INDEPENDENCE OF THE ISTHMUS.
1801-1822.
ADMINISTRATION UNDER SPAIN—INFLUENCE OF EVENTS IN
EUROPE AND SPANISH AMERICA ON THE ISTHMUS—HOSTILITIES IN
NUEVA GRANADA—CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT—GENERAL HORE'S
MEASURES TO HOLD THE ISTHMUS FOR SPAIN—MACGREGOR'S
INSURGENT EXPEDITION AT PORTOBELLO—REËSTABLISHMENT OF THE
CONSTITUTION—CAPTAIN-GENERAL MURGEON'S RULE—THE ISTHMUS IS
DECLARED INDEPENDENT—ITS INCORPORATION WITH COLOMBIA—JOSÉ
FÁBREGA IN TEMPORARY COMMAND—JOSÉ MARÍA CARREÑO APPOINTED
INTENDENTE AND COMANDANTE GENERAL—ABOLITION OF AFRICAN
SLAVERY.
The intimate relations of the Panamá Isthmus with Central America,
and indeed with the whole Pacific coast, led me in the first instance
to give its history; and in continuation of that purpose, I herewith
carry on the narrative of events in that quarter, although in the later
political partition Panamá is not classed among the Central American
states.
* * * * *
We have seen in a preceding volume how Panamá, formerly the entrepôt
for the trade of Spain with her South American colonies on the Pacific,
in the course of the eighteenth century descended from her lofty
position, and became veiled in obscurity, until the name of the once
famous Castilla del Oro is well-nigh consigned to the pages of modern
mythology. The events of the following century, which so beneficially
changed the political condition of most of the American provinces, only
tended to impoverish the Isthmus. However, its important geographical
position, making it a bridge between the two great oceans, brought back
for a time the old prosperity, notably by reason of the discovery of
gold in California, the building of a railway, and the much-discussed
project of an interoceanic ship canal.
[Sidenote: UNDER THE VICEROYS.]
The Isthmus was enjoying in 1801 its usual tranquillity under the rule
of the Spanish viceroy at Santa Fé de Bogotá, Pedro de Mendinueta y
Muzquiz, as well as under the more immediate one of Brigadier Antonio
Narvaez y la Torre, the governor and comandante general. He was in
1803 promoted to mariscal de campo, and relieved on the 15th of March
the same year, by Colonel Juan de Márcos Urbina, who at his death in
1805 was succeeded[XXIV-1] by Brigadier Juan A. de la Mata. The latter
is represented to have been a man of estimable character, and as he
was both respected and liked, he found during his term but little
difficulty to rule the three provinces of Portobello, Veragua, and
Darien, and the partidos of Natá and Alange, into which this region
had been divided.[XXIV-2] Pursuant to the customary policy of Spain,
an asesor, or legal adviser, was appointed to consult with him, while
the military functions of the governor, in case of his being prevented,
were assumed by another substitute, also nominated beforehand, with the
title of teniente de rey.
The judicial organization was equal to those of other Spanish
colonies; matters of little importance were decided by the ordinary
alcaldes or the city councils, and only appeals were brought before
the courts of Bogotá.[XXIV-3] There was also an extensive financial
department, comprising the custom-houses of Portobello, Chagres,
and Panamá, a general treasury with its dependent offices and the
different administrations of customs and monopolies belonging to the
crown. But their product was not sufficient to cover the expenses of
the provinces, with their numerous officials and a permanent military
force,[XXIV-4] required as garrisons for Portobello, Chagres, and
Panamá, all of which places were then fortified, and temporarily
financial subventions from Peru became necessary. The reason was
the decline of commerce which involved a corresponding neglect of
husbandry, and other branches, agriculture producing only what was
required for home consumption. Stock-raising, for which the soil of
Veragua was so well adapted, decreased; and mining in Portobello and
Darien was scarcely worthy of mention. Such a depressing state of
affairs could but have a degenerating influence on the inhabitants,
which, if not fostered by the government, at least was allowed to
go on without an effort to check it. Education was at a low ebb
everywhere; in the capital there was one primary school and a Latin
class. Nearly all books not of a certain religious character[XXIV-5]
were forbidden, intercourse with foreigners was hindered, and the
diffusion of liberal ideas was effectually repressed. The facility
of obtaining the few means of subsistence required in such a climate
contributed to produce that state of indolence which characterized the
inhabitants at the beginning of the nineteenth century. Most of their
time was spent in bull-fights, gambling, and religious performances,
there being more than one hundred holidays in the year. The regular
clergy, as in other parts of Spanish America, had always been powerful
in Panamá, and possessed, notwithstanding the decadence of the country,
a number of establishments independent from those belonging to the
bishopric.[XXIV-6]
[Sidenote: HAPPY DAYS.]
Thus all was lethargy in Panamá while the new viceroy of New Granada,
Antonio Amar y Borbon, quietly assumed the government at Bogotá.
Few of the inhabitants of the Isthmus had a clear understanding of
the political convulsions that had taken place in France and in the
United States. The masses were totally indifferent to and suffered
little from the policy of the government, which carefully suppressed
all information about the countries where anti-monarchical principles
prevailed. The course pursued by the crown in this respect was as
fruitless as was another effort made at the time to revive trade by
reëstablishing on January 20, 1803, the casa de contratacion de Indias.
The hope of Panamá again becoming the great entrepôt for all ports
on the Pacific was not realized. Not a single vessel came from Spain
during the year; and open trade with foreign countries being unlawful,
smuggling was resorted to by the merchants of Panamá and Jamaica,
their rendezvous being generally in the neighborhood of Chagres, where
English vessels transferred their cargoes to small boats, which took
the goods on shore.[XXIV-7] This trade was continued, even in 1804,
after Spain had declared war against England, an event which otherwise
caused much excitement on the Isthmus. But the people, instead of
preparing for defence, contented themselves with invoking the Lord
of hosts for favor to the Spanish arms, and for relief of their own
distress, or in other words, their laziness.[XXIV-8]
The government and priesthood, acting in accord, thus kept most of
the population under control; and it was only in 1808 that liberal
ideas began to have expression in the province, and this was due
altogether to foreign influence. The government of the mother country,
having declared the American possessions to be no longer colonies, but
integral parts of the monarchy, their people having the same rights as
the people of Spain[XXIV-9]—although the declaration of the córtes to
this effect was not generally known or appreciated, to the intelligent,
its significance was fully understood. The movements for independence
made in other provinces could no longer be concealed from the people,
and the idea rapidly gained ground that Spanish domination of America
was approaching its end. This greatly exacerbated the ill feeling
always existing, though only to a limited extent on the Isthmus,
between the Spaniards and the native Panameños.[XXIV-10]
In connection with it, a system of espionage was established by the
rulers, the discussion of politics was discountenanced, and the holding
of meetings forbidden. But this policy was without effect; the liberty
to trade with Jamaica, granted in 1809 with a view to appease the
discontent of the Isthmians, invigorated not only their commercial
but also their political life.[XXIV-11] Newspapers from Jamaica were
occasionally received, and the contract with an enlightened people gave
rise to new ideas.
[Sidenote: REVOLUTIONARY WAR.]
In New Granada the first resistance occurred at Cartagena, where the
governor, Francisco Montes, opposed the establishment of a diputacion
provincial, and assumed an attitude hostile to the liberal cabildo. He
made his report to the viceroy, but before any redress could be made
he was arrested on June 14, 1810, and sent away to Habana.[XXIV-12]
Hardly one month later a similar movement broke out at Bogotá, where
several previous plans to overthrow the viceregal authority had
failed;[XXIV-13] but the agitation being continued, on the 20th of
July a trifling incident[XXIV-14] sufficed to cause an outbreak. Three
days later the viceroy was imprisoned and the government placed in
charge of a junta.[XXIV-15] The revolutionary movement in Bogotá as
in Cartagena did not at the time purpose to break wholly with Spain;
its real object was to obtain an autonomic government without ignoring
the supremacy of that of the mother country.[XXIV-16] It was with such
intent that both juntas extended invitations to all the provinces of
New Granada to meet in congress and discuss the form of government
to be adopted. The governor of Panamá declined to take part, and
endeavored to persuade the people of the Isthmus that there was no
need for such a revolution.[XXIV-17] That the absence of the Panameños
from the congress, which met early in 1811, had not been of their own
choice, was not a secret to that body; and when the fundamental act
of the federation was passed, it contained a clause binding all those
represented in the congress to labor for the freedom of the other
provinces which were still under Spanish control.[XXIV-18]
It seemed, however, as if Panamá was more distant than ever from
gaining her independence. Early in 1812 a new viceroy, Benito Perez,
arrived, and being unable to get to Bogotá, established his residence
on the Isthmus,[XXIV-19] where the audiencia and other offices were
also established. Thus Panamá became temporarily the capital of New
Granada, an honor little cherished at that time by the friends of
independence. Perceiving the unsafe condition of the government,
the new viceroy took steps to increase his military force. Upon his
request, three men-of-war were sent from Cuba and a battalion of
soldiers from Spain, part of which reënforcements were despatched
to Santa Marta, then at war with Cartagena. The latter place was
blockaded, and being hard pressed for supplies, the insurgents
despatched two commissioners with the avowed object of treating
with the viceroy for an armistice. The project was favored by the
vice-admiral of the English squadron at Jamaica, Charles Sterling,
who guaranteed the commissioners a safe return. They arrived at Panamá
in October 1812, and at once began pretended negotiations, their real
purpose being to gain time for the besieged town, obtain if possible a
suspension of hostilities, and ascertain the feeling of the population.
But some correspondence intercepted by the governor of Santa
Marta,[XXIV-20] and forwarded to Viceroy Perez, apprised the latter,
who at once had the commissioners arrested and brought to trial. They
would have been severely dealt with but for the timely interference
of Sterling, who energetically demanded their release, which the
viceroy at last acceded to, returning them to Cartagena. They had
meantime become satisfied that the intelligent part of the population
strongly favored the emancipation, and that the new governor, Cárlos
Meyner,[XXIV-21] could not prevent any effort for independence. The
only opposition to be feared would be from the viceroy and the chief
officers of the garrison, most of whom were loyal and energetic. But
fortune seemed to smile on the revolutionary party; several vessels
with troops and military supplies despatched by Perez to the relief of
Santa Marta, then besieged by the insurgents, fell into the hands of
the latter, and the viceroy himself was removed from his position by
the government in Spain.[XXIV-22] His successor was the mariscal de
campo, Francisco Montalvo, who with some reënforcements furnished by
the government of Cuba proceeded from Habana directly to Santa Marta,
where he arrived in May 1813, and forthwith began to push the military
operations against the revolutionists of Cartagena.
[Sidenote: THE VICEREGAL PARTY.]
The natives of Panamá rejoiced on hearing of the establishment of the
viceregal seat at Santa Marta, and for obvious reasons. The danger
was removed that Panamá might become the theatre of a bloody war, and
on the other hand, there would be less difficulty in working for the
emancipation of the province. The cause of independence gained more
and more sympathy; and when toward the close of 1813 it was proposed
to form a confederation, comprising New Granada, Quito, Venezuela,
and Tierra Firme, the idea was eagerly embraced by the patriotic party
on the Isthmus. The friends of independence gradually became bolder;
they openly manifested their dislike of Spanish rule at parties and
in public songs, and induced the cabildo to demand and obtain from
the government at Cádiz the removal of the bishop,[XXIV-23] and the
transfer of the officials of the audiencia, then in Panamá, to other
places. But the latter met with opposition from the senior oidor,
Joaquin Carrion, who well understood the workings of the patriotic
party, and disregarding the protestations of the city council,
continued alone to exercise the jurisdiction of the audiencia
till 1816. Strange though it may appear, and perhaps owing to the
listlessness Panamá had thus far exhibited, when revolution prevailed
everywhere else, the city came to be looked upon by the government
in Spain as most loyal; whereupon the córtes resolved to reward it,
establishing there a diputacion provincial,[XXIV-24] which did not then
come to pass, for only one month later King Fernando suppressed all
such bodies, together with the constitution of 1812.[XXIV-25]
Unwilling to relinquish her hold on the American colonies, Spain,
early in 1815, fitted out an expedition comprising sixty-five large and
several smaller transport vessels, convoyed by the line-of-battle ship
_San Pedro Alcantara_ of seventy-four guns and several frigates; the
total number of sailors, soldiers, and marines being 15,000,[XXIV-26]
all well provided with artillery and supplies, the soldiers being
veterans of the war against Napoleon's army.
[Sidenote: GOVERNOR HORE.]
The original plan had been to send both fleet and army to Montevideo,
but subsequently it was considered more urgent to regain possession
of Venezuela and New Granada, and to strengthen the forces on the
Isthmus.[XXIV-27] The general-in-chief was Mariscal de campo Pablo
Morillo, a brave man of firm character, who, in nine years, had risen
from sergeant to general. Soon afterward more forces were sent out
from Spain to coöperate with those of Morillo, after which they were
to be stationed at Panamá. Their commander, Alejandro de Hore, was
appointed governor. Military supplies were also sent to equip troops
for a campaign in Peru. The expectations of the Isthmians were now
almost beyond the possibility of realization. It made but little
difference that a part of Hore's force fell into the hands of the
insurgents of Cartagena,[XXIV-28] and that Hore himself barely escaped
with the auxiliaries that Morillo could furnish almost at any time;
he was always able to maintain the Spanish régime on the Isthmus. No
sooner, indeed, had he arrived at Panamá and established the government
on a military basis,[XXIV-29] than he displayed his harsh, despotic
character.[XXIV-30] An extensive system of espionage was organized,
and it is said that Hore treated the members of the patriotic party
"according to their proclivities for independence, always availing
himself of some false pretext to strike." Much as the Isthmians
suffered under his iron rule, their anxiety became greater when it was
said that Morillo was on his way to Panamá to place the city in a state
of defence; fortunately it proved to be a false alarm.
Hore was a partisan of absolute authority; but when it suited his
purposes he would support liberal ideas and policies. Thus we see him
coöperating with the people of Panamá in opposing the reinstatement of
the jesuits.[XXIV-31] He did not like priestly interference in state
affairs. The governor also manifested a strong inclination to foster
trade with foreigners, and it is said that he never refused to honor,
with his acceptance, such gifts as the smugglers awarded him.
[Sidenote: ENGLISH EXPEDITION.]
Early in 1819, news arrived that a formidable expedition had been
prepared in England by friends of the insurgent cause, and was on its
way to America, intended to wrest the Isthmus from Spanish domination.
The rumor proved well founded. A former officer of the revolutionists,
one Gregor MacGregor, together with José María del Real, the agent
in London of the "United Provinces of New Granada," had, with the
aid of some English merchants, fitted out an expedition,[XXIV-32]
which, consisting of three ships, carrying 417 fighting men, sailed
from Gravesend on the 18th of December, 1818, and in the following
February cast anchor off Aux Cayes in Hayti. Here they were joined
by two other vessels, and together they continued the voyage to San
Andrés, the rendezvous, of which, on the 4th of April, 1819, they
took formal possession in the name of the United Provinces. Four days
after, the squadron appeared off Portobello and captured the place,
meeting with scarcely any resistance. Governor Hore had expected the
landing at Chagres, and made preparation to meet the invaders.[XXIV-33]
Most of the troops were forthwith landed, and the town having been
almost entirely deserted, the soldiers found ready quarters, and
garrisons were placed in the forts, and the batteries were manned.
MacGregor issued a high-sounding bulletin, in which he set forth that
"the first division of the army of New Granada had won immarcesible
glory." Detachments were sent out to reconnoitre, and no hostile force
being discovered, the march to Chagres and Panamá, was spoken of as if
neither nature nor the Spaniards would offer any obstacles.[XXIV-34]
Two exiles from New Granada, José Elías Lopez and Joaquin Vargas
Besga, who had accompanied the expedition, were made governor and
vice-governor respectively. After a te deum, and a few days time, the
inhabitants of the town who had returned to their homes were harangued
to induce them to take up arms against the Spanish yoke. About 100
men, mostly colored, responded to the appeal and enlisted, forming the
nucleus of a regiment called América Libre, which, under the command
of some foreign officers, was to be the advanced guard on the march to
Panamá. The scheme proved a failure, for soon these same free Americans
disbanded or deserted, most of them joining the enemy.
The condition and general discipline of the invading force were far
from satisfactory. The men clamored for their pay, and there being no
money in the military chest, the people were called upon to furnish
funds, which caused them to again leave the place. Sickness also
broke out among the troops, several of the officers and men becoming
victims of the climate. Discipline was neglected, and all semblance
of order disappeared. The soldiers sold their ammunition and effects
for liquor.[XXIV-35] This same carelessness prevailed even when toward
the end of April news came of the near approach of Spanish forces from
Panamá. It seems that as soon as Hore heard of the loss of Portobello
he concentrated his forces, and with about 500 men marched across the
Isthmus, bent upon expelling the invaders. Taking a route different
from the usual one, and favored by the carelessness of the English and
the thick forests surrounding Portobello, Hore arrived near the town
unperceived on the 29th of April.
On the same day a vessel with supplies and provisions for the invaders
had arrived from Jamaica, an event which was gayly celebrated in the
town. In the evening the alcalde and some priests took part in the
carousals, which were kept up to a late hour, with a complete neglect
of duty on the part of the officers. At six o'clock next morning one
division of Hore's troops, under the command of Lieutenant-colonel
José de Santa Cruz, surprised the soldiers and took the town, killing
all who came in their way. Among the slain were the newly appointed
governor, Lopez, and many of the officers, who perished either at their
quarters or while attempting to reach the fort. MacGregor leaped over
the balcony of the government house, ran to the beach, and thence swam
to one of his vessels. Unsuccessful attacks were made on the forts,
though the beseiged were unable to use the unwieldy guns, unsupported
as they were by the vessels, which made no preparation to aid them. The
Spaniards were not disposed to storm the forts, but knowing that the
garrisons had suffered severely, they demanded their surrender. This
was refused; and notwithstanding the cowardly conduct of some of the
officers, the negotiations might have been broken off, but the soldiers
declined further to fight. A capitulation was then entered into, under
which the invaders, after delivering up their arms, were to retain
their baggage and reëmbark to go whither they chose. At this juncture,
orders came from MacGregor not to surrender, giving assurance that the
ships would soon be ready to open upon the Spaniards. But the surrender
had already been made, and the men, about 340 in all, had been disarmed
and marched to the main plaza, where, instead of being permitted to go
their way, they were declared prisoners, to be conveyed as convicts
to Panamá.[XXIV-36] On learning the result, the gallant MacGregor,
from whose coming the New Granadinos had expected so much put to sea,
leaving his companions to their fate.[XXIV-37]
[Sidenote: FAILURE OF THE EXPEDITION.]
The matter did not end at Portobello, however. Hore despatched his
prisoners to Panamá on the 2d of May, and reported his achievement to
Viceroy Sámano, who commanded that the prisoners, none excepted, should
be shot.[XXIV-38] But for some reason Hore did not carry out the order.
The prisoners were, nevertheless, subjected to cruel treatment, being
kept in chain-gangs at work on the fortifications, roads, and streets,
which, added to the ravages of the deadly climate, soon reduced their
numbers. Several of the officers were shot afterward at Cana in Darien
on the pretext of their having attempted to escape.[XXIV-39] When after
seventeen months of suffering the release of the survivors was ordered
on September 20, 1820, only 121 remained,[XXIV-40] who were at an early
day taken to Chagres, whence they embarked for Jamaica.
Important events had meantime taken place in Spain, by which
constitutional régime was restored. A change in the government of
the Isthmus soon followed, the people for the first time being called
upon to exercise the right of suffrage.[XXIV-41] The newly organized
ayuntamiento[XXIV-42] was composed of men well disposed toward
independence. The change of system curtailing Hore's powers so preyed
upon his mind that he died.[XXIV-43] This was a serious loss to the
Spanish cause, whose interests the deceased had ever been ready to
uphold by fair or foul means.
[Sidenote: COMING OF SÁMANO.]
Brigadier Pedro Ruiz de Porras, who succeeded Hore in the military
command, if not a partisan of independence, was a friend of
constitutional government. The civil governor, or gefe político, Pedro
Aguilar, showed so much indifference that little opposition was feared
from him. The new cabildo demanded the installation of a diputacion
provincial, the election of a deputy to the Spanish córtes, and other
measures provided for in the national constitution.[XXIV-44] These
demands were not, however, complied with. The independent party saw
the necessity of close relations with their friends outside of Panamá,
and developed them, without disregarding the precautions demanded by
the presence of a strong hostile garrison in their midst. They were
now greatly hindered by the sudden appearance in Panamá, of Viceroy
Sámano, who came by way of Jamaica. His object was to establish his
government on the Isthmus, which the cabildo and constitutionalists
opposed on the ground of his having forfeited the viceregal office by
a refusal to take the oath to support the constitution. He had been
detained several days at Las Cruces, but the military party proved the
stronger, and admitted him into the city. His coming caused general
uneasiness,[XXIV-45] as he was known to be a man of bad temper.
However, as he met with no further opposition, and as his health was
precarious, he limited himself to levying a forced loan.[XXIV-46]
Free ideas had, however, gained too strong a hold to be easily
suppressed by the mere opposition of the ruler, and when in 1821
a new city council was elected, the members[XXIV-47] were again
liberal-minded men. They repeated the demand for the establishment of a
diputacion provincial, and for the election of a deputy to the Spanish
córtes; but the viceroy only returned evasive answers. Fortunately,
the province was soon relieved of him, by his death, on the 3d of
August, 1821.[XXIV-48] Then the press resumed a bold tone, and hopes
were revived in political circles. Soon after came to succeed Sámano,
the mariscal de campo Juan de la Cruz Mourgeon.[XXIV-49] He had been
appointed as captain-general of New Granada only, with the promise of
the office of viceroy when he should have reconquered two thirds of New
Granada.[XXIV-50]
Mourgeon brought from Spain some troops, adding to their number at
Puerto Cabello in Venezuela. His rule was based on principles entirely
opposite to those of his predecessor, namely, on the constitution
and the new organic laws of the monarchy. Members for the diputacion
provincial and a deputy to the Spanish córtes were elected, and the
former was installed amidst the usual demonstrations. This liberal
policy permeated his whole administration; the press was protected,
patriotic societies were formed, and to strengthen the ties between
Spaniards and Americans a masonic lodge was founded, and offices of
trust and honor were bestowed on men from both branches. Every effort
was made by the new ruler to do away with the old rivalry. But it all
came too late. The idea of independence had become deeply rooted,
and could not be affected by the new policy, the duration of which
was also uncertain. The natives of the Isthmus exhibited a remarkable
circumspection, which deluded the captain-general and the Spaniards.
Mourgeon felt confident of Panamá's loyalty, and still more so after
José de Fábrega, a native of the Isthmus, was appointed temporary
comandante of Tierra Firme;[XXIV-51] and began to think of securing
his promised viceregal office by the reconquest of Quito or Ecuador. He
accordingly set himself to make preparations for that undertaking; but
the impoverished condition of Isthmian finances greatly hampered him.
Nevertheless, though with the utmost difficulty,[XXIV-52] he fitted out
a squadron, composed of the corvette _Alejandro_, and three schooners,
on which he embarked two battalions of infantry, two dismounted
squadrons of cavalry, and some artillerymen; and assuming personal
command of the force, set sail on the 22d of October, 1821.[XXIV-53]
[Sidenote: SUB-REVOLUTION.]
This was the most propitious opportunity the friends of independence
could hope for, and they lost no time in availing themselves of it.
Secret meetings were held, at which they matured their plans. While
thus engaged at Panamá, a revolutionary movement broke out in the
villa de Los Santos, which, not being the result of any preconcerted
plan, caused the greatest alarm at the capital. The outbreak had
been, indeed, one which merely proclaimed independence, without
pretending to establish any form of government.[XXIV-54] The governor,
local authorities, and other prominent officials, after a hasty
consultation, resolved upon gentle means to quell the disturbance, and
commissioners were despatched at once to Los Santos to restore peace
if possible.[XXIV-55] But the more impatient among the friends of
independence hoped that their mission would fail, and that the spirit
of sedition, known to exist throughout the Isthmus, would boldly assert
itself as soon as the capital should give the signal. But this signal
could not as yet be given. Both the cabildo and diputacion countenanced
the revolution, and it was believed that Fábrega would not oppose a
movement to free his own country; but resistance was certain from the
troops of the garrison. Any sudden insurrection would, therefore, be
untimely, and probably end in disaster.
New plans were devised, and it was finally resolved to undermine the
military power by encouraging desertions,[XXIV-56] and at the same time
to spread among the masses the scheme of independence. Four prominent
citizens[XXIV-57] undertook the first task, to facilitate which a fund
was raised, and were very successful. Desertions became frequent, and
their number increased from day to day, till the government began to
suspect the cause, but the independent agents were reticent. Measures
were adopted which only partially succeeded in checking desertions. The
garrison was soon so reduced that there were hardly men enough to guard
the jail, hospital, and powder magazine. In the night of November 27,
1821, sixty soldiers disappeared, together with their muskets.[XXIV-58]
The government now became convinced that a revolution was impending,
and took measures to resist it. The few remaining troops were
distributed in the most convenient places, and artillery was placed at
street-crossings.
The day so anxiously waited for, the memorable day in the history of
the Isthmus, came at last. On the 28th of November, 1821, at the call
of a number of citizens, the ayuntamiento held a session, and the
governor, diputacion provincial, bishop, and other chief officials were
invited to take part in their deliberations. The meeting was held with
open doors; people might come and go as they chose. The question was,
Should or should not the Isthmus of Panamá declare its independence
from Spain? A motion to that end met with approval.[XXIV-59]
[Sidenote: DECLARATION AND REORGANIZATION.]
The next subject discussed was the form of government to be
adopted, which resulted in a voluntary annexation to the republic
of Colombia,[XXIV-60] to whose general congress the Isthmus was to
accredit a deputy. Other resolutions were passed concerning the
military force in the state,[XXIV-61] and the organization of a
new government, which was intrusted to the former governor, José de
Fábrega, who now assumed the title, Jefe Superior del Istmo. All the
civil, municipal, and ecclesiastical authorities were to continue
in office, and in the same manner the existing laws were to remain
in force, when not conflicting with the independence, and until a
new code could be framed. Fábrega was directed to adopt measures for
preserving peace, to obtain the surrender of Chagres and Portobello,
and to raise a loan to meet necessary expenses. The several authorities
and officials of all grades were to take the oath of allegiance,
and copies of the proceedings were to be circulated, together with
requests for pecuniary contributions. A special committee then drew
up a formal minute of the declaration and of the resolutions passed,
and amid the cheers of the multitude, the document was signed by José
de Fábrega, the bishop José Higinio Duran y Martel, a number of other
citizens,[XXIV-62] and the public notary José de los Santos Correoso.
Thus ended the 28th of November, 1821.[XXIV-63] Two days later the
support of the declaration of independence was publicly sworn to with
great solemnity, and on the 1st of December a similar proclamation was
made at Santiago de Veragua.[XXIV-64]
On the day, however, that the celebration occurred at Panamá, the
inhabitants were thrown into consternation by the arrival of two
Spanish frigates accompanied by Mourgeon's transports. It was at
first feared that he had returned from Ecuador,[XXIV-65] till it
was ascertained that the war ships had come in quest of the general,
and the transports for reënforcements. The alarm was well founded,
for the place had no means of defence. Nevertheless, the authorities
made preparations for resistance, and the town soon assumed a warlike
appearance. The suspense lasted six days, at the end of which the
commanders of the frigates offered to surrender to the new government,
the only condition required in return being that the latter should pay
the wages due the crews. It will be a matter of surprise that so modest
a demand was not complied with. It is true that the treasury was empty,
but it does not appear that any efforts were made to procure the funds.
An agreement was, however, entered into, the two commanders binding
themselves not to assail the Isthmus, nor afford aid to Mourgeon, but
to surrender to the government of Peru, which was done.[XXIV-66]
About the time that Panamá became free, other Spanish colonies also
secured their independence. Consequently, Panamá found no difficulty to
effect a union with the then republic of Colombia, whose constitution,
framed in the latter part of 1821,[XXIV-67] became the political
groundwork of Tierra Firme. In January, 1822, Fábrega assured the
people that there was no further cause to fear Mourgeon's attacks,
should he attempt them; troops in sufficient number for defence had
arrived; but funds for their support were at the same time called
for. However, as late as October, 1827, there were apprehensions of
a Spanish invasion, and Bolívar, the president of Colombia, issued
a military order for the protection of the coast.[XXIV-68] Early
in February 1822, José María Carreño was appointed intendente and
comandante general of the Isthmus, with a command independent from
Cartagena, and Fábrega was made governor and comandante general of
Alange, Veragua, and annexes.[XXIV-69] This same year Mexico received
with high honors a Colombian minister, and formally recognized the
independence of the republic.[XXIV-70]
[Sidenote: ABOLITION OF SLAVERY.]
The republican government, among its first acts, not only prohibited
the importation of African slaves, but made provision for extinguishing
slavery within its limits in the near future. Slaves were allowed to
purchase their own freedom, and all children born of slave parents
after the 21st of June, 1821, were declared free, the masters being
required to feed, clothe, and educate them, in return for which the
children were to work till their eighteenth year for the masters of
their mothers.[XXIV-71] In 1850 the government redeemed, by offering
compensation to the owners, all colored men and women who had not at
that time attained their freedom.[XXIV-72]