THE RETREAT FROM GUBAT.
The result of the taking of Khartoum was naturally to increase the
renown of the Mahdi to a greater extent than ever in the Moslem world.
His fame as a conqueror spread not only throughout the Soudan, but also
in the towns and villages of Upper and Lower Egypt. Many of those who
before had disbelieved in him, now became fully assured of his holy
mission. Had he at once followed up his success by an advance down the
Nile, the consequences to the British forces at Gubat and elsewhere
might have been disastrous. As it was, he contented himself with staying
with his followers in the neighbourhood of Khartoum, the pillaging of
which no doubt afforded an agreeable relaxation after a long and arduous
siege.
With Khartoum in the Mahdi's power, the whole situation was changed. His
army instead of being concentrated before Khartoum, was set free to
strike a blow at any point which he might think opportune for attack.
Not merely was the small force at Gubat in danger, but Wolseley's entire
army was at this period divided and split up in fragments. One of these
was at Gubat, in immediate proximity to the fortified town of Metammeh
held by a superior force. Another was isolated near Kirbekan, where the
enemy were reported to be in considerable strength; whilst a third
remained with Wolseley at the head-quarters at Korti. In addition
detachments were scattered across the Bayuda desert at the different
points of communication.
Though at first the capture of Metammeh and operations against Berber
were contemplated, the question of the relief of Khartoum gradually
resolved itself into the problem of extricating "The Relief Expedition"
itself. Opinions differed greatly how this was to be effected. Some were
in favour of the immediate retreat of the desert column to Korti. Others
considered a march across the desert of so small a force, with the
prospect of encountering hordes of Mahdists from Khartoum, anything but
a safe operation. Other advisers were in favour of concentrating the
whole of the expeditionary force on the capture of Berber and holding
that place until the arrival of reinforcements from India or from home
landed at Souakim, should either insure the safe retreat of the force,
or allow of the recapture of Khartoum. That which was done will appear
later.
During the absence of Sir Charles Wilson, the British force in the
neighbourhood of Gubat, under Colonel Boscawen, was employed in
improving and strengthening the works there. A triangular fort was
erected, and earthworks with flanking trenches and parapets were thrown
up both on the land side and towards Metammeh. Brushwood and wire
entanglements were placed outside to impede the enemy in the event of
their attempting to storm the position, and, in fact, every preparation
was made to stand a siege.
Although an attack was constantly expected, the enemy, beyond beating
tom-toms all night and making a parade every day, did nothing.
The force from time to time sent convoys of sick and wounded back across
the desert to Abu Klea and Korti. To facilitate and guard the line of
communications, the garrisons at the Wells were strengthened from time
to time by detachments from Korti.
The whole country round Metammeh, except the village itself, where 2,000
to 3,000 of the enemy were quartered, remained quiet. At Metammeh, on
the 28th January, there was a great firing of guns, with other signs of
rejoicing over the news from Khartoum.
On intelligence of General Stewart's condition reaching head-quarters,
Sir Redvers Buller was appointed to succeed to the command of the Desert
column, Sir Evelyn Wood becoming Lord Wolseley's Chief of the Staff,
and Brigadier-General Grenfell succeeding Sir Evelyn Wood as "Sirdar"
(Commander-in-Chief) of the Egyptian army.
Buller left Korti on the 29th January for Gakdul by the Desert route.
The Royal Irish and West Kent Regiments left at the same time to
strengthen the garrisons at the Wells and reinforce Gubat.
On the 11th February, Buller, with six companies of the Royal Irish
Regiment, which had marched on foot the whole way from Korti, reached
Gubat. His instructions were to seize Metammeh and march on Berber, but
on no account to let himself be hemmed in at Metammeh.
The programme was suddenly altered, and in lieu thereof a retreat was
decided on. One reason for this change was the loss likely to be
incurred in the taking of Metammeh, another consideration was the
insufficiency of Buller's column to operate against Berber in the face
of the large force, which, set free by the fall of Khartoum, the Mahdi
would now have at his disposal.
Buller deemed it unwise even to attempt to hold the position at Gubat
against the Mahdi's army reinforced by Gordon's captured soldiers, and
supplied with the arms and ammunition taken at Khartoum. Reports of the
Mahdi having commenced an advance with 50,000 men were received, and it
was judged best to retire, and so avoid the risk of having the retreat
cut off.
Under these circumstances preparations were made for the march back
across the Bayuda desert.[126]
Before leaving, Gordon's two remaining steamers were rendered useless by
removal of parts of the machinery.
On the 13th Buller evacuated Gubat. His force numbered nearly 1,600 rank
and file, and consisted of the following corps:--Squadron of 19th
Hussars, Naval Brigade with two Gardner guns, detachment of Royal
Artillery with two guns, a portion of the Mounted Infantry, a portion of
the Guards Camel Corps, a wing of the Heavy Cavalry Camel Corps,
portions of the Sussex and Royal Irish Regiments, details from
departmental corps, and 300 Soudanese.
The wounded were the first sent off, the escort of 300 men being placed
under the command of Colonel Talbot. The bad cases were carried in
litters by the Egyptians. Sir Herbert Stewart, by this time much changed
for the worse, was among the sick.
On the march to Abu Klea, Buller met with no opposition beyond a
skirmish which the advance guard had on the day of starting.
On the 16th the column arrived at Abu Klea, and at once set to work to
strengthen the position against attack.
About thirty of the enemy's cavalry were seen scouting round the place
all day. About an hour before sunset these were reinforced by some 400
infantry armed with rifles. They crossed the hills to the north-east and
eastward, and having made a cover by throwing up a series of low stone
walls, opened a well-directed fire at long range on the camp. The
bullets fell all round and over the position. No lights or fires were
allowed after dark, as the enemy kept up a dropping fire throughout the
night. The British force made no reply. Up to the morning of the 17th,
two men had been killed, and four officers and ten men wounded. On the
17th the guns of the Royal Artillery opened fire on the enemy's position
with shrapnel. The Gardners were also turned on, but as the supply of
ammunition was limited the fire had to be restricted. Still, slow as was
the fire, it sufficed to check that of the enemy until eight a.m., when
the cover they had been throwing up being completed, their fire became
as heavy as before. Fortunately, the aim was somewhat interfered with by
the high wind blowing, and by clouds of sand. Still, as Buller in his
despatch to Lord Wolseley observed, to remain stationary subject to this
unceasing pelting by bullets "was annoying."
The fire of the enemy did not interfere with the work of strengthening
the camp. Three new forts mutually supporting one another were
constructed. Buller placed the command of the principal and largest of
them in the hands of Lord Charles Beresford, with his naval men and
guns. The Royal Irish were ordered to hold the fort on the west of the
camp, while the Sussex men garrisoned the fort on the east. The
Engineers guarded the zeriba itself, in which the hospital was erected.
About noon a steady shelling of the enemy's position was commenced. The
Gardner guns were at the same time again brought into use, and the
Mounted Infantry also opened fire with their Martinis. After about two
hours of this long range fighting, the enemy's fire showed signs of
slackening. Major Wardrop was then sent out to reconnoitre, and
endeavoured to ascertain the actual strength and position of the enemy,
up to this time unknown.
With one officer and three troopers the Major crept round the enemy's
right, under cover of some rising ground. Ascending a slight rise, he
looked cautiously over, and observed that the enemy's riflemen on the
hill were not numerous, and had no supports. He dismounted his men, and
made them, without showing more than their heads, fire a volley. He then
remounted and galloped off and repeated his tactics two or three times
in different places, leaving one man in each place to fire as rapidly as
possible, but without exposing himself to view. The Arabs were
completely deceived by this manoeuvre, and imagining that large
reinforcements of British troops had come up, became demoralized, broke
off the fight, and retreated towards Metammeh, carrying with them their
killed and wounded, and leaving only a few mounted scouts to watch the
camp.
Buller's loss in this skirmish amounted to three men killed, and four
officers and twenty-three men wounded. The enemy's losses were more
severe. They were seen to carry off several bodies, and they left six on
the field of battle. Owing to the nature of the ground it was impossible
to form an estimate as to the strength of the enemy. Equally difficult
was it to understand what their object was, but the better opinion seems
to be that it was intended to try and engage Buller until the Mahdi
should come up with his whole army.
Buller then sent off a detachment of the Light Camel Corps, with
despatches for Gakdul, requesting that more transport camels with
ammunition might be sent to him. His reasons for thus weakening his
forces were twofold. In the first place, the water supply at Abu Klea
was not sufficient for the whole force for many days. In the second, his
means of transport were insufficient for the requirements of the
marching column, in addition to those of the garrison at the Wells.
The night of the 17th was passed quietly at the camp. On the morning of
the 18th Buller detached a party of infantry which moved southwards
towards the hills which had been occupied by the enemy. Their position
was found to be completely abandoned, and was taken possession of by
the British force. A strong post was established on the principal hill,
and scouting-parties were sent out, but nothing more could be seen of
the enemy.
Sir Evelyn Wood, with three companies of the West Kent Regiment, was
despatched from Korti to strengthen the force at Gakdul Wells, which
they reached on the 17th, and from Gakdul a supply of transport camels
with stores was sent on to Buller at Abu Klea.
During the march of the convoy from Gakdul nothing had been seen of the
enemy until the neighbourhood of Abu Klea was reached, when suddenly a
small body of armed men was observed watching the movements of the
party. Some of the Camel Corps forthwith went in chase, and captured a
half-dozen. These made no attempt to resist capture, but threw down
their Remingtons, and begged for mercy. When interrogated the prisoners
declared that there was no strong force of rebels anywhere near. There
was, they said, a rebel camp on rising ground some two miles distant,
but there were only 600 fighting men there, all of whom had recently
come from Metammeh. The prisoners agreed in stating that none of the
Mahdi's forces from Khartoum had yet reached Metammeh.
On the arrival of the camels and stores, Buller made his preparations
for evacuating Abu Klea. His original intentions were merely to destroy
the forts, and leave the wells untouched. But on the forenoon of the
23rd, he got information to the effect that the enemy had received a
strong reinforcement, estimated at not less than 8,000 men. This
compelled him to modify his plans, and he resolved to leave the forts
standing, but to fill up all the larger wells.
The latter step was afterwards much criticized, and can only be
justified by the extreme peril in which Buller's force might otherwise
have been placed. To stop up a desert well is to the Oriental mind about
the blackest crime that could be committed; and is a measure which is
never adopted even in savage warfare. Buller, however, had no
alternative. The absence of water in his rear was the sole thing that
could check pursuit by the supposed force in his rear. It was, in short,
the only method of covering his retreat. Accordingly, regardless of
Eastern traditions, heaps of stones and rubbish were piled into all the
principal wells before leaving. It was foreseen that before the enemy
could advance he must lose several hours, and perhaps days, in restoring
the wells to their former state. This time Buller calculated on
employing in getting a start over his pursuers.
At two p.m. all the baggage was sent on under convoy to camp on the Omit
Handel plain out of gunshot range of the Abu Klea hills. At six the
outposts were withdrawn, and an hour later the whole force, including
thirty-two sick and wounded, was in retreat towards Gakdul. As they
marched out, the troops were not interfered with by the enemy. The
enemy's scouts appeared about midday on the 24th, and fired a few shots.
After this they retired, and the column was no more molested, reaching
Gakdul on the 26th.
There being barely sufficient camels for the supplies, all the men and
officers had to march on foot. This, as Buller observed in his despatch,
in the weather which prevailed, with an allowance of only three quarts
of water per man a-day, was most exhausting. He adds, "Nothing could
have been better than the spirit shown by all ranks."
At Gakdul Buller's force learned the news of the death on the 16th of
their former leader, General Stewart, who, with the other wounded, had
been sent on in advance. The latest accounts of his condition had been
such as to lead to hope of his recovery. It subsequently transpired that
the nature of the wound he had received rendered this impossible, and
after supporting the hardships of the desert march he finally succumbed
the day before the convoy reached the wells of Gakdul, where a small
force was left to bring on the stores.[127]
The column remained but a brief period at Gakdul, and on the 27th set
out for Korti, which was reached on the 1st March, the last of the
troops arriving on the 15th.
Of the march of Stewart's column across the Bayuda desert to Metammeh
and back, it is unnecessary to say anything more. The highest military
authority in Europe, Count Von Moltke, said of the men who took part in
it, "They were not soldiers but heroes."