C. Newman, of the Royal Engineers;
Lieutenant Montague H. M. Seymour, of the Naval Brigade; Major Von
Beverhoudt, of the Indian Contingent; Quartermaster C. Eastmead, of the
Ordnance Store Department, and Lieutenant George S. Swinton, of the
Berkshire Regiment. The bodies of 8 British and 25 Indian soldiers were
found in the bush away from the zeriba.
The loss in transport animals was enormous, over 900 camels alone being
killed. Scores of them, which had been left outside the zeriba, were
shot as the enemy swarmed on to the attack.
The enemy's loss was severe. Graham states that 1,000 bodies were found
on the field. Besides the 112 bodies counted in the zeriba, there were
the 200 found in front of the Berkshire Regiment. Near the redoubt held
by the Naval Brigade, the dead lay in heaps. All around the ground was
literally strewn with bodies; among them were several women and boys.
Throughout the entire conflict McNeill showed the greatest coolness and
judgment, leading his men on with a courage oblivious of danger. During
his preliminary efforts to rally the Bengal Native Infantry, the
General, mounted on his grey Arab horse, found himself outside the
defences, with the enemy streaming on full in front. Here, strange to
say, he seemed to be entirely unnoticed, and, with revolver in hand
ready to despatch any who might venture too near, he quietly turned his
horse, and without difficulty made him cross the fence and step into the
zeriba.
Later on, towards half-past three, there were circumstances which
appeared to indicate that the enemy, notwithstanding the heavy loss they
had sustained, were disposed to renew the attack, a large gathering of
them presenting itself to the south-east of the zeriba. Their attitude
was so threatening that McNeill resolved to make a sortie and endeavour
to disperse them. Taking with him two companies of Marines, he led them
straight for the enemy. As they advanced the little force was soon in
front of the foe. Fire was at once opened, and the ground cleared; and
though the men were anxious to make a charge with the bayonet, the
demonstration having served its purpose, the troops were withdrawn
without further fighting.
Notwithstanding McNeill's successful defence of the zeriba, and the
heavy loss inflicted on the enemy in the action on the 22nd, Sir John
has been the object of much adverse criticism. This criticism has been
directed upon several points. It has been asked, Why were the fatigue
men employed in cutting materials for the zeriba allowed to go into the
bush unarmed? Sir John's answer is, that this was done designedly; the
working parties were covered by the Cossack pickets of the Lancers; men
incumbered with slung arms could not work to any good purpose in hot
weather; in the event of attack, it was not desirable that the working
parties should attempt to make a stand, as they would be of more service
by running in and taking their places in the alignment marked by their
piled arms, and they would thus avoid the danger of masking the fire of
the troops in position.
The main charge, however, brought against the General is that he allowed
himself to be surprised. This, however, if true at all, is so only in a
limited sense of the term. That his force was attacked before the whole
of it had time to form up in a fighting attitude is undoubted; but
whether this was through any fault of his is quite another matter. The
careful planning of the zeribas, the disposition of the troops, and the
outlying pickets and vedettes have already been referred to. It is
difficult to see what other precautions the General, with the means at
his command, could have adopted. Not more than one-third of the British
troops ever left their arms, and the Indians, minus their fatigue
parties, remained throughout in position constantly ready for an attack.
Whilst one half of the Berkshires moved into their completed zeriba, the
remaining half was carefully re-formed in square outside. In the issue,
as showing that a zeriba was little required for their protection, this
last half battalion proved the strongest part of the position, and
though subject to repeated attacks, lost not a man.
That Sir John was not informed in time of the impending attack was due
to the insufficient number (one squadron only) of cavalry with which he
was provided, and which were absolutely necessary for covering a
frontage of over three miles. Here it may perhaps be remarked that, had
this suggested itself to the General's mind, it seems strange that he
did not take steps to detain and utilize the squadron of Hussars, under
Major Graves, which visited the zeriba shortly before the attack was
made.
The General had many difficulties to contend with. He was incumbered
with a wholly disproportionate mass of transport; was directed on an
impracticable line; was unsupplied with information of vital importance;
and, finally, was sent to conduct an operation of which he strongly
disapproved. To crown all, there was the flight of the Bengal Infantry
at the very commencement of the fight, an event which the General could
hardly have been expected to foresee. The result, however, was a signal
victory, and practically the only successful operation of the campaign.
Graham was at Souakim whilst the attack was made on the zeriba. On
first hearing the firing at 2.45 p.m., he ordered the Guards and Horse
Artillery to go to McNeill's assistance. The force advanced two miles on
the road when a message sent by the field-telegraph from the zeriba
arrived, stating that the attack had been repelled, after which the
proposed reinforcements returned to Souakim.
The following day Graham advanced to McNeill's zeriba. Here he sent off
the following despatch, dated Souakim, March 23rd, 6.30 p.m.:--
"_Advanced Zeriba, 12 noon._
"Arrived here with Guards and large convoy. Am sending in
wounded and baggage animals with Indian Brigade and Grenadier
Guards, under Fremantle, leaving two battalions of Guards here
with McNeill's brigade. A strong zeriba has been constructed,
and I consider position secure against any number of enemy. The
attack yesterday was very sudden and determined, and came
unfortunately on our weakest point. The Sikhs charged the enemy
with bayonet. The Berkshire behaved splendidly, clearing out
the zeriba where entered and capturing three standards. Marines
also behaved well. Naval Brigade was much exposed and suffered
severely. Engineers also suffered heavily, being out working
when attacked. The enemy suffered very severely, more than a
thousand bodies being counted. Many chiefs of note are believed
to have fallen. I deeply regret our serious losses, but am of
opinion that McNeill did everything possible under the
circumstances. The cavalry, 5th Lancers, did their best to give
information, but the ground being covered with bush it was
impossible to see any distance. The troops behaved extremely
well. All the staff and regimental officers did their utmost.
Enemy charged with reckless courage, leaping over the low
zeriba to certain death; and, although they gained a temporary
success by surprise, they have received a severe lesson, and up
to the present time have not again attempted to molest the
zeriba."
Of the scene round McNeill's zeriba some idea may be formed from the
following description:--
"When going from Souakim the last three miles of the march were
marked at every step by graves, Arab and Indian, so shallow that
from all oozed dark and hideous stains, and from many protruded
mangled feet, half-stripped grinning skulls, or ghastly hands
still clenched in the death agony, though reduced to little more
than bone and sinew. Strewed around, thicker and thicker, as we
neared the scene of that Sunday's fight, lay the festering
bodies of camels and mules; and around them hopped and
fluttered, scarcely moving when our column passed, hundreds of
kites and vultures. The ground was also thickly sown with hands
and feet dragged from their graves by the hyænas, and the awful
stench and reek of carrion which loaded the air will never be
forgotten by any of us. Day after day we passed and repassed
over the same sickening scene with our convoys, in blinding dust
and under a scorching sun, obliged to move at a foot's pace to
keep up with the weary camels, and to pick our steps carefully
for fear of suddenly setting foot on one of those dreadful heaps
of corruption."
On the 25th March a convoy was sent out to McNeill's zeriba, under
escort of the 15th Sikhs, 28th Bombay, and the Madras Sappers, with a
few cavalry. When three miles from Souakim the convoy halted according
to instructions, commenced cutting wood and forming a zeriba. A
battalion composed of Guards and Marines from McNeill's force marched
towards them and was attacked on the way by a long range fire from the
enemy, by which a lieutenant of the Marines and one private were
wounded. At two p.m. the two escorts met, when the Guards and Marines
taking over the convoy prepared to return to McNeill's zeriba. At this
moment the enemy appeared in force and attacked the column. The Guards,
Marines, and Cavalry, moving out in four different detachments, fired
into the attacking force and dispersed it.
The Guards and Marines then started again, but after ten minutes the
enemy again appeared and fired a volley into them, which was at once
returned. After less than a quarter of an hour a third attack was made.
The Guards fired volley after volley, and once more drove back their
assailants. The column then renewed its march, parties of the enemy
still following them, and from time to time attacking their rear.
Eventually the party got safely to the zeriba.
The result of the day's proceedings was to show that the enemy, in no
way disheartened by the losses on the 22nd, were still in force, and
ready to attack within four miles of Souakim. The attempt on the convoy
was evidently made with the object of capturing the supplies destined
for McNeill; and though it failed, it showed the increasing boldness of
the enemy.
On the 25th, a war balloon which had been sent out to McNeill's zeriba
made an ascent in charge of Major Templar. The same day, with a view to
the advance, the head-quarters camp was shifted to a spot two miles
nearer Tamaai, and the East Surrey Regiment having destroyed the post on
the hills near Hasheen, came in and joined the main body.