DISSOLUTION OF THE UNION.
1839-1852.
INTERSTATE DISSENSIONS—PACTO DE CHINANDEGA—CONFEDERACION
CENTRO AMERICANA—SUPREMO DELEGADO CHAMORRO—HOSTILITY OF
GUATEMALA AND BRITISH OFFICIALS—ARCE INVADES SALVADOR—WAR
OF THE CONFEDERACY AGAINST GUATEMALA—HELPLESSNESS OF
CHAMORRO—END OF THE PACTO DE CHINANDEGA—CONDITION OF
THE STATES—FERRERA'S BAD FAITH—SALVADOR AND HONDURAS
AGAINST NICARAGUA—HORRORS OF LEON—VICE-PRESIDENT JOAQUIN
E. GUZMAN—HONDURAS AND SALVADOR AT WAR—GUARDIOLA'S
VANDALISM—MALESPIN OVERTHROWN—RENEWED EFFORTS TO
CONFEDERATE—GUATEMALA AN INDEPENDENT REPUBLIC—COSTA RICA
FOLLOWS—SALVADOR, NICARAGUA, AND HONDURAS A CONFEDERACY—ITS
SHORT LIFE—FURTHER UNSUCCESSFUL ATTEMPTS.
[Sidenote: ENGLISH INTERVENTION.]
The government of Nicaragua, on the 13th of September, 1839, following
the advice of Minister Pavon of Guatemala, asked for the mediation of
Frederick Chatfield, the British consul, in an endeavor to bring to
an end the existing dissensions with Salvador. Chatfield declined to
interfere, on the plea that Salvador, in a treaty with the state of
Los Altos, on the 10th of August, had insulted the British crown.[X-1]
However, on the 27th of May, 1840, he sent to the government of
Nicaragua an extract of a despatch of March 2d from the British
foreign office, saying that his sovereign would cordially mediate
between the two states, provided such mediation was asked for by both,
or by all the governments interested, in which event he, Chatfield,
was authorized to use his good offices. But he was at the same time
directed to add that Great Britain was not disposed to enter into any
engagement binding her to employ armed forces in Central America. This
course was not pleasing to Pavon, but fully satisfied the executive of
Nicaragua. Chatfield's mediation was never called for.
* * * * *
Buitrago, director of the state of Nicaragua, was drawn by the
force of public opinion to give his assent to the state taking part
in a convention intended to reorganize the republic of Central
America.[X-2] The Nicaraguan delegates used their best endeavors
for the accomplishment of their mission; but from the beginning they
found their efforts hindered by the machiavelism of the aristocrats
of Guatemala, and in disgust left the convention after filing a
protest.[X-3] They returned to it afterward, however, and on the 11th
of April, 1842, the convention made a declaration in seven articles
establishing a 'gobierno nacional provisorio,' having at its head
a 'supremo delegado,' with a council composed of one representative
chosen by each of the respective state assemblies.[X-4] Antonio José
Cañas was appointed supremo delegado. But this great effort on the
part of the men imbued with a truly patriotic spirit came to naught,
because the assembly of Guatemala indignantly rejected the compact
of Chinandega, and Ferrera of Honduras acted in bad faith. Costa Rica
accepted it with certain restrictions.[X-5]
A second effort was made on the 27th of July at Chinandega by the
delegates of Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua, who passed an act to
form a league under the name of Confederacion Centro Americana.[X-6]
Sixteen of the articles in the constitution conformed with the
instructions given by the aristocrats of Guatemala through the state
assembly to the commissioners despatched to the villa de Santa Rosa
on the 28th of September, 1839; and yet, after their adoption by
the convention of Chinandega, these same persons made opposition to
them. The fact was, that they had been all along using deception,
appointing commissioners to several diets, but never intending that
a reorganization of Central American nationality should be arrived
at.[X-7]
[Sidenote: PACTO DE CHINANDEGA.]
Guatemala accredited a legation at Leon, Gerónimo Carcache being the
envoy. He tried to exculpate his government for its opposition to the
compact of Chinandega, asserting at the same time its firm resolve to
uphold the treaty concluded in October 1842, by Pavon, Arriaga, and
Duran, and accepted by Costa Rica in May 1843.[X-8] This opposition,
notwithstanding the organization of the executive and council, under
the compact of Chinandega, was effected at San Vicente, in Salvador, on
the 29th of March, 1844; Fruto Chamorro, delegate from Nicaragua, being
chosen supremo delegado, Juan Lindo, delegate from Honduras, president
of the council, and Justo Herrera, ex-jefe of the same state, secretary
of that body. The installation of the confederate government was at
once communicated to the several states.
Honduras, on the 27th of April, recognized and accepted what had
been done at San Vicente. Salvador and Nicaragua expressed much
satisfaction. The reactionary government of Guatemala kept silent, and
on being pressed for an answer, returned a cold and laconic one, to the
effect that the matter would be laid before the legislative body; that
is to say, the assembly which, on the 17th of April, 1839, had declared
the Central American confederation dissolved.[X-9] It could not be
expected that such an assembly would give its assent. The committee to
which the subject was referred made an unfavorable report, which the
assembly accepted. Costa Rica suggested amendments to the 'pacto de
Chinandega.'[X-10] This document never had any practical value, for the
governments which were parties thereto took no account of the duties
it imposed on them. It will be seen that the executive of Honduras was
its covert enemy, and that the government of Salvador openly infringed
a number of its clauses.
[Sidenote: MALESPIN AND ARCE.]
Malespin, president of Salvador, was arranging affairs for a change in
favor of a theocratic régime to please Viteri, bishop of San Salvador,
when news came that the state had been invaded at Atiquizaya by Manuel
José Arce. The ex-president had with him troops of Guatemala, and
a supply of arms and ammunition to put in the hands of Malespin's
enemies. The question will be asked, Why did the aristocrats of
Guatemala cause the invasion of Salvador, her executive being their
agent Malespin, who was, moreover, under the control of Bishop Viteri?
This is easily explained. Malespin was, in the eyes of the aristocrats,
another Carrera, disposed at times to slip out of their hands. It was,
therefore, important to have him superseded by Arce, when affairs in
the state would go on smoothly and to their satisfaction. In Arce
ruling over Salvador, they would have, besides, a support against
Carrera.[X-11] But the people of Salvador, albeit much dissatisfied
with Malespin and Viteri, were decidedly opposed to Arce with
aristocratic surroundings. His invasion of the state only served to
strengthen Malespin's power for a time. The president set the whole
state in motion to meet the emergency. He did even more: he asked
for the assistance of the supremo delegado of the confederacy, which
was promised him. Each state was to furnish 1,000 men; but meanwhile
Salvador was to place 2,000 men at the disposal of the confederate
executive.[X-12] The general government agreed to use its utmost
endeavors to avert the subjugation of Salvador by Guatemala. Malespin
was enjoined, on his part, to confine his military operations within
the territory of his own state. He easily got together in a few days
at San Salvador 4,000 men, with which force he marched to the front.
One portion of the vanguard, under Lieutenant-colonel Pedro Escalon, on
the 5th of May, reached the Chingo Valley in pursuit of Arce, Aquilino
San Martin, and Guillermo Quintanilla, who fled to their headquarters
at Coatepeque. They were attacked there, and took to flight a second
time, leaving a large quantity of arms and ammunition. Another portion
of the vanguard occupied Chalchuapa, placing a force and the artillery
at Santa Ana.[X-13]
[Illustration: GUATEMALA AND SALVADOR.]
Malespin, in disregard of the command he had received from the supremo
delegado, marched triumphantly to Jutiapa, in Guatemala; in consequence
of which, the government of Rivera Paz assumed that Guatemala was in a
state of war, her territory having been invaded; and Carrera was called
upon to use her forces against the invaders. A forced loan was decreed,
and a change took place in the cabinet, Manuel F. Pavon assuming the
portfolios of relations, government, and war.[X-14] Pavon was certainly
the man for the occasion.[X-15] He returned an answer to a note from
the minister of the supremo delegado, which Milla, his biographer, has
pronounced an able and conclusive one. But it was in reality a mass of
abuse against Salvador and Malespin. He did not attempt to show that
Arce's invasion was not the act of the Guatemalan government, as he
should have done; but claimed that the war against Malespin was not a
consequence of Arce's act, but of the malice of the Salvadoreños.[X-16]
[Sidenote: TREATY BETWEEN HONDURAS AND SALVADOR.]
The bad climate of Jutiapa soon began to decimate the Salvador army,
reducing it to about 3,000 men. Moreover, the government of Salvador,
then in charge of Vice-president Guzman, could not easily procure means
for the support of such a force. It was quite evident that the time
for upsetting Carrera had not yet come; and Malespin's defeat would
only bring greater outrages upon the people. Patience was necessary
under the circumstances. It was consequently decided to abandon
Jutiapa and recross the rio de la Paz, which was effected on the 17th
of June.[X-17] The assembly empowered the government to negotiate for
peace, and a convention was entered into at the hacienda de Quezada
on the 5th of August, 1844,[X-18] under which friendly relations were
restored, and Guatemala promised to accredit a commissioner near the
confederate government.[X-19] This convention was, however, annulled
by the Guatemalan commissioners, because the supremo delegado had
refused to ratify it.[X-20] But the government of Guatemala determined
that it should be held valid by Malespin's accepting it as law for
the Salvadoreños. Bishop Viteri undertook to accomplish this, and
succeeded.[X-21] Malespin gave his assent to the convention being
ratified by the supremo delegado, and made a declaration of peaceful
intentions toward Guatemala.[X-22] He refers to the liberals residing
at Leon, who had been driven from Honduras by Ferrera, and from
Salvador by himself; and he accuses them of being the cause of much
trouble, for which they should be discountenanced by honorable men.
The pacto de Chinandega, as we have seen, had become a dead letter.
Honduras and Salvador entered, on the 10th of July, 1844, at San
Salvador, into a treaty, which was ratified by both governments.[X-23]
Chamorro's government was notified by Ferrera that auxiliary forces
from Nicaragua would no longer be allowed to traverse Honduran
territory.[X-24] Chamorro's minister, M. Aguilar, remonstrated against
a measure which would prevent the arrival of friendly troops to defend
the confederacy, whereof Honduras was a component part.[X-25] Chamorro,
using his lawful authority, ordered J. Trinidad Muñoz, who commanded
the Honduras force of operations, not to obstruct the passage of the
Nicaraguan troops. Muñoz disobeyed the order; and upon the Nicaraguans
arriving at Choluteca, on the 17th of August, he required them to leave
the territory of Honduras forthwith; which not being done, he assailed
and conquered them on the 19th, after a three hours' fight.[X-26] This
action had a great influence on the fate of Central America; for it
satisfied the aristocrats of Guatemala that the supremo delegado had no
means for enforcing his authority or for carrying out his plans. It was
virtually a declaration of war between Honduras and Nicaragua. Malespin
was likewise emboldened by it to assail Nicaragua. The latter must
then move with the utmost activity against Ferrera, before Malespin,
now at peace with Guatemala, could come to his aid. But difficulties
that could not be overcome were in the way; and it was only on the
23d of October that upwards of 1,000 Nicaraguans appeared before
Nacaome, which they assaulted the next day, and after two hours of hard
fighting, were repulsed.[X-27]
[Sidenote: WAR ON NICARAGUA.]
Trinidad Cabañas and Gerardo Barrios, two of Morazan's officers,
made, on the 5th of September, 1844, an attempt at San Miguel to
overthrow Malespin without bloodshed; but having failed, they went off
to Nicaragua by way of La Union. Malespin's minister, José Antonio
Jimenez, then demanded of the Nicaraguan government that Cabañas
and Barrios should be either expelled or surrendered to Salvador
for punishment. The demand was rejected. The two officers were by no
means discouraged. They persevered in their efforts, which, more than
anything else, finally brought about the tyrant's overthrow. By virtue
of a special decree, Malespin took, on the 25th of October, personal
command of the state forces, placing the executive office in charge
of the vice-president, Joaquin Eufracio Guzman, who on the same day
entered upon the discharge of his duties, giving Malespin unlimited
powers for the defence of the state. Such authorization did not justify
Malespin's carrying the war into Nicaragua.[X-28] This state, after
the defeat of its troops at Nacaome, had removed them from Honduran
territory, and sued for peace. And yet Malespin, in violation of
the laws of Salvador, made preparations for an offensive war against
Nicaragua.
It will be well, before relating the events of this campaign, to
cast an eye upon the present lamentable condition of the four states
thus bent upon each other's destruction. Guatemala was ruled by the
aristocrats with a rod of iron. Her financial affairs were completely
disorganized. In Salvador Malespin had no other rule of conduct than
his own will and Bishop Viteri's evil counsels. He believed himself
surrounded by enemies, and indeed he was.[X-29] Honduras was in a
disturbed state, and the victim of Ferrera's despotism. Nicaragua
was in anything but a satisfactory situation. The men who with their
superior talents, statesmanship, and influence might have carried the
ship of state safely through the coming storm, Francisco Castellon and
Máximo Jerez, were in Europe working to undo the evils wrought against
Central America by Pavon and Chatfield. The director of the state,
Manuel Perez,[X-30] lacked the prestige that the occasion required.
Casto Fonseca, the commander of the forces, had been given the rank of
'gran mariscal.'[X-31]
The pacto de Chinandega had ceased to exist. Owing to hostile acts
of Malespin, Chamorro had to seek safety in flight. Ferrera treated
Chamorro with contumely, and shamefully abused him in a report to the
chambers of Honduras, in January 1846.[X-32] Malespin and his army
against Nicaragua entered Honduras, and at Nacaome made an address to
the president and army of Honduras.[X-33] The two allied presidents
had a conference at Sauce on the 7th of November, and agreed that
Malespin should be recognized as the general-in-chief of their forces.
At Choluteca proposals for peace came from Leon; and on the 21st of
the same month the treaty of Zatoca[X-34] was concluded, which was
disgraceful to the Nicaraguan negotiators.[X-35] A secret clause was
also agreed to, binding Nicaragua, among other things, to retire her
troops from Chinandega to Chichigalpa. But the authorities and people
of Leon preferred death with honor to submission to such degrading
demands. The treaty and secret clause were indignantly rejected. Perez,
the director, surrendered the executive office to Senator Emiliano
Madrid.
[Sidenote: ATTACK ON LEON.]
In the night of November 21st the allied forces encamped in the
barranca de San Antonio.[X-36] On the 26th, at 8 in the evening, they
were in front of Leon, and threw bombs into the city. The next morning
at 3 o'clock Malespin, being drunk, ordered an assault, which resulted
disastrously for the invaders; for at sunrise he found his camp strewn
with corpses.[X-37] The attack was, however, continued that day till
4 o'clock in the afternoon, when the allies found themselves short of
ammunition, and with many of their chief officers killed or wounded.
Discord now broke out among them, and the Hondurans wanted to abandon
the campaign; but J. Trinidad Muñoz, acting for Malespin, quieted them,
and the struggle went on. That night Muñoz erected intrenchments,
and at break of day on the 28th the allies were in condition to act
vigorously.[X-38]
Commissioners came out to the allied headquarters, and on the 1st of
December a treaty was negotiated,[X-39] to which no ratification was
given in the city, and the war continued. Meanwhile there was much
agitation in Salvador, with occasional revolutionary attempts, which
becoming known at Leon, emboldened the authorities and citizens to keep
up the fight, notwithstanding the other departments had turned against
them.[X-40]
[Illustration: SOUTH-WESTERN NICARAGUA.]
José Francisco Montenegro and Juan Ruiz were the commissioners of Rivas
and Granada, near Malespin. Their mission brought about the creation of
a new government, which had no recognition in Leon. Senator Silvestre
Selva lent himself to be made by Malespin and his allies director
supremo of Nicaragua, under the stipulation of ratifying the convention
of December 1st, adding the name of Pio Castellon to the list of the
proscribed.[X-41]
[Sidenote: SIEGE OF LEON.]
Several partial actions took place in other parts of the department
of Leon, which turned out favorably for the invaders.[X-42] But
Malespin was furious at his failure thus far to capture Leon. The
firing of his guns was incessant. He made a final effort, throwing
himself at the head of a force upon the works of Sutiaba, which were
in charge of Gerardo Barrios; and after some hours' hard fighting was
repulsed, leaving the field covered with his killed and wounded. But
there was no unity of action in the city at this time. Some officers
believed that Casto Fonseca, though brave, was not competent to make
a proper defence; and one of them, named José M. Valle, alias El
Chelon, suggested that he should turn over the command to Cabañas.
Fonseca looked upon the suggestion as an insult, and in consequence
Valle retired, and Cabañas became an object of suspicion to Fonseca.
The siege with its horrors continued. The fatal spirit of localism
that maintained discord between the several towns, specially between
Granada and Leon, was now as ever, and till the transfer of the capital
from Leon to Managua, a great misfortune for the whole country. The
besiegers made the most of it.[X-43]
A vessel arrived at this time at Realejo with arms for the besieged,
of which Malespin got information from the Englishman Manning, and
through Selva's agent he obtained possession of 1,000 muskets, 200
rifles, 200 barrels of powder, 200 quintals of lead, and 12,000 flints.
With this supply the operations against Leon were pushed with still
greater vigor, and the city succumbed to an assault by Guardiola on
the 24th of January, 1845. Malespin now gave full sway to his bloody
instincts, by shooting a number of prominent citizens and surrendering
the town to the soldiery for plunder.[X-44] The outrages committed defy
description.[X-45]
* * * * *
[Sidenote: INDEPENDENCE OF SALVADOR.]
While Malespin was engaged in the Nicaragua campaign, the state of
Salvador was preparing to throw off the yoke, and his brother Calixto
was issuing arbitrary orders without the knowledge or assent of
Vice-president Guzman. At last, at midnight between the 30th and 31st
of December, 1844, the garrison at San Salvador was surprised by a
party of armed men from the Calvario, and captured, together with the
arms in the barracks.[X-46] After that the revolt went on gaining large
proportions; but the rebels were defeated in the plain of Jucuapa,
Cojutepeque, on the 4th of January, 1845.
The liberal chiefs Cabañas and Barrios, who escaped from Nicaragua,
reached La Union. Barrios,[X-47] with the view of rousing the
Salvadorans, spread the report that Malespin had succumbed at Leon.
Cabañas, a truthful man, disliked the scheme, but finally allowed his
companion to pursue his plan without contradiction. They both entered
San Miguel on the 28th of January, 1845, and loudly congratulated his
friends and acquaintances on Malespin's defeat. The whole department
was soon in commotion, and letters poured upon Guzman to sound the
cry for liberty. Calixto Malespin continued his arbitrary acts, and
Guzman concluded to oust him from his command, without bloodshed if
possible. In this he was successful on the 2d of February;[X-48] the
barracks were soon surrendered to him, the troops following his lead.
The capital seconded the movement, and was soon followed by the other
departments.[X-49] The government sent a circular to the other states
announcing the change effected, and it was recognized by all but
Honduras.[X-50]
The chambers of Salvador assembled on the 15th, before which Guzman
made an energetic speech, and Malespin was not only dethroned, but his
election to the presidency was declared null.[X-51] However, there
was much to do yet to uproot him from Central American politics, as
he had the support of Honduras. In an encounter at Quelepa Cabañas was
defeated, which gave the reactionists courage to approach San Vicente;
but public opinion was now so clearly pronounced against Malespin that
Bishop Viteri turned against him, and began his efforts to win over
to the clerico-oligarchic party the new president, Joaquin Eufracio
Guzman.[X-52] He at once issued a decree of excommunication against
Ex-president Malespin.[X-53] But the government of Honduras being
bent on supporting Malespin at all hazards, Guardiola landed at La
Union with an armed force, and occupied San Miguel; notwithstanding
which act Guzman did not declare war against Honduras. Attributing
it to ignorance of the true state of affairs in Salvador, he sent
a second note, which, like the first, remained unanswered. Malespin
continued—with the assent of Honduras, and without that of Nicaragua,
which had assumed neutrality in the contest—calling himself
general-in-chief of the armies of Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua,
and declared Guzman, the Salvadoran chambers, and the inhabitants of
upwards of 100 towns which had set him aside, guilty of treason.
Guzman was now menaced from several quarters; namely, from Malespin's
partisans in San Salvador, the military at Comayagua, J. Trinidad
Muñoz, who wanted to destroy the liberals that had escaped from Leon,
and lastly, Rafael Carrera, who, though at times inclined to wheedle
the liberals, generally had his claws ready to tear them to pieces.
Guzman found the panther more untractable than the other wild beasts.
It was therefore necessary to place in Guatemala experienced tamers;
but he was unsuccessful in this. His commissioners, though they
managed by fawning to approach Carrera, met with poor success in their
mission.[X-54]
[Sidenote: TREATY OF PEACE.]
Guzman marched against Belloso at San Vicente and defeated him. He
next went to San Miguel, which he entered amidst the plaudits of the
people.[X-55] Malespin entered with him into a convention at Jocoro,
binding himself to surrender all national property of Salvador and
to leave the country. But the authorities of Honduras disapproved the
arrangement, and it fell to the ground;[X-56] the war continued, till
on the 18th of April a treaty of peace and friendship was concluded
at Chinameca, to which the minister of Salvador, Dueñas, added another
clause, requiring that both Salvador and Honduras should disband their
troops immediately after the ratification of the treaty.[X-57] Honduras
failed to ratify it, and proposed that new conferences should be held
at Gualcinse, and at the same time despatched 900 men upon that place
under Malespin. Armed parties from Honduras invaded Salvador; and,
indeed, Ferrera was using all possible means to exasperate the latter
state into committing acts of hostility against the former, so that
Carrera might have an opportunity to take a hand in the game.
The chambers of Salvador assembled at this time, and Minister Dueñas
reported a treaty of peace, amity, and alliance with Guatemala.[X-58]
He seemed to expect aid from that side of the river Paz.[X-59]
Nicaragua had extended a friendly reception to two Salvador
commissioners.[X-60] The chambers gave Guzman ample powers for the
defence of the state. This did not include authority to invade any
other state, unless as a retaliatory measure. A resort to this was
finally resolved upon, and a Salvadoran army under Cabañas marched
the 24th of May upon Comayagua, meeting with defeat there on the 2d of
June, and again at Sensenti on the 10th of the same month.[X-61] The
Hondureños inhumanly put to death all the wounded Salvadoreños left at
Comayagua and Santa Rosa. Ferrera, now flushed with victory, thought
that he could dictate terms to Salvador.[X-62] It was a mistake on his
part, for the people of Salvador rose en masse to repair the disasters
of Comayagua and Sensenti.
[Illustration: SALVADOR AND HONDURAS.]
[Sidenote: GUARDIOLA'S VANDALISM.]
Guardiola committed many acts of vandalism in La Union, in consequence
of which Minister Dueñas, on the 25th of July, addressed a circular to
the agents of foreign nations protesting against the seizure of foreign
goods in the government's warehouse at that port. Cabañas, after the
disasters before related, arrived at San Miguel with scarcely fifty
men, and endeavored to collect his scattered forces; but his efforts
were unavailing, and Guardiola marched into the city—which had been
abandoned by nearly all the inhabitants—and gave it up to be plundered
by his soldiers.[X-63]
All that part of Salvador on the Lempa and the district of Chalatenango
were in the hands of the enemy, who acted as the master of a conquered
country. One of the commanders was the notorious Manuel Quijano.
The Salvadoreños attacked him and were defeated. The Hondurans now
felt certain that they could capture San Salvador. But on the 15th
of August Guardiola with 900 men attacked the Salvadoreños at the
hacienda del Obrajuelo and was routed, losing two thirds of his
force and most of his war material.[X-64] He evacuated San Miguel at
midnight. The authorities of Honduras soon after published a suspension
of hostilities in order to negotiate a peace.[X-65] An armistice was
afterward signed at Sumpul.[X-66] Muñoz of Nicaragua, for motives of
his own, exerted himself to bring about peace between Honduras and
Salvador, to which end he despatched Sebastian Escobar as commissioner
to the two belligerents. Sensenti was finally fixed upon as the place
for holding the conferences, and a treaty of peace, amity, and alliance
was concluded on the 27th of November, 1845, under which Malespin and
Espinosa were forbidden to set foot in Salvador without leave of her
government.[X-67]
[Sidenote: GUATEMALAN INDEPENDENCE.]
The government of Guatemala, with a view of not too openly going
counter to public opinion in the states desiring to see a national
government established, inserted in the treaty concluded with Salvador
on the 4th of April, 1845, a clause apparently intended to promote that
end.[X-68] And yet it was at the same time considering the expediency
of declaring the entire independence of Guatemala, and gathering
material which was made public in a manifesto in March 1847. Indeed,
she had no desire to carry out the stipulations, though she named
Joaquin Duran and Doctor Mariano Padilla her commissioners.[X-69]
Pretexts were not wanting, and new commissioners appointed, namely,
Marure and Rodriguez, both of whom favored Guatemala's absolute
independence. The result was the abandonment of the plan of
reorganization as entirely impracticable.[X-70] The declaration of
independence was made in the decree of March 21, 1847.[X-71] Carrera,
the president, in a manifesto, set forth the causes that had prompted
such a measure, which he called one of regeneration, and asked the
people to greet it with the same enthusiasm that was shown in 1821,
when the cry for separation from Spain was raised.[X-72]
The secessionists pronounced it an able effort; but it caused a
disagreeable impression in the states, and in none more so than in
Salvador. It wounded public sentiment. Carrera had no legal right to
take such a step. The constituent assembly had placed him in charge
of the executive, but had not made him a legislator. For all that,
the separation from the rest of Central America became an accomplished
fact, and Carrera was declared a hero, the founder of the republic, and
coin was struck with his bust on it.[X-73] This act was ratified on the
14th of September, 1848, by the constituent assembly of Guatemala, when
Carrera was no longer in power.
Lindo was ruling in Honduras and Guerrero in Nicaragua, but these two
states were in accord with Salvador, from fear of British pretensions,
on the necessity of a Central American union. They constituted, early
in 1848, the diet of Nacaome, which urgently invited Guatemala and
Costa Rica to join it; but the former peremptorily declined, alleging
that the decree of March 21st precluded her taking any step backward.
Costa Rica sent deputies to Nacaome.[X-74] The celebrated Ecuatorian
general, Juan José Flores, arrived in Costa Rica in July 1848, and was
received with much consideration, which flattered his vanity. He wanted
the aid of Costa Rica for his own plans, and got himself into the good
graces of President Castro. The dissolution of the Colombian republic
had enabled him to become the ruler of Ecuador; and being of the same
way of thinking as Pavon and his fellow-secessionists of Guatemala,
he counselled a complete separation of the states of Central America.
Several influential men of Costa Rica favored the policy of a wholly
independent government for their state.[X-75]
[Sidenote: REPUBLIC OF COSTA RICA.]
Congress, on the 30th of August, 1848, consummated the work of final
separation, with a decree declaring that the title 'Estado de Costa
Rica' was not in consonance with the 22d article of the constitution,
which established the principle of Costa Rica's sovereignty, freedom,
and independence; that with this understanding, and as a free,
sovereign, and independent nation, other powers had treated with her
on a footing of equality. It was therefore resolved, carrying out
the wishes of the municipal districts, that the term 'república' be
substituted for that of 'estado.'[X-76] President Castro sanctioned its
promulgation on the 31st.
Notwithstanding so many difficulties, the friends of union never
resigned the hope of accomplishing their purpose. In November 1849
commissioners of Honduras, Salvador, and Nicaragua assembled at Leon,
and on the 8th agreed upon a basis of union of the three states,
the terms of which were subsequently promulgated;[X-77] and it was
left optional with Guatemala and Costa Rica to join it or not. The
remnants of the aristocratic element, with the support of British
officials,[X-78] opposed the union, and in order to defeat it, promoted
revolutions in Nicaragua and Honduras. The compact went into effect,
however, on the 9th of January, 1851, when the national representatives
assembled in Chinandega, José F. Barrundia, representative from
Salvador, being chosen their president.[X-79]
The national constituent congress was installed at Tegucigalpa on the
9th of October, 1852, and began its labors on the following day.[X-80]
[Sidenote: A SHORT-LIVED FEDERATION.]
Trinidad Cabañas was on the 13th elected jefe supremo of the
federation, but he declined the honor, being desirous of disarming
opposition to the new organization on the part of his political
opponents. His resignation was accepted on the 26th, and Francisco
Castellon chosen on the 28th.[X-81] An organic law was enacted
on the 13th of October, and communicated to the government of the
federation.[X-82] The supreme executive authority, on the 20th of
November, 1852, was held by Pedro Molina, vice-jefe, four senators,
and two acting ministers of state. The federation thus organized was
not destined to be long lived. Upon the allegation that the congress
had created a dictatorship, and referred the organic statute to the
people instead of the legislatures of the states, the assemblies
of Salvador and Nicaragua set aside the federation, and declared
themselves independent states.[X-83] Nicaragua may have receded from
that act; but whether it was so or not, the union between Honduras and
Nicaragua was dissolved by the war which broke out in February 1863
between Salvador and Guatemala, Honduras joining one of those states,
and Nicaragua the other. Further efforts have been made from time to
time—1871-76, and even as late as 1885—to accomplish the union of the
states under one government; but obstacles have been in the way, the
chief doubtlessly being the personal ambition or jealousy of rulers,
and the project still remains as a possible event to come about in
a few years, as it is believed to be much desired by the majority of
Central Americans.[X-84]