WOLSELEY AND THE PROSECUTION OF THE CAMPAIGN.
To return to Lord Wolseley's head-quarters at Korti.
There is no doubt that the news of the fall of Khartoum was a severe
blow to Wolseley. It seemed as if, for once, his star had deserted him.
All hope of adding the rescue of Gordon and the relief of Khartoum to
his list of triumphs, was gone from the General who had so often been
described as "the luckiest man in the British army."
On the 4th February Wolseley had telegraphed the disaster to the War
Office. On the 5th he sent another message, saying that he had directed
all the wounded to be removed as soon as possible from Abu Klea and
Gubat, and added, "I only await the decision of Government to give
further orders."
There is here a gap in the published Blue Book, some of the messages
exchanged with the War Office being evidently suppressed. But in a
despatch to Sir Evelyn Baring, dated the 6th February, it is stated that
"Her Majesty's Government have given complete discretion to Lord
Wolseley to take all such measures as he may deem necessary for the
further conduct of his operations, and they have assured his Lordship
that he will receive any further assistance which he may desire, either
by the despatch of troops to Souakim and Berber, or in any other manner
he may indicate."
That Wolseley, under the altered circumstances, was not prepared to
advise an attempt to recapture Khartoum with the force at his disposal,
appears clear from the following extracts from his despatch to Lord
Hartington of the 9th February:--
"I shall not attempt to disguise from your Lordship how deeply
the reported fall of Khartoum is felt by all ranks in the army
under my command. If it be literally true--and it is difficult
to disbelieve it--the mission of this force, which was the
relief of Khartoum, falls to the ground.
"The strength and composition of this little army was
calculated for the relief, not the siege and capture, of
Khartoum, the two operations being entirely different in
character and magnitude. The former meant one or more
engagements in the open with an enemy who, owing to the
geographical position of Khartoum, could not concentrate his
forces without raising the siege, and who, in order to
concentrate, would have had to pass his troops, guns,
ammunition, &c., over two unfordable rivers of considerable
breadth, in the face of General Gordon's armed steamers.
"If he opposed my advance along the right bank of the Nile upon
Khartoum, he must have fought in a position where defeat would
have been his destruction. I think I may say that, as long as
Khartoum held out, he could not have prevented my entering it,
although he might afterwards have awaited my attack in a
selected position on the left bank of the White Nile to the
south or south-west of the city.
"With Khartoum in the enemy's possession, the whole conditions
are reversed, and the Mahdi, strengthened by the large number
of rifles, guns, ammunition, &c., taken in that place, and by
the captured troops, who would certainly fight on his side,
could concentrate an overwhelming force to oppose my advance;
and, if defeated, could still fall back upon the city, the
siege and capture of which, situated as it is in the fork of
two unfordable rivers, would be an impossible operation for the
little army under my command, more especially as it would then
be incumbered by a large number of wounded men. As I have
already said, the force under my command was not intended for
any operation of that magnitude, nor was such an operation even
contemplated in the instructions I received from Her Majesty's
Government. Khartoum, in the hands of the enemy, cannot be
retaken until the force under my command has been largely
augmented in numbers and in artillery."
Although operations against Khartoum were for the moment out of the
question, the necessity of doing something seems to have occurred both
to the Government and Lord Wolseley, if only for the sake of satisfying
public opinion and restoring the prestige of the British army.
Seeing the position occupied by the British forces at this time, it is
not surprising that Wolseley should have had the idea of seizing Berber
by means of a combined attack by the River column under General Earle
and by the Desert column from Metammeh under General Buller. It was
intended that this operation should be accompanied by an onslaught upon
Osman Digna in the neighbourhood of Souakim, which it was hoped would
have the effect of keeping open the road between that place and Berber.
On 8th February, Wolseley telegraphed to General Earle as follows:--
"Government have decided that Mahdi's power at Khartoum must be
overthrown. This most probably means a campaign here next cold
weather, and certainly the retention in the Soudan of all troops
now here. A strong force of all arms goes as soon as possible to
Souakim to crush Osman Digna. We must now take Berber. Buller
will take Metammeh. Let me know date you will reach Berber, so
that Buller's force may co-operate with you."
The same day Wolseley telegraphed to Lord Hartington as follows:--
"The sooner you can now deal with Osman Digna the better. I
should recommend brigade of Indian Infantry and one regiment of
Punjaub Cavalry to be sent to Souakim as soon as possible to
hold that place during summer, and co-operate with me in keeping
road to Berber open; the English troops you send now to Souakim
might then either go to mountains near there for summer, or to
Egypt to be ready for autumn campaign."[129]
It is clear from the two preceding despatches that there had been some
communication between the General and the Government which has not been
disclosed, on the subject of the English force which it was intended to
send to Souakim.
On 9th February, a further despatch from Wolseley to Earle stated that
the Government had decided that the troops were to stay in the Soudan
till the Mahdi's power at Khartoum was destroyed; that if they could not
do this before the hot weather they must wait till autumn; that Buller
had left Gakdul on the 8th for Gubat, and would take Metammeh as soon as
the Royal Irish reached Gubat; that on the River column reaching Berber,
Buller, who would be in the neighbourhood with four or six guns and
about 1,500 men on the left bank, would meet Earle and co-operate with
him in the attack on Berber.
The Government lost no time in carrying out the Souakim project, and on
the 9th General Stephenson in Cairo received instructions to arrange for
the immediate purchase of camels for the expedition,[130] and on the 9th
February Lord Hartington telegraphed to Wolseley the composition of the
force which the Government proposed sending to Souakim, making
altogether 9,000 men. The despatch added that the Indian Brigade and
cavalry asked for had also been ordered. The General was asked to give
his opinion as between this and the smaller force, which could move more
quickly.[131]
On the 11th Wolseley's plans were so far matured that he telegraphed to
Lord Hartington that he proposed leaving for Gubat to direct the
operations himself.
To this Lord Hartington replied on the 13th that there appeared to be
great advantages in Wolseley's present position for communicating with
both columns, and with Souakim and Egypt, and stated that the Government
relied on him not to allow his natural wish to take an active part in
the operations to influence his decision. The General replied that, as
he did not expect to take Berber before the 16th March, there was no
immediate necessity to decide the question of his leaving. He added
that he proposed to leave General Dormer in command at Korti in case he
(Wolseley) felt it desirable in the interests of the service to go
forward.
On the 17th Lord Hartington telegraphed to Wolseley further details as
to the Souakim force, and also the arrangements made with Messrs. Lucas
and Aird for the construction of a railway from Souakim to Berber.
This seems to have been the first mention of the railway. Wolseley
replied that if he could take Berber before the hot weather set in,
which was very doubtful, the railway could then be made through to that
place without any cessation of construction; but, if Berber were in the
enemy's hands, in all probability it could only be made to the
neighbourhood of Ariab. In the meantime, rails, sleepers, &c., for the
construction of the desert section of 110 miles, from Ariab to Berber,
should be collected at Ariab.
A few days later the news of Buller's retreat from Gubat apparently
caused Wolseley to modify his plans.
Reporting that movement on the 18th, his Lordship added as follows:--
"I think he (Buller) acted with wisdom and discretion; for,
since the fall of Khartoum, the whole of the Mahdi's army is
disposable, and could have invested him at Gubat with a large
force, not only of men, but of guns; this they cannot do either
at Abu Klea or Gakdul. My instructions to General Buller were on
no account to allow himself to be shut in near Metammeh; and,
with the information he had of the Mahdi's movements, in
proceeding to Abu Klea, he has rightly interpreted the spirit of
these instructions. The fall of Khartoum set free for the Mahdi
a considerable army; and furnished him with an arsenal
containing a great number of guns and rifles, and about
1,000,000 rounds of rifle ammunition. Operations which before
could be carried out under only the ordinary hazards of war
cannot now be undertaken without incurring inordinate risks.
When Khartoum fell, moreover, the main object for which General
Stewart's force was sent to Metammeh ceased to exist. That
object was to be prepared to march at once, even at considerable
hazard, to the assistance of Gordon, should it be found that he
required immediate aid.
"The capture of Khartoum left his force without an objective;
while, at the same time, it greatly increased the insecurity of
its position. Its isolated situation, separated from me by 180
miles of desert, and liable at any moment to have its
communications cut by a movement of the Mahdi down the Nile,
has latterly caused me considerable anxiety."
At the opening of Parliament on the 19th February the Government
announced that it had decided on going to Khartoum to break the power of
the Mahdi. On the 20th February Lord Wolseley telegraphed that the state
of his supplies would not admit of his going to Berber, even if he
thought his lines of communication sufficiently secure, which he did not
think they were, to warrant such a forward movement so late in the
season. He would hold the line of river from Merawi to Dongola and
Hanneck Cataract during the summer, and prepare for an autumn campaign.
To do anything else would, he thought, be unwise.
With a view to carrying out the plan of holding the river as indicated,
Wolseley now sent orders to Earle's Nile Column, to stop the advance
upon Berber and to return to Merawi.
On the 21st, Lord Hartington asked Wolseley if anything more could be
done for supplies for the summer.
Lord Wolseley replied on the 22nd as follows:--
"When I have concentrated my force on this part of the Nile, I
have no fear for my communications, so I do not want any more
troops here now. It is important to thoroughly crush Osman
Digna, and restore peace to the country now under his influence,
in order to push forward the railway, and, by a brilliant
success near Souakim, make the Soudanese realize what they must
expect when we move forward in the autumn."
Wolseley's views on the military situation, and on the operations to be
conducted, were communicated to Lord Hartington in a despatch dated 6th
March, 1885, from which the following is an extract:--
"In reply to my telegram, your Lordship informed me that my
immediate duty was to protect the province of Dongola--the only
province of the Soudan which is still clear of the enemy--and
that, as soon as the necessary arrangements could be completed,
Her Majesty's Government had determined to destroy the Mahdi's
power at Khartoum, in order that peace, order, and a settled
government might be established there. This I conceive to be in
general terms a fair description of the new mission with which I
have been intrusted, and which I shall endeavour to carry out
next autumn.
"I take this opportunity of congratulating Her Majesty's
Government upon having adopted the Nile route as the line of
advance for this force on Khartoum. Had this army been
despatched from Souakim as a base, and upon arrival at, or
near, Berber, learnt that Khartoum had fallen, it could not
possibly have transferred its base to the Mediterranean, for it
could not have been fed under those circumstances in this part
of the Nile Valley. The province of Dongola would have been at
the enemy's mercy, and the frontiers of Egypt would have been
open to his attack.
"As it is impossible for me to undertake any offensive
operations until about the end of summer, it is important that
in the meanwhile Osman Digna's power in the Souakim district
should be crushed. The defeat will, in some measure, act as a
counterpoise to the Mahdi's capture of Khartoum. This operation
is not difficult, as the forces are near the seaboard, and it
should be immediately followed by the occupation of the Tokar
and Sinkat districts. A railway should also be begun without
delay at Souakim in the direction of Berber. Your Lordship has
informed me that a contract has been entered into for the
construction of this railway on a gauge of 4 ft. 8-1/2 inches.
"Although I do not for a moment entertain the idea that a
railway of such a gauge can be completed over the 250 miles
(about) of country lying between Souakim and Berber in time to
have any very direct or immediate effect upon our operations
towards Khartoum next autumn, I am convinced that active
progress made upon it will bring home to Mohammed Ahmed, and to
all intelligent Sheikhs, the fact that we are now in earnest,
and do not mean to leave the country until we have
re-established order and a settled government at Khartoum.
"I am now engaged in distributing the army along the left bank
of the Nile on the open reach of water that extends from the
Hanneck Cataract to Abu Dom, opposite Merawi. There I shall be
quite prepared to meet Mohammed Ahmed at any time during the
summer, should he, by any good fortune, be tempted to advance
in this direction. During the summer I shall collect the
supplies which this army will require for its advance in the
autumn. The railway from Souakim to Berber would take about two
years and five months to complete."
In reading this despatch it will be seen that Wolseley lays stress upon
the necessity of crushing Osman Digna's force at Souakim. He also
recommends the immediate construction of the Souakim-Berber railway. But
on the 20th February instructions had already been given to Graham to
effect both these objects. Of this Wolseley was fully aware at the time,
and it strikes one as singular that so late in the day he should be
found advising the Government to take two steps which had already been
decided on.
Further, it will be noticed that his Lordship, whilst approving of the
construction of the railway (which he reckons would require two years
and five months) is careful to point out that he does not for a moment
entertain the idea that it could be constructed in time to have any
direct or immediate effect upon the operations towards Khartoum, to be
undertaken in the autumn.
Another singular feature in the despatch is the complacency with which
his Lordship, after the total failure of the expedition by way of the
Nile, congratulates the Government on having chosen that route.
The difficulties in the way of further operations during the summer now
began to be apparent. The hot weather had set in at Korti. The
thermometer on the 5th March registered 104 degrees under the shade of
the trees. Later on it went up two degrees higher still. The wind
blowing from the desert was like a blast from a furnace. Under these
conditions the tents with which the soldiers were provided offered
little or no protection. Sickness, too, began to break out, and several
cases of enteric fever were reported.
The Nile Column, as already stated, got back on the 8th March, and the
last troops of the Desert Column arrived from Abu Klea on the 16th, and,
with the exception of the detachment left at Merawi, the whole of
Wolseley's army was now assembled at Korti.[132]