CHAPTER XXII.

HONDURAS AFFAIRS.

1865-1886.

NATIONAL FLAG AND ESCUTCHEON—ORDER OF SANTA ROSA—MEDINA'S

LONG RULE—HIS DIFFERENCES WITH DUEÑAS, AND TRIUMPH—WAR WITH

SALVADOR AND GUATEMALA—MEDINA DEFEATED AND OVERTHROWN—CÉLEO

ARIAS SUCCEEDS HIM—HIS LIBERAL POLICY—HE IS BESET BY THE

CONSERVATIVES—HIS FORMER SUPPORTERS DEPOSE HIM—PONCIANO LEIVA

BECOMES PRESIDENT—HIS COURSE DISPLEASES BARRIOS, WHO SETS

MEDINA AGAINST HIM—HE IS FORCED TO RESIGN—MARCO AURELIO SOTO

MADE PRESIDENT BY BARRIOS—ATTEMPTED REVOLT OF EX-PRESIDENT

MEDINA—HIS TRIAL AND EXECUTION—SOTO'S ADMINISTRATION—HE GOES

ABROAD—HIS QUARREL WITH BARRIOS, AND RESIGNATION—PRESIDENT

BOGRAN—FILIBUSTERING SCHEMES.

There is very little to record for Honduras in the five years from

1865 to 1870; the country enjoyed comparative peace under the same

conservative system existing in Guatemala and Salvador. President

Medina being reëlected was again inducted into office on the

1st of February, 1866, and a few days later the military rank of

lieutenant-general was conferred on him.[XXII-1] On the 16th of the

same month congress decreed a change in the national coat of arms and

flag, in the manner described at foot.[XXII-2]

Early in 1868 Medina and congress, with the approbation of the council

of state,[XXII-3] resolved upon the creation of an order of merit

to reward important civil, military, and religious services rendered

to the nation, and other praiseworthy acts of its citizens. Congress

then on the 21st of February established the Órden de Santa Rosa y de

la Civilizacion de Honduras.[XXII-4] The executive promulgated the

decree on the 24th with the signature appended of Trinidad Ferrari,

minister of the interior. The idea met with the approval of some, and

excited the ridicule of others. The order soon fell into discredit,

many unworthy persons having obtained it, and its suppression was

decreed.[XXII-5]

Medina was chosen president for another term of four years. In order

to do this, the clause in article 33 of the national constitution

forbidding reëlection for the next immediate period was repealed, which

Medina's partisans effected through a constituent assembly convoked ad

hoc.[XXII-6] He was accordingly reinaugurated February 1, 1870.

Honduras was now to experience another series of troubles, which lasted

several years. In the last days of December 1869, disturbances were

apprehended in Olancho and Paraiso, in connivance with Nicaraguan

exiles, for which reason those refugees were concentrated in Comayagua.

Some seditious attempts were made in the following year, but were

easily put down.

[Sidenote: TROUBLES WITH SALVADOR.]

Early in 1871, serious differences existed between the governments of

Honduras and Salvador, or, to be more exact, between presidents Medina

and Dueñas, on several points. The causes, as well as the fruitless

efforts made by Honduran commissioners in San Salvador to effect a

peaceable settlement of long-existing differences, are fully explained

elsewhere.[XXII-7] Medina, on the 7th of February, declared all

treaties between the two republics suspended, and war soon broke out.

A Salvadoran army, under General Xatruch, invaded Honduras and took

Comayagua, that commander styling himself provisional president. The

Honduran government had entered into a correspondence with the United

States ministers resident at Tegucigalpa and San Salvador, calling

their attention to the 14th article of the treaty of July 4, 1864,

between their nation and Honduras, under which the former recognized

the rights of ownership and sovereignty of the latter in the line of

the Honduras interoceanic railway, the works on which, it said, were in

danger of interruption by the Salvadoran invaders. From the tenor of

its notes, it would seem as if it expected the United States to hoist

their flag over Comayagua, which might have hindered the operations

of Xatruch. Medina's pretension was untenable, the understanding being

that the obligation of the United States did not attach till after the

completion of the work.[XXII-8] Moreover, the Honduran government could

not reasonably expect that those ministers had an armed force at their

command. The United States had no need, even if willing to accept the

duty of protecting those works, to adopt any measures, being assured by

the Salvadoran government that the neutrality of the Honduras railway

would not be interfered with in any manner.

Medina was not idle in devising means to injure the enemy. He occupied

Sensuntepeque on March 17th, and next Ilobasco. Dueñas' forces under

General Tomás Martinez attacked the latter place on the 19th, and

being repulsed retreated to Cojutepeque. General Santiago Gonzalez

with Hondurans and disaffected Salvadorans occupied San Vicente on the

19th, the reserve remaining in Sensuntepeque, which revolted against

Dueñas.[XXII-9] The campaign in Salvador ended at Santa Ana, where

the fate of Dueñas' government was decided.[XXII-10] Peace was then

concluded between the new government of Salvador and that of Honduras.

Medina started after Xatruch, who then had about 700 men in Gracias;

but the news of the result at Santa Ana reaching there his troops

deserted him. The war was soon over, Xatruch himself in a proclamation

of May 11th signifying his intention to leave the country. After this

the political situation was for a while satisfactory. Still Medina

deemed it expedient to invite a plebiscite, and ascertain if the

people wished him to continue at the head of affairs the rest of his

term.[XXII-11] The result was as he desired it.

A great commotion was caused in August by 300 or 400 Indians and

revolutionists, against whom the government forces never obtained but

partial successes. The disturbance lasted until an understanding was

arrived at with the rebel leaders on the 13th of December.[XXII-12]

[Sidenote: PERPETUAL WAR.]

Further trouble was impending, this time between Medina and the

liberal governments lately established in Salvador and Guatemala. He

claimed of Salvador an indemnity for his services in overthrowing

Dueñas, which that government deemed preposterous and disallowed.

The two governments, which had entered into an alliance offensive

and defensive, on the other hand accused Medina of having formed a

coalition with the oligarchs to restore the latter to power.[XXII-13]

Medina closed official relations with Salvador March 25th; and this

act, being looked upon by Salvador and Guatemala as a declaration of

war, they invaded Honduras, and soon after a victory over Medina's

general, Velez, occupied the principal towns, all of which revolted

against Medina, and a provisional government was set up[XXII-14] with

Céleo Arias at the head of affairs. Medina had temporarily placed the

executive office in charge of Crescencio Gomez, and taken command

of his troops in the field. Upon Comayagua being occupied by the

Salvadorans, Gomez and his officials fled to Gracias. Medina attempted,

May 27th, to recapture Comayagua, but was repulsed.[XXII-15]

Omoa had been given up July 20th to Juan Antonio Medina, a Salvadoran

general, for Arias' government. Medina, the president, suffered

a defeat on the same day at Potrerillos, and a crushing one on

the 26th, in Santa Bárbara, at the hands of the allied forces of

Arias, Guatemala, and Salvador, escaping with only six officers to

Omoa,[XXII-16] where he joined the other man of the same surname, who

had a few days previously accepted the executive office, transferred

to him by Crescencio Gomez, proclaiming himself provisional president,

and appointing a cabinet. But a revolt of the troops put an end to this

arrangement, José M. Medina, his substitute Gomez, and others being

made prisoners, and sent at once to Comayagua, where they arrived on

or about August 9th.[XXII-17] Arias' government now had but little

difficulty to secure its tenure of power. Ex-president Medina was held

in confinement to answer such charges as would be preferred against him

before the next national congress.[XXII-18] A full amnesty was decreed

for all political offences committed from March 5, 1871, to November

1, 1872, the only persons excluded from its benefits being José María

Medina, and his ministers, Manuel Colindres and Rafael Padilla, who

were also to abide the action of congress.[XXII-19]

The constitution of 1865 having become a dead letter, the provisional

government, in a decree of November 15th, recognized as existing

in their full force all the rights of citizens under republican

institutions,[XXII-20] though reserving the privilege of suspending

some of them in the event of public disturbance. This decree was

countersigned by the three ministers of state.[XXII-21] The people were

on the 17th of March, 1873, convoked to choose deputies to a convention

which was to frame a new constitution. The last Sunday of the following

April was named for the elections.[XXII-22]

[Sidenote: COMING OF CONSERVATIVES.]

Guatemala was experiencing troubles in her eastern departments. An

expedition of conservatives landed at Trujillo from the ship _General

Sherman_, menacing the government of Arias, and at the same time aiding

the faction which was trying to overthrow that of Guatemala.[XXII-23]

The latter and Salvador attributing the scheme to President Guardia

of Costa Rica, jointly accredited a minister in Nicaragua, the result

of whose mission was a tripartite defensive alliance. Arias decreed

martial law, and reassumed the dictatorship which the people conferred

on him the previous year.[XXII-24]

The revolutionary forces under Miranda were signally defeated by the

Guatemalan commander, Solares, on the north side of the Chamelecon

River on the 9th of August, with great loss, General Casto Alvarado

and Colonel A. Muñoz being killed, and a large quantity of war material

falling into the victor's hands.[XXII-25] The presidents of Guatemala

and Salvador, after the insurrection in the former republic had been

quelled, held conferences at Chingo on the situation in Honduras, and

came to the conclusion that Arias' government, being unpopular, could

not sustain itself without their material as well as moral support,

which would be a heavy burden. He was then asked in a joint note to

give up the executive office to some one more in the confidence of

the people. He refused to accede to the demand, and the allied troops

approached Comayagua to carry out their suggestion. The first notice

of their intent was the proclamation in the town of Aguanqueterique,

of Ponciano Leiva as provisional president, who organized his

administration at Choluteca on the 23d of November, and on the 8th of

December declared all the acts of Arias null.[XXII-26]

The allied forces of Leiva under his minister of war, General Juan

Lopez, of Guatemala under Solares, and of Salvador under Espinosa, laid

siege to Comayagua on the 6th of January, 1874, and after seven days'

resistance, Arias, together with his ministers and chief supporters,

had to capitulate on the 13th. Ex-president Medina was released from

confinement, and eventually, having recognized the new ruler, was set

free, when he went to live in La Paz.[XXII-27]

[Sidenote: LEIVA SUCCEEDS ARIAS]

Leiva's government was soon recognized by the other states. It was

of course expected to pursue a policy in accord with the governments

that gave it existence. But it seems that Leiva preferred to follow an

independent course,[XXII-28] and in a short time the two powers that so

elevated him were in antagonism, Guatemala using her influence against

and Salvador for him, as will be seen hereafter. A constituent congress

convoked by Leiva adjourned in May, after adopting three important

measures; namely, confirming Leiva as provisional president, restoring

the constitution of 1865, and ordering Arias into exile for five

years.[XXII-29] The political state of affairs was not satisfactory to

Guatemala. The elections had yielded a majority of conservatives and

reactionists in congress, and many if not most of the public offices

had gone into the hands of men of that party, one of the most prominent

being Manuel Colindres. The regular congress was installed on the 20th

of January, 1875, and the next day the executive sent in his message,

giving in detail the condition of public affairs. February 1st he took

the oath of office as constitutional president, having been elected by

the people.[XXII-30] A full amnesty for political offences was granted

by congress February 9th, and promulgated the same day by the president

and his minister of relations and justice, Adolfo Zúñiga.

The people of Honduras were not allowed, however, to enjoy the benefits

of peace but for a short time; for Ex-president Medina instigated, as

it was generally believed, by President Barrios of Guatemala, raised

at Gracias, on the 21st of December, the standard of revolution,

proclaiming himself provisional president.[XXII-31] He afterward

suffered for his lack of wisdom. The government at once prepared to

meet the emergency. Salvador organized a force to support it, and

Guatemala resolved to sustain Medina, whose real plan was to hurl

Gonzalez from the executive chair of Salvador, as well as Leiva from

that of Honduras.

The revolution assumed proportions, and Medina had come to believe

himself master of the situation. The presidents of Salvador and

Guatemala arranged at Chingo, on the 15th of February, 1876, to

intervene in Honduras and stop the revolution. At this time it was

thought that Leiva could not hold his own, his forces having been

routed at Intibucá, and his authority being felt only in the eastern

departments. The rebels had captured the capital, Comayagua, and

delivered it to the horrors of an exterminating war. But the battle of

Naranjo changed the aspect of affairs, Leiva's troops gaining there

a decisive victory, which restored his authority over almost the

whole extent of the republic.[XXII-32] There was no further need of

Guatemala and Salvador pacifying Honduras; peace had been virtually

restored, and only a few scattered parties of rebels in the departments

of Copan and Gracias had to be eliminated.[XXII-33] But soon after

another contestant for the presidential office appeared on the field,

namely, Marco Aurelio Soto, ex-minister of foreign relations of

Guatemala,[XXII-34] whom a Guatemalan force supported. A treaty of

peace was concluded, however, with the mediation of Salvador, at Los

Cedros June 8, 1876,[XXII-35] and the executive office went into the

hands of Crescencio Gomez by transfer from Marcelino Mejía, to whom the

treaty had given it. Gomez decreed August 12th to turn over the office

to Medina, who declined accepting it; but as the republic was thereby

left without a chief magistrate, he concluded on the 18th to call Marco

Aurelio Soto to fill the position,[XXII-36] denying in a manifesto that

Guatemala purposed controlling the affairs of Honduras.[XXII-37]

[Sidenote: PRESIDENT SOTO.]

Soto announced August 27th from Amapala[XXII-38] his assumption of the

executive duties, declaring that his policy would be fair and friendly

at home and toward the other Central American states, and that he

was free from internal or foreign entanglements. He was soon after

recognized by other governments as the legitimate chief magistrate

of Honduras.[XXII-39] Under his administration the people were once

more enabled to devote themselves to peaceful pursuits. On the 27th

of May, 1877, in an extensive message to congress, he set forth the

condition of public affairs, and what his government had done in every

branch of the public service during the last nine months. He assured

the representatives that no branch had been neglected; and expressed

the hope that if peace and order were preserved, the country would

erelong begin to reap the benefits of his measures.[XXII-40] He had

been chosen by the people, on April 22d, constitutional president, and

the extraordinary congress acknowledged him as such on the 29th of May.

He was formally inaugurated on the following day.

Ex-president Medina, and the Salvadoran general Ezequiel Marin,

together with two colonels and several other officers of less rank,

and a number of civilians, for an attempted rebellion in the latter

end of 1877, were subjected to the action of a court-martial at Santa

Rosa, on the charge of high treason and other offences,[XXII-41] and

sentenced to death. The cause being taken, for revision, to the supreme

council of war, the sentence against Medina and Marin was confirmed,

the court having found no extenuating circumstances; one lieutenant and

one sergeant obtained a commutation to ten years' confinement in the

fortress at Omoa. The other prisoners were set at liberty, but with a

warning never again to engage in similar conspiracies, or the sentence

of the court-martial against them would be enforced. Medina and Marin

were shot at Santa Rosa at 8 o'clock in the morning of February 8,

1878.[XXII-42] The other two men were at once despatched to their

prison at Omoa.

* * * * *

[Sidenote: AN INFAMOUS RULER.]

José María Medina has been styled a genuine liberal, and his friends

gave him credit as a commander of resources, and an able administrator.

His military record showed that he surrendered the fortress of Omoa to

General Carrera, and followed him to Guatemala, where he was rewarded

for that service with a lieutenant-colonelcy. He never won any action

of importance. During the insurrection of Olancho in 1864, he never

went beyond Yoro until informed that the affair was over. He issued the

order of December 25, 1864, countersigned by his minister, Francisco

Cruz, empowering all his officers to put prisoners to death,[XXII-43]

and that in the face of several constitutional clauses abolishing the

death penalty, and forbidding the trial of citizens by military courts.

He was also guilty of incendiarism in burning many towns and haciendas,

and of confiscation. He made himself and his satellites wealthy at

the expense of his country and his victims. He reached the presidency

by the favor of the oligarchs of Guatemala. As a ruler he was an

unmitigated tyrant; as an administrator he left nothing to entitle him

to a place among the benefactors of his nation—no schools, no material

improvements of any kind. In lieu thereof he left the national name

dishonored abroad, the national character degraded, financial ruin,

corruption, immorality, poverty, bitter animosities, and almost every

misfortune that could have befallen hapless Honduras.

* * * * *

Nothing worthy of particular mention occurred from this time on till

November 2, 1880, when the national capital was removed to Tegucigalpa.

In December of the same year Marco Aurelio Soto was reëlected

president,[XXII-44] and the people continued enjoying the benefits

of peace. The national assembly met at Tegucigalpa on the 19th of

February, 1883. Doctor Soto was again installed as president by virtue

of a reëlection, and in an able and lucid address congratulated the

representatives of the people that since their last meeting in 1881

quiet had reigned, and the liberal constitution framed in 1877 had

worked successfully. Relations with Costa Rica, interrupted in 1878,

were renewed on the 15th of last October; and those with the rest of

the Central American states, as well as with other powers, were on the

most friendly footing. The long-pending boundary question with Salvador

had been referred to the arbitration of President Zavala of Nicaragua.

The government had, on the 15th of September, 1882, sanctioned the

plan of Central American unification. Finances were in a satisfactory

state, large payments having relieved the treasury of heavy burdens.

The administration of justice had become improved, and public education

advanced. Agriculture was progressing, trade on the increase with

the facilities afforded it; and mining had engaged the attention of

capitalists both at home and abroad.[XXII-45]

President Soto sent in his resignation to congress on March 10th,

pleading ill health. It was not accepted, and instead a leave of

absence was granted him with a liberal pecuniary allowance for

expenses.[XXII-46] Congress thought proper, however, to utilize his

intended visit to Europe to place on a better footing the financial

affairs of the republic.[XXII-47] Before taking his departure, Soto

placed, on the 9th of May, the executive office in charge of the

council of ministers, namely, Enrique Gutierrez, Luis Bogran, and

Rafael Alvarado. This was in accordance with the constitution. In

bidding good by to his fellow-citizens, Soto congratulated them upon

the reign of peace at home,[XXII-48] and the cordiality existing with

other nations. He promised to come back as soon as possible to complete

his term, and to surrender the trust to his successor.[XXII-49]

[Sidenote: SOTO AND BARRIOS.]

A serious quarrel occurred soon after, while Soto was in San Francisco,

California, between him and Barrios. He received, as he considered

it, from a reliable source, information that Barrios, being displeased

with his government, had resolved to promote a revolution in Honduras

as an excuse for war and for overthrowing that government. He wrote

Barrios on July 6, 1883, that his government having been ever loyal

and friendly to and fulfilled its treaty obligations with Guatemala,

he must attribute to personal motives Barrios' intended course. He

was not, he said, disposed to give the latter an opportunity to sow

distraction in his own country, and to let loose again the dogs of

war in all Central America. To avert those calamities he was ready to

bring about a legal transfer of his office, and would lay his final

resignation before congress. But he wished Barrios to know that he

did so actuated by patriotic motives, and not by fear, for he had

sufficient power in Honduras to sustain himself, and to defend her

against unjust aggression. Barrios returned a scathful answer on August

3d. After denying Soto's accusations, he attributes his resignation to

a preconceived resolve to desert by actual flight his post, and lead

abroad a life of ease and luxury upon his ill-gotten wealth; and now

was using his, Barrios', name as a pretext to justify his conduct. He

asserts that Soto left Honduras with the intention of not returning,

and indeed, with a full knowledge that the Hondurans would never permit

his return.[XXII-50] The writer in the plainest language accuses him

of having enriched himself at the expense of a country which he had

ruined, and of private parties alike. As to Soto's brave words, they

are taken, he says, at their true worth in Guatemala, where he is well

known. It would be easier and less costly to hurl him from power, than

it was to raise him to and keep him at the head of the government.

Barrios concluded that he would take no further notice of Soto's

remarks, as there was a broad sea between them. His charges about

Soto's incompetency, disloyalty, and general dishonesty are certainly

exaggerated. Soto sent his resignation from San Francisco, and congress

unanimously accepted it on the 3d of September.[XXII-51]

General Luis Bogran was spontaneously and almost by unanimity chosen by

the people president of the republic,[XXII-52] and assumed the duties

on the 30th of November, soon after organizing his cabinet with the

ministers named below.[XXII-53]

The country continued at peace, and there was no reason to apprehend

any immediate disturbance. In the attempt made by Guatemala to

reorganize Central America by force of arms, in the early part of 1885,

Honduras pledged her coöperation, but had little opportunity to take

an active part. Upon hearing of the Guatemalan defeat, and of the death

of President Barrios on the 2d of April, she wavered, but finally made

peace with Salvador, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica.

[Sidenote: PEACE RESTORED.]

About the middle of 1885 there were near Trujillo some slight

disturbances, but quiet was restored. A filibustering expedition was

expected at Trujillo on the ship _Dorian_, said to have been fitted out

by Ex-president Soto, with the view of recovering power. The government

of Belize, at the request of the Honduran authorities, despatched the

gun-boat _Lily_ to Trujillo, where she arrived September 29th, and made

known the object of her visit.[XXII-54] No such expedition came to

create disturbance. Still later, in 1886, a similar attempt was made

but failed, the ship supposed to have been engaged for the purpose

being captured at sea by an American cruiser.

History of Central America, Volume 3, 1801-1887 The Works of Hubert Howe Bancroft, Volume 8 · 第 22 / 43 章