THE ADVANCE ON METAMMEH.
Although active preparations were commenced at once for the march to
Metammeh, the column was not ready to proceed till 3.30 p.m. on the
18th. The interval was occupied in loading up the camels, filling the
water-bottles and constructing a fort to protect the wounded, who were
to be left behind with a detachment of the Sussex Regiment. It had been
hoped that the advance would be postponed until the following morning,
in order that the men might have a rest, but General Stewart was
resolved to push on before the enemy had time to recover from their
recent defeat. So, as soon as everything was in order, the march
commenced. Stewart's intention was to proceed along the Metammeh road,
and after passing the wells of Shebacat and getting within a few miles
of Metammeh, to turn to the right and strike the Nile about three miles
above the town. This he hoped to do before daybreak, and then to attack
the town. The column moved off with the Hussars in front, then the
Guards, and after them the convoy, followed by the Heavies and the
Mounted Infantry. The total number of camels was 2,500, of which 1,350
were ridden by the fighting part of the force, and the remainder were
used for transport.
The force got on pretty well and with few halts until sunset, but as
darkness came on the tall grass became thicker, and the ground more
broken. Here the camels began to tumble about and get out of their
places. After two hours of this work, the guide reported that they were
getting near the wells, and the Guards dismounted so as to be prepared
for an attack.
The trees now became more dense, and the tracks so diminished in number
as to allow only room for a half section of cavalry to pass between the
scrub on either side. Here the column fell into wild disorder; the
baggage camels got entangled in the bush, and many of them had to be
left behind.[112] The men, utterly worn out by want of rest, went to
sleep, tumbled off, and their unguided camels wandered off the track. To
show the confusion that existed, on several occasions the rear guard
were found in front of the force, thus proving that the troops were
going in a circle. The passage through the bush, difficult as it would
have been for the men and transport by daylight, by night, and with no
moon, became almost impossible, and the disorder was endless. Had the
enemy attempted to rush the column in the darkness, the consequences
might have been disastrous, more especially considering the exhausted
condition of both men and animals.
Still the column blundered on till at last it got to open ground, where
a long halt was made. At 1.15 a.m. on the 19th, the force again advanced
over a fairly easy country, with a few scattered trees, but no path.
Both men and animals were so worn out that continual halts had to be
made. Directly the halt sounded the men laid down to snatch a few
minutes' sleep.
Daylight found the column still some six or seven miles from the Nile,
which, however, was nowhere visible. Stewart, suspecting the guide of
treachery, now placed him in charge of a cavalry escort, and altered the
direction of the column more to the eastward in the hope of striking
the river. After going about two miles further, the town of Metammeh,
with a broad tract of vegetation marking the presence of the Nile, came
in sight.
There was no chance now of getting to the river without being seen, so
the column kept on its way till about 7 a.m., when crowds of the enemy
were observed swarming out of the town, some coming straight towards the
British force, while others kept along the river bank as if to cut off
the column from the Nile.
The troops had by this time reached an open piece of ground, where, on a
low gravelly hill, they halted and formed square round the camels. It
was evident that a fight was inevitable, and Stewart, determining that
his men, exhausted by their long night march, should not fight on empty
stomachs, ordered breakfast to be got ready.
Meanwhile the enemy were working round the position with great rapidity,
and firing with their Remingtons into the square, where by 8 a.m. the
bullets began to drop freely. The plain around was dotted with bushes,
and there were many depressions, so that the enemy's marksmen, whilst
concealed themselves, were able to keep up a steady fusillade.
To protect the men, a zeriba of camel saddles, boxes, &c., was hastily
constructed. The work was very trying, and the men fell fast whilst it
was going on. As the fire became hotter, the parapet of the zeriba grew
in height, and here and there traverses of boxes and packages were built
up as a protection against the enfilading fire of the enemy's
sharpshooters.
A little after ten General Stewart fell, severely wounded, and from this
moment Sir Charles Wilson took over the command. Other casualties
occurred about the same time, including Lieutenant C. Crutchley, of the
Scots Guards, wounded, and Cameron, correspondent of the "Standard," and
Herbert, correspondent of the "Morning Post," killed. Burleigh, of the
"Daily Telegraph," was also wounded. The British troops all this time
were replying as best they could to the enemy's fire, but the men were
gradually being worn out, and their shooting was comparatively
ineffective. The enemy being concealed in the long grass, the men in the
zeriba laboured under the disadvantage of being exposed as targets
without being able to strike back. This went on for hours, the fire on
both sides continuing without intermission, and men dropping fast. It
became evident that this state of things could not last, and orders were
given to construct works in which to place the heavy baggage and the
wounded, in charge of a small detachment, whilst the square should take
the initiative and march to the Nile.
Under heavy fire the works were completed, a redoubt being thrown up by
Major Dorward and Lieutenant Lawson, of the Engineers, and the zeriba
strengthened. This was not accomplished without loss, twelve men being
killed and forty wounded up to this time. The baggage, camels, &c., were
protected by the artillery and the Gardner guns which were left in the
zeriba. With them were the 19th Hussars (whose horses were so done up as
to render them useless as cavalry), the Naval Brigade, half the Heavy
Camel Corps. Colonel Barrow was left in command under Lord Charles
Beresford, who was the senior officer in rank.
During the forming of the square, so hopeless did the situation appear
to some of the correspondents, that they started for Abu Klea, but were
turned back, partly by the cavalry sent out by Colonel Barrow, and
partly by the enemy's horsemen. Eventually all the correspondents
remained in the zeriba except Villiers, the artist of the "Graphic," who
went forward with the column.
Owing to the delay caused by strengthening the zeriba and constructing
the redoubt, it was three o'clock when the square moved slowly out from
the zeriba. The object of the advance was not so much to attack as to
gain the desired position on the river. The movement was a strikingly
bold one, as the smaller force left behind was exposed to great risks,
and the larger one was weakened by division. Everything depended on the
steadiness of the advancing square. Were it to give way, the small party
remaining in the redoubt could not hope to hold out for any length of
time.
The column was about 1,200 strong. The front of the square was composed
of the Grenadier Guards and Coldstreams, the right flank of the Scots
Guards and part of the Heavy Camel Corps, and the left flank of the
Mounted Infantry, while the Sussex Regiment and another part of the
Heavy Camel Corps brought up the rear.
They moved at a slow march, keeping always in the open, covered by the
fire of the Gardner gun in the redoubt, whilst flanking skirmishers
threaded their way through the mimosas, for the ground was rough and
irregular, with bushes in all directions.
For two miles the enemy, though visible in force, made no direct attack,
but contented themselves with keeping up an incessant rifle-fire from a
distance. However, on approaching a gravel ridge between the British
force and the river, a body on foot, some thousands strong, was seen
approaching in crescent formation. The square was at once halted, and
the men lying down, delivered volley after volley with the utmost
steadiness. Soon the critical moment came when the charge took place.
Led by several emirs on horseback, 800 of the enemy's spearmen hurled
themselves against the square. The troops never wavered for a moment,
but cheered lustily when they saw the rush coming. The main body of the
assailants made for the left angle of the front face, where the Guards
and Mounted Infantry were posted. The attack looked serious, but the
Guards and Mounted Infantry received the charge with a fire so deadly at
300 yards, that all the leaders with their fluttering banners went down,
and not one got within thirty yards of the square. The fight only lasted
a few minutes; the Dervish front ranks were swept away, and then there
was a backward movement as the whole of the assailants recoiled and,
with the masses assembled on the adjoining hills, disappeared in the
direction of Metammeh. They left 250 bodies on the field, including
those of five of the emirs, whilst not a single British soldier was
either killed or wounded in repelling the charge.
During the advance, the garrison in the zeriba had been engaging the
enemy at long range. Though attacked by rifle-fire up to the time that
the charge was made on the square, the assailants never came to close
quarters. The garrison made effective use of the guns in shelling the
masses of the enemy on the gravel hills in front of Wilson's advancing
force. As the column moved forward, their shells were seen bursting and
scattering the crowds, and it was mainly owing to the accuracy of the
artillery fire that a larger number of spearmen did not join in the
charge.
The British loss in the day's fighting was twenty killed and sixty
wounded. The officers and newspaper correspondents killed were as
follows: Officers, 19th Hussars, Quartermaster A. G. Lima; Commissariat
and Transport Corps, A. C. Jewell; correspondents, Messrs. St. Leger
Herbert and Cameron.
A few minutes' halt to enable the men to have a drink of water and fill
up their ammunition pouches was allowed, and then the column continued
its march towards the hill. When the gravelly ridge was occupied the sun
was about setting, and the river, which had been so long looked for, was
not yet in sight. Parties were pushed on in search of it in the
darkness, and eventually, half an hour after nightfall, the Nile was
reached.[113]
The wounded were at once taken to the most suitable place to be found on
the river bank, whilst the men went down by companies to drink. The
camels, which were by this time as worn out as the men, were turned
adrift to graze in the surrounding vegetation. The men were so exhausted
that when they came up from their drink they fell down like logs, and
difficulty was experienced in rousing them and getting them into their
places for the night.
The force was allowed to bivouac in peace on the Nile bank, and both
officers and men, lying on the bare ground, found the rest of which they
were so much in need. The only sign of the enemy's presence was the
beating of the "tom-toms," which went on all night.
On the 20th the adjacent village of Abu Kru (which for some unknown
reason was called Gubat) was occupied, and a small garrison being placed
there, the rest of the troops, recruited and refreshed, marched back to
relieve the party at the zeriba. As the returning column neared the
work, the small garrison greeted it with hearty cheers. The task of
removing the wounded, together with the rest of the camels, the baggage,
and guns, was then commenced, and continued until the whole were brought
to the new position at Gubat.[114] The Hussars' horses by this time had
been two days and the camels five days without water.
Sir Charles Wilson's dash for the Nile was one of the most hazardous of
military operations, and has been condemned by nearly all professional
critics. He not only divided his already reduced forces in the face of
the enemy, but cut himself off from his baggage, artillery, and
supplies. On the other hand, there was an absolute necessity for gaining
a position on the river with the least possible delay, and, if a further
justification were wanted, Sir Charles can point to the complete success
which attended the movement. If one regards closely the question of
risk, it is impossible not to feel that the despatch of Stewart's column
of only 1,800 men across the desert against an enemy of unknown strength
was in itself a highly venturesome proceeding, and one which, if
undertaken by a less able commander or with inferior troops, must have
ended in disaster. This, in fact, was very nearly being the case with
the column at Abu Klea, where nothing but the steadiness of the men
saved the day. "Success justifies all risks," but it is a curious
circumstance that, whilst one argument against adopting the
Souakim-Berber route was that it involved a long desert march with a
fight at the end at Berber, this was practically what happened to
Stewart's force, which, after a long and trying march, had to fight
towards its end both at Abu Klea and Metammeh. There was this
difference, however, between the two, that the result of Stewart's
operations was to open a line of communications from Metammeh to Cairo
of more than 1,300 miles, instead of one of only 280 miles from Berber
to the Red Sea. There was the further consideration that, from the
disposition of the Mahdi's forces, less resistance would probably have
been met with at Berber than was encountered in the Bayuda desert,
whilst Khartoum being almost as accessible from Berber as from Metammeh,
the former would have been nearly as important as the latter as an
objective point for the purposes of the expedition.
On the 21st, a garrison having been left in camp to protect the wounded,
the rest of the column marched towards Metammeh, which was found to be a
long village of mud houses with loopholed walls and two or three
mountain guns. If, as was thought possible after the events of the
previous day, it was found to be undefended, Wilson's idea was to take
possession of the place. The advance commenced at daybreak. On nearing
the town it was found to be full of people and strongly held. An
adjoining village was occupied by Wilson's men, who had to sustain a
well-aimed fire from the loopholed buildings, whilst they could hit
nobody in return. Two of the British guns were brought up, but did
little harm, the shell merely going through the mud walls without
bursting. Wilson's force was too small and already too much incumbered
with wounded to justify an attack at close quarters, and the town if
taken was too big to hold. So he determined to retire without pressing
the attack. The troops, whose casualties amounted to only one man killed
and one officer wounded, now deployed and fell back covered by
skirmishers and the artillery.
Just at the moment when the attacking force was nearest the town, and
the guns were attempting to make a breach in the enemy's walls, four
steamers flying the Egyptian flag came down stream and anchored. Every
one knew at once that they were from General Gordon, and greeted them
with loud cheers. They were commanded by Nusri Pasha, and were sent by
Gordon from Khartoum to communicate with the expeditionary force. They
had on board some Soudanese and Egyptians and some brass howitzers. Four
of the latter were at once landed and run into action by a force of
Soudanese from the steamers under Khasm-el-Mus, a native sheikh with the
rank of bey. These made excellent practice at the town up to the moment
when the retreat sounded.
Khasm-el-Mus stated that he had seen a force under Feki Mustapha
marching down the west bank from Khartoum, and that it would reach
Metammeh by sunset or very early next morning. The camp at Gubat was
therefore hurriedly placed in a state to resist an attack, and
arrangements were made for bringing in such of the stores as still
remained at the zeriba.