THE SOUAKIM EXPEDITION OF 1885.
The real object and intention of the Gladstone Administration in
directing the despatch of the Souakim expedition of 1885 will probably
remain for ever a mystery.
Wolseley had, it is true, pointed out the necessity of losing no time in
dealing a crushing blow to Osman Digna, and had suggested the sending of
a brigade of Indian Infantry and a regiment of Punjaub Cavalry to
Souakim to hold that place during the summer and to co-operate with him
in keeping open the road to Souakim. He also approved the commencement
of the Souakim-Berber railway. But his demands, so far as the published
papers show, appear to have gone no further than that. The expedition
told off to Souakim was nevertheless fixed at 9,000 men, and comprised
nearly every arm of the service. In addition, there were all the plant,
materials, and labour required for the purpose of making the
Souakim-Berber railway. The season chosen for the expedition, too, was
singularly unfortunate, as it coincided with the precise time of the
year at which, a twelvemonth before, the hot weather had compelled the
withdrawal of Graham's army, and when even the one or two squadrons of
Cavalry which Gordon had asked to be sent to Berber were refused him.
There is some reason to suppose that at the time the expedition was
resolved upon the idea was that it should co-operate with Wolseley's
forces in a movement upon Khartoum as soon as the Nile force should have
succeeded in taking Berber, and that when the movement on Berber was
postponed till the autumn the object of the expedition had to be limited
to "the crushing of Osman Digna and the opening up of the Souakim-Berber
route." At all events, this was announced as the official programme. It
will not fail to strike the reader that this was to undertake in March,
1885, with troops from England, precisely the enterprise which the
Government, in March, 1884, declined to undertake with troops on the
spot. The only change in the situation was that then the expedition
would have been in time to have saved Khartoum, whereas now it was too
late. It seems to have been fated that the policy of "Rescue and retire"
should always be adopted, the former too late, and the latter too soon.
Probably the true explanation is to be found in the exigencies of the
political situation. The Gladstone Administration felt the necessity for
doing something, if only to satisfy public opinion, intensely excited by
the news from Khartoum. The Government had allowed Khartoum to fall and
Gordon to perish. The result was neither creditable to the Ministry nor
favourable to British prestige. On the 19th February Lord Salisbury,
replying to Lord Granville's announcement that the Government had
"decided upon going on to Khartoum to break the power of the Mahdi,"
declared that "Gordon had been sacrificed to the squabbles of a Cabinet
and the necessities of party politics."
This was followed on the 23rd by Sir Stafford Northcote moving a vote of
censure in the House of Commons on the Soudan policy of the Government.
The motion was only lost by fourteen votes, a similar motion by Lord
Salisbury being carried in the House of Lords by no less than 121 votes.
Whatever may have been the motives of the Government in deciding upon
the expedition to Souakim, no time was lost in making the necessary
preparations. This time it was determined to carry out the operations on
a grand scale.
The force was fixed at considerably more than double the number engaged
in the Souakim expedition of 1884.
Amongst the troops ordered to take part in it were the 1st Battalion of
the Coldstream Guards; the 2nd Battalion of the Scots Guards; the 3rd
Battalion of the Grenadier Guards; the 1st Battalion of the Shropshire
Regiment; the 2nd Battalion of the East Surrey; the 1st Battalion of the
Berkshire Regiment; one Battalion of Royal Marines; one regiment of
Australian Infantry; some batteries of Royal Horse Artillery, of Royal
Artillery, and Australian Artillery; some companies of Royal Marine
Artillery, and Royal Engineers, as well as squadrons of the 5th Lancers,
and the 20th Hussars, and detachments of the Ordnance, Commissariat, and
Medical Staff Corps. In addition to these, an Indian Contingent of over
2,000 men was provided. It comprised the 9th Bengal Cavalry, the 15th
(Loodianah) Sikhs, the 17th Bengal Native Infantry, the 28th Bombay
Native Infantry, and some companies of Madras Sappers. Besides the
above, several hundred labourers were ordered from England, and one
thousand coolies from India to construct the railway to Berber.
The operation of crushing Osman Digna having to be performed, General
Graham was selected as the "crusher."
This was a surprise to most people, and probably equally so to Graham
himself. Military critics had not forgotten how, by his order to charge,
given at an unfortunate moment, the General very nearly caused the wreck
of the 2nd Brigade at Tamaai; nor the ill-feeling, bordering almost upon
insubordination, which his treatment of the Black Watch had brought
about in the Soudan army of 1884; and the appointment was freely
criticized. The General, however, was a nominee of Lord Wolseley, and
this, although it did not silence criticism, served in a great measure
to satisfy public opinion.
Brevet-Major-General A. J. L. Fremantle was appointed to command the
Brigade of Guards, and Major-General Greaves was named Chief of the
Staff. The Infantry Brigade was placed under Major-General Sir J. C.
McNeill, V.C.
General Graham's instructions, dated 20th February, were on arrival at
Souakim to take command of the forces which were to be assembled there,
to make the best arrangements which the shortness of the time at his
disposal, before the hot weather commenced, would admit of to organize a
field force, and to make such transport arrangements as were possible to
enable it to secure the first and most pressing object of the campaign,
viz., the destruction of the power of Osman Digna.
The General was told that an agreement had been made with Messrs. Lucas
and Aird to construct a railway from Souakim to Berber, and that on this
he must greatly rely for his means of transporting supplies. It would
therefore be of the first importance that every possible facility should
be given to Messrs. Lucas and Aird in the conduct of their operations.
The pushing on of the railway from Souakim towards Berber was the next
point to which he was to direct the greatest attention. By the agreement
with Messrs. Lucas and Aird, the contractors were to construct for the
War Department for the purposes of the expeditionary force, a 4 ft.
8-1/2-inch gauge single line of railway from Souakim, and thence in
sections so far towards Berber as might from time to time be ordered in
writing by the Secretary of State, and also an 18-inch gauge single line
of railway in or about Souakim. The War Department engaged to keep the
way clear and the working staff protected. The contractors were to
supply plant and working staff, and, with regard to the latter, were to
be at liberty, with the consent of the Secretary at War, to employ
natives as labourers. The staff to be paid by the Government, and
rationed and clothed by the War Department. The contractors were to
receive a commission of 2 per cent. upon all expenditure, from the War
Department, such commission, however, not to exceed in the whole
£20,000, and they were to be entitled to a further sum not exceeding
£20,000 if the railway should be satisfactorily completed in the
judgment of the Secretary of State.
On the 27th February, Lord Hartington again called Graham's attention to
the necessity for rapidly constructing the railway from Souakim to
Berber, and to the extreme importance of the services it would be
required to perform, not only in connection with the advance of Graham's
force, but also in connection with the troops under Wolseley's command
when concentrated at Berber. His Lordship pointed out that by this route
alone, when the railway should have been completed, could that force be
supplied, re-equipped, and reinforced with that precision and certainty
so essential to the future operations on the Nile. He continued:--
"When the first and essential operation of crushing Osman Digna
and clearing the country sufficiently to make it safe for the
constructors of the railway is accomplished, the next most
important duty will be the pushing on of the railway, and I
request that you will facilitate and aid this object by every
means in your power. You will, of course, decide what military
posts you will occupy."
Towards the end of February Graham's force began to assemble at Souakim,
and from that date troop-ships and store-ships began to come in almost
daily.
Early in March Graham reached Souakim, and assumed command of the force
assembled there.
Considering the camp to be too extended, rendering night attacks too
easy, he at once took steps to reduce the front occupied. The enemy had
in fact for some time been in the habit of attacking in small bodies
every night, and succeeded in killing or wounding many of the sentries.
The camps were surrounded by zeribas and entanglements which were never
attacked, the plan adopted being to creep in at unguarded points, and
stab or spear the men as they slept. A large number of so-called
friendly natives were employed about the camps in the daytime, and so
acquired a knowledge of the localities. Returning at night, it was thus
easy for them to choose positions which were unguarded, and so to murder
the sleeping soldiers. That this was so, was shown by more than one
native who had been shot down being found to be wearing the red badge
given to the "friendlies."
On the 17th Graham's force amounted to 491 officers, 10,222
non-commissioned officers and privates, 1,616 horses, 2,759 camels, 791
mules, and 2,629 followers. At this date troop and store-ships were
still arriving.
On the 19th Graham made a reconnaissance to Hasheen, about seven and a
half miles from Souakim, with the Cavalry Brigade and Mounted Infantry,
the Infantry of the Indian Contingent moving out about four miles in
support. The enemy retired in front of the British force, evacuating the
village of Hasheen, and making for the mountains, but not without first
offering some resistance, by which one private was killed, and one
officer and a sergeant were wounded. After this the whole force marched
back to the camp.
On the 20th Graham determined on a general advance to Hasheen, and at
6.15 a.m., leaving only the Shropshire Regiment and details as guards,
the whole force, numbering about 10,000 men, marched out from the camp.
Making for the hills in front of Hasheen, the Cavalry moved off at about
6.10 a.m., the Infantry following at 6.25 in the following order:--The
Guards in columns of companies, on the right; the 2nd Brigade (East
Surrey Regiment and Marines), in line of company columns of fours; the
Indian Brigade in column of companies on the left; the Horse Artillery
Battery on the right of the line. The water camels and transport animals
followed in rear of the 2nd Brigade.
The action is described in the General's despatch as follows:--
"The advance was made in a direction nearly due west. The
Infantry reached the foot of the hills at about 8.25 a.m. The
17th and 24th Companies Royal Engineers, the Madras Sappers, and
the 70th East Surrey Regiment, were ordered to commence work at
once. The enemy had fallen back on Dihilibat and the Beehive
Hill, exchanging shots with my advance guard at about eight a.m.
I now determined to clear these hills, and gave orders to the
Infantry to advance in the following order:--2nd Brigade in
first line, Indian Contingent in support, Guards in reserve; the
Horse Artillery to take up a position on Beehive Hill.
"At about nine a.m. the force had reached the foot of Dihilibat
Hill. The Berkshire Regiment advanced up the steep slopes of
the hill in attack formation, with one half battalion Royal
Marine Light Infantry on the right rear, and the other half
battalion in rear of the centre of the Berkshire Regiment as
supports. The ascent was very steep and difficult, but the
first spur was occupied without opposition. This spur is
separated from the main edge by a deep ravine. The enemy now,
however, opened a heavy fire from the summit, and from a
position further to the right. The Berkshire Regiment replied
by volleys, and the half battalion of Marines on the right was
advanced to flank the enemy's position. The enemy then
abandoned their position, and the Berkshire Regiment advanced
to the summit, and detached one company to a spur on the left,
from which an effective fire was opened upon the retiring
enemy. Meanwhile the Indian Brigade had taken up a position
between the foot of Dihilibat and the Beehive Hill; the Guards
also were formed up near the foot of the north-east spur of
Dihilibat Hill.
"The Horse Artillery, which moved out with the Guards' Brigade
as far as the first hills, received orders to follow the Indian
Brigade in its further advance, and to take up a position on
Beehive Hill. While passing under the Hill Dihilibat they were
heavily fired upon, losing two horses. The slopes of Beehive
Hill proving impracticable for the guns, the battery, after
firing a few rounds of shrapnel into the bush, detached three
guns to a position on a low spur to the west of Beehive Hill,
where they remained in action for some time shelling parties of
the enemy who were visible across the valley on the spurs of
the Wharatab Range. The battery subsequently retired with the
Guards' square, and took up a position on one of the hills
reached at 8.25. Here several rounds were fired, subsequently
to the retirement of the Infantry, at parties of the enemy
which appeared on the low spur.
"At about 9.40 a.m. two squadrons of the 9th Bengal Cavalry
were detached by Colonel Ewart, commanding Cavalry Brigade, to
pursue the enemy, who, driven from the Hill Dihilibat by the
Berkshire Regiment, were retiring south in the direction of
Tamaai. Colonel Ewart ordered two squadrons to dismount and
fire volleys. These squadrons were charged by the enemy in
considerable strength, and retired with loss on the square
formed by the Guards at the foot of the Dihilibat Hill.
"During the morning the 5th Lancers were employed in securing
the right front. At about 10.45 a considerable force of the
enemy endeavoured to advance down the Hasheen Valley from the
north-west, apparently attempting to turn my right flank. Both
the 5th Lancers and a portion of the 9th Bengal Cavalry were
engaged with the small advanced parties of this force, and
succeeded in checking the movement. During this time work was
carried on by the Royal Engineers and Madras Sappers, assisted
by parties of the East Surrey Regiment, and by about 2.30 p.m.
four strong posts had been formed, and a zeriba commenced.
"At 12.25 I recalled the Indian Brigade, the Berkshire
Regiment, and the Marines covering the movement. The latter
then joined the Indian Brigade, and, forming a single square,
retired to the more open ground south. The Guards' square and
the Artillery remained at the foot of the Dihilibat Hill till
one p.m., and then retired, taking a direction somewhat to the
south of that followed by the 2nd and Indian Brigades.
"During the retirement of the Guards the right face of the
square received a hot fire from parties of the enemy concealed
among the bushes, and suffered some loss. By firing steady
volleys into the bush the enemy's fire was effectually
silenced, and the Brigade halted close to the south foot of the
hills first mentioned. The general retirement of the whole
force began about 4.30 p.m., and the camp was reached at 6.15.
"The Dihilibat Hill was carried by the Berkshire Regiment with
the greatest spirit, and the behaviour of the Guards' square
under a heavy fire from an unseen enemy was marked by extreme
steadiness. During the formation of the fortified posts, the
presence of the enemy in rear rendered it necessary several
times to order the East Surrey Regiment to stand to their arms.
This was done without any confusion, and the Royal Engineers
and Madras Sappers quietly continued their work on the
defences.
"It is impossible in such a country to estimate the numbers of
an enemy who is able to remain completely concealed until he
chooses to attack; but it is probable that on this occasion the
number of Arabs present was about 3,000, of whom at least 250
were killed, much of this loss being caused by the fire of the
Berkshire Regiment from the commanding position they had taken
up on Dihilibat Hill. The scouting was very efficiently
performed by the Cavalry, considering the great difficulties of
the country with which they had to contend."
The enemy, according to other accounts, seemed to have lost none of the
daring with which they had met Graham's force a twelvemonth before.
Instead of fleeing before the charge of the Bengal Lancers, the
Soudanese actually charged the Cavalry. The same tactics were practised
as at El-Teb, the Soudanese throwing themselves on the ground at the
critical moment of the charge, and slashing with their swords at the
horses' legs. So badly were the Lancers used that they had to fall back
as stated in the despatch, losing one non-commissioned officer and four
men, whose horses had been hamstrung in the encounter.
In the course of the fight, some 150 of the enemy sprang up from behind
a hill 300 yards off, and had the audacity to charge the whole of the
Guards' Brigade. The assailants were received by such a deadly fire from
the face of the square that they never succeeded in getting nearer than
fifteen or twenty yards of the line of bayonets. Those who survived at
once turned and fled, leaving behind their wounded chief on a camel,
within thirty yards of the square, where he was made prisoner.
The object of the recall of the Indian Brigade at 12.25 p.m., and the
subsequent retirement towards the hill (then being fortified by the 70th
Regiment) of that force, the Berkshire Regiment, and Marines, followed
at one p.m. by the Guards and Artillery, practically the whole army, is
not stated in the General's despatch. But from other reports it seems
that the troops had got into a position where the thickness of the bush
gave the enemy the advantage of pouring a heavy fire into General
Graham's force, whilst the latter could only deliver an ineffective fire
in return.[133] At the position to which the troops fell back, the
ground was more open, and Graham's men could make better practice with
their Martinis.
The apparent intention of the enemy to turn the right of the British
line, also probably influenced the General in retiring.
After some hours' marching and fighting under a blazing sun the force
set out on the return to Souakim, leaving a detachment to guard the
fortified posts made by the Engineers and Madras Sappers.
The following are the casualties as reported by telegram from
Graham:--Officers killed, Lieutenant M. D. D. Dalison, Scots Guards; 1
native officer, Indian Contingent; 4 non-commissioned officers and
privates, and 12 sowars of the Indian Contingent. Wounded, 6 officers,
26 non-commissioned officers and privates, 13 sowars, and 3 privates of
the Indian Contingent.
The enemy's strength was, as usual, liberally estimated in the various
newspaper reports of the action, some putting the number as high as
14,000 men. General Graham's original estimate was 4,000, but this he
subsequently reduced to 3,000, a number probably much nearer the mark.
Graham's object in occupying a position at Hasheen was declared by him
to be to protect his right flank in the impending advance on Tamaai, to
obtain a post of observation near to the mountains, and to assist in
overawing the tribes. How far this was effected may be judged from the
fact that only five days later the works were dismantled and the place
was abandoned.