GORDON'S JOURNALS.
Gordon's journals began on 10th September, 1884, and continued to 14th
December, 1884. Want of space renders it necessary to give but a few
extracts.
Gordon seems to have felt the announcement that the object of Lord
Wolseley's expedition was to relieve him not less acutely than the
neglect with which he had been treated by the Government. More than once
he recurs to the subject, and the receipt of some newspapers mentioning
the departure of the Gordon Relief Expedition drew from him the
following comments:--
"I altogether decline the imputation that the projected
expedition has come to _relieve me_; it has come to save our
national honour in extricating the garrisons, &c., from the
position our action in Egypt has placed these garrisons in....
_I came up to extricate the garrisons and failed; Earle comes up
to extricate garrisons, and, I hope, succeeds_. _Earle does not
come to extricate me_.... I am not the _rescued lamb_, and will
not be."
In another passage he refers again to the personal question:--
"It may be said that the object of the present expedition is for
my relief personally; but how is it possible for me to go away
and leave men whom I have egged on to fight?"
On the subject of how the expedition should advance, and of what it
ought to do on arrival, he wrote the following:--
"My view is this, as to the operations of British forces. I will
put three steamers, each with two guns on them, and an armed
force of infantry at disposal of any British authority. Will
send these steamers to either Metammeh, opposite Shendy, or to
the cataract below Berber to there meet any British force which
may come across country to the Nile. These steamers with this
force coming across country will (D.V.) capture Berber and then
communicate with Khartoum.... When Berber is taken I should keep
the bulk of the forces there, and send up the fighting column to
Khartoum."
On the same subject he adds:--
"I cannot too much impress on you that this expedition will not
encounter any enemy worth the name in a European sense of the
word; the struggle is with the climate and destitution of the
country. It is one of time and patience, and of small parties of
determined men, backed by native allies, which are got by policy
and money. A heavy lumbering column, however strong, is nowhere
in this land. Parties of forty or sixty men, swiftly moving
about, will do more than any column. If you lose two or three,
what of it? It is the chance of war. Native allies above all
things, at whatever cost. It is the country of the irregular,
not of the regular. If you move in mass, you will find no end of
difficulties, whereas, if you let detached parties dash out here
and there, you will spread dismay in the Arab ranks."
Later on he wrote:--
"All that is absolutely necessary is for fifty of the
expeditionary force to get on board a steamer and come up to
Halfiyeh, and thus let their presence be felt; this is not
asking much, but it must happen at once, or it will (as usual)
be too late."
It will not excite any great surprise that Gordon should have felt bound
to come to the conclusion that--
"We are wonderful people; it was never our Government that made
us a grand nation; our Government has been ever the drag upon
our wheels. It is, of course, on the cards that Khartoum is
taken under the nose of the expeditionary force, which will be
_just too late_."
As indicated in this last sentence, Gordon seems to have had a
presentiment that the relief which he had been looking to, more for the
sake of his followers than of himself, would fail to arrive in time.
Thus, on October 24th, he wrote, "If they do not come before the 30th
November, the game is up, and Rule Britannia." And then comes the
following paragraph, in characteristic style:--
"I dwell on the joy of never seeing Great Britain again, with
its horrid, wearisome dinner-parties and miseries. How we can
put up with those things passes my imagination! It is a perfect
bondage. I would sooner live like a Dervish with the Mahdi than
go out to dinner every night in London. I hope, if any English
general comes to Khartoum, he will not ask me to dinner. Why men
cannot be friends without bringing their wretched stomachs in,
is astounding."
The variety of Gordon's ideas, military, political, and humorous, is
forcibly illustrated throughout the journals. Now he is describing a
battle with clearness and graphic power, now he is criticizing a
Government or a Minister, and now and again he is indulging his love of
fun, at one time in pure jest, and at others in brilliant satire.
Speaking of the tendency of his men to duck their heads in order to
avoid the Arab rifle-fire, he says:--
"In the Crimea it was supposed and considered mean to bob, and
one used to try and avoid it. ---- used to say, 'It is all well
enough for you, but I am a family man,' and he used to bob at
every report. For my part, I think judicious bobbing is not a
fault, for I remember seeing on two occasions shells before my
eyes, which certainly had I not bobbed would have taken off my
head. 'And a good riddance, too,' the Foreign Office would say."
One of the most amusing passages is that in which he says, "I must say I
hate our diplomatists." Here follows a rough sketch of two figures, one
intended for Sir Evelyn Baring, and the other for Mr. Egerton, his
deputy in Cairo. The former is represented as saying, "Most serious, is
it not? He called us humbugs--arrant humbugs." Egerton is made to reply,
"I can't believe it; it's too dreadful." Gordon, with characteristic
candour, continues, referring to diplomatists in general, "I think with
few exceptions they are arrant humbugs, and I expect they know it."
The foregoing is accompanied by one of the many extracts from the
Scriptures, which abound. It is as follows: "Blessed is the man who does
not sit in the seat of the scornful" (Ps. i. 1).
Hearing the news that to prevent outrage the Roman Catholic nuns at
Obeid had been compelled to declare themselves married to the Greek
priests, Gordon remarks, "What a row the Pope will make about the nuns
marrying the Greeks; it is the union of the Greek and Latin Churches."
On the 23rd of September Gordon says, that from 12th March till 22nd
September the garrison had expended 3,240,770 Remington cartridges,
1,570 Krupp cartridges, and 9,442 mountain-gun cartridges. He calculated
that of the Remington cartridges perhaps 240,000 had been captured by
the enemy, so that the number fired away would be only three millions.
As the rebels lost perhaps 1,000 men in all, he reckons that each man
killed required 3,000 cartridges to kill him.
There is less in the Diaries than might have been expected in the way of
personal attack on the Government which sent Gordon to Khartoum. He
says, indeed:--
"I could write volumes of pent-up wrath on this subject if I did
not believe things are ordained and work for the best. I am not
at all inclined to order half rations with a view to any
prolongation of our blockade; if I did so it would probably end
in a catastrophe before the time when, if full rations are
given, we should have exhausted our supplies. I should be an
angel (which I am not, needless to say) if I was not rabid with
Her Majesty's Government; but I hope I may be quiet on the
subject of this Soudan and Cairo business, with its indecision;
but to lose all my beautiful black soldiers is enough to make
one angry with them who have the direction of our future."
The diaries refer frequently to the Stewart incident, already mentioned
in these pages. Gordon resolved to send the _Abbas_ down, and upon his
assuring Stewart, in reply to his inquiry, that he "could go in honour,"
Stewart left. Stewart asked for an order, but this Gordon refused, as he
would not send him into any danger he did not share. It was the wish of
Stewart and Mr. Power (the "Times" correspondent) to leave Khartoum and
proceed down the Nile, and Gordon placed no restraint on their wish.
Further, when they left he took every step in his power to provide for
their security. He sent his river boats to escort them past Berber, and
he gave them much advice, which, if it had been implicitly followed,
should have brought them in safety to Dongola. Once reconciled to their
departure and the despatch of some of his steamers northwards, he formed
his plan for the co-operation of the latter with the Relief Expedition.
It has been shown how this was actually carried out; but while thus
endeavouring to facilitate the progress of the expedition, Gordon
seriously weakened his own position in Khartoum.
That these steamers, each of which he considered worth 2,000 men, had to
run no inconsiderable danger is shown by the following extract:--
"If any officer of the expedition is on board, he will know what
it is to be in a penny boat under cannon-fire. The _Bordein_ has
come in; she has seven wounded and one woman killed."
The news of the loss of the _Abbas_ was a terrible blow to Gordon, and
although at the time he knew nothing certain as to the fate of those on
board, yet he feared treachery. Many of his anticipations as to the
ultimate fall of Khartoum and other events were prophetic; and although
he did not foresee the exact circumstances of the loss of the _Abbas_,
he foresaw the fate of Stewart and those with him. After he heard that
the _Abbas_ had been captured, but had received no information as to the
circumstances of the loss, he writes:--
"Stewart was a man who did not chew the cud, he never thought of
danger in prospective; he was not a bit suspicious (while I am
made up of it). I can see, in imagination, the whole scene, the
Sheikh inviting them to land, saying, 'Thank God, the Mahdi is a
liar!'--bringing in wood--men going on shore and dispersed. The
_Abbas_ with her steam down, then a rush of wild Arabs and all
is over!"
Throughout the journals reference is made to various important
documents, the most notable of which is a letter from the Mahdi to
Gordon, dated 2nd Moharrem, 1302 (22nd October, 1884). In it the writer
says:--
"We have now arrived at a day's journey from Omdurman, and are
coming, please God, to your place. If you return to the Most
High God, and become a Moslem, and surrender to His order and
that of His Prophet, and believe in us as the Mahdi, send us a
message after laying down your arms and giving up all thought of
fighting, so that I may send you some one with safe-conduct, by
which you will obtain (assurance of) benefit and blessing in
this world and the next. Otherwise, and if you do not act thus,
you will have to encounter war with God and His Prophet. And
know that the Most High God is mighty for your destruction, as
He has destroyed others before you, who were much stronger than
you, and more numerous."
In reply, Gordon sent a telegram to the Commandant of Omdurman, to be
communicated to the Mahdi, with the memorable words "I am like iron, and
hope yet to see the English arrive."
The following passages record some of the later incidents of the
siege:--
"12th November, 10.20 a.m.--For half an hour firing lulled, but
then recommenced, and is still going on. The _Ismailia_ was
struck with a shell, but I hear is not seriously damaged. The
_Husseinyeh_ is aground (I feel much the want of my other
steamers at Metammeh). 11.15 a.m.--Firing has lulled; it was
very heavy for the last three-quarters of an hour from
_Ismailia_ and Arabs. It is now desultory, and is dying away.
_Husseinyeh_ is still aground; the _Ismailia_ is at anchor. What
a six hours' anxiety for me when I saw the shells strike the
water near the steamers from the Arabs; imagine my feelings!
Noon.--The firing has ceased, I am glad to say. I have lived
years in these last hours! Had I lost the _Ismailia_ I should
have lost the _Husseinyeh_ (aground), and then Omdurman and the
North Fort, and then the town. One p.m.--The Arabs are firing on
the steamers with their two guns. The _Husseinyeh_ still
aground; that is the reason of it. 1.30 p.m.--Now has ceased.
The _Ismailia_, struck by three shells, had one man killed,
fifteen wounded on board of her; she did really very well. This
is our first encounter with the Mahdi's personal troops. 2.45
p.m.--The _Ismailia_ tried to take _Husseinyeh_ off and got
struck twice, in addition to the three times before mentioned,
with shells, so she desisted from the attempt. The Arabs are
firing on the _Husseinyeh_. I have ordered the Krupp of (Fort)
Mogrim to play on the Arab guns, and shall wait till night to
take off the _Husseinyeh_. She is nearer to the left bank than
to the right bank. It is not clear if she is aground or half
sunk (equally a trouble). 3.30 p.m.--The Arabs are bringing
their guns nearer to the aground or half-sunken _Husseinyeh_.
The _Ismailia_ reports that the two last shells have done her no
material damage. 4.30 p.m.--The Arabs have now three guns
bearing on the _Husseinyeh_. Six p.m.--The firing has ceased. I
hope to get the _Husseinyeh_ off to-night. Seven p.m.--The Arabs
keep up a dropping fire on the _Husseinyeh_, who, I hear, has
two shell holes in her, and has six men, including the captain,
wounded.
"22nd November.--I am terribly anxious for the fort at
Omdurman, and am trying to devise some means of occupying the
Arabs and diverting their attention elsewhere.... The Arab
camps are about five miles from the city.
"5th December.--I have almost given up an idea of saving the
town; it is a last resource we make to open the route to the
Omdurman Fort.
"6th December.--I have given up all idea of landing at
Omdurman; we have not the force to do it. The Arabs fired
forty-five rounds at (Fort) Mogrim and the steamers. We had two
men wounded at Mogrim and one killed. This is most distressing,
to have these poor fellows wounded and killed.
"13th December.--The steamers went up and attacked Arabs at
Buri. Certainly this day after day delay has a most
disheartening effect on every one. To-day is the two hundred
and seventy-sixth day of our anxiety. The Arabs appear to have
suffered to-day heavily at Buri.... We are going to send down
the _Bordein_ the day after to-morrow, and with her I shall
send this journal. If some effort is not made before ten days'
time, the town will fall. It is inexplicable this delay. If the
expeditionary forces have reached the river, and met my
steamers, one hundred men are all that we require just to show
themselves."
The latest entry in the Diaries is on 14th December, and is as
follows:--
"Arabs fired two shells at the Palace this morning: 546 ardebs
dhoora in store; also 83,525 okes of biscuits. 10.30 a.m.--The
steamers are down at Omdurman engaging the Arabs. Consequently I
am on 'tenterhooks.' 11.30 a.m.--Steamers returned. The
_Bordein_ was struck by a shell in her battery. We had only one
man wounded. We are going to send down the _Bordein_ to-morrow
with this journal. If I was in command of the two hundred men of
the expeditionary force, which are all that is necessary for the
movement, I should stop just below Halfiyeh and attack the Arabs
at that place before I came on here to Khartoum. I should then
communicate with the North Fort, and act according to
circumstances. Now, mark this, if the expeditionary force--and I
ask for no more than two hundred men--does not come in ten days
the town may fall, and I have done my best for the honour of our
country. Good-bye.
"C. G. GORDON."
It would be impossible to find words more simple and at the same time
more pathetic than those contained in the concluding sentences of the
man who so long held the attention of the world riveted upon him, and
who, unaided and alone, maintained the highest traditions of British
courage and fortitude.