CHAPTER XLVI.

THE NILE COLUMN.

The advance guard of the Nile column, consisting of 545 of the 38th

South Staffordshire Regiment, left Korti for Abu Hamid in the whalers on

the 28th December, 1884. Brigadier-General Brackenbury, second in

command, with a troop of the 19th Hussars, followed the next day.

On the 3rd January, 1885, the force encamped at Hamdab, where General

Earle and his staff arrived on the 4th. The remainder of the column was

sent forward from time to time, as the regiments reached Korti.

On the 24th the force at Hamdab, having been in the meantime joined by

the Royal Highlanders (Black Watch), a portion of the Gordon

Highlanders, the Duke of Cornwall's Regiment, the Transport Camels and

the Camel Battery, left camp and continued the journey up stream, the

mounted troops proceeding along the banks, and the remainder going in

the whalers as before. The enemy being reported to be in force at Berti,

every precaution was taken to avoid a surprise, zeribas being formed

each night, and a system of moonlight signalling was adopted.

Passing the Fourth Cataract and other formidable rapids, Berti was

reached by the advance guard on the 1st February and found deserted. The

enemy, according to the report of a deserter, had abandoned the place on

the previous day, and retired up the river to Salamat. Suleiman Wad

Gamr, the murderer of Colonel Stewart's party, it was reported, had fled

beyond recall. The boat belonging to Stewart's steamer _Abbas_ was

discovered on the shore. Hussein Ismael, the stoker, whose account of

the murder has been already given, presented himself and confirmed his

previous story. The houses in Berti being searched, traces of Stewart's

party were found in the shape of a number of papers, fragments of books,

and a portion of a barometer.

On the 3rd the head-quarters moved to Berti, where the rest of the

troops encamped as they came up. On the 4th news was received of the

fall of Khartoum by a telegram from Sir Evelyn Wood. The discouraging

information was carefully kept from the knowledge of the men. The same

message instructed General Earle to halt where he was until further

orders. On the 8th the General was informed by telegraph that Lord

Wolseley was communicating with the Government as to future operations,

but that the column was to push on to Abu Hamid. Orders for the troops

to move up were thereupon issued.

On the night of the 8th General Earle received a report from Colonel

Butler, who was in command of the advanced camp, that, in reconnoitring

that day, he had found the enemy in a strong position, occupying some

rocky knolls, and holding a high razor-backed ridge of hills behind.

Earle then ordered the advance of the 1st Battalion South Staffordshire

and 1st Battalion Royal Highlanders, in boats, to an open camping-ground

which Colonel Butler had selected, about a mile short of the enemy's

position, and ordered the squadron 19th Hussars, half of the Egyptian

Camel Corps, and two guns of the Egyptian artillery, to advance to the

same place.

On the 9th General Earle himself arrived on the scene, and having

personally reconnoitred the enemy's position, and sent Colonel Butler

with the cavalry to make a wide reconnaissance towards the enemy's rear,

he decided to attack the position the next morning.

A company of the Royal Highlanders was left in a zeriba to guard the

boats, baggage, and baggage animals, and at 7 a.m. on the 10th the

advance commenced.

Two companies of the South Staffordshire and two guns were placed under

the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Alleyne, who was instructed to take up

a position on a rocky hillock facing the enemy's position, and, with the

assistance of the Egyptian Camel Corps, to occupy the attention of the

defenders in front, whilst, with six companies of the South

Staffordshire and six companies of the Royal Highlanders, Earle marched

about a mile and a half to his right front, thus completely turning the

high ridge referred to in Butler's report, and the whole of the enemy's

position.

[Illustration: BATTLE OF KIRBEKAN.]

Meanwhile fire was opened (at 8.30) by the two companies of the

Staffordshire and the guns under Colonel Alleyne, the enemy replying

with their Remingtons.

After turning the enemy's position, Earle's column, pivoting on its

left, brought the right of the column round till it reached the rear of

the enemy's lines, and then marched over broken and rocky ground through

a valley in the direction of the river, keeping the high ridge on the

left. It was found that the column formation, ready to form square, was

unsuited to the nature of the ground, and the further advance was made

by companies, but not in extended order, points of vantage in the rocky

ground being occupied in succession.

The enemy had been seen crowding the high ridge as the column passed its

eastern end, but at first they appeared to take no notice. No sooner,

however, had the force wheeled to the left than (at 9.15) fire was

opened on it with Remingtons, hitting two or three men. As the fire

became hotter Earle sent two companies of the South Staffordshire, under

Colonel Eyre, to take the high ridge by working up its western shoulder.

The men advanced under a heavy fire, and climbed about a third of the

way up the shoulder, till they reached a cluster of rocks under which

they obtained partial shelter.

At the same time, two companies of the Highlanders and a company of the

Staffords were directed to advance under cover of the river bank and

take the knoll nearest the river, towards which parties of the enemy

were seen making their way, and swimming to the other side. This knoll

was speedily captured, and the enemy's position on the two principal

knolls was thus enfiladed.

The remainder of the Highlanders and Staffords then advanced from one

cluster of rocks to another towards the rear of the position, firing as

they did so, till they reached the rocks nearest to the enemy's

position, about 400 yards distant. From behind the enemy's works,

consisting of earthworks and loopholed buildings, a steady and

well-directed fusillade was kept up on the attacking force. This

continued for some time, till, difficulty being found in dislodging the

enemy by musketry fire, the order was about to be given to assault the

position and carry it at the point of the bayonet, when suddenly a body

of the enemy abandoned their works, and with spears and banners charged

down upon the nearest of the Highlanders, who were somewhat advanced

towards the British left front under Colonel Green.

The Highlanders, without changing their formation, received the assault

with a withering fire, killing many. The rest turned to their left and

made for the river, where several of them were shot in the water as they

attempted to escape.

After repelling this onslaught the Highlanders advanced with their pipes

skirling, scaled the rocks, and stormed the main position from front and

flank in gallant style, killing every one of the enemy, who were in

great numbers among the rocks and boulders.

At this time General Earle, who had accompanied the advance up the

ridge, was killed by a bullet from a hut in which several of the

defenders had taken refuge.

Meantime the two companies of the South Staffordshire sent to take the

high ridge had been received by a heavy fire; Lieutenant-Colonel Eyre

had been killed, and their ammunition was exhausted. Lieutenant-Colonel

Beale was sent by General Brackenbury, who had assumed the command, to

reinforce the attack and take the ridge, which duty was successfully

accomplished, and the enemy were driven from their last position by 1.30

p.m. Most of the defending force were armed with Remington rifles, and

their position, which was a formidable one, was defended with desperate

courage.

When General Earle made his turning movement, and so placed the

detachment he was leading between the enemy and their camp, Colonel

Butler, who had guided the column to the rear of the enemy's position,

made a wide sweeping detour with the cavalry to the enemy's camp, three

miles further on, which he captured. So rapidly was this operation

conducted that the camp was in his possession before the Highlanders had

captured the main position.[128]

Leaving two companies of the Highlanders to guard the captured position,

the remainder of the troops were sent back to the camp they had left in

the morning.

The Egyptian Camel Corps did excellent service in the fight. The

position which they had taken up at the commencement of the day enabled

them to protect the flank of the infantry in its advance. They remained

in that position throughout the day, assisting by their rifles to keep

down the fire from the high ridge and shooting, and in some instances

pursuing and capturing, such of the enemy as attempted to escape towards

the east on the southern slope of the hill. When the Staffords stormed

the shoulder of the hill one Egyptian soldier charged up alone on their

extreme right and joined in the attack.

Besides forty-one donkeys and camels captured at Kirbekan, fifty-eight

rifles, four fowling-pieces, two flint-lock muskets, one revolver,

twenty-two swords, fifty-three spears, and ten standards fell into the

hands of the English. Some prisoners were taken, and, according to their

statements, the enemy were surprised by General Earle attacking their

rear, and thought the soldiers who got behind their position were coming

from Berber.

Owing to the way in which the position was surrounded, it is difficult

to see how many of the enemy could have escaped. They lay thick in every

nook and crevice, and on the open ground where they charged the troops,

and the Staffordshires killed many on the main ridge of hills.

Nevertheless, their losses are only put in the General's report as 200.

As no account mentions more than 125 bodies having been counted on the

field of battle, this appears a liberal estimate, even after allowing

for the bodies swept away by the stream. The return of rifle ammunition

expended gives a total of 24,040 rounds, or rather more than 120 for

each man killed, leaving out of the calculation twenty-three shells

fired from the Camel Battery. The English force engaged only numbered

1,200, owing to the Gordon Highlanders and the half battalion of the

Duke of Cornwall's Regiment not having come up; the former, in fact, had

not succeeded in getting further than Berti.

The enemy's force at Kirbekan was stated by prisoners as being from

1,500 to 2,000. General Brackenbury, however, has put the number who

held the works at 800, and says that at least half of these escaped

before the attack. The resistance made was due to the almost impregnable

position taken up.

Owing to the excellent tactics adopted in taking the works in the rear,

the loss of the attacking force was but small. The death of General

Earle, however, made Kirbekan a dearly purchased victory. He met his

death shortly after the assault which resulted in the capture of the

ridges. The troops were at the time being collected and formed up.

Between the crests of the two main knolls there was a depression forming

a small flat plateau, on which stood a stone hut with a thatched roof.

Earle was forming up the ranks only ten yards from the hut, when it was

discovered that there were men in it. One of the latter fired from the

hut and shot a soldier. The General thereupon ordered the roof to be set

on fire, at the same time approaching the hut. The roof commenced to

burn, and a native rushed out, and was at once bayoneted. At this moment

a shot was fired from a window of the hut, and the General fell, shot

through the head. The back of the skull was shattered, and he lived only

a few minutes.

In addition to General Earle, the British and Egyptian loss was as

follows:--

_South Staffordshire Regiment_--Killed, Lieutenant-Colonel Eyre and 3

men; wounded, 2 officers and 20 men.

_Royal Highlanders_--Killed, Lieutenant-Colonel Coveney and 4 men;

wounded, 2 officers and 18 men; missing, 1 man.

_Egyptian Camel Corps_--Killed, 2 men; wounded, 1 man.

Total killed, 11; wounded and missing, 44.

On the 11th, General Brackenbury received further instructions,

according to which the Expedition was to stay in the country till the

Mahdi's power at Khartoum was destroyed, and arrangements were to be

made for co-operation with General Buller in an attack on Berber. The

instructions further stated that the column was to push on with all

possible speed pursuant to orders.

On the same day, the column continued its progress, the wounded officers

and men being conveyed in the boats. The difficult pass of Shukook was

got through without opposition, though it bore signs of having been

prepared for defence throughout its entire length of six miles.

On the 17th Salamat was occupied, and the force destroyed the house,

palm-trees, and sakheas of Suleiman Wad Gamr, the chief author of

Colonel Stewart's murder. Many relics of the murder were found, such as

cards, papers, photographs, &c.

On the 20th, Hebbeh, close to the scene of the murder, was reached, and

on that and the following day the 800 horses and camels of the force

swam over to the opposite bank, the equipments and loads being ferried

across in boats.

The wreck of Stewart's steamer was seen fixed upon a rock about 200

yards from the bank of the river. She was pitted with bullet-marks, and

torn by fragments of shell. The natives had stripped her of everything

useful.

The house of Fakri Wad Etman, where the murder was committed, was

visited by General Brackenbury. Fragments of books, Stewart's visiting

cards, and a shirt-sleeve stained with blood, were found close by.

Whilst the crossing was being effected, the troops, not otherwise

engaged, were employed in destroying the houses and property of Fakri

Etman. The force then advanced along the right bank towards Abu Hamid.

On the night of the 23rd, the whole column with 215 boats was

concentrated at the last cluster of huts in the Monassir country,

twenty-six miles from Abu Hamid, and the Cavalry, which had scouted six

miles ahead, were still without touch of the enemy.

On the 24th, just as the further advance was being resumed, Brackenbury

received Wolseley's instructions to discontinue the movement on Abu

Hamid and return to Merawi. The despatch said, "Buller evacuated Gubat.

His main body went to Gakdul with sick and wounded. He remains with

1,500 at Abu Klea. I have abandoned all hope of going to Berber before

the autumn campaign begins." This was a bitter disappointment to both

officers and men. A strong patrol was advanced to within sight of Mograt

Island (just opposite Abu Hamid), after which the column was reversed,

reaching Hebbeh again the same day.

On the 25th it remained at the halting-place the whole day, as the

horses and camels absolutely required rest.

Continuing his movement down the river on the following day, Brackenbury

reached a village opposite Salamat. Here, leaving the mounted troops and

convoy to move independently on the right bank under the command of

Colonel Butler, the General descended the river himself with the boats.

On the 4th March Hamdab was reached, the force having descended with the

boats in nine days, a distance that it had taken thirty-one days to

ascend. On the following day the force arrived at Merawi. The crossing

commenced at 2 p.m., and was completed at 11.30 a.m. on the 6th. On the

7th, Brackenbury, leaving the Black Watch, a troop of Hussars, the

Egyptian Camel Corps, and a detachment of Engineers, to remain at Merawi

under Colonel Butler, started with the rest for Korti, which was reached

the following day.

Apart from the engagement at Kirbekan, the Nile column had no fighting

exploit to boast of. The crushing effect of that action was, however,

shown by the fact that after the fight, the enemy allowed General

Brackenbury's force to march unmolested through the Monassir country, to

take successively all the positions which had been prepared for defence,

and subsequently to retire through the same positions without firing a

shot or offering any opposition.

Credit is undoubtedly due to the column for the manner in which it

triumphed over the difficulties caused by the nature of the river, which

from a few miles above Merawi presented a succession of rapids. All

these rapids, amongst the most formidable obstacles on the Nile, were

ascended and descended at an unfavourable season, with a loss by

drowning of only three lives throughout the entire operation.

The Egyptian campaigns, 1882 to 1885 · 第 19 / 43 章