WILSON'S VOYAGE TO KHARTOUM.
"Khartoum all right, can hold on for years.--C. G. Gordon, 29: 12: '84,"
was the cheering message, written on a tiny slip of paper, which reached
Sir Charles Wilson by Gordon's steamers.
With this writing came Gordon's journals, containing a narrative of
events from the 10th September to the 14th December, some private
letters and also some despatches addressed by him to "the Officer
Commanding H.M.'s troops," to Sir Evelyn Baring, and others.
In one of the despatches, dated 20th October, 1884, Gordon informs the
officer in command of the British troops of the sending to him of the
steamers, and advises the removal from them of all Egyptians, whether
pashas, beys, or privates, all of whom Gordon terms "hens." The letter
concludes:--
"If you do not use the steamers, at least take out the hens and
send them back empty. If you choose to put black troops on
board, they will be welcome, but not those heroes of
Tel-el-Kebir."
In another letter, dated 21st October, addressed to "the Chief of the
Staff, Soudan Expeditionary Force," Gordon wrote that he had tendered
the resignation of his commission in the British Army, and requested
that the General commanding Her Majesty's troops advancing for the
relief of the garrison might be informed of this fact.
The letter addressed to Sir Evelyn Baring was dated the 12th December.
In it Gordon stated that, having been sent to Khartoum to draw up a
report on the state of the Soudan, and for this purpose having been
placed under the orders of Her Majesty's Minister in Egypt, he now
informed him that Colonel Stewart took down this report, and that
consequently Gordon's connection with the Foreign Office and Baring had
ceased.
The latest letter was dated the 14th December, and was addressed to the
Chief of the Staff. Its contents were as follows:--
"I send down the steamer _Bordein_ to-morrow with Vol. 6 of my
private journal containing account of the events in Khartoum
from 5th November to 14th December. The state of affairs is such
that one cannot foresee further than five to seven days, after
which the town may at any time fall. I have done all in my power
to hold out, but I own I consider the position is extremely
critical, almost desperate; and I say this without any feeling
of bitterness with respect to Her Majesty's Government, but
merely as a matter of fact. Should the town fall, it will be
questionable whether it will be worth the while of Her Majesty's
Government to continue its expedition, for it is certain that
the fall of Khartoum will insure that of Kassala and Sennar."
The writing dated 29th December, 1884, containing the expression,
"Khartoum all right, can hold on for years," was probably intended,
like Gordon's previous message to the like effect, merely to convey the
information that he was still holding out.
The wording of the document was simply a _ruse_ in the event of the
capture of the person who brought the message, on foot, to the steamer
after she left Khartoum. This is apparent from the letter of the 14th
December, as well as from the statements of the Egyptian officers who
accompanied the steamers. They reported that they had been for some
weeks stationed a short distance above Metammeh waiting for the arrival
of the British column. They had assisted in getting messages into and
out of Khartoum, where the situation was altogether most gloomy. Gordon
himself was well, they said, but his soldiers were despairing of relief,
and it was necessary that some Europeans should proceed with the utmost
alacrity to Khartoum, in order to reassure the population and the
troops.
Abdul Hamid Bey, who commanded one of the steamers, the _Bordein_,
informed Sir Charles Wilson that he left Khartoum on the 14th in that
vessel, and Gordon then told him that if he (Abdul Hamid) did not return
with English troops within ten days it would be too late; and that in
that case he had better not attempt to return at all.
The other three steamers had quitted Khartoum in September, and had been
down to Shendy and other places looking for the expeditionary force.
On the 22nd January, 1885, it was decided to construct two forts--a
village fort to be held by the Guards, and a river fort, containing the
hospital, to be held by the remainder of the force. The three small guns
of the column, together with some from the steamers, were put in
position.
The same day, the steamers were utilized by Sir Charles Wilson for the
purposes of another reconnaissance, this time towards Shendy, a town
opposite to Metammeh on the right bank of the Nile. Only a small force,
consisting for the most part of a detachment of the Mounted Infantry,
was embarked. Shendy was found to be in the possession of the enemy,
though they were not in overwhelming force. One Krupp gun was mounted
there. The steamers contented themselves with throwing a few shells into
the place and then retired.
It was found that a portion of the enemy had occupied a small island in
the Nile just opposite the British camp. The guns of the steamers were
speedily brought to bear on them, and the infantry opening a steady fire
drove the intruders out of the island and across the river.
The whole of the 23rd was occupied in changing the crews and soldiers on
board the steamers, fitting them up and loading them with supplies for
Khartoum, and preparing for a start. Owing to the absence of coal, wood
had to be substituted, and the latter commodity was scarce. It was only
obtained by landing parties from the steamers carrying off the timber of
which the sakheas or waterwheels were constructed. A convoy of camels
under Colonel Talbot was sent back to Gakdul after dark with despatches
for Lord Wolseley, and instructions to bring up provisions. The escort
of 400 men accompanying the convoy reduced the little garrison at Gubat
to a total of 922 all told.
The original plan was for Lord Charles Beresford to man two of the
steamers with his naval brigade and, after putting fifty of the Sussex
Regiment on board, to take them with Sir Charles Wilson to Khartoum.
Unfortunately it was impossible to carry out this programme. All the
naval officers were killed or wounded except Beresford, who was so ill
as to be unable to walk, and many of the best petty officers and seamen
were also gone. Beresford indeed offered to accompany the expedition,
but, as he was clearly not in a fit condition, Wilson felt bound to
decline the offer. After consultation with him Khasm-el-Mus was placed
in command of the steamer _Bordein_, and Abdul Hamid Bey in command of
the _Tala Hawiyeh_. It was Lord Wolseley's idea that the military escort
should enter Khartoum in red coats. There was some difficulty in finding
a sufficient number of coats for the purpose, but at the last moment
they were obtained from the Guards, and the Sussex men were enabled to
appear in tunics which were sadly wanting in point of fit, though
correct in colour.
At 8 a.m. on the 24th Sir C. Wilson left for Khartoum in the _Bordein_,
with Captain Gascoigne, Yorkshire Hussars, ten non-commissioned officers
and men of the Sussex Regiment, and one petty officer, artificer, Royal
Navy; the _Tala Hawiyeh_ followed with Captain Trafford and ten
non-commissioned officers and men of the Sussex, Lieutenant
Stuart-Wortley, King's Rifles, and one petty officer, artificer, Royal
Navy. Captain Trafford commanded the escort, and Captain Gascoigne and
Lieutenant Stuart-Wortley accompanied Wilson for service with Gordon, at
Khartoum.
No information has been given why only two of the four vessels were
despatched, nor why only twenty British soldiers were embarked. Of
course little more than a "demonstration" could have been made with any
force such as the steamers could have carried, even if all of them had
been employed. Still the singular reduction from 14,000, the total of
the British Army in Egypt, to 7,000, the force told off for the
expedition, then to 1,800, the number of Sir Herbert Stewart's column,
and finally to twenty, the number of Sir Charles Wilson's forlorn hope,
cannot fail to strike the reader.
Colonel Boscawen was left in command of the force which remained at
Gubat.
When near Sheikeih, on the left bank, a portion of the force under
Fiki-Mustapha, which, it had been reported, was marching on Metammeh,
was seen in the distance. It was ascertained afterwards that this force,
about 3,000 men, had halted on receiving news of the fight at Metammeh,
and then retired to Wad-Habeshi.
On the 26th two Shukriyehs came on board and reported that for the last
fifteen days there had been fighting at Khartoum, and on the 27th a man
shouted out from the left bank, that a camel-man had just passed with
the news that Khartoum had fallen, and that Gordon had been killed.
On the 28th, a Shukriyeh on the right bank stated that Khartoum had
fallen two days previously, and that Gordon had been killed. The news
was generally discredited, and the vessels prepared to force their way
past the enemy's batteries into Khartoum, the _Bordein_ leading and the
_Tala Hawiyeh_ following close astern. The orders to the detachment of
the Royal Sussex were to fire volleys at the embrasures of the
batteries, whilst the Soudanese troops kept up an independent fire and
the four guns on the steamers replied to the fire of the batteries.
On approaching Halfiyeh it was noticed that the palm-grove there had
been burned, and that three or four large nuggers were lying alongside
the bank. On the attention of Khasm-el-Mus being called to this, he at
once replied, "Gordon's troops must be there, as the Mahdi has no
boats." Directly afterwards a heavy fire was opened upon the steamers
from four guns, and from rifles at from 600 to 900 yards range. One gun
was in a sakhea pit at the water's edge, two in an earthwork a little
above the sakhea, and one in the village. After passing Shamba, two guns
on the right bank opened on the steamers while a heavy rifle-fire came
from both banks, and this was sustained until they came within range of
the guns of Omdurman. When abreast of Tuti Island, which it was expected
to find in Gordon's possession, the vessels were received by a sharp
musketry fire at from 75 to 200 yards range; three or four guns, of
which one was a Krupp, opened fire from the upper end of Tuti, or from
Khartoum, two guns from the fort at Omdurman, and a well-sustained
rifle-fire from the left bank. The steamers returned the fire both with
guns and rifles.
On reaching a point beyond Tuti, Wilson came to the conclusion that
Khartoum was in the hands of the enemy, and that it would be a useless
sacrifice of life to attempt to land or try to force a passage to the
town itself; he therefore ordered the _Bordein_ to turn and run down the
river at full speed. The _Tala Hawiyeh_, which had grounded for a few
minutes, near the upper end of Tuti Island, followed, and the steamers
drew up for the night near Tamaniat.
Here Wilson sent out two messengers, one to go to Khartoum to ascertain
the fate of Gordon, the other to collect information. The latter, on his
return, stated he had met a Jaalin Arab, who told him that Khartoum had
fallen on the night of the 26th, and that Gordon was dead. He also said
that on the 27th the Mahdi had entered Khartoum, prayed in the principal
mosque, and then retired to Omdurman, leaving the town to three days'
pillage.
The reasons which led Wilson to the conclusion that Khartoum had fallen
were:--The heavy fire brought to bear from Tuti Island; the absence of
any fire from Khartoum in his support; the fact that no Egyptian flag
was flying from any place in or near the town, though Government and
other houses were plainly visible; the presence of a large number of
dervishes with their banners on a sandspit; and the fact that a number
of Gordon's troop boats and nuggers were lying along the left bank of
the White Nile under Omdurman Fort.
On the 29th the _Tala Hawiyeh_ ran at full speed on a sunken rock in
open water opposite Jeb-el-Royan and rapidly filled. The _Bordein_ was
brought up at a small island below the wreck, and before sunset Captain
Trafford and Lieutenant Stuart-Wortley came down with a large nugger, in
which they placed every one on board the steamer, the two guns, and such
of the ammunition as had not been damaged.
Fiki-Abd-Er-Rahman, who had come down to the river with a flag of truce
at Omdurman, and followed down to the scene of the wreck, came on board
with a letter from the Mahdi, which was addressed to the party. The
letter stated that Khartoum had been taken and Gordon killed, and
offered a safe-conduct to any one sent to verify the facts. The Mahdi
enjoined the English to become Moslems if they wished for peace, and
promised protection to Khasm-el-Mus and his followers if they submitted.
The messenger, on the other hand, stated that Gordon was with the Mahdi
at Omdurman, and that the garrison of Tuti having refused to submit had
been put to the sword.
Wilson made no reply to the Mahdi's letter, but, to secure a safe
passage through the cataracts, where the slightest opposition would have
been fatal to every one on board the steamers, Khasm-el-Mus, with
Wilson's cognizance, answered that he would never give himself up unless
the Mahdi sent him a special safe-conduct and promise of safety. If this
were sent he would surrender to Fiki-Mustapha at Wad-Habeshi, where guns
had been mounted to oppose the passage of the steamers.
On the 30th they passed the most difficult portion of the cataract
without opposition (the result of Khasm-el-Mus' answer, for during
several hours the soldiers and men on the steamer and nugger were at the
mercy of a few sharpshooters).
The same day two Shukriyehs came on board with information that Gordon
was shut up in the mission church at Khartoum with some faithful
followers.
On the 31st, after the _Bordein_ had been lowered down a difficult fall
with great care, she was run on a sunken rock off the island of Mernat
between two and three miles above the enemy's position at Wad-Habeshi.
The steamer was beached on the sandspit of a small island, and
everything landed. The island of Mernat, about forty yards distant, was
occupied by a picket of the Royal Sussex and the crew and soldiers of
the _Tala Hawiyeh_, and at nightfall the picket of the Sussex was
withdrawn to the smaller island.
Stuart-Wortley was directed to proceed as soon as it was dark to Gubat,
with information of the position of the expedition, and a request for
assistance.
Wilson at first intended to cross to the right bank of the Nile and
march as soon as the moon rose, but finding it impossible to move the
Soudanese troops, he bivouacked with Khasm-el-Mus on Mernat, whilst
Captains Trafford and Gascoigne remained on the smaller island to guard
the stores.
On the 1st February a zeriba was made on Mernat Island; the four guns
from the steamers were mounted, and all the ammunition and stores which
had been saved were collected. Some Shukriyehs from the mainland visited
the party, and said that since the fall of Khartoum they had determined
to throw in their lot with the Mahdi; they advised Khasm-el-Mus to do
the same, but he replied he would never surrender without a letter from
the Mahdi promising safety.
When the zeriba was finished, Wilson called the men to arms and, during
the inspection which followed, was able to assure himself that a large
proportion of the soldiers would remain loyal and fight to the last. One
soldier deserted during the day. Two messengers were sent to Halfiyeh to
obtain news from Khartoum.
On the 2nd Fiki-Mustapha, from Wad-Habeshi, crossed to the island and
tried to persuade Khasm-el-Mus to submit, but he returned the same
answer as before. A friendly Shukriyeh brought news that a steamer had
left Gubat for the relief of the force at noon the previous day. A
sister of Khasm-el-Mus, who had followed the steamers down the river,
also arrived, with news that the families of all the officers on board
the steamers had been killed at Khartoum, and that Gordon was killed
whilst coming out of his room in Government House. Khasm-el-Mus' sister
was sent back to Khartoum to obtain further information, and to purchase
back any of the family sold into slavery. During the afternoon Abdul
Hamid Bey (who had brought a strong letter of recommendation from Gordon
to Lord Wolseley) deserted, as well as some of the "Reises" (pilots) and
four soldiers. As soon as Wilson was aware of this, he placed the
remaining Reises, who were all Dongolawis, and friendly to the Mahdi,
under a guard of the Sussex, with orders that they were to be shot if
they attempted to escape.
On the 3rd, Wilson ordered all the troops to be confined to the zeriba,
and, in the event of the non-arrival of the steamer, made arrangements
to seize Fiki-Mustapha, who was again to visit the island, and keep him
as hostage.
To return to Stuart-Wortley: he left the island at 6.45 p.m. in a small
rowing-boat with four English soldiers and eight natives, and floated
past the enemy's works, who did not see him until opposite their last
bonfire, when they fired several shots without effect. He then ordered
the men to row hard, and reached the camp at Gubat at 3 a.m. on the 1st
February without any further opposition.
The news he brought placed the force at Gubat in a state of
consternation. The first necessity was, of course, to get Wilson's party
off the island. It was decided that Lord Charles Beresford should start
early in the afternoon in one of the remaining steamers. It was also
resolved to send off a convoy across the desert to bring up
reinforcements in view of a probable advance of the Mahdi with the force
which the capture of Khartoum had set free.[115]
Stuart-Wortley left Gubat at 2 p.m. on board the _Safiyeh_, with Lord
Charles Beresford in command; a portion of the Naval Brigade, under
Lieutenant Van Koughnet; twenty non-commissioned officers and privates
of the Mounted Infantry, under Lieutenant Bower, King's Royal Rifles;
two Gardner guns; and two 4-pounder brass mountain-guns.
On the 2nd a few shots were fired from the west bank. The vessel stopped
for the night just past Gebel-Fangur. On the 3rd she started at 6.30
a.m. At 8 a.m. she came in sight of the enemy's works at Wad-Habeshi,
where the Arabs could be seen running into the rifle-trench; fire was
opened with the bow gun at about 1,000 yards range. On nearing the
position, the enemy opened a heavy rifle-fire, and a gun, in an
embrasure facing down the river, also opened fire. The steamer replied
with the Gardners and rifles, and also with a 4-pounder. When opposite
the central embrasure, the enemy moved their gun and fired, their shot
passing over the steamer. The latter's fire was so rapid and
well-directed that the enemy were shy of putting their heads over the
parapet to take aim. Having passed the embrasure facing up the river,
where the enemy had their second gun, a round shot passed through the
vessel's boiler and caused the steam to escape in a huge volume. She
proceeded about 300 yards further, while the steam lasted, and then
dropped anchor at 500 yards from the enemy's position. Van Koughnet was
shot through the thigh when serving the Gardner, one bluejacket was
mortally wounded, and two more were severely scalded. The Gardners had
to be moved abaft the battery, and a hole made in it to allow the gun
and the Gardners to play upon the enemy's works. The boiler was found to
be repairable. Firing continued very brisk until 10.30 a.m., when the
enemy's fire was silenced.
Wilson's party heard the _Safiyeh_ coming into action with the enemy's
battery at Wad-Habeshi; but shortly afterwards Trafford, who was on the
"look-out" at the end of the island, reported that he had seen the
steamer enveloped in smoke, and feared she had met with a serious
accident. As the steamer continued to fire on the battery, and could be
seen swinging at anchor, it was determined to break up the zeriba at
once and march down to her.
As soon as the order was given a scene of wild confusion arose, as it
was impossible to keep the Soudanese soldiers under control, and the
enemy opened a heavy rifle-fire when they noticed the movement.
Eventually the guns, ammunition, stores, wounded, and women, were placed
in a nugger, and the troops assembled on the island. Gascoigne, with a
small guard of the Sussex, was put in charge of the nugger with
instructions to stop at the nearest point he could reach on the right
bank.
Wilson then marched the rest of the British and Soudanese troops to the
end of the island, whence they crossed to the right bank in a small
boat. The crossing was covered by the detachment of the Sussex.
On reaching the nugger Gascoigne proceeded down the river until he
reached the right bank opposite the _Safiyeh_, whilst Wilson marched to
the same place. Finding it difficult to communicate with Beresford by
signal, he sent Gascoigne, who volunteered for the service, in a small
boat to the _Safiyeh_ with the two naval artificers, and a native crew;
the boat was received with a sharp rifle-fire from the enemy going and
returning, but fortunately no one was hit. In the meantime, Wilson had
got one of the guns out of the nugger and brought it into action against
the centre embrasure of the battery; whilst three marksmen of the Sussex
made good practice at 1,100 yards range, and the remainder of the Sussex
and the Soudanese were drawn up behind a sakhea channel.
Lord Charles Beresford having sent a message to say that his boiler,
which had been pierced by a shot, would be ready by the evening, and
that he would pick the party up at a more convenient place about three
miles lower down next morning, Wilson directed Trafford to proceed down
the river with the Sussex and a portion of the Soudanese under
Khasm-el-Mus to form a zeriba at the selected point.
Wilson remained behind to cover the passage of the nugger with the gun
and a detachment of Soudanese, but she unfortunately ran on a sandbank,
and did not get off before sunset. In dragging the gun down through the
tangled vegetation after dark, the men, who had had no food, became
exhausted, and it was found necessary to abandon the gun, which was
spiked and thrown into the river. After sunset Gascoigne endeavoured to
run past the battery in the nugger, but she again grounded on two rocks
opposite to and about 200 yards from the centre embrasure. Here she
remained all night and until about 8 a.m. next morning, under fire from
the battery and rifle-pits, but by most extraordinary good fortune no
one was wounded.
On the 4th Beresford, having got up steam, ran past the battery, which
now reopened on him, and brought to a short distance below; he then sent
a party of bluejackets under Lieutenant Keppel, in a boat, to
Gascoigne's assistance. For more than an hour the work of lightening the
nugger had to be carried on under fire, and nothing could exceed the
coolness and gallantry shown by Gascoigne and by Keppel, who was struck
by a spent ball during this trying time. When the nugger was clear of
the rocks Beresford proceeded down stream, and embarked the soldiers and
crews of the steamers by 11 a.m. The camp at Gubat was reached at 5.30
p.m.
Though the members of Wilson's expedition were repeatedly under fire,
their losses were only two Soudanese killed and twenty-five wounded.
This was due to the excellent manner in which the steamers were
protected, as well as to the enemy's bad shooting. The casualties on
board Beresford's steamer have been already mentioned, and they also
were comparatively small for the same reason.
It only remains to add that there are probably few more gallant
achievements recorded than the successful rescue effected by Lord
Charles Beresford in the face of difficulties.[116]