CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT.
1825-1830.
GENERAL ELECTIONS—MEETING OF THE FIRST CONGRESS—MANUEL
JOSÉ ARCE, FIRST PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC—FOREIGN
RELATIONS—ARCE'S PREVARICATIONS—CONFLICT WITH GUATEMALA—PARTY
BICKERINGS—LIBERALS QUARREL WITH ARCE—HE JOINS THEIR
OPPONENTS—BITTERNESS ENGENDERED—PRESIDENT VERSUS
GUATEMALAN RULERS—ARREST OF JEFE JUAN BARRUNDIA—RIOTS AT
QUEZALTENANGO—MURDER OF VICE-JEFE CIRILO FLORES—ARCE AS
DICTATOR IN GUATEMALA—WAR AGAINST SALVADOR—ARCE DEFEATED—HE
GIVES UP THE PRESIDENCY, AND CANNOT RECOVER IT—BLOODY WAR OF
1826-9—MORAZAN THE VICTOR—JOSÉ FRANCISCO BARRUNDIA, ACTING
PRESIDENT—LIBERAL MEASURES—PEACE RESTORED—SPANISH SCHEMES.
The first constitutional congress of the Estados Federados de Centro
América was installed on the 6th of February, 1825, Mariano Galvez
being chosen president,[V-1] as well as the leader of the liberal
party. A number of the old delegates had been reëlected for the new
body,[V-2] whose principal duties were the election of a president,
and the ratification of the constitution. The latter, as we have
already seen, was on the 1st of September; the former proved a more
difficult task, and was achieved amidst contradictions and stormy
discussions. The provisional executive power elected in 1823 had not
been harmonious. Arce and Valle assumed their duties soon after their
election, and before many days had serious differences, which ended in
Arce's resignation of the presidency of the triumvirate. Being replaced
by José Manuel de la Cerda, he departed for Salvador and Nicaragua,
exerting himself in the pacification of the latter. His services in
this direction won him much good-will, and it was proposed to make
him the first constitutional president of the republic, a proposition
that met with popular favor. Meanwhile his opponent, Valle, was also
working.[V-3] Since May 1824 the congress had been convoked. Both
liberals and moderados had untiringly worked for their respective
candidates. The latter seemed to have every prospect of victory; of
the 79 votes cast, 41 being for Valle, their candidate.[V-4] As 42
votes were necessary for a choice under the constitution, congress
assumed the right of selecting one of the two candidates. A compromise
between the contending parties was effected, Arce pledging himself
to remain neutral on certain questions upon which the other party was
much disturbed.[V-5] The moderados then voted for Arce, and congress,
on the 21st of April, 1825, declared him to have been duly elected by
a majority of twenty-two votes against five for Valle. The latter was
recognized as the vice-president, and having declined the position,
Mariano Beltranena was chosen in his place.[V-6] The justices of
the supreme court were elected at the same time, and on the 29th of
April[V-7] took possession of their offices.
* * * * *
[Sidenote: RECOGNITION BY THE UNITED STATES.]
The recognition of the Central American republic as an independent
nation had engaged the attention of the supreme authorities at the same
time that the internal organization was proceeding. The first treaty
concluded by the new republic was on the 15th of March, 1825, with
Colombia, Pedro Molina acting as its plenipotentiary at Bogotá.[V-8] A
few months later, at Washington, on the 5th of December, 1825, a treaty
was entered into with the United States of America, with which power
there had been formal relations since the beginning of the year.[V-9]
Antonio José Cañas represented Central America as her plenipotentiary.
The United States soon after accredited William Miller as chargé
d'affaires near the new republic. Diplomatic relations with Great
Britain and the Netherlands were opened early in 1825. Spain continued
refusing to recognize the independence of Central America, and the pope
followed in her footsteps, as he had done in regard to Mexico.[V-10]
The republic being now fairly launched, had Arce possessed the
ability all might have gone well. But he either overestimated his
administrative powers, or underrated the magnitude of his task; and
after decreeing some wise measures upon the military defences, he
began to sow dissatisfaction by his vacillating policy. A member
of the liberal party from the first day that he took part in the
political affairs of the country, he now committed the serious error
of abandoning the ground upon which he might have trod with safety.
In his endeavors to please both parties, he succeeded in offending
the liberals without securing the confidence of their opponents, who,
though willing enough to admit him to their ranks, declined rendering
implicit obedience. His former friends now openly assailed him.[V-11]
A conflict sprang up, also, between the federal government and the
local authorities of Guatemala City, because the latter refused to take
part in celebrating the anniversary of the installation of the first
assembly on the 24th of June, and force was at last brought to bear
upon them.[V-12]
[Sidenote: ARCE, RAOUL, AND VALLE.]
The ill-feeling against Arce became intensified when the state
government soon after decreed a transfer of its seat to Guatemala,
and for want of accommodations in public buildings, took possession
of the property of private citizens without their consent. The owners
claimed protection from the federal congress, and serious disturbances
were averted only by a compromise. During this episode the moderados
or serviles kept fanning the flame of discord between Arce and the
liberals, extolling his measures. When the first congress closed its
session, on the 25th of December, 1825,[V-13] the political features
of the country had notably changed. But fortunately the danger to the
republic from the action of the serviles was avoided, because, upon
lots being cast on the 1st of October for the renewals of members
of congress,[V-14] the retiring members happened to be chiefly of
districts where the servile party had majorities before, and were
now replaced by liberals, the preponderance of the latter being thus
increased. The second constitutional congress assembled on the 1st of
March, 1826. Among its members was Valle, who, bent on revenge, erelong
made common cause with the liberals,[V-15] though he was not allowed to
exercise a predominant influence in their counsels.
On the day congress opened, the president delivered his message
detailing the condition of the country, but most of it had reference
to the relations with foreign powers.[V-16] The impending rupture was
finally hastened by the president's course toward Colonel Nicolás
Raoul, a French officer who had recently arrived from Colombia,
and had been made commander of the artillery and a member of the
council of war.[V-17] Notwithstanding the considerations and favors
conferred on him by Arce, no sooner had he received his appointment
than he openly sided with the liberals and gave utterances against
the government. Therefore, when Raoul was summoned by congress to
aid in the organization of the federal troops, the president, to get
rid of him, sent him to explore the northern coasts.[V-18] Arce then
undertook to increase the federal army to 4,000 men, under the pretext
that such a force was needed for the pacification of Nicaragua, and
the defence of the country against a Spanish invasion, rumors of which
were circulating. In order to facilitate the operation, he proposed
that the members of congress should stir up public enthusiasm in their
respective states; but instead of acceding to his recommendation,
several persons known to be hostile to the government, among them
Raoul, were selected by that body. All remonstrances to the contrary
on the part of Arce[V-19] had no other effect than to imbitter the
liberals against him. Charges were accordingly brought forth, such as
his neglecting to lay before congress an account of expenditures during
his administration, and his having squandered a considerable portion of
the money raised by loan in London. The outcry against his conduct was
growing louder from day to day.
This unsatisfactory state of affairs determined Arce to dissolve
congress. Still he was loath to use violent means, and in fact, there
was no need of it. One of the clauses of the constitution allowed
the admission of substitutes for the deputies to congress in certain
cases, and both parties had taken advantage of it without opposition.
However, when the question of calling the president to account arose,
the serviles protested against the presence of the liberal substitutes
which gave to that party the majority.[V-20] On the 2d of June the
deputies from Salvador, under instructions from their government,
which was friendly to Arce, abandoned their seats, their example
being followed by those from Costa Rica and most of the serviles, thus
leaving the chamber without a quorum.[V-21] The session was reopened,
however, ten days later, upon the liberals pledging themselves not
to introduce any motion against the president or the serviles, and
thenceforth the discussions were confined to matters of a general
character till the 30th of June, when the session was closed; but the
deputies of Salvador and Costa Rica had not resumed their seats.
[Sidenote: STATE AND NATION.]
It was now evident that a collision was unavoidable. The state
government, controlled by the liberals, became fearful that the
serviles, in their endeavor to support the president, might also attack
the authorities of Guatemala, and under the pretext of an invasion
threatening from Chiapas, secretly began to make military preparations.
Salvador and Costa Rica, on the other hand, offered aid of troops
to the federal government. Both parties precipitated the crisis: the
liberals by their heedless attacks on the clergy,[V-22] and specially
by ridiculing its members; the serviles by fanning, jointly with the
clericals, ill feeling among the low, ignorant classes, whom it was
easy to persuade that the liberal party aimed at the destruction of
their religion. This had now become a matter of greater ease, owing
to the irritation already existing, caused by the forced loans and
recruiting for the army decreed by the state government. Strange
though it may appear, the serviles had no suspicion that the federal
authorities were aware of their intrigues. The clash came in May
1826, when Raoul, without having fulfilled his commission on the
northern coast, tendered his resignation, accompanied with a number of
invectives against the executive, which he subsequently repeated in a
second letter.[V-23] He was arrested on the 17th of July, and subjected
to the action of a court-martial for disrespect and insubordination.
This raised a storm of fury in the local legislature, where Raoul's
arrest was considered as an encroachment on the state's authority.
An order of arrest was issued against Captain Espínola, the officer
who had carried out the commands of the federal executive, and the
jefe, or chief of the state, Juan Barrundia, was authorized to raise
a sufficient force to seize Espínola's person,[V-24] and the pecuniary
contingent of the state for federal expenses was withheld.[V-25]
The troops despatched to arrest Espínola numbered 300 men, and were
commanded by Cayetano de la Cerda, who encountered his man near
Acasaguastlan. To avoid bloodshed, a capitulation was agreed upon
by both parties until they should obtain further orders from their
respective governments.[V-26]
When news of this agreement reached Guatemala, a few days later,
simultaneously rumors came to the ears of Arce that a coup-de-main
was contemplated by Barrundia, with the evident intent of effecting
his removal. To anticipate the blow,[V-27] on the 5th of September
Arce secretly ordered the commander of the federal forces to arrest
Barrundia at an early hour the following morning, and disarm the state
troops, using force if necessary.[V-28] This was done, the officer
meeting with no resistance.[V-29] The liberals had no suspicion of
Arce's resolve till after its execution. The vice-jefe of the state,
Cirilo Flores, then forthwith assumed the government, and being
tendered the aid of federal troops to support his authority, proudly
rejected it.[V-30]
[Sidenote: ARREST OF BARRUNDIA.]
On the following day the chiefs of the other states were apprised of
Barrundia's arrest, in a circular from Arce defending his course, which
he declared to have been pursuant to duty under the constitution.[V-31]
Such was the position assumed by his friends and by the serviles in
general; while the radical liberals, taking a different view, denounced
him as a violator of the constitution.[V-32] However, the energy
thus displayed by Arce was rather favorably looked upon, perhaps
from a feeling of relief arising from the supposition that party
bickerings had been brought to an end, more than from any sympathy
for Arce. The president might now have strengthened his party, but
did not, and went on committing serious mistakes. Instead of turning
the imprisoned Barrundia over to the state assembly, as prescribed
by the constitution, to be tried upon the several charges that had
been ostentatiously preferred against him, he allowed the legal
time for prosecution to elapse, and then released the prisoner under
bonds.[V-33]
The second constitutional congress was to meet on the 1st of October,
1826, and the liberal party had, since September, industriously worked
to secure a majority. But on the appointed day there was no quorum, the
members of the opposition having refused to take their seats, evidently
to prevent the adoption of any measures against the president.[V-34]
It was rather suspicious that the government at San Salvador, always
friendly to Arce, had forbidden its delegates to occupy their seats in
congress unless it were to discuss the expediency of transferring the
federal authorities to some place distant from Guatemala.[V-35] It soon
became apparent that the president's aim was to have his own assembly,
for on the 10th of October he convoked an extraordinary congress.[V-36]
This was open violation of the constitution, which vested in the senate
the authority for convoking, and moreover limited representation to
only one delegate for every 30,000 inhabitants. Much indignation was
felt by the members of congress, who had constituted themselves into an
organizing commission, but dispersed on the same day that Arce's decree
was published.[V-37]
[Sidenote: MURDER OF FLORES.]
Exciting events now followed in quick succession. The vice-jefe Cirilo
Flores and the state authorities had retired on the 8th of October
to Quezaltenango, where he was murdered a few days afterward—on the
13th—by a mob of fanatical Indians.[V-38] The act was attributed
to Arce and his immediate friends, but apparently without much
reason,[V-39] though it must be admitted that intrigues of the servile
party and the preaching of hostile priests aroused the fanaticism of
the populace to such a degree that the slightest cause would bring
about the commission of outrages. The trouble did not end with Flores'
death, for many members of the assembly and representative council were
compelled to flee for their lives.
The state was now powerless, for even its military forces disappeared
before the federal troops. The liberals in the state and republic saw
their hopes dashed, and many emigrated.[V-40] Arce held the executive
authority of both the federation and the state of Guatemala; and acting
upon the advice of Salvador, he began reorganization, decreeing on the
31st of October the election of a new executive and legislature for
Guatemala, from which the inhabitants entertained hopes of a final
restoration of peace throughout the republic. But those hopes were
frustrated by a sudden change of policy on the part of the Salvador
government, which surprised everybody, all the more from the fact that
it had heretofore firmly supported the president.
[Sidenote: ARCE'S VICTORY AND DEFEAT.]
Pedro Molina arrived at San Salvador from Panamá when Arce had in his
charge the affairs of Guatemala, and had decreed the new elections
for the state. Being a political opponent of the president, Molina
refused to go to Guatemala to report the action of the Panamá congress.
It was not a difficult matter for him to find congenial spirits
for an intrigue against the federal executive. An estrangement had
occurred between Arce and Delgado, who aspired to be bishop of San
Salvador,[V-41] and was a man of great political power. Moreover, it
so happened that the jefe of Salvador, owing to ill health, had to
turn over his office to the vice-jefe, Mariano Prado, who was under
the influence of the discontented party. His first act was to repeal
Arce's decree of October 10th convoking an extraordinary congress at
Cojutepeque.[V-42] Then simultaneously forces were levied in Salvador,
ostensibly to protect congress when assembled at Ahuachapan. Internal
difficulties in Honduras led the federal government to interfere;[V-43]
and thus, at the end of 1826, there were a number of forces at work to
drive Arce from the presidential seat. This state of affairs continued
till February 1827, when rumors of an invasion began to circulate in
Guatemala. The next month Salvadoran forces, under Trigueros, started
on their march toward the capital. All doubts about the plans of the
invading army having ceased, Arce displayed unusual activity in his
preparations to meet the enemy. With the aid of the newly chosen jefe
of Guatemala, Aycinena, he increased the garrison to 2,000 men, and
leaving the executive authority in charge of Vice-president Beltranena,
took personal command of the troops. He made an effort, however, to
avert an encounter, but without avail;[V-44] and they fought, a few
days later, at Guadalupe, a short distance from Guatemala, the invaders
being repulsed, and the following day, March 23d, utterly routed at
Arrazola.[V-45] This victory caused great exultation in Guatemala, and
Arce's prestige grew rapidly. Money and reënforcements were cheerfully
placed at his command, and he allowed himself to be carried away by
evil counsels to pursue an aggressive policy and punish Salvador.[V-46]
[Sidenote: CÁSCARAS IN SALVADOR.]
The federal army marched in April into the state of Salvador, and
reënforced from Sonsonate and Santa Ana,[V-47] reached Nejapa without
opposition, that place being about twelve miles from the city of
San Salvador. After certain negotiations for peace, which had no
satisfactory result, Arce attacked the city on the 18th of May, at
the head of 2,000 men, and was repulsed with heavy loss. His slow
movements had given the Salvadorans time to act.[V-48] His retreat
was in good order to Santa Ana; but from this place, desertions
having greatly diminished the force, it degenerated into flight, of
which the pursuing Salvadorans failed to take advantage. Arce reached
Cuajiniquilapa toward the end of May, with only 300 men. This early
failure of a war from which were to flow such great results brought
odium on Arce; but by the efforts of friends, confidence in him was
restored, and about 700 men were obtained to resume operations by
taking Santa Ana.[V-49] For several months no events of importance
occurred. The time was employed by Arce in strengthening his force,
with which he made a fruitless attempt to intercept a Salvador
division that assailed Sonsonate. Overtures for peace were again made
by Salvador, but though not absolutely rejected, no understanding was
arrived at. They gave rise, however, to a discussion as to whether the
federal president was, as he thought himself, authorized to decide upon
the question of peace or war without consulting the state government
of Guatemala.[V-50] Piqued at the opposition he had met, which he
supposed to arise from want of confidence, Arce received with pleasure
a request from Vice-president Beltranena to give up the army and
return to Guatemala and take charge of the government.[V-51] Brigadier
Francisco Cáscaras was thereupon made commander of the army on the
12th of October, 1827. Soon after Arce's return to Guatemala he took
steps to restore peace, and issued, on the 5th of December, a decree to
convoke a new congress,[V-52] and at the same time ordered a suspension
of hostilities. But his commissioner, Juan de Dios Mayorga, who was
to notify the authorities at San Salvador of his measures, was not
allowed to proceed to that city, the Salvadorans, now reënforced with
officers exiled from Colombia,[V-53] being more than ever opposed to
conciliation. Hostilities were resumed and conducted with alternating
success;[V-54] but on the whole, disadvantageously for the federal
force, owing to Cáscaras' lack of strategy, and the temporizing policy
of the enemy; for the latter, whenever pressed, would make overtures of
peace, protesting a willingness to terminate the war, though breaking
their promises as fast as they were made.[V-55] Cáscaras' situation
was daily becoming perilous, on account of the numerous desertions of
his troops. At last, on the 17th of December, a bloody encounter took
place in the streets of Santa Ana, which terminated in a capitulation,
under which both forces were to leave the place the next day. Cáscaras
left it as stipulated, but Colonel Merino with the Salvadorans
remained.[V-56] Cáscaras returned to Guatemala toward the end of
December, the Salvadorans having regained possession of Santa Ana, and
of all the other places formerly occupied by the federal army.
Shortly after, with Aycinena's assistance, another federal army
was organized, but Arce took good care to give positions in it
only to trusted friends.[V-57] As soon as the organization was
nearly completed, detachments were sent to check the enemy's raids
in Chiquimula, and then, under the command of a foreigner named
William Perks, the army marched against the Salvadoran headquarters
at Ahuachapan. Once more stratagem was resorted to by the wily
Salvadorans, who made proffers of peace, the farce ending as
usual.[V-58] In the mean time troubles broke out in the federal army,
and Perks, the commander, was deposed by the field-officers and sent to
Guatemala as a prisoner.[V-59] The command then devolved upon Colonel
Antonio José Irisarri. Arce tried in vain to have Perks reinstalled,
and his efforts in that direction only served to increase the ill
feeling, which grew so strong that on the 14th of February, 1828, he
turned over the executive office, though without a formal resignation,
to Beltranena,[V-60] who conferred the command of the federal army
on Brigadier Manuel Arzú. This officer marched at once against the
Salvadorans, refusing to listen to any overtures for negotiations
from their chief, Merino. The armies met at Chalchuapa on the 1st of
March, and the federal troops obtained a victory, which drove the foe
back to San Salvador.[V-61] Arzú followed and made an assault on that
city, in which both sides gave proofs of extraordinary bravery. The
assault failed; at the end of six hours' fighting the assailants had to
retreat behind their intrenchments.[V-62] From this time San Salvador
and San Miguel became the theatres of war. A series of encounters,
none of sufficient importance to be lengthily described, followed, with
varying success for either side.[V-63] The Salvadorans having besieged
the remnants of the federal army under Colonel Manuel Montúfar, at
Mejicanos, after eight months compelled them to surrender, on the 20th
of September. Their commander and general staff were held as prisoners
of war.[V-64]
[Sidenote: GUATEMALA AND SALVADOR.]
The division of the federal army that occupied the department of San
Miguel, which had been defeated by General Morazan at Gualcho on the
6th of July, being intercepted on its retreat toward the Lempa, laid
down its arms, under honorable terms, at San Antonio, on the 9th of
October.[V-65]
The condition of federal affairs was now far from encouraging. It
may be that Arce, had he been replaced, might have turned disaster;
but his application had met with a refusal, and he took no further
part in the political events of the republic.[V-66] After all hostile
forces had been either captured or expelled from Salvador, Morazan
made a triumphant entry into the state capital on the 23d of October,
1828.[V-67] Shortly before this a commission had come from Costa Rica
to mediate between Guatemala and Salvador, but the latter demanded too
much.[V-68] Morazan's presence in San Salvador greatly strengthened the
warlike party, and the idea of invading Guatemala gained favor from
day to day, till it was finally carried out. After peace overtures
had been rejected by the federal authorities, Morazan began his march
toward Guatemala in the latter end of November 1828.[V-69] The news
struck terror into the hearts of the now defenceless Guatemalans,
and no steps to meet the emergency could be taken, owing to lack of
order, official rivalries, and party intrigues. It was, as a saving
measure, finally decided in the assembly to detach the state from the
federation, though it was never sanctioned or carried out. To increase
difficulties, a revolution broke out in the department of La Antigua,
placing it under the protection of Morazan,[V-70] who, at the head of
about 2,000 men, assuming the title of 'ejército aliado protector de
la ley,' laid siege to the city of Guatemala, assailing it from the
side of the Garita del Golfo, on the 5th of February. He was repulsed
after a brisk fire.[V-71] This was followed on the 15th by a sally of
the garrison, which annihilated at Mixco a considerable portion of the
invading army.[V-72]
[Sidenote: SUCCESS OF MORAZAN.]
In consequence of this reverse, Morazan raised the siege of Guatemala,
and concentrated his forces at La Antigua. The success of Mixco was the
last experienced by the federal army; for with the same neglect which
had characterized its operations almost throughout the whole campaign,
no advantage was taken of the victory, nor of several military errors
of Morazan.[V-73] A strong division under Pacheco sallied out of
Guatemala toward the towns of Zumpango and El Tejar, as if to confine
Morazan in La Antigua; but Pacheco disseminated his force, and was
beaten.[V-74] Early in March Morazan's troops reoccupied Mixco, and
when attacked, shortly afterward,[V-75] by the federal forces at Las
Charcas, signally defeated them, and the fate of the servile party in
Guatemala was thus sealed.[V-76]
Through the mediation of General Verveer, minister from the
Netherlands, an attempt was made to bring peace to the distracted
country. Commissioners representing the several belligerents assembled,
on the 27th of March, at the house of Ballesteros, and discussed the
propositions laid before them, which were rejected, and they then
retired. Morazan, who was anxious for a compromise, specially as
he had good reasons to apprehend the dissolution of his army by the
small-pox epidemic which had broken out, urged Verveer to invite the
commissioners to hold another conference. It took place; and those of
Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua presented four propositions, which
were likewise rejected by the federal and Guatemalan negotiators.[V-77]
Morazan had felt certain that those proposals would be accepted, and
believed them to be exceedingly generous in view of the fact that the
city could no longer hold out. However, hostilities were resumed, and
on the 9th of April the forces under Morazan attacked the city, and a
part of it was taken and plundered.[V-78]
[Sidenote: FALL OF GUATEMALA CITY.]
Aycinena applied on the 11th to Morazan, as commander-in-chief of the
allied army of Honduras and Salvador, for a suspension of hostilities,
in order to negotiate a capitulation which he was disposed to enter
into. Morazan replied at once that he could agree to nothing but the
unconditional surrender of the city, though offering to guarantee the
lives and property of all persons existing therein.[V-79] The fighting
continued, and on the 12th the place capitulated. The occupation was
effected on the following day,[V-80] and immediately Vice-president
Beltranena and his ministers of relations and treasury, Aycinena and
his secretary Piélago, and Ex-president Arce[V-81] were placed under
arrest.[V-82] Morazan, assuming then all the powers of state, restored
Juan Barrundia to the position of jefe of Guatemala,[V-83] whereof he
had been deprived by Arce. The capitulation of April 12th was on the
20th declared void, on the ground that the federal commander had failed
to comply with its terms in not giving up all the arms his forces held
at the time of the surrender.[V-84] Morazan treated the functionaries,
both federal and of the state of Guatemala, who had taken part in the
revolution of 1826 to 1829, with much rigor.[V-85]
* * * * *
[Sidenote: MORAZAN'S MEASURES.]
A period of reaction, or restoration as it was properly called, was now
inaugurated. During several years the servile party had held undisputed
control of public affairs in Guatemala, crushing out all opposition
to the best of its ability. Its policy had been one of intolerance,
and its downfall was hailed with joy. Morazan seemed to have been
chosen by providence to inflict condign punishment on those who had
so cruelly exercised a usurped power. Surrounded as he was by so many
diverse elements, the severity of the blows he dealt must not be all
laid to his account. The state assembly, which had been dissolved in
1826, having again met on the 21st of April, 1829,[V-86] with its old
president, Nicolás Espinosa, was practically a tool in the hands of
the victorious general, and enacted several vigorous laws against the
vanquished party.[V-87] On the 4th of June the assembly passed an act,
which was sanctioned by the consejo representativo on the 12th, and by
Jefe Barrundia on the 13th, declaring null all elections made pursuant
to the unconstitutional decree of the president of the republic
dated October 31, 1826, and the subsequent ones of 1827 and 1828. It
furthermore stamped as revolutionists and usurpers all persons who by
virtue of those decrees had obtained and held office of the federation
or the state of Guatemala, and as such guilty of high treason, and
amenable to the death penalty.[V-88] On the same day was issued a
so-called amnesty law; but the number of exemptions from its benefits
made its name a piece of irony.[V-89] The position of the prisoners
taken in Guatemala at the time of the capture of said city, and others,
became a more complicated one, in consequence of a decree passed by the
assembly of Salvador on the 9th of June, declaring that it would not
recognize in the assembly of Guatemala any authority to grant, without
the assent of the other states, amnesty to the factious disturbers of
public order; and that the capitulation entered into between Morazan
and Aycinena having been annulled, the captives were really prisoners
of war of the allied states.[V-90] A number of the prisoners were,
however, permitted to go into exile within fifteen days, paying
first the expenses of their support while in prison, and one third
of the value of their estates[V-91] into the federal treasury, as
indemnification for the damages they had inflicted on the country. That
privilege was not granted to the president and vice-president and their
ministers, the former chief of Guatemala, and others. In fact, it was
a proscription of all the principal men who had sided with the servile
party.[V-92] It was also decreed that all salaries paid from October
1826 to April 1829 should be refunded. Harsh measures were used to
force a compliance.
The federal congress that was dismissed in October 1826 assembled on
the 22d of June,[V-93] under the presidency of Doroteo Vasconcelos,
and on the 25th José Francisco Barrundia[V-94] assumed the office of
president of the republic, he being the senior senator, and having been
specially called thereto by the congress, though the real power in the
country was Morazan.
[Sidenote: EXPULSION OF FRIARS.]
The chief point of discussion in congress[V-95] was, what to do with
the prisoners. Some members favored their execution, and though others
disapproved of such a disposal of them, none had sufficient courage
to openly condemn such vindictiveness. The discussions continued till
July 9th, when a number of the prisoners were sent under an escort
to Sonsonate, to be embarked at Acajutla and expatriated.[V-96] Two
days later a similar blow was struck at the church, evidently because
of the sympathy of its head men with the servile party.[V-97] During
the night between the 10th and 11th of July, an armed force, acting
under orders of Morazan, who issued them in accordance with the
views of the acting president and the jefe of Guatemala, seized the
archbishop and the friars of several orders, and despatched them to
the Atlantic coast, where they were embarked for Habana. Several of
the friars are represented to have died on the voyage.[V-98] Whether
there was sufficient cause for so violent a proceeding is doubtful.
However, the federal congress thanked the executive for his zeal. The
sentence of expatriation against the archbishop was not formally issued
till about a year after.[V-99] On the 28th of July the assembly of
Guatemala decreed the suppression of all monastic establishments of
men, excepting only the Bethlehemite hospitallers, who were allowed
to remain as secular priests, and prohibited in the nunneries vows
and professions in the future. All the temporalities of the suppressed
convents were declared confiscated to the state. The federal congress
approved this act on the 7th of September, declaring that the nation
would no longer receive or recognize within its territory any religious
orders.[V-100]
Peace being finally restored, the large army of Morazan was gradually
dissolved, and the leader became a candidate for the presidency. The
necessity of an energetic man, such as Morazan was, at the head of
affairs, was quite apparent, for new difficulties were threatening from
different quarters. Costa Rica, disapproving the course of Salvador,
declared her secession from the union, and it was only after much
persuasion that she retracted it. The federal government, and that
of the state of Guatemala, now in charge of Pedro Molina,[V-101]
clashed on several occasions, and specially when, in 1830, the
question of constituting Guatemala city as a federal district again
came upon the tapis. The state rejected the plan, as on every previous
occasion.[V-102] A project of Molina to reform the confederation met
with the same fate. He favored the model of the Swiss republic at that
time, abolishing the expensive machinery of a federal government, which
was almost continually at variance with the different states.[V-103]
The failure of this scheme brought with it the downfall of Molina, who
was afterward suspended on fictitious charges and tried, and though
acquitted, was not reinstated.[V-104]
* * * * *
[Sidenote: SPANISH EFFORTS.]
The plan of King Fernando VII. of Spain for the reconquest of his
former American dominions, and the steps he was taking to accomplish
it, naturally caused a sensation in Central America, where that monarch
would be sure to find elements favorable to his views. The so-called
nobles, who had endeavored, after the downfall of Iturbide and the
separation from Mexico, to establish in Central America an aristocratic
republic, such as that of Genoa or Venice, had been again balked in
their aims by the successes of Morazan. In their disappointment they
turned their eyes to Fernando, and through special agents, as well as
through Archbishop Casaus, made known to the captain-general of Cuba
that the circumstances Central America was then in were most propitious
for the restoration of the royal sway; for, as they asserted, all
honest, right-thinking men and women in the country yearned for it, and
the Indians were likewise anxious for the change. Therefore, the only
opposition thereto lay in the comparatively small number of aspirants
to public offices, who made revolution in order to control the public
funds for their own benefit. Such reports were full of encouragement
for the Spaniards who were intriguing in behalf of Fernando's
interests, which were probably also their own.
Positive information was at last received from a reliable source
that Spain was preparing, in Habana, an expedition to land at Omoa
and march on Guatemala, where it expected to find the requisite
coöperation.[V-105] This report coincided with the departure of
the Spanish expedition under Brigadier Barradas to Tampico.[V-106]
President Barrundia, on the 3d of September, 1829, issued a stirring
address; and the congress, in October and November, with the sanction
of the executive, passed an act forbidding Spaniards to enter or land
in Central American territory under any pretext. The ports of the
republic were closed to the Spanish flag, and to the products and
manufactures of Spain, her colonies, and dependencies.
There were not a few Spaniards who, together with the self-styled
nobles of native birth, desired to see the flag of the old country
waving again over Central America. That anxiously wished for day
had become almost the only subject of conversation in their circles,
of which the assembly of Guatemala took due warning. In November it
declared the sequestration of all property belonging to Spaniards who
dwelt in the republic, coupled with the assurance that none should be
restored till Spain had formally recognized the independence of Central
America.[V-107]